Borghetti, A.Silvestro, F.Massucco, S.Meini, L.Nucci, C. A.Paolone, M.2012-05-012012-05-012012-05-01200510.1109/PTC.2005.45247262-s2.0-51549092527https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/79925The paper focuses on bidding selection mechanisms based both on offer price and electricity-quantity strategies. The aim of the paper is to present a procedure that allows the use of both game theory and of detailed cost-based unit-commitment computer codes. The procedure is conceived in a way to be as much as possible independent of the specific market rules. The results of a preliminary analysis are shown, concerning simple test cases that incorporate some distinctive characteristics of electricity markets and power plants.Bidding strategiesElectricity marketGame theoryUnit commitmentElectric power plantsElectricityElectricity auctionsPower plantsepfl-smartgridstext::conference output::conference proceedings::conference paper