Igier, MathildeVaudenay, Serge2016-12-212016-12-212016-12-21201610.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_48https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/132146WOS:000389953600048Distance Bounding (DB) is designed to mitigate relay attacks. This paper provides a complete study of the DB protocol of Kleber et al. based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We contradict the claim that it resists to Terrorist Fraud (TF). We propose some slight modifications to increase the security of the protocol and formally prove TF-resistance, as well as resistance to Distance Fraud (DF), and Man-In-the-Middle attacks (MiM) which include relay attacks.Distance boundingcryptographytext::conference output::conference proceedings::conference paper