000099451 001__ 99451
000099451 005__ 20190205040425.0
000099451 037__ $$aREP_WORK
000099451 245__ $$aReducing Fair Exchange to Atomic Commit
000099451 269__ $$a2004
000099451 260__ $$c2004
000099451 336__ $$aReports
000099451 520__ $$aThe fair exchange problem is key to trading electronic items in systems of mutually untrusted parties.We consider modern variants of such systems where each party is equipped with a tamper proof security module. The security modules trust each other but can only communicate by exchanging messages through their host parties. These are untrusted and could intercept and drop those messages. We show that the fair exchange problem at the level of untrusted parties can be reduced to an atomic commit problem at the level of trusted security modules. This reduction o ers a new perspective with which fair exchange protocols can be designed. In particular, we present a new atomic commit protocol, called Monte Carlo NBAC, which helps build a new and practical fair exchange solution. The exchange does always terminate and no party commits the exchange with the wrong items. Furthermore, there is an upper bound on the the probability that the exchange ends up being unfair, and this bound is out of the control of the untrusted parties.
000099451 6531_ $$aNCCR-MICS
000099451 6531_ $$aNCCR-MICS/CL3
000099451 700__ $$0240944$$aAvoine, Gildas$$g149622
000099451 700__ $$0240335$$aGuerraoui, Rachid$$g105326
000099451 700__ $$aKursawe, Klaus
000099451 700__ $$0241950$$aVaudenay, Serge$$g131602
000099451 700__ $$aVukolic, Marko
000099451 8564_ $$s177818$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/99451/files/IC_TECH_REPORT_200411.pdf$$zn/a
000099451 909C0 $$0252183$$pLASEC$$xU10433
000099451 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:99451$$pIC$$preport$$qGLOBAL_SET
000099451 937__ $$aLASEC-REPORT-2007-001
000099451 973__ $$aEPFL$$sPUBLISHED
000099451 980__ $$aREPORT