Bidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities

We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has a general, strictly monotonic utility functions u_{i,j}(p_j) expressing her utility of being matched to item j at price p_j . For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and non-continuous. Furthermore, we give an algorithm to find such a solution. Although the running time of this algorithm is exponential in the number of items, it is polynomial in the number of bidders.


Editor(s):
Leonardi, Stefano
Published in:
Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics, 575-582
Presented at:
5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics (WINE), Rome, December 14-18, 2009
Year:
2009
Publisher:
Berlin, Springer
Keywords:
Laboratories:


Note: The status of this file is: Involved Laboratories Only


 Record created 2009-10-12, last modified 2018-09-13

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