Tatarenko, TatianaKamgarpour, Maryam2021-12-012021-12-012021-12-012019-0410.1109/TAC.2018.2841319https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/183332We consider multiagent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we propose a novel distributed payoff-based algorithm, where each agent uses information only about its cost value and the constraint value with its associated dual multiplier. We prove convergence of this algorithm to a Nash equilibrium, under the assumption that the game admits a strictly convex potential function. In the absence of coupling constraints, we prove convergence to Nash equilibria under significantly weaker assumptions, not requiring a potential function. Namely, strict monotonicity of the game mapping is sufficient for convergence. We also derive the convergence rate of the algorithm for strongly monotone game maps.text::journal::journal article::research article