Elokda, EzzatCendese, CarloZhang, KenanCensi, AndreaLygeros, JohnFrazzoli, Emilio2023-11-302023-11-302023-11-30202310.1109/MED59994.2023.10185731https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/202429A popular remedy for the morning commute bottleneck congestion is to split the highway capacity into a managed lane that is kept in free-flow and a general purpose lane that is subject to congestion. A classical theoretical result is that the more capacity is allocated to the managed lane the less the resulting congestion. However, existing approaches to restrict access to the managed lane are primarily monetary, e.g., tolls, which severely limits the public willingness to accept them due to equity concerns. Following up on recent work which introduces karma as a completely non-monetary credit used to control access to a so-called Karma Priority (KP) lane, we first review the strategic problem of the commuters which is modeled as a dynamic population game. We then numerically investigate the effect of varying the KP lane capacity. The karma scheme is equitable with respect to different income classes irrespective of the capacity split, meanwhile achieving near-optimal traffic reduction. Thus, managing a larger fraction of the bottleneck could be more socially feasible under a karma scheme than a monetary scheme.Road transportationLimitingCostsAutomationNumerical analysisComputational modelingSociologytext::conference output::conference paper not in proceedings