Sound Proof of Proximity of Knowledge

Public-key distance bounding schemes are needed to defeat relay attacks in payment systems. So far, only five such schemes exist, but fail to fully protect against malicious provers. In this paper, we solve this problem. We provide a full formalism to define the proof of proximity of knowledge (PoPoK). Protocols should succeed if and only if a prover holding a secret is within the proximity of the verifier. Like proofs of knowledge, these protocols must satisfy completeness, soundness (protection for the honest verifier), and security (protection for the honest prover). We construct ProProx, the very first sound PoPoK.


Presented at:
The 9th International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec 2015), Kanazawa, Japan, November 24-26, 2015
Year:
2015
Laboratories:




 Record created 2016-10-18, last modified 2018-03-17

n/a:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)