A Study of Persistent Fault Analysis

Persistent faults mark a new class of injections that perturb lookup tables within block ciphers with the overall goal of recovering the encryption key. Unlike earlier fault types persistent faults remain intact over many encryptions until the affected device is rebooted, thus allowing an adversary to collect a multitude of correct and faulty ciphertexts. It was shown to be an efficient and effective attack against substitution-permutation networks. In this paper, the scope of persistent faults is further broadened and explored. More specifically, we show how to construct a key-recovery attack on generic Feistel schemes in the presence of persistent faults. In a second step, we leverage these faults to reverse-engineer AES- and PRESENT-like ciphers in a chosen-key setting, in which some of the computational layers, like substitution tables, are kept secret. Finally, we propose a novel, dedicated, and low-overhead countermeasure that provides adequate protection for hardware implementations against persistent fault injections.


Publié dans:
[Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering. 9th International Conference, SPACE 2019, Gandhinagar, India, December 3-7, 2019. Proceedings]
Présenté à:
SPACE 2019:9th International Conference on Security, Privacy and Applied Cryptographic Engineering, Gandhinagar, India, December 3 - 7, 2019
Année
2019
Publisher:
Springer
Lien supplémentaire:
Laboratoires:




 Notice créée le 2019-09-30, modifiée le 2019-12-05


Évaluer ce document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Pas encore évalué)