ACMChatel, SylvainKnabenhans, ChristianPyrgelis, ApostolosTroncoso, CarmelaHubaux, Jean-Pierre2024-03-182024-03-182024-03-182023-01-0110.1145/3576915.3624403https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/206296WOS:001124987203036Homomorphic encryption has become a promising solution for protecting the privacy of computations on sensitive data. However, existing homomorphic encryption pipelines do not guarantee the correctness of the computation result in the presence of a malicious adversary. In this poster, we present two encodings compatible with state-of-the-art fully homomorphic encryption schemes that enable practical client-verification of homomorphic computations, while enabling all the operations required for modern privacy-preserving analytics. Based on these encodings, we introduce a ready-to-use library for the verification of any homomorphic operation executed over encrypted data. We demonstrate its practicality for various applications and, in particular, we show that it enables verifiability of some homomorphic analytics with less than 3x overhead compared to the homomorphic encryption baseline.TechnologyHomomorphic EncryptionMalicious AdversariesVerifiable Computationtext::conference output::conference proceedings::conference paper