Babonneau, FredericBahn, OlivierHaurie, AlainVielle, Marc2020-11-072020-11-072020-11-07202110.1007/s10666-020-09734-6https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/173096WOS:000581523800001In this paper, we propose a simple oligopoly game model to represent the interactions between coalitions of countries in deploying carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies in a steady-state net-zero emission climate regime that could take place by the end of the twenty-first century. The emission quotas and CDR activities obtained in the solution of this steady-state model could then be used as a target for end-of-period conditions in a dynamic integrated assessment analysis studying the transition to 2100. More precisely, we analyze a steady-state situation where m coalitions exist and behave as m players in a game of supplying emission rights on an international emission trading system. The quotas supplied by a coalition must correspond to the amount of CO2 captured through CDR activities in the corresponding world region. We use an extension of the computable general equilibrium model GEMINI-E3 to calibrate the payoff functions and compute an equilibrium solution in the noncooperative game.Environmental SciencesEnvironmental Sciences & Ecologycarbon dioxide removalclimate changeintegrated assessmentmitigationnegative emissionssteady-state gamegeneral equilibrium-modelcarbon capturestorageco2energytext::journal::journal article::research article