Dütting, PaulHenzinger, Monika R.Weber, Ingmar2009-10-122009-10-122009-10-12200910.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_58https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/43592WOS:000278097500058We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has a general, strictly monotonic utility functions u_{i,j}(p_j) expressing her utility of being matched to item j at price p_j . For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and non-continuous. Furthermore, we give an algorithm to find such a solution. Although the running time of this algorithm is exponential in the number of items, it is polynomial in the number of bidders.bidder optimalitygeneral utilitiesstable matchingtruthful mechanismsponsored searchtext::conference output::conference proceedings::conference paper