Cryptanalysis of Bluetooth Keystream Generator Two-level E0

• Presented at: The 10th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Advances in Cryptology, ASIACRYPT 2004, Jeju Island, South Korea, December 5-9, 2004
• Published in: The 10th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Advances in Cryptology, ASIACRYPT 2004, vol. 3329, p. 483-499
• Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Publication date: 2005

In this paper, we carefully study both distinguishing and key-recovery attacks against Bluetooth two-level EO given many short frames. Based on a flaw in the resynchronization of Bluetooth EO, we are able to fully exploit the largest bias of the finite state machine inside EO for our attacks. Our key-recovery attack works with 2⁴⁰ simple operations given the first 24 bits of 2³⁵ frames. Compared with all existing attacks against two-level EO, this is the best one so far

Keywords: NCCR-MICS ; NCCR-MICS/CL3

Reference

• LASEC-CONF-2005-003
• View record in Web of Science
• URL: http://www.springer.com/

Record created on 2007-01-18, modified on 2017-05-12