000256717 001__ 256717
000256717 005__ 20190619220043.0
000256717 037__ $$aREP_WORK
000256717 245__ $$aExploring the diversity of social preferences: Is a heterogeneous population evolutionarily stable under assortative matching?
000256717 260__ $$c2018
000256717 269__ $$a2018
000256717 300__ $$a46
000256717 336__ $$aWorking Papers
000256717 520__ $$aWhy do individuals make different decisions when confronted with similar choices? This paper investigates whether the answer lies in an evolutionary process. Our analysis builds on recent work in evolutionary game theory showing the superiority of a given type of preferences, homo moralis, in fitness games with assortative matching. We adapt the classical definition of evolutionary stability to the case where individuals with distinct preferences in a population coexist. This approach allows us to establish the characteristics of an evolutionarily stable population. Then, introducing an assortment matrix for assortatively matched interactions, we prove the existence of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population in 2x2 symmetric fitness games under constant assortment, and we identify the conditions for its existence. Conversely to the classical setting, we find that the favored preferences in a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population are context-dependent. As an illustration, we discuss when and how an evolutionarily stable population made of both selfish and moral individuals exists in a prisoner's dilemma. These findings offer a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed diversity of preferences among individuals.
000256717 6531_ $$aSocial Preferences
000256717 6531_ $$aHomo moralis
000256717 6531_ $$aPreference evolution
000256717 6531_ $$aEvolutionary Game Theory
000256717 6531_ $$aAssortative matching
000256717 6531_ $$aHomophily
000256717 700__ $$g260801$$aAyoubi, Charles Chadi$$0249456
000256717 700__ $$0248793$$aThurm, Boris$$g192957
000256717 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/256717/files/Exploring%20the%20diversity%20of%20social%20preferences.pdf$$zPREPRINT$$s688363
000256717 8560_ $$f260801@epfl.ch
000256717 909C0 $$xU10252$$pLEURE$$mphilippe.thalmann@epfl.ch$$0252124
000256717 909C0 $$0252155$$xU11004$$pCEMI$$malexandra.vonschack@epfl.ch
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000256717 960__ $$aboris.thurm@epfl.ch
000256717 961__ $$apierre.devaud@epfl.ch
000256717 973__ $$aEPFL$$sSUBMITTED$$rREVIEWED
000256717 980__ $$aREP_WORK
000256717 981__ $$aoverwrite