Coevolution of Synchronization and Cooperation in Costly Networked Interactions

Despite the large number of studies on synchronization, the hypothesis that interactions bear a cost for involved individuals has seldom been considered. The introduction of costly interactions leads, instead, to the formulation of a dichotomous scenario in which an individual may decide to cooperate and pay the cost in order to get synchronized with the rest of the population. Alternatively, the same individual can decide to free ride, without incurring any cost, waiting for others to get synchronized to his or her state. Thus, the emergence of synchronization may be seen as the byproduct of an evolutionary game in which individuals decide their behavior according to the benefit-to-cost ratio they accrued in the past. We study the onset of cooperation and synchronization in networked populations of Kuramoto oscillators and report how topology is essential in order for cooperation to thrive. We also display how different classes of topology foster synchronization differently both at microscopic and macroscopic levels.

Published in:
Physical Review Letters, 118, 23, 238301
College Pk, American Physical Society

 Record created 2017-06-12, last modified 2018-01-28

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