STATISTICAL CRYPTANALYSIS OF BLOCK CIPHERS

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to Mimi and Chloé
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Abstract

Since the development of cryptology in the industrial and academic worlds in the seventies, public knowledge and expertise have grown in a tremendous way, notably because of the increasing, nowadays almost ubiquitous, presence of electronic communication means in our lives. Block ciphers are inevitable building blocks of the security of various electronic systems. Recently, many advances have been published in the field of public-key cryptography, being in the understanding of involved security models or in the mathematical security proofs applied to precise cryptosystems. Unfortunately, this is still not the case in the world of symmetric-key cryptography and the current state of knowledge is far from reaching such a goal. However, block and stream ciphers tend to counterbalance this lack of “provable security” by other advantages, like high data throughput and ease of implementation.

In the first part of this thesis, we would like to add a (small) stone to the wall of provable security of block ciphers with the (theoretical and experimental) statistical analysis of the mechanisms behind Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis as well as more abstract models of attacks. For this purpose, we consider the underlying problem as a statistical hypothesis testing problem and we make a heavy use of the Neyman-Pearson paradigm. Then, we generalize the concept of linear distinguisher and we discuss the power of such a generalization. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of sequential distinguisher, based on sequential sampling, and of aggregate distinguishers, which allows to build sub-optimal but efficient distinguishers. Finally, we propose new attacks against reduced-round version of the block cipher IDEA.

In the second part, we propose the design of a new family of block ciphers named FOX. First, we study the efficiency of optimal diffusive components when implemented on low-cost architectures, and we present several new constructions of MDS matrices; then, we precisely describe FOX and we discuss its security regarding linear and differential cryptanalysis, integral attacks, and algebraic attacks. Finally, various implementation issues are considered.
Résumé

Depuis le développement de la cryptologie dans les mondes industriel et académique, les connaissances et l’expertise publique ont cru de manière soutenue, notamment en raison de l’omniprésence des moyens de communication électronique dans la vie de tous les jours. Les algorithmes de chiffrement par blocs sont ainsi des briques de base incontournables de la sécurité de nombreux systèmes. Récemment, de nombreuses avancées ont été publiées dans le domaine de la cryptographie à clé publique, que ce soit dans la compréhension des modèles de sécurité en jeu, ou dans les preuves mathématiques de sécurité appliquées à des systèmes bien précis. Malheureusement, le monde de la cryptographie symétrique reste clairement en retrait, bien que la situation évolue lentement. Les algorithmes de chiffrement par blocs, ou par flot, tendent ainsi à compenser leur manque de “sécurité prouvée” par d’autres atouts, tels qu’un débit de chiffrement élevé et une certaine facilité d’implantation.

Dans la première moitié de cette thèse, nous tentons d’ajouter une (modeste) brique à l’édifice de la sécurité prouvée des algorithmes de chiffrement par blocs en analysant (théoriquement et expérimentalement) les mécanismes statistiques sous-jacents à la cryptanalyse linéaire de Matsui ainsi qu’à des modèles d’attaques plus abstraits. Pour atteindre ce but, nous interprétons le problème comme un test d’hypothèses statistiques en utilisant notamment le paradigme de Neyman-Pearson. Nous généralisons ensuite le concept de distinguéur linéaire et nous en discutons la puissance. Nous introduisons également le concept de distinguéur séquentiel, basé sur l’échantillonnage séquentiel, ainsi que celui de distinguéur à agrégats, qui permet de construire des distinguéurs certes sub-optimaux, mais néanmoins efficaces. Finalement, nous proposons une série de nouvelles attaques contre des versions réduites de l’algorithme IDEA.

Dans la seconde moitié, nous proposons une nouvelle famille d’algorithmes de chiffrement par blocs, baptisée FOX. Pour cela, nous étudions sur des architectures à bas coût l’efficacité de composants de diffusion optimaux, et nous proposons plusieurs nouvelles constructions de matrices MDS. Enfin, nous décrivons précisément FOX, nous étudions sa sécurité vis-à-vis des attaques linéaires, différentielles, intégrales et algébriques, et nous discutons finalement les aspects liés à son implantation.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Since the appearance of cryptology in the industrial and academic worlds in the seventies, public knowledge and expertise in this fascinating scientific domain have grown in a tremendous way, notably because of the increasing, nowadays almost ubiquitous, presence of electronic communications means in our lives.

Interestingly, we note that the scientific development of cryptology has followed different paths: for instance, “provable secure” public-key cryptosystems, i.e. cryptographic algorithms for which the security can be mathematically proved as difficult as a well-known (supposedly hard to solve) computational problem, exist since a few years, and the involved models of security have been seriously studied and are nowadays well understood. Unfortunately, this is still not the case in the world of symmetric-key cryptography, where algorithms are widely deployed in many applications (being in the civilian life or for military purposes), and the current state of knowledge is far from reaching such a goal. Block and stream ciphers tend to counterbalance this lack of “provable security” by other advantages, like high data throughput and ease of implementation, and it is not astonishing that practical solutions involve both public-key and symmetric worlds, exploiting their advantages in parallel.

During the last 30 years, the academic research on the security of block ciphers has evolved from an empirical way to solve the problem of designing a secure algorithm to an heuristic one, where a list of well-established and well-understood security properties that a block cipher must fulfill in order to be secure is available. But ultimately (and unfortunately), the experience and the feelings of the designers often matter more for which concerns the (good or bad) quality of the result, and more importantly, the perceived security of a block cipher is still heavily dependent of the talent, the intuition, and the time at disposal of the people attempting at breaking it!

Finally, we note that the gap between the present state of knowledge
and real, practical provable security for block ciphers tends to fill only very slowly, mainly because of the rather slow pace of the research.

**Thesis Outline and Contributions**

The goals of the thesis are twofold: on the one hand, we aim at adding a (small) stone to the wall of provable security of block ciphers with the statistical analysis of the mechanisms behind Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis. On the other hand, we present the design of a new family of block ciphers named FOX developed on behalf of the company MediaCrypt AG [218]. This thesis is organized as follows:

- The chapter §2 is devoted to the description of the current (publicly available) knowledge about block ciphers. After having reviewed some terminology in §2.1, we describe in §2.2 the three block ciphers having the most significant practical impact at the time of writing, namely the former American standard, DES, and the current one, AES, as well as IDEA, and we discuss their security. In the same section, we briefly address the classical modes of operation of block ciphers. Then, in §2.3, we focus on the known attacks developed to break block ciphers; we successively discuss black-box, statistical, algebraic as well as more “exotic” attacks. Finally, we describe in §2.4 three models of security, namely Shannon’s perfect security, (time- or memory-) bounded adversaries, and ad-hoc proofs of security.

- Chapter §3 begins by recalling the statistical tests framework due to Neyman and Pearson in §3.1, since we make heavy use of it in the subsequent sections. In §3.2, we present a new analysis of Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis against DES, we discuss its optimality, we show that it can be improved using an optimal key-ranking procedure, and we finally present some experimental results issued from the implementation of both the original and the improved versions. Then, in §3.3, we study the statistical modelization of generic distinguishers, and we derive the precise description of optimal linear and differential distinguishers and we analyze their performances; furthermore, we introduce and discuss the concepts of generalized linear distinguishers, of aggregate distinguishers, and of sequential distinguishers. Finally, in §3.4, we present some new attacks on reduced-round versions of IDEA.

- While the chapter §3 was undoubtedly oriented towards the cryptanalysis of block ciphers, the chapter §4 is more (but not completely) dedicated to the design of block ciphers. In §4.1, we review different strategies commonly used to design block ciphers and we discuss their advantages as well as their drawbacks. In §4.2, we focus on the design
of fast diffusive components, and we present several new constructions. Last but not least, the FOX family of block ciphers is described in §4.3, as well as first attempts to break it, a discussion of its security, and implementation issues.

Our contributions can be summarized as follows:

- A new statistical modelization of three variants of Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis has been proposed and their theoretical success probability has been computed.

- The concept of “optimal key-ranking procedure” has been formally defined, allowing the optimization of Matsui’s attack against DES.

- Matsui’s attack against DES, as well as our improved version, have been implemented on conventional PCs and run 21 times.

- The shape of optimal computationally unbounded distinguishers between two binary random sources has been proposed, as well as tight bounds on their advantage. These results have been applied to conventional linear and differential distinguishers.

- The concept of “generalized linear distinguisher” has been proposed, as well as the computation of their power.

- The concept of “aggregate distinguishers” has been proposed and their benefits have been discussed.

- The concept of “sequential distinguishers”, based on sequential sampling, have been proposed and they have been shown, given a fixed advantage, to be optimal with respects to the number of required samples.

- New linear-like attacks against reduced-round versions of the block cipher IDEA have been demonstrated.

- A study of fast diffusive components for block ciphers has been done, and several new constructions have been proposed.

- The design of a new family of block ciphers named FOX has been proposed, as well as first attempts to break it, a discussion of its resistance towards several attacks, and a discussion of implementation issues.

Most of the results described in this thesis have been published: a paper [144] describing the statistical modelization of Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis, as well as experimental results derived from its implementation has been presented at Selected Areas in Cryptography in 2001. The description of optimal linear and differential distinguishers, obtained by considering the
task of a distinguisher as a statistical hypothesis test, the application of Chernoff bounds derived in §3.3.2, and the discussion of sequential distinguishers have been published in a paper [145] presented at EUROCRYPT 2003. Optimal key-ranking procedures and their application to the linear cryptanalysis of DES have been published in a paper [149] co-written with Serge Vaudenay and presented at FAST SOFTWARE ENCRYPTION in 2003. The FOX family of block ciphers, which is a joint work with Serge Vaudenay, has been the subject of a paper [150] presented at SELECTED AREAS IN CRYPTOGRAPHY in 2004 and has been the subject of two European patent applications [146,148]; the complete specifications of the ciphers have been published as an EPFL technical report [147] and an updated and corrected version is available in another technical report [151]. The work about fast diffusive components, which is a joint work with Serge Vaudenay as well, is the subject of another paper [152] presented at SELECTED AREAS IN CRYPTOGRAPHY in 2004, too. The notion of generalized linear distinguishers, obtained in close collaboration with Thomas Baignères and Serge Vaudenay, has been published in [14] and presented at ASIACRYPT 2004. Finally, the new attacks against reduced round version of IDEA are described in a paper which follows, at the time of writing, the submission process.
A Brief Overview of Block Ciphers

This chapter aims at offering a wide, although inevitably not exhaustive, overview of the world of block ciphers. It is organized as follows: §2.1 defines the terminology as well as basic concepts necessary to the good understanding of this thesis; then, §2.2 presents and describes in details three block ciphers which are probably the most important and the most widely disseminated ones nowadays, namely DES, IDEA, and AES. The part §2.3 focuses on the presentation of the current state-of-the-art in the domain of cryptanalysis of block ciphers, and §2.4 treats different kinds of security proofs applied to block ciphers.

2.1 Terminology

2.1.1 Basic Definitions

Roughly expressed, a symmetric-key block cipher is a cryptographic system whose principal aim is to guarantee the confidentiality of data. Mao [198] gives the following definition of a cryptographic system.

Definition 2.1.1 (Cryptographic system). A cryptographic system consists of the following:

- a plaintext message space $\mathcal{P}$ which is a set of strings over some alphabet;
- a ciphertext message space $\mathcal{C}$ which is set of possible ciphertext messages;
- an encryption key space $\mathcal{K}$ which is the set of possible encryption keys, and a decryption key space $\mathcal{K}'$ which is the set of possible decryption keys;
- an efficient key generation algorithm: $\gamma : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{K}'$;
- an efficient encryption algorithm: \( \varepsilon : \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{C} \);

- an efficient decryption algorithm: \( \varepsilon' : \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{K}' \rightarrow \mathcal{P} \).

For a security parameter \( 1^\ell \), the key generation algorithm outputs a key pair \((k, k') \in \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{K}'\) of length \( \ell \). For \( k \in \mathcal{K} \) and \( p \in \mathcal{P} \), we denote by

\[ c = \varepsilon_k(p) \]

the encryption operation and by

\[ p = \varepsilon'_{k'}(c) \]

the decryption operation. It is furthermore necessary that for all \( m \in \mathcal{M} \) and all \( k \in \mathcal{K} \), there exists \( k' \in \mathcal{K}' \) such that

\[ \varepsilon'_{k'}(\varepsilon_k(p)) = p \]

A block cipher can be seen in a simple way as a deterministic, memoryless, invertible function mapping an \( n \)-bit plaintext block \( p \in \{0, 1\}^n \) to an \( n \)-bit ciphertext block \( c \in \{0, 1\}^n \); furthermore, this function is parametered by a single \( \ell \)-bit secret key \( k \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \); in other words, and using the terminology of Def. 2.1.1, \( \varepsilon = \varepsilon' \), \( \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{K}' \), and \( k = k' \). The notion of symmetry in block ciphers comes hence from the fact that the same key is used for both encryption and decryption operations; the opposed notion is the asymmetric or public-key cryptography \([91,92]\) which uses different, related keys for both operations.

In order that a ciphertext decrypts to a unique plaintext for a given fixed key, it is necessary that the encryption function is a bijection; this restrict the number of block ciphers to the \((2^n)!\) permutations on \( n \)-bit values. As this value is extremely large\(^1\) for common values of \( n \) (64 or 128 bits), the size of the key further restricts the number of reachable permutations. Usual key lengths (up to 256 bits) imply that this number is actually an infinitesimally small fraction of all possible permutations. Informally, the goal is to make it practically impossible to retrieve the plaintext from the ciphertext without any knowledge on the secret key.

The concept of block cipher is summarized in a formal way in Def. 2.1.2, taken out of \([221]\). As the a block cipher is memoryless, we will see it as a function and therefore use a different notation.

**Definition 2.1.2 (Symmetric-Key Block Cipher).** An \( n \)-bit symmetric-key block cipher is a function \( e : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n \) such that for each key \( k \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \), the encryption function \( e(p, k) \), written \( e_k(p) \), is an invertible mapping from \( \{0, 1\}^n \) to \( \{0, 1\}^n \). The inverse mapping is the decryption function, denoted \( d_k(c) \), where \( c = e_k(p) \) denotes the ciphertext \( c \) resulting from the encryption of plaintext \( p \) under key \( k \).

\(^1\)Using Stirling’s formula, one can show that \( \log (2^n!) \approx 2^n \cdot (n - 1.44) \).
Note that it is possible to imagine probabilistic block ciphers which take some randomness in addition to the key as input in order to select a mapping in a non-deterministic way; thus, each time a plaintext block $p$ is encrypted under the key $k$, the output is a set of eligible ciphertext blocks and the function chooses one ciphertext block $c$ out of this set. Since the encryption function is essentially one-to-many, the requirement for invertibility implies data expansion, which is a disadvantage of randomized encryption; furthermore, gathering “good” randomness is not a trivial problem in the real world. However, depending on the strength of the security model under consideration, some randomness may be required. In practice, this property is often shifted to the use of randomized modes of operations (see §2.2.4).

We will not address probabilistic block ciphers in more details in this thesis.

Virtually all block ciphers are product ciphers, i.e. they combine at least two or more transformations in a manner intending that the resulting cipher is more secure than the individual components. The underlying idea is to build a complex encryption function by combining several simple operations which offer complementary, but individually insufficient security properties. A very important class of product ciphers is the category of iterated block ciphers (see Fig. 2.1). The key idea is to iterate the same round function $f$ several times on the plaintext block $p$. More precisely, an iterated block cipher is a block cipher involving the sequential repetition of an internal function $f$ called a round function. Parameters include the number of rounds $r$, the block bit size $n$ and the bit size $\ell$ of the input key $k$ from which $r$ subkeys $k^{(i)}$ (also called round keys) are derived. For invertibility purposes, the round function $f$ must be a bijection on the round input for each value $k^{(i)}$.

Various schemes are used to build modern iterated block ciphers, like substitution-permutation networks (SPNs), Feistel schemes and variants, and many others; we will discuss them later on. The round keys $k^{(i)}$ are derived from the key $k$ by an algorithm named key-schedule algorithm. Iterated block ciphers have several advantages: it is possible to implement them in an efficient way, because one can reuse the same code or circuit in each round. Furthermore, it is easier to analyze them in a security point of view since several theoretical results concerning iterated block ciphers are available.

A more “high-level” way to build a new block cipher consists in combining directly block ciphers. The key point is that the keys used by the individual block ciphers should be statistically independent; however, the distinction is not always clear. A cascade cipher is usually defined [221] as being the concatenation of $s \geq 2$ block ciphers (called stages), each with (statistically) independent keys: the plaintext is the input of the first stage, the output of stage $i$ is the input of stage $i + 1$ and the output of stage $s$ is defined to be the ciphertext. Multiple encryption is similar to cascade ciphers, but the keys may be dependent and the stage block ciphers may
Figure 2.1: Diagram of an $r$-round iterated block cipher.
be either a block cipher $e$ or its corresponding decryption function $d$. Most common constructions of multiple encryption are the double encryption and triple encryption (see Def. 2.1.3 and Def. 2.1.4).

**Definition 2.1.3 (Double Encryption).** For a block cipher $e_k$, double encryption is defined as $e(x) = e_{k_2}(e_{k_1}(x))$, where $k_1$ and $k_2$ are statistically independent.

**Definition 2.1.4 (Triple Encryption).** For a block cipher $e_k$, triple encryption is defined as

$$e(p) = e_{k_3}^{(3)}\left( e_{k_2}^{(2)}\left( e_{k_1}^{(1)}(p) \right) \right)$$

where $e^{(i)}$ denotes either $e_k(.)$ or $d_k(.)$. The case

$$e(p) = e_{k_3}^{(3)}\left( d_{k_2}^{(2)}\left( e_{k_1}^{(1)}(p) \right) \right)$$

is called EDE triple-encryption; the sub-case $k_1 = k_3$ is called two-key triple encryption.

### 2.1.2 Good and Bad Block Ciphers

The rigorous evaluation of block ciphers is an extremely difficult and time-consuming task since several criteria have influence on the good (or bad) quality of a block cipher:

- **Security level**: A very important criterion in the evaluation of a block cipher is obviously its estimated security level. Unfortunately, the current state of the science does not allow (up to now) to prove in a mathematical, rigorous way whether a given (practical) block cipher is secure or not; although the concept of perfect security [295] has been formalized several decades ago, perfect ciphers (like the one-time pad [321], for instance) are very impractical for a real use, as they require at least as many key bits as the message length. This fact explains why evaluations projects, like the AES [3], NESSIE [247], or CRYPTREC [72] efforts, are necessary. Thus, at this time, some subjectivity will inevitably be present in the estimation of the security of a block cipher. Does a given algorithm come with a certain “proof of security”? Does it has withstood expert cryptanalysis from several people over a substantial time period (i.e. years)? Responses to this kind of questions help to take a decision regarding the security criterion, but do not give any formal guarantee about the security towards (yet) unknown attacks.
- **Throughput**: Block ciphers are often used to encrypt large amounts of data; this makes throughput an important evaluation criterion as well. Throughput is related to the complexity of the cryptographic mapping and the degree to which the algorithm is tailored to a particular platform or implementation context. One often differentiates hardware and software cases, the speed of the algorithm setup, the key setup, a key change and the encryption and decryption operations.

- **Flexibility**: Usually, an expected important property of a block cipher is that it offers a large flexibility at different points of view. For instance, a flexible algorithm may offer several possible block and key sizes, allowing to tailor an instance of the block cipher to precise external requirements. Another flexibility form concerns implementation issues. If the block cipher under consideration can be implemented on various platforms, i.e. on fast 32-bit, 64-bit microprocessors, on hardware (either as an ASIC or on a FPGA), on low-cost 8-bit architectures (like a smartcard) while keeping an acceptable throughput, then one can consider it as flexible. Finally, a block cipher can be used as a building block in various (but unusual) cryptographic constructions (like a hash function, an authentication code, or a stream cipher); if it offers an acceptable security level in all of these situations, then one can consider that it is a flexible block cipher.

### 2.2 Examples of Block Ciphers

It is astonishing how many different designs of block ciphers have been proposed in the academic literature; Fig. 2.2 aims at listing the most important ones. Few of them have a real impact in the practical life, but most of them suggest interesting questions and open problems about their security. In the next parts, we describe precisely three block ciphers which are probably the most frequently encountered ones in practice, namely DES, IDEA, and AES.

#### 2.2.1 Data Encryption Standaard (DES)

The “Data Encryption Standard” (DES), also known as the “Data Encryption Algorithm” (DEA) by ANSI or as DEA-1 by ISO, respectively, has been a de facto worldwide symmetric encryption standard for more than two decades (the latest version\(^2\) of the NIST standard is [246]). In this section, we first recall some historical perspectives and we sketch its definition, since we will use it in a later part.

\(^2\)At the time of writing, the NIST has announced that the standard will shortly be withdrawn.
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**Figure 2.2:** List of Block Ciphers
DES has been designed\(^3\) by a group of permanent researchers working in the seventies for IBM Corp: Coppersmith, Konheim, Adler, Notz, Smith, Feistel, Tritter, Tuckerman, Meyer, Grossman, McNeil, Tuchmann, and Oseas.

**Historical Perspectives**

Interestingly, the history\(^4\) of DES is closely related to the history of “modern” cryptology. In the early 70s, non-military research about cryptographic algorithms was nearly inexistent and very few people understood the science of cryptology. In 1972, the former US “National Bureau of Standards” (NBS), known nowadays as the “National Institute of Standards and Technology” (NIST), initiated a program with the goal of protecting computer and communications data; part of this program was the development of a single standard cryptographic algorithm, such that it could be tested and certified, and different equipments using it could interoperate easily.

In 1973, the NBS issued a public request for proposals; the propositions demonstrated that there was a lot of public interest in this field, but very little expertise, since none of the submissions came only close to meeting the requirements defined by the NBS. A second request was issued one year later, and the NBS eventually received a promising candidate: an algorithm based on another one developed by IBM, called Lucifer. The NBS requested help of the “National Security Agency” (NSA), and comments by the general public.

Many people were afraid that the NSA had modified the algorithm to install a trapdoor, complained about the reduced key size (from 128-bit to 56-bit) and the inner working of the algorithm, since the rationales behind the design of the algorithm were kept secret. In 1976, the NBS initiated two workshops, one dedicated to the mathematics of the algorithm and the possibility of a trapdoor, the other being devoted to the possibility of increasing key’s length. For instance, Brickel *et al.* [47] conclude in a paper aiming at discovering the design criteria of DES S-boxes, that

“All the structure of the S-boxes that we have described appears to be the result of design principles. The question that remains is whether it is a complete list of the design principles used in creating the S-boxes. This question could be answered in the negative if further structure was discovered in the S-boxes that did not occur in the boxes created using these design principles.”

\(^3\)The names of people having worked on the design of DES have been disclosed by Coppersmith during an invited lecture at Crypto’2000 conference. See [60] as well.

\(^4\)This part is mostly inspired by the book of Schneier [283, Chapter 12], and we refer the reader to it for more information about the history of DES.
Despite of criticism, DES was adopted as a federal standard on November 23, 1976 and authorized for use on all unclassified government communications. The official and initial description of the standard can be found in [242]. As the terms of the DES standards stipulate that it should be reviewed every five years, it was re-certified in 1983, 1987, 1993, and in 1999. However, in 1997, as DES was showing some signs of old age and as it can no more be considered as a secure algorithm (mainly because of its small key size, see §2.3.2), the NIST has decided to launch a process\(^5\) in order to find a successor, known as the *Advanced Encryption Standard* (AES).

**Description of DES**

DES is a *Feistel cipher* encrypting a 64-bit block with help of a 56-bit key. It consists in applying an initial permutation to the plaintext, then applying 16 consecutive Feistel rounds (the final swap being omitted), and finally applying the inverse of the initial permutation. The Feistel cipher structure [102] is guaranteed to be reversible (or, in other words, one can use the same process, up to the subkeys order, to encrypt and to decrypt data). Furthermore, one can notice that the function \(f\) does not need to be a bijection. The concept of Feistel cipher is formally described in Def. 2.2.1 and Fig. 2.3 illustrates a Feistel round.

**Definition 2.2.1 (Feistel Cipher).** A Feistel cipher \(\Gamma\) is an iterated cipher mapping a plaintext of \(n = 2t\) bits, denoted \(x_1^{(0)} || x_r^{(0)}\), with \(t\)-bit blocks \(x_1^{(0)}\), and \(x_r^{(0)}\) to a ciphertext \(x_1^{(r)} || x_r^{(r)}\) through an \(r\)-round process, where \(r \geq 1\).

\(^5\)See §2.2.3 for more details about AES.
For $0 \leq i < r$, round $i$ maps $x_r^{(i)} || x_l^{(i)} \mapsto x_r^{(i+1)} || x_l^{(i+1)}$ according to

$$\Gamma : \begin{cases} x_r^{(i+1)} = x_r^{(i)} \\ x_l^{(i+1)} = x_l^{(i)} \odot f(x_r^{(i)}, k^{(i+1)}) \end{cases}$$

where each subkey $k^{(i)}$, $1 \leq i \leq \ell$ is derived from the key $k$ and $\odot$ is a group law on $\{0, 1\}^\ell$.

The overall structure of DES is illustrated in Fig. 2.4, the right part of the figure being the key-schedule algorithm, while the left part is the Feistel scheme.

A DES key is often expressed as a 64-bit string, where the least significant (i.e. leftmost) bit of each byte is ignored and used as parity check bit to ensure that the key is error-free; the process of selecting these bits is performed by the transformation $PC_1$ (Fig. 2.6), which eliminates the superfluous bits and permutes the remaining ones. After this operation, a different 48-bit subkey is generated for each of the 16 rounds of DES in the following manner: first the 56-bit key is divided into two 28-bit registers. Then, the halves are rotated to the left by two positions for all rounds but the rounds number 1, 2, 9, and 16, which are rotated to the left by a single position. After being rotated, 48 out of the 56 bits are selected and permuted by a compression function $PC_2$ (Fig. 2.7). Because of the rotation, a different subset of key bits is used in each subkey. Actually, each bit is used in approximately 14 of the 16 rounds, but not all bits are used exactly the same number of times.

The initial transformation $IP$ (Fig. 2.5) and its inverse $IP^{-1}$ are straightforward bit permutations on 64-bit strings; actually, they does not possess any cryptographic meaning as they are key-independent GF(2)-linear operations.

The round function of DES is illustrated in Fig. 2.8 (note that the flow of the figure goes from the right to the left). It takes a 32-bit input $x$ and outputs a 32-bit value $y$. First, a transformation called expansion-permutation $EP$ expands the 32-bit input to 48 bits; this operation duplicates and permutes certain bits. Then, the 48-bit round subkey is combined with the output of $EP$ with an exclusive-or operation (this operation being denoted $K$ in Fig. 2.8). The result feeds then the substitution part of the cipher.

The substitution stage is composed of eight different non-linear transformations (see Fig. 2.9) mapping 6-bit values to 4-bit ones which are usually called “S-boxes”. Hence, the 48-bit are split into eight 6-bits blocks. Each separate block is operated on by a separate S-box. An S-box is defined as a table of four rows and sixteens columns. The leftmost and the rightmost bit of the 6-bit input are combined to compute an index selecting the row, and the four inner bits specify the index of the column. For instance, the input $100100$ to S-box $S_5$ gives $10$ as row index and $0010$ as column index, which results in the output $0001$. 
Finally, the end of DES’s round function consists of a straight bit permutation $P$ which maps each output bit of the substitution stage to an output position, which means that no bit is used twice and no bit is ignored.

Design Criteria of DES

As outlined in the previous section, the non-published design criteria of DES have been the subject of much debates during the 80s and 90s. According to [67], Brown noticed in her PhD thesis [48] that

“It has been stated [173] that there were 12 (possibly 13) criteria used, which resulted in about 1000 suitable S-boxes, of which the implementors chose 8.”

Brickel et al. [47] mentioned that the only source of for specific design principles seem to be responses from the NSA to a study of the DES made by Lexar Corp. In these comments, the NSA labeled the following points as “design criteria” for the S-boxes: (1) no S-box is a linear or affine function of the input, (2) changing one input bit to an S-box results in changing at least two output bits, and (3) $S(x)$ and $S(x \oplus 001100)$ must differ in at least two bits; the following points were labeled by the NSA as “caused by design criteria”: (1) $S(x) \neq S(11ab00)$ for any choice of $a$ and $b$, and (2) the S-boxes were chosen to minimize the difference between the number of 1’s and 0’s in any S-box output when any single input is held constant.

After the invention of differential cryptanalysis by Biham and Shamir (see §2.3.3), Coppersmith revealed [60] the criteria used in the S-box design: (1) each S-box should have six bits of input and four bits of output, (2) no output bit of an S-box should be too close to a linear function of the input bits, (3) each row of an S-box should contain all possible outputs, (4) if two inputs to an S-box differ in exactly one bit, their outputs must differ by at least two bits, (5) if two inputs to an S-box differ exactly in the middle two bits, their outputs must differ by at least two bits, (6) if two inputs to an S-box differ in their first two bits and agree on their last two, the two outputs must differ, and finally, (7) for any nonzero 6-bit difference between inputs, no more than eight of the thirty-two pairs of inputs exhibiting that difference may result in the same output difference.

In an invited talk at the CRYPTO’2000 conference, Coppersmith mentioned some other design criteria as well: (1) when the two outer bits are fixed, the rest is a permutation on four bits, (2) $\Delta_{in} = 0x00xy00 \implies \Delta_{out} \neq 0$, where $\Delta_{in}$ and $\Delta_{out}$ denote the input and output differences (relatively to $\oplus$) and finally, (3) the implementation of an S-box should use at most 47 logical gates.
Figure 2.4: DES High-Level Scheme and Key-Schedule Algorithm
Figure 2.5: IP transformation

Figure 2.6: PC1 transformation

Figure 2.7: PC2 transformation
Figure 2.8: DES Round Function
### Table 2.9: DES S-boxes

| $S_1$ | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | A  | B  | C  | D  | E  | F  |
|-------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 0     | E  | 4  | D  | 1  | 2  | F  | B  | 8  | 3  | A  | 6  | C  | 5  | 9  | 0  |
| 1     | 0  | F  | 7  | 4  | E  | 2  | D  | 1  | A  | 6  | C  | B  | 9  | 5  | 3  |
| 2     | 4  | 1  | E  | 8  | D  | 6  | 2  | B  | F  | C  | 9  | 7  | 3  | A  | 5  |
| 3     | F  | C  | 8  | 2  | 4  | 9  | 1  | 7  | 5  | B  | 3  | E  | A  | 0  | 6  |

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**Figure 2.9: DES S-boxes**
Cryptanalysis of DES

More than any other block cipher, and since it was one of the first commercially developed block cipher with open specifications, DES has motivated a large amount of cryptanalytical efforts: differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, and Davies’ attack are generic attacks invented for the purpose of breaking DES (see §2.3.3 for a description of these attacks).

The main weakness of DES is its short key length which allows nowadays to break it practically using an exhaustive key search; for instance, a dedicated machine has been built in 1998 by the Electronic Frontier Foundation to demonstrate the vulnerability of such a small key length. More information is given in §2.3.2. Hellman’s time-memory tradeoff (see [129] and §2.3.2) can break DES using about $2^{38}$ cells of memory and $2^{38}$ operations after a single precomputation of $2^{56}$ operations.

Biham and Shamir’s differential cryptanalysis [31–33] breaks DES faster than an exhaustive search if $2^{47}$ chosen plaintexts are available. Another attack breaking DES faster than exhaustive search is an improvement of Davies’ attack [83], by Biham and Biryukov [24, 25]; this known-plaintext attack requires $2^{50}$ known plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

In 1993, Matsui demonstrated [202, 203] that linear cryptanalysis can break DES as well, provided $2^{43}$ known plaintext-ciphertext pairs are available. Based on the same principles, Shimoyama and Kaneko [297] replaced linear approximations by probabilistic quadratic relations to slightly reduce the data complexity. Matsui’s attack was transformed later by Knudsen and Matthiassen [166] in a chosen-plaintext attack, hence slightly reducing the required amount of data as well. We describe and discuss experimental results on the linear cryptanalysis of DES in §3.2.5, (see [144] as well) and we will demonstrate how to optimally use all the information furnished by Matsui’s probabilistic linear approximations (see §3.2.4, page 80 and [149]).

### 2.2.2 IDEA

IDEA was one of the first proposed alternatives to DES. It was designed by Lai and Massey [179, 182] and is actually a “tweak” of PES [181] needed to counter differential cryptanalysis. IDEA has withstood a large amount of cryptanalytical effort (its popularity is due to the fact that it was chosen as the block cipher in the first versions of the software Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [109] by Zimmerman) and all kinds of cryptanalytical attacks surprisingly well until now. Its strength is certainly due to an elegant and simple design approach which consists in mixing three algebraically incompatible group operations, namely the addition of vectors over GF (2)$^{16}$, denoted “⊕“, the addition of integers over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{16}}$, denoted “⊞“, and the multiplication in GF ($2^{16} + 1$)$^{∗}$, denoted “⊙”.

---

6Note that this attack still works if the data are coming from up to $2^{33}$ different keys.
Description of IDEA

IDEA encrypts 64-bit data blocks under a 128-bit key; it consists of eight identical rounds and a final half-round (a key addition layer similar to those in a full round). Fig. 2.10 illustrates the computational flow of one round. Round $r$ transforms a 64-bit input represented as a vector of four 16-bit words to an output vector of the same size:

$$(x_1^{(r)}, x_2^{(r)}, x_3^{(r)}, x_4^{(r)}) \mapsto (y_1^{(r)}, y_2^{(r)}, y_3^{(r)}, y_4^{(r)})$$

This process is parametered by six 16-bit subkeys denoted $k_i^{(r)}$, with $1 \leq i \leq 6$, which are derived from the master 128-bit key by means of the key-schedule algorithm. One evaluates the three IDEA algebraic operations as follows: $\oplus$ is a simple exclusive-or operation, $\boxplus$ is the addition modulo $2^{16}$ and $\odot$ is the common multiplication modulo $2^{16} + 1$ (where 0 is considered as the number $2^{16}$). First, two intermediate values $\alpha^{(r)}$ and $\beta^{(r)}$ are computed as follows:

$$\alpha^{(r)} = (x_1^{(r)} \odot k_1^{(r)}) \oplus (x_3^{(r)} \boxplus k_3^{(r)})$$

$$\beta^{(r)} = (x_2^{(r)} \boxplus k_2^{(r)}) \oplus (x_4^{(r)} \odot k_4^{(r)})$$

These two values form the input of the multiplication-addition box (MA-box) which provides two outputs $\gamma^{(r)}$ and $\delta^{(r)}$:

$$\gamma^{(r)} = \left((\alpha^{(r)} \odot k_5^{(r)}) \boxplus \beta^{(r)}\right) \odot k_6^{(r)}$$

$$\delta^{(r)} = \left((\alpha^{(r)} \odot k_5^{(r)}) \boxplus \beta^{(r)}\right)$$

Finally, the output of the round $r$ is given by

$$y_1^{(r)} = (x_1^{(r)} \odot k_1^{(r)}) \oplus \delta^{(r)}$$

$$y_2^{(r)} = (x_2^{(r)} \boxplus k_2^{(r)}) \oplus \gamma^{(r)}$$

$$y_3^{(r)} = (x_3^{(r)} \boxplus k_3^{(r)}) \oplus \delta^{(r)}$$

$$y_4^{(r)} = (x_4^{(r)} \odot k_4^{(r)}) \oplus \gamma^{(r)}$$

A half-round is defined to be the key-addition layer; we denote its output $(c_1^{(r)}, c_2^{(r)}, c_3^{(r)}, c_4^{(r)})$.

The key-schedule of IDEA allows to derive fifty-two 16-bit subkeys out of the 128-bit key $k$. Its description is straightforward; first, order the subkeys as $k_1^{(1)}, \ldots, k_6^{(1)}, k_6^{(2)}, \ldots, k_1^{(9)}, \ldots, k_4^{(9)}$ partition $k$ into eight 16-bit blocks, and assign these blocks directly to the first eight subkeys. Then, do the following until all remaining subkeys are assigned: rotate $k$ left 25 bits, partition the result, and assign these blocks to the next eight subkeys. In Fig. 2.11, we give explicitly the value of the subkeys (where $k_{[0\ldots15]}$ means the bits 0 to 15 (inclusive) of $k$, $k_{[117\ldots127]}$ means the bits 117-127 and 0-4 of $k$, and where the leftmost bit of $k$ is numbered with 0).
Figure 2.10: Round $r$ of IDEA

Figure 2.11: Complete Key-Schedule of IDEA
Cryptanalysis of IDEA

The cryptanalysis process of IDEA has been a rather lengthy process (see Fig. 2.12 for a recapitulation). To the best of our knowledge, Meier [219] was the first one to publish an attack based on differential cryptanalysis against up to 2.5 rounds running faster than an exhaustive search. Then, Borst et al. [45] presented a differential-linear attack against 3 rounds and a truncated differential attack on 3.5 rounds; Biham et al. [27] managed to break 4.5 rounds using impossible differentials. Motivated by a paper of Nakahara et al. [238] explaining how to break 2.5 rounds using an integral attack, Demirci [84] was able to break up to 4 rounds; one year later, these results were extended [85] using meet-in-the-middle techniques to break up to 5 rounds slightly faster than an exhaustive search. Very recently, Nakahara et al. [239] devised known-plaintext attacks against reduced-round versions of IDEA using ideas of Demirci as well as an (unpublished) observation of Biryukov. Other papers [35,77,128] present attacks against the full version of IDEA, but these attacks work only for a negligible fraction of the keys. Additionally, we will present in §3.4 some efficient linear-like and square-like attacks on reduced-round versions of IDEA.

2.2.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

As mentioned above, due to the improvement of sciences and technology, DES is no longer appropriate for securing electronic communications. The NIST decided to launch in 1997 a new standardization process, known as Advanced Encryption Standard. This process, on a competitive basis, was completely open: anyone (i.e. non-American citizen and companies as well) was invited to submit a candidate algorithm and to send public comments on the other proposals. Fifteen candidates were accepted from all over the world in 1998: CAST256, Crypton, DEAL, DFC, E2, Frog, Hasty Pudding, LOKI 97, Magenta, Mars, RC6, Rijndael, SAFER+, Serpent, and Twofish. Based on extensive public comments, this set of candidates was reduced to 5 finalists (Rijndael, Mars, Serpent, Twofish and RC6) in 1999. In October 2000, Rijndael was selected to become the AES. The algorithm has been designed by two Belgian cryptographers, Daemen and Rijmen. A book [81] explaining the algorithm, its features and the rationales behind its design has been published.

Description of AES

AES processes 128-bit data blocks under a 128-, 192- or 256-bit key. Its design consists in writing the 128-bit plaintext as a $4 \times 4$ square matrix of bytes (this principle was first proposed in Square). The encryption process is made
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<td>[238]</td>
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<td>Memory: $2^{64}$</td>
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Figure 2.12: Attacks against IDEA
of 10, 12 or 14 rounds, for keys of 128-, 192- and 256-bit, respectively. It begins with the addition (through a XOR operation) of a round subkey to the input data. Then, a fixed number of rounds of a substitution-permutation network (SPN) is applied.

Each round consists in four operations: first, a bijection, SubBytes, is applied to the matrix, consisting basically of 16 byte-wise substitutions defined by the same substitution table. SubBytes is a bijective mapping offering optimal characteristics regarding non-linearity (and thus an optimal resistance towards linear and differential cryptanalysis, see §2.3.3). It consists in the inversion operation in GF \((\text{GF}(2^8))\) where elements of the field are polynomials of degree at most 7 on GF(2) modulo the irreducible polynomial \(x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1\); it is followed by an affine transformation over GF \((\text{GF}(2^8))\). Second, a circular shift called ShiftRows of all rows of the matrix is applied: row number \(i, 1 \leq i \leq 4\) is rotated to the right by \(i\) positions. Third, a linear transformation, defined by a \(4 \times 4\) matrix over GF \((\text{GF}(2^8))\), called MixColumns, is applied on each column (the last round omitting the MixColumns and ShiftRows steps); more precisely, this operation considers a column as the coefficients of a polynomial over GF \((\text{GF}(2^8))/(x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1)\) and the columns are multiplied by the polynomial \(0x03 \cdot x^3 + 0x01 \cdot x^2 + 0x01 \cdot x + 0x02\) modulo \(x^4+1\). MixColumns possesses optimal diffusion properties: if \(\ell\) input bytes are modified, at least \(5 - \ell\) output bytes will be modified. Finally, a 128-bit round subkey is XORed.

The decryption process consists simply in applying the respective inverse operations in the reverse order, while the key-schedule algorithm description may be found in [81].

Cryptanalysis of AES

At the time of writing this thesis, there is no (undisputed) attack against the full version of AES breaking it faster than an exhaustive key search.

The designers of AES claim [81] that no 4-round differential characteristic hold with probability greater than \(2^{-150}\), and no 4-round linear characteristic exist with a bias greater than \(2^{-75}\), as an analysis of the propagation of activity patterns leads to the conclusion that any linear or differential characteristic activate at least 25 S-boxes. Note however that such numbers have to be taken with a grain of salt, since there must exist at least a differential or a linear hull which hold with a probability of \(2^{-128}\) or a bias equal to \(2^{-64}\), respectively; this demonstrates that the cumulative effect of characteristics is huge in AES. However, more recently, Keliher et al. [155–157] obtained (with help of about 200’000 hours of computations) an upper bound on the maximum average linear hull probability (and on the maximum expected differential probability) of \(2^{-92}\) for 9 rounds or more. Using more theoretical arguments, Park et al. obtained [258] an upper bound of \(2^{-112}\) and of \(2^{-105}\) on the maximum differential probability, and on the maximum linear
hull probability for 4 rounds of AES, respectively.

Biham and Keller [30] have proposed an impossible differential cryptanalysis on 5 rounds which was later extended to 6 rounds in [59] and to 7 rounds, with help of a weakness of the key-schedule algorithm, by Phan [264].

Several types of integral attacks [103, 115, 194] have been applied with success against reduced-round versions of AES, the best having been proposed by Gilbert and Minier [115]. Furthermore, as AES has a simple algebraic structure, several papers have demonstrated puzzling properties, which may eventually be exploited in the future in an attack [11,16,70,104,108,235].

2.2.4 Modes of Operation

A block cipher handles messages as data blocks. Usually, the size of data to be encrypted is larger than the block size $n$ of the cipher under consideration. Thus, these data have to be divided into a sequence of message blocks having the same length $n$. Different modes of operation, based on an underlying block cipher, have been designed. These modes of operation usually provide a set of desirable properties to the ciphertext blocks, such as adding randomness to a block cipher, padding plaintexts to an arbitrary length, control of error propagation, or even the transformation of a block cipher in a stream cipher.

Modes of operation are often discussed according to following criteria:

- **Error expansion**: two types of error may occur during the transmission of a message processed by a mode of operation. Either one can encounter slip errors which means that either bits are deleted or inserted in an arbitrary manner, or bit-flipping errors where some bits are flipped. Depending on the mode in usage, these errors may cause no error expansion, i.e. the errors are limited to the same block, finite error expansion, i.e. the error propagates to a limited amount of block, or even an infinite error propagation.

- **Plaintext redundancy**: this criterion is related to whether the mode under consideration allows the plaintext probability distribution to propagate to the ciphertext, either in a partial or in a full way.

- **Random access**: certain modes of operation allow to read or to modify a block at random position without the need to read (or modify) other blocks.

- **Parallel processing**: certain modes of operation have the property to be processed in a parallel way; this means that every block can be computed without the need to know other blocks. Such modes allow very-high performance implementations.
Randomness addition: certain modes require some additional randomness, like an initialization vector, independently of the plaintext or of the key.

In the next section, we recall briefly the five most important modes of operation, namely ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, and CTR.

Electronic Codebook Mode

The Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB), standardized in [137, 243], is the most straightforward (and the most insecure) way to employ a block cipher for encrypting (or decrypting) a sequence of messages. It just consists in encrypting them one another separately.

**Definition 2.2.2 (Electronic Codebook Mode).** Let $x = x_1 || \ldots || x_m$ be a message made of $m$ blocks of size $n$, and let $e(.)$ be a block cipher having a block length equal to $n = |x_i|$. The encryption of $x$ in the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) under a key $k$ is defined as

$$y_i = e_k(x_i) \quad 1 \leq i \leq m$$

while the decryption operation is

$$x_i = d_k(y_i) \quad 1 \leq i \leq m$$

where $d(.)$ is the inverse of $e(.)$.

The ECB mode is deterministic, meaning that two encryptions under the same key of the same message $x$ will result twice in the same ciphertexts $y$. Furthermore, the ECB mode may leak some statistical information about the plaintext, if the latter is very redundant: for instance, equal plaintexts result in equal ciphertexts. As each block is treated separately and does not depend on other blocks, the ECB mode can be implemented in a highly parallel way; bit-flipping errors cause harm only on the block in which they occur, while slip errors cause infinite error expansion. In practice, mainly due to its deterministic nature, the use of ECB mode is only recommended to encrypt a single block of data.

Cipher Block Chaining Mode

The Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC), standardized in [137, 243], defines a dependence between a block to be encrypted and the previous encrypted block and make use of an Initialization Vector (IV).

**Definition 2.2.3 (Cipher Block Chaining Model).** Let $x = x_1 || \ldots || x_m$ be a message made of $m$ blocks of size $n$, and let $e(.)$ be a block cipher having
a block length equal to $n = |x_i|$. The encryption of $x$ in the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) under a key $k$ is defined as

$$
y_0 = IV \quad y_i = e_k(x_i \oplus y_{i-1}) \quad 1 \leq i \leq m
$$

while the decryption operation is

$$
y_0 = IV \quad x_i = d_k(y_i) \oplus y_{i-1} \quad 1 \leq i \leq m
$$

where $d(\cdot)$ is the inverse of $e(\cdot)$.

The security of CBC mode has been studied by Bellare et al. [19]. They conclude that, in order that the CBC mode resists to chosen-plaintext attacks, it is required that the underlying block cipher can be modeled as a pseudo-random permutation, and that the initialization vector is secret and chosen uniformly at random for each new message and key. However, CBC is insecure in the chosen-ciphertext attack model; furthermore, it suffers from a confidentiality limitation [162], as when two ciphertext blocks are equal, one can recover the XOR of the subsequent plaintexts. This phenomenon is likely to occur when one encrypts message whose size is about equal to the square root of the block size of the underlying cipher.

The CBC mode resists quite well to bit-flipping errors, which cause only the current and the next block to be incorrectly decrypted. However, slip errors result in infinite error expansion.

**Output Feedback Mode**

The Output Feedback Mode (OFB) [137, 243] features feeding the successive output blocks from the underlying block cipher back to it. These feedback bits form a sequence of bits which are used as a key for the Vernam cipher. This mode requires an initialization vector, which however does not need to be secret.

**Definition 2.2.4 (Output Feedback Mode).** Let $x = x_1||\ldots||x_m$ be a message made of $m$ blocks of size $n$, and let $e(\cdot)$ be a block cipher having a block length equal to $n = |x_i|$. The encryption of $x$ in the Output Feedback Mode (OFB) under a key $k$ is defined as

$$
\kappa_0 = IV \quad \kappa_i = e_k(\kappa_{i-1}) \quad 1 \leq i \leq m \quad y_i = x_i \oplus \kappa_i
$$
while the decryption operation is
\[
\begin{align*}
\kappa_0 &= \text{IV} \\
\kappa_i &= \mathcal{E}_k(\kappa_{i-1}) \quad 1 \leq i \leq m \\
x_i &= y_i \oplus \kappa_i
\end{align*}
\]
where \(d(.)\) is the inverse of \(e(.)\).

Note that we have defined here the version of OFB which produces a keystream by steps which have the same size as the block size of the underlying algorithm. This mode can be generalized to (and is usually defined as) \(r\)-bit OFB which generates a keystream by steps of \(r \leq n\) bits. The OFB mode is relatively resistant to bit-flipping errors, as errors are limited to the same segment and there is no error expansion. Slip errors cause an infinite error propagation.

**Cipher Feedback Mode**

The **Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)** \([137,243]\) features feeding the successive cipher segments which are output from the mode back as input to the underlying block cipher. Like CBC and OFB, CFB requires an initialization vector.

**Definition 2.2.5 (Cipher Feedback Mode).** Let \(x = x_1 || \ldots || x_m\) be a message made of \(m\) blocks of size \(n\), and let \(e(.)\) be a block cipher having a block length equal to \(n = |x_i|\). The encryption of \(x\) in the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) under a key \(k\) is defined as
\[
\begin{align*}
y_0 &= \text{IV} \\
y_i &= x_i \oplus \mathcal{E}_k(y_{i-1})
\end{align*}
\]
while the decryption operation is
\[
\begin{align*}
y_0 &= \text{IV} \\
x_i &= y_i \oplus \mathcal{E}_k(y_{i-1})
\end{align*}
\]
where \(d(.)\) is the inverse of \(e(.)\).

Similarly to the OFB mode, the CFB mode can be generalized to (and is usually defined as) \(r\)-bit CFB which generates a keystream by steps of \(r \leq n\) bits.

**Counter Mode**

The **Counter Mode (CTR)** has been proposed by Diffie and Hellman \([94]\).
Definition 2.2.6 (Counter Mode). Let $x = x_1 || \ldots || x_m$ be a message made of $m$ blocks of size $n$, and let $e(.)$ be a block cipher having a block length equal to $n = |x_i|$. The encryption of $x$ in the Counter Mode (CTR) under a key $k$ is defined as

$$
\begin{align*}
\kappa_0 &= \text{IV} \\
\kappa_i &= e_k(\kappa_i + 1 \mod 2^n) \\
y_i &= x_i \oplus \kappa_i
\end{align*}
$$

while the decryption operation is

$$
\begin{align*}
\kappa_0 &= \text{IV} \\
\kappa_i &= e_k(\kappa_i + 1 \mod 2^n) \\
x_i &= y_i \oplus \kappa_i
\end{align*}
$$

where $d(.)$ is the inverse of $e(.)$.

The security of the CTR mode can be proven for adversaries able to mount a chosen-plaintext attack if the underlying block cipher can be modeled as a pseudo-random permutation and that the initialization counter is non-repeating for each new message and for each re-synchronization under the same key.

2.3 Attacks Against Block Ciphers

2.3.1 Attack Models and Terminology

The concept of attack against a block cipher includes several notions: its outcome, the threat model in which it can be realized, its type, and its complexity. In this part, we discuss each of these notions in a detailed way.

Outcome of an Attack

According to the type of information recovered during an attack, Knudsen [162] classified the possible outcomes of an attack in a hierarchical way, the first described outcome being the most favorable for an adversary.

- **Total break**: an adversary recovers (or reconstructs) the secret key $k$.
- **Global deduction**: an adversary finds an algorithm functionnaly equivalent to $e_k(.)$ or $d_k(.)$ without knowing the actual value of the key $k$. A global deduction is possible when a block cipher contains “block structures”, i.e. if certain subsets of the ciphertext are independent of certain subsets of the plaintext; in this case, independently of the
key length, such a block cipher is vulnerable to a global deduction in a known-plaintext attack. Another possibility of global deduction is that an attack is able to recover the round subkeys but not the key, in the case where the key-schedule algorithm is designed to be a (secure) one-way function, for instance.

- **Instance (local) deduction**: an adversary finds the plaintext (or ciphertext) of an intercepted ciphertext (or plaintext) which (s)he did not obtain from the legitimate sender. An instance deduction may be as dangerous as a total break if the number of likely plaintexts (or ciphertexts) is small.

- **Distinguishing attack**: an adversary is able to tell whether the attacked block cipher is a permutation chosen uniformly at random from the set of all permutations or one of the $2^l$ permutations specified by the secret key. Distinguishing attacks are often considered as the least serious threat in practice; however, they often can be transformed into a key-recovery attack which may lead to a total break (or a global deduction). Distinguishing attack are the corner stone of the Luby-Rackoff security approach which will be discussed in §2.4.2.

Additionally to these four outcomes, Knudsen [162] defines an “information deduction attack”: an adversary gains some information (in the sense of Shannon’s information theory [294]) about the secret key, the plaintexts or the ciphertexts (s)he did not had *a priori*. For instance, an adversary, after an attack, may learn that some plaintexts are distributed according to ASCII English text or that the key comes from a subset of the set of all possible keys. In practice, an information deduction may be a serious problem if the plaintext (or ciphertext) possesses a low entropy. In contrast to the four above definitions, the latter one seems difficult to work with in a mathematical, formal sense, since, by definition, Shannon’s information is a measure between probability distributions which is independent of the fact that an enemy knows the value of that measure or not.

**Threat Model of a Block Cipher**

A usual model of threats classification consists in building a hierarchy of attacks according to the adversary’s potential (or assumed) capabilities, ranked from the least powerful attacks to the most powerful ones.

- **Ciphertext-only attack**: in this kind of passive attack, an adversary tries to deduce some information about the key (or about the plaintext) by only *observing* a certain amount of ciphertexts. Usually, one assumes some known property about the plaintext or the key; for instance the adversary may know that the plaintext consists of ASCII
characters. Block ciphers vulnerable to ciphertext-only attacks are considered to be completely broken.

- **Known-plaintext attack**: in this case, one assumes that an adversary knows a certain amount of plaintext-ciphertext pairs; the goal of this kind of passive attack consists in finding the key. Typically, one encounters known-plaintext attacks in scenarios where an adversary can observe encrypted version of well-known data, like the data exchanged during the setup phase of a protocol, for instance. A typical example of known-plaintext attack is the linear cryptanalysis (see §2.3.3, page 45 and §3).

- **Non-adaptive chosen-plaintext attack**: when performing this kind of active attack, the adversary is able to choose plaintexts and obtains the corresponding ciphertexts; the plaintext must not depend on the obtained ciphertexts: one can view them as submitted in a parallel way. Subsequently, the adversary uses any information deduced in order to recover either the key, or plaintext(s) corresponding to previously unseen ciphertext(s). One may encounter such a scenario for instance when a tamper-proof module implementing a block cipher with a fixed key falls in the hands of an adversary and where it is not possible to recover directly the key (e.g. with physical means). A typical example of a non-adaptive chosen-plaintext attack is the differential cryptanalysis (see §2.3.3, page 40).

- **Adaptive chosen-plaintext attack**: such an attack is a chosen-plaintext attack wherein the choice of the plaintext may depend on the ciphertext received from previous requests.

- **(Non-) Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack**: one assumes that the adversary is able to decrypt arbitrary ciphertexts (in a adaptive way or not) and obtain the corresponding plaintext with the objective of recovering the key or to encrypt a (not previously observed) plaintext. In the context of block ciphers, this kind of attack is very similar to chosen-ciphertext attacks.

- **Combined chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attack**: this extremely powerful type of adaptive attacks assumes that the adversary can encrypt and decrypt arbitrary texts as (s)he desires. A typical example of such an attack is Wagner’s boomerang attack (see §2.3.3, page 44).

- **Related-key attack**: this model of attack assumes that the adversary knows (or can choose) additionally some mathematical relation between the keys used for encryption and decryption, but not their val-
This kind of attack may be practical when a block cipher is used as a primitive for a hash function, for instance.

Even if a given attack may not be considered to be a practical threat against a block cipher, because it lives in a too strong threat model, such an attack may be viewed as a kind of certificational attack against the block cipher. To quote Winternitz and Hellman who have introduced this concept in [331] together with the one of related-key attack, “if two systems are of approximately equal complexity, and if one system succumbs to a chosen-key cryptanalytic attack [...] while the second does not, the second is to be preferred”.

Type of Attack

Depending on the knowledge of the internal details of a block cipher, and depending on the information gathered when analyzing implementation details, one can classify attacks in an alternative way as follows:

- **Black-box attacks**: these are generic attacks which treat the block cipher as a black box taking plaintexts and a key in input and outputting ciphertext; as such attacks do not depend on any internal details of the algorithm, one can apply them against every block cipher, and their complexity depends only on parameters like the key length $\ell$ and the block length $n$ of the block ciphers under consideration. Known black-box attacks, like exhaustive key search or generic time-memory tradeoffs, are discussed in further details in \S 2.3.2.

- **Shortcut attacks**: on the contrary to black-box attacks, shortcut attacks are based on a mathematical analysis of the internal details of the block ciphers under consideration. The most powerful known attacks are of course shortcut attacks; we discuss them from \S 2.3.3 to \S 2.3.6.

- **Side-Channel attacks**: inevitably, the fate of a block cipher is to be implemented either in software or in hardware. Side-channel attacks exploits various physical phenomenons generated by these implementations. For instance, timing attacks can be applied when the execution time of an algorithm is dependent of the data and/or the key value. Although proposed for the first time to attack public-key algorithms [170], timing attacks were demonstrated [57, 122, 172] against block ciphers as well. Another way to exploit weaknesses of physical implementations of block ciphers is to measure the power consumption of tamper-proof hardware [171] and infer some information about the key from these measures. Finally, fault analysis exploits the following idea, proposed by Biham and Shamir [34]: one can induce faults during the execution of a block cipher by using any physical mean (like
power glitches), to study the effects of these faults on the algorithm behavior, and to extract some information about the key.

**Parameters of an Attack**

Attacks against block ciphers, besides the threat model under consideration, depend on several parameters. Even if it is not always obvious to compare in practice the power of two attacks, since their success depends heavily on the context, these parameters are however inevitable central points in such a comparison.

- **The time complexity** of an attack is the amount of computational processing required to perform this attack successfully. The computational unit is often chosen such that one can compare the attack to an exhaustive key search. Furthermore, one sometimes divides this time complexity in two parts, namely the **pre-computation** and **post-computation** times, if the attack needs to perform computations off-line, i.e. before and after data are required.

- **By data complexity**, one means the number of data (like ciphertexts, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, ...) required to perform an attack in the threat model under consideration. Since these data must be obtained from the key holder, this has a direct influence on the communication complexity.

- **The success probability** of an attack measures the frequency at which the attack is successful when repeated a certain number of times in a (statistically) independent way.

- **The memory complexity** measures the amount of memory units necessary to store either pre-computed data necessary to perform the attack, or (possibly parts of) the data obtained in the threat model under consideration.

Usually, the **complexity of an attack** is often chosen to be the largest figure among the time, data and memory complexities, although there is no general consensus about this fact in the academic literature.

To decide whether a block cipher is broken or not is often more a matter of taste than something which is clearly defined. Usually, an attack is considered to be successful, and the attacked block cipher is considered to be **broken** if the time complexity is significantly smaller than $2^{\ell}$ evaluations of the block ciphers, where $\ell$ denotes its key size; a block cipher is considered to be **partially broken** if some of the plaintext bits can be discovered in time faster than an exhaustive search.

In a similar way, for a fixed key, a block cipher can be completely characterized if the encryption of all possible $2^n$ plaintexts is available, where $n$
is its block size; this puts an upper bound on the data complexity. Quoting NESSIE’s final security report [269],

“A block cipher is considered secure if no attack requires both time and data complexity significantly less than $2^\ell$ and $2^n$, respectively.”

However, it is worth mentioning that the above definition implies that all block ciphers could be considered as broken, since Hellman’s time-memory tradeoff (see [129] and §2.3.2) needs only in the order of $2^{2/3}$ operations and $2^{2/3}$ space to succeed (after a $2^\ell$ pre-computation, which can however be amortized on many attacks)! We prefer adopt the following definition.

**Definition 2.3.1 (Secure Block Cipher).** A block cipher is considered secure if no attack requires both time and data complexity significantly less than the respective complexities required by any generic attack.

As it is often difficult (or it may even be impossible) to exhibit an attack against the full version of an iterative block cipher, another common mean to assess its security consists in taking into account the maximal number of rounds for which an attack is known; at least, this can give some feeling about the security margin of such a block cipher. An illustrative example is Fig. 2.12, page 24, which summarizes the currently best known attacks (without the attacks described in S3.4) on various reduced-round versions of IDEA.

### 2.3.2 Black-Box Attacks

As outlined in the previous part, some of the known attacks against block ciphers can be applied in a “black-box” fashion, i.e. without attacking the internal structure of the block cipher. These attacks include the exhaustive key search, attacks dedicated to multiple encryption, key-collision attacks, and time-memory tradeoffs.

**Exhaustive Key Search**

One of the simplest way to attack a block cipher consists in trying one key after the other until the right one is found. Typically, for a block cipher $e$ having a key size $\ell$ and a block size $n$, and provided that a very small number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs (slightly more than $\lceil \ell/n \rceil$, actually, provided the cipher is not badly flawed) encrypted under the same key $k$, one can recover this key $k$ by exhaustive search; this operation has a worst case time complexity equal to $2^\ell$ evaluations of $e$ and an average time complexity of $2^{\ell-1}$. If the underlying plaintext space is known to contain some redundancy (for instance, it is ASCII text), then one can even consider a ciphertext-only exhaustive search.
One of the interesting properties of an exhaustive key search is that it is an attack which can be executed in parallel on many processors or dedicated machines, each one testing disjoint subsets of the key space. The success probability of an exhaustive key search is equal to the fraction of the key space searched: if one searches one tenth of the key space, then one has roughly a 10% probability to succeed. In other terms, a fixed key size $\ell$ defines an upper bound on the security of a block cipher. Thus, for any secure block cipher, $\ell$ should be large enough to thwart exhaustive key search attacks.

The minimal necessary key size to offer a comfortable security margin has been the subject of much debates in the literature. A prominent example is the key size of DES (see §2.2.1), which possesses a relatively small key size (56 bit) and very early, concerns about the resistance of DES to an exhaustive key search were raised by researchers. In 1977, Diffie and Hellman [93] estimate that a US$ 20'000'000 worth dedicated machine could be built to attack one DES key. In an unpublished paper presented during EUROCRYPT’87 [88], Desmedt and Quisquater propose the design of a dedicated machine based on a chip described in [133] which could be able to break one million DES keys in 4 weeks, or about 3000 keys each hour in average. They estimate the cost of this machine to US$ 3'000'000. In 1990, Garon and Outerbridge [110] estimate that a machine using special-purpose chips costing US$ 1'000'000 could break a DES key in nine days using 1995’s technology and in 43 hours in 2000. At CRYPTO’92, Eberle [96] proposes the design of a chip able to encrypt 1 Gbit/s and estimates that an exhaustive attack against DES would take less than 16 days using a US$ 1'000'000 worth machine. At the same conference, Wayner [325] estimates that a very simple parallel architecture using a content-addressable memory can be used to build a US$ 30'000'000 worth machine able to recover a DES key in one day in average. In 1993, Wiener [328,329] presented the detailed design of a dedicated machine costing about US$ 1’000’000 able to find a DES key in an average of 3.5 hours; in 1997, he revised his estimation down to a time of 35 minutes.

Interestingly, the small key size of DES motivated on the one hand the construction of a dedicated machine in the spirit of the ones described in the works cited above, and on the other hand, several projects based on distributed software and using the idle time of many volunteer computers spread over the Internet, for the sole purpose of demonstrating the weakness of such a small key length. In 1998, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) [97] announced the construction of a US$ 210’000 worth exhaustive-search machine dedicated to attack DES, the design of the machine being

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7This paper appears as Chapter 9 in [98].
8It is worth noticing that Standaert [302] estimates that in 2004, a FPGA-based machine costing US$ 12'000 should break a DES key in 3 days.
thoroughly described in [98]; this machine is able to recover a DES key in about 109 hours in average. The company RSA Security [281] has proposed a sequence of challenges consisting in recovering a DES key. Fig. 2.13 summarizes the results obtained, the most impressive result being a DES key recovered in less than 24 hours. The distributed.net [95] project recovered a RC5 64-bit key on July 14th, 2002 after 1757 days of work and is attempting, at the time of writing, to recover a RC5 72-bit key.

An attempt by a group of cryptographers to address the key size problem in a rigorous way is [40]. In this document, published in 1996, they recommend a minimal key length of 75 bits for providing adequate protection against the most serious threats. For protecting information in a secure way during the next 20 years, they estimate that a minimal key length of 90 bits should be sufficient.

Lenstra and Verheul give in [185] a rigorous estimation of the trend in the future of the computing power needed to break symmetric keys by exhaustive search, taking into account the financial aspects as well as an estimation of the technology power increase. One of their conclusions is that breaking a 78-bit symmetric key in 2010 will be as “hard” as it was to break a 56-bit DES key in 1982. Fig. 2.14 summarizes some of their estimations.

Nowadays, modern block ciphers usually allow keys of 128, 192, 256 bits or even more; this allows to thwart easily an exhaustive search of the key space. Note that in all of these considerations, we have assumed a classical model of computation. Actually, a quantum computer, implementing Grover’s
algorithm [120], is able to find a given item in an unsorted list of size $n$ in time $O(\sqrt{n})$ instead of $O(n)$. Actually, Grover’s algorithm can be shown to be optimal. Thus, a quantum computer will have to execute in the order of $2^{64}$ (quantum) operations to break a 128-bit key by exhaustive search. However, the current state of the technology is far to be sufficient to build a quantum computer.

Key-Collision Attack

Another interesting black-box attack, called key-collision attack, has been described by Biham [20]. The principles are very simple and are based on the birthday paradox. We assume that we are attacking a block cipher with a key length $\ell$ and a block length $n < \ell$; furthermore, we assume that a known plaintext $p$ is encrypted under many distinct keys. We can build a table of $p$ encrypted under $2^\ell$ random distinct keys and, by the birthday paradox, we expect that, after observing about $2^{\ell/2}$ ciphertexts, the probability to recover at least one key becomes non-negligible. Fig. 2.15 gives the relation between the number of precomputed encryptions and the expected number of keys found in the case of a key-collision attack against DES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of precomputed ciphertexts</th>
<th>$2^{28}$</th>
<th>$2^{32}$</th>
<th>$2^{40}$</th>
<th>$2^{48}$</th>
<th>$2^{56}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected number of keys found</td>
<td>$1$</td>
<td>$2^8$</td>
<td>$2^{24}$</td>
<td>$2^{40}$</td>
<td>$2^{56}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.15: Complexity of a key-collision attack against DES**

Multiple Encryption

A few black-box attacks against block ciphers using multiple encryption (in the sense of Def. 2.1.3 and Def. 2.1.4) have been discovered so far.

In 1977, Diffie and Hellman [93] noted a meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack on double encryption (see Def. 2.1.3), suggesting that one should using at least three-fold encryption in a multiple-encryption scenario. This attack works as follows: we assume first that we have a few known plaintext-ciphertext pairs $(p_i, c_i)$ encrypted with the same (unknown) key at disposal, i.e. such that $c_i = e_{k_2}(e_{k_1}(p_i))$. Given $(p_1, c_1)$, we compute $m_s = e_s(p_1)$ under all possible $2^{\ell}$ possible key values $s$ and we store the pairs $(m_s, s)$, indexed on the $m_s$'s in a table. Then, we decipher $c_1$ under all $2^{\ell}$ possible key values $t$ and for each pair $m_t = d_t(c_1)$, we look for an equality $m_t = m_s$ in the first table. Each solution clearly identifies a possible solution key pair $(s, t)$. Using the few other known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, one can finally isolate the right key $(k_1, k_2)$. This attacks breaks a block cipher with a $\ell$-bit key used in double-encryption mode in time $O(2^{\ell})$ and uses $O(2^{\ell})$ memory.
cells. This attack has been generalized to a cascade of \( c \geq 2 \) block ciphers by Even and Goldreich in [100].

According to [221, page 272], Merkle describes in his PhD thesis [222] (see [224] as well) a chosen-plaintext attack against two-key triple encryption (see Def. 2.1.4) which needs \( O(2^\ell) \) block cipher evaluations, \( O(2^\ell) \) memory cells and \( O(2^\ell) \) chosen plaintexts, where \( \ell \) is the key size. The idea is to reduce a two-key triple encryption to a double encryption in the following way: for all possible \( 2^\ell \) possible key values \( s \), compute \( p_s = d_s(0) \). Submit each resulting \( p_s \) as a chosen-plaintext to the encryption module and obtain the corresponding \( c_s \). For each \( c_s \), compute \( x_s = d_s(c_s) \). This value represents an intermediate value \( x \) after the second of the three encryption stages, as it is the case for the \( p_s \) values. Then, sort the values \( p_s \) and \( x_t \) in a table. The cases where \( p_s = x_t \) propose a candidate key pair \((s, t)\). One finally isolates the solution among the candidates using a few more known pairs.

This attack was turned in 1990 into a known-plaintext attack by van Oorschot and Wiener [309]. Basically, given \( q \) known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, their attack requires \( O(q) \) memory cells and a time complexity equal to \( O(2^\ell \log_2 q) \), where \( \ell \) is the total key length. In [310], the same authors consider ways to decrease the (costly) memory needs while increasing the time complexity; Lucks studies in [193] the inverse strategy.

### Time-Memory Tradeoffs

Hellman [129] proposed a time-memory tradeoff which can be applied to an exhaustive key search. The idea here consists in precomputing some information and to use it in order to speed up key searches. Practically, this attack is able to recover an \( \ell \)-bit secret key after \( O\left(2^{2\ell / 3}\right) \) encryption operations by using \( O\left(2^{2\ell / 3}\right) \) words of memory, whose content is initialized in a unique precomputation step needing \( 2^\ell \) encryptions. According to Denning [87, page 100], Rivest proposed to use distinguished points to reduce the search time. Some extensions of these works (both theoretical and practical) may be found in [5, 105, 106, 175, 304].

The efficiency of Hellman’s time-memory tradeoff has been improved by Oechslin [256] (although the asymptotic time complexity remains the same): in his paper, he proposes a new way to pre-calculate the data which allows to reduce significantly the number of operations during the attack itself.

#### 2.3.3 Statistical Attacks

In this part, we present briefly a sequence of attacks exploiting undesirable probabilistic properties of block ciphers.
Differential Cryptanalysis and Variants

A very important attack against block ciphers is the differential cryptanalysis. It was proposed by Biham and Shamir in 1990 to attack DES [31–33] and then applied against several ciphers by many cryptographers with success. In this part, we present the ideas behind differential cryptanalysis together with some known variations and generalizations.

Differential cryptanalysis is a method which looks at ciphertext pairs whose corresponding plaintexts have particular differences. More precisely, let $\cdot$ denote the group law on the groups of bit strings used to combine the key with the text in a block cipher and where $(p')^{-1}$ is the inverse element of $p'$ in the group. Then a difference $\Delta$ is defined as $\Delta p = p \cdot (p')^{-1}$ where $(p')^{-1}$ is the inverse element of $p'$ in the group. Indeed, $\cdot$-based differences are invariant under the $\cdot$ operation used to mix a (fixed) key, since

$$(p \cdot k) \cdot (p' \cdot k)^{-1} = p \cdot k \cdot k^{-1} \cdot (p')^{-1} = p \cdot (p')^{-1}$$

for all $p, p'$ and (fixed) key $k$. Closely related concepts are the differential probability and the maximal differential probability.

**Definition 2.3.2 (Differential Probability).** The differential probability of a function $f_k$ relatively to a pair of differences $\Omega = (a, b)$ and a group operation $\cdot$, denoted $\text{DP}^f(a, b)$, is defined as

$$\text{DP}^f(a, b) = \Pr_X [f_k (X \cdot a) = f_k (X) \cdot b]$$

and the maximal differential probability is defined to be

$$\text{DP}^f_{\text{max}} = \max_{a \neq 0, b} \text{DP}^f(a, b)$$

As this group operation is an exclusive-or (XOR), denoted $\oplus$, in a majority of block ciphers, we will restrict ourselves to this operation when speaking about differential cryptanalysis.

One can concatenate two difference pairs $\Omega_1 = (\omega_1^{(1)}, \omega_2^{(1)})$ and $\Omega_2 = (\omega_1^{(2)}, \omega_2^{(2)})$ if $\omega_2^{(1)} = \omega_1^{(2)}$. In this case, one may often approximate the differential probability of the resulting differential pair by the product of the differential probabilities of $\Omega_1$ and of $\Omega_2$, respectively.

Let $f = f^{(r)} \circ \ldots \circ f^{(1)}$ be an iterated block cipher made of $r$ rounds; we are interested in pairs $(x, x')$ such that $f (x \oplus a) = f (x') \oplus b$ with high probability for some fixed $a \neq 0$ and $b$. The sequence of differences induced by the pair $\Omega = (a, b)$ in the $r$ rounds of $f$ is called [33] a differential characteristic.

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9In fact, differential cryptanalysis was known before 1990. Coppersmith, which was a member of the DES [242] design team at IBM in the early 70’s, revealed that his team was aware of this attack back in 1974 and that they designed DES S-boxes and the permutations in order to optimally defeat it.
Definition 2.3.3 (r-rounds differential characteristic). An r-rounds differential characteristic $\Omega$ is a sequence of differences defined as an $(r+1)$-tuple $(\omega_0, \omega_1, \ldots, \omega_r)$ where $\Delta x = \omega_0$ and $\Delta y_i = \omega_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq r$.

A heuristic assumption used to mount a differential cryptanalysis states that the propagation of differences is independent of the (unknown) subkey values and that the associated differential probability is the same than the average over all possible subkey values. This assumption is known as hypothesis of stochastic equivalence and was formally stated by Lai [179, 182].

Assumption 2.3.1 (Hypothesis of stochastic equivalence). For virtually all high-probability r-round differentials $(\omega_0, \omega_r)$, \[
\Pr_{X_1, X_2|K} \left[ \Delta Y^{(r)} = \omega_r | \Delta X = \omega_0 \right] = \Pr_{X_1, X_2|K} \left[ \Delta Y^{(r)} = \omega_r | \Delta X = \omega_0, K = k \right]
\]
holds for a substantial fraction of the subkey values $k = (k_1, \ldots, k_r)$.

In other words, one assumes that the variance of $\text{DP}^f(\omega_0, \omega_r)$ (taken over the key distribution) is very small for every “interesting” pair $(\omega_0, \omega_r)$. Thus, an essential measure is the one of expected differential probability.

Definition 2.3.4 (Expected Differential Probability). The expected differential probability of a function $f_k$ relatively to a pair of differences $\Omega = (a, b)$ is defined by \[
\text{EDP}^f(a, b) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \text{DP}^{f_k}(a, b) \right]
\]
where the expectation is taken over the key distribution.

In order to study in a formal way differential cryptanalysis, which is essentially heuristic, we need a good probabilistic model of the block cipher $f$ under review. Lai’s PhD thesis [179] (see [182] as well) introduces the concept of Markov cipher.

Definition 2.3.5 (Markov Cipher). An iterated block cipher with round function $y = f_k(x)$ is a Markov cipher if there is a group operation $\circ$ for defining differences such that, for all choices of $a \neq 0$, $b \neq 0$, and of $x$, the equality \[
\Pr_K \left[ f_K(x \circ a) = f_K(x) \circ b \right] = \text{EDP}^f(a, b)
\]
holds.

In an iterated r-round Markov cipher, the differential probability of a differential characteristic $\Omega = (\omega_0, \omega_1, \ldots, \omega_r)$ is independent of the actual input
of a given round, and provided the round subkeys are statistically independent and uniformly distributed, the individual round probabilities are independent and may be computed as

$$
E \left[ \Pr_{X_1, X_2} \left[ \Delta Y^{(i)} = \omega_i, 1 \leq i \leq r \mid \Delta X = \omega_0 \right] \right] = \prod_{i=1}^{r} \text{EDP}^{f(i)}(\omega_{i-1}, \omega_i).
$$

where the expectation is taken over the key.

Conceptually, no real block cipher is a Markov cipher, since most modern design use a key-schedule algorithm to generate round subkeys out of the key. Thus, round subkeys are virtually always statistically dependent. Anyway, Biham and Shamir [32] observe that the product of the 1-round differential probabilities seems to result in a good approximation in the case of a differential cryptanalysis of DES.

As observed for the first time by Lai, Massey and Murphy [182], it may sometimes be useful to consider an $r$-rounds differential characteristic depending only of $\Delta X$ and $\Delta Y^{(r)}$: one calls such a “characteristic” a differential.

**Definition 2.3.6 ($r$-rounds differential).** An $r$-rounds differential is defined as a pair of differences $(\omega_0, \omega_r)$ where $\Delta x = \omega_0$ and $\Delta y^{(r)} = \omega_r$.

In other words, the intermediate differences $\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_{r-1}$ are allowed to take any value and the cryptanalyst takes thus advantage of the cumulative effect of many differential characteristics. The probability of an $r$-round differential in a Markov cipher $f$ is then equal to

$$
\text{DP}^f(\omega_0, \omega_r) = \sum_{\omega_1} \ldots \sum_{\omega_{r-1}} \prod_{i=1}^{r} \Pr \left[ \Delta y^{(i)} = \omega_i \mid \Delta y^{(i-1)} = \omega_{i-1} \right]
$$

with the convention that $\Delta y^{(0)} = \Delta x$.

Typically, the first step towards a successful differential cryptanalysis against a block cipher consists is finding a high-probability differential characteristic or differential. In order to be able to mount a key-recovery attack against an $r$-rounds, one usually exploits a characteristic active on a $r - s$ rounds, with $s$ small (e.g. $s = 1$ or $s = 2$). The second step consists in “guessing” the $k$ key bits relevant to the $s$ first (or last, or a mixture of the two) rounds and linked to the differential characteristic, which allows us to in some sense to “peel” these $s$ rounds off. By managing a counter for each of the $2^k$ (sub-) key candidates, one counts the number of times where a (sub-) key leads to the expected difference pair.

In their seminal paper, Biham and Shamir [33] introduce the concept of signal-to-noise ratio: it is the ratio, for a fixed subkey candidates, between the number of right pairs it generates, i.e. the pairs of plaintexts which lead to the expected output difference, and the average number of wrong
pairs taken over all (sub-) key candidates, i.e. pairs which don’t lead to this precise difference. To isolate the correct (sub-) key, one needs obviously a sufficiently large number of right pairs. Biham and Shamir observed that high values of signal-to-noise ratio (i.e. significantly larger than one) lead to a small need in right pairs, while values equal or smaller than one lead to an unreasonably large number of needed right pairs.

**Impossible Differentials** A variant of differential cryptanalysis using so-called *impossible differentials* was proposed later by Biham, Biryukov and Shamir [26] against 31 rounds of Skipjack; it is a sieving attack which looks at differentials having a probability equal to zero (or unexpectedly low) to occur. If a pair is decrypted to such a difference under some key, then this key is certainly not the correct one and can be eliminated from the set of candidates. A typical technique (called “miss-in-the-middle”) to construct an impossible differential is to combine two differentials holding with probability 1, but which cannot be simultaneously satisfied.

Borst, Knudsen and Rijmen [45] observed in an attack against a variant of IDEA that in the case where the signal-to-noise ratio is larger than one, the right (sub-)key value is among the most suggested while, when the signal-to-noise ratio is smaller than one, the right (sub-)key is the least suggested one. According to Nakahara [237], “the overall consensus is that the case where the signal-to-noise ratio is equal to 1 does not allow to distinguish the right subkey from the wrong ones”. We will come back to this issue in §3.3.4, prove this assertion and show that the signal-to-noise ratio is indeed a quantity linked to the optimal distinguisher.

**Higher-Order Differentials** The concept of difference has been generalized by Lai in [180] and used to define an attack framework called “higher-order differentials” by Knudsen [161].

**Definition 2.3.7 (Higher-order differential).** A one-round differential of order $i$ is an $(i+1)$-tuple $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_i, \beta)$ such that

$$\Delta_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_i} f(x) = \beta$$

where $f$ is a function from an additive Abelian group $\mathcal{G}$ to an additive Abelian group $\Sigma$ and

$$\Delta_a f(x) = f(x + a) - f(x)$$

$$\Delta_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_i}^{(i)} = \Delta_{\alpha_i} \left( \Delta_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{i-1}}^{(i-1)} f(x) \right)$$

A higher-order differential attacks works similarly as a basic differential cryptanalysis, i.e. it exploits a high-probability higher-order difference pair. Higher-order differential attacks have then been applied with success by Morai, Shimoyama and Kaneko [230] against CAST and against reduced-round versions of Misty1 and Kasumi (see [13, 56, 127, 306, 307]).
Truncated Differentials Another variant of differential cryptanalysis is the so-called truncated differential cryptanalysis (see Def. 2.3.8) which have been proposed by Knudsen in [161]. In this paper, it is shown that it can be advantageous to predict parts of the differences after each round of a cipher. A truncated differential can be seen as a collection of common differentials.

**Definition 2.3.8 (Truncated differential).** Let $\Omega = (\omega_0, \omega_r)$ be a $r$-round differential. If $\omega'_0$ is a subsequence of $\omega_0$ and $\omega'_r$ is a subsequence of $\omega_r$, then $\Omega' = (\omega'_0, \omega'_r)$ is called a $r$-round truncated differential.

Truncated differentials have been used in an attack [165] against 5 of the 6 rounds of SAFER K-64, to attack [45] 3.5 rounds of IDEA and Skipjack [117, 168, 272].

Boomerang attack A more adaptive differential-like attack is Wagner’s boomerang attack [322]. Usually, a block cipher designer may argue that a block cipher is immune against differential cryptanalysis because he obtains an upper bound on the probability $\pi$ of any differential characteristic and that one needs supposedly at least $\frac{1}{\pi}$ texts to break the cipher. A boomerang distinguisher allows the attacker to beat the $\frac{1}{\pi}$ bounds in certain cases.

This attack, in contrast to a classical differential attack, does not require that the full cipher is spanned by a single differentials; it exploits high probability differentials, possibly uncorrelated, but that jointly cover the full cipher. To perform this attack, an attacker needs two oracles, namely
an encryption and a decryption one. More formally, let \( f \) be a block cipher that can be written\(^{10}\) as \( f = f_1 \circ f_0 \). let us assume that there exists a differential characteristic (or a differential, or a truncated differential) \( (\delta, \delta') \) with respect to \( \oplus \) which spans \( f_0 \) with a non-negligible probability \( \pi(\delta, \delta') \): then \( \delta' = f_0(p_1) \oplus f_0(p_2) \). Let \( c_1 = f(p_1) \) and \( c_2 = f(p_2) \) and let us define \( \lambda = c_1 \oplus c_3 = c_2 \oplus c_4 \), where the differential characteristic \( (\lambda, \lambda') \) spans \( f_1 \) with a non-negligible probability \( \pi(\lambda, \lambda') \) (see Fig. 2.16 for an illustration); then,

\[
\lambda' = f_1^{-1}(c_1) \oplus f_1^{-1}(c_3) = f_1^{-1}(c_2) \oplus f_1^{-1}(c_4)
\]

The attack works as follows: choose a pair \((p_1, p_2)\) such that \( \delta = p_1 \oplus p_2 \) and submit it to the encryption oracle to get the pair \((c_1, c_2)\). Then submit \((c_1 \oplus \lambda, c_2 \oplus \lambda)\) to the decryption oracle and check that the corresponding plaintext pair \((p_3, p_4)\) satisfies \( \lambda = p_3 \oplus p_4 \). Following Wagner’s terminology, a right quartet is defined as a 4-tuple \((p_1, p_2, c_3, c_4)\) for which all four differential patterns defined previously hold simultaneously. The probability \( \pi_b \) to observe a boomerang \( \delta = p_3 \oplus p_4 \) can be estimated as

\[
\pi_b = \pi^2(\delta, \delta') \times \pi^2(\lambda, \lambda')
\]

Improvements of the boomerang attack are the amplified boomerang attack \([158]\) of Kelsey, Kohno and Schneier and the rectangle attack of Biham, Dunkelman and Keller \([28]\).

### Linear Cryptanalysis and Variants

Another generic way to exploit non-linearities in block ciphers is the linear cryptanalysis. Based on earlier observations by Shamir \([292]\) and attacks against FEAL of Gilbert, Tardy-Corfdir, Chassé, Matsui and Yamagishi \([113, 206, 308]\), this known-plaintext attack was proposed by Matsui in \([202]\) in a version dedicated to \(\text{DES}\), which was refined later and implemented in \([203]\).

The goal of a linear cryptanalysis is to find unbalanced linear relations: they are Boolean equations involving the sum in \(\text{GF}(2)\) of some plaintext, ciphertext and key bits which holds with a probability \( \pi \neq \frac{1}{2} \). By linear relation, we mean an equation

\[
a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot f_k(x) = 0
\]

where \(a, b\) are vectors over \(\text{GF}(2)\) (and usually called masks), \(x\) and \(f_k(x)\) are seen as vectors over \(\text{GF}(2)\) and \(\cdot\) denotes the inner dot-product. In a similar way as in the case of linear cryptanalysis, we can define the concepts of linear probability.

\(^{10}\)The parts do not need to have the same size.
Definition 2.3.9 (Linear probability). The linear probability of a function \( f \) relatively to a pair of masks \( (a, b) \) of vectors over \( \text{GF}(2) \), denoted \( \text{LP}^f(a, b) \), is defined as
\[
\text{LP}^f(a, b) = \left( 2 \Pr_X \left[ a \cdot X = b \cdot f_k(X) \right] - 1 \right)^2
\]
and the maximal linear probability is defined to be
\[
\text{LP}^f_{\text{max}} = \max_{a, b \neq 0} \text{LP}^f(a, b)
\]
Similarly to the definition of expected differential probability, one can define the expected linear probability.

Definition 2.3.10 (Expected Linear Probability). The expected linear probability of a function \( f_k \) relatively to a pair of masks \( (a, b) \) is defined by
\[
\text{ELP}^f(a, b) = E \left( \text{LP}^{f_k(a, b)} \right)
\]
where the expectation is taken over the key distribution.

We can define the concepts of \( r \)-rounds linear characteristic in a similar way as for differential cryptanalysis.

Definition 2.3.11 (Linear characteristic). Let \( f = f^{(r)} \circ \cdots \circ f^{(1)} \) be an iterated block cipher made of \( r \) rounds. An \( r \)-round linear characteristic \( \Lambda \) is a sequence of masks defined as an \( r + 1 \)-tuple \( (\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_r) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq r \).

The linear characteristic probability is then defined as follows.

Definition 2.3.12 (Linear Characteristic Probability). The linear characteristic probability of an \( r \)-round iterated function \( f_k \) relatively to an \( r \)-rounds linear characteristic \( \Lambda = (\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_r) \) is defined as
\[
\text{LCP}^{f_k}(\Lambda) = \prod_{i=1}^{r} \text{LP}^{f_k(i)}(\lambda_{i-1}, \lambda_i)
\]
where \( f^{(i)} \) denotes the \( i \)-th round function equipped with a round subkey. The expected linear characteristic probability is defined as
\[
\text{ELCP}^f(\Lambda) = \prod_{i=1}^{r} \text{ELP}^{f(i)}(\lambda_{i-1}, \lambda_i)
\]
Similar to the concept of differential in a differential cryptanalysis, Nyberg [250] has introduced the concept of linear hulls.
Definition 2.3.13 (Linear hull). Let $f = f^{(r)} \circ \ldots \circ f^{(1)}$ be an iterated block cipher made of $r$ rounds. An $r$-round linear hull $(a, b)$ is the set of all $r$-round linear characteristics of the form $(\lambda_0, \ldots, \lambda_r)$ where $\lambda_0 = a$ and $\lambda_r = b$.

As in the case of a differential, the intermediate masks are allowed to take any value; thus, one takes advantage of the cumulative effect of many linear characteristics. The effect of linear hull explains why linear cryptanalysis’ efficiency could be underestimated in certain situations.

Some generalizations have been proposed, without any significant practical improvements: linear cryptanalysis with multiple approximations [153], with non-linear approximations [167] or with quadratic expressions [297]. We will come back in §3 on several issues about linear cryptanalysis.

Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis

In certain precise situations, one can combine different attack techniques to form a new attack. A nice illustration is the differential-linear cryptanalysis proposed by Langford and Hellman [183]. In this attack, one uses a differential through a fraction of the cipher which is used to create a linear relation holding with probability 1. This linear relation is then concatenated with other linear relations on the remaining of the cipher. This technique was refined recently by Biham et al. [29] in order to create linear relations holding with a probability strictly less than 1.

$\chi^2$ Attacks

This attack was proposed for the first time by Vaudenay [312] in the context of a statistical cryptanalysis of DES: in this paper, it is shown that one can obtain an attack slightly less powerful than a linear cryptanalysis, but without knowing precisely what happens in the block cipher. The idea consists in looking for relations of any kind which produce a significant deviation from what one should expect from a uniformly distributed permutation. A distinguisher is then built using a $\chi^2$ statistical analysis. We will come back on the foundations of this attack in §3.

Non-Surjective Attacks

Davies’ attack\textsuperscript{11} [83] (which is probably the first statistical attack in the modern cryptanalysis era) against DES is a statistical attack which exploits

\textsuperscript{11}Note that, although this attack was published in 1995, it has been already communicated by Davies in 1987 to some cryptographers. According to the PhD thesis of Gilbert [112], it may be due to the fact that DES was (and is still) broadly used in the banking system and that it was useless to drop the confidence in this algorithm.
the fact that the outputs from neighboring S-boxes are not uniformly distributed. This attack, which has been optimized in [24, 25] by Biham and Biryukov, can derive a DES secret key if $2^{50}$ known plaintext-ciphertext pairs are available. Although it can theoretically be applied to any Feistel cipher, this attack has merely historical interest: it was the third attack breaking DES faster than an exhaustive key search.

This attack framework was generalized in 1997 by Rijmen, Preneel, and De Win [276]. It applies to Feistel ciphers (see Fig. 2.3). More formally, let us consider an $r$-round Feistel cipher on $n$-bit strings, where $r \geq 4$ and $n$ and $r$ are even numbers. Plaintexts and ciphertexts consists in two halves $x_l$ and $x_r$ of size $\frac{n}{2}$ each. Round $i$ of the Feistel scheme takes a $n$-bit input $(x_l^{(i)}, x_r^{(i)})$ and a round subkey $k^{(i)}$ and returns a $n$-bit output computed as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
  x_l^{(i+1)} &= x_r^{(i)} \\
  x_r^{(i+1)} &= x_l^{(i)} \oplus f\left(k^{(i)} \oplus x_r^{(i)}\right)
\end{align*}
\]

Let us furthermore define the quantity

\[
\sigma_r = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{r/2} f\left(k^{(2i)} \oplus x_r^{(2i-1)}\right)
\]

We can note that $\sigma_r = x_r^{(0)} \oplus x_r^{(r)}$. If the function $f^{(i)}$ is unbalanced, i.e. if it does not take all the outputs in its range equally often, or in other words, it is not surjective, then $\sigma_r$ will be unbalanced as well, provided the subkeys are independent and uniformly distributed. If not all values of $\sigma_r$ have the same probability to occur, then one can gather statistical information about the key.

### 2.3.4 Integral Attacks

Basically, differential cryptanalysis and variants thereof consist in studying the propagation of differences between pairs of plaintexts (or ciphertexts). The integral cryptanalysis [134, 169] extends this view by considering sums of (many) values. Older and less general variants of this attack are known as the square attack, proposed in the specifications of Square, structural cryptanalysis of Biryukov and Shamir [36], and the saturation attack of Lucks [195]. A central concept is the one of integral.

**Definition 2.3.14 (Integral).** Let $\mathfrak{G}$ be a finite Abelian group of order $k$ and let us consider the product group $\mathfrak{G}^n = \mathfrak{G} \times \ldots \times \mathfrak{G}$ equipped with the component-wise addition. Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a multiset of vectors. An integral over $\mathcal{M}$ is defined as

\[
\int \mathcal{M} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{M}} v
\]

where the summation is defined in terms of the group operation for $\mathfrak{G}^n$. 

In an integral attack, one will typically try to predict the values of integrals after a certain number of rounds. One usually is interested in one of the three following cases: all $i$-th components are equal, all components are different or all $i$-th components sum to a (predicted in advance) constant.

2.3.5 Algebraic Attacks

In his seminal paper [295], Shannon stated that breaking of a block cipher should “require as much work as solving a system of simultaneous equations in a large number of unknowns of a complex type”. Some preliminary attempts in this direction is the early work of Schaumüller-Bichl [282] in an application to DES, but without much practical success.

Interpolation Attack

A purely algebraic (and practical) way to break block ciphers is the interpolation attack proposed by Knudsen and Jakobsen [142]. It is based on the well-known Lagrange’s formula: if $\mathbb{F}$ is a field, the unique polynomial $p(x) \in \mathbb{F}[x]$ of degree at most $n - 1$ such that $p(x_i) = y_i$ for $n$ pairs $(x_i, y_i) \in \mathbb{F}^2$ is equal to

$$p(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i \prod_{1 \leq j \leq n \atop j \neq i} \frac{x - x_j}{x_i - x_j}$$

In an interpolation attack, one is interested in constructing polynomials using inputs and outputs of the block cipher. The attack’s idea is that if the constructed polynomials have a small degree, only few plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts are necessary to solve for the key-dependent coefficients of the polynomial. A probabilistic version of the interpolation attack has been published later by Jakobsen [139, 143].

Courtois-Pieprzyk Attack

Under a purely algebraic approach, a first step is to express a given block cipher in a system of equations; actually, every component of a block cipher can be described with help of a set of algebraic equations. If one collects these descriptions, one gets a large system which mathematically defines the complete block cipher. If it is possible to solve this system faster than an exhaustive key search, then the cipher may be considered to be broken. Surprisingly, Ferguson, Schroeppel and Whiting [104] have managed to do in the case of Rijndael. Actually, they express Rijndael as a single equation made of $2^{50}$ terms. Undoubtedly, such a huge equation is extremely difficult to work with, but it is a nice proof-of-concept.

In a second step, Courtois and Pieprzyk [70] show that the S-boxes of Rijndael and Serpent can be written as an overdefined system of algebraic
equations on GF (2); this fact is due to the algebraic essence of the S-box (it is based on the inverse operation in a finite field) in the case of Rijndael and to the small size (4-bit) of the substitution boxes of Serpent. In their paper, they claim that Serpent with 256-bit may be broken faster with exhaustive search using their so-called XSL-attack. They exploit previous results of Shamir and Kipnis [293] developed to attack public-key cryptosystems based on multivariate quadratic equations; the key idea is to consider nonlinear terms as independent linear variables and to solve the obtained system using a Gaussian reduction. This process is named re-linearization and has been extended later by Courtois et al. [68]. At the time of writing, the exact complexity of these attacks is not known, and an accurate analysis remains an open problem; however, it is worth noticing that such attacks are clearly effective against stream ciphers [65, 66, 69].

Interestingly, Murphy and Robshaw [235] show that it is possible to reduce the complexity of the system of equations describing Rijndael by working on GF \((2^8)\) instead of GF (2). At the time of writing attacks against the 128-bit key version of Rijndael expressed as a multivariate quadratic equations system over GF \((2^8)\) are claimed to succeed within about \(2^{80}\) to \(2^{100}\) operations, but this complexity is far to be accepted by the research community.

2.3.6 Other Attacks

Slide Attacks

An interesting concept of attack is the slide attack and variations thereof proposed by Biryukov and Wagner [37, 38]. An important and unusual property of this attack is that it is independent of the block cipher rounds number. It exploits the degree of self-similarity of the block cipher: for instance, one can apply it against block ciphers having a periodic key schedule. Let \(f = f_r \circ \ldots \circ f_1\) be an \(r\)-round block cipher and let us denote \(x_i\) the encrypted value after \(i\) rounds (\(x_0\) denotes thus the plaintext and \(x_r\) the ciphertext). If the relation \(x_1 = f_1(x_0, k^{(1)})\) holds, where \(k^{(1)}\) is the round subkey used during the first round, then \((x_0, x_1)\) is called a slid pair. An adversary gets two relations \(x_1 = f_1(x_0, k^{(1)})\) and \(f_r(x_r, k^{(r)}) = x_{r+1}\) which involve only a single round function, and which can potentially be solved for \(k^{(1)}\) and \(k^{(r)}\).

This attack can be applied to variants of DES, like the one proposed by Brown and Seberry [52], the Even-Mansour scheme [101], or every Feistel scheme with a 4-rounds periodic key-schedule, for instance. Furthermore, it has been shown that certain auto-key ciphers (where the choice of the round key is dependent of the data) are also vulnerable to this attack.
Related Cipher Attack

Certain block ciphers allow a variable round number. Wu demonstrated in [332] that block ciphers with such a property, whose key-schedule does not depend on the total number of rounds, and which share the same round functions may succumb to a related-cipher attack.

A related-cipher attack can be applied when the key is fixed, and when the block cipher is used with different round numbers; it can recover the key when the differences between the round numbers is small. More formally, let \( f_r \) be a block cipher made of \( r \) rounds and \( f_{r+1} \) the same block cipher with one round more. Let us admit that an adversary is able to get the decryption \( p = f_r^{-1}(c) \) of a ciphertext \( c \) under a key \( k \) and the encryption \( c' = f_{r+1}(p) \) of \( p \) under the same key by the same cipher with one more round. Then, the adversary knows that \( f(c) = c' \) under the key \( k \). As a single round function is insecure in most of block ciphers, there is a high probability that the adversary is able to recover the round subkey. More generally, the adversary may use this method to learn the remaining round subkeys, and eventually the key, provided the key-schedule algorithm is not one-way. This attack could still be applied against more than one round, exploiting an elaborated attack against this reduced-round cipher.

2.4 Security Models

To precisely quantify the security of a block cipher, and thus prove that it fulfills given security requirements, is an extremely difficult task with nowadays knowledge (ultimately, one should not forget that up to now, very little can be proved with respect to the practical security of block ciphers).

A first task consists in defining the precise security model in which one would like to prove the security of a primitive. A rather intuitive definition of the security of a block cipher is the K-security concept of Daemen and Rijmen [81]; obviously, this definition is extremely difficult to work with in a mathematical sense.

**Definition 2.4.1 (K-Security).** A block cipher is K-secure if all possible attack strategies for it have the same expected work factor and storage requirements as for the majority of possible block ciphers with the same dimensions. This must be the case for all possible modes of access for the adversary (known / chosen / adaptively chosen plaintext / ciphertext, known / chosen / adaptively chosen key relations, ...) and for any a priori key distribution.

The NESSIE project [247] considered furthermore two additional informal (but pragmatic) security models, namely practical security and historical security: in the first model, which includes most of the cryptanalysis performed nowadays, a block cipher is considered secure if the best-known at-
tack requires too much resources by an acceptable margin. It is a very practical model as one can test the block cipher with different known attacks and assess a certain security level to it. However, it is not possible to predict the security of the underlying block cipher with respect to yet unknown attacks. The historical security of a block cipher is derived according to the amount of cryptanalytic work on the ciphers performed over the years. An old block cipher which resists to all cryptanalytical attacks since a long time will inevitably inspire a larger security feeling than a new block cipher which has not been extensively cryptanalysed.

In this section we present additionally different formal approaches described so far in the academic literature; we consider Shannon's perfect security model, also named information-theoretical security, the security against polynomially bounded adversary, and ad-hoc proofs of security.

2.4.1 Perfect Secrecy

In his seminal paper about cryptography, Shannon [295] introduced a model of security known as perfect security or unconditional security. In this very strong model, one assumes that the adversary is infinitely powerful, but restricted to a ciphertext-only attack.

Let us model a block cipher as two statistically independent probability distributions on the plaintext $X$ and on the key $Y$, respectively. Then, a cryptosystem $f$, where $Y = f_K(X)$ is said to have the property of perfect secrecy if the two probability distributions, for all $x$ and $y$, satisfy

$$\Pr_{X|Y}[X = x|Y = y] = \Pr_X[X = x]$$

Perfect security means that the a posteriori distribution of the plaintext $X$ after viewing the ciphertext $Y$ is equal to the a priori distribution of the plaintext, or in other words, the adversary learns nothing more about the plaintext after having viewed the ciphertext than she knew before. Let us recall Shannon’s notion of entropy [294].

**Definition 2.4.2 (Entropy of a random variable).** Let $X$ be a discrete random variable defined on a finite set $\mathcal{X}$. The entropy of $X$ is defined to be the quantity

$$H(X) = - \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X} \neq \emptyset} \frac{\Pr[X = x]}{\Pr[X = x] \neq 0} \log_2 \Pr[X = x]$$

One can express the concept of perfect secrecy with help of entropy.

**Theorem 2.4.1 (Shannon [295]).** Let $X$ and $Y$ be random variables distributed according to the probability distribution of the plaintext and the ciphertext, respectively. Perfect secrecy is equivalent to

$$H(X) = H(X|Y)$$
A well-known example of perfectly secure cipher is the one-time pad, or Vernam cipher [321]. Let us assume that the plaintext is a string \( x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \) of \( \ell \) bits. The key is defined to be an \( \ell \)-bit string drawn uniformly at random from the set of all \( \ell \)-bit strings and statistically independent of the plaintext, and the ciphertext is just the bitwise XOR operation between the plaintext and the key. Then, provided the key is used to encrypt a single plaintext (otherwise, the one-time-pad would suffer from a trivial known-plaintext attack), the Vernam cipher is a perfect cipher. Unfortunately, the one-time-pad suffers from two major drawbacks: the key is very large, and one cannot reuse it. However, it is the price to have perfect secrecy, as stated by the following theorem, due to Shannon [295].

**Theorem 2.4.2.** Let \( X \) and \( Y \) be random variables distributed according to the probability distribution of the plaintext and the ciphertext, respectively. Perfect secrecy implies

\[
H(K) \geq H(X)
\]

In other words, in a perfect cipher, the key must be at least as large as the plaintext.

### 2.4.2 Security against Bounded Adversaries

Mainly due to the fact that perfect secrecy is a too strong model of security which leads to unpractical constructions, modern cryptography assumes usually that the adversary’s power (like computational resources, memory resources, or the number of queries to an oracle), are bounded.

**Bounded-Storage Model**

In the bounded-storage model, proposed by Maurer [207,208], one assumes that an adversary has an infinite computational power, but is limited in terms of storage capacity. Known ciphers in the bounded-storage model make largely use of a randomizer, i.e. a large amount of public randomness which can be tampered by the adversary, but not stored completely.

**Luby-Rackoff Model**

The field of provable security for block ciphers has probably been initiated by Luby and Rackoff in their seminal article [191] where they proved that a three-round Feistel cipher (see Def. 2.2.1) involving statistically independent pseudorandom functions results in a pseudorandom permutation. Since then, many researchers have studied, improved and extended their results (see [164, 192, 209, 213, 241, 260, 261, 263, 265, 271, 336]).

In the Luby-Rackoff security model, a distinguisher \( \delta^* \) is a computationally (and memory) unbounded Turing machine which can play with an
oracle \( \Omega \) implementing a permutation. This permutation is, with probability \( \pi_0 = \frac{1}{2} \) the block cipher \( C \) under review (i.e. a random permutation defined by a block cipher on \( \{0, 1\}^m \), where \( m \) is the block size and the randomness comes from the choice of the key), or with probability \( \pi_1 = \frac{1}{2} \) a permutation \( C^* \) chosen uniformly at random from the set of all permutations on \( \{0, 1\}^m \); the latter is usually called the “perfect cipher”.

The distinguisher \( \delta^\nu \) can submit a bounded number \( \nu \) of queries to \( \Omega \) and ultimately outputs a decision bit “0” (if it guesses that \( C^* \) was implemented by \( \Omega \)) or “1” (if it guesses that \( C \) was implemented by \( \Omega \)); one is interested in characterizing and computing its advantage

\[
\text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu}(C, C^*) = \left| \Pr_C[\delta^\nu(x) = 1] - \Pr_{C^*}[\delta^\nu(x) = 1] \right|
\]

where \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_\nu) \) is the vector of the values queried to the oracle; another important measure is the best advantage of any distinguisher:

\[
\text{BestAdv}^\nu(C, C^*) = \max_{\delta^\nu} \text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu}(C, C^*)
\]

Here, the maximum is taken over the set of all possible (non-adaptive and computationally unbounded) distinguishers between \( C \) and \( C^* \). There is an important difference between adaptive and non-adaptive distinguishers: an adaptive distinguisher is allowed to wait for an answer before submitting the next query, which may thus be a function of the previous answer. In this model, a “security proof” means that one is able to provide an acceptable upper-bound on \( \text{BestAdv}^\nu(C, C^*) \) for a given block cipher \( C \). As outlined above, the current state of research is able to give security proofs only for very few constructions, mainly for high-level schemes, like the Feistel cipher.

Vaudenay’s decorrelation theory (see [313, 314, 316–318, 320]) is a set of mathematical tools which aims at studying and defining the security of block ciphers in the Luby-Rackoff model. Basically, a central concept of decorrelation theory is the so-called decorrelation matrix of order \( \nu \). Given a function \( f_K \) parametered by a random key \( K \) from a set \( A \) to a set \( B \), its decorrelation matrix of order \( \nu \) is defined to be

\[
[f_K]^\nu_{(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu), (y_1, \ldots, y_\nu)} = \Pr_K[f_K(x_1) = y_1 \land \ldots \land f_K(x_\nu) = y_\nu]
\]

where the probability is taken on the key \( K \), and \( [f_K]^\nu_{(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu), (y_1, \ldots, y_\nu)} \) is a real matrix defined on \( A^\nu \times B^\nu \) where the rows are numbered by input \( \nu \)-tuples and the columns are numbered by output \( \nu \)-tuples. Given a norm \( ||\cdot|| \) on the vector space of \( A^\nu \times B^\nu \)-type real matrices, the \( \nu \)-wise decorrelation bias of \( f \) is defined by

\[
\text{Dec}^\nu(f_K) = ||[f_K]^\nu_{(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu), (y_1, \ldots, y_\nu)} - [f^*_K]^\nu_{(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu), (y_1, \ldots, y_\nu)}||
\]

where \( [f^*_K]^\nu_{(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu), (y_1, \ldots, y_\nu)} \) is the \( \nu \)-wise decorrelation matrix of the canonical ideal random function \( f^*_K \).
The link to the best advantage of any adaptive distinguisher limited to \(\nu\) queries is the following: for a matrix \(M \in \mathbb{R}^{A^\nu \times B^\nu}\), one defines the following norm:

\[
\|M\|_a = \max_{x_1} \sum_{y_1} \max_{x_2} \sum_{y_2} \cdots \max_{x_\nu} \sum_{y_\nu} |M(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu)(y_1, \ldots, y_\nu)|
\]

Then, one can show that

\[
\text{BestAdv}^\nu(f_K, f_K^*) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left\| f_K^\nu(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu)(y_1, \ldots, y_\nu) - f_K^\nu(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu)(y_1, \ldots, y_\nu) \right\|_a
\]

As a constructive example of the application of decorrelation theory, one can mention the *Peanut construction* (over which DFC is based) which is basically an \(r\)-round Feistel scheme with decorrelation modules as a round function. If these decorrelation modules achieve a \(\nu\)-wise decorrelation bias of \(\epsilon\), by using the multiplicative properties of the matrix norm and the triangular inequality with a truly random 3-round Feistel construction, one obtains from the Luby-Rackoff Theorem [191] that

\[
\text{Dec}^\nu(f_K) \leq \left(2^{\nu r} 2^{-\frac{m}{2}} + \epsilon\right) \left\lfloor \frac{r}{3} \right\rfloor
\]

where \(m\) is the block length in bits.

### 2.4.3 Ad-Hoc Proofs of Security

Theoretical notions of security towards practical attacks like differential [31–33] and linear cryptanalysis [202, 203] have been defined quite early by Nyberg [249] and by Chabaud and Vaudenay [58], respectively. This approach leads to ad-hoc proofs where maximal (multi-path) linear and differential probabilities are upper-bounded for a given construction (as in [10, 155, 156, 251, 252, 257, 258], for instance). One of the first examples of practical, real-world block cipher based on such ad-hoc proofs of security with regards to linear and differential cryptanalysis is Misty1 [205].

However, one must remain fully aware of the fact that ad-hoc proofs of security are not real proofs of security: they are merely heuristic arguments that a given attack strategy can not apply on a certain block cipher, but they do not imply that this block cipher possesses any security property towards other (and maybe still unknown) kinds of attacks. For instance, the prototype cipher PURE, which is a variant of a family proposed by Knudsen and Nyberg [252] and shown to be secure against differential cryptanalysis has been attacked using an interpolation attack [142]; another example is the COCONUT98 block cipher proposed by Vaudenay [313] and immune to linear and differential cryptanalysis: it succumbs to Wagner’s boomerang attack [322] and to a linear-differential cryptanalysis [29].
Furthermore, we have to note the difference which exists between “proofs of security” and “arguments for the security” of a block cipher. For instance, block cipher designers often compute upper bounds on the maximum differential probability of any differential characteristic and conclude that their cipher is immune to differential cryptanalysis: it is not really a mathematical proof of resistance towards differential cryptanalysis, since it does not take into account the cumulative aspect of differentials. However, it is still a strong argument in favor of the immunity of that cipher towards differential attacks. And finally, we have to keep in mind that such “proofs of security” often assume hypotheses which are not formally true in the reality: for instance, one often assumes that, in an iterative block cipher, the round subkeys are uniformly distributed and statistically independent; although such an assumption is usually not likely to be true, because of the nature of the key-schedule algorithm, it often captures that reality in an acceptable way.
Historically, statistical procedures have always been associated with cryptanalytic attacks against block ciphers. In the “modern” era of cryptanalysis, one of the first ever published attack exploiting statistical correlations in the core of DES [242] is Davies and Murphy’s attack [83]. Biham and Shamir’s differential cryptanalysis [31–33], Matsui’s attack against DES [202, 203], Vaudenay’s statistical and $\chi^2$ cryptanalysis [312], Harpes and Massey’s partitioning cryptanalysis [126], Gilbert-Minier stochastic cryptanalysis [225], and Wagner’s boomerang attack [322], as well as all the attacks derived from those, are attacks using statistical procedures in their core (we refer the reader to §2.3). To the best of our knowledge, Murphy et al. proposed for the first time in an unpublished report [234] a general statistical framework for the analysis of block ciphers using the technique of likelihood estimation. Other examples can be found in the field of cryptology: recently, Coppersmith, Halevi and Jutla [61] have devised a general statistical framework for analysing stream ciphers; they used the concept of statistical hypothesis testing for systematically distinguishing a stream cipher from a random function. Other examples (this list being non-exhaustive) include Maurer’s analysis of Simmon’s authentication theory [210,211] and Cachin’s theoretical treatment of steganography [54,55]. In a parallel way, some attempts to formalize the resistance of block ciphers towards cryptanalytic attacks have been proposed: for instance, Pornin [267] derived a general criterion of resistance against the Davies and Murphy attack; for this purpose, he made use of statistical hypothesis testing. Vaudenay, in a sequence of papers (e.g. [313,316,320]) proposed the decorrelation theory as a generic technique for estimating the strength of block ciphers against various kinds of attacks. In these papers, he notably derived bounds on the best advantage of any linear and differential distinguishers, however without using
statistical hypothesis testing concepts.

As pointed out by many authors, statistical hypothesis tests are convenient in the analysis of statistical problems, since, in certain cases, well-known optimality results (like the Neyman-Pearson lemma, for instance) can be applied. In this chapter, we consider the resistance of block ciphers against linear and differential cryptanalysis, as a first step, and against general iterated attacks as a second step, as a statistical hypothesis testing problem. This allows us to derive several bounds on the best advantage of a wide class of attacks and to state optimality results on the decision processes involved during these attacks.

3.1 The Neyman-Pearson Paradigm

Statistical hypothesis testing is a formal way for distinguishing between probability distributions on the basis of random variables generated from one of these distributions; obviously, this is a frequently encountered situation in cryptanalysis. A useful and well-known statistical framework is the Neyman-Pearson approach; it will build the mathematical foundations of our considerations about deriving optimal attacks. In this framework, the probability distributions are grouped into two aggregates, one of which is called the null hypothesis, and is denoted by $H_0$, and the other of which is called the alternative hypothesis and is denoted by $H_1$. For instance, $H_0$ might state that the distribution of a random variable modeling the information obtained during an attack was a normal law with mean $\mu_0$ and variance $\sigma$, while the alternative hypothesis $H_1$ might state that the random variable was distributed according to a normal law with mean $\mu_1 \neq \mu_0$ and the same variance $\sigma$. When both hypotheses are completely determined, as it is the case in this simple example, such hypotheses are called simple hypotheses. When a hypothesis does not completely specify the probability distribution under consideration, one calls it a composite hypothesis. We now describe formally the Neyman-Pearson paradigm.

According to the Neyman-Pearson paradigm, a decision as to whether or not reject the null hypothesis $H_0$ in favor of $H_1$ is made on the basis of a statistic $M(x)$, where $x$ denotes the sample value taking values on a set $\mathcal{X}$. The sets of values of $M$ for which $H_0$ is accepted or rejected are called the acceptance region, denoted $\mathcal{A}$, and the rejection region, denoted $\mathcal{A}^c$, respectively. More formally,

$$\mathcal{A} = \{ x : \delta(M(x)) = 0 \} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{A}^c = \{ x : \delta(M(x)) = 1 \}$$

---

1 A statistic is a function on samples, such that any possible sample from a population is paired with a value of the statistic. A statistic is in fact a random variable, and there is a probability distribution that identifies for all its different possible values the probability of each being measured. This distribution is called the sampling distribution to avoid confusion with the distribution of values in the population.
where $\delta : \mathbb{R} \to \{0, 1\}$ is a decision rule (or a test) mapping any value of $M(x)$ either to $\mathcal{H}_0$ or to $\mathcal{H}_1$. The decision rule $\delta$ might make two types of error.

**Definition 3.1.1 (Type I/II Error Probabilities).** The probability that a decision rule $\delta$ reject the null hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_0$ when it is actually true is called type I error and is noted

$$\alpha = \Pr_{X \leftarrow D} [\delta(M(X)) = 1 | D \in \mathcal{H}_0].$$  \hfill (3.1)

The probability that a decision rule $\delta$ accept the null hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_0$ when it is actually false is called type II error and is noted

$$\beta = \Pr_{X \leftarrow D} [\delta(M(X)) = 0 | D \in \mathcal{H}_1].$$ \hfill (3.2)

If $\mathcal{H}_0$ is simple, one calls $\alpha$ the significance level, or the size of the test; if it is composite, $\alpha$ generally depends on which particular member of $\mathcal{H}_0$ is true: in this case, the significance level is defined to be the least upper bound of these probabilities. Similarly, if $\mathcal{H}_1$ is composite, $\beta$ depends on which particular member of $\mathcal{H}_1$ holds as well. Finally, the probability that $\mathcal{H}_0$ is rejected when it is false is called the power of the test; hence, the power equals $1 - \beta$. An ideal test would have $\alpha = \beta = 0$, but this can be achieved only in trivial cases [274]. In practice, it is furthermore always the case that, for a fixed sample size, $\beta$ must be increased in order to decrease the significance level, and vice-versa. The Neyman-Pearson approach resolves this conflict by imposing an asymmetry between the two hypotheses: the significance level is fixed in advance and then an attempt is made to construct a test yielding a small value for $\beta$.

### 3.1.1 Likelihood-Ratio Tests

In the simplest case of hypothesis testing, we have to decide between two fully characterized distributions. Let $X$ be a random variable with $X \leftarrow D$, and let us consider two hypotheses: $\mathcal{H}_0 = \{D_0\}$ and $\mathcal{H}_1 = \{D_1\}$, where $D_0$ and $D_1$ are known. Thus, we have to decide between $D = D_0$ and $D = D_1$. The Neyman-Pearson lemma [248] derives the shape of the optimum test between two probability distributions$^2$.

**Lemma 3.1.1 (Neyman-Pearson).** Let $X$ be a random variable distributed according to $X \leftarrow D$ on a finite set $X$ and let the decision problem corresponding to the hypotheses $\mathcal{H}_0 = \{D_0\}$ and $\mathcal{H}_1 = \{D_1\}$. For $\tau \geq 0$, let the acceptance region $A_\tau$ be defined by

$$A_\tau = \left\{ x : \Pr_{D_0} [X = x] \geq \tau \cdot \Pr_{D_1} [X = x] \right\}. \hfill (3.3)$$

$^2$We state the Neyman-Pearson lemma for discrete probability distributions, but the same results hold for continuous distributions as well.
Let \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) be the corresponding probabilities of error defined as in Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2), respectively. Let \( \mathcal{B} \) be any other decision region with associated probabilities of error \( \alpha' \) and \( \beta' \). If \( \alpha' \leq \alpha \), then \( \beta' \geq \beta \).

**Proof.** Let \( 1_{A_\tau} \) and \( 1_B \) be the indicator functions of the decision regions \( A_\tau \) and \( B \), respectively. Then, for all \( x \in \mathcal{X} \),

\[
(1_{A_\tau}(x) - 1_B(x)) \cdot \left( \Pr_{X \leftarrow D_0} X = x - \tau \cdot \Pr_{X \leftarrow D_1} X = x \right) \geq 0
\]
since it is always the product of two terms with the same sign. Let

\[
\pi_{D_0}(x) = \Pr_{X \leftarrow D_0} X = x \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_{D_1}(x) = \Pr_{X \leftarrow D_1} X = x.
\]

Then, we sum over all \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) and obtain

\[
0 \leq \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} (1_{A_\tau}(x) - 1_B(x)) \cdot (\pi_{D_0}(x) - \tau \cdot \pi_{D_1}(x))
\]

\[
= \sum_{x \in \mathcal{A}_\tau} (\pi_{D_0}(x) - \tau \pi_{D_0}(x)) - \sum_{x \in \mathcal{B}} (\pi_{D_0}(x) - \tau \pi_{D_0}(x))
\]

\[
= (1 - \alpha) - \tau \beta - (1 - \alpha') + \tau \beta'
\]

\[
= \tau (\beta' - \beta) - (\alpha - \alpha').
\]

The lemma follows from \( \tau \geq 0 \).

Let us now express Eq. (3.3) in an alternate way:

\[
M_{lr} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow [0, +\infty] \quad x \mapsto \frac{\pi_0 \Pr_{X \leftarrow D_0} X = x}{\pi_1 \Pr_{X \leftarrow D_1} X = x} \quad (3.4)
\]

with the convention\(^3\) that \( \frac{x}{0} = +\infty \) for \( 0 < x < 1 \). Interpreted in terms of \( M_{lr} \), the Neyman-Pearson lemma indicates that the optimum test (regarding error probabilities) in case of a binary decision problem is a test based on the statistic which is called a **likelihood-ratio**, and that the test simply consists in comparing the value of \( M_{lr}(x) \) to a fixed threshold \( \tau \). Practically, there still exists the problem of choosing \( \tau \) and the desirable type I or type II error probabilities. Another possibility consists in following a **Bayesian approach** and to assign prior probabilities \( \pi_0 \) and \( \pi_1 = 1 - \pi_0 \) to both hypotheses. If we assume that correct decisions are not penalized and incorrect decisions are penalized equally, which is a desired property in a completely symmetrical approach, then one can show [71, page 314] that an optimal decision rule is based on the statistic

\[
M_{blr} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow [0, +\infty] \quad x \mapsto \frac{\pi_0 \Pr_{X \leftarrow D_0} X = x}{\pi_1 \Pr_{X \leftarrow D_1} X = x} \quad (3.5)
\]

\(^3\)Note that the case \( \frac{x}{0} \) must never occur when dealing with discrete probability spaces.
and chooses $\mathcal{H}_0$ if and only if $M_{\text{blr}}(x) \geq 1$. It is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the overall error probability defined by

$$\pi_e = \pi_0 \alpha + \pi_1 \beta.$$ 

### 3.1.2 Generalized Likelihood-Ratio Tests

As outlined in the previous paragraph, the test based on the likelihood ratio $M_{\text{lr}}$ is optimal for choosing between two simple hypotheses. It is actually possible [274, page 308] to develop generalizations of this test for use in situations in which the hypotheses are not simple. Such tests are not generally optimal, but they are typically not optimal in situations for which no optimal test exists.

It is often the case that the hypotheses under consideration specify, or partially specify, the values of parameters of the probability distribution according to which the sample data are distributed. Let $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, \ldots, X_\nu)$ be a random vector representing the sample data, and let $f_D(x, \theta)$ be their joint probability density function (which depends on a parameter $\theta$). Then, for instance, the null hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_0$ may specify that $\theta \in \mathcal{P}_0$, where $\mathcal{P}_0 \subset \mathcal{P}$ is a subset of the set $\mathcal{P}$ of all possible values for $\theta$, and the alternate hypothesis may specify that $\theta \in \mathcal{P}_1$, where $\mathcal{P}_1 \subset \mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{P}_0 \cap \mathcal{P}_1 = \emptyset$. Let us furthermore define $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P}_0 \cup \mathcal{P}_1$. Based on these data, a plausible measure to compare both hypotheses may be the ratio of their likelihood. If the hypotheses are composite, each likelihood ratio is evaluated at the value of $\theta$ which maximizes it:

$$M'_{\text{glr}}(x) = \frac{\max_{\theta \in \mathcal{P}_0} f_D(x, \theta)}{\max_{\theta \in \mathcal{P}} f_D(x, \theta)} \tag{3.6}$$

Hence, small values of $M'_{\text{glr}}(\cdot)$ tends to discredit the null hypothesis. Note that it is preferable, for some technical reasons [274], to use the statistic

$$M_{\text{glr}}(x) = \frac{\max_{\theta \in \mathcal{P}_0} f_D(x, \theta)}{\max_{\theta \in \mathcal{P}'} f_D(x, \theta)} \tag{3.7}$$

rather than the one defined in Eq. (3.6). Since $M_{\text{glr}} = \min\{M'_{\text{glr}}, 1\}$, small values of $M'_{\text{glr}}$ correspond to small values of $M_{\text{glr}}$. In order for this likelihood-ratio test to have a significance level equal to $\alpha$, the threshold $\tau$ must be chosen such that

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{X} \sim D}[M_{\text{glr}} \leq \tau | D \in \mathcal{H}_0] = \alpha.$$ 

Provided the sampling distribution of $M_{\text{glr}}$ is known under the null hypothesis, then it is sometimes possible to determine the corresponding threshold $\tau$, but this sampling distribution is generally not of a simple form; however,

---

4We refer the reader to the definition of a random variable (Def. A.1.3) and to the generalization to random vectors described thereafter.
in many situations, the following (informally stated) theorem [274] allows to gain some insight to derive a valid approximation. The dimensions of $\mathcal{P}_0$ and $\mathcal{P}'$ are the numbers of free parameters fully determining the distributions in $\mathcal{H}_0$ and in $\mathcal{H}_1$.

**Theorem 3.1.1.** Under certain smoothness conditions on the involved probability density function, the null distribution of $-2\log M_{\text{glr}}$ tends to a $\chi^2$ distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the dimension of $\mathcal{P}'$ minus the dimension of $\mathcal{P}_0$ as the sample size tends to infinity.

An example of generalized likelihood-ratio test particularly useful in the context of cryptanalytical attacks is the following: we would like to test the goodness of fit of a model for a given multinomial probability distribution $^5$. More formally, we would like to judge the plausibility of a multinomial distribution (described by a vector $p(\theta)$ which possibly depends on a parameter $^6$) relatively to an alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_1$ which contains all possible vectors $p'$ under the sole constraint that their components sum up to 1. If the vectors are $m$-valued, $\mathcal{P}'$ is thus the set consisting of $m$ nonnegative numbers whose sum is equal to 1. In this case, the numerator of Eq. (3.7) can be written as

$$\max_{p\in \mathcal{P}_0} \left( \frac{n!}{\hat{x}_1! \cdots \hat{x}_m!} p_1(\theta)^{\hat{x}_1} \cdots p_m(\theta)^{\hat{x}_m} \right) \tag{3.8}$$

where the $\hat{x}_i$'s are the observed counts in the $m$ components of the vector. In case where Eq. (3.8) depends on $\theta$, this equation has to be maximized in terms of $\theta$, leading to an “optimal” $\bar{\theta}$. We will denote the corresponding probabilities by $p_i(\bar{\theta})$. Since the probabilities are unrestricted under $\mathcal{P}'$, one can show that the denominator of Eq. (3.7) is maximized by $p'_i = \frac{\hat{x}_i}{n}$. Rewriting Eq. (3.7), we get

$$-2\log M_{\text{glr}} = 2 \sum_{i=1}^m \hat{x}_i \log \left( \frac{\hat{x}_i}{np_i(\theta)} \right)$$

Under $\mathcal{P}'$, the cell probabilities are allowed to be free, with the constraint that they sum to 1, so the dimension of $\mathcal{P}'$ is equal to $m - 1$. Provided that the probabilities $p(\bar{\theta})$ depend on a $k$-dimensional parameter $\theta$, the dimension of $\mathcal{P}_0$ is equal to $k$. Then, according to Theorem 3.1.1, the sampling distribution of $-2\log M_{\text{glr}}$ is thus a $\chi^2$ distribution with $m - k - 1$ degrees of freedom.

Note furthermore that, with help of a Taylor series argument, it is possible to give an heuristic argument [274] indicating that, at order 2, Eq. (3.7) and

---

$^5$We refer the reader to Def. A.2.3.

$^6$In a cryptanalytical context, $p(\theta)$ will be most of the time the uniform distribution, and thus, do not even depend on $\theta$. 

Pearson’s $\chi^2$ statistic

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \frac{(\hat{x}_i - np_i(\bar{\theta}))^2}{np_i(\bar{\theta})}$$ (3.9)

are asymptotically equivalent under $\mathcal{H}_0$.

### 3.2 Linear Cryptanalysis of DES Revisited

In this section, we describe in detail, discuss and improve several aspects of Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis, which is a generic technique invented to attack block ciphers; some basic aspects were already covered in §2.3.3. First, we recall some historical aspects as well as required preliminaries about linear cryptanalysis in §3.2.2; then we present a statistical modelization of its success probability and we show how to fully exploit the information gathered during a linear cryptanalysis by deriving generic and optimal key ranking procedures. Second, we describe and discuss in §3.2.5 experimental results about the real complexity of a linear cryptanalysis when applied to DES.

#### 3.2.1 Historical Perspectives

Ideas inducing to linear cryptanalysis can be traced back to an early observation of Shamir\(^7\) [292] presented during the conference CRYPTO’85; in this short paper, Shamir demonstrates that there is a clear statistical correlation between the XOR of all the output bits of DES’s S-boxes and the second input bits; he was however not able to exploit these correlations. He observes furthermore that DES’s S-box $S_5$ is the most biased one according to this criterion. Later, Tardy-Corfdir and Gilbert\(^8\) [308] presented a known-plaintext attack of statistical nature against 4-rounds and 6-rounds FEAL. This attack is based on the fact that one can approximate the addition modulo 256 using a linear approximation involving the XOR of some well-chosen input and output bits, i.e. a Boolean equation being probabilistically true. According to [308], the principles of the attack can be described as follows:

“[..]Our attack is a statistical variant of the well-known meet-in-the-middle method. It is based on two kinds of relations:

\(^7\)According to [292], correlations between the XOR of the output bits and the second input bit were independently observed by Franklin in his M.Sc. thesis submitted two months before CRYPTO’85.

\(^8\)Actually, the nomenclature “Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis” seems to be an instance of Stigler’s law of eponymy, stating that “no law, theorem, or discovery is named after its originator”, as Tardy-Corfdir-Gilbert [308] attack against FEAL is nothing but a linear cryptanalysis. Note that Stigler is a statistician who did not discover the eponymy law!
1. It uses some key-independent statistics which involve the plaintext and intermediate block of the FEAL data randomizer (say the block $x^{(n-1)}$ which appears as an input to the last round of the Feistel scheme).

2. In addition, the deciphering algorithm provides a key-dependent relation between this intermediate block and the ciphertext.

An exhaustive search for the value optimizing the agreement between the a-priori expected statistics (1) and the statistics deduced from the ciphertext (2) provides the part of the expanded key involved in (2)."

Matsui and Yamagishi [206] presented then at EUROCRYPT’92 a variant of Tardy-Corfdir and Gilbert’s attack using exact linear expressions, i.e. equations holding with probability one, to attack the same cipher, but with much less necessary known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The technique has been considerably extended and refined by Matsui [202] in an attack against DES. Finally, key-ranking procedures have been introduced by Matsui [203], as well as a report on the first⁹ successful experimental attack against DES.

### 3.2.2 Basic Attack

In this part, we describe thoroughly the versions published in [202, 203] of both attacks of Matsui against DES [242]. As outlined in §2.3.3, linear cryptanalysis exploits the imbalance of linear approximations. Such a probabilistic equation involves the sum (where the addition is the one of GF (2), namely the XOR operation) of some input bits, of some output bits, and of some key bits. For the sake of convenience, the selection of the involved input, output, and key bits, which are seen as vectors over GF (2), is often expressed in terms of the inner dot-product of bit masks with the input, output, and key variables, respectively. As the inner dot-product is usually defined for vectors over $\mathbb{R}^n$ or $\mathbb{C}^n$ (and not for vectors over finite fields), we give here a formal definition thereof. Note that in this thesis, when using the inner dot-product operation, we will always assume that the underlying field has a characteristic equal to 2.

**Definition 3.2.1 (Inner Dot-Product over $\text{GF}(2^n)^m$).** Let the finite field of characteristic 2 with $2^n$ elements be denoted by $\text{GF}(2^n) = (\mathcal{F}, +, \times)$. Let $\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{y}$ be $m$-valued vectors over $\mathcal{F}^m$. Then, the inner dot-product of $\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{y}$, denoted $\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{y}$, is defined by

$$\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{y} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} x_i y_i$$

⁹To be more precise, it is at least the first publicly reported attack.
where \(x_i\) denotes the \(i\)-th component of \(x\).

Note that the addition in a field of characteristic 2 is frequently denoted \(\oplus\) and we will adopt this convention in the following. Let us now denote by \(x\), \(y\), and \(k\) the vectors over \(\text{GF}(2)\) representing the plaintext, the ciphertext, and the key, respectively. Then, a linear relation can be written, with help of Def. 3.2.1, as

\[
a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot y = c \cdot k
\]  

(3.10)

with \(y = f_k(x)\) for a block cipher \(f(.)\). Another convenient way to write Eq. (3.10) frequently encountered in the literature is

\[
x_{\{i_1,\ldots,i_a\}} \oplus y_{\{j_1,\ldots,j_b\}} = k_{\{k_1,\ldots,k_c\}}
\]

where \(z_{\{l_1,\ldots,l_d\}}\) means “sum of the bits of \(z\) numbered \(l_1,\ldots,l_d\)“:

\[
z_{\{l_1,\ldots,l_d\}} = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{d} z_{l_i}
\]

As the substitution boxes of DES are the sole non-linear components in the entire cipher, we obviously need to study their non-linearity to begin a linear cryptanalysis. Matsui introduced in [202] the concept of local S-box approximation for this purpose.

**Definition 3.2.2 (Local S-box approximation).** Let \(S\) be an S-box defined as \(S : \{0,1\}^{t_1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{t_2}\); let \(a \in \{0,1\}^{t_1}\) and \(b \in \{0,1\}^{t_2}\) be fixed bit masks. Then, the local approximation of \(S\) for the masks \(a\) and \(b\) is the number defined by

\[
\text{NS}^S(a, b) = \# \{ x \in \text{GF}(2)^{t_1} : a \cdot x = b \cdot S(x) \}
\]

(3.11)

Clearly, there exists an effective linear statistical correlation as soon as \(\text{NS}^S(a, b) \neq 2^{t_1}\) for some \(a\) and \(b \neq 0\). In the case of DES, it is possible to compute the \(\text{NS}^S(a, b)\) for all S-boxes \(S_i\) and all the possible masks \(a\) and \(b\), since the S-boxes have a relatively small size. The most biased S-box of DES is \(S_5\) for the masks \(a = 0x10\) and \(b = 0xF\):

\[
\text{NS}^{S_5}(0x10, 0xF) = 12
\]

One would expect a value of 32 in an unbiased S-box. Note that the masks exactly correspond to the above mentioned observation by Shamir [292]. Using the definition of DES’s round function (see §2.2.1), one can write a biased linear approximation of a round function \(f^{(i)}\) of DES derived from the
local approximation of $S_5$ as follows\footnote{We have purposely chosen not to follow Matsui’s and FIPS’ bit notations to be consistent with the notations used throughout this thesis. Matsui [202,203] denotes the bit indices from right to left and begins with the index 0, while the standard describing DES [242] numbers the bit from left to right and begins with the index 1. We use a C-like notation, which means that we number the bits from the left to right, and we begin with the index 0.}:

$$x^{(i)}_{\{16\}} \oplus f^{(i)}_{\{2,7,13,24\}}(x^{(i)}) = k^{(i)}_{\{9\}} \quad \text{(3.12)}$$

where $k^{(i)}$ is the subkey used in round $i$. Hence, this linear relation holds with probability $\frac{12}{64}$. To extend Eq. (3.12) to a round, one needs the following simple results, which show how behave masks in the case of a XOR and a “branching” operation.

**Lemma 3.2.1.** Let $a, b \in \{0, 1\}^t$ be two bit masks. Let $f : \{0, 1\}^t \times \{0, 1\}^t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t$ defined by $f(x, y) = x \oplus y$ and $g : \{0, 1\}^t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t \times \{0, 1\}^t$ defined by $g(x) = x || x$. Then the following equalities hold:

$$a \cdot x \oplus a \cdot y = a \cdot f(x, y)$$

$$a \cdot x = (b || a \oplus b) \cdot g(x) = (a \oplus b || b) \cdot g(x)$$

The above lemma allows us to rewrite Eq. (3.12) for the $i$-th round of DES.

$$x^{(i)}_{\{16\}} \oplus x^{(i)}_{\{2,7,13,24\}} \oplus x^{(i+1)}_{\{16\}} = k^{(i)}_{\{9\}} \quad \text{(3.13)}$$

where $x_l$ and $x_r$ denote the left and right 32-bit halves in the Feistel scheme, respectively. The linear relation Eq. (3.13) holds also with probability $\frac{12}{64}$. The next natural step consists in extending the linear relation Eq. (3.13) to multiple rounds: for this purpose, one can concatenate single-round relations if the output bit mask of a given relation is the same as the input bit mask of the following relation in order to construct a linear characteristic (see Def. 2.3.11). Under the assumption that the input values are statistically independent, one can use Matsui’s piling-up lemma [202] to compute the bias of the resulting linear approximation.

**Lemma 3.2.2 (Piling-up lemma).** Let $X_1, \ldots, X_\nu$ be $n$ statistically independent Boolean random variables with $\Pr[X_i = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon_i$. Then

$$\Pr \left[ \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} X_i = 0 \right] = \frac{1}{2} + 2^{n-1} \prod_{i=1}^{n} \varepsilon_i \quad \text{(3.14)}$$

A particularly fruitful approach to find linear characteristic consists in finding an iterative linear characteristic, i.e. a characteristic having the same input and output masks; such linear approximations are useful because we can apply them on any number of rounds. Since the sole components of
DES which are non-linear are the S-boxes, one wishes to minimize the number of active S-boxes in the linear relation, i.e. S-boxes which have a non-zero output bit mask. Indeed, using an algorithm based on a branch-and-bound technique described in [204], Matsui exhibited [202] the best (i.e. the most biased) $r$-rounds linear characteristics for $3 \leq r \leq 20$; in [204], Matsui proved that these characteristics are actually the best ones and he showed that such characteristics have at most one active S-box per round. Furthermore, an interesting fact is that for certain number of rounds, there exists two best linear characteristics having a kind of palindromic shape due to the symmetry of the DES skeleton. The following four linear approximations are the best ones on 14 and 15 rounds of DES.

**Theorem 3.2.1 (Best Linear Approximations on 14-Rounds DES).**

The best linear approximations on 14-rounds DES are

\[
\begin{align*}
  x_{[7,13,24]} & \oplus y_{[2,7,13,24]} \oplus y_{[16]} = \\
  k_{[25]}^{(2)} & \oplus k_{[25]}^{(3)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(4)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(6)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(7)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(8)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(10)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(11)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(12)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(14)}
\end{align*}
\]

and

\[
\begin{align*}
  x_{[2,7,13,24]} & \oplus x_{[16]} \oplus y_{[7,13,24]} = \\
  k_{[25]}^{(2)} & \oplus k_{[25]}^{(4)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(5)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(6)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(8)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(9)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(10)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(12)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(13)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(14)}
\end{align*}
\]

where $k_{[8]}^{(i)}$ denote the set $B$ of the $i$-th round subkey. The above two linear approximations hold with probability $\frac{1}{2} - 1.19 \cdot 2^{-21}$.

**Theorem 3.2.2 (Best Linear Approximations on 15-Rounds DES).**

The best linear approximations on 15-rounds DES are

\[
\begin{align*}
  x_{[7,13,24]} & \oplus x_{[15,19]} \oplus y_{[2,7,13,24]} \oplus y_{[16]} = \\
  k_{[24,28]}^{(1)} & \oplus k_{[25]}^{(3)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(4)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(5)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(7)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(8)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(9)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(10)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(11)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(12)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(13)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(15)}
\end{align*}
\]

and

\[
\begin{align*}
  x_{[2,7,13,24]} & \oplus x_{[16]} \oplus y_{[7,13,24]} \oplus y_{[15,19]} = \\
  k_{[25]}^{(1)} & \oplus k_{[25]}^{(3)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(4)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(5)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(7)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(8)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(9)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(11)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(12)} \oplus k_{[25]}^{(13)} \oplus k_{[24,28]}^{(15)}
\end{align*}
\]

where $k_{[8]}^{(i)}$ denote the set $B$ of the $i$-th round subkey. The above two linear approximations hold with probability $\frac{1}{2} - 1.19 \cdot 2^{-22}$. 
Algorithm 3.1: Matsui’s First Algorithm [202]

Information Extraction about the Key

Let us assume that we make use of a biased linear approximation on a block cipher \( f \) for a fixed key \( k \):

\[
a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot f_k(x) = c \cdot k
\]  

(3.15)

with

\[
\Pr_x[a \cdot X \oplus b \cdot f_k(X) = c \cdot k] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon
\]  

(3.16)

Let us furthermore assume that we make use of a random source generating some \((x, f_k(x))\) pairs. Equivalently, we can assume that we make use of an oracle \( \Omega \) implementing \( f_k(.) \) which is queried by a uniformly distributed random plaintext source (i.e. it is a known-plaintext attack). It is then possible to extract one bit of information about the key using Matsui’s First Algorithm [202] described in Alg. 3.1. This bit \( c \cdot k \) of information about the key could be used for instance to speed up an exhaustive key search. A major drawback of Alg. 3.1 is the small amount of extracted information.
1: **Input**: an oracle $\Omega$, a data complexity $\nu$, $a$, $b$, $c$, $\varepsilon$.
2: **Output**: a guess about $c \cdot k$ and $k^{(r)}$.
3: Initialize $2^{\ell_{r'}}$ counters $\hat{m}_i$ with $1 \leq i \leq 2^{\ell_{r'}}$ to 0.
4: For each candidate $k^{(r)}$ with $1 \leq i \leq 2^{\ell_{r'}}$, let $\hat{m}_i$ be the number of uniformly and statistically independent plaintext-ciphertext pairs queried to $\Omega$ for which the left side of Eq. (3.17) is equal to 0.
5: Let $\hat{m}_{\text{max}} \leftarrow \max_i \hat{m}_i$ and $\hat{m}_{\text{min}} \leftarrow \min_i \hat{m}_i$.
6: if $|\hat{m}_{\text{max}} - \frac{\nu}{2}| > |\hat{m}_{\text{min}} - \frac{\nu}{2}|$ then
   7: Output the key candidate corresponding to $\hat{m}_{\text{max}}$ and $c \cdot k = 0$ (if $\varepsilon > 0$) or $c \cdot k = 1$ (if $\varepsilon < 0$).
   8: else
   9: Output the key candidate corresponding to $\hat{m}_{\text{min}}$ and $c \cdot k = 1$ (if $\varepsilon > 0$) or $c \cdot k = 0$ (if $\varepsilon < 0$).
10: end if

**Algorithm 3.2: Matsui’s Second Algorithm** [202]

about the key. A possible improvement\(^{11}\) is the following: let us assume that we make use of a linear relation on $r - 1$ rounds of a block cipher. The idea consists in guessing a subset of the $\ell_r$ key bits used as the last round subkey and to partially decrypt the known plaintext-ciphertext pairs with these key guesses. Under this scenario, one can rewrite Eq. (3.15) as

$$a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot \left( f^{(r)^{-1}}(c, \hat{k}^{(r)}) \right) = c \cdot k$$

(3.17)

where $f^{(r)^{-1}}(c, \hat{k}^{(r)})$ denotes the inverse of the last round function fed with a subkey candidate $\hat{k}^{(r)}$. Let us assume that $\ell_{r'}$ key bits are necessary to recover the effective output bits of the linear relation on $r - 1$ rounds. We have then $2^{\ell_{r'}} - 1$ wrong subkey candidates and a single correct one. Intuitively, if we decrypt the last round with the right subkey candidate, we will evaluate the linear approximation properly, and this approximation should be biased as expected. If we decrypt with a wrong subkey candidate, we can see this operation as equivalent to encrypt the ciphertext with a supplementary round, and the linear approximation bias should be rendered far more uniform. This idea is formally expressed as Alg. 3.2 which is named *Matsui’s Second Algorithm*. Once the cryptanalyst has a guess for the effective bits of the last round subkey, the other key bits can be recovered using an exhaustive key search. A further improvement which generalize Alg. 3.2, named *key ranking*, was introduced by Matsui in his second paper [203]. Instead of taking the most biased subkey candidate as the right one, and then to

---

\(^{11}\)The idea of “peel off” one or more rounds originate from Biham and Shamir differential cryptanalysis [31]; Matsui [202] seems to be the first one to use the idea in a different context; however, the key idea is implicitly present in the paper of Tardy-Corfdir and Gilbert [308].
search exhaustively for the remaining unknown key bits, Matsui proposed to rank the subkey candidates from the most likely to the least likely, and, in this order, to search exhaustively for the remaining unknown key bits until the right key is found. We name this algorithm *Matsui’s Third Algorithm* and it is formally described in Alg. 3.3.

3.2.3 Analysis of Matsui’s Attacks

In this part, we analyze the success probability and discuss the optimality of the three versions of Matsui’s attack as described earlier.

**Statistical Analysis of Matsui’s First Algorithm**

The success probability of Alg. 3.1 has been approximated by Matsui [202]; we give here a more precise analysis and we derive tight bounds.

**Theorem 3.2.3 (Success Probability of Alg. 3.1).** Let $\nu$ be the number of given known plaintext-ciphertext pairs; let $\varepsilon$ be the bias of Eq. (3.15). Then, the success probability of Alg. 3.1 satisfies

$$
\Pr[\text{“Alg. 3.1 is successful”}] \approx \int_{-\infty}^{\frac{2\sqrt{\nu|\varepsilon|}}{\sqrt{(1-4\varepsilon^2)}}} \phi(t)\,dt \quad (3.18)
$$

and

$$
\lim_{\nu \to \infty} \Pr[\text{“Alg. 3.1 is successful”}] = 1.
$$
Proof. Let us assume without lost of generality that \( \varepsilon > 0 \), that \( \mathbf{c} \cdot \mathbf{k} = 0 \) (the other three cases are symmetric situations), and that \( \nu \) is odd. Let us denote by \( \hat{M} \) a discrete random variable modeling the value of the counter \( \hat{m} \). Then the success probability of Alg. 3.1 is \( \Pr \left[ \hat{M} > \frac{\nu}{2} \right] \), thus it satisfies

\[
\Pr[\text{"Alg. 3.1 is successful"}] = \sum_{i=\left\lceil \frac{\nu}{2} \right\rceil}^{\nu} \binom{\nu}{i} \left( \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \right)^i \left( \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon \right)^{\nu-i}.
\]  

(3.19)

Since \( \varepsilon \) is small, one can approximate the above probability using the central-limit theorem (see Th. A.2.1) and noting that \( \hat{M} \) follows approximately a normal distribution with parameters

\[
\mu = \nu \left( \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma = \sqrt{\nu \left( \frac{1}{4} - \varepsilon^2 \right)}.
\]

Hence,

\[
\Pr[\text{"Alg. 3.1 is successful"}] \approx \Phi \left( \frac{-2 \left( \frac{\nu}{2} - \frac{\nu(1+2\varepsilon)}{2} \right)}{\sqrt{\nu (1-4\varepsilon^2)}} \right) = \Phi \left( \frac{2\sqrt{|\varepsilon|}}{\sqrt{(1-4\varepsilon^2)}} \right)
\]

which concludes the proof. \( \square \)

We note that the above theorem gives an extremely good approximation of the success probability of Alg. 3.1 for any "practical" value of \( \nu \) and \( \varepsilon \) in the context of a cryptanalysis and reduce to Matsui’s result given in [202] for small \( \varepsilon \):

\[
\Pr[\text{"Alg. 3.1 is successful"}] \approx \Phi \left( 2\sqrt{\nu |\varepsilon|} \right)
\]

For estimating the tightness of Eq. (3.18), we need to derive non-asymptotic lower and upper bounds on the probability function of a binomial law; we will use the following approximation (see [262]):

\[
\sum_{i=0}^{k} \binom{n}{i} p^i (1-p)^{n-i} \approx \Phi(z) - \frac{(1-2p)(z^2 - 1)\phi(z)}{6\sqrt{np(1-p)}}
\]

(3.20)

where

\[
z = \frac{k + \frac{1}{2} - np}{\sqrt{np(1-p)}}
\]

(3.21)

and \( k = 0, \ldots, n \). We can bound the maximum absolute error of this approximation using the following result, due to Raff [270].
Theorem 3.2.4 (Raff). Let $\eta_{\text{max}}(n, p)$ be the maximum absolute error when the cumulative distribution function of a binomial law with parameters $n$ and $p$ is approximated by Eq. (3.20) and Eq. (3.21). Then,

$$\eta_{\text{max}}(n, p) \leq \frac{0.056}{\sqrt{np(1-p)}}$$

(3.22)

The following bounds are then a straightforward application of Eq. (3.20), Eq. (3.21) and of Th. 3.2.4 to our scenario.

Theorem 3.2.5. Let $\nu$ be the (even) number of given known plaintext-ciphertext pairs; let $\varepsilon$ be the bias of Eq. (3.15). Then, the success probability of Alg. 3.1 satisfies

$$\left| \Pr[\text{“Alg. 3.1 is succ.”}] - \Phi\left(\frac{\varepsilon\sqrt{\nu}}{\sigma}\right) - \frac{\varepsilon(\nu\varepsilon^2 - \sigma^2)\phi\left(\frac{\varepsilon\sqrt{\nu}}{\sigma}\right)}{6\sigma^3\sqrt{\nu}} \right| \leq \frac{0.056}{\sigma\sqrt{\nu}}$$

(3.23)

where $\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \varepsilon^2}$.

Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that $\varepsilon > 0$. According to Eq. (3.19), we have

$$\Pr[\text{“Alg. 3.1 is successful”}] = \sum_{i=\frac{\nu}{2}}^{\nu} \binom{\nu}{i} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon\right)^i \left(\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon\right)^{\nu-i}$$

$$= 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{\frac{\nu}{2}} \binom{\nu}{i} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon\right)^i \left(\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon\right)^{\nu-i}$$

We substitute $k = \frac{\nu}{2}$ and $p = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$ into Eq. (3.20), we note that $\Phi(-z) = 1 - \Phi(z)$ and that $\phi(-z) = \phi(z)$, we write $\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \varepsilon^2}$, and this results in

$$\Pr[\text{“Alg. 3.1 is successful”}] \approx \Phi\left(\frac{\varepsilon\sqrt{\nu}}{\sigma}\right) + \frac{\varepsilon(\nu\varepsilon^2 - \sigma^2)\phi\left(\frac{\varepsilon\sqrt{\nu}}{\sigma}\right)}{6\sigma^3\sqrt{\nu}}.$$  

(3.24)

The theorem follows from the straightforward application of Raff’s bounds given in Th. 3.2.4 to Eq. (3.24).

Theorem 3.2.5 plots the success probability of Alg. 3.1 in terms of $c = \nu\varepsilon^2$. Interestingly, we can note that Th. 3.2.3 implicitly assumes that the absolute bias $|\varepsilon|$ is independent of the key value $k$ actually implemented by $\Omega$. This implicit assumption was recognized early by Nyberg [250] and named fixed-key equivalence hypothesis by Harpes et al. [125].
Assumption 3.2.1 (Fixed-Key Equivalence Hypothesis). The absolute bias $|\varepsilon|$ of a linear expression as defined in Eq. (3.15) and Eq. (3.16) is independent of the key value $k$.

In other words, the above assumption states that a linear expression approximates the cipher in the same way for all key values, i.e. that $|\varepsilon|$ is not key-dependent; this assumption holds well in the case of DES, but not in the case of RC5 and RC6 [46, 290, 291], for instance, because of the presence of strong key-dependent components in the definition of these ciphers.

Let us now consider the statistical decision process on which Alg. 3.1 is built. For this, we construct an optimal statistical test to decide whether $c \cdot k = 0$ or $c \cdot k = 1$ using the Neyman-Pearson approach described in §3.1. We assume that we make use of a linear approximation

$$a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot f_k(x) = c \cdot k$$

with

$$\Pr_x[a \cdot X \oplus b \cdot f_k(X) = c \cdot k] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \quad \text{with } \varepsilon \neq 0$$

and that $\varepsilon > 0$ (the case $\varepsilon < 0$ leads to similar considerations). We assign to the null hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_0$ the probability distribution $D_0$

$$D_0: \begin{cases} 
\Pr[a \cdot X \oplus b \cdot f_k(X) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \\
\Pr[a \cdot X \oplus b \cdot f_k(X) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon
\end{cases}$$

and to the alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_1$ the probability distribution $D_1$

$$D_1: \begin{cases} 
\Pr[a \cdot X \oplus b \cdot f_k(X) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon \\
\Pr[a \cdot X \oplus b \cdot f_k(X) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon
\end{cases}$$
Note that $\mathcal{H}_0$ is equivalent to $c \cdot k = 0$ and that $\mathcal{H}_1$ is equivalent to $c \cdot k = 1$, since we know the sign of $\varepsilon$. As a second step, we build the likelihood-ratio corresponding to this decision problem. Let us denote by $E_i$ the event

$$E_i = 1_{a \cdot X_i \oplus b \cdot f_k(X_i) = 0}$$

for the $i$-th query $X_i$ to the oracle $\Omega$. We have then

$$M_{lr}(\hat{E}_1, \ldots, \hat{E}_\nu) = \prod_{i=1}^{\nu} \frac{\left(\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon\right)^{E_i} \left(\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon\right)^{1-E_i}}{\left(\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon\right)^{\hat{E}_i} \left(\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon\right)^{1-\hat{E}_i}}$$

where $\hat{m} = \sum_i \hat{E}_i$. By taking the logarithm of $M_{lr}(\hat{E}_1, \ldots, \hat{E}_\nu)$, one can rewrite the above expression as

$$\log \left( M_{lr}(\hat{E}_1, \ldots, \hat{E}_\nu) \right) = (\nu - 2\hat{m}) \left( \log \left( \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon \right) - \log \left( \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \right) \right)$$

Comparing $M_{lr}(\hat{E}_1, \ldots, \hat{E}_\nu)$ to 1 is thus equivalent to comparing $\hat{m}$ to $\frac{\nu}{2}$, which is the decision rule of line 11 in Alg. 3.1. Hence, we proved the following theorem.

**Theorem 3.2.6.** For a fixed number $\nu$ of data queried to the oracle $\Omega$, Matsui’s First Algorithm (Alg. 3.1) is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the success probability over all algorithms based on the sample bit $a \cdot X_i \oplus b \cdot f_k(X_i)$.

We can interpret the above results as follows: based on the statistical information gathered by Matsui’s First Algorithm, and on the *a priori* knowledge about the sign of $\varepsilon$, one cannot define a decision rule on samples of $c \cdot k$ which performs better than Eq. (3.25); note that we take into account infinitely powerful adversaries as well.

**Success Probability of Matsui’s Second and Third Algorithms**

As explained in page 69, one expects that during a key-ranking procedure, the right key will have a different behavior than all the other wrong keys. This intuition is summarized in the following assumption, named *hypothesis of wrong-key randomization*\(^\text{12}\) by Harpes et al. [125].

\(^\text{12}\)Interestingly, one can note that this assumption is (implicitly) stated in terms of a likelihood-ratio.
Assumption 3.2.2 (Wrong-Key Randomization Hypothesis). For any linear relation $\Lambda$ similar to 3.17 for which its bias is large for virtually all values $k^{(1)}, \ldots, k^{(r-1)}$ of the round subkeys, the following is true: for virtually all possible round subkeys $k^{(1)}, \ldots, k^{(r-1)}$, for all possible guesses $K^{(r)}$ of the last round subkey,

\[
\left| \frac{\Pr[\Lambda \text{ holds } | K^{(r)} = \hat{k}^{(r)}]}{\Pr[\Lambda \text{ holds } | K^{(r)} = \hat{k}^{(r)}_w]} - \frac{1}{2} \right| \gg 1
\]

where $\hat{k}^{(r)}_w$ denotes a wrong guess and $\hat{k}^{(r)}$ denotes the right guess.

We give now a new modelization of the success probability of Matsui's Second and Third Algorithms. For this, we will first need the definition of the incomplete beta function of order $(a,b)$.

**Definition 3.2.3 (Incomplete Beta Function).** The incomplete beta function of order $(a,b)$ is defined by

\[
B_{a,b}(x) = \frac{\Gamma(a + b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)} \int_0^x t^{a-1}(1-t)^{b-1} dt \quad (3.26)
\]

where $\Gamma(x)$ denotes the gamma function\textsuperscript{13}.

As a first step, let us consider the following scenario: let $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n$ be $n$ independent and identically distributed continuous random variables having $f_M$ and $F_M$ as density and distribution functions, respectively. We sort the values of $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n$ in strictly increasing order and denote them by $\tilde{M}_1 < \tilde{M}_2 < \ldots < \tilde{M}_n$. The distribution function $F_{\tilde{M}_i}$ of the $i$-th smallest random variable $\tilde{M}$ is given by the following lemma whose proof can be found in [273, page 205].

**Lemma 3.2.3.** The distribution function of the $i$-th smallest among $n$ iid random variables is

\[
F_{\tilde{M}_i}(x) = B_{i,n-i+1}(F_M(x))
\]

where $B_{a,b}(x)$ is the incomplete beta function of order $(a,b)$.

By using the previous result and the independence between the involved random variables, we prove now the following theorem.

**Theorem 3.2.7.** Let $M_1, \ldots, M_n$ be $n$ iid random variables having $f_M$ and $F_M$ as probability density and distribution functions, respectively. Let $M^*$ be a random variable statistically independent of the $M_i$. Let $R$ denote a random variable modeling the rank of $M^*$ when the $n+1$ random variables

\textsuperscript{13} The gamma function is related to the factorial by $\Gamma(n) = (n-1)!$.

\textsuperscript{14} The probability that equal values occur is 0.
\{M_i : 1 \leq i \leq n\} \cup \{M^*\} are sorted in non-increasing order. For \( r \in \mathbb{N}, 1 \leq r \leq n \), the distribution function of \( R \) is equal to

\[
\Pr[R \leq r] = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} B_{n+1-r,r}(F_M(x)) f_{M^*}(x) dx
\]

and

\[
E[R] = 1 + n \left(1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F_M(x) f_{M^*}(x) dx\right)
\]

where \( B_{a,b}(x) \) is the incomplete beta function of order \((a,b)\).

**Proof.** Let us denote the \( n+1 \) sorted random variables by

\[
\tilde{M}_1 > \cdots > \tilde{M}_i > M^* > \tilde{M}_{i+1} > \cdots > \tilde{M}_n
\]

We can compute the distribution function \( F_R(x) \) of \( R \) as follows:

\[
\Pr[R \leq r] = \Pr[\tilde{M}_r < M^*]
\]

\[
= \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{y} f_{\tilde{M}_r}(x) f_{M^*}(y) dx dy
\]

\[
= \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} B_{n+1-r,r} (F_M(y)) f_{M^*}(y) dy
\]

where the last equality follows from Lem. 3.2.3. By definition of the expectation of a random variable, we have

\[
E[R] = \sum_{r=1}^{n+1} r \cdot \Pr[R = r]
\]

\[
= \Pr[R = 1] + \sum_{r=2}^{n+1} r (\Pr[R \leq r] - \Pr[R \leq r - 1])
\]

\[
= n + 1 - \sum_{r=1}^{n} \Pr[R \leq r]
\]

where

\[
\sum_{r=1}^{n} \Pr[R \leq r] = \sum_{r=1}^{n} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} B_{n+1-r,r} (F_M(y)) f_{M^*}(y) dy
\]

\[
= \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} f_{M^*}(y) \sum_{r=1}^{n} B_{n+1-r,r} (F_M(y)) dy
\]
It is easy to see that
\[
\sum_{r=1}^{n} B_{n+1-r,r} \left( F_M(y) \right) = n \int_{0}^{F_M(y)} \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \left( \begin{array}{c} n-1 \\ i \end{array} \right) t^i (1-t)^{n-1-i} \, dt
\]
\[
= n \int_{0}^{F_M(y)} dt = n F_M(y)
\]
and we can thus conclude with
\[
E[R] = n + 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} f_{M^*}(y) \sum_{r=1}^{n} B_{n+1-r,r} \left( F_M(y) \right) \, dy
\]
\[
= n + 1 - n \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} f_{M^*}(y) F_M(y) \, dy
\]
\[
= 1 + n \left( 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} f_{M^*}(y) F_M(y) \, dy \right)
\]
which proves the theorem.

We compute now the probability distributions of the random variables \( \hat{M}_i \) modeling the counters \( \hat{m}_i \) used in Alg. 3.2 and Alg. 3.3. For this purpose, we denote by \( \hat{M}_i \), with \( 1 \leq i \leq 2^{\ell_r'} - 1 \), the (ordered) counters corresponding to wrong subkey candidates, and by \( \hat{M}^* \) the counter corresponding to the right subkey candidate. We first take an assumption which is essentially of heuristic nature.

**Assumption 3.2.3.** The \( 2^\ell_r' \) random variables \( \hat{M}_i \), with \( 1 \leq i \leq 2^\ell_r' - 1 \), and \( \hat{M}^* \) are statistically independent.

The two following assumptions are motivated, on the one hand, by the accuracy of the approximation by a normal distribution of a binomial distribution \( \text{Bin}^{n,p} \) when \( n \) is large and \( p \approx \frac{1}{2} \), and on the other hand, by both Ass. 3.2.1 and Ass. 3.2.2.

**Assumption 3.2.4.** The random variables \( \frac{2^{\hat{M}_i - \nu}}{\sqrt{\nu}} \), with \( 1 \leq i \leq 2^\ell_r' - 1 \) are distributed according to the normal distribution \( \mathcal{D}_\phi \).

**Assumption 3.2.5.** The random variable \( \frac{2^{\hat{M}^* - \nu(1-2\epsilon)}}{\sqrt{\nu}} \) is distributed according to the normal distribution \( \mathcal{D}_\phi \).

We note that Matsui’s Third Algorithm considers the absolute deviation from the counters to \( \frac{\nu}{2} \) (see line 5 of Alg. 3.3). To take this fact into account, as well as the three above assumptions, we define \( \tilde{B} \) to be a random variable
distributed according to the probability distribution of the absolute bias of a counter corresponding to a wrong subkey candidate

\[ \hat{B} = \left| \frac{\hat{M}_i}{\nu} - \frac{1}{2} \right| \]

as well as

\[ \hat{B}^* = \left| \frac{\hat{M}^*_i}{\nu} - \frac{1}{2} \right| . \]

where \( \hat{B}^* \) is a random variable distributed according to the probability distribution of the absolute bias of a counter corresponding to the right subkey candidate. Note that the probability distribution of \( Y = |X - a| \), provided \( X \) is normally distributed and \( a \) is a real constant, is often called the folded normal distribution. The computation of the probability distribution of \( \hat{B} \) and \( \hat{B}^* \) can be easily derived using the following lemma.

**Lemma 3.2.4.** Let \( X \) be a continuous random variable distributed according to a normal distribution with parameters \( \mu \) and \( \sigma \); let \( a \in \mathbb{R} \) be a real constant. The probability density function of \( Y = |X - a| \), with \( a \leq \mu \), is

\[ f_Y(y) = \phi \left( \frac{y - \mu + a}{\sigma} \right) + \phi \left( \frac{a - y - \mu}{\sigma} \right) \]

for \( 0 \leq y \leq +\infty \) and \( f_Y = 0 \) otherwise.

**Proof.** The cumulative distribution function of the random variable \( Y \) can be computed as

\[ F_Y(y) = \Pr[Y \leq y] = \Pr[|X - a| \leq y] = \Pr[-y + a \leq X \leq y + a] = \Phi \left( \frac{y - \mu + a}{\sigma} \right) - \Phi \left( \frac{a - y - \mu}{\sigma} \right) \]

As the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution is absolutely continuous, which ensures that it has a probability density function with respect to Lebesgue measure, one can write

\[ f_Y(y) = \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left( \Phi \left( \frac{y + a - \mu}{\sigma} \right) - \Phi \left( \frac{a - y - \mu}{\sigma} \right) \right) = \phi \left( \frac{y + a - \mu}{\sigma} \right) + \phi \left( \frac{a - y - \mu}{\sigma} \right) \]

which concludes the proof. \( \square \)
Under Ass. 3.2.3, Ass. 3.2.4, Ass. 3.2.5, using Lem. 3.2.4, and assuming that the linear approximation is unbalanced in case of a wrong key candidate (in the spirit of Ass. 3.2.2), we can compute the probability density function of $\hat{B}$ and $\hat{B}^*$ for the case of a linear cryptanalysis applying Matsui’s Second and Third Algorithms as follows: $\hat{B}^*$ is distributed according to a folded normal law with $a = \frac{1}{2}$, $\mu^* = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$, and $\sigma^2 = \frac{1}{4\nu}$

$$f_{\hat{B}^*}(x) = \phi \left(2(x - \varepsilon)\sqrt{\nu}\right) + \phi \left(2(x + \varepsilon)\sqrt{\nu}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.27)

while $\hat{B}$ is distributed according to a folded normal law with $a = \frac{1}{2}$, $\mu = \frac{1}{2}$, and $\sigma^2 = \frac{1}{4\nu}$

$$f_{\hat{B}}(x) = 2\phi \left(2x\sqrt{\nu}\right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.28)

We get thus the following result, which is a straightforward application of Th. 3.2.7 in this setting.

**Corollary 3.2.1.** Under assumptions 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, and 3.2.5, the probability distribution of the rank $R$ of the right subkey candidate when using Alg. 3.3 is equal to

$$\Pr[R \leq r] = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} B_{n+1-r,r}(F_{\hat{B}^*}(x))f_{\hat{B}^*}(x)dx$$

and

$$\mathbb{E}[R] = 1 + n \left(1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} f_{\hat{B}^*}(x)F_{\hat{B}}(x)dx\right)$$

where $B_{a,b}(x)$ is the incomplete beta function of order $(a,b)$, $n = 2^{\ell r'} - 1$, $f_{\hat{B}^*}$ and $f_{\hat{B}}$ are respectively defined in Eq. (3.27) and Eq. (3.28), and $F_{\hat{B}^*}$ and $F_{\hat{B}}$ are their respective cumulative distribution functions.

It is worth noticing that our results stated in Cor. 3.2.1 have been reworked by Selçuk and Bıçak [289] in a manner allowing a simpler numerical evaluation. Their result was derived with help of the following classical application of the central limit theorem (a proof thereof can be found in [273, page 490]).

**Theorem 3.2.8.** Let $W_1, \ldots, W_n$ be $n$ independent and identically distributed random variable with an absolutely continuous distribution function $F_W(x)$. Suppose that the probability density function $f_W(x)$ is continuous and positive on the interval $[a,b]$. If $0 < F_W(a) < q < F_W(b) < 1$, and if $k(n)$ is a sequence of integers such that

$$\lim_{n \to +\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \left| \frac{k(n)}{n} - q \right| = 0$$

$^{15}$Note that we do not need to know the sign of $\varepsilon$ anymore when working with a folded normal distribution.
and if $\tilde{W}_i$ denotes the $i$-th order statistic of the sample $W_1, \ldots, W_n$, then $\tilde{W}_{k(n)}$ is in the limit normally distributed:

$$
\lim_{n \to +\infty} \Pr \left[ \frac{\tilde{W}_{k(n)} - \mu}{\sigma} < \frac{x}{\sqrt{n}} \right] = \Phi(x)
$$

where

$$
\mu = F_{\tilde{W}}^{-1}(q) \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma = \frac{1}{f_{\tilde{W}(\mu)}} \sqrt{\mu(1-\mu) n}
$$

Taking $k(n) = \lfloor qn \rfloor + 1$, this theorem states that the empirical sample quantile of order $q$ of $n$ elements is for sufficiently large $n$ approximately normally distributed with mean $\mu_q = F_{\tilde{W}}^{-1}(q)$ and standard deviation $\sigma_q = \frac{1}{f_{\tilde{W}(\mu_q)}} \sqrt{\frac{q(1-q)}{n}}$. Selçuk and Bıçak obtained the following theorem holding under the same assumptions than those stated in Cor. 3.2.1.

**Theorem 3.2.9 (Selçuk and Bıçak [289]).** Let $\nu$ be the number of given known plaintext-ciphertext pairs; let us assume that Matsui’s Second Algorithm Alg. 3.2 furnishes $2^{\ell'}$ subkey candidates; let finally $\varepsilon$ be the bias of Eq. (3.15). Then, the success probability of Alg. 3.2 is approximately equal to

$$
\Pr \left[ R \leq r \right] = \Phi \left( 2\sqrt{\nu} |\varepsilon| - \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{r}{2^{\ell'+1}} \right) \right).
$$

Fig. 3.2 expresses the success probability of Matsui’s Second Algorithm in terms of the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs at disposal of an adversary in the context of a linear cryptanalysis of 16-round DES using a single best approximation on 14- and 15-rounds, respectively, as stated in Th. 3.2.1 and Th. 3.2.2. An interesting phenomenon occurs here: on the one hand, the best approximation on 15-rounds is less biased than the one on 14 rounds, but since the latter involves 12 unknown key bits, while the 15-rounds approximation involves only 6 bits, the success probability is on the other hand essentially better for the approximation on 15 rounds, as there is less noise from the wrong subkey candidates. However, note that the exhaustive search of the remaining unknown key bits is $2^6$ times more costly.

Fig. 3.3 plots the cumulative distribution function of the rank $r$ of the right subkey candidate in the same context, using Matsui’s Third Algorithm and a single best approximation on 14-rounds for various amounts $\nu$ of known plaintext-ciphertext at disposal of the adversary.

### 3.2.4 Improvement of Matsui’s Attack

Matsui has introduced [202,203] the idea of taking a “soft decision” about the value of the right subkey by ranking subkey candidates by “maximum likelihood”. We would like now to look more closely at this concept.
Figure 3.2: Success probability of Matsui’s Second Algorithm (Alg. 3.2).

Figure 3.3: Success probability of Matsui’s Third Algorithm (Alg. 3.3).
1. **Counting Phase**: Collect several random samples \( s_j = f_2(p_j, c_j) \), for \( j = 1, \ldots, \nu \) and count all occurrences of all the possible values of the \( s_j \)'s in \(|S|\) counters denoted \( \hat{m}_i \) with \( 1 \leq i \leq |S| \).

2. **Analysis Phase**: For each of the subkey candidates \( k_i, 1 \leq i \leq 2^{\ell_r} \), count all the occurrences in all \( x_i = f_3(k_i, s_j) \) and give it a mark \( \mu_{k_i} \) using the statistic \( \Sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu) \).

3. **Sorting Phase**: Sort all the candidates \( k_i \) using their mark \( \mu_{k_i} \). This list of sorted candidates is denoted \( U \).

4. **Searching Phase**: Exhaustively try all keys following the sorted list of all the subkey candidates.

**Figure 3.4**: Structure of a statistical cryptanalysis

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**Optimal Key-Ranking Procedure**

First of all, we define what we mean by an “optimal key ranking procedure”. As our considerations apply to any attack of statistical nature, we first recall the model of statistical cryptanalysis we will adopt. Let \( P, C \) and \( K \) be the plaintext, ciphertext and key space, respectively. A statistical cryptanalysis uses three functions, denoted \( f_1, f_2 \) and \( f_3 \) which have the following role:

- \( f_1 : K \rightarrow K' \) is a function which extract the useful information of the key for the cryptanalysis. We assume here that \( |K'| = 2^{\ell_r} \).
- \( f_2 : P \times C \rightarrow S \), where \( S \) is called the sample space, extracts the useful information about the plaintext and ciphertext spaces for the attack.
- \( f_3 : K' \times S \rightarrow Q \), where \( Q \) is a space summarizing information depending on intermediate results in the encryption.

In order to be efficient, a statistical cryptanalysis should fulfill the following conditions: the information \( x = f_3(k', s) \), where \( k' \in K', s \in S \) and \( x \in Q \), should be computable with a small piece of information on \( (p, c) \in P \times C \) and \( k \in K \) (namely, \( s \) and \( k' \)); furthermore, the information \( x = f_3(s, k'_r) \) should be statistically distinguishable from \( x' = f_3(s, k'_w) \), where \( k'_r \) and \( k'_w \) is the information given by the right key and a wrong key, respectively. The main idea of the attack consists in assuming that we can distinguish the right key from wrong key with help of a statistical measurement \( \Sigma \) on the observed distribution of the \( x_i \)'s. The attack is summarized in Fig. 3.4. The data complexity is then defined to be the number \( n \) of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs needed in step 1, while the computational complexity is usually\(^{16}\) the number of operations in the last phase of the attack.

---

\(^{16}\)The complexity of steps 2 and 3 is usually negligible, but it may not be the case in all situations.
The key ranking procedure corresponds to step 3 in Fig. 3.4: instead of returning the subkey \(k'_\text{max} \) possessing the highest mark \(\mu_{k'_\text{max}} = \max_i \mu_{k'_i} \) out of \(|K'|\) subkey candidates, the idea is to return a sorted list \(U\) containing key candidates ranked by likelihood and to search exhaustively for the remaining un-attacked bits in this order. Obviously, two central points in a statistical cryptanalysis are the definition of the statistic \(\Sigma\) and of the mark \(\mu\) which has to be assigned to a subkey candidate. The first issue is the very essence of the attack: the cryptanalyst must find a “statistical weakness” in the cipher. In this part, we will be interested in the second issue, namely how to define an optimal key-ranking procedure, which is formally defined in Def. 3.2.4.

**Definition 3.2.4 (Optimal Key Ranking Procedure).** Let a set of (sub-)key candidates be denoted \(K' = \{k_1, \ldots, k_{2^{l'}}\}\) and let \(R^*\) be a random variable which denotes the right one. Let \(S\) be a set of random measurements. An optimal key-ranking procedure is a function which maps \(S\) to a permutation \(\xi\) on \(\{1, \ldots, 2^{l'}\}\) such that

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{2^{l'}} i \Pr[k'_{\xi(i)} = R^*] \tag{3.29}
$$

is minimal.

In other words, an optimal key ranking procedure orders the subkey candidates in such a manner that the cost of finding the distinguished subkey (i.e. the right one) is minimal; here, we assume implicitly here that the cost of testing a candidate for “distinguishness” is the same for every candidate. The following simple lemma claims that an optimal key ranking procedure in the spirit of Def. 3.2.4 must order the (sub-)key candidates by decreasing probabilities of finding the distinguished candidate.

**Lemma 3.2.5.** Let \(K' = \{k'_i : 1 \leq i \leq 2^{l'}\}\) be a set of (sub-)key candidates proposed by an attack, where one of the subkeys is a distinguished one, denoted by \(R^*\). A permutation \(\xi\) on \(\{1, \ldots, 2^{l'}\}\) which orders the (sub-)key candidates such that

$$
\Pr[R^* = \tilde{k}_1] \geq \ldots \geq \Pr[R^* = \tilde{k}_{2^{l'}}] \tag{3.30}
$$

where \(\tilde{k}_{\xi(j)} = k'_j\) is an optimal key ranking procedure.

**Proof.** Let us assume that there exists a permutation \(\xi\) not satisfying the condition stated in Eq. (3.30) which minimizes Eq. (3.29). Let us denote \(\pi_i = \Pr[R^* = \tilde{k}_i]\) the probability that the right subkey is at rank \(i\). Without
loss of generality, we assume that $\xi$ implies that $\pi_i < \pi_j$ for some $i < j$. Then, by assumption, we must have
\[ \sum_{u: u \notin \{i, j\}} u \cdot \pi_u + i \cdot \pi_i + j \cdot \pi_j \leq \sum_{u: u \notin \{i, j\}} u \cdot \pi_u + i \cdot \pi_j + j \cdot \pi_i \]
which is equivalent to
\[ i \cdot \pi_i + j \cdot \pi_j \leq i \cdot \pi_j + j \cdot \pi_i \iff i(\pi_i - \pi_j) \leq j(\pi_i - \pi_j) \]
As $\pi_i - \pi_j \leq 0$ by assumption, the above equation implies that $i \geq j$, which is a contradiction, and the theorem follows by induction.

Application to DES

Let us now apply optimal key-ranking procedure to the context of a linear cryptanalysis implemented as Matsui’s Third Algorithm (Alg. 3.3), the probabilistic scenario is the one described in Th. 3.2.7 under Ass. 3.2.2, Ass. 3.2.3, Ass. 3.2.4, and Ass. 3.2.5: we have $2^\ell r'$ iid random variables $M_1, \ldots, M_\nu$ sharing $f_M$ and $F_M$ as probability density and distribution functions, respectively, which model the value of the absolute bias of the counters corresponding to wrong subkey candidates. Additionally, there is a random variable $M^*$ distributed according $f_{M^*}$, statistically independent of the $M_i$’s, which models the value of the absolute bias of the counter corresponding to the right subkey candidate. Let us assume that a subkey candidate is bound to each counter such that we can use the counters to denote the subkey candidates. Let us sort now sort the sample values $\hat{m}_i$ by decreasing value of $|\hat{m}_i - \frac{1}{2}|$, where $\nu$ is the number of samples, and rename them $\tilde{m}_i$, i.e.
\[ \tilde{m}_1 \geq \tilde{m}_2 \geq \ldots \geq \tilde{m}_{2^\ell r'} . \] (3.31)

Let us now consider the two following hypotheses (out of the $2^\ell r'$ possible ones) for the rank of the right subkey candidate in the sorted sequence given in Eq. (3.31): either the right subkey candidate has rank $\psi$, or rank $\psi'$, with $1 \leq \psi, \psi' \leq 2^\ell r'$ and $\psi \neq \psi'$. Then, the condition expressed in Th. 3.2.5 can be rewritten as
\[ f_{M^*}(\tilde{m}_\psi) \prod_{1 \leq i \leq 2^\ell r', i \neq \psi} f_M(\tilde{m}_i) \geq f_{M^*}(\tilde{m}_{\psi'}) \prod_{1 \leq i \leq 2^\ell r', i \neq \psi'} f_M(\tilde{m}_i) \] (3.32)
which is, after some algebraic manipulations, equivalent to
\[ \frac{f_{M^*}(\tilde{m}_\psi)}{f_M(\tilde{m}_\psi)} \geq \frac{f_{M^*}(\tilde{m}_{\psi'})}{f_M(\tilde{m}_{\psi'})} \]
This immediately drives us to rank the candidates by *decreasing likelihood-ratio values*: the greater the value, the more likely it is to be the looked-for candidate. We call this ranking procedure *Neyman-Pearson ranking procedure*.

**Definition 3.2.5 (Neyman-Pearson Ranking Procedure).** To each candidate $k'$, assign the mark

$$
\mu_{k'} = \frac{f_{M^*}(\Sigma_{k'})}{f_{M}(\Sigma_{k'})}
$$

where $\Sigma_{k'}$ is the statistic produced by the candidate $k'$, and $f_{M^*}$ and $f_{M}$ are the density functions of $\Sigma_{k'}$ in case of the right and a wrong key, respectively. Then, sort the candidates by decreasing values of $\mu_{k'}$.

The following result is then a straightforward consequence of Th. 3.2.5 and of Eq. (3.32).

**Theorem 3.2.10.** *Neyman-Pearson key-ranking procedures are optimal (in the sense of Def. 3.2.4).*

Multiple lists (note that these considerations are valid for more than two lists, too) giving information on disjoint subsets of the key bits can thus be optimally combined easily if the joint distribution of the underlying statistics is available. Usually, reasonable heuristic statistical independence assumptions can be taken.

We prove now that, in case of a linear cryptanalysis, Matsui’s ranking procedure is equivalent to a Neyman-Pearson ranking procedure. Without loss of generality, we will consider a linear approximation having a bias equal to $\varepsilon > 0$; furthermore, we recall that $\nu$ denotes the number of samples at disposal. Approximations of the $\Sigma$ distributions were derived in §3.2.3; for the sake of clarity, we recall them:

$$
f_M(x) = \sqrt{\frac{8}{\nu \pi}} e^{-\frac{2x^2}{\nu}}, \quad \text{for } x \geq 0
$$

and

$$
f_{M^*}(x) = \sqrt{\frac{2}{\nu \pi}} \left( e^{-\frac{2(\varepsilon - \nu \varepsilon)^2}{\nu}} + e^{-\frac{2(\varepsilon + \nu \varepsilon)^2}{\nu}} \right), \quad \text{for } x \geq 0
$$

The likelihood-ratio is then given by a straightforward calculation.

**Lemma 3.2.6.** In the case of a linear cryptanalysis, the likelihood-ratio is given by

$$
\mu_{k'} = e^{-2\nu \varepsilon^2} \cdot \cosh(4\varepsilon \Sigma_{k'}), \quad \Sigma_{k'} \geq 0
$$

where $\Sigma_{k'}$ is defined according to

$$
\Sigma_{k'} = \left| \frac{\hat{m}_{k'}}{\nu} - \frac{1}{2} \right|.
$$
We can now state the following result for single-list ranking.

**Theorem 3.2.11.** Matsui’s single-list ranking procedure (following Alg. 3.3) is equivalent to a Neyman-Pearson ranking procedure and is therefore optimal in terms of the number of key tests.

Matsui’s refined attack against DES published in [203] actually makes use of two linear approximations involving disjoint subsets of key bits; one is the best linear approximations on 14 rounds of DES and is used for deriving the second one using a “reversing trick”. Each of them gives information about 13 key bits, the remaining 30 unknown key bits having to be searched exhaustively. In order to combine the information coming from these two sources, Matsui computes two independent ranking and generate the final ranking by considering subkey candidates sorted according to the product of their ranks in the two primitive lists of candidates. We can easily observe that Matsui’s double-list ranking procedure, as described, although very simple, is not a Neyman-Pearson key-ranking procedure (it is actually not a total ordering) and it does not make use of the whole information given by each subkey candidate (i.e. it does not use the experimental bias associated with each candidate, but only their respective ranks). The first observation leads to some ambiguity in the implementation of this double-list ranking: should the combination of two candidates having respective ranks equal to 1 and 4 be searched for the unknown key bits before or after the combination consisting of two candidates having both rank 2? We now illustrate the use of a Neyman-Pearson ranking procedure in the case of a linear cryptanalysis of DES. We have to compute the joint probability distribution of the statistics $\Sigma_{k'_1}$ and $\Sigma_{k'_2}$ furnished by the two linear approximations. As these statistics are dependant of disjoint subsets of the key bits, one can reasonably take the following assumption.

**Assumption 3.2.6.** For each $k'_1$ and $k'_2$, $\Sigma_{k'_1}$ and $\Sigma_{k'_2}$ are statistically independent, where $k'_1$ and $k'_2$ denote subkey candidates involving disjoint key subsets.

A second assumption neglects the effects of semi-wrong keys, i.e. keys which behave as the right one according to a list only. This is motivated by the fact that, in case of a linear cryptanalysis of DES, the number of such keys is small, and thus their effect on the joint probability distribution is negligible.

**Assumption 3.2.7.** For each $k'_1$ and $k'_2$, $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{k'_1}, \Sigma_{k'_2})$ is distributed according either to $D_{M^*} = D_{M}^{(1)} \times D_{M}^{(2)}$, or to $D_{M} = D_{M}^{(1)} \times D_{M}^{(2)}$, where $D_{M}^{(1)}$ and $D_{M}^{(2)}$ are the distributions of the right subkey for both key subsets, and $D_{M}$ is the distribution of a right subkey for both key subsets, respectively.
Using these two assumptions, the probability density functions defined in Eq. (3.34) and Eq. (3.35), and the fact that the bias of both linear expression is the same and equal to $\varepsilon$, one can derive the likelihood-ratio:

$$\mu_{(k'_1, k'_2)} = e^{-4\nu\varepsilon^2} \cdot \cosh(4\varepsilon \Sigma_{k'_1}) \cdot \cosh(4\varepsilon \Sigma_{k'_2})$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.37)

As Eq. (3.37) is not “numerically” convenient to use, we may approximate it using a Taylor development in terms of $\varepsilon$, which gives a very intuitive definition of the Neyman-Pearson ranking procedure:

$$\mu_{(k'_1, k'_2)} \approx 1 + (8\Sigma^2_{k'_1} + 8\Sigma^2_{k'_2} - 4\nu)\varepsilon^2 + O(\varepsilon^4)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.38)

Hence, we can note that it is sufficient to rank the subkey candidates by decreasing values of $\Sigma^2_{k'_1} + \Sigma^2_{k'_2}$, i.e. the final mark is just the Euclidean distance between an unbiased result and a given sample.

We may generalize this result to the case where the biases, which we denote $\varepsilon_1$ and $\varepsilon_2$, are different in both equations; in this case, the likelihood-ratio is given by

$$\mu_{(k'_1, k'_2)} = e^{-2\nu(\varepsilon_1^2 + \varepsilon_2^2)} \cosh(4\varepsilon_1 \Sigma_{k'_1}) \cosh(4\varepsilon_2 \Sigma_{k'_2})$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.39)

A first order approximation is then given by

$$\mu_{(k'_1, k'_2)} \approx 1 + 8\Sigma^2_{k'_1}\varepsilon_1^2 + 8\Sigma^2_{k'_2}\varepsilon_2^2 - 2\nu(\varepsilon_1^2 + \varepsilon_2^2)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.40)

which is equivalent to put a grade equal to $\mu_{(k'_1, k'_2)} = \Sigma^2_{k'_1}\varepsilon_1^2 + \Sigma^2_{k'_2}\varepsilon_2^2$. We summarize these facts in the following theorem.

**Theorem 3.2.12.** Under assumptions 3.2.6 and 3.2.7, in a linear cryptanalysis using $t$ approximations on disjoint key bits subsets having each a bias equal to $\varepsilon_i, 1 \leq i \leq t$, a procedure which ranks the subkey candidates by decreasing

$$\mu_{(k'_1, ..., k'_t)} = \sum_{i=1}^{t} \left(\Sigma_{k'_i}\varepsilon_i\right)^2$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.41)

is a Neyman-Pearson ranking procedure, and furthermore, it is optimal.

We have implemented Neyman-Pearson key-ranking procedures in the case of DES, and we report some experimental results in §3.2.5, page 94. Finally, we note that several published attacks (to the best of our knowledge, all are derived from Matsui’s paper) use key ranking procedures or suggest them as potential improvement. In [297], Shimoyama and Kaneko use quadratic Boolean approximations of DES’ S-boxes possessing a larger bias. The first part of their attack consists in a traditional linear cryptanalysis, and thus we can apply our optimal ranking procedure; furthermore, another part of their attack consists also in a sorting procedure using Matsui’s heuristic.
In [166], Knudsen and Mathiassen show how to modify Matsui’s attack into a chosen-plaintexts attack in order to reduce the needs of pairs. Their attack can also use the ”reversing trick”, i.e. one can apply the same linear characteristic on both encryption and decryption function, in order to derive twice as much key bits. A new time, one could use a key-ranking procedure and our optimal rule to define the order of the subkey candidates during the exhaustive search part.

3.2.5 Implementation of Matsui’s Attack

The linear cryptanalysis attack as described in [203] (and in Alg. 3.3), except the exhaustive search part\footnote{After having determined the final rank $r$ of the right subkey candidate, we have computed the expected complexity (in DES evaluations) of the exhaustive search part as $(r - 1) \cdot 2^{30} + 2^{26}$.}, has been implemented. The computational most intensive part of the attack is obviously the encryption of $2^{43}$ plaintexts. For this, we have written in pure assembly code a DES encryption routine designed for the Intel Pentium III microprocessor, which we now describe.

Bitslice Implementation of DES

One of the main problems arising during an implementation of DES in the classical way is to deal effectively with the bit permutations. One has to consider each bit in a CPU register separately; this is clearly an ineffective way to employ the CPU’s power. It is possible to use lookup tables and streamlined operations, but these techniques are memory intensive and the data quickly do not fit anymore in the CPU memory cache.

The bitslice technique was first proposed in the cryptography field by Biham [21], although it seems to be an implementation trick well-known in the hardware field. The idea behind bitslice is quite simple: one allocates one register for each bit of data, instead of storing all the bits in an unique register. This allows to process in parallel a number of bits which is equal to the size of the available registers.

If we consider DES (as defined in §2.2.1), we note that it mainly consists of permutations and substitutions. When assigning a register to a single bit, the permutations are dealt with at compile time, as it is actually an addressing issue. In other words, it is not necessary to isolate a given bit, which is a costly operation, because we have the bit ready in a register, or in a memory location which is hard-coded in the program.

The only remaining problem concerns the S-boxes. Instead of using lookup tables, one has to express this non-linear stage in DES as their gate circuit, i.e. as a Boolean expression. Fortunately, as there is no loop in an S-box, one does not have to deal with conditional behavior. The evaluation
of these Boolean expressions will typically be more expensive than lookup-
tables, but the cost is amortized by the fact that we can evaluate 32 or 64
bits in parallel, provided the register size at disposal is 32- or 64-bit wide,
respectively.

As outlined before, the main advantages [268] of a bitsliced implementa-
tion are, on the one hand, that the bit permutations cost nothing at
execution time, and on the other had, that the CPU’s logical unit is used
at full rate. Obviously, one can list several disadvantages [268] as well: the
data are usually not available nor usable when they are spread over a bunch
of registers, which implies some conversion stage (this problem is known as
orthogonalization problem). Second, table lookups are not possible anymore
and have to be replaced by some logical computation which may be rather
painful to calculate and slow to execute. Even finding the optimal Boolean
evaluation of a given S-box is not a trivial task. Third, the resulting code is
large and it is possible to loose some speed if the CPU’s instruction cache is
not large enough. Fourth, in order to get some benefit from this technique,
many registers are needed, as memory is slow. And, last but not least, this
technique is very painful when implemented by hand. Although the num-
ber of disadvantages seems larger that the number of benefits, Biham [21]
was able to gain a speed factor equal to 3 on a 64-bit Alpha architecture
compared to the best classical implementations of DES.

Optimizations for the Intel Pentium MMX Architecture  Intel’s
MMX architecture has been designed with the goal to improve multimedia
and intensive floating-point arithmetic applications. It achieves this goal by
offering a new set of 8 dedicated 64-bit registers, a new instruction set which
allows to process data in a parallel way, and a super-scalar architecture. In
our bitsliced implementation of DES, we have only used 5 MMX logical
operations, namely MOVQ, PXOR, PAND, PANDN, and POR. Unfortunately, there
are no other available logical operations, as it is sometimes the case on
certain RISC architectures. Another drawback is the lack of NOT operation.

Taking account of the temporal property of a linear cryptanalysis, we
have made a heavy use of the new cache management instructions of the
Intel Pentium III: the PREFETCH instruction is able to retrieve a minimum of
32 bytes of data prior to the data actually needed. This hides the latency for
data access in the time required to process data already resident in the cache.
This instruction does not change the user-visible semantics of a program,
but it may affect considerably the performances of a program when used
on purpose. Finally, our code has been fully unrolled, to avoid any latency
resulting from branch mispredications.

Kwan’s Boolean Representation of S-Boxes  In his paper [21], Biham,
describes a Boolean representation of the DES S-boxes with an average count
of 100 gates (see Fig. 3.5). These results where later improved by Kwan [176] down to an average gate count equal to 51; our fast DES implementation was hence implemented with Kwan’s representation.

**Performance Results** The number of clock cycles on an Intel Pentium III spent\(^{18}\) by our bitslice implementation is given in Fig. 3.5 for each S-box. The whole DES routine needs 14893 clock cycles to encrypt 64 blocks of data (i.e. 4096 bits), which represents an amortized cost of 232.7 clock cycles per block. On a CPU clocked at 666 MHz, this results in a throughput equal to 183 Mbps. One can hardly compare this number with existing fast implementations of DES, because of optimizations specifically related to the linear cryptanalysis; however, using classical available implementations for our purposes would have resulted in significantly poorer performances.

**Pseudo-Random Generator**

We have used a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), as suggested by Matsui [203], to generate the known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Let $\xi$ be a root of an primitive polynomial $p(x)$ of degree $n$ over GF (2). Then, a LFSR can be seen as the iteration of the mapping

$$i \mapsto i \times \xi$$

where the multiplications is done in the representation of the finite field GF ($2^n$) defined by $p(x)$. Matsui [203] reports to have worked with such a strategy in GF ($2^{64}$) to generate the known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, since LFSRs are known to have very good statistical properties and that they generate maximum-length sequences. We furthermore observe that one can implement 64 LFSRs in parallel in a bitslice manner provided 64-bit registers are available.

We found desirable to split the attack on several processors with a fine granularity, mainly for ease of process management reasons. In order to achieve this goal, we have split the $2^{43}$ work load in 2048 partial jobs, each handling 64 sequences at a time in parallel. Taking into account the effects of the birthday scenario in this precise situation, it is quite insightful to estimate the probability of generating overlapping sequences with a LFSR.

---

\(^{18}\) Using the measurement procedure described in [9].
Lemma 3.2.7. Let \( x \in \text{GF}(2^n) \) with \( x \neq 0 \) be the seed value of a sequence of length \( 2^\ell \) generated by a maximal-period LFSR. Let

\[
\alpha = \left\lfloor \frac{2^n - 1}{3 \cdot 2^\ell - 2} \right\rfloor.
\]

Let \( m < \alpha \) be the number of generated sequences in parallel. Then, the probability \( \pi_{\text{overlap}} \) of generating two overlapping sequences is upper bounded by

\[
\pi_{\text{overlap}} \leq 1 - \left( 1 - \frac{m - 1}{\alpha} \right)^{m-1}
\]

Proof. We consider a sequence somewhere in the cycle of length \( 2^n - 1 \). Let us reserve space of length \( 2^\ell - 1 \) at the left and a the right of a given subsequence. Then, we divide the space in \( \alpha \) non-overlapping subsequences of \( 3 \cdot 2^\ell - 2 \) elements, and a birthday paradox reasoning is finally applied.

Using Lem. 3.2.7, we observe that \( \text{GF}(2^{64}) \) is too small to avoid overlapping sequences, so we chose to work in \( \text{GF}(2^{128}) \) represented by the primitive polynomial \( x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 \).

Experimental Results

We have performed the attack 21 times, using the idle time of 8 to 16 CPUs; this represents between 3 and 6 days for a single run, depending on the availability of the computers. An exhaustive table of our experimental results regarding the complexity of the key exhaustive search part of the attack is available in Fig. 3.6. This table gives the experimental complexity for various amounts \( \nu \) of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, where a figure \( x \) means \( 2^x \) DES evaluations.

It is widely accepted that linear cryptanalysis of DES, given \( 2^{43} \) known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, has a success probability of 85\% within a complexity of \( 2^{43} \) DES encryptions, which are values given by Matsui in [203] (they are based on extrapolations from experiments on 8-rounds DES). Our experimental results lead to the following observations:

- Given \( 2^{43} \) known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, our experiments have a complexity of less than \( 2^{41} \) DES evaluation with a success probability of 86 \% where more than the half of the cases have a complexity less than \( 2^{39} \). Furthermore, if an attacker is ready to decrease her success probability, the complexity drops dramatically (less than \( 2^{34} \) DES evaluations with a success probability of 10 \%).

- Given \( 2^{42.5} \) known plaintext-ciphertext pairs (i.e. with 30 \% less pairs), half of the experiments have a complexity less than \( 2^{42} \) DES evaluations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>$\nu = 2^{43}$</th>
<th>$\nu = 2^{42.5}$</th>
<th>$\nu = 2^{42}$</th>
<th>$\nu = 2^{41}$</th>
<th>$\nu = 2^{40}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>39.1836</td>
<td>38.4818</td>
<td>45.0307</td>
<td>51.3802</td>
<td>51.0533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.2479</td>
<td>41.6346</td>
<td>43.6383</td>
<td>48.0928</td>
<td>43.1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>38.6055</td>
<td>41.8023</td>
<td>43.9622</td>
<td>48.5492</td>
<td>51.6012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>38.1267</td>
<td>34.6147</td>
<td>41.3351</td>
<td>48.7240</td>
<td>51.2041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>37.4878</td>
<td>29.0000</td>
<td>36.5157</td>
<td>46.1991</td>
<td>52.3685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>34.0444</td>
<td>44.2753</td>
<td>46.6834</td>
<td>48.5221</td>
<td>50.1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>36.4676</td>
<td>45.5732</td>
<td>44.2949</td>
<td>47.3010</td>
<td>51.2913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>36.1189</td>
<td>44.7222</td>
<td>41.4091</td>
<td>51.6338</td>
<td>52.1143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>40.3515</td>
<td>47.0565</td>
<td>48.6184</td>
<td>52.1953</td>
<td>53.1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>41.6540</td>
<td>41.8682</td>
<td>45.7429</td>
<td>47.9120</td>
<td>41.9750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>45.4059</td>
<td>51.2973</td>
<td>51.9932</td>
<td>51.8155</td>
<td>52.1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>36.1189</td>
<td>43.6633</td>
<td>46.7256</td>
<td>50.3949</td>
<td>49.2317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>36.4009</td>
<td>36.1189</td>
<td>43.2183</td>
<td>47.0756</td>
<td>46.7680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>39.0042</td>
<td>42.6736</td>
<td>44.3057</td>
<td>44.7116</td>
<td>47.3256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>37.6330</td>
<td>39.8572</td>
<td>47.6536</td>
<td>49.5244</td>
<td>52.6439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>38.9204</td>
<td>36.6653</td>
<td>41.5447</td>
<td>49.1082</td>
<td>49.9939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>33.5236</td>
<td>38.8502</td>
<td>43.3128</td>
<td>46.1030</td>
<td>48.6798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>39.8478</td>
<td>47.4938</td>
<td>52.3671</td>
<td>50.6770</td>
<td>50.3675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>32.1699</td>
<td>31.8074</td>
<td>40.5093</td>
<td>43.8552</td>
<td>48.4968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>40.7503</td>
<td>38.3729</td>
<td>40.3734</td>
<td>45.2436</td>
<td>52.3101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>41.8721</td>
<td>44.9063</td>
<td>45.4147</td>
<td>52.0730</td>
<td>52.8571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.6: Experimental Results about Linear Cryptanalysis of DES.
With only $2^{40}$ pairs at disposal, the complexity is still far lower than
an exhaustive search.

Even if we have to take these experimental results carefully because of the
relative small number of statistical samples, they suggest strongly a lower
complexity than expected by Matsui in [203] and we risk the following con-
jecture:

Conjecture 3.2.1. Given $2^{43}$ known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, it is possible
to recover a DES key using Matsui’s Third Algorithm (Alg. 3.3) within a
complexity of $2^{41}$ DES evaluations with a success probability of 85 %.

These experimental results give us the possibility to test the accuracy
of Cor. 3.2.1 as well. Each of the 21 experiments provides two statistical
samples of the rank $R$ of the right subkey candidate. Fig. 3.7 table summa-
rizes our results about the ranks of the right subkey candidates for various
amounts $\nu$ of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and compare them to the
theoretical expectations (values in smaller characters) given by Cor. 3.2.1.
We observe that Cor. 3.2.1 seems to give a pessimistic expected value for
the rank. However, we have noticed that Cor. 3.2.1 is very sensitive numer-
ically. For instance, the expected rank $E[R]$ is equal to 113 and to 39 when
we assume that $\varepsilon = 1.1 \cdot 2^{-21}$ and $\varepsilon_r = 1.3 \cdot 2^{-21}$, respectively.

Finally, a key parameter regarding the linear cryptanalysis success is of
course the bias of the involved linear approximation(s). As it is infeasible
to compute the exact bias of a linear approximation, one uses implicit as-
sumptions, such as the wrong-key randomization one (Ass. 3.2.2) and the
statistical independence of data between two successive rounds (in the spirit
of Lem. 3.2.2). The incidence of these assumptions has been well discussed
in the literature (see [42, 125, 174, 250]). Although several situations where
these assumptions can fail have been suggested and discussed, it is accepted
that the linear expression real bias should be well approximated in case the
of DES.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
$\nu$ & $2^{43}$ & $2^{42.5}$ & $2^{42}$ & $2^{41}$ & $2^{40}$ \\
\hline
$r \leq 5$ & 20 (22) & 13 (13.5) & 7 (7.6) & 0 (2.3) & 0 (0.8) \\
$r \leq 10$ & 27 (25.8) & 16 (17.1) & 9 (10.5) & 2 (3.6) & 0 (1.3) \\
$r \leq 50$ & 33 (33.6) & 26 (26.2) & 18 (18.8) & 5 (8.6) & 2 (3.9) \\
$r \leq 150$ & 38 (37.7) & 34 (32.3) & 24 (25.7) & 10 (14.3) & 5 (7.7) \\
$r \leq 300$ & 42 (39.4) & 39 (35.7) & 31 (30.3) & 17 (19.2) & 14 (11.6) \\
$r \leq 600$ & 42 (40.8) & 40 (38.5) & 35 (34.6) & 25 (24.7) & 22 (16.8) \\
$E[R]$ & 38 (71) & 129 (182) & 302 (362) & 654 (847) & 1121 (1312) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Comparison between experimental and theoretical results.}
\end{table}
Our experimental results go indeed in this direction. We have computed the sample mean of the experimental biases \( \hat{B}^* \) and \( \hat{B} \), which can be compared to the expected values of the densities given in Eq. (3.27) and in Eq. (3.28). In case of a right key, the sample mean (averaged over the 42 samples) is equal to \( 5.5 \cdot 10^{-7} \) with a standard deviation of \( 0.2 \cdot 10^{-7} \). Thus, under our statistical model, we can estimate that

\[
\Pr \left[ 4.9 \cdot 10^{-7} \leq E[B^*] \leq 6.1 \cdot 10^{-7} \right] = 2\Phi(3) - 1 \approx 0.997
\]

using a classical central-limit theorem reasoning\(^{19}\). This interval has to be compared with the expected value of a random variable distributed according to Eq. (3.27) furnished by our statistical model: \( E[\hat{B}^*] \approx 5.674 \cdot 10^{-7} \).

We can at least conclude that there is no significant linear hull effect in DES.

Our experiments provide furthermore a good opportunity to confirm the validity of Ass. 3.2.2. The sample mean in case of wrong subkey candidates, averaged over all the wrong subkeys and all experiments, is equal to \( 1.38 \cdot 10^{-7} \) with a standard deviation of \( 0.03 \cdot 10^{-7} \), a value has to be compared with \( E[B] = 1.345 \cdot 10^{-7} \) given by \( \varepsilon = 0 \) where \( \hat{B} \) is distributed according to (3.28) and the following confidence interval

\[
\Pr \left[ 1.29 \cdot 10^{-7} \leq E[B] \leq 1.46 \cdot 10^{-7} \right] \approx 0.997.
\]

This seems to fully legitimate Ass. 3.2.2 in the case of DES.

**Experimental Results for the Neyman-Pearson Key-Ranking**

The Neyman-Pearson ranking procedure described in the previous section has been simulated in the context of 21 linear cryptanalysis of DES, using the data than those described in the previous section. The following table summarizes our experimental results on the complexity of the exhaustive search part of the attack given \( 2^{43} \) known plaintext-ciphertext pairs; we use the following notation: \( \mu_C \) denotes the average experimental complexity, \( C_{85\%} \) the maximal complexity given a success probability of 85 \%, which is the success probability defined by Matsui in [203], \( C_{\text{med}} \) the median, \( C_{\text{min}} \) and \( C_{\text{max}} \) being the extremal values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Matsui’s Ranking</th>
<th>Optimal Ranking</th>
<th>( \Delta )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \log_2 \mu_C )</td>
<td>41.4144</td>
<td>40.8723</td>
<td>-31.32 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_2 C_{85%} )</td>
<td>40.7503</td>
<td>40.6022</td>
<td>-9.75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_2 C_{\text{med}} )</td>
<td>38.1267</td>
<td>36.7748</td>
<td>-60.71 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_2 C_{\text{min}} )</td>
<td>32.1699</td>
<td>31.3219</td>
<td>-40.00 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_2 C_{\text{max}} )</td>
<td>45.4059</td>
<td>44.6236</td>
<td>-41.86 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{19}\) We still have to keep in mind that the number of samples (42) is rather low.
These results lead us to the following observations:

- The average complexity is decreased by a factor of about 30%. Actually, the average complexity is not a good statistical indicator for the average behavior of the linear cryptanalysis, because most cases have a far lower complexity and only 3 cases have a complexity greater than the average. Thus, those three cases have a considerable influence on the average complexity and it is worth examining the median behavior.

- A perhaps more significant result is that the median complexity is decreased by a factor of about 60%. Although one have to be careful with this result because of the small size of the statistical samples number, this value seems to be more accurate regarding the real impact of the improved rule as the average one.

- Although the optimal rule decreases the exhaustive search part complexity on average, “pathological” cases where Matsui’s heuristic is better than the Neyman-Pearson ranking procedure can occur. One can explain this by the fact that the Σ densities are sometimes bad approximations of the real ones, several heuristic assumptions being involved.

As the data complexity and the computational complexity of a linear cryptanalysis are closely related, it is possible (and desirable in the context of a known-plaintext attack) to convert a gain in the first category to a gain in the second one: even if we decrease sensibly the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the complexity will remain within reasonable areas: for instance, given $2^{42.46}$ known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, $\hat{C}_{85\%} = 2^{44.46}$ DES evaluations, and with only $2^{42}$ pairs, $\hat{C}_{85\%} = 2^{46.86}$; these experimental values are summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$2^{42.00}$</th>
<th>$2^{42.46}$</th>
<th>$2^{43.00}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data complexity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time complexity</td>
<td>$2^{46.86}$</td>
<td>$2^{44.46}$</td>
<td>$2^{40.60}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success probability</td>
<td>85 %</td>
<td>85 %</td>
<td>85 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.6 Summary

In this section, we have proposed a new and precise statistical modelization of various versions of Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis against DES. The accuracy of these results was then checked with experimental results obtained by implementing the attack 21 times, and even if the number of attacks does not allow us to draw definitive conclusions, they clearly tend to support the heuristic assumptions we took.
A second contribution of this section is the optimization of the most recent (and most powerful) version of Matsui's attack obtained when using an optimal key-ranking procedure. Due to their genericity, the latter can be used in various types of statistical attacks. Furthermore, we have presented experimental results which tend to indicate that optimal key-ranking procedure allow to gain a non-negligible factor in terms of computational complexity.

Finally, we can note that the Neyman-Pearson paradigm, in spite of its simplicity, allowed us to state optimality results for attacks based on linear cryptanalysis. An interesting consequence is that one can give strict bounds on the best performance of an adversary implementing such attacks. The next section aims at considering the theoretical modelizations of certain classes of distinguishers at the light of those tools.

3.3 Statistical Modelization of Distinguishers

The theoretical modelization of generic statistical cryptanalytic procedures against block ciphers has been studied by only few researchers. In [313, 316], Vaudenay introduces the general concept of iterated attacks and gives security results against this class of attacks, as well as refined measures of security towards linear and differential cryptanalysis. In an even more abstract framework, we can furthermore outline the recent works of Maurer et al. [212, 214, 215] where they develop a general theory of random systems and prove several results about their properties in terms of distinguishability.

In this section, we make use of the Neyman-Pearson paradigm described in §3.1 to study certain classes of generic attacks against block ciphers. This allows us to derive new and tight bounds on the best advantage of any distinguisher for these models of attack.

3.3.1 Preliminaries

First of all, we recall basic notions about cryptographic distinguishers and about the Luby-Rackoff model of security [191] (we refer the reader to the brief introduction of §2.4.2, page 53, and to the bibliographical references therein). In the Luby-Rackoff security model, a distinguisher $\delta^\nu$ is a computationally (and memory) unbounded Turing machine which can play with an oracle $\Omega$ implementing a permutation $\mathcal{C}$ over some alphabet $\mathcal{B}$ (e.g. $\mathcal{B} = \{0, 1\}^n$ with $n = 64$ or $n = 128$). Typically, $\Omega$ can implement either a permutation on $\mathcal{B}$ chosen uniformly at random in a given family of permutations (i.e. a block cipher indexed by a key$^{20}$), or a permutation $\mathcal{C}^*$ chosen uniformly at random from the set of all permutations on $\mathcal{B}$; the latter is usually called the perfect cipher.

$^{20}$In this case, the randomness provides from the choice of the key.
The distinguisher $\delta^\nu$ can submit a bounded number $\nu$ of queries to $\Omega$ and ultimately outputs a decision bit "0" (if it guesses that $C^*$ was implemented by $\Omega$) or "1" (if it guesses that $C$ was implemented by $\Omega$); we are then interested in characterizing and computing its advantage:

$$\text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu}(C, C^*) = \left| \Pr_{C} [\delta^\nu(x) = 1] - \Pr_{C^*} [\delta^\nu(x) = 1] \right|$$

(3.42)

where $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_\nu)$ is the vector of the values queried to the oracle; another important measure is the best advantage of any distinguisher:

$$\text{BestAdv}^\nu(C, C^*) = \max_{\delta^\nu} \text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu}(C, C^*)$$

Here, the maximum is taken over the set of all possible distinguishers between $C$ and $C^*$ asking at most $\nu$ queries to $\Omega$.

There is an important difference between adaptive and non-adaptive distinguishers: an adaptive distinguisher is allowed to wait for an answer before submitting the next query, which may thus be a function of the previous answer. Alg. 3.4 describes formally a $\nu$-limited adaptive distinguisher, while Alg. 3.5 do the same for a $\nu$-limited non-adaptive distinguisher. We remark

1: Input: An oracle $\Omega$ implementing an unknown permutation $U$ on $B$, a complexity $\nu$, functions $f_i$, with $1 \leq i \leq \nu$, an acceptance function $\text{accept}$.
2: Output: A decision bit.
3: Select a message $x_1 = f_1()$ and get $y_1 = U(x_1)$ from $\Omega$.
4: Compute a message $x_2 = f_2(x_1, y_1)$ and get $y_2 = U(x_2)$ from $\Omega$.
5: ...
6: Compute a message $x_\nu = f_\nu(x_1, \ldots, x_{\nu-1}, y_1, \ldots, y_{\nu-1})$ and get $y_\nu = U(x_\nu)$ from $\Omega$.
7: Output $\text{accept}(x_1, \ldots, x_\nu, y_1, \ldots, y_\nu)$.

Algorithm 3.4: $\nu$-Limited Adaptive Distinguisher

1: Input: An oracle $\Omega$ implementing an unknown permutation $U$ on $B$, a complexity $\nu$, an acceptance function $\text{accept}$.
2: Output: A decision bit.
3: Select $\nu$ messages $X = (x_1, \ldots, x_\nu)$.
4: Get $Y = (y_1 = U(x_1), \ldots, y_\nu = U(x_\nu))$.
5: Output $\text{accept}(X, Y)$.

Algorithm 3.5: $\nu$-Limited Non-Adaptive Distinguisher

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21 Note that the probabilities are taken on the permutation distribution (i.e. on the key) and possibly on the distribution of the random coins needed by $\delta^\nu$.

22 These definitions are those of Vaudenay [320].
that the core of Alg. 3.4 and Alg. 3.5 consists of the accept function (and of the functions $f_i$ for the adaptive case) which actually define the attack used to distinguish $C$ from $C^*$.

It is worth noticing that the Luby-Rackoff security model is an extremely strong model, since we put no restriction on the computational power of the adversary. In this model, a “security proof” would mean that we are able to provide an acceptable (i.e. tight and small) upper-bound on $\text{BestAdv}^\nu(C, C^*)$ for a given block cipher $C$. As outlined in §2.4.2, the current state of research is able to give security proofs only for very few constructions, mainly for high-level schemes, like the Feistel cipher, whose round functions are themselves extremely strong functions. For these reasons, one possibility to slightly weaken the attack model consists in focusing on iterated distinguishers.

Informally, the basic idea behind the concept of iterated distinguisher is that we make use of an elementary distinguisher (or “core distinguisher”) limited to $d$ queries between a block cipher $C$ and the ideal cipher $C^*$, and that we iterate a certain number of times this core distinguisher (in a statistically independent way) with the goal of amplifying the advantage of the core distinguisher. Note that we will restrict ourselves to non-adaptive core distinguishers. First of all, we recall the definition of Vaudenay [316] of a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order $d$, which we will denote by $\delta^\nu_{\text{iter}(d)}$ (see Alg. 3.6).

**Definition 3.3.1 (Non-Adaptive Iterated Distinguisher).** Let $\nu$ and $d$ be strictly positive integers, and let $B$ be a set. Then, a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order $d$ and complexity $\nu$, denoted $\delta^\nu_{\text{iter}(d)}$, for a permutation on $B$, is a computationally unbounded Turing machine characterized by a probability distribution $D_B$ on $B^d$, named the plaintext distribution, a (possibly randomized) function $\text{test} : B^d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, named a test function, and a (possibly randomized) function $\text{accept} : \{0, 1\}^\nu \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, named an acceptance function.

Actually, non-adaptive iterated distinguishers model a large number of the known attacks against block ciphers.

- Linear cryptanalysis (see §2.3.3, page 45), as well as some of these variants (like non-linear cryptanalysis as proposed by Knudsen and Robshaw [167] and by Shimoyama and Kaneko [297]) is an non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order $d = 1$.

- Differential cryptanalysis (see §2.3.3, page 40) as well as some of these variants (like impossible differential attacks [27] and truncated differential attacks [161]) is an non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order $d = 2$. 
1: **Input**: An oracle $\Omega$ implementing an unknown permutation $U$ on $B$, a plaintext distribution $D_B$, a complexity $\nu$, a test function $\text{test}$, and an acceptance function $\text{accept}$.
2: **Output**: A decision bit.
3: **for** $i$ from 1 to $\nu$ **do**
4: Pick a random $x_i = (x_1, \ldots, x_d)$ according to $D_B$ and submit them to the oracle $\Omega$.
5: Get the corresponding $y_i = (U(x_1), \ldots, U(y_d))$ from $\Omega$.
6: Pick a random bit $b_i$ with an expected value equal to $\text{test}(x_i, y_i)$.
7: **end for**
8: Output a decision bit with an expected value equal to $\text{accept}(b_1, \ldots, b_\nu)$.

**Algorithm 3.6**: Non-Adaptive Iterated Distinguisher of Order $d$

- Differential-linear cryptanalysis [183] and its generalization [29] (see §2.3.3, page 47) is an non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order $d = 2$.

- Integral attacks (see §2.3.4, page 48) [134,169] considering sums of $\alpha$ words is a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order $d = \alpha$.

There are statistical attacks which do not fit into this framework, mainly because they store more than a single bit between the executions of the core distinguisher: for instance, Vaudenay’s $\chi^2$ cryptanalysis [312], Davies’ attack and all the non-surjective attacks (see §2.3.3, page 47), and several generalizations of linear cryptanalysis, like the partitioning cryptanalysis [126] of Harpes and Massey. Actually, all of these attacks are based on distinguishers working on probability distributions defined on sets of cardinality greater than two. Wagner’s boomerang attack [322] (see §2.3.3, page 44) as well as its refinements (the amplified boomerang attack [158], and the rectangle attack of Biham, Dunkelman and Keller [28]) can be seen as an adaptive iterated distinguisher of order $d = 4$, meaning that the core distinguisher is adaptive.

### 3.3.2 Distinguishing Two Binary Random Sources

In the following, we will assume the following simple statistical game: we consider an oracle $\Omega$ which first draws a bit $b$ uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}$. Depending on the value of $b$, $\Omega$ implements either a random source distributed according to $D_0$, or a random source distributed according to $D_1$ (where $D_0$ is referred to as an “ideal” distribution). The oracle $\Omega$ allows then a distinguisher $\delta^\nu$ to submit at most $\nu$ uniformly distributed and statistically independent queries; at the end of the game, $\delta^\nu$ must output a guess about the bit $b$. We are then naturally interested in bounding the advantage of any computationally unbounded distinguisher in this scenario.
We now interpret this framework as a statistical hypothesis test. When dealing with error probabilities, one usually proceeds as follows in the classical approach: one of the two possible error probabilities is fixed, and we minimize the other error probability if we use the Neyman-Pearson lemma to define the acceptance function. However, this approach lacks symmetry and it is quite inconvenient in our case. Another possibility is to follow a Bayesian approach and to assign prior probabilities \( \pi_0 \) and \( \pi_1 \) to both hypotheses, respectively, and to assume that correct decisions are not penalized, while incorrect decisions are penalized equally, then the optimal Bayesian decision rule is given by

\[
\text{accept}(x) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \pi_0 \Pr_{D_0}[x] > \pi_1 \Pr_{D_1}[x] \\
1 & \text{if } \pi_0 \Pr_{D_0}[x] = \pi_1 \Pr_{D_1}[x] \\
c & \text{if } \pi_0 \Pr_{D_0}[x] < \pi_1 \Pr_{D_1}[x]
\end{cases}
\] (3.43)

Here, \( c \in \{0, 1\} \) means that a bit\(^{23}\) is drawn uniformly at random. In this case, according to [274, page 583], the above rule minimizes the overall error probability defined by

\[
\pi_e = \pi_0 \alpha + \pi_1 \beta
\] (3.44)

where \( \alpha \) is the probability that \( \text{accept} \) outputs “1” when the samples are distributed according to \( D_0 \), and \( \beta \) is the probability that \( \text{accept} \) outputs “0” when the samples are actually distributed according to \( D_1 \).

The link between the overall error probability defined by Eq. (3.44) and the advantage defined by Eq. (3.42) is made clear by the following simple lemma.

**Lemma 3.3.1.** Let \( \pi_e \) denote the overall probability of error of a distinguisher \( \delta \) as defined in Eq. (3.44) with \( \pi_0 = \pi_1 = \frac{1}{2} \). Then,

\[
\text{Adv}_\delta(C, C^*) = 1 - 2\pi_e = 1 - (\alpha + \beta).
\] (3.45)

**Proof.** Let \( x \) and \( y \) denote the vector of the queries and of the answers given by an oracle \( \Omega \), respectively. First of all, by the definition of the advantage, we have

\[
\text{Adv}_\delta(C, C^*) = \left| \Pr'_C[\delta(x, y) = 1] - \Pr'_{C^*}[\delta(x, y) = 1] \right|
\]

\[
= \left| 1 - \Pr'_C[\delta(x, y) = 1] - \Pr'_C[\delta(x, y) = 0] \right|
\]

\[
= \left| 1 - \alpha - \beta \right| = 1 - (\alpha + \beta)
\]

\(^{23}\)Actually, the acceptance function \( \text{accept}(\cdot) \) does not need to be randomized: we can make it output 0 if and only if \( \pi_0 \Pr_{D_0}[X = x] \geq \pi_1 \Pr_{D_1}[X = x] \) without modifying the overall error probability.
Now, in order to prove the equality (3.45), we have still to show that $\alpha + \beta \leq 1$. Let us assume the opposite, i.e. that $\alpha + \beta > 1$. By the Neyman-Pearson lemma, we know that the optimal Bayesian rule minimizes $\pi_e$. Let us “invert” the rule (i.e. we make it output the opposite result). Then,

$$\pi_e = \pi_0(1 - \alpha) + \pi_1(1 - \beta) = \frac{1}{2}(2 - \alpha - \beta) < \frac{1}{2} \quad (3.46)$$

which implies that the inverted rule would possess a “better” $\pi_e$, which is a contradiction and proves the lemma.

In the following, we will consider the case encountered during a linear cryptanalysis, namely the case where we have to distinguish between the two following random sources: one of the sources generating independent and uniformly distributed bits, while the second one is slightly biased. More formally, let $D_0$ be the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}$ and let $D_1$ be a probability distribution defined as

$$\Pr_{D_1}[X = 0] = 1 - \Pr_{D_1}[X = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$$

such that $0 < |\varepsilon| \ll \frac{1}{2}$. First of all, we can describe precisely the shape of the acceptance function of an optimal distinguisher between these two random sources.

**Lemma 3.3.2.** Let $D_0$ be the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}$ and $D_1$ be a probability distribution defined as $\Pr_{D_1}[X = 0] = 1 - \Pr_{D_1}[X = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$ with $\varepsilon \geq 0$. Let $\delta^\nu$ be a computationally unbounded distinguisher limited to $\nu$ queries implementing an acceptance function $\text{accept}$ defined by

$$\text{accept}(u) = 1 \iff u \geq \nu \cdot \log\left(1 + 2\varepsilon \right) \log\left(1 - 2\varepsilon \right) - \log\left(1 + 2\varepsilon \right) \quad (3.47)$$

where $0 \leq u \leq \nu$ is the number of times that the source outputs 0. Then $\delta^\nu$ maximizes $\text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu}(D_0, D_1)$.

**Proof.** We know that optimal decision rule is defined by Eq. (3.43). In other words, $\delta^\nu$ must decide for $D_1$ if and only if

$$\left(\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon\right)^u \left(\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon\right)^{\nu-u} \geq \frac{1}{2^\nu}$$

which is equivalent to

$$u \log\left(\frac{1 + 2\varepsilon}{1 - 2\varepsilon}\right) + \nu \log(1 - 2\varepsilon) \geq 0$$

The lemma follows by noticing that $\varepsilon$ is positive by assumption. \qed
Lem. 3.3.2 can be easily adapted for the case $\varepsilon < 0$, and we obtain a symmetric acceptance function satisfying

$$\text{accept}(u) = 1 \iff u \leq \nu \cdot \frac{\log(1 + 2\varepsilon)}{\log(1 + 2\varepsilon) - \log(1 - 2\varepsilon)}.$$  

Note furthermore that, when $\varepsilon$ is small and positive (the other case being similar), we can approximate very accurately Eq. (3.47) as

$$\text{accept}(u) = 1 \iff u \geq \nu \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right).$$

A Chernoff-Like Bound

We now focus on the advantage of an optimal distinguisher. Vaudenay gives in [320] the following result.

**Lemma 3.3.3 (Vaudenay [320]).** For any computationally unbounded distinguisher $\delta^\nu$ limited to $\nu$ queries,

$$\text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu}(D_0, D_1) \leq 4|\varepsilon|\sqrt{\nu}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.48)

where $D_0$ is the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}$ and $D_1$ is a probability distribution defined as $\Pr_{D_1}[X = 0] = 1 - \Pr_{D_1}[X = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$.

Note that Th. 3.3.3 indicates that $\nu$ should be in the order of $\varepsilon^{-2}$ for having a non-negligible advantage. However, it does not seem to capture the asymptotic behavior of the advantage for $\nu \rightarrow +\infty$, since the right-hand side of Eq. (3.48) tends to the infinity when $\nu \rightarrow +\infty$ and since $\text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu}$ is upper bounded by 1. Let $\alpha^{(\nu)}$ and $\beta^{(\nu)}$ denote the respective error probabilities when an optimal distinguisher outputs a decision bit after having queries $\nu$ samples. Clearly, the overall error probability $\pi^{(\nu)} = \pi_0\alpha^{(\nu)} + \pi_1\beta^{(\nu)}$ of an optimal Bayesian distinguisher defined according to Eq. (3.43) must decrease towards zero as the number $\nu$ of samples increases (and thus the advantage must asymptotically go to 1). It turns out that the decrease asymptotically approaches an exponential in the number of samples drawn before the decision, the exponent being given by the so-called Chernoff bound (stated in Th. 3.3.1). We refer the reader to App. B for a very short introduction to the theory behind the method of types, which is very useful to prove Chernoff’s bound.

**Theorem 3.3.1 (Chernoff).** The best probability of error of the Bayesian decision rule defined in (3.43) satisfies

$$\lim_{\nu \rightarrow +\infty} \frac{1}{\nu} \log \frac{\pi^{(\nu)}}{2^{-\nu\gamma}} = 0$$
where $\gamma = C(D_0, D_1)$ is the Chernoff information between $D_0$ and $D_1$ defined by

$$C(D_0, D_1) = - \min_{0 \leq \lambda \leq 1} \log_2 \left( \sum_{x \in X} \Pr_{X_0}[x]^\lambda \Pr_{X_1}[x]^{1-\lambda} \right).$$

Note that the Bayesian error exponent does not depend on the actual value of $\pi_0$ and $\pi_1$, as long as they are non-zero: essentially, the effect of the prior probabilities is just washed out for large sample sizes. Using an improved version of Chernoff’s theorem (Th. 3.3.1) adapted to probability distributions on binary sets, we can bound the advantage of the best linear-like distinguisher as follows.

**Theorem 3.3.2.** For any computationally unbounded optimal iterated distinguisher $\delta^\nu$ of order 1 limited to $\nu$ queries,

$$1 - \frac{(\nu + 1)}{2^{\nu \gamma - 1}} \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{lin}}(D_0, D_1) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{(\nu + 1) \cdot 2^{\nu \gamma - 1}} \quad (3.49)$$

where $\gamma = C(D_0, D_1)$ is the Chernoff information between $D_0$, the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}$ and $D_1$, a probability distribution defined as $\Pr_{D_1}[X = 0] = 1 - \Pr_{D_1}[X = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$.

**Proof.** In order to show the bounds given in Th. 3.3.2, we use an improved version of Sanov’s Theorem than the one given in Th. B.2.1 tailored to binary random variables. Let $A^{(\nu)}_{\text{opt}}$ be the optimal acceptance region for $\delta^\nu$. Let $\mathcal{E}_{\alpha(\nu)} \in \mathcal{P}_\nu$ be the set of types such that

$$\mathcal{E}_{\alpha(\nu)} = \left\{ x \in \mathcal{P}_\nu : D_X \notin A^{(\nu)}_{\text{opt}} \right\}$$

when $x \leftarrow D_{X_0}^\nu$. Similarly,

$$\mathcal{E}_{\beta(\nu)} = \left\{ x \in \mathcal{P}_\nu : D_X \in A^{(\nu)}_{\text{opt}} \right\}$$
when \( x \leftarrow D_{X_1}^\nu \). Then,

\[
\Pr_{X_0}^{[E_{\alpha(\nu)}]} = \sum_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} \Pr[\mathcal{T}(D_X)] \\
\leq \sum_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} 2^{-\nu D(D_X || X_0)} \\
\leq \sum_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} \max_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} 2^{-\nu D(D_X || X_0)} \\
= \sum_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} 2^{-\nu \min_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} D(D_X || X_0)} \\
\leq \sum_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} 2^{-\nu \min_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} D(D_X || X_0)} \\
= \sum_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} 2^{-\nu D(D_X^* || X_0)} \\
\leq (\nu + 1) \cdot 2^{-\nu D(D_X^* || X_0)}
\]

where the last inequality comes from

\[
|\mathcal{P}_\nu| = \left( \nu + |X| - 1 \right) \\
|X| - 1
\]

The computation for upper bounding \( \Pr_{X_0}^{[E_{\beta(\nu)}]} \) are similar. For the lower bound, we need a set \( E_{\alpha(\nu)} \) such that for all large \( \nu \), we can find a distribution in \( E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu \) which is close to \( D_{X^*} \). As \( E_{\alpha(\nu)} \) is the closure of its interior (thus the interior must be non-empty), then since \( \bigcup_\nu \mathcal{P}_\nu \) is dense in the set of all distributions, it follows that \( E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu \) is non-empty for all \( \nu \geq \nu_0 \). We can then find a sequence of distributions \( D_{X_\nu} \) such that \( D_{X_\nu} \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu \) and \( D(D_{X_\nu} || D_{X_0}) \to D(D_{X^*} || X^*_0) \). For each \( \nu \geq \nu_0 \),

\[
\Pr_{X_0}^{[E_{\alpha(\nu)}]} = \sum_{D_X \in E_{\alpha(\nu)} \cap \mathcal{P}_\nu} \Pr[\mathcal{T}(D_X)] \\
\geq \Pr_{X_0}^{[\mathcal{T}(D_X)]} \\
\geq \frac{2^{-\nu D(D_{X_\nu} || X_0)}}{\nu + 1}
\]

Consequently,

\[
\liminf \frac{1}{\nu} \Pr_{X_0}^{[E_{\alpha(\nu)}]} \geq \liminf \left( -\frac{\log(\nu + 1)}{\nu} - D(D_{X_\nu} || X_0) \right) = -D(D_{X^*} || D_{X_0})
\]

The computations are similar for lower bounding \( \Pr_{X_0}^{[E_{\beta(\nu)}]} \). Combining the upper bounds derived before and this lower bound, and the computations of App. B yields Th. 3.3.2.
Note that in our case, we can express the Chernoff information between $D_0$ and $D_1$ as
\[
\gamma = C(D_0, D_1) = -\min_{0 \leq \lambda \leq 1} 2^{-\lambda} \cdot ((\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon)^\lambda + (\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon)^{1-\lambda})
\]
is maximal for
\[
\lambda = \log \left( \frac{-\log(1-2\epsilon)}{\log(1+2\epsilon)} \right) \log \left( \frac{1+2\epsilon}{1-2\epsilon} \right).
\]
Thus, using a Taylor approximation, we finally get that the Chernoff exponent satisfies
\[
\gamma = C(D_0, D_1) = -\frac{\epsilon^2}{2} + O(\epsilon^4).
\]
This clearly matches the results of Lem. 3.48 stating that the advantage of an optimal distinguisher becomes significant when $\nu \approx \epsilon^{-2}$. Finally, we note that the derivation of Chernoff’s bound is still valid for any discrete probability distribution pairs; consequently, they are not extremely tight when applied in our statistical scenario.

**Tighter Bounds**

We now prove tighter bounds on the best advantage of any iterated distinguisher of order 1 using the same techniques than in the proof of Th. 3.2.5. First of all, let
\[
z = k + \frac{1}{2} - np \sqrt{np(1-p)};
\]
the following notation will then used later:
\[
\Phi^{(n,p)}_{\text{down}}(k) = \Phi(z) - \frac{(1-2p)(z^2-1)\phi(z)}{6\sqrt{np(1-p)}} - \frac{0.056}{\sqrt{np(1-p)}} \tag{3.50}
\]
and
\[
\Phi^{(n,p)}_{\text{up}}(k) = \Phi(z) - \frac{(1-2p)(z^2-1)\phi(z)}{6\sqrt{np(1-p)}} + \frac{0.056}{\sqrt{np(1-p)}} \tag{3.51}
\]
represents the lower and the upper bound of Raff’s theorem Th. 3.2.4, respectively. Let us furthermore denote by
\[
\tau = \frac{\log(1-2\epsilon)}{\log(1+2\epsilon)} \tag{3.52}
\]
the optimal threshold defined by Lem. 3.3.2. Let $U$ denote a random variable modeling the number of times the unknown source outputs 1. Then, we have, according to Lem. 3.3.1 and Lem. 3.3.2,
\[
\text{BestAdv}^\nu(D_0, D_1) = 1 - (\alpha + \beta)
\]
where
\[ \alpha = \Pr_{D_0}[U > \lceil \tau \nu \rceil] \quad \text{and} \quad \beta = \Pr_{D_1}[U < \lceil \tau \nu \rceil]. \]

Using the notation defined in Eq. (3.50) and in Eq. (3.51), we get
\[ 1 - (\alpha + \beta) \geq \Phi_{\text{down}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2})}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) - \Phi_{\text{up}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon)}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil). \]

Similarly, the following lower bound may be derived:
\[ 1 - (\alpha + \beta) \leq \Phi_{\text{up}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2})}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) - \Phi_{\text{down}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon)}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil). \]

We have thus proven the following theorem.

**Theorem 3.3.3.** Let \( D_0 \) be the uniform distribution on \( \{0, 1\} \) and \( D_1 \) be a probability distribution defined as \( \Pr_{D_1}[X = 0] = 1 - \Pr_{D_1}[X = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \). Then, for an optimal computationally unbounded iterated distinguisher \( \delta^\nu \) of order 1 limited to \( \nu \) queries,
\[ \text{BestAdv}^\nu(D_0, D_1) \geq \Phi_{\text{down}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2})}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) - \Phi_{\text{up}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon)}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) \]
and
\[ \text{BestAdv}^\nu(D_0, D_1) \leq \Phi_{\text{up}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2})}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) - \Phi_{\text{down}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon)}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil), \]
where \( \tau, \Phi_{\text{down}}, \text{and} \Phi_{\text{up}} \) are defined in Eq. (3.52), Eq. (3.50), and Eq. (3.51), respectively.

Without loss of generality, let us assume that \( \varepsilon > 0 \) is small and fixed. For \( \nu \to +\infty \), we have \( \tau \approx \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \), and it is then easy to verify that
\[ \lim_{\nu \to +\infty} \Phi_{\text{down}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2})}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) = \lim_{\nu \to +\infty} \Phi_{\text{up}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon)}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) = 1 \]
as well as
\[ \lim_{\nu \to +\infty} \Phi_{\text{up}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon)}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) = \lim_{\nu \to +\infty} \Phi_{\text{down}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2})}(\lceil \tau \nu \rceil) = 0. \]
Thus, we have accordingly
\[ \lim_{\nu \to +\infty} \text{BestAdv}^\nu(D_0, D_1) = 1. \]

### 3.3.3 Optimal Linear Distinguishers

A linear distinguisher \( \delta^\nu_{\text{lin}} \) is a (possibly computationally unbounded) Turing machine which can play with an oracle \( \Omega \) (see Alg. 3.7); it is actually a subclass of iterated distinguishers of order 1 which uses a linear approximation as \( \text{test}(\cdot) \) function. Let us now consider the following scenario. We have a permutation \( C \) on \( \{0, 1\}^n \) for which
\[ \Pr[a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot C(x) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \]
1: **Input**: An oracle $\Omega$ implementing an unknown permutation $U$ on $B$, a complexity $\nu$, a linear approximation $(a, b)$, an acceptance function $\text{accept}$.

2: **Output**: A decision bit.

3: Initialize a counter $u$ to 0.

4: **for** $i = 1$ to $\nu$ **do**

5: Pick uniformly at random $x$ and query $U(x)$ to the oracle $\Omega$.

6: **if** $a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot U(x) = 0$ **then**

7: Increment $u$.

8: **end if**

9: **end for**

10: Output $\text{accept}(u)$.

**Algorithm 3.7**: Classical modelization of a linear distinguisher $\delta^\nu_{\text{lin}}$.

for half of the keys, and

$$\Pr[a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot C(x) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon$$

for the other half, with $\varepsilon > 0$. This corresponds to an idealized version of a linear cryptanalysis where Ass. 3.2.1 holds. We can rewrite the above expression as

$$\Pr[a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot C(x) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + (-1)^\kappa \varepsilon$$

for a fixed value $\kappa \in \{0, 1\}$ depending on the key. We bound the advantage of an optimal linear distinguisher $\delta^\nu_{\text{lin}}$ knowing $\kappa$ between $C$ and a uniformly distributed binary iid source $D_0$ using Th. 3.3.3, which gives us

$$\text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu_{\text{lin}}}(C, D_0) \leq \Phi_{\text{up}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2})}(|\tau\nu|) - \Phi_{\text{down}}^{(\nu, \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon)}(|\tau\nu|)$$

where $\tau$, $\Phi_{\text{down}}$, and $\Phi_{\text{up}}$ are defined in Eq. (3.52), Eq. (3.50), and Eq. (3.51), respectively. According to Vaudenay [320], the advantage of an optimal linear distinguisher aiming at distinguishing $C^*$ from a uniformly distributed binary iid source is bounded by

$$\text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu_{\text{lin}}}(C^*, D_0) \leq 3 \sqrt[3]{\frac{\nu}{2^n - 1}}$$

(3.53)

where $n$ is the block size of the permutations. Then, using the triangle inequality, we note that

$$\text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu_{\text{lin}}}(C^*, C) \leq \text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu_{\text{lin}}}(C^*, D_0) + \text{Adv}_{\delta^\nu_{\text{lin}}}(C, D_0).$$

Then, we are in position to prove the following result.
Corollary 3.3.1. Let \( C \) be a permutation such that

\[
\Pr[a \cdot x \oplus b \cdot C(x) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + (-1)^\kappa \varepsilon
\]

for \( \kappa \in \{0, 1\} \) where \( \kappa = 0 \) for half of the keys. Then, the advantage of any linear distinguisher \( \delta_{\text{lin}}^\nu \) limited to \( \nu \) queries between \( C \) and \( C^* \) is upper bounded by

\[
\text{Adv}_{\delta_{\text{lin}}} (C^*, C) \leq \Phi_{\text{up}}^{(\kappa, \frac{1}{2})} (\lfloor \tau \nu \rfloor) - \Phi_{\text{down}}^{(\kappa, \frac{1}{2}+\varepsilon)} (\lfloor \tau \nu \rfloor) + 3 \sqrt{\frac{\nu}{2^n - 1}}
\]

(3.54)

where \( n \) is the block size of the permutations and where \( \tau, \Phi_{\text{down}}, \) and \( \Phi_{\text{up}} \) are defined in Eq. (3.52), Eq. (3.50), and Eq. (3.51), respectively.

Proof. These distinguishers are a particular case of more powerful ones which are given the value of \( \kappa \) as input (for \( C \)) or a uniformly distributed random bit (for \( C^* \)). Using the triangular inequality, Th. 3.3.3, and Eq. (3.53), we obtain the claimed result.

We would like to remark that the condition that \( \delta_{\text{lin}}^\nu \) knows the value \( \kappa \) is not practically annoying, since it would be possible to build an optimal linear distinguisher based on the acceptance function defined by

\[
\text{accept}(u) = 1 \iff \frac{\frac{1}{2} (\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon) u (\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon)^{\nu-u} + \frac{1}{2} (\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon) u (\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon)^{\nu-u}}{u} \geq 1
\]

However, in this case, the interval of the \( u \) values for which \( \text{accept}(u) = 1 \) can no more be expressed analytically.\(^{24}\)

3.3.4 Optimal Differential Distinguishers

Similarly, we can briefly study differential distinguishers with help of the same statistical tools. A differential distinguisher \( \delta_{\text{diff}}^\nu \) is a (possibly computationally unbounded) Turing machine which is able to submit chosen pairs of plaintext to an oracle \( \Omega \) implementing with probability \( \pi_0 \) a permutation \( C^* \) drawn uniformly at random from the set of all permutations on \( m \)-bit strings, or with probability \( \pi_1 \), a fixed permutation \( C \) (see Alg. 3.8, which is the definition of a differential distinguisher given by Vaudenay [320]). Although the cryptanalytical settings are quite different (\( \delta_{\text{diff}}^\nu \) can indeed submit chosen queries), the distinguishing process is in a statistical point of view very similar to linear distinguishers.

If we look closely at Alg. 3.8, we note that, although the complexity \( \nu \) is given in advance as input and is (implicitly) fixed, the effective number of

\(^{24}\)Computing this interval is however possible if we solve this expression numerically.
Algorithm 3.8: Classical modelization of a differential distinguisher $\delta_{\text{diff}}^{\nu}$.

Algorithm 3.9: Unorthodox modelization $\delta'_{\text{diff}}$ of a differential distinguisher.

As outlined in §2.3.3, page 40, differential cryptanalysis depends on the quantity $\text{DP}^U(a, b) = \Pr_X [U(X + a) = U(X) + b]$ for a uniformly distributed plaintexts $X$. We assume now the following statistical scenario: the proba-
bility that the counter $u$ is incremented in Alg. 3.9 is equal to 
\[ \frac{1}{2^m - 1} \] in the case if $U = C^*$, where $m$ is the block-size of the permutation, and to 
\[ \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2^m - 1} \] if $U = C$, for $0 < \varepsilon \leq 2^m - 2$. Applying the optimal Bayesian rule defined in Eq. (3.43), the optimal acceptance function will make $\delta_{\text{diff}}'$ output 1 if

\[
\left( \frac{\nu}{u} \right)^u \left( \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2^m - 1} \right)^u \left( 1 - \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2^m - 1} \right)^{\nu - u} \geq \left( \frac{\nu}{u} \right)^u \left( \frac{1}{2^m - 1} \right)^u \left( \frac{2^m - 2}{2^m - 1} \right)^{\nu - u},
\]

where $u$ is the final value of the counter. Reworking algebraically the above expression, we get the following result.

**Lemma 3.3.4.** Let $D_0$ be a probability distribution on $\{0, 1\}$ defined as $\Pr_{D_0}[X = 0] = 1 - \Pr_{D_0}[X = 1] = \frac{1}{2^m - 1}$ and $D_1$ be a probability distribution defined as $\Pr_{D_1}[X = 0] = 1 - \Pr_{D_1}[X = 1] = \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2^m - 1}$ with $0 < \varepsilon \leq 2^m - 2$. Let $\delta^\nu$ be a differential distinguisher limited to $\nu$ queries implementing an acceptance function $\text{accept}$ defined by

\[
\text{accept}(u) = 1 \iff u \geq \nu \cdot \frac{\log(2^m - 2) - \log(2^m - 2 - \varepsilon)}{\log((2^m - 2)(1 + \varepsilon)) - \log(2^m - 2 - \varepsilon)} \quad (3.55)
\]

where $0 \leq u \leq \nu$ is the number of times that the source outputs 0. Then $\delta^\nu$ has a maximal advantage for distinguishing $D_0$ from $D_1$.

Note that, for small $\varepsilon$, Eq. (3.55) may be approximated by

\[
\text{accept}(u) = 1 \iff u \geq \nu \cdot \left( \frac{1}{2^m - 1} + \frac{2^{m-1} - 1}{(2^m - 2)(2^m - 1)} \cdot \varepsilon \right).
\]

Finally, if we come back to Alg. 3.8, we note that $\delta_{\text{diff}}$ as defined in Alg. 3.8 is an optimal differential distinguisher submitting $n$ queries to the oracle if and only if Eq. (3.55) is satisfied for all $u \in \mathbb{N}$ with $1 < u \leq \nu$ and for all $0 < \varepsilon \leq 2^m - 2$. Actually, it is not difficult to artificially build a situation where Alg. 3.8 is not optimal: it is sufficient to take a characteristic $(a, b)$ with $\text{DP}^C(a, b)$ true with very high probability. In this case, it is not sufficient for $\delta_{\text{diff}}'$ to wait for only one differential event and to stop, since if it is unique during the $\nu$ samples, it would have been better to output 0. However, if we have a look at Eq. (3.55), we can note that Alg. 3.8 captures well real-world situations, where exploited differential probabilities are usually only slightly larger than ideal ones.

As outlined page 43, we frequently encounter the concept of *signal-to-noise ratio* which was used by Biham and Shamir in the papers defining the differential cryptanalysis [31–33]; it is defined as being the ratio of probability of the right (sub-)key being suggested by a right pair and the probability of a random (sub-)key being suggested by a random pair, given the initial

\[ \text{It is well-known [320] that the expectation over the key space of } \text{DP}^C(a, b) \text{ is equal to } \frac{1}{2^m - 1} \], where $m$ is the block-size of the permutation.
difference. By empirical evidence, they suggested that when this ratio is around 1-2, about 20-40 right pairs are sufficient for a successful attack, and when this ratio is higher, even 3-4 right pairs are enough; clearly, this is a (implicitly defined) likelihood-ratio test, which turns out to be optimal in terms of error probabilities. Finally, coming back to the quotation of Naka
hara on the same page 43, and at the light of our considerations, it results naturally that there is no better strategy than flipping a coin in the case where the signal-to-noise ratio is equal to 1.

3.3.5 Generalized Linear Distinguishers

As outlined several times in the previous sections, the (idealized) statistical core of linear distinguishers (and therefore, of linear cryptanalysis) consists in sampling a biased binary source generating iid bits. Soon after the publication of [202], several attempts in generalizing linear cryptanalysis have been published. For instance, Kaliski and Robshaw [153] demonstrate how it is possible to combine several statistical independent linear approximations involving the same key bits. On their side, Harpes, Kramer and Massey [125] replace the linear approximation by so-called input-output sums, i.e. balanced binary-valued functions; they prove the actual effectiveness of such a generalization by exhibiting a block cipher secure against conventional linear cryptanalysis but vulnerable to their attack. Practical examples are the attack of Knudsen and Robshaw [167] against LOKI 91 and the one of Shimoyama and Kaneko [297] against DES; both attacks are based on non-linear probabilistic biased approximations. However, all these attacks sample binary probability spaces.

Another direction to generalize linear cryptanalysis was opened by Vau
denay in [312]: in this paper, he defines another kind of attack against DES, named χ^2-attack, and he demonstrates that one can obtain an attack only slightly less powerful than a linear cryptanalysis, but without the need to describe mathematically what happens in the core of the block cipher. Vau
denay’s attack is, as its name suggests it, based on a χ^2 statistical test, and interestingly, it can sample probability spaces whose cardinality is larger than two.

Another noteworthy work is the one of Harpes and Massey [126]: in this paper, they generalize the results of [125] by considering partitions pairs of the input and output spaces. Let \( \mathcal{X} = \{X_1, \ldots, X_n\} \) and \( \mathcal{Y} = \{Y_1, \ldots, Y_n\} \) be partitions of the input and output sets, respectively, where \( X_i \) and \( Y_i \) are called “blocks”. Then, the pair \( (\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}) \) is called a partition-pair if all blocks of \( \mathcal{X} \) (resp. \( \mathcal{Y} \)) contain the same number of plaintexts (resp. ciphertexts). A partitioning cryptanalysis exploits the fact that the probabilities

\[
\Pr[(X, f_k(X)) \in (\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})]
\]

may not be uniformly distributed for a block cipher \( f \) for a fixed key \( k \). In
order to characterize the non-uniformity of a sample distribution, Harpes and Massey consider mainly two “measures” between a discrete probability distribution and the uniform distribution, named *peak imbalance* \( I_p \) and *squared Euclidean imbalance* \( I_E \) defined as follows

\[
I_p(X) = \frac{m}{m-1} \left( \max_{0 \leq i < m} \Pr[X = i] - \frac{1}{m} \right)
\] (3.56)

and

\[
I_E(X) = \frac{m}{m-1} \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \left( \Pr[X = i] - \frac{1}{m} \right)^2,
\] (3.57)

where \( X \) is a random variable distributed according to the sampling distribution and \( m \) is the cardinality of the probability space. Given a set of (sub-)key candidates, the attack choose the right (sub-)key as being the one maximizing the chosen bias measure. They report to have observed on toy examples that \( I_E \) seems to perform better than \( I_p \). Harpes and Massey results were completed later by Jakobsen and Harpes [140,141], where they develop useful bounds to estimate the resistance of block ciphers to partitioning cryptanalysis, with the help of spectral techniques; these bounds are relative to the squared Euclidean imbalance only, but this choice is not motivated in a formal way. To the best of our knowledge, the first practical example of partitioning cryptanalysis breaking a block cipher is the attack known as “stochastic cryptanalysis” [225] proposed by Minier and Gilbert against Crypton [186,187].

Finally, the NESSIE [247] effort resulted in a few papers investigating the power of linear (or non-linear) approximations based on different algebraic structures, like \( \mathbb{Z}_4 \). For instance, Parker [259] shows how to approximate constituent functions of an S-box by any linear function over any weighted alphabet. However, Parker observes that it is not straightforward to piece these generalized linear approximations together. In [303], Standaert et al. take advantage of approximations in \( \mathbb{Z}_4 \) by *recombining* the values in order to reduce the problem to the well-known binary case; they still obtain more interesting biases comparatively to a classical linear cryptanalysis.

In this part, we address the statistical problems encountered in these works in the same manner than done for classical linear cryptanalysis, and we show that our approach easily allows to derive optimal distinguishers and to compute their complexities in terms of necessary number of samples; for this purpose, we briefly describe some results obtained in collaboration with Thomas Baignères and Serge Vaudenay; we refer to [14] for the proofs.

Let us consider a random source generating a sequence of iid discrete random variables \( Z^n = (Z_1, \ldots, Z_n) \) distributed according either to \( D_0 \) or according to \( D_1 \), where both probability distributions are defined over a finite set \( Z \); note that we do not require that the cardinality of \( Z \) is equal to 2. Here, we will refer to \( D_0 \) has being an “ideal” distribution. Let us now...
apply the optimal Bayesian rule defined in Eq. (3.43) to this scenario. Let us denote by \( z_\nu = (z_1, \ldots, z_\nu) \) a sample vector obtained from the unknown source. We denote by

\[
llr(z_\nu) = \sum_{a \in \mathbb{Z}} N(a|z_\nu) \log \frac{\Pr_{D_0}[a]}{\Pr_{D_1}[a]}
\]

the corresponding log-likelihood ratio. It is then straightforward to see that the optimal acceptance function is defined by

\[
\text{accept}(z_\nu) = 1 \iff llr(z_\nu) \leq 0
\]

where \( N(a|z_\nu) \) denotes the number of occurrences of the symbol \( a \) in the sample \( z_\nu \in \mathbb{Z}_\nu \), with the convention that \( \log 0 = -\infty \) and \( \log \infty = +\infty \).

The following result is then a direct application of the central limit theorem (see Th. A.2.1). It makes heavy use of the Kullback-Leibler distance between discrete probability distributions (see Def. B.1.1, page 264).

**Lemma 3.3.5.** Let \( Z_1, Z_2, \ldots \) be a sequence of iid random variables of distribution \( D \) and let \( D_0 \) and \( D_1 \) be two discrete probability distributions sharing the same support. Then,

\[
\Pr \left[ \frac{\| \log \Pr_{D_0}[z_\nu] - \mu_0 \| \sqrt{\nu}}{\sigma_0} < t \right] \xrightarrow{n \to \infty} \Phi(t),
\]

where \( \mu = \mu_j \) with \( \mu_0 = D(D_0 \parallel D_1) \geq 0 \) and \( \mu_1 = -D(D_1 \parallel D_0) \leq 0 \), and that \( \sigma^2 \) is

\[
\sigma_j^2 = \sum_{z \in Z} \Pr[z] \left( \log \frac{\Pr_{D_0}[z]}{\Pr_{D_1}[z]} \right)^2 - \mu_j^2
\]

when \( D = D_j \) for \( j \in \{0, 1\} \).

We now assume that \( D_0 \) and \( D_1 \) are “close” to each other; this is a frequently encountered situation during a cryptanalysis.

**Assumption 3.3.1.** Let \( D_0 \) and \( D_1 \) be two discrete probability distributions sharing the same support. Then,

\[
\forall z \in Z \quad \Pr_{D_0}[z] = \pi_z \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr_{D_1}[z] = \pi_z + \varepsilon_z \quad \text{with} \quad |\varepsilon_z| \ll \pi_z.
\]

Under Ass. 3.3.1, and using a Taylor series argument, we get

\[
\mu_0 \approx \mu_1 \approx \frac{1}{2} \sum_{z \in Z} \frac{\varepsilon_z^2}{\pi_z} \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma_0^2 \approx \sigma_1^2 \approx \sum_{z \in Z} \frac{\varepsilon_z^2}{\pi_z}.
\]

The following heuristic result gives an estimation of the required number of samples an optimal distinguisher needs, as well as its implied error probability, for distinguishing two close probability distributions \( D_0 \) and \( D_1 \).
Theorem 3.3.4 (Baignères [15]). Let $Z_1, \ldots, Z_\nu$ be iid random variables over the set $\mathcal{Z}$ of distribution $D$, $D_0$ and $D_1$ be two discrete probability distributions sharing the same support which are close to each other, and $n$ be the number of samples of an optimal distinguisher between $D = D_0$ or $D = D_1$. Let $d$ be a real number such that

$$\nu = \frac{d}{\sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \frac{\varepsilon_z^2}{\pi_z}} \approx \frac{d}{2D(D_0 \parallel D_1)}$$

(where $\pi_z = \Pr_{D_0}[z]$ and $\pi_z + \varepsilon_z = \Pr_{D_1}[z]$). Then, the overall probability of error is $\pi_e \approx \Phi(-\sqrt{d}/2)$.

Let us now assume that $D_0$ is the uniform distribution. When $D_1$ is a distribution whose support is $\mathcal{Z}$ itself and which is close to $D_0$, Th. 3.3.4 can be rewritten with

$$\nu = \frac{d}{|\mathcal{Z}| \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \varepsilon_z^2}$$

This shows that the “distinguishability” can be measured by means of the Euclidean distance between $D_0$ and $D_1$. In the very specific case where $\mathcal{Z} = \{0, 1\}$, we have $\varepsilon_0 = -\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon$ and one can see that $n$ is proportional to $\varepsilon^{-2}$, which is a well-known result due to Matsui (see §3.2). We now recall what appears to be the natural measure of the bias of a distribution, considering the needed number of samples and Ass. 3.3.1.

Definition 3.3.2 (Squared Euclidean Imbalance). Let $\varepsilon_z = \Pr_{D_1}[z] - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{Z}|}$. The squared Euclidean imbalance (SEI) $\Delta(D_1)$ of a distribution $D_1$ of support $\mathcal{Z}$ from the uniform distribution is defined by

$$\Delta(D_1) = |\mathcal{Z}| \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \varepsilon_z^2$$

Although the appellation “SEI” coincides with the one of [125], note that the definitions slightly differ. It is well-known (for instance see [121, 159]) that a $\chi^2$ cryptanalysis needs $O(1/\Delta(D_1))$ queries to succeed, which is by no means worse, up to a constant term, than an optimal distinguisher. As recalled in §3.1.2, a $\chi^2$ statistical test is asymptotically equivalent to a generalized likelihood-ratio test developed for a multinomial distribution; although such tests are not optimal in general, they usually perform reasonably well. The above results confirm this fact: a cryptanalyst will not lose any essential information in the case she can describe only one of the two distributions, but the precise knowledge of both distributions allows to derive an optimal attack. In other words, when it is impossible to derive both probability distributions, or when an attack involves many different distributions and only one is known, the best practical alternative to an
optimal distinguisher seems to be a $\chi^2$ attack, as proposed in [312]. This fact corroborates the intuition stipulating that $\chi^2$ attacks are useful when one does not know precisely what happens in the attacked block cipher.

We now assume that random variables are bitstrings, so that $Z = \{0, 1\}^\ell$. According to the notations of Ass. 3.3.1, let $D_1$ be the probability distribution defined by the set $\{\varepsilon_z\}_{z \in Z}$, $D_0$ being the uniform distribution on $Z$. We define the Fourier transform of $D_1$ at point $u \in Z$ as

$$\hat{\varepsilon}_u = \sum_{z \in Z} (-1)^{u \cdot z} \varepsilon_z.$$  (3.58)

We note that the involution property of the Fourier transform leads to

$$\varepsilon_z = \frac{1}{2^\ell} \sum_{u \in Z} (-1)^{u \cdot z} \hat{\varepsilon}_u.$$  (3.59)

The next lemma can be compared to Parseval’s Theorem.

**Lemma 3.3.6.** In the case where $D_0$ is the uniform distribution over $Z = \{0, 1\}^\ell$, the SEI and the Fourier coefficients are related by

$$\Delta(D_1) = \sum_{u \in Z} \varepsilon_u^2.$$  

We now recall the definition of the linear probability of a Boolean random variable $B$:

$$\text{LP}(B) = (\Pr[B = 0] - \Pr[B = 1])^2 = (2\Pr[B = 0] - 1)^2 = (E[(-1)^B])^2.$$  

**Lemma 3.3.7.** Let $Z = \{0, 1\}^\ell$. If $Z \in Z$ is a random variable distributed according to $D_1$, the SEI and the linear probability are related by

$$\Delta(D_1) = \sum_{w \in Z \setminus \{0\}} \text{LP}(w \cdot Z).$$  

**Corollary 3.3.2.** Let $Z$ be a random variable over $Z = \{0, 1\}^\ell$ of distribution $D_1$ and let $\text{LP}_{\text{max}}^Z$ be the maximum of $\text{LP}(w \cdot Z)$ over $w \in Z \setminus \{0\}$. We have

$$\Delta(D_1) \leq \left(2^\ell - 1\right) \text{LP}_{\text{max}}^Z.$$  

Interpreting Th. 3.3.4 and Cor. 3.3.2 together, we note that the sample complexity of the best distinguisher between two distributions of random bit strings can decrease with a factor up to $2^\ell$ when compared to the best linear distinguisher. It is interesting to note that there are cases where this bound is tight. For example if $D_1$ is such that $\Pr_{D_1}[z] = \frac{1}{2^\ell} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^\ell}\right)\gamma$ if $z = 0$, and $\frac{1}{2^\ell} - \frac{1}{2^\ell}\gamma$ otherwise (where $\gamma$ is a positive constant), it can be
shown that $\text{LP}(w \cdot Z) = \gamma^2$ for all $w \neq 0$. Hence $\Delta(D_1) = (2^\ell - 1)\gamma^2$ and $\text{LP}_{\text{max}} = \gamma^2$.

So far, we have considered the scenario where an optimal distinguisher is fed with two random variables following two distinct distributions in a set $Z = \{0,1\}^\ell$ where $\ell$ should not be too large from an implementation point of view. If we try to distinguish two random variables distributed in some set $\{0,1\}^\ell$ of large cardinality (e.g. where $\ell = 128$), we will not be able to implement the best distinguisher of as the memory requirement would be too high (since we must keep a counter for each possible outcome $z$). Instead, we can reduce the source space to a smaller space $Z = \{0,1\}^\ell$ by means of a projection\footnote{We borrow this appellation from Vaudenay [312]; the same expression is used within Wagner’s unified view of block cipher cryptanalysis [323] as well.} $h : \{0,1\}^\ell \rightarrow Z$ defining, for a random variable $S \in \{0,1\}^\ell$ of distribution $D$, a random variable $Z = h(S)$ of distribution $D$. Here we consider that $h$ is a balanced function and that $D_0$ is a uniform distribution, so that $D_0$ is the uniform distribution as well. This is a typical construction in a real-life block cipher cryptanalysis, where the block length is quite large. Now, even though we know which distinguisher is the best to use in order to distinguish $D_0$ from $D_1$, it is still not clear how the projection $h$ has to be chosen. Probably the most classical example arises when $\ell = 1$ and $h(S) = a \cdot S$ for some non-zero $a \in \{0,1\}^\ell$. We then talk about a linear distinguisher (as discussed in the previous sections). In this case, we note that $\Delta(D_1) = \text{LP}(a \cdot S) \leq \text{LP}_{\text{max}}^S$. Modern ciphers protect themselves against that type of distinguisher by bounding the value of $\text{LP}_{\text{max}}^S$. A natural extension of the previous scheme would be to consider any linear projection onto wider spaces, e.g. to consider $h(S) \in Z = \{0,1\}^{\ell'}$ (where $\ell' > 1$ is still small) such that $h$ is $GF(2)$-linear. We then talk about an extended linear distinguisher. It seems natural to wonder about the complexity gap between linear cryptanalysis and this extension. The following result proves that if a cipher provably resists classical linear cryptanalysis, it is (to some extent) protected against extended linear cryptanalysis.

**Theorem 3.3.5.** Let $S$ be a random variable over $\{0,1\}^{\ell'}$. Whenever the source space is reduced by a projection $h : \{0,1\}^{\ell'} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$ in a $GF(2)$-linear way, we have $\Delta(h(S)) \leq (2^\ell - 1)\text{LP}_{\text{max}}^S$.

A classical example of a linear space reduction arises when considering concatenation of several projections. For example, denoting $D_1^{(i)} = h^{(i)}(D_1)$ for $i \in \{1, \ldots, \ell\}$ where $h^{(i)} : \{0,1\}^{\ell'} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is linear, we consider $h(S) = (h^{(1)}(S), \ldots, h^{(\ell)}(S))$. This corresponds to the works of Kaliski and Robshaw [153] (where different linear characteristics involving identical key bits are merged) and to the situation discussed in §3.2.4 (where different linear characteristics involving different key bits are merged). In the latter situation, if no assumption is made about the dependency among the $\Delta(D_1^{(i)})$'s,
Th. 3.3.5 tells us $\Delta(D_1^{(1)} \times \cdots \times D_1^{(\ell)}) \leq (2^\ell - 1)L_{\text{max}}^S$. The following proposition tells us what happens in general when the $D_i^{(1)}$'s are independent but do not necessarily come from a linear projection nor a Boolean projection.

**Theorem 3.3.6.** Consider the case where $D_1 = D_1^{(1)} \times \cdots \times D_1^{(\ell)}$. If $D_1^{(1)}, \ldots, D_1^{(\ell)}$ are independent distributions, then

$$\Delta(D_1) + 1 = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \left( \Delta(D_1^{(i)}) + 1 \right).$$

Therefore, $\Delta(D_1)$ can be approximated by the sum of the $\Delta(D_1^{(i)})$’s.

This result tells us that merging $\ell$ independent biases should only be considered when their respective amplitudes are within the same order of magnitude. In the light of the preceding discussion, the cryptanalyst may wonder if it is possible to find a distinguisher with a high advantage even though the value of $L_{\text{max}}^S$ is very small. We refer the reader to [14], where an example for which it is indeed the case is provided.

Generalized linear distinguishers have recently been used in [189, 190] by Lu and Vaudenay to derive very efficient distinguishing attacks against $E_0$, a stream cipher used in the Bluetooth technology [43].

### 3.3.6 Aggregate Distinguishers

Optimal distinguishers can be implemented in an efficient way in most situations, i.e. when the cardinality of the underlying probability spaces keeps “reasonably” small. These algorithms, however, are hardly practical if the underlying probability distributions share a support whose cardinality is very large, since they need in this case too large amounts of memory, as we will explain it later. In the following, we briefly describe the construction of suboptimal distinguishing algorithms which may however still be rather efficient in terms of the number of necessary samples and which need practical (and fixed in advance) number of memory cells.

As outlined previously, a natural “measure” of bias is the **squared Euclidean imbalance** $\Delta(D_0, D_1)$, between a distribution $D_0$ and a close distribution $D_1$ defined by

$$\Delta(D_0, D_1) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \frac{x^2}{\pi_x}$$

(3.60)

since $\Delta(D_0, D_1)$ is, according to Th. 3.3.4, directly linked to the number of sample required for an optimal distinguisher to distinguish both probability distributions with a good success probability. In order to be able to implement an optimal distinguisher, the evaluation of the following likelihood-ratio is required:

$$\text{llr}(z^\nu) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \nu_x(z^\nu) \log \frac{\Pr_{D_0}[x]}{\Pr_{D_1}[x]}.$$ 

(3.61)
where $\nu_x(z^\nu)$ denotes the number of times the symbol $x$ appears in $z^\nu$. Let us now consider the situation where one knows how to compute efficiently the probabilities $\pi_x = \Pr_{D_0}[x]$ and $\pi_x + \epsilon_x = \Pr_{D_1}[x]$ of a given element $x$, but where the cardinality of $\mathcal{X}$ is very large. In this case, we can sequentially evaluate the sum of Eq. (3.61) and we do not need to store the value of

$$\log \frac{\Pr_{D_0}[x]}{\Pr_{D_1}[x]}$$

for each $x$. Thus, the computational complexity of evaluating Eq. (3.61) is $\nu$ times as costly as the (average) time required to evaluate Eq. (3.62), and the memory complexity is negligible.

The situation becomes slightly more complicated in these case where it not possible to evaluate Eq. (3.62) on-the-fly. This can have several reasons: either the evaluation of Eq. (3.62) is too costly, or values were obtained using some heuristic approximations, and they have to be stored, for instance. In this case, the amount of memory needed to manage the counters, and thus to compute Eq. (3.62), may be too large to be possible in practice. For instance, it would be, at the time of writing, quite costly to implement an optimal distinguisher between probability distributions defined on a support $\mathcal{X}$ with $|\mathcal{X}| \gg 2^{32}$. Our goal is thus to construct sub-optimal distinguishers taking still a reasonable amount of samples and which do not require too much memory.

In order to get some intuition into our problem, let us consider the following scenario: $D_0$ is the uniform probability distribution on a set $\mathcal{X}$, and $D_1$ is a probability distribution defined on the same set $\mathcal{X}$ such that for $\mathcal{X}' \subset \mathcal{X}$, $\mathcal{X}'' \subset \mathcal{X}$, $\mathcal{X}' \cap \mathcal{X}'' = \emptyset$, $\omega = |\mathcal{X}'| = |\mathcal{X}''| \ll \mathcal{X}$, and $\Pr_{D_1}[x] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|} + \epsilon$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}'$, $\Pr_{D_1}[x] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|} - \epsilon$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}''$, for some $\epsilon > 0$, and $\Pr_{D_1}[x] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|}$ for all $x \notin \mathcal{X}' \cup \mathcal{X}''$. Clearly, the “bias” of the distribution $D_1$ is concentrated on $\mathcal{X}' \cup \mathcal{X}''$. Let us now define a probability distribution $D'_1$ derived from $D_1$ as follows: we aggregate all $x \in \mathcal{X}'$ to a single element $x'$, and we assign it the probability $\omega(\frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|} + \epsilon)$; similarly, we aggregate all $x \in \mathcal{X}''$ to a single element $x''$, and we assign it the probability $\omega(\frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|} - \epsilon)$; finally, we aggregate all $x \notin \mathcal{X}' \cup \mathcal{X}''$ to a single element $x^*$ and we assign it the probability $1 - \frac{2\omega}{|\mathcal{X}|}$. Similarly, we build a new probability distribution out of $D_0$ by assigning the probability $\frac{\omega}{|\mathcal{X}|}$ to $x'$, the probability $\frac{\omega}{|\mathcal{X}|}$ to $x''$, and $1 - \frac{2\omega}{|\mathcal{X}|}$ to $x^*$. The intuition behind this construction is the following: one concentrates the distinguishing efforts on biased elements of $D_1$, since other elements do not give any information. Clearly, an optimal
distinguisher aiming at distinguishing \( D_0 \) from \( D_1 \) will need, given a fixed overall success probability, exactly the same amount of samples than for distinguishing \( D'_0 \) from \( D'_1 \) (i.e. \((2|X|\omega \varepsilon^2)^{-1}\)) but interestingly, the underlying probability distributions are far simpler. If we cannot easily compute on-the-fly the values of Eq. (3.62), then we can restrict ourselves to manage \( 2\omega \) (instead of \(|X|\)) memory cells (i.e. by storing in a table for an element \( x \in \mathcal{X}' \cup \mathcal{X}'' \) the value \( \kappa \in \{-1, 1\} \) of its probability \( \frac{1}{|X|} + \kappa \varepsilon \), the elements not present in the table being assigned the probability \( \frac{1}{|X|} \)). Thus, by defining a distinguisher interpreting \( D_0 \) and \( D_1 \) as \( D'_0 \) and \( D'_1 \), respectively, one can decrease the memory needs without any lost of distinguishing power.

This extreme example leads naturally to the concept of aggregate distinguisher. Let us assume now that we have enough memory to manage \( \omega \) cells. Informally, we can proceed as follows: we derive two probability distributions \( D'_0 \) and \( D'_1 \) from \( D_0 \) and \( D_1 \), respectively, such that \( D'_0 \) and \( D'_1 \) share a support \( \mathcal{Y} \) with \( \omega = |\mathcal{Y}| \ll |X| \) and such that the distinguishing power loss is minimized; furthermore, we need to define an explicite surjection \( \mu : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y} \) which maps each element of \( \mathcal{X} \) to an element of \( \mathcal{Y} \). The natural idea consists then in aggregating elements with low biases to form new elements of the derived distributions.

Let us assume now that we would like to aggregate two elements \( x, y \in \mathcal{X} \) with \( x \neq y \) to a single one named \( x||y \in \mathcal{Y} \). The loss of contribution to the sum of Eq. (3.60) can be expressed as

\[
\frac{\varepsilon_x^2}{\pi_x} + \frac{\varepsilon_y^2}{\pi_y} - \frac{(\varepsilon_x + \varepsilon_y)^2}{\pi_x + \pi_y} = \frac{(\pi_y \varepsilon_x - \pi_x \varepsilon_y)^2}{\pi_x \pi_y (\pi_x + \pi_y)}. \]

This quantity must obviously be minimized in order to get the best possible aggregate in terms of \( \Delta(D'_0, D'_1) \). These considerations naturally lead to Alg. 3.10, which can be viewed as a derivation of an optimal encoding procedure for Huffman codes [135] and whose optimality follows from the preceeding considerations by induction.

**Theorem 3.3.7.** Let \( \omega > 1 \) be a fixed integer; let \( D_0 \) and \( D_1 \) be two discrete probability distributions sharing the same support \( \mathcal{X} \). Then, Alg. 3.10 minimizes

\[
\Delta(D_0, D_1) - \Delta(D'_0, D'_1)
\]

where \( D'_0 \) and \( D'_1 \) are the two probability distributions defined by \( S \) and \( \mu \).

Finally, we must note a quite annoying property of Alg. 3.10 which could render it useless in certain situations: namely, for each “aggregate”, we must store somewhere the corresponding part of the mapping \( \mu \). Unfortunately, the memory required to store the mapping may be (in certain cases) as large as the memory required to store the whole information about the probability distribution under scrutiny. However, when applied to probability distributions having a small number of elements with a highly biased probability,
1: **Input**: $D_0, D_1, \text{ and } \omega$.
2: **Output**: $D'_0, D'_1$ such that $|D'_0| = |D'_1| = \omega$ and $\Delta(D_0, D_1) - \Delta(D'_0, D'_1)$ is minimal, and a surjective mapping $\mu : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$.
3: Let $S = \mathcal{X}$.
4: while $|S| > \omega$ do
5: Let $x, y \in S$ with $x \neq y$ such that $(\frac{\pi_x \varepsilon_x - \pi_y \varepsilon_y}{\pi_x \pi_y (\pi_x + \pi_y)})^2$ is minimal.
6: Remove $x$ and $y$ from $S$, replace them with the element labelled $x||y$, and assign it the probability $\pi_x + \pi_y + \varepsilon_x + \varepsilon_y$. Add furthermore $x \mapsto x||y$ and $y \mapsto x||y$ to the mapping $\mu$.
7: end while

Algorithm 3.10: Derivation of Optimal Aggregates

then aggregate distinguishers are definitely useful. We may even think about situations where one can explicitly find sub-optimal distinguishers which do not require much memory to store the mapping $\mu$, but it remains an open problem to us at the time of writing.

### 3.3.7 Sequential Distinguishers

1: **Input**: An oracle $\Omega$ implementing an unknown permutation $U$, a complexity $\nu$, acceptance functions $\text{accept}_i, 1 \leq i \leq \nu$, and rejection functions $\text{reject}_i, 1 \leq i \leq \nu - 1$.
2: **Output**: A decision bit.
3: $i \leftarrow 1$
4: repeat
5: Select non-adaptively a message $x_i$ and get $y_i = U(x_i)$.
6: if $\text{accept}(y_1, \ldots, y_i) = 1$ then
7: Output “1” and stop.
8: else if $\text{reject}(y_1, \ldots, y_i) = 0$ then
9: Output “0” and stop.
10: end if
11: $i \leftarrow i + 1$
12: until $i = \nu - 1$
13: Select non-adaptively a message $x_{\nu}$ and get $y_{\nu} = U(x_{\nu})$.
14: if $\text{accept}(y_1, \ldots, y_\nu) = 1$ then
15: Output “1”.
16: else
17: Output “0”.
18: end if

Algorithm 3.11: A $\nu$-limited sequential non-adaptive distinguisher

If we look at Alg. 3.8, we can observe that, although the complexity $\nu$
is given in advance as input and is (implicitly) fixed, the effective number of queries to the oracle is merely a random variable. In other words, $\delta_{\text{diff}}$ does not make use of all the information that it could exploit. In fact, we can see the class of distinguishers submitting a random number of queries to the oracle as a generalization of the class of distinguishers submitting a fixed number of queries. We will call this generalization sequential distinguishers. In this part, we formalize the concepts of sequential non-adaptive distinguisher (SNAD) and of $\nu$-limited sequential non-adaptive distinguisher ($\nu$-limited SNAD). These kinds of distinguishers use sequential sampling procedures as their statistical core. The only example of an advanced attack based on such a sequential procedure we are aware of is an attempt of Davies and Murphy described in the appendix of [83] to decrease the complexity of their non-surjective attack against DES.

In the Luby-Rackoff model, a non-adaptive adversary (which may be modeled by an $\nu$-limited adaptive distinguisher as described in Algorithm 3.4) is an infinitely powerful Turing machine which has access to an oracle $\Omega$. It aims at distinguishing a cipher $C$ from the “ideal cipher” $C^*$ by querying $\Omega$, and with a limited number $\nu$ of inputs. The attacker must finally take a decision; usually, one is interested in measuring the ability (i.e. the advantage as defined in Eq. (3.42)) to distinguish $C$ from $C^*$ for a given, fixed amount $\nu$ of queries. Clearly, in this model, we are interested in maximizing the advantage under the constraint defined by the number of allowed queries. In the real life, a cryptanalyst proceeds usually in an inverse manner: given a fixed success probability (i.e. a fixed advantage), she may look for minimizing the amount of queries to $\Omega$, since such queries are typically costly to obtain in practice. With this model in head, we can now define a $\nu$-limited sequential non-adaptive distinguisher (see Alg. 3.11), which actually turns out to be more efficient in terms of the average number of oracle queries than Alg. 3.5 given a fixed advantage. In fact, such a distinguisher implements an adaptive decision process. Namely, after having received the $i$-th response from the oracle, the distinguisher compares the $i$ responses it has at disposal towards an acceptance set $A_i$ (defined by the Boolean function $\text{accept}_i$ in Alg. 3.5) and a rejection set $R_i$ (defined by the Boolean function $\text{reject}_i$), which depends on the number of queries and on the (fixed in advance) advantage, and can then take three different decisions: either it decides to output “0” and to stop, or to output “1” and to stop, or to query one more question to the oracle and to repeat the decision process, until it has queried $d$ questions. Note that $A_i \subseteq B^i$ and $R_i \subseteq B^i$ must be disjoint sets for all $1 \leq i < \nu$ and that $A_\nu \cup \overline{A_\nu} = B^\nu$, which means that the functions $\text{accept}_i$ and $\text{reject}_i$ must define consistent decisions. In statistics, this process is known as a sequential decision procedure\textsuperscript{28}. We finally note that

\textsuperscript{28}Historically, in very general terms, the concept of sequential hypothesis testing came into existence simultaneously in the United States and Great Britain in response to de-
Alg. 3.8 can be interpreted as a sequential differential distinguisher which does not take explicitly into account intermediate decision functions, since it always outputs “1” as soon as it observes a “differential event”.

**Sequential Statistical Inference**

We describe now formally the sequential decision procedure behind Alg. 3.11. Let $D$ be the set of possible decisions.

**Definition 3.3.3 (Sequential decision procedure).** Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots$ be random variables observed sequentially. A sequential decision procedure consists in:

1. a stopping rule $\sigma_i$ which specifies whether a decision must be taken without taking any further observation at step $i$. If at least one observation is taken, this rule specifies for every set of observed values $(x_1, \ldots, x_i)$, with $i \geq 1$, whether to stop sampling and take a decision out of $D$ or to take another observation $x_{i+1}$.

2. a decision rule $\delta_i$ which specifies the decision to be taken. If $i \geq 1$ observations have been taken, then one takes an action $\delta_i(x_1, \ldots, x_i) \in D$. Once a decision has been taken, the sampling process is stopped.

If we consider Alg. 3.11 at the light of Def. 3.3.3, $D = \{0, 1\}$,

\[
\sigma_i(x_1, \ldots, x_i) = \begin{cases} 
\text{Continue sampling if} & \text{accept}_i(x_1, \ldots, x_i) = 0 \text{ and } \text{reject}_i(x_1, \ldots, x_i) = 1 \\
\text{Stop sampling if} & \text{accept}_i(x_1, \ldots, x_i) = 1 \text{ or } \text{reject}_i(x_1, \ldots, x_i) = 0 
\end{cases}
\]

and

\[
\delta_i(x_1, \ldots, x_i) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \text{reject}(x_1, \ldots, x_i) = 1 \\
1 & \text{if } \text{accept}(x_1, \ldots, x_i) = 1 
\end{cases}
\]

We are now interested in applying sequential decision procedures in the context of binary hypothesis tests and of the Neyman-Pearson paradigm. We have seen that Lem. 3.1.1 allows us to define precisely the shape of the optimal acceptance regions in the case of binary hypothesis tests (for a simple hypothesis versus a simple alternative). Theoretically, if we would be able to compute the exact joint probability distribution of the oracle’s responses when it implements both ciphers, we would be able to compute the optimal acceptance region $A$ for any $\nu$-limited distinguisher. Practically, one should notice that it seems considerably easier to compute joint probability distributions when the distinguisher is non-adaptive, since one can use

mands for more efficient sampling inspection procedures during World War II, and all these developments were summarized by their principal architect, Wald, in [324]. We refer to [299] for an excellent treatment of this subject.
some (maybe heuristic) statistical independence assumptions. A *sequential likelihood-ratio test* uses exactly the same process to define two sets of acceptance regions, denoted $\mathcal{A}_i$ and $\mathcal{R}_i$, respectively. So, it is always possible to define a sequential test when one has a classical test at disposal. In few words, a sequential test has three alternatives once it has received a response from the oracle: either it can conclude for one of both hypotheses, or it can decide to query more samples. In its simpler definition, a sequential ratio test has the possibility to query *as many samples as it is needed to take a decision*, given a fixed error probability. The *expected* number of queries required to reach one of the two possible decision turns out to be less than it would need in order to make the same decision on the basis of a single *fixed-size* sample set. Of course it may happen that the sequential procedure will take more queries than the fixed-size one, but sequential sampling is a definitely economical procedure. To fit into our framework, we may interpret Alg. 3.11 as a *truncated sequential test*, i.e. one fixes an upper-bound $d$ on the number of queries; it is still clear that such a sequential procedure cannot be worse than a fixed-size sampling procedure.

We state now some well-known definitions and results about sequential hypothesis tests.

**Definition 3.3.4 (Sequential Likelihood-Ratio Test).** To test $X \leftarrow D_0$ against $X \leftarrow D_1$, define two constants $\tau_{\text{up}} > \tau_{\text{down}} > 0$ depending on $\alpha$ and $\beta$, and define the likelihood ratio

$$
lr(x) = \frac{f_{X_1}(x)}{f_{X_0}(x)}
$$

The decision function at $i$-th step is

$$
\delta_{\text{opt}} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{(i.e accept } X \leftarrow D_1) \\
0 & \text{(i.e. accept } X \leftarrow D_0) \\
\emptyset & \text{query another sample}
\end{cases}
\text{ if } lr(x^{(i)}) \geq \tau_{\text{up}}
\text{ if } lr(x^{(i)}) \leq \tau_{\text{down}}
$$

(3.63)

When the observations are *independent and identically distributed*, then sequential likelihood-ratio tests have a nice property, as stated by Th. 3.3.8. We refer the reader to the book of Siegmund [299] for an excellent treatment of sequential procedures and for the proof of the three following theorems.

**Theorem 3.3.8.** For testing a simple hypothesis against a simple alternative with independent, identically distributed observations, a sequential probability ratio test is optimal in the sense of minimizing the expected sample size among all tests having no larger error probabilities.

The following results relate error probabilities $\alpha$ and $\beta$ to $\tau_{\text{up}}$ and $\tau_{\text{down}}$, and give an approximation of the expected number of samples.
Theorem 3.3.9. Let us consider a sequential likelihood-ratio test with stopping bounds \( \tau_{\text{up}} \) and \( \tau_{\text{down}} \), with \( \tau_{\text{up}} > \tau_{\text{down}} \) and error probabilities \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \) and \( 0 < \beta < 1 \), then

\[
\tau_{\text{down}} \geq \frac{\beta}{1-\alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad \tau_{\text{up}} \leq \frac{1-\beta}{\alpha}
\]

The approximation \( \tau_{\text{down}} = \frac{\beta}{1-\alpha} \) and \( \tau_{\text{up}} = \frac{1-\beta}{\alpha} \) is known as “Wald’s approximation”. The following theorem gives some credit to this approximation.

Theorem 3.3.10. Let us assume we select for given \( \alpha, \beta \in ]0,1[ \), where \( \alpha + \beta \leq 1 \), the stopping bounds \( \tau'_{\text{down}} = \frac{\beta}{1-\alpha} \) and \( \tau'_{\text{up}} = \frac{1-\beta}{\alpha} \). Then it holds that the sequential likelihood-ratio test with stopping bounds \( \tau'_{\text{down}} \) and \( \tau'_{\text{up}} \) has error probabilities \( \alpha' \) and \( \beta' \) where

\[
\alpha' \leq \frac{\alpha}{1-\beta}, \quad \beta' \leq \frac{\beta}{1-\alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha' + \beta' \leq \alpha + \beta
\]

Let us denote by \( N \) the random variable modeling the number of samples queried to \( \Omega \) before Alg. 3.11 stops and outputs a decision bit. By taking into account Wald’s approximation, we can easily compute approximations of the expected number of queries:

\[
E_{X_0}[N] \approx \frac{\alpha \log \left( \frac{1-\beta}{\alpha} \right) + (1-\alpha) \log \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\alpha} \right)}{E_{X_0}[\log(f_{X_1}(x)) - \log(f_{X_0}(x))]} \]

where \( E_{X}[\cdot] \) denotes that the expectation is taken over \( D_1 \) and

\[
E_{X_1}[N] \approx \frac{(1-\beta) \log \left( \frac{1-\beta}{\alpha} \right) + \beta \log \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\alpha} \right)}{E_{X_1}[\log(f_{X_1}(x)) - \log(f_{X_0}(x))]}.
\]

Application of Sequential Distinguishers

We now illustrate the usefulness of sequential distinguishers in a cryptanalytic context using two examples. The first one consists in turning Matsui’s First Algorithm Alg. 3.1 in a sequential procedure, while the second example is the optimization of Canvel et al. timing attack against SSL [57].

A Toy-Example on DES In order to illustrate advantages of sequential linear distinguishers, we have implemented a linear cryptanalysis of DES reduced to five rounds which uses a sequential distinguisher for deciding the parity of the linear approximation, i.e. the parity of the sum of involved key bits. Using a static test (i.e. using Matsui’s First Algorithm Alg. 3.1), we need roughly 2800 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs in order to get a success probability of 97%. Using a sequential strategy and for the same success
probability, only 1218 samples were necessary on average. We describe now both the static and the sequential decision rules.

Let $S_\nu$ denote the number of times that Matsui's best linear characteristic [202] on 5-rounds DES evaluates to 0, where $n$ is the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs at disposal. This linear approximation holds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + 0.01907$. According to Th. 3.2.6, the optimal static decision rule is then defined to make Alg. 3.1 output the message “key parity = 0” if and only if

$$S_\nu \geq \frac{\nu}{2},$$

and to output the message “key parity = 1” if and only if

$$S_\nu < \frac{\nu}{2}.$$  

With 2800 known pairs at disposal, the static rule is successful in about 97% of the cases.

Let us now focus on defining a sequential rule to perform the same task. For $\alpha = \beta = 0.025$, Wald’s approximation gives $\tau_{\text{up}} = 48$ and $\tau_{\text{down}} = \frac{1}{48}$. Let furthermore $\varepsilon = 0.01907$. Then the sequential rule is then defined as follows: in case

$$S_\nu \leq \frac{\nu}{2} - \frac{\log \tau_{\text{up}}}{2 \log \left( \frac{1+2\varepsilon}{1-2\varepsilon} \right)} \quad (3.64)$$

then output the message “key parity = 1” and stop; in case

$$S_\nu \geq \frac{\nu}{2} + \frac{\log \tau_{\text{down}}}{2 \log \left( \frac{1-2\varepsilon}{1+2\varepsilon} \right)} \quad (3.65)$$

then output the message “key parity = 0” and stop; in case where none of the conditions of Eq. (3.64) and of Eq. (3.65) are satisfied, then query another sample.

We repeated this experiment 1’000’000 times for 5 different keys and got the results tabulated in Fig. 3.8. Basically, we need more than two times less samples when using a sequential rule than when using a static rule.
Optimization of the Timing Attack against SSL/TLS  The SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and its most modern version, named TLS (Transport Layer Security), are certainly the most important protocols used to build secure communications over the Internet (see [39,90] for their formal specifications). It consists basically in first negotiating a security parameters and a cipher suite, i.e. a set of cryptographic algorithms which the two communicating entities accept to use for the sequel of the communication, and second, in exchanging secret keys. Once this setup step is performed successfully, the communicating entities are able to exchange arbitrary messages which will typically be authenticated using a Message Authentication Code (MAC), and then encrypted using a block cipher. In case where the message concatenated with the MAC is not long enough to fit in a multiple of the block length of the cipher, then a padding operation is necessary which consists in adding enough (fixed and known) supplementary bytes. Recently, Vaudenay exhibited in [319] a side-channel attack based on the knowledge whether or not the padding removal operation during the decryption was successful or not. Provided this side information is available, this attack allows an adversary to decrypt any block of data without knowledge of the key, and is thus very powerful.

Unfortunately, such a side-channel is not (directly) available in the context of SSL/TLS, since the error messages are encrypted. However, in order to get access to this information anyway, Canvel et al. [57] observed that it is possible to obtain it using a timing attack (first proposed by Kocher in [170] against public-key cryptosystems). Namely, in order to check whether the padding is correct, the server only needs to perform simple operations on the very end of the ciphertext. If the padding is correct, the server further has to perform time-expensive cryptographic operations on the whole length of the ciphertext in order to check its authenticity (by re-computing a MAC), and this typically requires more time. Thus, if an adversary is able to observe this small time shift, it can finally get the needed information.

Provided the adversary is relatively close to the server (i.e. in terms of network distance), she can measure the elapsed time several times, and observe the sampling distribution in both cases. If the noise due to external conditions keeps relatively low, we can expect the adversary be able to distinguish the two distributions. Fig. 3.9 represents timing measurements obtained by Canvel et al. on a LAN where a simple firewall was present between the adversary and the server. They report to have modelled these sampling distributions by two normal distributions whose parameters where inferred from statistical measurements.

Motivated by our work, Canvel et al. report to have implemented both a static and a sequential distinguisher, and they observed that the latter was four to five time faster depending on the experimental conditions, rendering the attack very practical.
3.3.8 Summary

In this section, we have shown that it is possible to interpret the Luby-Rackoff model of security as a statistical hypothesis problem. This has allowed us to derive the optimal shape of several types of distinguishers, to bound tightly their best advantage, and to improve some existing results under slightly weakened assumptions. Furthermore, we have presented some results about the generalization of linear distinguishers, which are allowed here to sample random sources of greater cardinality than 2. Then, we have discussed how to improve the practicability of optimal distinguishers in certain cases by applying the idea to derive more friendly probability distribution using the aggregation of elements; finally, we have shown that the concept of sequential sampling has interesting properties in the context of cryptanalysis.

3.4 New Linear-Like Attacks against IDEA

In this section, we present a sequence of new attacks against reduced-round versions of IDEA, up to 4 rounds (out of 8.5). These attacks are mainly based on the Biryukov-Demirci relation proposed by Nakahara et al. [240]. Some
of them, given a comparable computational complexity, reduce considerably the amount of necessary chosen plaintexts, while other attacks, given a comparable amount of chosen plaintexts, decrease favorably the computational complexity; none of our attacks need large amounts of memory. Furthermore, we show how to use some of these attacks in combination with other known attacks, which allows in certain cases to gain more key bits with a lesser complexity, or to avoid the use of both encryption and decryption oracles. We refer the reader to §2.2.2 for a description of the IDEA block cipher and for a discussion about the existing attacks against it. In the sequel, we will make use of the notations defined in Fig. 2.10, page 22: the $i$-th input word at round $r$ is denoted $x_i(r)$, the $i$-th output word is denoted $y_i(r)$, and the $i$-th word after a half-round (i.e. after a key addition layer) is denoted $c_i(r)$; finally, the left and right input words of the MA-box at round $r$ are denoted $\alpha(r)$ and $\beta(r)$, respectively, while the output words are denoted $\gamma(r)$ and $\delta(r)$.

### 3.4.1 The Biryukov-Demirci Relation

A crucial observation on which our attacks is based is that there exists a linear-like expression holding with probability one on any number of rounds. Nakahara et al. [240] name it Biryukov-Demirci relation. It is actually a combination of two facts, one of these being the following observation by Demirci [84].

**Lemma 3.4.1 (Demirci [84]).** For any number $r$ of round(s) in the block cipher IDEA,

$$\text{lsb}\left(\gamma(r) \oplus \delta(r)\right) = \text{lsb}\left(\alpha(r) \odot k_5^{(r)}\right)$$

(3.66)

where lsb($a$) denotes the least significant (rightmost) bit of $a$.

Using this theorem, one can easily set up a distinguisher using a few known triplets $(\alpha(r), \gamma(r), \delta(r))$ which works as follows: for each possible value of $k_5^{(r)}$, check whether Eq. (3.66) hold for a certain number of known triplets; this allows to sieve wrong values of $k_5^{(r)}$ from the right one. Actually, one gets two candidates for $k_5^{(r)}$, as observed by Demirci: if $k_5^{(r)} \notin \{0, 1\}$, this distinguisher eliminates all keys except the correct one and a “conjugate” $2^{16} + 1 - k_5^{(r)}$. Otherwise, it eliminates all keys except 0 and 1.

The second (unpublished) observation\(^{29}\) states that the two middle words in a block of data are only combined, either with subkeys or with internal cipher data, via group operations (namely $\oplus$ and $\ominus$) which are $\text{GF}(2)$-linear when considering their least significant (rightmost) bit; this fact is valid across the full cipher (and is actually independent of the number of rounds).

\(^{29}\)According to [240], this observation is due to Biryukov.
Combining this observation and Lem. 3.4.1, one easily obtain the Biryukov-
Demirci relation.

**Theorem 3.4.1 (Biryukov-Demirci relation).** For any number \( r \) of round(s) in the block cipher IDEA, the following expression is true with proba-
bility one:

\[
\text{lsb} \left( \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} (\gamma^{(i)} \oplus \delta^{(i)}) \oplus x_{2}^{(1)} \oplus x_{3}^{(1)} \oplus y_{2}^{(n+1)} \oplus y_{3}^{(n+1)} \right) = \text{lsb} \left( \bigoplus_{j=1}^{n} (k_{2}^{(j)} \oplus k_{3}^{(j)}) \right)
\]

Note that Th. 3.4.1 can easily be extended when a final half-round (key-
addition layer) is present by adding the two relevant key bits.

**3.4.2 Retrieving All Key Bits for 1.5 Rounds**

The simplest attack described in [240] is built on top of the following ex-
pression holding with probability one; it is a straightforward application of
Th. 3.4.1 to 1.5-rounds IDEA.

\[
\text{lsb} \left( x_{2}^{(1)} \oplus x_{3}^{(1)} \oplus c_{2}^{(2)} \oplus c_{3}^{(2)} \oplus k_{2}^{(1)} \oplus k_{3}^{(1)} \oplus k_{2}^{(2)} \oplus k_{3}^{(2)} + k_{5}^{(1)} \circ \left( x_{1}^{(1)} \oplus k_{1}^{(1)} \right) \oplus \left( x_{3}^{(1)} \oplus k_{3}^{(1)} \right) \right) = 0 \quad (3.67)
\]

By taking into account the key-schedule algorithm and guessing key bits
numbered (see Fig. 2.11) 0-15, 32-47, 64-79, which represent 48 unknown key
bits, one can recover these right key bits and \( \text{lsb} \left( k_{2}^{(1)} \oplus k_{2}^{(2)} \right) \) with proba-
bility larger than 0.99 in roughly \( 3.12 \cdot 2^{48} \approx 2^{48.26} \) 1.5-rounds IDEA evalua-
tions if 55 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs are available using Alg. 3.12. The
complexity of this attack can be evaluated as follows: for each key candi-
date, one needs to evaluate Eq. (3.68) at least two times, three times with
probability \( \frac{1}{4} \), four times with probability \( \frac{1}{8} \), and so on, which results in an
average of three evaluations of Eq. (3.68); as in [240], we assume furthermore
that a \( \circ \) operation is equivalent to three \( \oplus \) (or three \( \boxplus \)) operations: thus,
one evaluation of Eq. (3.68) costs 12 simple operations while a full evalua-
tion of 1.5-round IDEA costs 30 simple operations. Note that we may have
adopted the strategy of [240], which consists in guessing \( \text{lsb} \left( k_{2}^{(1)} \oplus k_{2}^{(2)} \right) \)
as well and evaluating Eq. (3.67). In this case, one would need one pair
of known plaintext-ciphertext more to ensure the same success probability,
and the complexity would have been equal to \( 2 \cdot \frac{14}{30} \cdot 2^{49} \approx 2^{48.90} \), which is
slightly worse.
1. **Input:** An oracle $\Omega$ implementing encryption by 1.5-rounds IDEA under a fixed, unknown key.

2. Query the ciphertexts corresponding to 55 different, uniformly distributed plaintexts $P_i$ to $\Omega$.

3. **for** all possible subkey candidates $(k_1^{(1)}, k_3^{(1)}, k_5^{(1)})$ **do**

4. Check whether the expression

$$\text{lsb} \left( x_2^{(1)} \oplus x_3^{(1)} \oplus c_2^{(2)} \oplus c_3^{(2)} \oplus k_5^{(1)} \odot \left( (x_1^{(1)} \odot k_1^{(1)}) \oplus (x_3^{(1)} \boxplus k_3^{(1)}) \right) \right) \quad (3.68)$$

... gives the same bit for the two first pairs. If yes, take sequentially other pairs as long as Eq. (3.68) evaluates to a constant. If it holds for all 55 pairs, output "Key candidate".

5. **end for**

**Algorithm 3.12:** Attack breaking 1.5-round IDEA

We observe that it is actually possible to apply a common trick\(^{30}\) to the Biryukov-Demirci relation and thus extend Nakahara et al. attack: we can apply the relation in two directions, namely in the encryption or in the decryption direction. When applied to the decryption direction, the distinguisher Eq. (3.67) becomes

$$\text{lsb} \left( x_2^{(1)} \oplus x_3^{(1)} \oplus c_2^{(2)} \oplus c_3^{(2)} \oplus k_5^{(1)} \odot \left( (c_1^{(2)} \odot k_1^{(2)}) \oplus (c_2^{(2)} \boxplus k_2^{(2)}) \right) \right) = 0 \quad (3.69)$$

Although it would not be more interesting to use Eq. (3.69) as single distinguisher (since one should the same number of unknown key bits), one can use it after Eq. (3.67) to recover all key bits using roughly the same amount of computational effort. More precisely, once the key bits 0-15, 32-47, 64-79 are known, which actually fix $k_1^{(1)}$ and $k_5^{(1)}$, one can recover $k_1^{(2)}$ and $k_2^{(2)}$ (key bits numbered 96-127) in a $3 \cdot \frac{12}{30} \cdot 2^{32} \approx 2^{32.26}$ effort, derive the key bit 31, and search exhaustively for the remaining 47 unknown key bits. The overall complexity of this attack is approximately equal to $2^{48.26} + 2^{47} + 2^{32.26} \approx 2^{48.76}$ 1.5-round IDEA evaluations.

---

\(^{30}\)This trick was proposed for the first time, to the best of our knowledge, by Matsui [203] in the linear cryptanalysis of DES.
3.4.3 A New Chosen-Plaintext Attack Breaking 2 Rounds

Let us consider the relation Eq. (3.67) on 2 rounds, and let us fix \( x_1^{(1)} \) and \( x_3^{(1)} \) to arbitrary constants\(^{31}\). Our attack proceeds as follows and assumes that the adversary is able to encrypt about 62 chosen plaintexts: as first step, encrypt 23 chosen plaintexts with fixed \( x_1^{(1)} \) and \( x_3^{(1)} \), and guess \( k_5^{(2)} \). In a second step, guess \( k_6^{(2)} \) and test Eq. (3.67) on the partially decrypted ciphertext, and determine these unknown key bits with help of Eq. (3.67) by eliminating the candidates which do not render this expression constant, since the expression

\[
\text{lsb} \left( k_5^{(1)} \odot \left( \left( x_1^{(1)} \odot k_1^{(1)} \right) \oplus \left( x_3^{(1)} \boxplus k_3^{(1)} \right) \right) \right)
\]

provides an unknown, but constant bit to the cryptanalyst. This process gives us 4 candidates for the key bits 57-88 within a complexity of less than \( 2^{20} \) 2-rounds IDEA evaluations.

Once this process is achieved, one can use the attacks described in §3.4.2 to derive key bits 0-15 and 32-47 in a \( 2^{33} \) effort and key bits 96-127 in another \( 2^{43} \) effort with 39 additional chosen-plaintext. Hence, this attack recovers all key bits (the 31 remaining ones with help of an exhaustive search) in a computational complexity approximately equal to \( 2^{34} \) 2-rounds IDEA evaluations. Thus, this attack compares quite favorably with Demirci’s square-like attack [84] which requires roughly the same order of chosen-plaintexts and a \( 2^{64} \) computational effort to recover the whole key.

If a decryption oracle is available, instead of an encryption one, we can still mount a chosen-ciphertext attack based on the same properties. It would work as follows: fix \( y_1^{(2)} \) and \( y_3^{(2)} \) to an arbitrary constant, and guess \( k_1^{(1)} \), \( k_3^{(1)} \), and \( k_5^{(1)} \) (which represent 48 unknown key bits numbered 0-15, 32-47, and 64-79). Once these 48 bits recovered, after a \( 2^{48} \) process (provided 55 chosen plaintexts are available), one can recover 16 more bits (i.e. the still unknown bits of \( k_5^{(2)} \) and \( k_6^{(2)} \) in a second step, and 32 more (numbered 96-127 and corresponding to subkeys \( k_1^{(2)} \) and \( k_2^{(2)} \)) in a third step; finally, the remaining ones can be found with help of an exhaustive search.

\(^{31}\)A similar technique was used by Knudsen and Mathiassen [166] to speed up by a small constant a linear cryptanalysis of DES.
3.4.4 A New Chosen-Plaintext Attack Breaking 2.5, 3, and 3.5 Rounds

If we apply the Demirci-Biryukov relation to 2.5-rounds IDEA, then one get the following expression:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{lsb} \left( x_2^{(1)} \oplus x_3^{(1)} \oplus c_2 \oplus c_3 \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^{3} \left( k_2^{(i)} \oplus k_3^{(i)} \right) \right) & \\
\text{lsb} \left( k_5^{(1)} \circ \left( \left( x_1^{(1)} \circ k_1^{(1)} \right) \oplus \left( x_3^{(1)} \bigoplus k_3^{(1)} \right) \right) \right) & \\
\text{lsb} \left( k_5^{(2)} \circ \left( c_1^{(3)} \circ k_3^{(1)} \right) \oplus \left( c_2^{(3)} \bigtriangledown k_2^{(3)} \right) \right) & = 0
\end{align*}
\]

where \( k_1^{(3)} \) denotes the inverse of \( k_1^{(3)} \) relatively to the group operation \( \circ \). If we use the same trick than for 2 rounds and fix \( x_1^{(1)} \) and \( x_3^{(1)} \), an adversary can recover \( k_5^{(2)} \), \( k_1^{(3)} \) and \( k_2^{(3)} \) (key bits 57-72 and 89-120) in a \( 2^{48} \) effort if 55 chosen-plaintexts are available (the success probability is then larger than 0.99). Once achieved, one can recover 39 key bits (\( k_1^{(1)} \), \( k_1^{(3)} \) and the remaining unknown bits of \( k_3^{(5)} \)) numbered 0-15, 32-47 and 73-79 with the same distinguisher where Eq. (3.71) is fixed and known. For this, we need 46 additional known plaintexts. The remaining 41 key bits can be recovered with an exhaustive search within negligible computational complexity. Note that in this case, the Demirci-Biryukov relation applied on the decryption operation results in the same distinguisher. To the best of our knowledge, it is the fastest attack on 2.5-rounds IDEA not involving any weak-key assumption.

If a decryption oracle is available, instead of an encryption one, it is possible to mount a similar (chosen-ciphertext) attack: fix \( c_1^{(2)} \) and \( c_2^{(2)} \) to an arbitrary constant, and guess \( k_1^{(1)} \), \( k_1^{(3)} \), and \( k_5^{(1)} \). In a second step, guess the remaining unknown bits of \( k_1^{(3)} \), \( k_2^{(3)} \), and \( k_5^{(3)} \); one can finalize the attack using an exhaustive search.

We can extend to 3 rounds the attack previously described in a straightforward way: actually, if we fix \( x_1^{(1)} \) and \( x_3^{(1)} \) and guess \( k_5^{(2)} \), \( k_1^{(3)} \), \( k_2^{(3)} \), \( k_3^{(3)} \) and \( k_6^{(3)} \) (which represent key bits numbered 50-81 and 89-120), one can recover 64 key bits in a \( 2^{64} \) process if 71 chosen-plaintext are available. Then, once \( k_5^{(2)} \), \( k_1^{(3)} \), \( k_2^{(3)} \), \( k_3^{(3)} \) and \( k_6^{(3)} \) are known, one can apply the attack on 2.5 rounds to derive 49 more bits (numbered 0-15, 32-47, 73-79 and 127) with negligible complexity and the remaining 15 bits can finally be searched exhaustively.

The chosen-ciphertext version of this attack is clearly less effective, since one has to guess at least 96 unknown key bits (corresponding to subkeys \( k_3^{(5)} \), \( k_6^{(3)} \), \( k_1^{(3)} \), \( k_2^{(3)} \), \( k_5^{(2)} \), \( k_1^{(1)} \), \( k_3^{(1)} \), and \( k_5^{(1)} \); the unknown key bits are numbered 0-15, 32-47, 50-81, and 89-120).
For attacking 3.5 rounds, one uses a new time the distinguisher described above, one fixes $x_1^{(1)}$ and $x_3^{(1)}$ and one guesses furthermore all the keys of the last half-round; the subkeys under consideration are then $k_5^{(2)}$, $k_1^{(3)}$, $k_2^{(3)}$, $k_5^{(3)}$, $k_6^{(3)}$, $k_1^{(4)}$, $k_2^{(4)}$, $k_3^{(4)}$ and $k_4^{(4)}$ (i.e. all the key bits but the interval 18-49, representing 96 key bits). The computational effort is approximately equal to $2^{97}$ if 103 chosen-plaintexts are available.

The same attack can be adapted for a decryption oracle, however resulting in a higher complexity: if 119 chosen-ciphertexts are available to an attacker (where $c_1^{(4)}$ and $c_3^{(4)}$ are fixed to an arbitrary constant), then one can recover 112 key bits numbered 0-111 (corresponding to subkeys $k_5^{(2)}$, $k_3^{(2)}$, $k_5^{(1)}$, $k_6^{(1)}$, $k_1^{(1)}$, $k_2^{(1)}$, $k_3^{(1)}$, and $k_4^{(1)}$).

### 3.4.5 Time-Memory Tradeoffs

We show now that it is possible under certain circumstances to trade between and time complexities in the attacks of Nakahara et al. [240].

Let us consider 2.5-rounds IDEA, and let us assume that we make use of 55 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. For all possible values of $k_1^{(1)}$, $k_3^{(1)}$, and $k_5^{(1)}$ (i.e. key bits numbered 0-15, 32-47, and 64-79), we can compute a guess for the value of the following expression.

$$k_2^{(1)} \oplus k_2^{(2)} \oplus k_3^{(2)} \oplus k_2^{(3)} \oplus k_3^{(3)} \oplus \text{lsb}(\delta^{(2)} \oplus \gamma^{(2)})$$

The sub-sum depending only of the key bits is unknown but constant. Let us store all these guesses in a large hash table made of $2^{48}$ 55-bit words. As second step of the attack, one guesses the key bits $k_5^{(2)}$, $k_1^{(3)}$, and $k_3^{(3)}$ (i.e. bits numbered 57-72 and 89-120): for all these guesses, and for the 55 ciphertexts, we can compute (by partially decrypting the ciphertexts) the value of \text{lsb}(\delta^{(2)} \oplus \gamma^{(2)}) and checking whether this value (or its complement) is stored in the table or not. With high probability, the right subkey candidate will be determined by one of the few expected matches. This attack hence requires two times $55 \cdot 2^{48} \approx 2^{54}$ partial encryptions/decryptions, and 2$^{48}$ memory cells, while the remaining 41 unknown bits can be recovered with an exhaustive search within negligible complexity.

The attack can be extended to more rounds in the following way. Using the same approach than for the 2.5-round case, one can compute a hash table containing, for all possible values of $k_1^{(1)}$, $k_3^{(1)}$, and $k_5^{(1)}$, a guess for

$$k_2^{(1)} \oplus k_2^{(2)} \oplus k_3^{(2)} \oplus k_2^{(3)} \oplus k_3^{(3)} \oplus \text{lsb}(\delta^{(2)} \oplus \gamma^{(2)}) \oplus \text{lsb}(\delta^{(3)} \oplus \gamma^{(3)})$$

for 71 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In a second step, by guessing $k_5^{(2)}$, $k_1^{(3)}$, $k_2^{(3)}$, $k_5^{(3)}$, and $k_3^{(3)}$ (i.e. key bits numbered 50-81 and 89-120), one can
recover a total of 96 key bits, the remaining 32 ones with help of an exhaustve search, in an approximate overall computational complexity of $2^{70}$ operations.

Finally, this attack can be extended to 3.5 rounds if we guess the additional unknown key bits of $k_1^{(4)}$, $k_2^{(4)}$, $k_3^{(4)}$, and $k_4^{(4)}$ (i.e. bits numbered 0-17 and 121-127). One needs in this case 103 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, $2^{48}$ 103-bit words of memory, and a computational complexity of about $2^{103}$ operations.

The same attack strategy on 4 rounds would imply guessing all the key bits, thus it is less efficient than an exhaustive key search.

### 3.4.6 Combination with other Attacks

Interestingly, we note that our attacks can be used in parallel with other attacks to gain more key bits. For instance, the attack on 3-rounds IDEA of Demirci et al. described in [85] is able to recover the values of $k_2^{(1)}$, $k_4^{(1)}$, $k_5^{(2)}$, and $k_5^{(3)}$ (which represents 41 key bits) in a $2^{42}$ effort (after a $2^{64}$ precomputation). Then, to derive 32 other key bits, the authors assume that a decryption oracle is available. If it is not the case, one can still relax this condition by applying the attack described in §3.4.4 and recover 41 additional key bits, namely those numbered 73-81 and 89-120, within negligible computational complexity. Similar considerations apply if only a decryption oracle is available.

Another interesting combination of known attacks and the ones described in this paper is the following: in [84], Demirci describes a square-like distinguisher which, with help of two sets of $2^{32}$ chosen-plaintexts, allows to recover $k_5^{(3)}$ in about $2^{49}$ operations. If, in a second step, we plug the obtained value of $k_5^{(3)}$ into the attack described in §3.4.4, we can derive 48 other key bits numbered 66-81, and 89-120 in a $2^{49}$ computational effort in a second step, and finally the remaining bits within negligible time. This defines an attack which derives all key bits within $2^{50}$ operations if $2^{33}$ chosen-plaintexts are available. This represents a complexity decrease by a factor of about $2^{22}$. Unfortunately, the same strategy does only improve marginally the attack against 3.5 (or more rounds): one can replace the final exhaustive search of the remaining 80-bit keys by our more efficient attack.

### 3.4.7 A New Square-Like Distinguisher

As observed for the first time by Nakahara et al. [238] and later by Demirci [84], square-like distinguishers can be used with success to attack IDEA. We present now such a distinguisher which is somewhat simpler to use than the ones available in the literature.
Lemma 3.4.2 (Square-Like Distinguisher on 2.5-Round IDEA). Let $2^{16}$ different inputs of 2.5-round IDEA be defined as follows: $x_1^{(1)}$, $x_2^{(1)}$, and $x_3^{(1)}$ are fixed to arbitrary constants, and $X_4^{(1)}$ takes all possible values. Then the XOR of the $2^{16}$ values of the equation

$$x_2^{(1)} \oplus x_3^{(1)} \oplus c_2^{(1)} \oplus c_3^{(1)} \oplus k_2^{(1)} \oplus k_3^{(1)} \oplus k_2^{(2)} \oplus k_3^{(2)} \oplus k_2^{(3)} \oplus k_3^{(3)} \oplus \text{lsb} \left( \gamma^{(1)} \oplus \delta^{(1)} \right) \oplus \text{lsb} \left( \gamma^{(2)} \oplus \delta^{(2)} \right)$$

(3.73)

is equal to 0 with probability one.

We can then use this distinguisher to attack reduced-round versions of IDEA. To attack 3 rounds, encrypt 39 different structures of $2^{16}$ chosen plaintexts according to Lem. 3.4.2. Then, for all possible values of $k_5^{(3)}$ and $k_6^{(3)}$ (i.e. bits numbered 50-81), partially decrypt the ciphertext for the 39 structures using the same iterative strategy as in Alg. 3.12. This attack recovers 32 key bits, and with a few more chosen plaintexts, we can apply the attack on 2.5-rounds described in §3.4.4 to recover all the keys bits. In summary, this attack requires less than $2^{22}$ chosen-plaintexts and a computational complexity of approximately $2^{50}$ operations.

On 3.5 rounds, we can attack the round keys $k_5^{(3)}$, $k_1^{(4)}$, and $k_2^{(4)}$ (i.e. 48 key bits numbered 50-65 and 82-113) in a similar fashion. In this case, we need 55 structures of $2^{16}$ chosen plaintexts (i.e. less than $2^{22}$ chosen plaintexts as well), and a computational complexity of approximately $3 \cdot 2^{16} \cdot 2^{48} \approx 2^{66}$ operations.

Finally, we can attack 4 rounds using the same strategy by guessing further key bits, i.e. those of $k_5^{(4)}$ and of $k_6^{(4)}$, which represents 80 unknown bits in total. Hence, we need about 87 structures of $2^{16}$ chosen plaintexts, which is less than $2^{23}$ chosen plaintexts, and a computational cost of about $3 \cdot 2^{16} \cdot 2^{80} \approx 2^{98}$ operations.

3.4.8 Summary

In this section, we have used the same kind of properties derived by Demirci [84] and Nakahara et al. [239] to derive a sequence of simple, yet efficient attacks against reduced-round versions of IDEA; the attacks against 2 and 2.5 rounds are the best known ones not involving any weak-key assumption, to the best of our knowledge. Some of them, given the same order of computational complexity, reduce the amount of necessary chosen plaintexts, while other attacks, given a comparable amount of chosen texts, decrease favorably the computational complexity; additionally, some tradeoffs between time and memory are presented, which lead to far less complex attacks using only known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Furthermore, we showed how to
use some of these attacks in combination with other known attacks, which allows sometimes to gain more key bits with a lesser complexity, or to avoid the use of both encryption and decryption oracles. The more important attacks against this block cipher are tabulated in Fig. 3.10 (which is an updated version of Fig. 2.12), as well as their respective complexities.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Rounds</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Attack type</th>
<th>Ref.</th>
<th>Note</th>
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<td>[238]</td>
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<td>[238]</td>
<td>Under 2(^{16}) rel. keys</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>121 KP</td>
<td>2(^{14})</td>
<td>linear-like</td>
<td>[239]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2(^{2}) CP</td>
<td>2(^{12})</td>
<td>impossible diff.</td>
<td>[27]</td>
<td>Memory: 2(^{48})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2(^{2}) CP</td>
<td>2(^{21})</td>
<td>collision</td>
<td>[85]</td>
<td>Memory: 2(^{64})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2(^{2}) CP</td>
<td>2(^{126})</td>
<td>collision</td>
<td>[85]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.10: Attacks against IDEA (updated)
Chapter 4

Design of Block Ciphers

This chapter is devoted to the design of secure and efficient block ciphers. We first review generalities about the task of designing a block cipher. Then, we address specifically the problem of designing fast diffusive components in §4.2. Finally, we present in §4.3 the description of a new family of block ciphers, named FOX, and we discuss thoroughly its characteristics both in terms of security and of performance.

4.1 General Considerations

In his seminal paper [295], Shannon noticed that the design of a block cipher should include two fundamental principles: confusion and diffusion. The principle of confusion was interpreted by Lai [179] in his PhD thesis as:

“The dependence of the key on the plaintext and ciphertext should be so complex that it is useless for cryptanalysis.”

while the principle of diffusion is defined as:

“For virtually every key, the encryption function should be such that there is no statistical dependence between simple structures in the plaintext and simple structures in the ciphertext and that there is no simple relation between different encryption functions.”

In this part, we discuss several strategies and issues about the design of modern, fast and secure block ciphers, namely how to guarantee these two properties into a block cipher. We treat successively common skeletons of block ciphers in §4.1.1, non-linear components in §4.1.2, diffusive components in §4.1.3, and key-schedule algorithms in §4.1.4. Finally, we briefly describe in §4.1.6 typical target platforms and the constraints they induce during the design of a block cipher.
4.1.1 Skeletons

Most of the known algorithms share the same kind of high-level structure, or skeleton. We discuss now the most common skeletons encountered in the literature and used in the practice. Finally, we discuss their respective advantages and drawbacks.

Feistel Schemes

The most widely used block cipher scheme is clearly the Feistel scheme [102] (see Def. 2.2.1 and Fig. 2.3 for a formal definition thereof and for an illustration, respectively). This popularity comes certainly from the fact that it is fairly easy to use any random round function \( f \) in order to make a permutation. In addition, encryption and decryption operations hardly need separate implementations. Another reason why the Feistel scheme is so popular is that it has been widely studied in a theoretical point of view. For instance, Luby and Rackoff proved in [191] that a Feistel network can generate a pseudorandom permutation if the underlying round functions are pseudorandom and if we use at least three rounds (see also the description of the Luby-Rackoff model of security in §2.4.2, page 53, which contains an extensive list of bibliographical references to the subject as well). A large number of block ciphers are Feistel ciphers: DES, the FEAL family, LOKI, Khufu, Khafre, Blowfish, Misty1, E2 and DFC, to name a few. Twofish uses a slightly modified Feistel structure, involving data-independent rotations in the branches, while Camellia is a Feistel cipher with an additional mixing layer every 6 rounds.

Generalized Feistel Schemes

In a common (balanced) Feistel scheme, half the bits operate on the other half. It is natural to consider the unbalanced case, where the \( f \)-function takes as input a different number of bits than its output. This approach has been proposed by Blaze and Schneier, in the design of MacGuffin, and then generalized in [285]. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the example of an unbalanced Feistel scheme with 4 branches. Three quarters of the data width form the \( f \)-function input in each round and the last quarter is combined with the \( f \)-function output. The high-level structures of CAST and Mars are a kind of unbalanced Feistel schemes.

It is furthermore possible to generalize the Feistel construction: for instance, we may consider a scheme where the \( f \)-function is not the same one (i.e. it is not only modulated by the subkeys) in each round. Since the internal properties of such a heterogenous scheme change from round to round, it may be much more complicated to find any kind of cryptanalytic property that propagates well through all rounds. However, implementing such a kind of schemes is costly and analyzing them is much more difficult.
Figure 4.1: Generalized unbalanced Feistel network with 4 branches
Lai-Massey Schemes

A far less-used skeleton is the so-called Lai-Massey scheme, which was introduced with PES and its successor IDEA. It is based on a group law and, like the Feistel scheme, it allows to build a permutation from any function (see Fig. 4.2). The two halves of the input are combined with help of the inverse group law (denoted $\oplus$ in Fig. 4.2), fed into the round function, and the corresponding output is combined with the two branches with help of the group law (denoted $\oplus$ in Fig. 4.2). We note however that without any modification, the Lai-Massey scheme is insecure, since there exists a differential characteristic which holds with probability one (see Eq. (4.5), page 197). This annoying property can however be avoided by plugging an orthomorphism, as we will discuss it in §4.3.4. Besides the ciphers PES, IDEA, and the MESH family, FOX, which will be described in §4.3, is also built on top of a (slightly modified) Lai-Massey scheme.
Substitution-Permutation Networks

The so-called substitution-permutation network (SPN) (see Fig. 4.3) applies
the principles of confusion and diffusion in a rather straightforward way by
alternating layers of substitution and layers of permutation. Although one
can view Feistel networks and related schemes as SPNs, we won’t refer to
them with this notation, because each layer does not apply on the whole
block size. There is usually two methods for combining the key material:
either subkeys are XORed before the entry in a substitution layer, or the
subkeys determine (key-dependent) S-boxes.

While SPNs’ security has been extensively studied (from an information-
theoristic point of view [300], towards differential and linear cryptanaly-
sis [130–132], for instance), there is rather few available theoretical work on
the structural security properties of SPNs. Recently, Biham published [22]
a dedicated attack against an ASASA structure, i.e. against a 5-layers SPN
where the permutations are affine transformations. Later, Biryukov and
Shamir have presented [36] the first structural attack against a SASAS struc-
ture, with a surprisingly low complexity. Another work in the same vein is
Moriai and Vaudenay’s discussion of SPNs at the light of the decorrela-
tion theory [231]. Several modern ciphers are SPNs. For instance, one can
mention Shark, Square, Rijndael, or Serpent.

Other Constructions

Some modern ciphers are not built on top of one of the typical structures
described below. For instance, RC5 has a kind of Feistel structure, but
where the f-function operations, the key mixing and the combination of
both branches are mixed. This structure has been extended to a kind of
generalized Feistel network with four branches in RC6.

4.1.2 Non-Linear Components

The strength of most of block ciphers (more specifically their resistance
against linear and differential cryptanalysis) is inevitably tied to the strength
of their S-boxes, which is usually their sole non-linear component. In this
part, we discuss the strength criteria of non-linear constructions together
with strong S-boxes construction methods.

An n-bit to m-bit S-box defines simply a substitution, i.e. to each n-
bit input is mapped a corresponding m-bit output value (which has not
necessarily the same length than the input). S-boxes are responsible for
bringing confusion in the data processing. This means that they should
hide any mathematical relationship between the plaintext, the ciphertext
and the key.

An S-box can be described by a lookup table of $2^n$ elements of $m$ bits.
Hence, for implementation reasons, it is desirable to keep the table as small
Figure 4.3: Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN)
as possible or to give a simple algorithmic description. For instance, in dedicated hardware implementations, S-boxes can be implemented as a straightforward lookup table stored in ROM. Since the area of such table grows exponentially with the length of the input, small boxes are desirable from this point of view. In software, an S-box is usually implemented as an array of constants that is indexed by the $n$-bit input. In general, S-boxes have a small portability; as a matter of fact, there is no benefit in using processors with a register length larger than the S-box input length. In certain cases, if the underlying processor has a register size which is several times as large as a S-box input, it is however possible to handle several S-boxes at the same time. Another way to implement S-boxes in an efficient way, given that the input size is not too large, is the bit-slice trick [21] (used on our fast implementation of DES, see §3.2.5): one expresses each S-box’s output bit as a Boolean expression of the input bits. This approach has been applied in the design of Serpent. However, finding optimal Boolean expressions of a S-box is not a trivial task [178] in the general case, and the results can be quite different on various architectures, provided the number and the size of logical operations at disposal, or the instruction cache size [216].

**Non-Linearity Criteria**

Obviously, there exist weak and strong S-boxes: to give a trivial illustration thereof, one can simply take the trivial substitution which consists in replacing each input by itself. Thus it seems natural to define strength criteria of S-boxes. We must however note that a weakness (or strength) measure is always related to a given attack, thus, new attacks often imply new strength criteria.

**Perfect Nonlinear Functions**

The importance of measuring the non-linearity (see Def. 4.1.1) of cryptographic functions was first noticed by Pieprzyk and Finkelstein [266].

**Definition 4.1.1 (Non-linearity of a Boolean function).** Let $f$ and $g$ be functions from $GF(2)^n$ to $GF(2)$. Let

$$\delta_H(f, g) = \sum_x 1_{f(x) \neq g(x)}$$

be the Hamming distance between $f$ and $g$. Let $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_{2^n+1}, \ldots, \varphi_{2^n+1}$ be all affine functions $\varphi_i : GF(2)^n \to GF(2)$. Then

$$n_f = \min_{i=1, \ldots, 2^n+1} \delta_H(f, \varphi_i)$$

is called the non-linearity of $f$. 
In their seminal paper [220] initiating the study of Boolean functions in a cryptographic context, Meier and Staffelbach consider the distance to linear and affine functions as a non-linearity criterion. They define perfect non-linear functions (see Def. 4.1.2); furthermore, it turns out that perfect non-linear functions correspond to certain functions known in combinatorics, the so-called bent functions.

**Definition 4.1.2 (Perfect non-linear Boolean functions).** A Boolean function $f : \mathbb{GF}(2^n) \rightarrow \mathbb{GF}(2)$ is called perfect non-linear if for every non-zero vector $a \in \mathbb{GF}(2)^n$ the values $f(x \oplus a) = f(x)$ are equal for exactly half of the arguments $x \in \mathbb{GF}(2)^n$.

An equivalent way to define perfect non-linear Boolean functions consists in saying that they have a non-linearity degree\(^1\) equal to $2^{n-1} + 2\frac{4^n}{n} - 1$.

**Strict Avalanche Criterion** Based on earlier ideas of Feistel [102] and of Kam and Davida [154], Webster and Tavares have proposed the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) in [326] (see Def. 4.1.3). This concept is based on the concept of completeness of a cryptographic function and on the concept of avalanche effect. A cryptographic function is said to be complete if each ciphertext bit depends on all the plaintext bits, while a function is said to exhibit the avalanche effect if an average of one half of the output bits change whenever a single input bit is complemented.

**Definition 4.1.3 (Strict avalanche criterion).** Let $x$ and $x'$ be two $n$-bit binary vectors such that $x$ and $x'$ differ only in bit $i$, $1 \leq i \leq n$. Let $v = y \oplus y'$, where $y = f(x)$, $y' = f(x')$ and $f(\cdot)$ is the Boolean function under consideration. $f$ is said to meet the strict avalanche criterion if the probability that each bit of $v$ is equal to 1 is equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ over the set of all vectors $x$ and $x'$ for all $i$.

This notion has then been generalized and linked to the Walsh-transform by Forrê [107] and functions satisfying higher order SAC criteria have been studied, for instance, by Cusick [74].

**Links between Nonlinearity Criteria** The links between non-linearity criteria have been the subject of several efforts after the discovery of the linear and differential cryptanalysis (see §2.3 for a description of these attacks). In order to study linear and differential properties of functions, useful measures are the linear (see Def. 2.3.9) and differential probabilities (see Def. 2.3.2). We summarize in the following list known results on Boolean functions and links between non-linearity criteria. We refer to $f$ as a function mapping $\{0, 1\}^p$ to $\{0, 1\}^q$.

---

\(^1\)Note that perfect non-linear Boolean functions exist only for $n$ even.
• $\text{DP}_{\text{max}}^f \geq 2^{-q}$. The equality holds for perfect non-linear functions.

• $\text{DP}_{\text{max}}^f \geq 2^{1-p}$. The equality holds for almost perfect non-linear functions [252].

• $\text{LP}_{\text{max}}^f \geq 2^{-p}$. The equality holds for bent functions [280].

• $\text{LP}_{\text{max}}^f \geq 2^{1-p} \left(1 + \frac{(2^{p-1}-1)(2^{p-2}-1)}{2^{p-2}}\right)$. The equality holds for almost-bent functions [58].

• Bent functions and perfect non-linear functions are equivalent [220] and exist if and only if $p \geq 2q$ and $p$ is even [249].

• Almost-bent functions exist if and only if $p = q$ and $p$ is odd and are almost-perfect non-linear functions (the reciprocal is not true) [58].

• Almost-perfect non-linearity is only possible if $(p, q) = (2, 1)$ or $q \geq p$.

S-Boxes Construction Methods

Since S-boxes play such a key role in the security of block ciphers, their selection method is a very important task during the design of a block cipher. It is possible to identify three different strategies: random choice, random choice followed by filtering, and algebraic constructions. The two first strategies are heuristic methods, while the last one is clearly more mathematical.

Random Choice  A possible strategy in selecting S-boxes is to choose them completely at random. While this approach can be insecure for small S-boxes (for instance, Biham and Shamir noticed [33] that replacing S-boxes of DES by random S-boxes yielded ciphers that were far weaker towards differential cryptanalysis than the original algorithm), theoretical works by O’Connor [253–255] and later by Youssef and Tavares [333–335] have shown that large random S-boxes are in average very resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis. A way to choose random S-boxes is to make them key-dependent. As example, this approach has been used in the algorithms IDEA, RC5, RC6, Blowfish or Twofish.

Random Choice Followed by Filtering  Another way to select good S-boxes is to generate random ones and to check if they have the desired properties until a good one is found. The following list enumerates common test criteria:

• Upper bound on every linear characteristic’s probability (according to Def. 2.3.11).

• Upper bound on every differential characteristic’s probability (according to Def. 2.3.3).
• Lower bound on the non-linearity of the S-box (see Def. 4.1.1).

• Upper bound on the single-bit correlation

$$\left| \Pr_x[S(x)_j = x_i] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$$

where $x_i$ denotes the $i$-th bit of $x$.

• SAC fulfilled (see Def. 4.1.3)

• Upper bound on the number of gates in a hardware implementation

Although it can be a very heavy and computation-intensive process, this approach has been used in a variety of block ciphers, including DES, Serpent, Mars, Crypton, or CAST, for instance.

**Algebraic Methods** In order to bring non-linearity in a block cipher, one can use algebraic methods, like mixing non-isomorphic operations (XOR and addition modulo $2^{32}$ for 32-bit vectors, for instance), or by using algebraic operations known to offer good non-linearity properties. Thus, one can see these S-boxes as data-dependent. We give now a (naturally non-exhaustive) list of common algebraic constructions:

• Mixing of addition in GF(2)$^n$ and in $\mathbb{Z}_n$ used in the design of FEAL, for instance.

• Power function in GF(2)$^n$ as in LOKI, or Shark.

• Combination of an inverse function $x \mapsto \frac{1}{x}$ in GF(2)$^n$ and an affine transformation over some other incompatible algebraic structure as in Square, Rijndael, Camellia, and many others.

• Combination of a power function $x \mapsto x^e$ in GF(2)$^n$ and an affine transformation over $\mathbb{Z}_n$ (E2, Misty1). Note that this generalizes the previous case (where $e = 2^n - 2$).

It remains however quite unclear at this time whether a pure algebraic S-boxes construction method is really as secure as expected (see the discussion in §4.3.1).

**4.1.3 Diffusive Components**

The purpose of a diffusive construction is to provide an avalanche effect, both in the context of differential and linear approximations. In the linear context, this means that there should be no correlations between linear combinations of a small set of inputs and linear combinations of a small set of outputs. In the differential context, small input changes should cause
large output changes, and conversely, to produce a small a output change, a large input change should be necessary. We discuss in this chapter several theoretical concepts which are used to build diffusive constructions in the practice.

Multipermutations

The concept of multipermutation\(^2\) was first introduced by Schnorr and Vaudenay in [287]. This concept is simply a formalization of perfect diffusion.

**Definition 4.1.4 (Multipermutation).** An \((r, n)\)-multipermutation over an alphabet \(\mathcal{A}\) is a function \(f\) from \(\mathcal{A}^r\) to \(\mathcal{A}^n\) such that two different \((r + n)\)-tuples of the form \((x, f(x))\) cannot collide in any \(r\) positions.

An equivalent definition says that the set of all \((r, n)\)-tuples of the form \((x, f(x))\) is an error correcting code with minimal distance \(n + 1\), which is the maximal possible. Some multipermutations are equivalent to Latin squares. For instance, a \((2, 1)\)-multipermutation is nothing else as a common Latin square, i.e. a \(k \times k\) matrix having elements over a finite set \(\mathcal{A}\) of \(k = \#\mathcal{A}\) elements such that all elements are represented in each column and in each row. A \((2, n)\)-multipermutation is equivalent to a set of \(n\) two-wise orthogonal Latin squares\(^3\).

The design of multipermutations over a finite alphabet is a very difficult problem, as the design of two-wise orthogonal Latin squares is a well-known difficult one. If we allow \(f\) to be a linear function\(^4\), then one can use a MDS code, which is the topic of a next section.

Branch Number Concept

A way to characterize the avalanche effect of a diffusive construction is its branch number [76], which is a concept proposed by Daemen in his PhD thesis. In the following, we denote by \(\delta_W(x)\) the Hamming weight of a vector having components in a finite field \(\text{GF}(2^n)\), i.e. the number of components different from zero.

**Definition 4.1.5 (Branch number).** Let \(\theta : \text{GF}(2^n)^m \rightarrow \text{GF}(2^n)^m\) be a mapping. Then
\[
\mathcal{B}(\theta) = \min_{x \neq 0} \{\delta_W(x) + \delta_W(\theta(x))\}
\]
is called the branch number \(\mathcal{B}(\theta)\) of \(\theta\).

\(^2\)The term “bipermutation” was suggested by Massey to mean a \((2, 2)\)-multipermutation, which eventually led to the one of “multipermutation”.
\(^3\)Two Latin square \(A\) and \(B\) are orthogonal if the mapping \((i, j) \mapsto (A_{i,j}, B_{i,j})\) gets all possible couples.
\(^4\)An example of non-linear multipermutation is the one used in CS Cipher.
The branch number of a diffusive construction gives a measure for the worst case diffusion: it thus is a lower bound for the number of active S-boxes in two consecutive rounds of a linear or a differential characteristic. Since a cryptanalysis will always exploit the worst case, this is a good measure for the diffusion property.

We note that the Hamming weight $\delta_W(x) \leq m$ for a vector $x$ and for any choice of $\theta$. If $\delta_W(x) = 1$, this implies that $\mathfrak{B}(\theta) \leq m + 1$. This leads to the definition of an optimal mapping

**Definition 4.1.6 (Optimal mapping).** A mapping

$$\theta : \text{GF}(2^n)^m \to \text{GF}(2^n)^m$$

is called optimal if $\mathfrak{B}(\theta) = m + 1$.

As a matter of fact, this optimal case corresponds to the multipermutation definition. A popular implementation of optimal linear invertible mappings are the MDS codes, which will be discussed afterwards. Several modern block ciphers use the concept of branch number in their design: this is the case of Shark, Square or Rijndael, for instance.

**MDS Codes**

MDS codes have rapidly become a very popular tool in block cipher design; Vaudenay [311] has first proposed them as an implementation of a multipermutation. Indeed, they are elegant ways to implement multipermutations and they are optimal invertible linear mappings, in the sense of Daemen’s branch concept number. We first give the formal definition of a linear code.

**Definition 4.1.7 (Linear code).** A $[n,k,d]$-linear code $C$ of length $n$, dimension $k$ and minimal distance $d$ is a $k$-dimensional subspace of the vector space of $n$-tuples over a given field, where the distance $d$ between two codewords is defined to be the number of elements in which they differ.

A well-known result of coding theory is the Singleton bound, which is an upper bound on the minimal distance of any linear code.

**Theorem 4.1.1 (Singleton’s bound).** For any $[n,k,d]$-linear code, the minimal distance $d$ is upper bounded by

$$d \leq n - k + 1$$

Codes with a minimal distance $d = n - k + 1$ are called maximal distance separable (MDS) codes. A well-known example of MDS-codes are the Reed-Solomon codes. A linear code $C$ can be represented by a generation matrix $G_{k \times n}$. This matrix has dimension $k \times n$, and is always of full rank. $C$ is formed by the subspace of dimension $k$ that is spanned by the rows of $G$

$$C = \left\{ G \cdot x \mid x \in \text{GF}(2^n)^k \right\}$$
As the generation matrix of a code is not unique, one can always write
\[ G_e = T \cdot G = [I_{k \times k} B_k \times (n-k)] \]
where \( I_{k \times k} \) is the \( k \times k \) identity matrix and \( T \) is a full-rank matrix; this form is called the echelon-form matrix of \( G \). The following theorem [275] (which is nothing but a rewrite of Vaudenay results in the branch number terminology) ensures that a MDS-code has optimal diffusive properties.

**Theorem 4.1.2.** Let \( C \) be a \([2n, n, n + 1]\)-code over \( GF(2^n) \). Let \( G_e \) be the generator matrix in echelon form \( G_e = [I_{k \times k} B_k \times (n-k)] \). Then \( C \) defines an optimal linear invertible mapping \( \theta \):

\[
\theta : \{ GF(2^m)^n \rightarrow GF(2^m)^n \}
\]

\[
x \mapsto B \times x
\]

Finally, we give an alternate and useful criterion (see [197, page 321] for a proof thereof) on matrices which allows to test for their optimality in terms of diffusion.

**Theorem 4.1.3.** A matrix is an MDS matrix if and only if every sub-matrix is non-singular.

MDS codes have become an increasing popularity: Shark, Rijndael, Twofish, Square are examples of ciphers using them as diffusive element. In §4.2, we will present a formal approach in designing efficient MDS matrices, as well as new constructions.

**Pseudo-Hadamard Transform**

The Pseudo-Hadamard Transform (see Fig. 4.4) was proposed by Massey in the cipher SAFER K-64. This is an unorthodox linear transform that allows the cipher rapidly to achieve the desired diffusion. The box denoted 2-PHT is defined as follows, where \( x \) and \( x' \) denote the input bytes and \( y \) and \( y' \) the output ones.

\[
\text{2-PHT} : \begin{cases} y = 2x + x' \pmod{256} \\ y' = x + x' \pmod{256} \end{cases}
\]

The arithmetic is usual byte arithmetic, i.e. performed modulo 256. Between levels of the linear layer, a decimation-by-2 permutation, which is familiar from the FFT and the ordinary discrete Hadamard transform, is applied.

**4.1.4 Key-Schedule Algorithms**

The key schedule algorithm is responsible for deriving subkey material out of the key to the data randomizing part of the block cipher. We discuss in this part various issues around the design of key schedule algorithms.
Although block cipher design theory seems now to have several well-established strategies (which we discuss in §4.1.5) at disposal, the descriptions of the key schedule algorithms found in the academic literature are astonishingly full of empiric receipts and it is not common to get well-founded scientific arguments on a specific key scheduling algorithm. The only usually needed functional property of a key schedule is that it is possible to compute it in both directions, i.e., one can produce a sequence $r_k(0), r_k(1), \ldots, r_k(n)$ of subkeys from the key $k$ as well as the reverse sequence $r_k(n), r_k(n-1), \ldots, r_k(0)$. This property is important for the efficiency of the decryption process.

The key schedule can play an important role for eliminating symmetry in a block cipher. For instance, it is quite common that a round transformation treats all bytes of the “current state” in a very similar manner. This symmetry can be removed by having constants in the key schedule. Furthermore, the round transformation is often the same for all rounds. This equality can be removed by having round-dependent round constants in the key-schedule.

Two major tendencies in the key-schedule design can be distinguished. A goal of older key schedule algorithms is to spread the key entropy in the subkeys in a “smooth” manner. A supplementary goal of more modern key schedule algorithms is to bring some one-wayness, in the sense that getting a subkey does not compromise most of the other subkeys. We discuss now these two strategies.
Diffusive Key Schedules

Older block ciphers have often a quite simple key schedule algorithm. One
very illustrative example of this fact is **DES**. The key schedule algorithm is
responsible to produce 16 subkeys of 48 bits from the 56-bit key. The key is
diffused in the subkeys by a subtle (but completely linear) key bits selection
process which uses rotations and a “compressive permutation”. Thus, every
key bit is used in approximately 14 of the 16 subkeys, although not all bits
are used exactly the same number of times.

Other nice examples of simple key schedules are the one of **LOKI**, which
uses a Feistel scheme with 12-bit and 13-bit rotations as f-function and the
one of **IDEA**, which employs rotations as well.

Unfortunately, using such simple, linear algorithms to derive subkey bits
from the key can expose the cipher to annoying, although not dramatic,
properties, like weak and semi-weak keys, complementation properties, or
even related-keys attacks (see §2.3 for more details about these attacks). For
instance, all the attacks against **IDEA** described in §3.4 do not work it the
key-schedule algorithm of **IDEA** is replaced by a stronger version.

Modern Key Schedules

In order to eliminate these potential annoying properties, block ciphers de-
signers are using non-linear key schedules. An early example is **FEAL**, which
uses a kind of Feistel scheme combined with the (slightly modified) f-function
of its data randomizing part. However, it is worth to note that designers
of **FEAL** assign to the key-schedule as sole task “the generation of different
extended keys from the 64-bit secret key”, without any further motivation.

Many attack models assume that the subkeys are statistically indepen-
dent and uniformly distributed. In order to allow to prove some security
level, one can see the key schedule algorithm as a pseudo-random generator
which uses the key as seed value. For instance, this approach was used in the
design of **DFC** in a way which was not successful in the original version (as
demonstrated by Coppersmith which exhibited a large class of weak keys); this
was later fixed in the design of **DFCv2**.

An interesting observation is that many attacks on iterated ciphers first
recover (part of) a round key. This knowledge is subsequently used to recover
other round keys. To make these attacks less efficient, one can generate the
round keys by processing the key with a preimage resistant function. This
idea has been used in the key schedule algorithm of **Blowfish** and **CAST**, or
in **Shark**. It is worth to note that this is not a general rule: **Square** specifies
its key schedule algorithm as being an “iterative invertible transformation”.

In order to protect block ciphers against exhaustive search attacks, it has
been proposed to render the key schedule process computationally intensive.
In the real world, a key schedule algorithm execution is often bound with
other time consuming operations, like public-key operations, or network protocol executions. Thus, as long as the key schedule is precomputed in memory and the data randomizing part of the block cipher is fast, this speed loss is not a real disadvantage in terms of performance. However, this argument holds only if enough memory is available, which is typically not the case in a smartcard environment, for instance. This concept has been applied in Blowfish in an intentional way, but most of modern block ciphers have a key schedule algorithm which is more time consuming than the data randomizing part.

When choosing the non-linear parts of the key schedule algorithm, block cipher designers reuse very often the same (or very slightly) modified components as in the data randomizing part. This is obviously a real advantage when implementing the cipher in hardware.

4.1.5 Block Ciphers Design Paradigms

In this part, we discuss several paradigms used in the past to design block ciphers, as well as their (dis-) advantages.

**Empirical Security**

A first possibility for a block cipher designer is to choose the *empirical security* strategy. The principle is very simple: one designs the algorithm such that it fulfills a set of practical design criteria (speed, platform, key size, implementation complexity) but without any mathematical justification towards the real security level of the cipher. So the cipher is considered to be secure by its designer(s) (and hopefully by the users) as long as nobody is able to break it faster than an exhaustive key search.

An example of (early) empirical security design is FEAL. In the first proposal [296], in 1987, the designers propose a block cipher built on a Feistel scheme dedicated to be faster than DES and to be an alternative thereof. This cipher, called FEAL-4, has 4 rounds, a block and a key size of 64 bits. We quote here, for historical purposes, the only statement found in the paper regarding the cipher’s security:

"FEAL working with no parity in a key block is safe from all-key attack because it is controlled by a 64-bit key, which is more secure than the 56-bit DES key. Regarding ciphertext randomization, FEAL is considered safe because the randomization indices are closer to the theoretical values than those of DES."

As FEAL-4 was broken by den Boer [86] a few months later, the number of rounds was increased to 8 and called FEAL – 8. In 1990, Biham and Shamir proposed the differential cryptanalysis [31] and showed that it is possible to break FEAL with a differential cryptanalysis up to 31 rounds. In the
same time, other researchers have proposed attacks against several variants of FEAL: Chassé and Gilbert [113] against 8 rounds in 1990, Tardy-Corfdir and Gilbert [308] against 4 and 6 rounds in 1991, Matsui and Yamagishi [206] against 4, 6, and 8 rounds in 1992. In response, Miyaguchi [227] proposed the so-called \textit{FEAL–n} cipher family, where \( n \) is the number of rounds, together with \textit{FEALNX}, a 128-bit key version of the cipher. The current suggested number of rounds is 32. Other studies regarding the resistance of the \textit{FEAL} cipher family towards modern cryptanalysis have been presented. For instance, Moriai, Aoki and Ohta prove in [229] that \textit{FEAL-32} is secure against linear cryptanalysis.

We think that empirical security arguments can no longer be considered as serious for modern block ciphers. Although \textit{FEAL} with 32 rounds is secure against modern forms of cryptanalysis, no real credibility is given by its design against future cryptanalysis. Since the first publication regarding \textit{FEAL}, several new cryptanalysis methods and more systematic ways of building secure block ciphers have been proposed.

\textbf{Heuristic Security}

By combining elements having known good properties, like for instance multipermutations for diffusion and highly non-linear functions for confusion purposes, one can build block ciphers which have a very good security level. For instance, \textit{CS Cipher} is such a cipher. By heuristic security, one means that some properties like resistance against various attacks can be proven for an algorithm by using heuristic assumptions, i.e. assumptions that are very likely to hold. In the case of \textit{CS Cipher}, Vaudenay [315] proves, that under a certain assumption, this algorithm is secure\(^5\) against linear, differential, and truncated differentials cryptanalysis. The involved assumption is that all round keys are uniformly distributed and independent; this is quite intuitive, given that the key schedule is not badly flawed. Furthermore, a certain confidence towards future cryptanalysis methods is given by the underlying cryptographic primitives.

\textbf{Provable Security}

As outlined in §2.4.3, it is very difficult to really prove security in a general way for a symmetric block cipher; many older constructions have empiric or heuristic security foundations, which bring more or less confidence. However, recent works have proposed interesting theoretical constructions in order to “prove” certain aspects of security in a block cipher. We discuss them in this section.

\footnote{More exactly, the proofs bound the probability of the best differential and linear characteristics.}
Recursive Schemes  Several theoretical results regarding the resistance of a block cipher against linear and differential cryptanalysis have been presented. The following theorem, proven\(^6\) by Nyberg and Knudsen [252] for which concerns the differential cryptanalysis and by Nyberg [250] in the case of a linear cryptanalysis, gives an upper bound on \(LP^\Psi_{\max}\) and \(DP^\Psi_{\max}\) in the context of a Feistel scheme.

Theorem 4.1.4. Assume that each round function \(f_i\) in a Feistel scheme \(\Psi\) is bijective and that

\[
\begin{cases}
LP^f_{\max} & \leq p \\
DP^f_{\max} & \leq p
\end{cases}
\]

If the entire function \(\Psi\) has at least four rounds, then

\[
\begin{cases}
LP^\Psi_{\max} & \leq 2p^2 \\
DP^\Psi_{\max} & \leq 2p^2
\end{cases}
\]

An example of cipher using this theorem is Misty1. In the paper describing it, Matsui shows how to “amplify” the results stated by this theorem with help of a recursive Feistel scheme, i.e. a Feistel scheme whose round function is a Feistel scheme, etc. Hence, by using a three level recursion, Matsui shows that the upper bound is \(p^4\) instead of \(p^2\).

Another example of a modern and recursive design is DEAL. In order to build a 128-bit block cipher, Knudsen simply takes a well-known and well studied 64-bit algorithm, DES, and uses it as a round function in a Feistel scheme. This construction has a level of recursion equal to two. The main advantages of this approach are a good backward compatibility with existing hardware and software implementations and a good confidence in its overall security level, while serious drawbacks are of course the resulting speed performances.

Decorrelation  As described in the previous sections, the problem of security analysis of a block cipher is often solved heuristically by giving evidences that known types of cryptanalysis (like linear or differential cryptanalysis) cannot work. Approaches have seldom been proposed in order to formally deal with security in a general way, i.e. against (still) unknown forms of attack. Vaudenay’s decorrelation theory (see §2.4.3 and [320]) proposes the Peanut construction (over which DFC is based) which is basically an \(r\)-round Feistel scheme with decorrelation modules as a round function. If these decorrelation modules achieve a \(d\)-wise decorrelation bias of \(\varepsilon\), by using the multiplicative properties and the triangular inequality with a truly random 3-round Feistel construction, one obtains from the Luby-Rackoff Theorem [191] that

\[
\text{Dec}_d(F) \leq \left(2d^22^{-\frac{r}{2}} + \varepsilon\right)^{\left\lfloor\frac{r}{2}\right\rfloor}
\]

\(^6\)The primitive results have been slightly improved by Aoki and Ohta in [10].
where $m$ is the block length in bits. A drawback is that decorrelation with large $a$ and $d$ requires very long keys; this explains why one uses $d = 2$ (like in DFC). The security may look very limited but one can still prove security against reasonable generalizations of differential and linear cryptanalysis. One can even prove the resistance against any statistical attack which uses simple events on $(x, \Psi(x))$ pairs.

### 4.1.6 Target Platforms

Block ciphers are typically implemented on very different target platforms, depending on their usage. We briefly discuss in this part the constraints imposed by these different kinds of platforms on the design of fast block ciphers. We successively treat hardware platforms, low-cost microprocessors, and high-end microprocessors.

**Hardware**

Clearly, the most efficient way to implement a block cipher consists in designing a dedicated electronic circuit, instead of programming it using a general-purpose microprocessor. According to Standaert [302], there exist two main approaches: the first one consists in using a purpose-built hard-wired technology, e.g. an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) to perform the execution of a block cipher in hardware while the second method consists in using so-called “reconfigurable devices”, like Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs).

ASICs are specifically designed to perform a given computation, and are thus extremely fast and efficient. However, the circuit cannot be modified after its production. FPGAs present similar properties, but a portion of the circuit is dedicated to the reconfigurability of the device instead of the application. This implies a decrease of performances which keeps however very reasonable compared to the benefits of the reconfigurability.

It is worth noticing that ASICs don’t define real constraints on the design of block ciphers by themselves, since any cipher which can be implemented in software can be implemented by an ASIC. However, an interesting feature of FPGAs is that they usually can compute very efficiently any mapping on 4-bit values. Namely, FPGA can be viewed as a large set of programmable blocks whose logic and routing are user-programmable, where each logic block usually contains a 4-bit arithmetic and logic unit.

**Low-Cost Microprocessors**

By low-cost microprocessors, we mean processors that can typically be found on low-cost smartcards, or on low-cost embedded devices. In this section, we list the requirements dictated by smartcards regarding the implementation of a block cipher.
- **Low RAM usage**: the resource representing the most important bottleneck in a block cipher implementation on a smartcard is of course the RAM usage. The amount of efficiently usable RAM available on a smartcard is typically in the order of 256 bytes. It is a bit larger on an ARM architecture, but as this type of smart card is devoted to contain more than a simple encryption routine, it would be a good thing not to use a tool large part of the available RAM.

- **ROM usage**: ROM is not as scarce as RAM on a smartcard, so the code size can be greater than the RAM usage. However, it is reasonable not to have a minimal code size (instructions + possible tables) greater than 1024 bytes.

- **Speed**: Obviously, the encryption/decryption (with key schedule) operation should last a minimal time.

- **Complex operations**: It is extremely costly to implement multiplications of operands greater than 8 bits.

As smartcards are one of the preferred targets for modern block ciphers, we give here more insight into two common categories of available smartcards: the 8051 and the ARM architectures. The first one is a typical cheap microcontroller developed by Intel Corp. [136] which is used in many smartcards; it is a low-cost device, typical of everyday life usage such as Pay-TV applications. The second one, developed by ARM Ltd. [12] is supposed to be representative of a powerful smartcard, aimed at providing several advanced services, like security, for instance.

**8051 Architecture** The 8051 architecture forms one of the most-used basic, low-cost microprocessor used in the smartcards. We can sketch its main characteristics as follows. Typically, a 8051 microcontroller implements an 8-bit Harvard architecture. Depending on versions, performance peaks vary between 1 (at 12 MHz) and 2.5 millions (at 30 MHz) 8-bits instructions per second, but we note that the standard clock frequency for a smartcard is fixed to 3.57 MHz. Usually, 32 to 2304 bytes of RAM are available. However, the RAM is organized in pages of 256 bytes, and accessing data located on another page is a rather costly operation. An 8051 is usually provided with 6 KB to 32 KB of ROM, and 8 general-purpose 8-bit registers are available.

An 8051 possesses a CISC architecture, i.e. it makes use of a complex, variable-sized set of instructions; some of them allow interesting spare of time in the context of a block cipher implementation. Furthermore, it is an accumulator-based architecture which means that data processing instructions specify only one operand; the other one must be stored in the accumulator before the instruction call, and the result will also be placed
in the accumulator. Several addressing modes are supported: for many
instructions, operating on memory is as fast as on registers.

The 8051 has a byte-to-byte multiplier, i.e. an instruction allowing to
multiply two 8-bits values yielding a 16-bits result. We note however that
this instruction may not always be implemented in hardware, which can
result in varying execution time among different versions of the chip. Finally,
the 8051 has a rotation instruction; it is however limited to rotate an 8-bit
value by one bit position (to the left or to the right).

**ARM Architecture**  ARM (for Advanced RISC Machine) is an archi-
tecture developped by ARM Ltd. [12]; the ARM architecture is a typical
example which can be found on more sophisticated smartcards, for instance.

Its main characteristics are the following: ARM microprocessors are built
on a 32-bit, 3-stages pipelined von Neumann architecture, with 3-address
instructions: every data processing instruction specifies both the operands
and the destination place for the results. 16 registers are available, some of
them having a preassigned function (like the program counter, or the stack
pointer). It is a LOAD-STORE-architecture, i.e. data processing instruc-
tions always operate either on direct values or on registers. Every instruc-
tion can be conditionally executed according the the state of flags, and there
is a barrel shifter, which means that the second operand in a data process-
ing instruction can optionaly be shifted or rotated before being processed.
This architecture can furthermore multiply two 32-bit values, yielding the
32 low-order bits of the product (some more advanced ARM processors have
the possibility to get the full 64-bit result). Finally, there is typically a few
kilobytes of RAM at disposal.

**32/64-bit Microprocessors**

This category of microprocessors is the one found in common computers.
Although some constructors are, at the time of writing, shipping machine
built on top of 64-bit processors, 32-bit architectures should remain a stan-
dard platform for a few years. For a long time, 64-bit RISC CPUs were
not available on low-cost, desktop computers used by everybody. They
were reserved to mainframes and to very expensive work stations, sold by
Hewlett-Packard, Compaq and other companies. This situation is changing
as most chip manufacturers are shipping 64-bit microprocessors and one can
expect a slow increase of such CPUs in a larger public.

Typically, a 64-bit RISC CPU offer many more registers than a CISC
architecture, while the latter can usually do complex operations (like bit ro-
tation) faster. Another advantage of RISC architectures is that it is always
possible to get the fastest possible implementation with a high-level lan-
guage, while it is not the case in a CISC architecture: an optimized version
of a program must frequently be written in assembly code.
Processor | cache size [kB] | Note |
---|---|---|
Alpha 21164 | 8 | (data) |
Alpha 21264 | 64 | (data) |
AMD Athlon XP | 128 | (data + code) |
AMD Athlon MP | 128 | (data + code) |
AMD Opteron | 64 | (data) |
Intel Pentium III | 16 | (data) |
Intel Pentium IV | 8/16 (Prescott) | (data) |
Intel Xeon | 8 | (data) |
Intel Itanium | 16 | (data) |
Intel Itanium2 | 16 | (data) |
PowerPC G4 | 32 | (data + code) |
PowerPC G5 | 32 | (data) |
UltraSparc II | 16 | (data) |
UltraSparc III | 64 | (data) |

Figure 4.5: Amount of L1 cache for various high-end microprocessors

We figured out that the main bottleneck of these architectures regarding the design of fast block ciphers is the amount of the fastest memory (typically named L1 cache) at disposal, as fetching memory cells which are not present at this level of the memory hierarchy results in very costly (in terms of clock cycles) cache misses. This implies an upper-bound on the amount of precomputed data necessary to execute an optimized implementation. Fig. 4.5 lists these figures for some popular 32/64-bit microprocessors.

## 4.2 Fast Diffusive Components

Although linear perfect diffusion primitives (i.e. MDS encoding matrices or linear multipermutations), are nowadays widely used in block ciphers, very little systematic work has been published so far, to the best of our knowledge, on how to find “efficient” ones. In this part, we present a first attempt to systematically address this problem by considering software implementations of such components on various platforms. Interestingly, this opens several combinatorial problems which we investigate, and finally, we propose a sequence of new efficient constructions of $4 \times 4$ and of $8 \times 8$ MDS matrices which can be used e.g. in block ciphers. We refer the reader to §4.1.3 for an introduction on perfect diffusive components.

It is actually very difficult to mathematically define what is an “optimal” matrix in terms of the efficiency of its implementation on, since there exist a large number of criteria which may be taken into account; furthermore, these criteria are usually very dependent of the target platform. In this
part, we have purposedly chosen to treat the problem of constructing MDS matrices whose implementation is very efficient on most low-cost platforms, like 8051, or ARM architectures (see §4.1.6 for a technical overview of these platforms). For this, we isolate a few criteria which look important, and we derive several optimality results based on these criteria.

Let \( \mathbb{F} = (\mathbb{K}, +, \times) \) be a field of characteristic 2. Typically, we have \( \mathbb{F} = \text{GF}(256) \). We consider linear multipermutations defined from \( \mathbb{K}^p \) to \( \mathbb{K}^q \) and we denote by \( M \) a \( q \times p \) matrix whose elements lie in \( \mathbb{K} \). Let furthermore \( M_{i,j} \) denote the matrix element on row \( i \) and column \( j \), where \( 1 \leq i \leq q \) and \( 1 \leq j \leq p \). Let us furthermore denote vectors taking elements in \( \mathbb{K} \) by \( x, y, \ldots \), and the \( i \)-th component of the vector \( x \) by \( x_i \). We interpret a linear multipermutation by the matrix multiplication \( x \mapsto M \times x \) which can simply be rewritten as

\[
x_i = \sum_{j=1}^{p} M_{i,j} x_j \quad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, q.
\]

Here, we note that the addition in \( \mathbb{F} \) can be efficiently implemented using a XOR operation, denoted \( \oplus \), which is available on virtually all microprocessor architectures. We describe now how to implement in an efficient way such mappings, on the one hand, on 32/64-bit architectures which dispose of large amounts of very fast memory, and on the other hand, on 8-bit low-cost architectures which do not have large amounts of memory at disposal.

### 4.2.1 Performances of Linear Multipermutations

Modern 32/64-bit microprocessors typically have relatively large quantities of very fast memory, also called cache memory. By “very fast”, we mean the fastest accessible cache memory, usually named L1 cache\(^7\). Fig. 4.5, page 160, lists typical high-end microprocessors and the quantity of L1 cache they have at disposal.

When enough fast memory is available, a well-known and quite simple implementation strategy (described in [81], for instance) can be applied. Namely, the columns of \( M \) can be partitioned into several sub-columns whose size correspond to the microprocessor word size or less. Let us denote by \( w \) the size of the words in terms of elements of \( \mathbb{K} \). Then, all possible multiplications can be precomputed and put in a lookup table. In other words, we consider the matrix \( M \) as a block matrix of type \( \lceil \frac{q}{w} \rceil \times p \), the output vector \( y \) as a block vector of \( \lceil \frac{q}{w} \rceil \) elements, and where every block are vectors of \( w \) elements of \( \mathbb{K} \), except the blocks in the last row which may be smaller if \( w \) does not divide \( q \). For instance, let us consider the example of a 32-bit

\(^7\)Note that we focus here on L1 cache, since accessing data which are not present at this level of cache hierarchy produces penalties of a large number of clock cycles on most of microprocessors. However, it has been shown by Lipmaa [188] that in certain precise cases, one can take profit of choosing an alternate implementation strategy exploiting higher levels of the cache hierarchy.
architecture, where \( \mathcal{R} = \text{GF}(2^8) \), and \( p = q = 4 \) (as in AES or in FOX64, for instance). This fixes \( w = 4 \). We define four tables \( T^j \), with \( 1 \leq j \leq 4 \) of 256 4-words vectors such that

\[
T^j : u \mapsto \begin{pmatrix} M_{1,j} \cdot u \\ M_{2,j} \cdot u \\ M_{3,j} \cdot u \\ M_{4,j} \cdot u \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{for } u \in \mathcal{K}
\]

Then the evaluation of \( y = M \times x \) reduces to the computation of

\[
y = T^1(x_1) \oplus T^2(x_2) \oplus T^3(x_3) \oplus T^4(x_4)
\]

which represents three XORs and four table lookups. The memory needs are, in this example, four tables of 256 32-bit values each, i.e. 4096 bytes; this clearly fits in the L1 cache of modern high-end microprocessors. An \( 8 \times 8 \) matrix multiplication over the same field \( \mathcal{R} \) would involve 7 XORs, 8 table lookups, and 8 tables of 256 64-bit values, i.e. 16384 bytes in total.

Under this approach, performances only depend on the external characteristics of \( \mathcal{M} \) and of the microprocessor, i.e. \( p, q, w, \) and \( \#\mathcal{K} \), but they do not depend on the internal structure of \( \mathcal{M} \). Interestingly, one can furthermore combine this strategy with a possible simultaneous evaluation of 8-bit substitution boxes by directly taking them into account in the precomputed tables (see §4.3.5 for detailed explanations about an example of this strategy of implementation).

The situation becomes more problematic for low-cost 8-bit architectures, since one cannot afford to waste too much memory for storing precomputed data: thus, the matrix multiplication must be computed on-the-fly, and in this case, the internal structure of \( \mathcal{M} \) has an impact on the performances. Obviously, it is necessary to evaluate in the order of \( p \cdot q \) operations in \( \mathcal{R} \) as no element can be equal to the additive neutral element of \( \mathcal{R} \) (otherwise, it would be a contradiction to Th. 4.1.3).

A first solution would consist of expressing each element \( x \) of \( \mathcal{K} \) as \( x = g^i \), where \( g \) is a generator of the multiplicative group of \( \mathcal{R} \), and to store the precomputed mappings \( x \mapsto i \) and \( i \mapsto x \) (this costs 512 bytes of memory if \( \mathcal{R} = \text{GF}(2^8) \)). Thus, any multiplication in \( \mathcal{R} \) can be implemented with help of three table lookups and an addition modulo 255. A table lookup can even be saved as the multiplications are actually between a variable operand and a constant one, thus the logarithm of the constant terms can be hard-coded. However, this approach remains quite costly.

Some multiplications tables are quite simple though: for instance, the multiplication by 1 (the multiplicative neutral element of \( \mathcal{R} \)) is trivial and does not cost anything. From this point, we will adopt the following approach: all multiplication tables by \( \mathcal{M}_{i,j} \) such that \( \mathcal{M}_{i,j} \neq 1 \) are pre-computed. Thus, the three following properties of matrices are playing an important role.
Definition 4.2.1 (Number of occurrences of 1). Let $\mathcal{K}^*$ be a set including a distinguished element denoted 1. Let $M$ be a $q \times p$ matrix with $M_{i,j} \in \mathcal{K}^*$ for all $i$ and $j$. Then $\kappa(M)$ is defined to be the number of entries $(i,j)$ of $M$ such that $M_{i,j} = 1$ and is called the number of occurrences of 1:

$$\kappa(M) = \# \{ M_{i,j} : M_{i,j} = 1 \}.$$

Definition 4.2.2 (Number of (non-trivial) entries). Let $\mathcal{K}^*$ be a set including a distinguished element denoted 1. Let $M$ be a $q \times p$ matrix with $M_{i,j} \in \mathcal{K}^*$ for all $i$ and $j$. Then $\vartheta(M)$ is defined to be the number of different entries $(i,j)$ of $M$ and is called the number of entries of $M$:

$$\vartheta(M) = \# \{ M_{i,j} : 1 \leq i \leq q \text{ and } 1 \leq j \leq p \}.$$

Furthermore, if 1 occurs in $M$, we define $\vartheta_1(M) = \vartheta(M) - 1$ as the number of non-trivial entries of $M$. Otherwise, $\vartheta_1(M) = \vartheta(M)$.

Under this approach, one needs to store pre-computed tables having a total size equal to

$$\vartheta_1(M) \times \# \mathcal{K}$$

to be able to implement a matrix multiplication, and the total time complexity may be expressed as $q(p - 1)$ XORs and

$$\vartheta_1(M_{1,:}) + \ldots + \vartheta_1(M_{q,:})$$

table lookups, where $M_{i,:}$ denotes the $i$-th column of $M$. Clearly, the quantity $\kappa(M)$ is linked to the data complexity of the implementation while $\vartheta_1(M)$ is related to its time complexity. Thus, a natural goal consists in finding matrices or skeletons of matrices minimizing $\vartheta_1(.)$ and maximizing $\kappa(.)$.

A further possibility to trade some multiplication tables against some computation units consists in filling $M$ with “efficient” entries, i.e. elements of $\mathcal{K}$ different of 1 which can be efficiently multiplied with any operand. For instance, if $\mathcal{K} = \text{GF}(2^8)$, one can interpret the elements of the field by polynomials $a_0 + a_1 x + \ldots + a_7 x^7$ of degree at most seven with coefficients $a_i$ in $\text{GF}(2)$, and represent these polynomials as 8-bit strings $a_7 \cdots a_1 a_0$. In this case, the multiplication by $x$ can simply be implemented by a logical left shift by one bit and a conditional XOR with a constant when a carry bit is set. Note that one should be especially careful about timing attacks; we give an example of such a constant-time implementation on an 8051 architecture in §4.3.5.

Similarly, the division by $x$ can be implemented with the help of a logical right shift and a conditional XOR with a constant. Furthermore, if a matrix $M$ includes to elements $x$ and $x + 1$, then we can omit the multiplication
table by \( x + 1 \), since one can emulate it by one multiplication by \( x \) followed with an XOR.

Another example is the multiplication by constants which are even power of a coefficient for which we make use of a precomputed table. For instance, if have the coefficients \( x \) and \( x^2 \) in a matrix, we do not need a precomputed table for the multiplication by \( x^2 \) since it can be emulated by two lookups in the table storing the results of a multiplication by \( x \).

Finally, we can also algebraically optimize implementations by playing with temporary variables storing intermediate results during the computations.

### 4.2.2 Bi-Regular Arrays

We concentrate now on finding MDS matrices with high \( \kappa \) and low \( \vartheta \) coefficients. The following definition introduces bi-regular arrays (and their converse, namely bi-singular arrays) which are useful objects to build MDS matrices. Clearly, a bi-singular array cannot be an MDS matrix since it contains a \( 2 \times 2 \) single sub-determinant. Hence, being bi-regular is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for being an MDS matrix.

Our approach for constructing MDS matrices with high \( \kappa \) and low \( \vartheta \) coefficients is first to construct a bi-regular array, second to assign elements to some non-zero field values until we get an MDS matrix. We can e.g. look at random values until it succeeds or concentrate on efficient GF elements, and using a brute-force search.

**Definition 4.2.3 (Bi-Regular Arrays).** Let \( \mathbb{K}^* \) be a set including a distinguished element denoted 1. We say that a \( 2 \times 2 \) array with entries in \( \mathbb{K}^* \) is bi-regular if at least one row and one column have the property of having different entries; a \( q \times p \) array with entries in \( \mathbb{K}^* \) is bi-regular if all \( 2 \times 2 \) sub-arrays are bi-regular.

**Definition 4.2.4 (Bi-Singular Arrays).** An array which is not bi-regular is called bi-singular.

We state now two theorems summarizing the optimal values of both \( \kappa \) and \( \vartheta_1 \) for \( 1 \leq p, q \leq 8 \) such that it is still possible to build bi-regular arrays. We refer to [152] for their proof.

**Theorem 4.2.1.** The maximal possible value of \( \kappa(M) \) such that it is possible to find a \( q \times p \) bi-regular array \( M \) for \( 1 \leq p, q \leq 8 \) is given in Fig. 4.6.

**Theorem 4.2.2.** The minimal possible value of \( \vartheta_1(M) \) such that it is possible to find a \( q \times p \) bi-regular array \( M \) for \( 1 \leq p, q \leq 8 \) is given in Fig. 4.7.
Figure 4.6: Maximal possible value for $\kappa(M)$ for a bi-regular array $M$

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Figure 4.7: Minimal possible value for $\vartheta_1(M)$ for a bi-regular array $M$

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4.2.3 New Constructions

We study now constructions with $p = q = 4$ over the field $\mathbb{F} = \text{GF}(256)$. Elements are represented as polynomials of degree at most 7 over $\text{GF}(2)$, the $a_0 + a_1 x + \cdots + a_7 x^7$ polynomial being represented by the bitstring $a_7 \cdots a_1 a_0$. Formally, $x$ represents a root of an irreducible polynomial over $\text{GF}(2)$ of degree 8.

The AES Matrix

Here is the MDS matrix which is the core diffusive component of the AES [81, 245]:

$$M_{\text{AES}} = \begin{pmatrix} x & x+1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & x & x+1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & x & x+1 \\ x+1 & 1 & 1 & x \end{pmatrix}$$

(4.1)

Multiplication by $x$ results in a logical shift and a conditional XOR, while the multiplication by $x+1$ requires an additional XOR. In this case, $\vartheta(M_{\text{AES}}) = 3$ is optimal according to our criteria and Th. 4.2.2, but $\kappa(M_{\text{AES}}) = 8$ is not. As described in [81], a multiplication by (4.1) can be implemented (in a pseudo-C notation) using 15 XORs, 4 table lookups and 3 temporary
variables with a single 256-byte table, namely the multiplication by \( x \) (see Fig. 4.8).

As a side remark, we note that AES also requires to implement the inverse MDS matrix for the decryption operation. Unfortunately, this inverse matrix (described in Eq. (4.2)) is not as implementation-friendly as Eq. (4.1), since it requires to implement the multiplication by four different coefficients:

\[
M_{\text{AES}}^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix}
    x^3 + x^2 + x & x^3 + x + 1 & x^3 + x^2 + 1 & x^3 + 1 \\
    x^3 + 1 & x^3 + x^2 + x & x^3 + x + 1 & x^3 + x^2 + 1 \\
    x^3 + x^2 + 1 & x^3 + 1 & x^3 + x^2 + x & x^3 + x + 1 \\
    x^3 + x + 1 & x^3 + x^2 + 1 & x^3 + 1 & x^3 + x^2 + x
\end{pmatrix}
\]  

In this case, we need either considerably more accesses to the table storing all possible results of an element multiplied by \( x \), or we need additional tables. Another possibility is to consider Eq. (4.2) as the product of \( M_{\text{AES}}^{-1} \) with another matrix, namely

\[
M_{\text{AES}}^{-1} = M_{\text{AES}} \times \begin{pmatrix}
    x^2 + 1 & 0 & x^2 & 0 \\
    0 & x^2 + 1 & 0 & x^2 \\
    x^2 & 0 & x^2 + 1 & 0 \\
    0 & x^2 & 0 & x^2 + 1
\end{pmatrix},
\]

and accordingly, to implement two matrix multiplications, one of which being required by the encryption operation, and the other being reasonably simple to implement.

**An Efficient 4 × 4 Matrix**

As we have seen, \( \kappa^{4,4} = 9 \) and \( \vartheta^{4,4} = 3 \) and we can hit both optimal criteria (\( M_4 \) in Eq. (4.3)); let us furthermore consider a second matrix \( M'_4 \), which is a permuted version of \( M_4 \).

\[
M_4 = \begin{pmatrix}
    a & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
    1 & 1 & b & a \\
    1 & a & 1 & b \\
    1 & b & a & 1
\end{pmatrix} \quad M'_4 = \begin{pmatrix}
    a & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
    1 & a & 1 & b \\
    1 & b & a & 1 \\
    1 & 1 & b & a
\end{pmatrix}
\]  

(4.3)
u = a[0] ^ a[1] ^ a[2] ^ a[3]; /* a is the input vector */
a[0] = u ^ timeap1[a[0]]; v = timeap1[a[1]];  

Figure 4.9: Multiplication by $M'_4$

One can easily verify that necessary conditions for $M'_4$ being an MDS matrix are: 0, 1, $a$ and $b$ must be pairwise different, $a \neq b^2$, $a \neq b+1$, and $a^2 \neq b$. If we make use of two multiplication tables (namely, by $a+1$ and by $b+1$), we can implement a multiplication by $M'_4$ as illustrated by Fig. 4.9. This implementation needs 10 XORs, 2 temporary variables, 7 table lookups in two 256-byte tables. This allows us to decrease the overall number of temporary variables and of operations (at the cost of a supplementary precomputed table), if the XOR operations and table lookups generate identical costs. A permuted version of $M_4$ is used in the design of FOX64; note that as this latter does make use of a self-inverting high-level scheme, we do not require that the inverse of $M_4$ to be efficiently implementable.

**Efficient 8 × 8 Matrices**

Here, we give explicit constructions with $p = q = 8$ over $\mathbb{R} = GF(256)$.

**Circulating-Like Matrix** By using the same circulating-like construction of the AES matrix, but with $p = q = 8$, we obtain $\kappa = 21$ and $\vartheta = 7$ which are not optimal figures.

\[
M_8 = \begin{pmatrix}
  f & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
 1 & 1 & a & b & c & d & e & f \\
 1 & f & 1 & a & b & c & d & e \\
 1 & e & f & 1 & a & b & c & d \\
 1 & d & e & f & 1 & a & b & c \\
 1 & c & d & e & f & 1 & a & b \\
 1 & b & c & d & e & f & 1 & a \\
 1 & a & b & c & d & e & f & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\]

Many different possibilities for filling the coefficients exist; we give here as illustration two different examples. For $GF(256)$ represented by the irreducible polynomial $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$ over $GF(2)$, a possible combination is given by $a = x+1$, $b = x^3+1$, $c = x^3+x$, $d = x$, $e = x^2$ and $f = x^4$. Note that we need a single precomputed table, namely the multiplication by $x$. If we can afford two precomputed multiplication tables (by $x$ and by $x^{-1}$, in this case), when using $x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1$ as field representation,
another possible combination is $a = x + 1$, $b = x^{-1} + x^{-2}$, $c = x$, $d = x^2$, $e = x^{-1}$ and $f = x^{-2}$. An implementation using 29 table lookups, 71 XORs is given in Fig. 4.10.

**Matrix with Rectangle Patterns** We obtain $\kappa = 15$ and $\vartheta = 5$ so this is optimal for which concerns the number of different coefficients with the following matrix.

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  b & a & c & b & d & c & 1 & d \\
  b & c & a & d & b & 1 & c & 1 \\
  c & b & d & a & 1 & b & 1 & c \\
  c & d & b & 1 & a & 1 & b & d \\
  d & c & 1 & b & 1 & a & d & b \\
  d & 1 & c & 1 & b & d & a & c \\
  1 & d & 1 & c & d & c & b & a \\
  1 & 1 & d & d & c & c & b & b \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

Representing GF(256) with $x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1$ as irreducible polynomial, a possible combination is given by $a = x^{-3} + x^{-1}$, $b = x^{-2} + x^{-1} + 1$, $c = x^4 + x$ and $d = x$. With $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$ as irreducible polynomial, a valid combination is $a = x + 1$, $b = x^4 + 1$, $c = x^4 + x$ and $d = x$. Using these coefficients, we are able to implement this matrix multiplication with the same amount of table lookups (i.e. 16), 54 XORs instead of 56 and two less temporary variables than the matrix used by the designers of Khazad (as described in [18]), for instance (see Fig. 4.11). Here,
\begin{verbatim}
t0 = x[0]^x[1]; t1 = x[0]^x[2];
t2 = x[3]^x[5]; t3 = x[1]^x[4];
t4 = x[2]^x[4]; t5 = x[5]^x[7];
t6 = x[3]^x[6]; t7 = x[4]^x[6];
r1 = t1^t5; r2 = t2^t4;
r3 = t3^t6; r4 = t2^t6;
y[0] = t0^t6^xtime[t3^t5^x[2]]^xtime[t1^t2];
y[1] = r1^x[4]^xtime[t6^x[1]^x[2]]^xtime[t0^t7];
y[2] = r4^t3^xtime[r1^t2]^xtime[t0^t5];
\end{verbatim}

Figure 4.11: Multiplication by $M_{\text{rect}}$

we use two precomputed tables, namely $xtime[\cdot]$ (multiplication by $x$) and $x4time[\cdot]$ (multiplication by $x^4$). We might do even better by dedicated optimizations.

### 4.2.4 Open Problems

MDS matrices are a well-known way to build linear multipermutations, i.e. optimal diffusion components which can be used as building blocks of cryptographic primitives, like block ciphers and hash functions. Although their implementation is quite straightforward on 32/64-bit architectures, which have large data L1 caches and thus allow to store large precomputed tables, we need to evaluate the matrix multiplication on-the-fly on low-cost 8-bit architectures, and we can afford only a very limited amount of precomputed data.

In this part, we have studied MDS matrices under the angle of efficiency, chosen an implementation strategy, defined mathematical criteria according to this strategy; furthermore, we give new constructions for efficient $4 \times 4$ and $8 \times 8$ matrices over GF(256).

We would like to stress out that, although not completely arbitrary, our choice of implementation strategy may not be optimal in certain scenarios, or under certain precise application-driven constraints. Thus, future potential investigations may go in the direction of hardware implementations of linear multipermutations, for instance, which we do not cover. Furthermore, we may extend our mathematical considerations criteria to the specific case of SPNs; such matrices must have inverses which are also efficient, for fast decryption operations.
4.3 The FOX Family of Block Ciphers

In this section, we describe the design of a new family of block ciphers, named FOX, developed for the company MediaCrypt AG [218]. The main goals of this design, besides a very high security level, are a large implementation flexibility on various platforms as well as high performances. The high-level structure is based on a Lai-Massey scheme, while the round functions are substitution-permutation networks. In addition, we propose a new design of strong and efficient key-schedule algorithms.

The section is organized as follows: in §4.3.1, we motivate the need for a new design, in §4.3.2, we give a formal description of the block ciphers, then we describe the rationales behind our design in §4.3.3; the security foundations are developed in §4.3.4, where we recall some Luby-Rackoff-like results about the Lai-Massey scheme, we analyse the security of FOX towards linear and differential cryptanalysis and we discuss some issues related to other attacks. Finally, we discuss several implementations aspects in §4.3.5, where some results about the performances of the ciphers are given.

4.3.1 Motivation

Inevitably, a burning question before designing a new block cipher consists in knowing whether it is really useful or not! First of all, a very large number of algorithms have been published since the beginning of the 80’s (see for instance Fig. 2.2, page 11), and among this list, a reasonable fraction thereof is still considered as both sufficiently fast and secure for any practical use. Furthermore, the AES [3] and NESSIE [247] efforts, among others, have resulted in a number of new proposals of block ciphers, in parallel with serious advances in the cryptanalysis field.

However, it is noteworthy that there exists a clear trend in direction of lightweight and fast key-schedule algorithms, as well as substitution boxes based on purely algebraic constructions. In a parallel way, we observe that, on the one hand, several of the last published attacks against block ciphers take often advantage of exploiting “simple” key-schedule algorithms (nice illustrations thereof are certainly Muller’s attack [233] against Khazad and Phan’s impossible differential cryptanalysis of 7-rounds AES [264]), and, on the other hand, algebraic S-boxes are helpful to Courtois-Pieprzyk algebraic attacks [70], and lead to puzzling properties as shown e.g. by [16, 104, 228, 235] (see §2.2.3, page 25, as well). Finally, despite of the standardization efforts, there still exists in the business world some demand of proprietary algorithms being publicly reviewed.

Our first goal is to offer a serious and secure alternative to block ciphers following present trends; we have explicitly chosen to avoid a lightweight key-schedule and a pure algebraic construction for the S-boxes. Our second goal is to reach the highest possible flexibility, being in terms of round
number, key size, block size and in terms of implementation issues. For instance, we feel that it is still useful to propose a 64-bit block size flavour for back-compatibility reasons. Our last motivation was to design a family of block ciphers which compares favourably with the performances of the fastest block ciphers on hardware, 8-bit, 32-bit, and 64-bit architectures.

Finally, we have adopted the following security objectives for FOX: the mapping \((x, k) \mapsto e_k(x)\) should be indistinguishable from a uniformly distributed random function, the key schedule should output pseudo-random sequences of subkeys, and the best attacks applying to FOX should be the generic ones (i.e. exhaustive key search, time-memory tradeoffs, dictionnary attacks, ...).

4.3.2 Description

The family consists in two main block cipher designs, the first one having a 64-bit blocksize and the other one a 128-bit blocksize. Each design allows a variable number of rounds and a variable key size up to 256 bits. The different members of the FOX family are listed in Fig. 4.12. The following conditions must hold in the case of FOX64/\(k/r\) and FOX128/\(k/r\): the number of rounds \(r\) must satisfy \(12 \leq r \leq 255\), while the key length \(k\) must satisfy \(0 \leq k \leq 256\), with \(k\) multiple of 8.

### Notations and Representation of \(\text{GF}(2^8)\)

We first describe some generic conventions used for the description of the FOX family. A variable \(x\) written with the suffix \(\langle n \rangle\) (i.e. \(x_{\langle n \rangle}\)) indicates that \(x\) has a length of \(n\) bits. For instance, \(y_{\langle 1 \rangle}\) is a single-bit variable and \(f_{\langle 64 \rangle}\) is a 64-bit value. The suffix will be omitted if the context is clear. A variable \(x\) written with the suffix \(\langle a...b \rangle\) (i.e. \(x_{\langle a...b \rangle}\)) indicates the bit subset of the variable \(x\) beginning at position \(a\) (inclusive) and ending at position \(b\) (inclusive). Indexed variables are denoted as follows: \(x_i\) is a variable \(x\) indexed by \(i\). A variable \(x\) indexed by \(i\) with a length of \(\ell\) bits is denoted \(x_{i(\ell)}\). A C-like notation is used for indexing which means that indices begin with 0. The suffix \(l\) (\(r\)) is used to denote the left (right) half of a variable. For instance, \(x_l\) is the left half of the variable \(x\) and \(x_r\) is its right half. The suffixes \(ll\), \(lr\), \(rl\), \(rr\) are used to...
denote quarters of a variable. For instance, \( x = x_\| \| x_l \| \| x_r \). In general, the input of a function \( f \) is denoted \( x \) and its output \( y \).

Some of the internal operations used in FOX are the addition and the multiplication in the finite field with 256 elements \( GF(2^8) \). We describe now the representation of \( GF(2^8) \) which is used in the FOX definition.

**Definition 4.3.1 (Irreducible Polynomial \( P(\alpha) \)).** The irreducible polynomial which represents \( GF(2^8) \) in the FOX block cipher family is the irreducible polynomial over \( GF(2) \) defined by

\[
P(\alpha) = \alpha^8 + \alpha^7 + \alpha^6 + \alpha^5 + \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + 1.
\]

Elements of the field are polynomials in \( \alpha \) of degree at most 7 with coefficients in \( GF(2) \) and the addition and multiplication operations are performed modulo \( P(\alpha) \). The field elements are identified to 8-bit strings as follows.

**Definition 4.3.2 (Representation of \( GF(2^8) \) Elements).** Let \( s \) be an 8-bit binary string\n
\[
s = s_0(1)\|s_1(1)\|s_2(1)\|s_3(1)\|s_4(1)\|s_5(1)\|s_6(1)\|s_7(1)
\]

The corresponding field element is then defined to be

\[
s_0(1)\alpha^7 + s_1(1)\alpha^6 + s_2(1)\alpha^5 + s_3(1)\alpha^4 + s_4(1)\alpha^3 + s_5(1)\alpha^2 + s_6(1)\alpha + s_7(1).
\]

In this chapter, a big-endian ordering is assumed, i.e. the index of the most significant part in a variable is equal to 0, while the index corresponding to the least significant part is the largest one. Here is an example: a 128-bit value \( q(128) \) can be written as

\[
q(128) = r_0(64)\|r_1(64) = s_0(32)\|s_1(32)\|s_2(32)\|s_3(32) = t_0(8)\|t_1(8)\| \ldots \|t_{14}(8)\|t_{15}(8) = u_0(1)\|u_1(1)\| \ldots \|u_{126}(1)\|u_{127}(1)
\]

**High-Level Structure**

In this part, we describe the skeleton and the encryption/decryption processes for both FOX64 and FOX128. For this purpose, we will follow a top-down approach.

**FOX64/k/r Skeleton** The 64-bit version of FOX is the \((r - 1)\)-times iteration of a round function denoted \( \text{Imor64} \), followed by the application of a slightly modified version of \( \text{Imor64} \), named \( \text{Imid64} \). \( \text{Imio64} \) is a function used during the decryption operation. Formally, \( \text{Imor64} \), \( \text{Imio64} \) and \( \text{Imid64} \) take
all a 64-bit input $x_{(64)}$, a 64-bit round key $r_{k_{(64)}}$ and return a 64-bit output $y_{(64)}$:

$$lmor64, lmio64, lmid64 : \{0,1\}^{64} \times \{0,1\}^{64} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{64}$$

$$\langle x_{(64)}, r_{k_{(64)}} \rangle \mapsto y_{(64)}$$

**FOX64 Encryption** The encryption $c_{(64)}$ by FOX64/$k$/r of a 64-bit plaintext $p_{(64)}$ is defined as

$$c_{(64)} = lmid64(lmor64(...(lmor64(p_{(64)}, r_{k_{0(64)}}), ...), r_{k_{r-2(64)}}, r_{k_{r-1(64)}}))$$

where

$$\begin{align*}
r_{k_{(r-64)}} &= r_{k_{0(64)}} || r_{k_{1(64)}} || \ldots || r_{k_{r-1(64)}} \\
\end{align*}$$

is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm from the key $k_{(r)}$.

**FOX64 Decryption** The decryption $p_{(64)}$ by FOX64/$k$/r of a 64-bit ciphertext $c_{(64)}$ is defined as

$$p_{(64)} = lmio64(lmio64(...(lmio64(c_{(64)}, r_{k_{r-1(64)}}, ...), r_{k_{1(64)}}, r_{k_{0(64)}}))$$

where

$$\begin{align*}
r_{k_{(r-64)}} &= r_{k_{0(64)}} || r_{k_{1(64)}} || \ldots || r_{k_{r-1(64)}} \\
\end{align*}$$

is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm from the key $k_{(r)}$, as for the encryption.

**FOX128/$k$/r Skeleton** Similarly to the definition of FOX64, the 128-bit version of FOX is the $(r-1)$-times iteration of a round function denoted elmor128, followed by the application of a modified version of elmor128 named elmid128. elmio128 is a function used during the decryption operation. Formally, elmor128, elmio128 and elmid128 all take a 128-bit input $x_{(128)}$, a 128-bit round key $r_{k_{(128)}}$ and return a 128-bit output $y_{(128)}$:

$$elmor128, elmio128, elmid128 : \{0,1\}^{128} \times \{0,1\}^{128} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{128}$$

$$\langle x_{(128)}, r_{k_{(128)}} \rangle \mapsto y_{(128)}$$

**FOX128 Encryption** The encryption $c_{(128)}$ by FOX128/$k$/r of a 128-bit plaintext $p_{(128)}$ is defined as

$$c_{(128)} =$$

$$elmid128(elmor128(...(elmor128(p_{(128)}, r_{k_{0(128)}}), ...), r_{k_{r-2(128)}}, r_{k_{r-1(128)}}))$$

where

$$\begin{align*}
r_{k_{(r-128)}} &= r_{k_{0(128)}} || r_{k_{1(128)}} || \ldots || r_{k_{r-1(128)}} \\
\end{align*}$$

is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm from the key $k_{(r)}$. 
FOX128 Decryption  The decryption $p_{(128)}$ by FOX128/$k/r$ of a 128-bit ciphertext $c_{(128)}$ is defined as

$$p_{(128)} = \text{elmid128}(\text{elmio128}(\ldots(\text{elmio128}(C_{(128)}, r_{k_{r-1}(128)}), \ldots, r_{k_1(128)}), r_{k_0(128)}))$$

where

$$r_{k_{(r-128)}} = r_{k_0(128)} || r_{k_1(128)} || \ldots || r_{k_{r-1}(128)}$$

is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm from the key $k_{(r)}$, as for the encryption operation.

Internal Functions

In this part, we describe formally all the functions used internally in the core of both algorithms FOX64/$k/r$ and FOX128/$k/r$.

Definitions of lmor64, limid64, lmio64  In the 64-bit version of the algorithm, one uses three slightly different round functions. The first one, lmor64, illustrated in Fig. 4.13, is built as a Lai-Massey scheme combined with an orthomorphism\(^*\) or. This function transforms a 64-bit input $x_{(64)}$

\(^*\)An orthomorphism $o$ on a group $(\mathcal{G}, +)$ is a permutation $x \mapsto o(x)$ on $\mathcal{G}$ such that $x \mapsto o(x) - x$ is also a permutation.
split in two parts \( x_{(64)} = x_{(32)} || x_{r(32)} \) and a 64-bit round key \( r_{k(64)} \) in a 64-bit output \( y_{(64)} = y_{(32)} || y_{r(32)} \) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
y_{(64)} &= y_{l(32)} || y_{r(32)} = \text{lmor64} \left( x_{r_{(32)}} || x_{r_{(32)}} \right) \\
&= \text{or} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus \text{f32} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus x_{r_{(32)}}, r_{k(64)} \right) \right) || \\
&\quad \left( x_{r_{(32)}} \oplus \text{f32} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus x_{r_{(32)}}, r_{k(64)} \right) \right)
\end{align*}
\]

The \text{Imid64} function is a slightly modified version of \text{lmor64}, namely it is the same one without the orthormorphism \text{or}:

\[
\begin{align*}
y_{(64)} &= y_{l(32)} || y_{r(32)} = \text{Imid64} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} || x_{r_{(32)}} \right) \\
&= \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus \text{f32} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus x_{r_{(32)}}, r_{k(64)} \right) \right) || \\
&\quad \left( x_{r_{(32)}} \oplus \text{f32} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus x_{r_{(32)}}, r_{k(64)} \right) \right)
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, \text{Imio64} is defined by

\[
\begin{align*}
y_{(64)} &= y_{l(32)} || y_{r(32)} = \text{Imio64} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} || x_{r_{(32)}} \right) \\
&= \text{io} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus \text{f32} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus x_{r_{(32)}}, r_{k(64)} \right) \right) || \\
&\quad \left( x_{r_{(32)}} \oplus \text{f32} \left( x_{l_{(32)}} \oplus x_{r_{(32)}}, r_{k(64)} \right) \right)
\end{align*}
\]

where \text{io} is the inverse of the orthormorphism \text{or}. 

---

**Figure 4.14:** Round function \text{elmor128}
Definitions of elmor128, elmid128, elmio128 In the 128-bit version of the algorithm, one uses three slightly different round functions, as in the 64-bit version. The first one, elmor128, illustrated in Fig. 4.14, is built as an Extended Lai-Massey scheme combined with two orthomorphisms or. This function transforms a 128-bit input $x_{(128)}$ split in four parts $x_{ll}(128) = x_{lll}(128) || x_{lrr}(128)$ and a 128-bit round key $rk_{(128)}$ in a 128-bit output $y_{(128)} = y_{lll}(32) || y_{lrr}(32) || y_{rrl}(32) || y_{rtr}(32)$ as follows:

$$y_{(128)} = y_{lll}(32) || y_{lrl}(32) || y_{rll}(32) || y_{rrl}(32) = \text{elmor128} \left( x_{lll}(32) || x_{lrl}(32) || x_{rll}(32) || x_{rrl}(32) \right)$$

$$= \text{or} \left( x_{lll}(32) \oplus f64 \left( \left( x_{lll}(32) \oplus x_{lrl}(32) \right) || \left( x_{rll}(32) \oplus x_{rrl}(32) \right), rk_{(128)} \right) \right)$$

$$y_{lrl}(32) = \text{elmor128} \left( x_{lrl}(32) || x_{rll}(32) || x_{rrl}(32) || x_{rtr}(32) \right)$$

$$= \left( x_{lrl}(32) \oplus f64 \left( \left( x_{lrl}(32) \oplus x_{rll}(32) \right) || \left( x_{rrl}(32) \oplus x_{rtr}(32) \right), rk_{(128)} \right) \right)$$

$$y_{rll}(32) = \text{elmor128} \left( x_{rll}(32) || x_{rrl}(32) || x_{rtr}(32) || x_{rrl}(32) \right)$$

$$= \left( x_{rll}(32) \oplus f64 \left( \left( x_{rll}(32) \oplus x_{rrl}(32) \right) || \left( x_{rtr}(32) \oplus x_{rtr}(32) \right), rk_{(128)} \right) \right)$$

$$y_{rrl}(32) = \text{elmor128} \left( x_{rrl}(32) || x_{rtr}(32) || x_{rrl}(32) || x_{rrl}(32) \right)$$

$$= \left( x_{rrl}(32) \oplus f64 \left( \left( x_{rrl}(32) \oplus x_{rtr}(32) \right) || \left( x_{rrl}(32) \oplus x_{rrl}(32) \right), rk_{(128)} \right) \right)$$

The elmid128 function is a slightly modified version of elmor128, namely it is the same one without the orthomorphism or:

$$y_{(128)} = y_{lll}(32) || y_{lrl}(32) || y_{rll}(32) || y_{rrl}(32) = \text{elmid128} \left( x_{lll}(32) || x_{lrl}(32) || x_{rll}(32) || x_{rrl}(32) \right)$$

Finally, elmio128 is defined by

$$y_{(128)} = y_{lll}(32) || y_{lrl}(32) || y_{rll}(32) || y_{rrl}(32) = \text{elmio128} \left( x_{lll}(32) || x_{lrl}(32) || x_{rll}(32) || x_{rrl}(32) \right)$$

Definitions of or and io The orthomorphism or is a function taking a 32-bit input $x_{(32)} = x_{l(16)} || x_{r(16)}$ and returning a 32-bit output $y_{(32)} = y_{l(16)} || y_{r(16)}$. It is defined as

$$y_{l(16)} || y_{r(16)} = \text{or} \left( x_{l(16)} || x_{r(16)} \right) = x_{r(16)} || \left( x_{l(16)} \oplus x_{r(16)} \right)$$
or is in fact a one-round Feistel scheme with the identity function as round function. The inverse function of or, denoted io, is defined as

\[ y_{l(16)} || y_{r(16)} = \text{io} \left( x_{l(32)} || x_{r(32)} \right) = \left( x_{l(16)} \oplus x_{r(16)} \right) || x_{l(16)} \]

**Definition of f32** The function f32 builds the core of FOX64/k/r. It is built of three main parts: a substitution part, denoted sigma4, a diffusion part, denoted mu4, and a round key addition part (see Fig. 4.15). Formally, the f32 function takes a 32-bit input \( x_{(32)} \), a 64-bit round key \( r_{k(64)} = r_{k0(64)} || r_{k1(64)} \) and returns a 32-bit output \( y_{(32)} \). The f32 function is then formally defined as

\[
y_{(32)} = f_{32}(x_{(32)}, r_{k(64)}) = \text{sigma4}(\text{mu4}(\text{sigma4}(x_{(32)} \oplus r_{k0(32)}) \oplus r_{k1(32)}) \oplus r_{k0(32)})
\]

**Definition of f64** The function f64 builds the core of FOX128/k/r. It is built of three main parts: a substitution part, denoted sigma8, a diffusion part, denoted mu8, and a round key addition part (see Fig. 4.16). Formally, the f64 function takes a 64-bit input \( x_{(64)} \), a 128-bit round key \( r_{k(128)} = r_{k0(64)} || r_{k1(64)} \) and returns a 64-bit output \( y_{(64)} \). The f64 function is then
The function $\sigma_4$ takes a 32-bit input $x_{(32)} = x_0(8)||x_1(8)||x_2(8)||x_3(8)$ and returns a 32-bit output $y_{(32)}$. It is defined as

$$y_{(32)} = \sigma_4(x_0(8)||x_1(8)||x_2(8)||x_3(8)) = sbox(x_0(8)||sbox(x_1(8)||sbox(x_2(8)||sbox(x_3(8)))$$

The function $\sigma_8$ takes a 64-bit input

$$x_{(64)} = x_0(8)||x_1(8)||x_2(8)||x_3(8)||x_4(8)||x_5(8)||x_6(8)||x_7(8)$$

and returns a 64-bit output $y_{(64)}$. It is defined as

$$y_{(64)} = \sigma_8(x_0(8)||x_1(8)||x_2(8)||x_3(8)||x_4(8)||x_5(8)||x_6(8)||x_7(8)) = sbox(x_0(8)||sbox(x_1(8)||sbox(x_2(8)||sbox(x_3(8)||sbox(x_4(8)||sbox(x_5(8)||sbox(x_6(8)||sbox(x_7(8))$$

Finally, the $sbox$ function is the lookup-up table defined in Fig. 4.17. We
read this table as follows: to compute \( sbox(4C) \), one selects first the row named \( 4 \) (i.e. the fifth row), and then one selects the column named \( .C \) (i.e. the thirteenth column) and we get finally

\[
sbox(4C) = 15
\]

**Definition of \( \mu_4 \)** The diffusive part of \( f_{32} \) is a linear \((4, 4)\)-multipermutation defined on \( \text{GF}(2^8) \). Formally, it is a function taking a 32-bit input

\[
x_{(32)} = x_{0(8)} || x_{1(8)} || x_{2(8)} || x_{3(8)}
\]

and returning a 32-bit output

\[
y_{(32)} = y_{0(8)} || y_{1(8)} || y_{2(8)} || y_{3(8)}
\]

and defined by

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
y_{0(8)} \\
y_{1(8)} \\
y_{2(8)} \\
y_{3(8)}
\end{pmatrix}
=
\begin{pmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 & \alpha \\
1 & c & \alpha & 1 \\
c & \alpha & 1 & 1 \\
\alpha & 1 & c & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\times
\begin{pmatrix}
x_{0(8)} \\
x_{1(8)} \\
x_{2(8)} \\
x_{3(8)}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where

\[
c = \alpha^{-1} + 1 = \alpha^7 + \alpha^6 + \alpha^5 + \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + \alpha^2 + 1
\]

All the additions and multiplications are defined in \( \text{GF}(2^8) \) using the representation described in §4.3.2.
**Definition of mu8**  The diffusive part of f64 is a linear (8, 8)-multipermutation defined on GF($2^8$). Formally, it is a function taking a 64-bit input

\[ x_{(64)} = x_{0(8)} || x_{1(8)} || x_{2(8)} || x_{3(8)} || x_{4(8)} || x_{5(8)} || x_{6(8)} || x_{7(8)} \]

and returning a 64-bit output

\[ y_{(64)} = y_{0(8)} || y_{1(8)} || y_{2(8)} || y_{3(8)} || y_{4(8)} || y_{5(8)} || y_{6(8)} || y_{7(8)} \]

f64 is defined as

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  y_{0(8)} \\
y_{1(8)} \\
y_{2(8)} \\
y_{3(8)} \\
y_{4(8)} \\
y_{5(8)} \\
y_{6(8)} \\
y_{7(8)}
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
  1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & a \\
  a & b & c & d & e & f & 1 \\
  b & c & d & e & f & 1 & a \\
  e & d & e & f & 1 & a & b \\
  d & e & f & 1 & a & b & c \\
e & f & 1 & a & b & c & d \\
  f & 1 & a & b & c & d & e \\
\end{pmatrix}
\times
\begin{pmatrix}
x_{0(8)} \\
x_{1(8)} \\
x_{2(8)} \\
x_{3(8)} \\
x_{4(8)} \\
x_{5(8)} \\
x_{6(8)} \\
x_{7(8)}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
a &= \alpha + 1 \\
b &= \alpha^{-1} + \alpha^{-2} = \alpha^7 + \alpha \\
c &= \alpha \\
d &= \alpha^2 \\
e &= \alpha^{-1} = \alpha^7 + \alpha^6 + \alpha^5 + \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + \alpha^2 \\
f &= \alpha^{-2} = \alpha^6 + \alpha^5 + \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + \alpha^2 + \alpha
\end{align*}
\]

All the additions and multiplications are defined in GF($2^8$) using the representation described in §4.3.2.

**Key-Schedule Algorithms**

The key schedule is the algorithm which derives the subkey material

\[ r_{k_{(r \cdot 64)}} = r_{k_0(64)} || r_{k_1(64)} || \ldots || r_{k_{r-1}(64)} \]

and

\[ r_{k_{(r \cdot 128)}} = r_{k_0(128)} || r_{k_1(128)} || \ldots || r_{k_{r-1}(128)} \]

(for FOX64 and FOX128, respectively) from the key $k_{(\ell)}$. 
Table of Key-Schedule Algorithms Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Block size</th>
<th>Key size</th>
<th>Key-Schedule Version</th>
<th>ek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOX64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>$0 \leq \ell \leq 128$</td>
<td>KS64</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>$136 \leq \ell \leq 256$</td>
<td>KS64h</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>$0 \leq \ell \leq 256$</td>
<td>KS128</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.18: Key-Schedule Algorithms Characteristics

**General Overview** A FOX key $k_{(\ell)}$ must have a bit-length $\ell$ such that $0 \leq \ell \leq 256$, and $\ell$ must be a multiple of 8. Depending on the key length and the block size, a member of the FOX block cipher family may use one among three different key-schedule algorithm versions, denoted respectively KS64, KS64h and KS128. A constant, $ek$, depends on these values as well. The table in Fig. 4.18 defines precisely the relation between the key size, the block size, the constant $ek$ and the key-schedule algorithm version.

The three different versions of the key-schedule algorithm are constituted of four main parts: a padding part, denoted $P$, expanding $k_{(\ell)}$ into $ek$ bits, a mixing part, denoted $M$, a diversification part, denoted $D$, whose core consists mainly in a linear feedback shift register denoted LFSR, and finally, a non-linear part, denoted $NL_x$ (see Fig. 4.19 and Alg. 4.1 for a high-level overview of the key-schedule algorithm design). As outlined above, the key-schedule algorithm definition depends on the number of rounds $r$, on the key length $\ell$ and on the cipher (FOX64 or FOX128). In fact, $NL_x$ is the only part which differs between the different versions, and we will denote the three variants $NL64$, $NL64h$ and $NL128$.

```plaintext
/* Preprocessing */
pkey ← P(k)
mkey ← M(pkey)
/* Initialization of the loop */
i ← 1
/* Loop */
while $i \leq r$ do
  dkey ← D(mkey, i, r)
  Output $rk_{i−1(x)} ← NLx(dkey)$
  $i ← i + 1$
end while
```

Algorithm 4.1: Key-Schedule Algorithm (High-Level Description)

**Definition of KS64** This key-schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX64 with keys smaller or equal to 128 bits. It takes the following parameters as input: a key $k$ of length $\ell$ bits, with $0 \leq \ell \leq 128$ and a number of rounds $r$. It returns in output $r$ 64-bit subkeys. $KS64$ is formally
Definition of $KS_{64h}$ This key schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX64 with keys larger than 128 bits. It takes the following parameters as input: a key $k$ of length $\ell$ bits, with $136 \leq \ell \leq 256$ and a number of rounds $r$. It returns in output $r$ 64-bit subkeys. $KS_{64h}$ is formally defined in Alg. 4.3.

Definition of $KS_{128}$ This key schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX128. It takes the following parameters as input: a key $k$ of length $\ell$ bits, with $0 \leq \ell \leq 256$ and a number of rounds $r$. It returns in output $r$ 128-bit subkeys. $KS_{128}$ is formally defined in Alg. 4.4.

Definition of $P$ The $P$-part, taking $ek$ and $\ell$ as input, is basically a function expanding a bit string by $\frac{ek - \ell}{8}$ bytes. More precisely, then $P$ concatenates the input key $k$ with the first $ek - \ell$ bits of the constant $pad$, giving $pkey$ as output. The $P$ function is defined formally in Alg. 4.5. The $pad$ constant value is defined in the following section.

Definition of $pad$ The constant $pad$ is defined as being the first 256 bits of the hexadecimal development of $e - 2$:

$$e - 2 = \sum_{n=0}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{n!} - 2$$
/* Preprocessing */
if $\ell < e_k$ then
  $pkey = P(k)$
  $mkey = M(pkey)$
else
  $pkey = k$
  $mkey = pkey$
end if

/* Initialization of the loop */
i = 1

/* Loop */
while $i \leq r$ do
  $dkey = D(mkey, i, r)$
  Output $rk_{i-1}(64) = NL64(dkey)$
  $i = i + 1$
end while

Algorithm 4.2: Key-Schedule Algorithm KS64

/* Preprocessing */
if $\ell < e_k$ then
  $pkey = P(k)$
  $mkey = M(pkey)$
else
  $pkey = k$
  $mkey = pkey$
end if

/* Initialization of the loop */
i = 1

/* Loop */
while $i \leq r$ do
  $dkey = D(mkey, i, r)$
  Output $rk_{i-1}(64) = NL64h(dkey)$
  $i = i + 1$
end while

Algorithm 4.3: Key-Schedule Algorithm KS64h
/* Preprocessing */
if $\ell < e_k$ then
  $pkey = P(k)$
  $mkey = M(pkey)$
else
  $pkey = k$
  $mkey = pkey$
end if
/* Initialization of the loop */
i = 1
/* Loop */
while $i \leq r$ do
  $dkey = D(mkey, i, r)$
  Output $rk_{i-1(128)} = NL128(dkey)$
  $i = i + 1$
end while

Algorithm 4.4: Key-Schedule Algorithm KS128

Output $pkey = k || pad_{[0 \ldots ek-\ell-1]}$

Algorithm 4.5: P-Part

Thus, it is the concatenation of the four following 64-bit constants

```
pad = 0xB7E151628AED2A6A ||
      0xBF7158809CF4F3C7 ||
      0x62E7160F38B4DA56 ||
      0xA784D9045190CFEF
```

Definition of $M$ The $M$-part is used to mix the padded key $pkey$, such that the constant words are mixed up by using the randomness provided by the key. This is done with help of a Fibonacci recursion. It takes as input a key $pkey$ with length $ek$ (expressed in bits). More formally, the padded key $pkey$ is seen as an array of $\frac{ek}{8}$ bytes $pkey_{i(8)}$, $0 \leq i \leq \frac{ek}{8} - 1$, and is mixed according to

$$mkey_{i(8)} = pkey_{i(8)} \oplus (mkey_{i-1(8)} + mkey_{i-2(8)} \mod 2^8) \quad 0 \leq i \leq \frac{ek}{8} - 1$$

with the convention that

$$mkey_{-2(8)} = 0x6A \text{ and } mkey_{-1(8)} = 0x76$$

Note here that $+$ denotes the addition performed modulo $2^8$ while $\oplus$ denotes the addition in GF$(2^8)$, which is actually a XOR operation.
**Definition of D**  The D-part is a diversification part. It takes a key $mkey$ having a length in bits equal to $ek$, the total round number $r$, and the current round number $i$, with $1 \leq i \leq r$; it modifies $mkey$ with help of the output of a 24-bit Linear Shift Feedback Register (LFSR) denoted $LFSR$. More precisely, $mkey$ is seen as an array of $\left\lfloor \frac{ek}{24} \right\rfloor$ 24-bit values $mkey_{j}(24)$, with $0 \leq j \leq \left\lfloor \frac{ek}{24} \right\rfloor - 1$ concatenated with one residue byte $mkey_{rb}(8)$ (if $ek = 128$) or two residue bytes $mkey_{rb}(16)$ (if $ek = 256$), and is modified according to

$$dkey_{j(24)} = mkey_{j(24)} \oplus LFSR \left( (i-1) \cdot \left\lceil \frac{ek}{24} \right\rceil + j, r \right)$$

for $0 \leq j \leq \left\lfloor \frac{ek}{24} \right\rfloor - 1$; the $dkey_{rb}(8)$ value ($dkey_{rb}(16)$) is obtained by XORing the most 8 (16) significant bits of $LFSR((i-1) \cdot \left\lceil \frac{ek}{24} \right\rceil + \left\lfloor \frac{ek}{24} \right\rfloor, r)$ with $mkey_{rb}(8)$ ($mkey_{rb}(16)$), respectively. The remaining 16 (8) bits of the LFSR routine output are discarded.

**Definition of LFSR**  The diversification part D needs a stream of pseudo-random values; it is produced by a 24-bit linear feedback shift register, denoted $LFSR$. This algorithm takes two inputs, the total number of rounds $r$ and a number of preliminary clocking $c$. It is based on the following primitive polynomial of degree 24 over GF(2).

**Definition 4.3.3 (Primitive Polynomial PKS($\xi$)).** The polynomial representing $GF(2^{24})$ in the FOX block cipher family is the primitive polynomial over GF (2) defined by

$$PKS(\xi) = \xi^{24} + \xi^{4} + \xi^{3} + \xi + 1$$

The register is initially seeded with the value $0x6A||r_{(8)}||\overline{r_{(8)}}$, where $r_{(8)}$ is expressed as an 8-bit value, and $\overline{r_{(8)}}$ is its bitwise complemented version (i.e. $r_{(8)} = \overline{r_{(8)}} \oplus 0xFF$). LFSR is described formally in Alg. 4.6.

**Definition of NL64**  The NL64-part takes a single input: the 128-bit value $dkey$ corresponding to the current round. The $dkey$ value passes through a substitution layer (made of four parallel $\sigma_4$ functions), a diffusion layer (made of four parallel $\mu_4$ functions) and a mixing layer called $\text{mix64}$. Then, the constant $\text{pad}_{0...127}$ is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if $k = ek$. The result passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 64 bits and the resulting value is encrypted first with a $l\text{mor64}$ round function, where the subkey is the left half of the $dkey$ value and second by a $l\text{mid64}$ function, where the subkey is the right half of $dkey$. The resulting value is defined to be the 64-bit round key. Fig. 4.20 illustrates the NL64 process and Alg. 4.7 describes it formally.
/* Initialization */
reg = 0x6A || r || r
/* Pre-Clocking */
p = 0
while p < c do
    p = p + 1
    if (reg AND 0x800000) ≠ 0x000000 then
        reg = (reg ≪ 1) ⊕ 0x00001B
    else
        reg = (reg ≪ 1)
    end if
end while
Output reg

Algorithm 4.6: LFSR Algorithm

Algorithm 4.7: NL64 Part
Figure 4.20: NL64 Part
**Definition of NL64**  The NL64h-part takes a single input: the 256-bit value \(dkey\) corresponding to the current round. The \(dkey\) value passes through a substitution layer (made of eight parallel \(\text{sigma}4\) functions), a diffusion layer (made of eight parallel \(\text{mu}4\) functions) and a mixing layer called \(\text{mix}64h\). Then, the constant \(\text{pad}\) is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if \(k = ek\). The result passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 64 bits and the resulting value is encrypted first with three \(\text{lmor}64\) round functions, where the respective subkeys are the three left quarters of the \(dkey\) value and secondly by a \(\text{lmid}64\) function, where the subkey is the rightmost quarter of \(dkey\). The resulting value is defined to be the 64-bit round key. Fig. 4.21 illustrates the NL64h process and Alg. 4.8 describes it formally.

---

### Algorithm 4.8: NL64h Part

```plaintext
/* Initialization */
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32)||t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32) = dkey\\)

/* Substitution Layer */
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32) = \text{sigma}4(t_0(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_1(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_2(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_3(32))\\)
\(t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32) = \text{sigma}4(t_4(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_5(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_6(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_7(32))\\)

/* Diffusion Layer */
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32) = \text{mu}4(t_0(32))||\text{mu}4(t_1(32))||\text{mu}4(t_2(32))||\text{mu}4(t_3(32))\\)
\(t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32) = \text{mu}4(t_4(32))||\text{mu}4(t_5(32))||\text{mu}4(t_6(32))||\text{mu}4(t_7(32))\\)
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32) = t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32)\) \(\text{mix}64h(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32)||t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32))\\)
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32) = t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32)\)
\(t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32) = t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32)\)
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32)||t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32)@\text{pad}\)

if \(k = ek\) then
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32)||t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32) = t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32)||t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32)\\)
end if

/* Substitution Layer */
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32) = \text{sigma}4(t_0(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_1(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_2(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_3(32))\\)
\(t_4(32)||t_5(32)||t_6(32)||t_7(32) = \text{sigma}4(t_4(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_5(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_6(32))||\text{sigma}4(t_7(32))\\)

/* Hashing Layer */
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32)||t_2(32)||t_3(32) = (t_0(32)\oplus t_3(32)||(t_2(32)\oplus t_3(32)||(t_4(32)\oplus t_5(32)||(t_6(32)\oplus t_7(32))\\)
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32) = t_0(32)||t_1(32)\) \(\text{lmor}64(t_0(32)||t_1(32),dkey[0..63])\\)
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32) = \text{lmor}64(t_0(32)||t_1(32),dkey[64..127])\\)
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32) = \text{lmor}64(t_0(32)||t_1(32),dkey[128..191])\\)
\(t_0(32)||t_1(32) = \text{lmor}64(t_0(32)||t_1(32),dkey[192..256])\\)

Output \(t_0(32)||t_1(32)\) as round subkey.
```
Figure 4.21: NL64h Part
**Definition of NL128**  The NL128-part takes a single different input: the 256-bit value \(dkey\) corresponding to the current round. Basically, the \(dkey\) value passes through a substitution layer (made of four parallel \(\sigma8\) functions), a diffusion layer (made of four parallel \(\mu8\) functions) and a mixing layer called \(\mu8\). Then, the constant \(pad\) is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if \(k = ek\). The result passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 128 bits and the resulting value is encrypted first with a \(elmor128\) round function, where the subkey is the left half of the \(dkey\) value and second by a \(elmid128\) function, where the subkey is the right half of \(dkey\). The resulting value is defined to be the 128-bit round key. Fig. 4.22 illustrates the NL128 process and Alg. 4.9 describes it formally.

\[
\begin{align*}
t_{0}(64) & \| t_{1}(64) \| t_{2}(64) \| t_{3}(64) = dkey \\
n_{0}(64) & \| n_{1}(64) \| n_{2}(64) \| n_{3}(64) = \text{sigma8}(t_{0}(64)) \| \text{sigma8}(t_{1}(64)) \| \text{sigma8}(t_{2}(64)) \| \text{sigma8}(t_{3}(64)) \\
n_{0}(64) & \| n_{1}(64) \| n_{2}(64) \| n_{3}(64) = \text{mu8}(t_{0}(64)) \| \text{mu8}(t_{1}(64)) \| \text{mu8}(t_{2}(64)) \| \text{mu8}(t_{3}(64)) \\
n_{0}(64) & \| n_{1}(64) \| n_{2}(64) \| n_{3}(64) = \text{mix128}(n_{0}(64)) \| n_{1}(64) \| n_{2}(64) \| n_{3}(64) \\
n_{0}(64) & \| n_{1}(64) \| n_{2}(64) \| n_{3}(64) = (t_{0}(64) \| t_{1}(64) \| t_{2}(64) \| t_{3}(64)) \oplus pad \\
\text{if } k = ek \text{ then } & \\
t_{0}(64) & \| t_{1}(64) \| t_{2}(64) \| t_{3}(64) = t_{0}(64) \| t_{1}(64) \| t_{2}(64) \| t_{3}(64) \\
\text{end if } & \\
n_{0}(64) & \| n_{1}(64) = \text{sigma8}(n_{0}(64)) \| \text{sigma8}(t_{1}(64)) \| \text{sigma8}(t_{2}(64)) \| \text{sigma8}(t_{3}(64)) \\
n_{0}(64) & \| n_{1}(64) = n_{0}(64) \| t_{2}(64) \| t_{3}(64) \| t_{4}(64) \\
n_{0}(64) & \| n_{1}(64) = \text{elmor128}(n_{0}(64)) \| t_{1}(64) \| dkey \| \text{pad} \\
n_{0}(64) & \| n_{1}(64) = \text{elmid128}(n_{0}(64)) \| t_{1}(64) \| dkey \| \text{pad} \\
\text{Output } t_{0}(64) \| t_{1}(64) \text{ as round subkey.}
\end{align*}
\]

**Algorithm 4.9: NL128 Part**

**Definition of mix64**  Given an input vector of four 32-bit values, denoted

\[
x = x_{0}(32) \| x_{1}(32) \| x_{2}(32) \| x_{3}(32)
\]

the \(mix64\) function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output vector denoted \(y = y_{0}(32) \| y_{1}(32) \| y_{2}(32) \| y_{3}(32)\). More formally, \(mix64\) is defined as

\[
\begin{align*}
y_{0}(32) &= x_{1}(32) \oplus x_{2}(32) \oplus x_{3}(32) \\
y_{1}(32) &= x_{0}(32) \oplus x_{2}(32) \oplus x_{3}(32) \\
y_{2}(32) &= x_{0}(32) \oplus x_{1}(32) \oplus x_{3}(32) \\
y_{3}(32) &= x_{0}(32) \oplus x_{1}(32) \oplus x_{2}(32)
\end{align*}
\]

**Definition of mix64h**  Given an input vector of eight 32-bit values, denoted

\[
x = x_{0}(32) \| x_{1}(32) \| x_{2}(32) \| x_{3}(32) \| x_{4}(32) \| x_{5}(32) \| x_{6}(32) \| x_{7}(32)
\]
Figure 4.22: NL128 Part
the $\text{mix64h}$ function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output vector denoted

$$y = y_0(32) || y_1(32) || y_2(32) || y_3(32) || y_4(32) || y_5(32) || y_6(32) || y_7(32)$$

More formally, $\text{mix64h}$ is defined as

$$
\begin{align*}
y_{0}(32) &= x_{2}(32) \oplus x_{4}(32) \oplus x_{6}(32) \\
y_{1}(32) &= x_{3}(32) \oplus x_{5}(32) \oplus x_{7}(32) \\
y_{2}(32) &= x_{0}(32) \oplus x_{4}(32) \oplus x_{6}(32) \\
y_{3}(32) &= x_{1}(32) \oplus x_{5}(32) \oplus x_{7}(32) \\
y_{4}(32) &= x_{0}(32) \oplus x_{2}(32) \oplus x_{6}(32) \\
y_{5}(32) &= x_{1}(32) \oplus x_{3}(32) \oplus x_{7}(32) \\
y_{6}(32) &= x_{0}(32) \oplus x_{2}(32) \oplus x_{4}(32) \\
y_{7}(32) &= x_{1}(32) \oplus x_{3}(32) \oplus x_{5}(32)
\end{align*}
$$

**Definition of mix128** Given an input vector of four 64-bit values, denoted $x = x_0(64) || x_1(64) || x_2(64) || x_3(64)$, the $\text{mix64}$ function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output vector denoted $y = y_0(64) || y_1(64) || y_2(64) || y_3(64)$. More formally, $\text{mix128}$ is defined as

$$
\begin{align*}
y_{0}(64) &= x_{1}(64) \oplus x_{2}(64) \oplus x_{3}(64) \\
y_{1}(64) &= x_{0}(64) \oplus x_{2}(64) \oplus x_{3}(64) \\
y_{2}(64) &= x_{0}(64) \oplus x_{1}(64) \oplus x_{3}(64) \\
y_{3}(64) &= x_{0}(64) \oplus x_{1}(64) \oplus x_{2}(64)
\end{align*}
$$

### 4.3.3 Rationales

In this part, we describe several rationales about important components building the FOX family of block ciphers.

**Non-Linear Mapping sbox**

As outlined earlier, our primary goal was to avoid a purely algebraic construction for the S-box\(^9\); a secondary goal was the possibility to implement it in a very efficient way on hardware using ASIC or FPGA technologies. The sbox function is a non-linear bijective mapping on 8-bit values. It consists of a Lai-Massey scheme with 3 rounds taking three different substitution boxes as round function where the orthormorphism of the third round is omitted; these “small” S-boxes are denoted $S_1$, $S_2$ and $S_3$, and their content is given in

\(^{9}\)A drawback of this choice is that it makes the study of “scaled-down” versions of the cipher difficult, if not impossible.
Fig. 4.23. The orthomorphism \(or4\) used in the Lai-Massey scheme is a single round of a 4-bit Feistel scheme with the identity function as round function. We describe now the generation process of the \(sbox\) transformation. First a set of three different candidates for small substitution boxes, each having a \(LP_{\text{max}}\) and a \(DP_{\text{max}}\) (as defined in §2.3.3) smaller than \(2^{-2}\) were pseudo-randomly chosen. Then, the candidate \(sbox\) mapping was evaluated and tested regarding its \(LP_{\text{max}}\) and \(DP_{\text{max}}\) values until a good candidate was found. The chosen \(sbox\) satisfies \(DP_{sbox}^{\text{max}} = LP_{\text{max}}^{sbox} = 2^{-4}\) and its algebraic degree is equal to 6.

**Linear Multipermutations \(\mu4/\mu8\)**

Both \(\mu4\) and \(\mu8\) are linear multipermutations. This kind of construction was early recognized as being optimal for which regards its diffusion properties (see [287,311] and the discussion in §4.1.3, page 150). As explained in §4.2, not all constructions are very efficient to implement, especially on low-end smartcard, which have usually very few available memory and computational power. We have thus chosen a permuted version of the circulating-like construction described as \(M_8\) for the structure of the matrix (see page 167).

Furthermore, in order to be efficiently implementable, the elements of the matrix, which are elements of GF\((2^8)\), should be efficient to multiply to. As the only really efficient operations are the addition, the multiplication by \(\alpha\) and the division by \(\alpha\). Note that \(\alpha^7 + \alpha = \alpha^{-1} + \alpha^{-2}, \alpha^7 + \alpha^6 + \alpha^5 + \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + \alpha^2 = \alpha^{-1}\), and that \(\alpha^6 + \alpha^5 + \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + \alpha^2 + \alpha = \alpha^{-2}\).

**Key-Schedule Algorithms**

The FOX key-schedule algorithms were designed with several rationales in mind: first, the function, which takes a key \(k\) and the round number \(r\) and returns \(r\) subkeys should be a cryptographic pseudorandom, collision resistant and one-way function. Second, the sequence of subkeys should be generated in any direction without any complexity penalty. Third, all the bytes of \(mkey\) should be randomized even when the key size is strictly smaller than \(ek\). Finally, the key-schedule algorithm should resist related-cipher attacks as described by Wu in [332] (see §2.3.6 as well), since FOX can possibly use different number of rounds.
We are convinced that “strong” key-schedule algorithms have significant advantages in terms of security, even if the price to pay is a smaller key agility, as discussed earlier. In the case of FOX, we believe that the time needed to compute the subkeys, which is about equal to the time needed to encrypt 6 blocks of data (in the case of FOX64 with keys strictly larger than 128 bit, it takes the time to encrypt 12 blocks of data) remains acceptable in all kinds of applications. During the AES effort, it was suggested that an example of extreme case would be a high-speed network switch having to maintain a million of contexts and switching between them every four blocks of data. Under such extreme constraints, one can still keep in memory one million fully expanded keys at a negligible cost.

The second central property of FOX key-schedule algorithms is ensured by the LFSR construction. As it is possible to back-clock it easily, the subkey generation process can be computed in the encryption as well as in the decryption direction with no loss of speed. The third property is ensured by our “Fibonacci-like” construction (which is a bijective mapping). Furthermore, $m_{key}$ is expanded by XORing constants depending on $r$ and $ek$ with no overlap on these constants sequences (this was checked experimentally). Finally, the fourth property is ensured by the dependency of the subkey sequence to the actual round number of the algorithm instance for which the sequence will be used.

We state now a sequence of properties of the building blocks of the key-schedule algorithm.

**P-Part** The goal of the P-part consists in transforming the user-provided key, which may have any length multiple of 8 smaller or equal than 256, in a fixed-size value of 128-bit or 256-bit. The chosen padding constant $e - 2$ was checked regarding the following property.

**Lemma 4.3.1.** It is impossible to find two values of $k$ with a length strictly smaller than $ek$ bits which lead to the same value of $p_{key}$.

**Proof.** In order for two different inputs to produce the same output during the padding operation, one has to concatenate the smaller one with a padding value which is contained in the one used for the larger input; this is only possible if the first $\ell$ bytes of the padding constant are present in another location. The lemma follows from the fact that the first byte 0xB7 is unique in the constant. \[\square\]

Note that in order to avoid that a padded key and non-padded key generate the same subkey sequence, a conditional negation has been incorporated in the NLx part of the key-schedule algorithm.

**M-Part** When using small keys, a large part of the key-schedule state is known to a potential adversary: it is the padding constant. The goal of
the M-part is hence to mix the entropy on all bytes. The following lemma insures that, when fed with two different inputs, the M-part will return two different outputs.

**Lemma 4.3.2.** The M-part is a permutation.

*Proof.* The lemma follows directly from the fact that the M-part is an invertible application.

**L-Part** The goal of the L-part is to diversify the dkey register (which serves as input for the NLx-part) at each round. The main design goals are its simplicity and its reversibility: as a LFSR step is equivalent to the multiplication by a constant in a finite field, the inverse operation is a division by the same constant. It is thus possible to evaluate the L in both directions. It was furthermore checked that the outputs (being 144 or 264 bits) for all $12 \leq r \leq 255$ and for all round numbers $1 \leq i \leq r$ are unique.

**NLx-Part** The goal of the NL part is to generate a pseudorandom stream of data as “cryptographically secure” as possible and as fast as possible; it is actually the one-way part of the key-schedule. For this, it re-uses the round functions in its core, and it needs only a few supplementary operations.

### 4.3.4 Security Foundations

**Security Properties of the Lai-Massey Scheme**

Although less popular than the Feistel scheme or SPN structures, the Lai-Massey scheme offers similar (super-) pseudorandomness and decorrelation inheritance properties, as was demonstrated by Vaudenay [317]. Note that we will indifferently use the term "Lai-Massey scheme" to denote both versions, as we can see the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as a Lai-Massey scheme: we can swap the two inner inputs as in Fig. 4.24, and we note that the function $(x, y) \mapsto \text{or}(x) \mid \text{or}(y)$ builds an orthomorphism (see Lem. 4.3.3).

**Lemma 4.3.3.** The application defined by

\[
\begin{align*}
\begin{cases}
(\{0,1\}^{32})^2 & \mapsto (\{0,1\}^{32})^2 \\
(x, y) & \mapsto (\text{or}(x), \text{or}(y))
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

is an orthomorphism, where or(.) is the orthomorphism defined in §4.3.2.

*Proof.* First, we show that this application is a permutation. This follows from the fact that the inverse application is given by

\[(x', y') \mapsto (\text{io}(x'), \text{io}(y'))\]
and that $io$ is a permutation, too. Now, we have to check that

$$(x, y) \mapsto (or(x) \oplus x, or(y) \oplus y)$$

(4.4)

is also a permutation. This follows easily from the fact that Eq. (4.4) is an invertible application.

From this point, we will make use of the following notation: given an orthomorphism $o$ on a group $(G, +)$ and given $r$ functions $f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_r$ on $G$, we note an $r$-rounds Lai-Massey scheme using the $r$ functions and the orthomorphism by $\Lambda^o(f_1, \ldots, f_r)$. Then the following results are two Luby-Rackoff-like [191] results on the Lai-Massey scheme. We refer to [317,320] for proofs thereof.

**Theorem 4.3.1 (Vaudenay).** Let $f_1^*, f_2^*$ and $f_3^*$ be three independent random functions uniformly distributed on a group $(G, +)$. Let $o$ be an orthomorphism on $G$. For any distinguisher limited to $d$ chosen plaintexts, where $g = |G|$ denotes the cardinality of the group, between $\Lambda^o(f_1^*, f_2^*, f_3^*)$ and a uniformly distributed random permutation $c^*$, we have

$$Adv(\Lambda^o(f_1^*, f_2^*, f_3^*), c^*) \leq d(d - 1)(g^{-1} + g^{-2}).$$
Theorem 4.3.2 (Vaudenay). If $f_1, \ldots, f_r$ are $r \geq 3$ independent random functions on a group $(G, +)$ of order $g$ such that $\text{Adv}(f_i, f_i^*) \leq \frac{r}{2}$ for any adaptive distinguisher between $f_i$ and $f_i^*$ limited to $d$ queries for $1 \leq i \leq r$ and if $\circ$ is an orthomorphism on $G$, we have

$$\text{Adv}(\Lambda^o(f_1, \ldots, f_r), c^*) \leq \frac{1}{2}(3\varepsilon + d(d-1)(2g^{-1} + g^{-2}))\left\lfloor \frac{r}{3} \right\rfloor.$$ 

Basically, the first result proves that the Lai-Massey scheme provides pseudorandomness on three rounds unless the $f_i$'s are weak, like for the Feistel scheme [102]. Super-pseudorandomness corresponds to cases where a distinguisher can query chosen ciphertexts as well; in this scenario, the previous result holds when we consider $\Lambda^o(f_1^*, \ldots, f_r^*)$ with a fourth round. The second result proves that the decorrelation bias of the round functions of a Lai-Massey scheme is inherited by the whole structure: provided the $f_i$'s are strong, so is the Lai-Massey scheme; in other words, a potential cryptanalysis will not be able to exploit the Lai-Massey’s scheme only, but it will have to take advantage of weaknesses of the round functions’ internal structure. We would like to stress out the importance of the orthomorphism $o$: by omitting it, it is possible to distinguish a Lai-Massey scheme using pseudorandom functions from a pseudorandom permutation with overwhelming probability, and this for any number of rounds. Indeed, denoting the input and the output of a Lai-Massey scheme by $x_l||x_r$ and $y_l||y_r$, respectively, the following equation holds with probability one:

$$x_l \oplus x_r = y_l \oplus y_r \quad (4.5)$$

where $\oplus$ denote the inverse of the additive group law used in the scheme.

One should not misinterpret the results in the Luby-Rackoff scenario in terms of the overall block cipher security: FOX’s round functions are far to be indistinguishable from random functions, as it is the case of DES round functions, for instance: the fact that DES is vulnerable to linear and differential cryptanalysis does not contradict Luby-Rackoff results. However, Th. 4.3.1 and Th. 4.3.2 give proper credit to the high-level structure of FOX.

Resistance w/r to Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis

It is possible to prove some important results about the security of both $f_32$ and $f_64$ functions towards linear and differential cryptanalysis, too. As these functions may be viewed as classical Substitution-Permutation Network constructions, we will refer to some well-known results on their resistance towards linear and differential cryptanalysis proved in [132] by Hong et al. For the sake of completeness, we recall the framework of consideration and the results they obtained using it. Then, we apply their result to the round functions of FOX, and we draw some conclusions about its security towards linear and differential cryptanalysis in functions of the round number. This
will help us to fix the minimal number of rounds which results in a sufficient level of security.

Let $S_i$ denote an $m \times m$ bijective substitution box, that is a bijection on $\{0, 1\}^m$. We consider a standard $kSPkSk$ structure (i.e. the one of FOX's round functions) on $m \times n$ bit strings, namely a key addition layer, a substitution layer, a diffusion layer, followed by a second key addition layer, a substitution layer, and a final key addition layer. We assume that the substitution layer consists of the parallel evaluation of $n$ $m \times m$ S-boxes $S_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$, that the diffusion layer can be expressed as an invertible $n \times n$ MDS matrix $M$ with coefficients in $GF(2^m)$, and that the key addition layer consists of XORing a $mn$-bit subkey to the state. Let us furthermore denote by $\pi_{SP} = \max_{1 \leq i \leq n}$ the respective maximal differential and linear probabilities we can find in the S-boxes $S_i$, according to the terminology of Def. 2.3.2 and Def. 2.3.9, respectively. Finally, let us denote by $\beta = \mathfrak{B}(M) = n + 1$ the branch number of the diffusion layer $M$ (according to Def. 4.1.5), which is defined to be maximal. Then the following theorem due to Hong, et al. [132] states upper bounds on the maximal differential and linear hull probabilities, respectively.

**Theorem 4.3.3 (Hong et al. [132]).** In a $kSPkSk$ structure, if the round subkeys are statistically independent and uniformly distributed, then the probability of each differential with respect to $\oplus$ is upper bounded by

$$\left(\frac{\pi_5}{\pi_{DP}}\right)^{\beta-1},$$

while the probability of each linear hull is upper bounded by

$$\left(\frac{\pi_5}{\pi_{LP}}\right)^{\beta-1}.$$

In the case of FOX64, since $DP_{\max}^{sbox} = LP_{\max}^{sbox} = 2^{-4}$, since $mu4$ (resp. $mu8$) has a branch number equal to five (resp. nine), and since one can assume that the subkeys are uniformly distributed and statistically independent, due to the nature of the key-schedule algorithm, one can reasonably apply Th. 4.3.3 and get the following result.

**Theorem 4.3.4.** If the round subkeys are statistically independent and uniformly distributed, then the following bounds hold:

$$LP_{\max}^{f32} = DP_{\max}^{f32} \leq 2^{-16},$$

and

$$LP_{\max}^{f64} = DP_{\max}^{f64} \leq 2^{-32}.$$
Let us now focus on embedding the round functions in the skeletons. For the sake of clarity, we prove now some interesting properties of an Extended Lai-Massey scheme regarding differential and linear characteristics.

**Lemma 4.3.4.** In the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as defined in §4.3.2, any differential characteristic on two rounds must involve at least one \( \texttt{f64} \)-function.

**Proof.** We follow a top-down approach. If we stack up two rounds of an Extended Lai-Massey scheme (see Fig. 4.25 for a detailed illustration of one round) and we force a differential characteristic at the input of the first \( \texttt{f64} \)-function to be equal to 0, then a differential characteristic at the input of the two rounds must have the form \((a, b, a, b, c, d, c, d)\) with \(a, b, c, d \in \{0, 1\}^{16}\) and \(a, b, c, d\) are not all equal to 0. At the end of the first round, the differential characteristic sounds \((b, a \oplus b, a, b, d, c \oplus d, c, d)\). At the input of the second \( \texttt{f64} \)-function, the differential characteristic is equal to \((a \oplus b, a, c \oplus d, c, d)\). We proceed by contraposition. If the input of the second \( \texttt{f64} \)-function is equal to zero, we have \(a = c = 0\). As \(a \oplus b\) and \(c \oplus d\) must be both equal to 0, the we conclude that \(a = b = c = d = 0\). This is a contradiction to our primary assumption about \(a, b, c\) and \(d\), and the theorem follows.

**Lemma 4.3.5.** In the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as defined in Fig. 4.3.2, any linear characteristic on two rounds must involve at least one function \( \texttt{f64} \).

**Proof.** We follow a bottom-up approach. By forcing a linear characteristic to be equal to \((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)\) at the end of the second \( \texttt{f64} \)-function, we note that the output linear characteristic must have the form \((a, a \oplus d, a \oplus d, b, b \oplus c, b \oplus c, c)\) with \(a, b, c, d \in \{0, 1\}^{16}\) and \(a, b, c, d\) not all equal to 0. If we consider now the first \( \texttt{f64} \)-function, we note that a linear characteristic at its output must have the form \((d, a \oplus d, b, b \oplus c)\), which implies that \(a = b = 0\) and then that \(c = d = 0\), which is a contradiction to our assumption, and the theorem follows.

By considering Th. 4.3.3, Lem. 4.3.4, and Lem. 4.3.5 together, we have thus the following result.

**Theorem 4.3.5.** The differential (resp. linear) probability of any single-path characteristic in \( \text{FOX64}/k/r \) is upper bounded by \((\text{DP}_{\text{max}}^{\text{sbox}})^{2r}\) (resp. \((\text{LP}_{\text{max}}^{\text{sbox}})^{2r}\)). Similarly, the bounds are \((\text{DP}_{\text{max}}^{\text{sbox}})^{4r}\) (resp. \((\text{LP}_{\text{max}}^{\text{sbox}})^{4r}\)) for \( \text{FOX128}/k/r \).

---

10These properties are actually trivial to prove in the case of a simple Lai-Massey scheme, and as discussed in §4.3.4, the Extended Lai-Massey scheme can be viewed as a simple Lai-Massey scheme.
Note that it is a kind of “hybrid” proof of security towards linear and differential cryptanalysis, as we have considered differential and linear hulls in the round functions, but characteristics in the high-level schemes. Thus, we have in reality slightly stronger results that the ones stated in Th. 4.3.5. Finally, we conclude that it is impossible to find any useful differential or linear characteristic after 8 rounds for both FOX64 and FOX128. Hence, a minimal number of 12 rounds provides a minimal safety margin.

Resistance Towards Other Attacks

In this part, we discuss the resistance of FOX towards various types of attacks.

Statistical Attacks Due to the very high diffusion properties of FOX’s round functions, the high algebraic degree of the sbox mapping, and the high number of rounds, we are strongly convinced that FOX will resist to known variants of linear and differential cryptanalysis (like differential-linear cryptanalysis [29,183], boomerang [322] and rectangle attacks [28]), as well as generalizations thereof, like Knudsen’s truncated and higher-order differentials [161], impossible differentials [26], and Harpes’ partitioning cryptanalysis [126], for instance.
Slide and Related-Key Attacks Slide attacks [37, 38] exploit periodic key-schedule algorithms, which is not a property of FOX’s key-schedule algorithms. Furthermore, due to very good diffusion and the high non-linearity of the key-schedule, related-key attacks are very unlikely to be effective against FOX.

Interpolation and Algebraic Attacks Interpolation attacks [142] take advantage of S-boxes exhibiting a simple algebraic structure. Since FOX’s non-linear mapping sbox does not possess any simple relation over GF(2) or GF(2^8), such attacks are certainly not effective.

One of our main concerns was to avoid a pure algebraic construction for the sbox mapping, as it is the case for a large number of modern designs of block ciphers. Although such S-boxes have many interesting non-linear properties, they probably form the best conditions to express a block cipher as a system of sparse, over-defined low-degree multivariate polynomial equations over GF(2) or GF(2^8); this fact may lead to effective attacks, as argued by Courtois and Pieprzyk in [70].

Not choosing an algebraic construction for sbox does not necessarily ensure security towards algebraic attacks. Note that we base our non-linear mapping on “small” permutations, mapping 4 bits to 4 bits, and that, according to [70], any such mapping can always be written as an overdefined system of at least 21 quadratic equations: let us denote the input (resp. the output) of such a small S-box by \( x_1 \Vert x_2 \Vert x_3 \Vert x_4 \) (resp. by \( y_1 \Vert y_2 \Vert y_3 \Vert y_4 \)), and if we consider a 16 \( \times \) 37 matrix containing in each row the values of the \( t = 37 \) monomials

\[
\{1, x_1, \ldots, x_4, y_1, \ldots, y_4, x_1x_2, \ldots, x_1y_1, \ldots, y_3y_4\}
\]

for each of the 16 possible entries, we note that its rank can be at most 16, thus, for any S-box, there will be at least \( \rho \geq 37 - 16 = 21 \) quadratic equations. We have checked that the rank of these matrices for FOX’s small S-boxes \( S_1, S_2, \) and \( S_3 \) are equal to 16, and there exist thus 21 quadratic equations describing it; furthermore, we are not aware of any quadratic relation over GF(2^8) for sbox. Following the very same methodology than [70], it appears that XSL attacks would break members of the FOX family within a complexity\(^{11} \) of \( 2^{139} \) to \( 2^{156} \), depending on the block size and on the rounds number.

Namely, we can construct an overdefined multivariate system of quadratic equations describing FOX using the XSL approach, which aims at recovering all the subkeys, without taking care of the key-schedule algorithm. Let us assume that FOX has \( r \) rounds, and thus \( r \) subkeys with the same size than the plaintext. We need hence \( r \) known plaintext-ciphertext pairs to uniquely determine the key. We use from now on the same notations than

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\(^{11}\)Under the most pessimistic hypotheses.
in [70]. $S$ is defined to be the total number of substitution boxes considered during an attack. Hence,

$$S_{FOX64} = 3 \cdot 8 \cdot r^2$$

for FOX64, and

$$S_{FOX128} = 3 \cdot 16 \cdot r^2$$

as each substitution box $sbox$ is built from three small S-boxes on $\{0, 1\}^s$, with $s = 4$. Let $t$ denote the number of monomials (i.e. $t = 37$ in our case), let $t'$ being the number of terms in the basis for one S-box that can be multiplied by some fixed variable and are still in the basis (we have $t' = 5$ in the case of FOX). Then, Courtois and Pieprzyk [70] estimate that the complexity of a XSL attack can be estimated to

$$T^\omega \text{ with } T \approx (t - \rho)^P \cdot \left(\frac{S}{P}\right)$$

where $\omega$ is the best possible exponent for Gaussian elimination, $T$ represents the total number of terms, and where

$$P = \frac{t - \rho}{s + \frac{t'}{S}}$$

In the case of FOX, we get

$$P = \frac{16}{4 + \frac{5}{24}} < 4$$

According to Courtois and Pieprzyk [70], in order that the attack works, as (difference operation) it is necessary to choose $P$ such that

$$\frac{R}{T - T'} \geq 1$$

(4.6)

where

$$R \approx S \cdot s(t - \rho)^{P-1} \cdot \left(\frac{S}{P - 1}\right)$$

represents the total number of equations, and

$$T' \approx t'(t - \rho)^{P-1} \cdot \left(\frac{S - 1}{P - 1}\right)$$

is the total number of terms in the basis that can be multiplied by some fixed variable and are still in the basis. Eq. (4.6), in the case which interests us, is already fulfilled for $P = 4$, but $R \approx 1$. As the overall complexity of the attack is very sensitive to the value of $P$, and according to Courtois and Pieprzyk [70],
Though XSL attacks will probably always work for some $P$, we considered the minimum value $P$ for which $R \geq 1$. This condition is necessary, but probably not sufficient.

we will consider the cases $P = 4$ as well as $P = 5$ in our estimations of the complexity of applying algebraic attacks to FOX.

Another subject of controversy is the value of $\omega$, i.e. the complexity exponent of a Gaussian reduction. Courtois and Pieprzyk [70] assume that $\omega = 2.376$, which is the best known value obtained by Coppersmith and Winograd [62]. According to [70], the constant factor in this algorithm is unknown to the authors of [62], and is expected to be very big. Accordingly, it is disputed whether such an algorithm can be applied efficiently in practice. For this reason, we will consider both $\omega = 2.376$ and $\omega = 3$ in our estimations.

A summary of our estimations is given in Fig. 4.26. At the light of the previous discussion, we should interpret these figures with an extreme care: on the one hand, the real complexity of XSL attacks is by no means clear at the time of writing and is the subject of much controversy [236]; one the other hand, we feel that the advantages of a small hardware footprint overcome such a (possible) security decrease.

**Integral Attacks** Integral attacks [169] apply to ciphers operating on well-aligned data, like SPN structures. As the round functions of FOX are SPNs, one can wonder whether it is possible to find an integral distinguisher on the whole structure and we show now that it is indeed the case.

Let us consider the case of FOX64: we denote the input bytes by $x_i(8)$ with $0 \leq i \leq 7$ and the output of the third round $l_{mid}64$ by $y_i(8)$ with $0 \leq i \leq 7$. We have the following integral distinguisher on 3 rounds of FOX64.

**Theorem 4.3.6.** Let $x_{3i(8)} = a$, $x_{7i(8)} = a \oplus c$, and $x_{i(8)} = c$ for $i = 0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6$, where $c$ is an arbitrary constant. We consider plaintext struc-
tures \(x^{(j)}\) for \(1 \leq j \leq 256\) where \(a\) takes all 256 possible byte values. Then,

\[
\begin{align*}
\bigoplus_{j=1}^{256} y_0^{(j)} \oplus y_6^{(j)} &= 0, \\
\bigoplus_{j=1}^{256} y_1^{(j)} \oplus y_7^{(j)} &= 0, \\
\bigoplus_{j=1}^{256} y_0^{(j)} \oplus y_2^{(j)} \oplus y_4^{(j)} &= 0, \\
\bigoplus_{j=1}^{256} y_1^{(j)} \oplus y_3^{(j)} \oplus y_5^{(j)} &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Proof. See Fig. 4.27, where “\(C\)” denotes a constant byte, “\(A\)” denotes an active byte, and “\(S\)” denotes a byte, whose sum under the structure is equal to zero. \(\square\)

This integral distinguisher can be used to break (four, five) six rounds of FOX64 (by guessing the one, two, or three last round keys and testing the integral criterion for each subkey candidate on a few structures of plaintexts) within a complexity of about \((2^{72}, 2^{136})\) \(2^{200}\) partial decryptions and negligible memory. A similar property may be used to break up to 4 rounds of FOX128 (by guessing the last round key) with a complexity of about \(2^{136}\) operations and negligible memory.

### 4.3.5 Implementation Issues

In this part, we discuss several issues about the implementation of the FOX family on low-end 8-bit architectures and on high-end 32/64-bit ones. Finally, we give results about the performances of various implementations we have written on different platforms.

#### 8-bit Architectures

The resources representing the most important bottleneck in a block cipher implementation on a smartcard (which uses typically low-cost, 8-bit microprocessors) is of course the RAM usage. The amount of efficiently usable RAM available on a smartcard is typically in the order of 256 bytes. It may be a bit larger depending on the cases, but as this type of smart card is devoted to contain more than a simple encryption routine, FOX implementations on this kind of platforms will minimize the amount of necessary RAM. ROM is not so scarce as RAM on a smartcard, so the code size can be greater than the RAM usage. It is usually reasonable not to have a ROM size (instructions + possible precomputed tables) greater than 1024 bytes.
Figure 4.27: Integral Distinguisher in 3 rounds of FOX64.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Precomputations</th>
<th>Data size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>No precomputed data</td>
<td>24 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>sbox</td>
<td>256 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>sbox, talpha, dalpha</td>
<td>768 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>sbox, talpha, sdlalpha, stalpha2, sdalpha2</td>
<td>1280 B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.28:** Four different strategies to implement FOX on low-end microprocessors

**Four Memory Usage Strategies** Obviously, the most intensive computation are related to the evaluation of the sbox mapping and of the mu4 and mu8 mappings. We propose in the following four different (the last one concerning uniquely FOX128) strategies using various amounts of precomputed data to implement these mappings; they are summarized in Fig. 4.28. Note that the precomputed data may be stored in ROM and that the constants needed in the key-schedule algorithm are not taken into account. Strategy A can be applied when extremely few memory is available. For this, one computes on-the-fly the sbox mapping, as it is described in §4.3.3, page 192, and all the operations in GF($2^8$). The sole needed constants are the small substitution boxes $S_1$, $S_2$ and $S_3$ (see Fig. 4.23). Strategy A is clearly the slowest one. A significant speed gain can be obtained if one precomputes the sbox mapping (Strategy B), the finite field operations being all computed dynamically. A third possibility (Strategy C) is to precompute two more mappings: $talpha(x)$ is a function mapping an element $x$ to $\alpha \cdot x$, with the multiplication in GF($2^8$); $dalpha(x)$ is a function mapping an element $x \in \text{GF}(2^8)$ to $\alpha^{-1} \cdot x$. Finally, in the case of FOX128, a further speed gain may be obtained (Strategy D) by tabulating the five following mappings:

- $sbox(x)$ : $x \mapsto sbox(x)$
- $stalpha(x)$ : $x \mapsto sbox(x) \cdot \alpha$
- $sdalpha(x)$ : $x \mapsto sbox(x) \cdot \alpha^{-1}$
- $stalpha2(x)$ : $x \mapsto sbox(x) \cdot \alpha^2$
- $sdalpha2(x)$ : $x \mapsto sbox(x) \cdot \alpha^{-2}$

The implementation of the sigma4/mu4 layer is relatively straightforward:

\[
y_{0(8)} = sbox(x_{0(8)}) \oplus sbox(x_{1(8)}) \oplus sbox(x_{2(8)}) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_{3(8)})
y_{1(8)} = sbox(x_{0(8)}) \oplus sbox(x_{1(8)}) \oplus sbox(x_{3(8)}) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_{2(8)}) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot sbox(x_{1(8)})
y_{2(8)} = sbox(x_{0(8)}) \oplus sbox(x_{2(8)}) \oplus sbox(x_{3(8)}) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_{1(8)}) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot sbox(x_{0(8)})
\]
\[
y_3(8) = sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_0(8)) \\
\quad \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot sbox(x_2(8))
\]

By carefully rewriting the above equations and by re-using some temporary results, one can easily minimize the number of \textit{sbox}, \textit{talpha}, \textit{dalpha} evaluations and the number of \(\oplus\) operations. However, the resulting implementation is strongly dependent of the chosen strategy.

The implementation of the \textit{sigma8/mu8} layer is not much complicated. By rewriting the operations as done above, one can easily obtain a fast implementation. For instance, in case of an implementation following memory strategy C, one can obtain the following computations:

\[
y_0(8) = sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus sbox(x_4(8)) \oplus sbox(x_5(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_7(8))
\]

\[
y_1(8) = sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_7(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_4(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_5(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)))
\]

\[
y_2(8) = sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)) \oplus sbox(x_7(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_4(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_5(8)))
\]

\[
y_3(8) = sbox(x_5(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)) \oplus sbox(x_7(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_4(8)))
\]

\[
y_4(8) = sbox(x_4(8)) \oplus sbox(x_5(8)) \oplus sbox(x_7(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_5(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)))
\]

\[
y_5(8) = sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus sbox(x_4(8)) \oplus sbox(x_7(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_4(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_5(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_5(8)))
\]

\[
y_6(8) = sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus sbox(x_7(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot (sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus sbox(x_5(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_6(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_4(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_4(8)))
\]

\[
y_7(8) = sbox(x_1(8)) \oplus sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_7(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot (sbox(x_2(8)) \oplus sbox(x_4(8)) \oplus \alpha \cdot sbox(x_5(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_3(8)) \oplus sbox(x_6(8)) \oplus \alpha^{-1} \cdot (sbox(x_0(8)) \oplus sbox(x_3(8)))
\]

This computation flow (consisting of 71 \(\oplus\), 15 \textit{talpha} and 15 \textit{dalpha} evaluations) is obviously not optimal in terms of operations; by using redundant temporary computations, one can spare a few more operations.
We give now a constant-time implementation of $t\alpha$ and $d\alpha$. The routines $t\alpha_2$ and $d\alpha_2$ can be implemented by iterating twice $t\alpha$ and $d\alpha$, respectively. Note that these implementations do not take into account security issues related to other side-channel attacks, like SPA/DPA.

```assembly
;; Implementation of $t\alpha()$ on 8051

MOV A, R0 ;; A := R0
RLC A ;; left rotation through carry
MOV R0, A ;; storing the result
CLR A ;; A := 0
SUBB A, #0 ;; C set ? A = 0xFF : A = 0x00
ANL A, #F9 ;; C set ? A = 0xF9 : A = 0x00
XRL A, R0 ;; A := A XOR R0
MOV R0, A ;; R0 := A

;; Implementation of $d\alpha()$ on 8051

MOV A, R0 ;; A := R0
RRC A ;; left rotation through carry
MOV R0, A ;; storing the result
CLR A ;; A := 0
SUBB A, #0 ;; C set ? A = 0xFF : A = 0x00
ANL A, #FC ;; C set ? A = 0xFC : A = 0x00
XRL A, R0 ;; A := A XOR R0
MOV R0, A ;; R0 := A
```

32/64-bit Architectures

Most modern CPUs architecture are 32- or 64-bit ones. In this section, we list several ways to optimize an implementation of FOX in terms of speed (i.e. of throughput).

Subkeys Precomputation Most of the time, block ciphers are used to encrypt several blocks of data, so it is very time-sparing to precompute the subkeys once for all and to store them in a table. Typically, one needs 128 bytes of memory to store all the subkeys for an implementation of FOX64 with 16 rounds and twice as much for FOX128.
Implementation of f32 and f64 using Table-Lookups

The f32 and f64 functions can be implemented very efficiently using a combination of table-lookups and XORs. We will focus on the f32 function, but the considerations are similar for which concerns f64. Let $x_0(8) || x_1(8) || x_2(8) || x_3(8)$ be an input of f32. We denote by $t_0(8) || t_1(8) || t_2(8) || t_3(8)$ the temporary result obtained after the mu4 application. Let $r_{k0}(8) || r_{k1}(8) || r_{k2}(8) || r_{k3}(8)$ denote the first half of the round key. Finally, let $v_i(8) = x_i(8) \oplus r_{ki}(8)$ for $0 \leq i \leq 3$. We have

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
  t_0(8) \\
  t_1(8) \\
  t_2(8) \\
  t_3(8)
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
  1 & 1 & 1 & \alpha \\
  1 & c & \alpha & 1 \\
  c & \alpha & 1 & 1 \\
  \alpha & 1 & c & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\times
\begin{pmatrix}
  \text{sbox}(v_0(8)) \\
  \text{sbox}(v_1(8)) \\
  \text{sbox}(v_2(8)) \\
  \text{sbox}(v_3(8))
\end{pmatrix}
$$

This equation may be rewritten as

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
  t_0(8) \\
  t_1(8) \\
  t_2(8) \\
  t_3(8)
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
  \text{sbox}(v_0(8)) \oplus \text{sbox}(v_1(8)) \oplus \text{sbox}(v_2(8)) \oplus \text{sbox}(v_3(8))
\end{pmatrix}
$$

Thus, one may precompute 4 tables of 256 4-bytes elements defined by

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{TBSM}_0[a] &= \begin{pmatrix}
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  c \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  \alpha \cdot \text{sbox}(a)
\end{pmatrix}, &
\text{TBSM}_1[a] &= \begin{pmatrix}
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  c \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  \alpha \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a)
\end{pmatrix} \\
\text{TBSM}_2[a] &= \begin{pmatrix}
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  \alpha \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  c \cdot \text{sbox}(a)
\end{pmatrix}, &
\text{TBSM}_3[a] &= \begin{pmatrix}
  \alpha \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a) \\
  1 \cdot \text{sbox}(a)
\end{pmatrix}
\end{align*}
$$

and write

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
  t_0(8) \\
  t_1(8) \\
  t_2(8) \\
  t_3(8)
\end{pmatrix} = \text{TBSM}_0[v_0(8)] \oplus \text{TBSM}_1[v_1(8)] \oplus \text{TBSM}_2[v_2(8)] \oplus \text{TBSM}_3[v_3(8)]
$$

Similarly, we can denote the temporary result after the second key-addition layer of f32 before the last substitution layer by $u_0(8) || u_1(8) || u_2(8) || u_3(8)$ and
by \( w_0(8) \| w_1(8) \| w_2(8) \| w_3(8) \), the temporary result after the last substitution layer, one can use the same strategy with the following tables:

\[
\begin{align*}
TBS_0[a] &= \begin{pmatrix} sbox(a) \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, & TBS_1[a] &= \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ sbox(a) \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \\
TBS_2[a] &= \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ sbox(a) \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, & TBS_3[a] &= \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ sbox(a) \end{pmatrix}
\end{align*}
\]

and write

\[
\begin{pmatrix} w_0(8) \\ w_1(8) \\ w_2(8) \\ w_3(8) \end{pmatrix} = TBS_0[u_0(8)] \oplus TBS_1[u_1(8)] \oplus TBS_2[u_2(8)] \oplus TBS_3[u_3(8)]
\]

As outlined before, the process is similar for the implementation of the f64 function. In this case, we have to define two times 8 tables of 256 64-bit elements. The following table summarizes the size of the various tables for a fully-precomputed implementation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>number of tables</th>
<th>width [bytes]</th>
<th>total size [bytes]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOX64</td>
<td>2 × 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX128</td>
<td>2 × 8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Depending on the target processor, the nearest cache (i.e. the fastest memory) size may be smaller than 32768 bytes. In this case, one can spare half of the tables (at the cost of a few masking operations) by noting that all the TBS tables are “embedded” in the TBSM ones; this implementation strategy will by denoted half-precomputed implementation. This allows to reduce the fast memory needs to 4096 and 16384 bytes, respectively. Fig. 4.29 summarizes the best strategies for various amounts of L1 cache memory.

For most modern microprocessors (denoted by \( \star \) in Fig. 4.29), a fully-precomputed implementation of FOX64 and FOX128 is probably the fastest possible solution. For the processors denoted by \( \bullet \), a half-precomputed implementation is likely the best solution. The supplementary masking operations may be furthermore used to increase the instructions throughput on pipelined architectures.

Some microprocessors have a very small L1 data cache (they are denoted in \( \star \) in Fig. 4.29). In the case of FOX128, even a half-precomputed implementation will result in many caches misses, inducing a performance
penalty. For early versions of Intel Pentium IV, a half-precomputed implementation of FOX64 is advantageous, while one can reduce the size of the precomputed data needed for a FOX128 implementation down to 8192 bytes at the cost of at most 18 supplementary PSHUFW instructions. Although these operations will result in a performance penalty, the latter will be reduced since the highly-parallelizable structure of the f64 function allows to fully use the pipeline and thus to improve the instructions throughput. As most modern CPU architectures are pipelined ones, one can take this fact into account in order to improve performances of FOX implementations. There are two “dependency walls” in a FOX round function. The first one is just after the first subkey addition, the second one just after the second subkey addition. Inbetween, the additions of the table-lookup results may be done in any order, as an XOR is a commutative addition.

FOX128 is an excellent candidate for using the 64-bit instructions of actual 32-bit microprocessors. For instance, on the Intel architecture, the MMX/SSE/SSE2/SSE3 instruction sets may be used to “emulate” a 64-bit microprocessor. Furthermore, by expressing the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as in Fig. 4.24, one can compute very efficiently the two orthomorphisms as a single one on 64-bit architectures.

In order to get the best performances for FOX implementations written in a high-level language, one can get large speed differences when using different compilers. Furthermore, the choice of the data structure of the precomputed tables and of the data to be encrypted plays an important role: implementing a simple way to access these data will result in a speed increase.

Key-Schedule Algorithms For applications needing a high key-agility, one can implement the various key-schedule algorithms using the same guidelines and tricks as for the core algorithm, since they share many common features.

Performance Results

Fig. 4.30 summarizes the results obtained at the time of writing by our optimized implementations of the FOX family (in clock cycles to encrypt one block, with precomputed subkeys): We note that FOX64 is extremely fast on 32-bit architectures, while FOX128 is competitive on 64-bit architectures. Namely, according to the Nessie project [247], FOX64/12 is the fourth fastest 64-bit block cipher on Pentium 3 behind Nimbus, CAST128 and RC5. It is 19% faster than Misty1 (NESSIE’s choice), 39% faster than IDEA, 57% faster than DESand about three times faster than Triple-DES. The generic version of FOX64 (with 16 rounds) is still 8% faster than IDEA. On the 64-bit architecture Alpha 21264, FOX128/12 is the third fastest block cipher behind NUSH and AES, according to [247], while FOX128 (16 rounds) with
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processor</th>
<th>cache size [kB]</th>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Best Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha 21164</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha 21264</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMD Athlon XP</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>(data + code)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMD Athlon MP</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>(data + code)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMD Opteron</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel Pentium III</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel Pentium IV</td>
<td>8/16 (Prescott)</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★/☆</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel Xeon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel Itanium</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel Itanium2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PowerPC G4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>(data + code)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PowerPC G5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UltraSparc II</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UltraSparc III</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>(data)</td>
<td>★</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.29: Best implementation strategies on 32/64-bit microprocessors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cipher</th>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>$r = 12$</th>
<th>$r = 16$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOX64/k/r</td>
<td>Intel Pentium 3</td>
<td>C (gcc)</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX64/k/r</td>
<td>Intel Pentium 3</td>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX64/k/r</td>
<td>Intel Pentium 4</td>
<td>C (gcc)</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX64/k/r</td>
<td>AMD Athlon-XP</td>
<td>C (gcc)</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX64/k/r</td>
<td>Alpha 21264</td>
<td>C (Compaq cc)</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX128/k/r</td>
<td>Intel Pentium 3</td>
<td>C (gcc)</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX128/k/r</td>
<td>AMD Athlon-XP</td>
<td>C (gcc)</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX128/k/r</td>
<td>Alpha 21264</td>
<td>C (Compaq cc)</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.30: Performances of optimized implementations of FOX
256-bit keys is still 30% faster than Camellia, which is one of NESSIE’s choices. Finally, we have an implementation of FOX64/12 (resp. FOX64/16) on 8051, a typical low-cost 8-bit architecture, needing 16 bytes of RAM, 896 bytes of ROM (precomputed data and precomputed subkeys) and 575 bytes of code size encrypting one block in 2958 (resp. 3950) clock cycles.
Chapter 5

Conclusion and Open Problems

As demonstrated, for instance, by the heuristic nature of the design of FOX, we are still far from a “provably secure”, and still practically fast block cipher. Currently, the only possibility to assess the security level of a block cipher consists in studying and trying to break it (being its full version, or reduced-round versions thereof). Therefore, the security level of a given block cipher keeps merely a function of the quantity of time and efforts invested by cryptanalysts, and a “secure” block cipher has only a time-security curve slowly decreasing; the IDEA block cipher surely is a very good example possessing such a curve, as demonstrated by Fig. 3.10, page 137. Obviously, proposing a new block cipher simultaneously defines open problems. Ideally, the security of FOX should be investigated thoroughly by different people, notably for which concerns Courtois-Pieprzyk algebraic attacks, before benefiting from the confidence of the cryptologic community, and by extension, of the industrial world. We would like to outline here that even in the unlikely case where using 4-bit S-boxes would result in a clear security decrease, and render FOX impractically insecure, replacing them by stronger S-boxes keeps a rather easy task.

The study of generic distinguishers in a formal way is a small step towards a better understanding of necessary mathematical conditions on block ciphers for security. In this thesis, we hope to have demonstrated that using old statistical tools, well-known and well applied in many engineering fields, but which were perhaps neglected so far in the domain of block ciphers, can help us to easily derive interesting properties of computationally unbounded distinguishers in a rather easy way. Still, many open problems remain: we have thoroughly treated the class of attacks which we can model by a non-adaptive distinguisher between two binary random sources, but even finding tight bounds for non-adaptive distinguishers between two general random sources is still an open problem. Furthermore, discussing (and efficiently describing) more complicated dependences about the key is an open issue as
well, and we feel that the adaptive case is even more complicated; iterated
attacks surely are an interesting intermediate case. In the hypothetical case
where we would be able to precisely define a set of sufficient conditions for
a block cipher to be secure, and this in a properly defined and practical
security model, exhibiting a block cipher satisfying these properties looks
like another non-trivial gap to fill. Hence, Vaudenay’s decorrelation theory,
which is nowadays the only general framework which proposes constructive
solutions and which goes in the right direction, deserves, in our personal
opinion, more attention.
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Appendix A

Probability Theory

In this thesis, we make a heavy use of results taken out of general probability theory; we recall now basic concepts thereof and useful notations, mostly according to [119].

A.1 Preliminaries

The set of all possible outcomes of an experiment is called the sample space and we will denote it by $S$. An event $\omega$ is then a subset $\omega \in S$ of $S$. This drives us to define the concept of $\sigma$-field:

**Definition A.1.1 ($\sigma$-field).** A sequence $\mathcal{F}$ of subsets of $S$ is called a $\sigma$-field if it satisfies the following conditions:

1. $\emptyset \in \mathcal{F}$;
2. if $\omega_1, \omega_2, \cdots \in \mathcal{F}$, then $\bigcup_{i=1}^{\infty} \omega_i \in \mathcal{F}$;
3. if $\omega \in \mathcal{F}$, then $\overline{\omega} \in \mathcal{F}$.

In order to be able to discuss the likelihood of occurrence of events, we need to define properly a probability measure.

**Definition A.1.2 (Probability Measure / Probability Space).** Let $S$ be a sample space and $\mathcal{F}$ be a $\sigma$-field of subsets of $S$. A probability measure $\Pr$ on $(S, \mathcal{F})$ is a function $\Pr : \mathcal{F} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ satisfying

1. $\Pr[\emptyset] = 0$ and $\Pr[S] = 1$;
2. if $\omega_1, \omega_2, \cdots$ is a sequence of disjoint members of $\mathcal{F}$, i.e. $\omega_i \cap \omega_j = \emptyset$ for $i \neq j$, then

$$\Pr \left[ \bigcup_{i=1}^{\infty} \omega_i \right] = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \Pr[\omega_i]$$
The triple \((\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{F}, \Pr)\) is called a probability space.

Two events \(\omega_1\) and \(\omega_2\) are called independent if \(\Pr[\omega_1 \cap \omega_2] = \Pr[\omega_1] \cdot \Pr[\omega_2]\). More generally, a family \(\{\omega_i : i \in I\}\) is called independent if

\[
\Pr\left(\bigcap_{i \in J} \omega_i\right) = \prod_{i \in J} \Pr[\omega_i]
\]

for all finite subsets \(J\) of \(I\). The conditional probability of an event \(\omega_1\) given a event \(\omega_2\) is then defined, provided \(\Pr[\omega_2] > 0\), as

\[
\Pr[\omega_1 | \omega_2] = \frac{\Pr[\omega_1 \cap \omega_2]}{\Pr[\omega_2]}
\]

One is not always interested in an experiment itself, but rather in some consequence of its random outcome. Such consequences, if real valued, may be thought of as function which map \(\mathcal{S}\) into the real line \(\mathbb{R}\). These functions are called random variables.

**Definition A.1.3 (Random Variable / Distribution Function).** A random variable \(X\) is a function \(X : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) with the property that \(\{s \in \mathcal{S} : X(s) \leq x\} \in \mathcal{F}\) for each \(x \in \mathbb{R}\). The distribution function of a random variable \(X\) is the function \(F_X : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]\) defined by

\[
F_X(x) = \Pr_X[X \leq x]
\]

In this thesis, we will frequently make use of discrete and continuous random variables. A random variable \(X\) is called discrete if it takes values in some countable subset of \(\mathbb{R}\). The distribution function of a discrete random variable \(X\) is called a probability mass function. A random variable \(X\) is called continuous if its distribution function can be expressed as

\[
F_X(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{x} f(t) \, dt \quad x \in \mathbb{R}
\]

for some integrable function \(f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, \infty]\) called the probability density function of \(X\). Furthermore, one can generalize the concept of distribution function of a random variable to the one of joint distribution function of a vector \(X\): let \(X = (X_1, \ldots, X_n)\) be a random vector of \(n\) random variables. The joint distribution function of \(X\) on the probability space \((\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{F}, \Pr)\) is the function \(F_X : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow [0, 1]\) defined by

\[
F_X(x) = \Pr_X[X \leq x]
\]

for \(x \in \mathbb{R}^n\). An important characteristic of a random variable is its expectation and its \(k\)-th moment.
Definition A.1.4 (Expectation/Moment). The expectation of a discrete random variable $X$ with probability mass function $f_X$ is defined to be

$$E[X] = \sum_{x : f_X(x) > 0} x \cdot f_X(x)$$

while the expectation of a continuous random variable with probability density function $f_X$ is defined to be

$$E[X] = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} x \cdot f_X(x) \, dx$$

If $k$ is a positive integer, the $k$-th moment $m_k$ of a random variable $X$ is defined to be $m_k = E[X^k]$; the $k$-th central moment $\sigma_k$ of $X$ is defined to be $\sigma_k = E[(X - m_1)^k]$.

In this thesis, we will mostly use the expectation and the second central moment of a probability distribution, the latter being called the variance.

A.2 Common Probability Distributions

Several probability distributions play a central role in our thesis. We define them formally and we state some of their properties.

Definition A.2.1 (Bernoulli Distribution). A discrete random variable $X$ is said to be distributed according to the Bernoulli distribution $D^{(p)}_{\text{Bern}}$ if it can take only two values, namely 0 or 1, with respective probabilities

$$\Pr_{D^{(p)}_{\text{Bern}}} [X = 0] = 1 - p$$
$$\Pr_{D^{(p)}_{\text{Bern}}} [X = 1] = p.$$ 

Definition A.2.2 (Binomial Distribution). A discrete random variable $X$ is said to be distributed according to the binomial distribution $D^{(n,p)}_{\text{Bin}}$ if it can take values $0 \leq k \leq n$ with probability

$$\Pr_{D^{(n,p)}_{\text{Bin}}} [X = k] = \binom{n}{k} p^k (1-p)^{n-k}.$$ 

Definition A.2.3 (Multinomial Distribution). Let $X$ be a discrete $r$-dimensional random vector whose $i$-th component is denoted $X_i$. $X$ is said to be distributed according to the multinomial distribution $D^{(n,p)}_{\text{Multi}}$ if it can take values $x \in \mathbb{N}^r$ with probability

$$\Pr_{D^{(n,p)}_{\text{Multi}}} [X = x] = \binom{n}{x_1! \ldots x_r!} p_1^{x_1} \cdots p_r^{x_r}.$$
under the constraints

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{r} x_i = n \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{i=1}^{r} p_i = 1. \]

**Definition A.2.4 (Normal Distribution).** A continuous random variable \(X\) is said to be distributed according to the normal distribution \(D_\phi\) if it takes values \(x \in \mathbb{R}\) with probability

\[
\Pr_{D_\phi}[\alpha \leq X \leq \beta] = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{\alpha}^{\beta} e^{-\frac{t^2}{2}} dt.
\]

Similarly, a continuous random variable \(X\) is said to be distributed according to the normal distribution \(D_\phi(\mu, \sigma)\) with parameters \(\mu\) and \(\sigma\) if the random variable

\[
\frac{X - \mu}{\sigma}
\]

is distributed according to \(D_\phi\).

We denote respectively the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution by

\[
\phi(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{x^2}{2}} \quad \text{and} \quad \Phi(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{x} e^{-\frac{t^2}{2}} dt.
\]

Finally, the following result obviously plays a central role in this thesis.

**Theorem A.2.1 (Central-Limit Theorem).** Let \(X_1, \ldots, X_n\) be a sequence of mutually independent random variables with a common probability distribution. Suppose that \(\mu = E[X_i]\) and \(\sigma^2 = \text{Var}[X_i]\) exist and let \(S_n = X_1 + \cdots + X_n\). Then for every fixed \(\xi\),

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr\left[ \frac{S_n - n\mu}{\sigma \sqrt{n}} < \xi \right] = \Phi(\xi)
\]
Appendix B

Statistical Information Theory

In this chapter, we recall some well-known results about Csiszár and Körner’s method of types [73] and we recall how to apply it to derive Chernoff’s information. We closely follow the organization of Chapter 12 in [71].

B.1 The Method of Types

Let us consider a discrete alphabet $\mathcal{X} = \{a_1, \ldots, a_{|\mathcal{X}|}\}$. The type $D_x$ (or empirical probability distribution) of a sequence $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of $n$ symbols with $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, is defined to be the relative proportion of occurrences of each symbol of $\mathcal{X}$, i.e.

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \Pr[D_x[a] = \frac{N(a|x)}{n}]$$

where $N(a|x)$ is the number of times the symbol $a$ occurs in the sequence $x \in \mathcal{X}^n$. We denote by $\mathcal{P}_n$ the set of types with denominator $n$. If $D_P \in \mathcal{P}_n$, then the set of sequences of length $n$ and type $D_P$ is called the type class of $D_P$, and is noted $T(D_P)$, i.e.

$$T(D_P) = \{x \in \mathcal{X}^n : D_x = D_P\}$$

The essential power of the method of types arises from the following result, which shows that the number of types is at most polynomial in $n$.

**Theorem B.1.1.**

$$|\mathcal{P}_n| \leq (n + 1)^{|\mathcal{X}|} \quad (B.1)$$

From this point, we will assume that the sequence $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ is drawn independently and identically distributed according to a distribution $D_P$. Let us define the Kullback-Leibler distance.
Definition B.1.1 (Kullback-Leibler Distance). The Kullback-Leibler distance \( D(\mathcal{D}_P||\mathcal{D}_Q) \) between two discrete probability distributions \( \mathcal{D}_P \) and \( \mathcal{D}_Q \) is defined to be

\[
D(\mathcal{D}_P||\mathcal{D}_Q) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr_{\mathcal{D}_P}[x] \log_2 \left( \frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{D}_P}[x]}{\Pr_{\mathcal{D}_Q}[x]} \right).
\]

Coming back to considerations, we note that all sequences with the same type have the same probability, as stated by the following theorem.

Theorem B.1.2. If \( X_1, \ldots, X_n \) are drawn iid according to \( \mathcal{D}_P \), then the probability of \( \mathcal{X} \) depends only on its type and is given by

\[
\Pr_{\mathcal{P}_n}[\mathcal{X}] = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \Pr_{\mathcal{P}}[x_i] = 2^{-n(H(\mathcal{X}) + D(\mathcal{D}_X||\mathcal{D}_P))}
\]

where \( H(\mathcal{X}) \) is the entropy\(^1\) of \( \mathcal{X} \) and \( D(\mathcal{D}_X||\mathcal{D}_P) \) is the Kullback-Leibler distance between the distributions \( \mathcal{D}_X \) and \( \mathcal{D}_P \).

The following theorem allows to give useful bounds on the size of a type class.

Theorem B.1.3. For any \( \mathcal{D}_P \in \mathcal{P}_n \),

\[
\frac{1}{(n+1)|\mathcal{X}|} 2^{nH(\mathcal{D}_P)} \leq |\mathcal{T}(\mathcal{D}_P)| \leq 2^{nH(\mathcal{D}_P)}
\]

(B.3)

With help of Theorem B.1.3, it is possible to prove the following result.

Theorem B.1.4. For any \( \mathcal{D}_P \in \mathcal{P}_n \), and any distribution \( \mathcal{D}_Q \), the probability of the type class \( \mathcal{T}(\mathcal{D}_P) \) under \( \mathcal{D}_Q^n \) satisfies

\[
\frac{1}{(n+1)|\mathcal{X}|} 2^{-nD(\mathcal{D}_P||\mathcal{D}_Q)} \leq \Pr_{\mathcal{Q}^n}[\mathcal{T}(\mathcal{D}_P)] \leq 2^{-nD(\mathcal{D}_P||\mathcal{D}_Q)}
\]

(B.4)

B.2 Sanov’s Theorem

The method of types and above summarized results can be used to show Sanov’s Theorem (see Th. B.2.1). We recall first some notions of topology. A family \( \tau \) of subsets of a set \( \mathcal{X} \) is a topology of \( \emptyset \in \tau \), if \( \mathcal{X} \in \tau \), if any union of sets of \( \tau \) belongs to \( \tau \), and if any finite intersection of elements of \( \tau \) belongs to \( \tau \). Sets that belong to \( \tau \) are called open sets, while complements of open sets are called closed sets. The interior of a subset \( \mathcal{A} \subset \mathcal{X} \) is the union of the open subsets of \( \mathcal{A} \). The closure of \( \mathcal{A} \), is the intersection of all closed sets containing \( \mathcal{A} \).

\(^{1}\)The entropy of a discrete random variable \( X \) distributed according to \( \mathcal{D}_X \) is defined by \( H(X) = -\sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr_X[x] \log_2(\Pr_X[x]) \).
Theorem B.2.1 (Sanov). Let $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ be $n$ iid random variables distributed according $D_Q$. Let $E \subseteq \mathcal{P}_n$ be a set of probability distributions. Then
\[
\Pr_{Q^n}[E] = \Pr_{Q^n}[E \cap \mathcal{P}_n] \leq (n + 1)^{n-1} 2^{-nD(P^\ast ||D_Q)} \tag{B.5}
\]
where
\[
D_P^\ast = \arg\min_{D_P \in E} D(D_P||D_Q) \tag{B.6}
\]
is the distribution in $E$ that is closest to $D_Q$ in relative entropy. If, in addition, the set $E$ is the closure of its interior, then
\[
\lim_{n \to +\infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \Pr_{Q^n}[E] = -D(P^\ast ||D_Q) \tag{B.7}
\]

B.3 Chernoff’s Information

We recall now the derivation of the highest achievable exponent for the probability of error of an optimal decision region when sampling $n$ times the same random variable. From Lem. 3.1.1, we know that the optimum test is a likelihood-ratio test. We can rewrite this ratio as
\[
\frac{\Pr_{X^n_0}[x]}{\Pr_{X^n_1}[x]} \geq \tau \iff D(D_x||D_{X^n_0}) - D(D_x||D_{X^n_1}) \geq \frac{1}{n} \log \tau
\]
or, in other words, it is possible to rewrite the log-likelihood ratio as the difference between the relative entropy distance of the sample type to each of the two possible distributions. Let $A$ denote the set on which hypothesis $x \leftarrow D_{X^n_0}$ is accepted. Then, since the set $A$ is convex, one can use Theorem B.2.1 to show that the error probability
\[
\alpha^{(n)} = \Pr_{X^n_0}[x \in A] \tag{B.8}
\]
is essentially determined by the relative entropy of the closest member $D_{X^n_0}$ of $A$ to $D_{X_0}$:
\[
\lim_{n \to +\infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \alpha^{(n)} = 0 \tag{B.9}
\]
Similarly,
\[
\lim_{n \to +\infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \beta^{(n)} = 0 \tag{B.10}
\]
where $\beta^{(n)} = \Pr_{X^n_1}[x \in A]$ and $D_{X^n_1}$ is the closest element in $A$ to distribution $D_{X_1}$. Now, minimizing $D(D_X||D_{X^n})$ subject to the constraint
\[
D(D_X||D_{X^n_0}) - D(D_X||D_{X^n_1}) \geq \frac{1}{n} \log \tau \tag{B.11}
\]
will result in the type in $\mathcal{A}$ that is closest to $D_{X_1}$. Setting up the minimization of $D_{X_1}$ subject to $D(D_X||D_{X_1}) - D(D_X||D_{X_0}) = \frac{1}{n} \log \tau$ using Lagrange multipliers, we obtain that the minimizing $D_X$ is of the form

$$\Pr_{X_1}[x] = \Pr_{\lambda}[x] = \frac{\Pr_{X_0}[x]^\lambda \Pr_{X_1}[x]^{1-\lambda}}{\sum_{a \in X} \Pr_{X_0}[a]^\lambda \Pr_{X_1}[a]^{1-\lambda}}$$ (B.12)

where $\lambda$ is chosen so that $D(D_{X_\lambda^*}||D_{X_0}) - D(D_{X_\lambda^*}||D_{X_1}) = \frac{\log \tau}{n}$. Furthermore, from the symmetry of the above equation, we have $D_{X_0} = D_{X_1}$.

We come back to our decision problem. In the Bayesian case, the overall probability of error is the weighted sum of the two probabilities of error, and we have

$$\lim_{n \to +\infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \frac{\pi_0 \alpha^{(n)} + \pi_1 \beta^{(n)}}{2^{-n} \min\{D(D_{X_\lambda}||D_{X_0}), D(D_{X_\lambda}||D_{X_1})\}}$$ (B.13)

where $D_{X_\lambda}$ has the form of (B.12). Since $D(D_{X_\lambda}||D_{X_0})$ increases with $\lambda$ and $D(D_{X_\lambda}||D_{X_1})$ decreases with $\lambda$, the maximum value of

$$\min\{D(D_{X_\lambda}||D_{X_0}), D(D_{X_\lambda}||D_{X_1})\}$$ (B.14)

is attained when they are equal. So choosing $\lambda$ such that

$$D(D_{X_\lambda}||D_{X_0}) = D(D_{X_\lambda}||D_{X_1}) = C(D_{X_0}, D_{X_1})$$ (B.15)

yields the highest achievable exponent for the probability error and is called the Chernoff’s information.
I was born in Bienne (Switzerland) in 1976. After having attended primary school in Alle and secondary school in Porrentruy, I obtained a scientific baccalaureate ("maturité fédérale type C") at the Lycée Cantonal of Porrentruy. In 1995, I began computer science studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETHZ) in Zurich with a strong emphasize in cryptography, information theory and theoretical computer science; I graduated in 2000 with a diploma thesis entitled "Linear Cryptanalysis of DES". During my studies and just before arriving in Lausanne, I shortly worked for Europay (Switzerland) AG where I was dealing with security issues in electronic payment systems. Since october 2000, I have been a full-time research and teaching assistant, as well as a PhD student under the supervision of Prof. Serge Vaudenay, in the Security and Cryptography Laboratory (LASEC) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) in Lausanne.