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conference paper
A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets
January 1, 2018
2018 International Conference On Smart Energy Systems And Technologies (Sest)
We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian duality to model the problem as a n-person non-cooperative game with a unique generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We provide a distributed algorithm which converges to the GNE. The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated by means of numerical simulations.
Type
conference paper
Web of Science ID
WOS:000450802300063
Authors
Publication date
2018-01-01
Publisher
Published in
2018 International Conference On Smart Energy Systems And Technologies (Sest)
ISBN of the book
978-1-5386-5326-5
Publisher place
New York
Peer reviewed
REVIEWED
EPFL units
Event name | Event place | Event date |
Sevilla, SPAIN | Sep 10-12, 2018 | |
Available on Infoscience
December 13, 2018
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