A Formal Analysis of Syverson`s Rational Exchange Protocol
Buttyan, Levente; Hubaux, Jean-Pierre; Capkun, Srdjan
2002

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Abstract

In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of a rational exchange protocol proposed by Syverson. A rational exchange protocol guarantees that misbehavior cannot generate benefits, and is therefore discouraged. The analysis is performed using our formal model, which is based on game theory. In this model, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium.

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Title A Formal Analysis of Syverson`s Rational Exchange Protocol
Author(s) Buttyan, Levente ; Hubaux, Jean-Pierre ; Capkun, Srdjan
Published in IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
Pages 181
Conference IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada
Date 2002
Keywords
DOI https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021816
Other identifier(s) View record in Web of Science
Laboratories LCA
LDS
Record Appears in Scientific production and competences > I&C - School of Computer and Communication Sciences > IC Archives > LCA - Laboratory for Computer Communications and Applications
Scientific production and competences > I&C - School of Computer and Communication Sciences > MICS - Mobile Information & Communication Systems
Scientific production and competences > MICS - Mobile Information & Communication Systems
Conference Papers
Work produced at EPFL
Published
Record creation date 2004-08-31

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