New Attacks against Reduced-Round Versions of IDEA

In this paper, we describe a sequence of simple, yet e cient chosen-plaintext (or chosen-ciphertext) attacks against reduced-round versions of IDEA (with 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, and 4 rounds) which compare favourably with the best known attacks: some of them decrease considerably the time complexity given the same order of data at disposal while other ones decrease the amount of necessary known- or chosen-plaintext pairs under comparable time complexities. Additionally, we show how to trade time and memory for some of the known-plaintext attacks of Nakahara et al.


Published in:
Fast Software Encryption: 12th International Workshop, FSE 2005, 3557, 384-397
Presented at:
Fast Software Encryption: 12th International Workshop, FSE 2005, Paris, France, February 21-23, 2005
Year:
2005
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 Record created 2007-01-19, last modified 2018-03-17

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