Phan, Raphael C.-W.Choo, Kim-Kwang RaymondHeng, Swee-Huay2007-12-172007-12-172007-12-17200710.1007/978-3-540-75670-5_11https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/15821WOS:000251784900011We revisit Shin et al.’s leakage-resilient password-based authenticated key establishment protocol (LR-AKEP) and the security model used to prove the security of LR-AKEP. By refining the Leak oracle in the security model, we show that LR-AKE (1) can, in fact, achieve a stronger notion of leakage-resilience than initially claimed and (2) also achieve an additional feature of traceability, not previously mentioned.text::conference output::conference proceedings::conference paper