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  4. Passive-Only Key Recovery Attacks on RC4
 
conference paper

Passive-Only Key Recovery Attacks on RC4

Vaudenay, Serge  
•
Vuagnoux, Martin  
2007
Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2007
SAC 2007

We present several weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4 when the secret key contains an initialization vector - a cryptographic scheme typically used by the WEP and WPA protocols to protect IEEE 802.11 wireless communications. First, we show how the previously discovered key recovery attacks can be improved by reducing the dependency between the secret key bytes. Then, we describe two new weaknesses related to the modulo operation of the key scheduling algorithm. Finally, we describe a passive-only attack able to significantly improve the key recovery process on WEP with a data complexity of 215 eavesdropped packets.

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Type
conference paper
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-77360-3_22
Web of Science ID

WOS:000252885500022

Author(s)
Vaudenay, Serge  
Vuagnoux, Martin  
Date Issued

2007

Publisher

Springer

Published in
Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2007
Series title/Series vol.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science; 4876

Start page

344

End page

359

Editorial or Peer reviewed

REVIEWED

Written at

EPFL

EPFL units
LASEC  
Event nameEvent place
SAC 2007

Ottawa, Canada

Available on Infoscience
January 7, 2008
Use this identifier to reference this record
https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/15956
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