Cryptanalysis of reduced-round MIBS Block cipher

This paper presents the first independent and systematic lin- ear, differential and impossible-differential (ID) cryptanalyses of MIBS, a lightweight block cipher aimed at constrained devices such as RFID tags and sensor networks. Our contributions include linear attacks on up to 18-round MIBS, and the first ciphertext-only attacks on 13-round MIBS. Our differential analysis reaches 14 rounds, and our impossible- differential attack reaches 12 rounds. These attacks do not threaten the full 32-round MIBS, but significantly reduce its margin of security by more than 50%. One fact that attracted our attention is the striking similarity of the round function of MIBS with that of the Camellia block cipher. We actually used this fact in our ID attacks. We hope further similarities will help build better attacks for Camellia as well.


Published in:
Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security, 6467, 1-19
Presented at:
The Ninth International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security (CANS), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 12-14, 2010
Year:
2010
Publisher:
Springer
Keywords:
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 Record created 2010-12-20, last modified 2018-09-25

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