This thesis uses machine learning techniques and text data to investigate the relationships that arise between the Fed and financial markets, and their consequences for asset prices.

The first chapter, entitled Market Expectations and the Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy: An Application to Twitter Data, is an answer to (Greenlaw et al., 2018), who show, by looking at a large set of monetary policy announcements made between November 2008 and December 2017 - FOMC meetings, release of minutes and speeches of the Fed Chair - that long term yields tended to increase following these events. By doing so, the authors challenge common wisdom according to which the central bank intervention in the aftermath of the financial crisis lowered long term rates (Gagnon, 2016). Using machine learning and twitter data, this chapter develops a novel measure of market expectations of monetary policy, and shows that the increase in yields was simply due to a marginal adjustment of market expectations following announcements being less dovish than expected.

The second chapter, entitled Informational Feedback Loop, Monetary Policy Decisions and Asset Prices Dynamics, investigates the consequences of a Fed that uses (1) its own private signal and (2) fed funds futures to take its monetary policy decision. Fed funds futures aggre- gate private information received by financial markets participants - traders - but they also depend on traders' expectations about the Fed's behavior, which makes futures endogenous in the central bank decision. The theoretical model shows that the surprise generated by monetary policy announcements and the subsequent adjustment in short term U.S. treasury yields depend on the precision of the signals received by each agent. When the signal received by traders is more precise than the central bank's, the latter relies more on fed funds futures to take its decision, and the surprise and adjustment of short term yields are smaller. By contrast, long term yields adjust only because the announcement provides traders with new information about the state of the economy, by revealing the central bank's private signal. Finally, when the Fed is averse to financial markets volatility, it tends to put some weight on fed funds futures even if they are not informative about the state of the economy. The empirical part of the paper provides some evidence supporting these channels, by using a topic and tone approach (Hansen and McMahon, 2016) to extract the precision of the signals received by the central bank and traders from FOMC minutes and tweets respectively.