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conference paper
A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets
January 1, 2018
2018 International Conference On Smart Energy Systems And Technologies (Sest)
We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian duality to model the problem as a n-person non-cooperative game with a unique generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We provide a distributed algorithm which converges to the GNE. The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated by means of numerical simulations.
Use this identifier to reference this record
Type
conference paper
Web of Science ID
WOS:000450802300063
Authors
Publication date
2018-01-01
Publisher
Published in
2018 International Conference On Smart Energy Systems And Technologies (Sest)
ISBN of the book
978-1-5386-5326-5
Publisher place
New York
Peer reviewed
REVIEWED
EPFL units
Event name | Event place | Event date |
Sevilla, SPAIN | Sep 10-12, 2018 | |
Available on Infoscience
December 13, 2018