000054297 001__ 54297
000054297 005__ 20190416220412.0
000054297 037__ $$aREP_WORK
000054297 245__ $$aRadio Frequency Identification: Adversary Model and Attacks on Existing Protocols
000054297 269__ $$a2005
000054297 260__ $$c2005
000054297 336__ $$aReports
000054297 520__ $$aRadio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems aim to identify objects in open environments with neither physical nor visual contact. They consist of transponders inserted into objects, of readers, and usually of a database which contains information about the objects. The key point is that authorised readers must be able to identify tags without an adversary being able to trace them. Traceability is often underestimated by advocates of the technology and sometimes exaggerated by its detractors. Whatever the true picture, this problem is a reality when it blocks the deployment of this technology and some companies, faced with being boycotted, have already abandoned its use. Using cryptographic primitives to thwart the traceability issues is an approach which has been explored for several years. However, the research carried out up to now has not provided satisfactory results as no universal formalism has been defined. In this paper, we propose an adversary model suitable for RFID environments. We define the notions of existential and universal untraceability and we model the access to the communication channels from a set of oracles. We show that our formalisation fits the problem being considered and allows a formal analysis of the protocols in terms of traceability. We use our model on several well-known RFID protocols and we show that most of them have weaknesses and are vulnerable to traceability.
000054297 6531_ $$aRFID
000054297 6531_ $$aAdversary Model
000054297 6531_ $$aPrivacy
000054297 6531_ $$aUntraceability
000054297 6531_ $$aCryptanalysis
000054297 700__ $$0240944$$aAvoine, Gildas$$g149622
000054297 8564_ $$s240339$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/54297/files/model.pdf$$zn/a
000054297 909C0 $$0252183$$pLASEC$$xU10433
000054297 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:54297$$pIC$$preport$$qGLOBAL_SET
000054297 937__ $$aLASEC-REPORT-2005-001
000054297 973__ $$aEPFL$$sPUBLISHED
000054297 980__ $$aREPORT