Kong, FookKuhn, DanielRustem, Berç2014-01-292014-01-292014-01-29201110.3182/20110828-6-IT-1002.02982https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/100231The set of correlated equilibria is convex and contains all Nash equilibria as special cases. Thus, the social welfare-maximizing correlated equilibrium is amenable to convex analysis and offers social welfare that is at least as good as the game s best performing Nash equilibria.We employ robust semidefinite programming (SDP) for computing the social welfare-maximizing correlated equilibria in static polynomial games, giving rise to a dedicated sequential SDP algorithm, the first of this type that can cope with multivariate strategy sets. We apply this algorithm to a wireless communication problem, where two mutually-interfering transmitters and receivers maximize their channel capacities.Control over communicationControl of networksMulti-agent systemstext::conference output::conference proceedings::conference paper