A Statistical Attack on RC6

This paper details the attack on RC6 which was announced in a report published in the proceedings of the second AES candidate conference (March 1999). Based on an observation on the RC6 statistics, we show how to distinguish RC6 from a random permutation and to recover the secret extended key for a fair number of rounds.


Published in:
The 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2000, 1978, 64-74
Presented at:
The 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2000, New York, NY, USA, April 10-12, 2000
Year:
2001
Laboratories:




 Record created 2007-01-19, last modified 2018-03-17

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