Mutual fund portfolio choice in the presence of dynamic ﬂows
We analyze the implications of dynamic flows on a mutual fund's portfolio decisions. In our model, myopic investors dynamically allocate capital between a riskless asset and an actively managed fund which charges fraction-of-fund fees. The presence of dynamic flows induces "flow hedging" portfolio distortions on the part of the fund, even though investors are myopic. Our model predicts a positive relationship between a fund's proportional fee rate and its volatility. This is a consequence of higher-fee funds holding more extreme equity positions. Although both the fund portfolio and investors' trading strategies depend on the proportional fee rate, the equilibrium value functions do not. Finally, we show that our results hold even if investors are allowed to directly trade some of the risky securities.
Keywords: mutual funds ; delegated portfolio management ; incomplete markets ; continuous time stochastic game ; BSDEs ; Management Contracts ; Utility Maximization ; Costly Information ; Performance ; Markets ; Returns ; Compensation ; Incentives ; Efficiency
Record created on 2009-10-12, modified on 2016-08-08