Radanovic, GoranFaltings, Boi2016-02-092016-02-092016-02-09201410.1609/aaai.v28i1.8797https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/123340We consider settings where a collective intelligence is formed by aggregating information contributed from many independent agents, such as product reviews, community sensing, or opinion polls. We propose a novel mechanism that elicits both private signals and beliefs. The mechanism extends the previous versions of the Bayesian Truth Serum (the original BTS, the RBTS, and the multi-valued BTS), by allowing small populations and non-binary private signals, while not requiring additional assumptions on the belief updating process. For priors that are sufficiently smooth, such as Gaussians, the mechanism allows signals to be continuous.ml-aiIncentives for Truthful Information Elicitation of Continuous Signalstext::conference output::conference proceedings::conference paper