000052526 001__ 52526
000052526 005__ 20190316233449.0
000052526 037__ $$aREP_WORK
000052526 245__ $$aByzantine Failures and Security: Arbitrary is not (always) Random
000052526 269__ $$a2003
000052526 260__ $$c2003
000052526 336__ $$aReports
000052526 520__ $$aThe Byzantine failure model allows arbitrary behavior of a certain fraction of network nodes in a distributed system. It was introduced to model and analyse the effects of very severe hardware faults in aircraft control systems. Lately, the Byzantine failure model has been used in the area of network security where Byzantine-tolerance is equated with resilience against malicious attackers. We discuss two reasons why one should be careful in doing so. Firstly, Byzantine-tolerance is not concerned with secrecy and so special means have to be employed if secrecy is a desired system property. Secondly, in contrast to the domain of hardware faults, in a security setting it is difficult to compute the assumption coverage of the Byzantine failure model, i.e., the probability that the failure assumption holds in practice. For this latter point we develop a methodology which allows to estimate the reliability of a Byzantine-tolerant solution exposed to attackers of different strengths.
000052526 6531_ $$afault-tolerance
000052526 6531_ $$asecurity
000052526 6531_ $$acoverage
000052526 6531_ $$areliability
000052526 6531_ $$aattacker models
000052526 700__ $$aGaertner, Felix C.
000052526 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/52526/files/IC_TECH_REPORT_200320.pdf$$zn/a$$s829803
000052526 909C0 $$xU10407$$0252114$$pDCL
000052526 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:52526$$qGLOBAL_SET$$pIC$$preport
000052526 937__ $$aLPD-REPORT-2003-009
000052526 970__ $$a200320/IC
000052526 973__ $$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000052526 980__ $$aREPORT