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conference paper

Courtesy As a Means to Coordinate

Danassis, Panayiotis
•
Faltings, Boi
2019
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems

We investigate the problem of multi-agent coordination under rationality constraints. Specifically, role allocation, task assignment, resource allocation, etc. Inspired by human behavior, we propose a framework (CA^3NONY) that enables fast convergence to efficient and fair allocations based on a simple convention of courtesy. We prove that following such convention induces a strategy which constitutes an epsilon-subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated allocation game with discounting. Simulation results highlight the effectiveness of CA^3NONY as compared to state-of-the-art bandit algorithms, since it achieves more than two orders of magnitude faster convergence, higher efficiency, fairness, and average payoff.

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Type
conference paper
Web of Science ID

WOS:000474345000079

Author(s)
Danassis, Panayiotis
Faltings, Boi
Date Issued

2019

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Publisher place

Richland, SC

Published in
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
ISBN of the book

978-1-4503-6309-9

Start page

665

End page

673

Subjects

[learning and adaptation] multiagent learning

•

[economic paradigms] noncooperative games: theory & analysis

•

anti-coordination

URL
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3306127.3331754
Editorial or Peer reviewed

REVIEWED

Written at

EPFL

EPFL units
LIA  
Available on Infoscience
August 14, 2019
Use this identifier to reference this record
https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/159817
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