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  4. Payoff-Based Approach to Learning Nash Equilibria in Convex Games * *This research is partially supported by M. Kamgarpour’s European Union ERC Starting Grant, CONENE.
 
research article

Payoff-Based Approach to Learning Nash Equilibria in Convex Games * *This research is partially supported by M. Kamgarpour’s European Union ERC Starting Grant, CONENE.

Tatarenko, T.
•
Kamgarpour, Maryam  
July 2017
IFAC-PapersOnLine

We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents’ actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents’ cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed payoff-based algorithm to learn Nash equilibria in the game between agents. Each agent uses only information about its current cost value to compute its next action. We prove convergence of the proposed algorithm to a Nash equilibrium in the game leveraging established results on stochastic processes. The performance of the algorithm is analyzed with a numerical case study.

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Type
research article
DOI
10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.300
Author(s)
Tatarenko, T.
Kamgarpour, Maryam  
Date Issued

2017-07

Published in
IFAC-PapersOnLine
Volume

50

Issue

1

Start page

1508

End page

1513

Editorial or Peer reviewed

REVIEWED

Written at

OTHER

EPFL units
SYCAMORE  
Available on Infoscience
December 1, 2021
Use this identifier to reference this record
https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/183357
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