000264911 001__ 264911
000264911 005__ 20190812204800.0
000264911 037__ $$aCONF
000264911 245__ $$aCryptanalysis of Enhanced MORE
000264911 260__ $$c2018
000264911 269__ $$a2018
000264911 336__ $$aConference Papers
000264911 520__ $$aFully homomorphic encryption (FHE) has been among the most popular research topics of the last decade. While the bootstrapping-based, public key cryptosystems that follow Gentry's original design are getting more and more efficient, their performance is still far from being practical. This lead to several attempts to construct symmetric FHE schemes that would not be as inefficient as their public key counterparts. Unfortunately, most such schemes were also based on (randomized) linear transformations, and shown completely insecure. One such broken scheme was the Matrix Operation for Randomization and Encryption (MORE). In a recent paper, Hariss, Noura and Samhat propose Enhanced MORE, which is supposed to improve over MORE's weaknesses. We analyze Enhanced MORE, discuss why it does not improve over MORE, and show that it is even less secure by presenting a highly efficient ciphertext-only decryption attack. We implement the attack and confirm its correctness.
000264911 700__ $$g237061$$aVizár, Damian$$0248081
000264911 700__ $$0241950$$aVaudenay, Serge$$g131602
000264911 7112_ $$cSmolenice, Slovakia$$dJune 6-8, 2018$$aCentral European Conference on Cryptology
000264911 8560_ $$ffatih.balli@epfl.ch
000264911 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/264911/files/MORE2.pdf$$s532872
000264911 909C0 $$pLASEC$$mfatih.balli@epfl.ch$$0252183$$zGrolimund, Raphael$$xU10433
000264911 909CO $$pconf$$pIC$$ooai:infoscience.epfl.ch:264911
000264911 960__ $$afatih.balli@epfl.ch
000264911 961__ $$aalain.borel@epfl.ch
000264911 973__ $$aEPFL$$rREVIEWED
000264911 980__ $$aCONF
000264911 981__ $$aoverwrite