000256167 001__ 256167
000256167 005__ 20190812210027.0
000256167 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_30$$2doi
000256167 037__ $$aCONF
000256167 245__ $$aFormal Analysis of Distance Bounding with Secure Hardware
000256167 260__ $$c2018-06-10
000256167 269__ $$a2018-06-10
000256167 336__ $$aConference Papers
000256167 520__ $$aA distance bounding (DB) protocol is a two-party authentication protocol between a prover and a verifier which is based on the distance between the prover and the verifier. It aims to defeat threats by malicious provers who try to convince that they are closer to the verifier or adversaries which seek to impersonate a far-away prover. All these threats are covered in several security definitions and it is not possible to have a single definition covering all. In this paper, we describe a new DB model with three parties where the new party is named hardware. In this model, called secure hardware model (SHM), the hardware is held by the prover without being able to tamper with. We define an all-in-one security model which covers all the threats of DB and an appropriate privacy notion for SHM. In the end, we construct the most efficient (in terms of computation by the prover-hardware and number of rounds) and secure DB protocols achieving the optimal security bounds as well as privacy.
000256167 6531_ $$aDistance bounding
000256167 6531_ $$aRFID
000256167 6531_ $$aNFC
000256167 6531_ $$aRelay attack
000256167 6531_ $$aTamper resistance
000256167 6531_ $$aTerrorist fraud
000256167 700__ $$g243751$$aKilinç, Handan$$0248945
000256167 700__ $$0241950$$aVaudenay, Serge$$g131602
000256167 7112_ $$aApplied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS) 2018
000256167 8560_ $$ffatih.balli@epfl.ch
000256167 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/256167/files/model.pdf$$s418663
000256167 909C0 $$xU10433$$pLASEC$$mfatih.balli@epfl.ch$$0252183
000256167 909CO $$qGLOBAL_SET$$pconf$$pIC$$ooai:infoscience.epfl.ch:256167
000256167 960__ $$ahandan.kilinc@epfl.ch
000256167 961__ $$afantin.reichler@epfl.ch
000256167 973__ $$rREVIEWED$$aEPFL
000256167 980__ $$aCONF
000256167 981__ $$aoverwrite