Notice détaillée
Titre
Radanovic, Goran
Sciper ID
211310
Laboratoires affiliés
LIA
Publications
A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Non-binary Signals
Elicitation and Aggregation of Crowd Information
Incentive Schemes for Participatory Sensing
Incentives for Subjective Evaluations with Private Beliefs
Incentives for Truthful Information Elicitation of Continuous Signals
Incentivizing Truthful Responses with the Logarithmic Peer Truth Serum
Information Gathering with Peers: Submodular Optimization with Peer-Prediction Constraints
Learning to Scale Payments in Crowdsourcing with PropeRBoost
Mechanismen zur Beschaffung korrekter Daten
Partial Truthfulness in Minimal Peer Prediction Mechanisms with Limited Knowledge
Voir toutes les publications (13)
Elicitation and Aggregation of Crowd Information
Incentive Schemes for Participatory Sensing
Incentives for Subjective Evaluations with Private Beliefs
Incentives for Truthful Information Elicitation of Continuous Signals
Incentivizing Truthful Responses with the Logarithmic Peer Truth Serum
Information Gathering with Peers: Submodular Optimization with Peer-Prediction Constraints
Learning to Scale Payments in Crowdsourcing with PropeRBoost
Mechanismen zur Beschaffung korrekter Daten
Partial Truthfulness in Minimal Peer Prediction Mechanisms with Limited Knowledge
Voir toutes les publications (13)
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Authorities > People