000125931 001__ 125931
000125931 005__ 20190316234318.0
000125931 02470 $$2ISI$$a000267057800018
000125931 037__ $$aCONF
000125931 245__ $$aRevocation Games in Ephemeral Networks
000125931 260__ $$c2008
000125931 269__ $$a2008
000125931 336__ $$aConference Papers
000125931 520__ $$aA frequently proposed solution to node misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks is to use reputation systems. But in ephemeral networks - a new breed of mobile networks where contact times between nodes are short and neighbors change frequently - reputations are hard to build. In this case, local revocation is a faster and more efficient alternative. In this paper, we define a game-theoretic model to analyze the various local revocation strategies. We establish and prove the conditions leading to subgame- perfect equilibria. We also derive the optimal parameters for voting-based schemes. Then we design a protocol based on our analysis and the practical aspects that cannot be captured in the model. With realistic simulations on ephemeral networks we compare the performance and economic costs of the different techniques.
000125931 6531_ $$aEphemeral networks
000125931 6531_ $$aGame theory
000125931 6531_ $$aRevocation
000125931 6531_ $$aNCCR-MICS
000125931 6531_ $$aNCCR-MICS/CL3
000125931 700__ $$aRaya, Maxim
000125931 700__ $$0243767$$g172513$$aManshaei, Mohammad Hossein
000125931 700__ $$0240438$$g149568$$aFelegyhazi, Mark
000125931 700__ $$0240456$$g105427$$aHubaux, Jean-Pierre
000125931 7112_ $$dOctober 27-31, 2008$$cAlexandria, VA, USA$$aACM CCS 2008
000125931 773__ $$tACM CCS
000125931 8564_ $$uhttp://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2008/$$zURL
000125931 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/125931/files/Revocation%20Games.ppt$$zn/a$$s2930688
000125931 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/125931/files/ccs34-raya.pdf$$zn/a$$s583839
000125931 909C0 $$xUS00024$$0252614$$pLCA
000125931 909C0 $$pLCA1$$xU10426$$0252452
000125931 909CO $$qGLOBAL_SET$$pconf$$pIC$$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:125931
000125931 937__ $$aLCA-CONF-2008-068
000125931 973__ $$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000125931 980__ $$aCONF