

Connecting space and justice in metropolitan Porto. The discourses of inhabitants on the spatial dimension of justice

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Abstract

This investigation on spatial justice, while being fundamental research, has empirical pertinence and operational quality in the form of a justice-minded urbanism. Connecting the concreteness of cities with the societal objectives of development and of justice lays at the heart of the relationship between space and justice that this thesis sets out to develop. This project proposes an encounter among erudite studies on space, justice and spatial justice and between these theories and the discourses of citizens on what matters for justice in space. A theoretical contribution (a program for a theory of spatial justice) intersects an empirical *terrain*, based on the metropolitan area of Porto. Exploratory interviews with a sample of this society allow the participants to determine the themes of pertinence to discuss the spatial dimension of justice. Listening to what the inhabitants of metropolitan Porto have to say about injustice and their habitat produces a better understanding on the ways in which space and ethics are related in this society.

Does space matter for justice? How do individuals problematize injustice through space? Is there one or several spatial justice conception in the society? Are individuals "coherent" or do they affiliate with different political-philosophical orientations in function of the themes at stake? In the pursuit of answers to these questions we conceive space and justice as two separate planes. We are interested in seeing the specific contribution of deontological components (rationality, impartiality and reasonableness) and ideas of justice (equality and freedom and their interrelations) vis-à-vis the proper spatial imagination of inhabitants. We arrive at the conclusion that there is a strong interconnection between the ways in which inhabitants treat these two dimensions in their configuration of spatial injustices and the proposition of their contraries. The capacity to imagine space as a resource for society's development project co-varies with the comprehensiveness of the "materials of justice" which are implied in the reversal of injustice. We identify that there is a proper ethical capacity involved in telling the just and that such capacity has varying degrees in different individuals.

Through the quantitative and qualitative exploration of the corpus we observe that there are today, in Porto, ten different ways of connecting space and justice. Two main fields – one located in an epoch of morality and the other in ethics – compose contrasting urban problems: societal versus non-societal scales, metrics of continuity or of separateness, and varying degrees of complexity of the substance of space. These contradictions confirm the idea that urbanism needs to be a political process, inclusive of all voices of a society holding different spatial justice conceptions, yet working towards their convergence as well. A theory of spatial justice can support the actors in detecting the reasons for their disagreements and in their reconstructive work towards the consensus of spatial-ethical values.

Key words: space, ethics, spatial justice, city, urbanism, capability, Porto.

Abstrait

Cette enquête porte sur la justice spatiale. Si ce travail est d'abord mené dans le champ de la recherche fondamentale, il a aussi une pertinence empirique et cherche à produire des conséquences opérationnelles pour un urbanisme soucieux de justice. Le lien entre la facette concrète des villes et des objectifs sociétaux de développement et de justice constitue le cœur du rapport entre espace et justice exploré dans cette thèse. Ce projet offre une rencontre entre les études érudites portant sur l'espace, la justice, la justice spatiale et les arguments des citoyens sur ce qui, dans l'espace, relève de la justice. La contribution théorique (un programme pour une théorie de justice spatiale) rencontre le terrain empirique, basé sur l'aire métropolitaine de Porto. Les interviews menées à partir d'un échantillon de la société permettent aux participants de déterminer les thèmes jugés pertinents pour approcher la dimension spatiale de la justice. En écoutant ce que les habitants de Porto ont à dire sur les injustices et sur leur habitat nous avons une meilleure compréhension des manières dont espace et éthique sont liés dans cette société.

Est-ce que l'espace compte pour la justice ? Comment les individus problématisent les injustices à travers l'espace ? Y a-t-il une ou plusieurs conceptions de justice spatiale dans la société ? Les individus sont-ils cohérents ou adhèrent-ils à des orientations de philosophie politique différentes selon l'enjeu abordé ? Pour répondre à ces questions, nous traitons d'abord espace et justice comme deux plans séparés. Nous portons notre intérêt sur l'apport spécifique d'éléments déontologiques (rationalité, impartialité et *raisonnabilité*) et d'idées de justice (égalité, liberté, et interrelations entre les deux notions) au regard de l'imagination proprement spatiale des habitants. Nous arrivons à la conclusion qu'il existe une très forte interconnexion entre les manières dont les habitants traitent ces deux dimensions dans leur conception des injustices spatiales et leur définition d'un espace vu comme plus juste. La capacité de chacun à imaginer l'espace comme une ressource pour le développement d'un projet de société varie avec l'exhaustivité des matériels de justice qu'ils impliquent à la fois dans leur reconnaissance d'injustices mais aussi dans leurs propositions de changement. Nous avons identifié qu'il existe une capacité éthique mise en œuvre et variable selon les individus lorsqu'il s'agit de dire le juste.

À travers plusieurs études (qualitatives et quantitatives) du corpus d'entretiens, nous observons qu'il existe aujourd'hui, à Porto, dix manières différentes de lier espace et justice. Deux grands champs, l'un situé dans une époque morale et l'autre dans un âge proprement éthique, définissent des problèmes urbaines contrastées : échelles sociétales ou non-sociétales, métriques de continuité ou au contraire de séparation, degrés de complexité variables de la substance constitutive de l'espace. Ces contradictions montrent la nécessité pour l'urbanisme d'engager un processus politique, incluant toutes les voix de la société qui portent les différentes conceptions de la justice spatiale et qui contribue à ses convergences. Une théorie de la justice spatiale peut aider les acteurs à mieux comprendre les raisons des désaccords et à effectuer un travail de reconstruction dirigé vers un consensus des valeurs éthico-spatiales.

Mots-clés: espace, éthique, justice spatiale, ville, urbanisme, capabilité, Porto.

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Introduction

Many actors, including European Union parties involved in the construction of a “European Urban Agenda”, consider it unquestionable that cities have a role to play in facing increasingly complex societal challenges.¹ Seeing cities as resources for the future of Europe is accompanied by the idea that these can help translate “national and EU policy objectives into concrete action.” (European Commission, 2015, p. 3). The idea of “concreteness” and “societal objectives” lays at the heart of the encounter between justice and space which this thesis sets out to develop. Specifically, this research explores the spatial dimension of justice by listening to what inhabitants of the metropolitan area of Porto have to say about injustice and their habitat. The objective of this research is to better understand the ways in which space and ethics are related in the ideality and experience of the society of metropolitan Porto. This empirical *terrain* is supported by the critical review of a selection of theories of space, theories of justice (and of morality) and of theories of spatial justice. The thesis proposes an encounter among these erudite studies and between the latter and the discourses of the citizens.

The dialogue between philosophy and social science proposed in this work postulates space and ethics as objects at the heart of *the social*.² The fact that space is a social construction is by now a solid theoretical acquisition. It has been reaffirmed in the last forty years through the centrality of actors in space making through spatiality, namely by Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault (Lévy & Lussault, 2003).³ Space is one of the planes of the multi-dimensionality of a society, concerned with the co-inhabiting solutions which humans construct in the face of the existence of distance. In this work we postulate that ethics can also be conceptualised as a construction of a society. We can see ethics as an infrastructural object belonging to a superior hierarchy in the explicative factors of society (Godelier, 1984/2010). We can also imagine it as an intermediate level linked to the productive sphere of social organisation. Ethics participates in the making of society by enabling convergence whenever interdependence between members of society is at stake, and when some shared values are needed to support cooperation. It is in this sense that we can talk of a proper ethical dimension that enters in a multi-dimensional model of society. It is a plane dedicated to the configuration of shared values capable of generating convergence in all productions that articulate the *living together* of society’s actors.⁴

Space brings us to think of justice in the context of the *actorisation* of society, foregrounding the contribution of spatial *systhémisme* for development. Space also mobilises ethics at the core of its specific construction of the social world. These are central ideas to the notion of spatial justice explored in this thesis. These ideas require reviewing the existing erudite discourses on space, justice and spatial justice,

¹ “Europe continues to be faced with challenges related to the economy, the climate, the environment, and society at large. Most of these challenges have a strong urban dimension. With almost three quarters of Europeans living in cities, it is clear that Europe needs its cities to win its battles.” (European Commission, 2015, p. 3). The societal challenges portrayed in this reference text include demographic change, urban poverty, migration, climate change (p. 3).

² *The social* refers to the ensemble of society’s components and their dynamic interrelation. For the definition of these components see chapter 1, “The premise of the concept of society”.

³ The concepts of space and spatiality, referring to the englobing spatial layout supporting or restraining individual choices and the spatial expression of the individual are explained in chapter 2, “Contemporary acquisitions of spatial thought”.

⁴ The geometry presented in this introduction is hesitant. It is part of the project to better define what the position of ethics is in relation to empirical spatial matters. The term *commutator* designates the idea that ethics is dependent of the substance of other social dimensions which it articulates (within and across social planes). The idea of a proper ethical plane suggests that ethics constructs its own objects (in ideality and materiality), environments and demands properly ethical actions, that can be articulated or not with other social dimensions. In both configurations the role of ethics is to participate in the making of society by enabling convergence whenever interdependence between members of society is at stake and when some shared values are needed to support cooperation, deliberation or individual choice. The expression *living together* expresses the common challenge of ethics and of space of solving with others the constraints and the possibilities of inhabiting the same world, but also the same cities (Lévy, 2006).

attempting to intersect the theoretical planes of space and justice in a more synthetic way than what they presently do. Reorganising these theoretical sources privileges the angle of *sociétalité* of justice and space. Five themes are considered in the exploration of *sociétalité* of the view of the social deployed in these works: society's open horizon (1), the dimensional production of society (2), the role of actors in that production (3), interacting with environments and social objects (4), and the imagined pragmatics towards that horizon (5). The translation of these themes into domains of the spatial (chapters 1 and 2), the ethos (chapter 4) and spatial justice (chapter 5) is the file rouge of the first part of our work: *Part I: Erudite theories for an encounter of space and justice*.

Chapter 1, "The premise of a concept of society", introduces the concept of society that underpins our thesis. Questions of individual and collective values place the dialogic individual/society as a central epistemic advance, not only of social and spatial theory, but also as a part of theories of justice. The first section of this chapter (section 1.1) reflects the hybridity of social and spatial theory developed over the last forty years in francophone social science (Géopoint, 2016). We also engage with a diachronic evolution from antagonistic to dialogic views of the concepts of individual and the society. We briefly annotate the sociological contributions of Durkheim, Elias, Bourdieu, Lahire, and Boltanski and Thévenot to the possibility of studying space and ethics as social constructs (section 1.2).

Chapter 2, "Contemporary acquisitions of spatial thought", observes the movement from Lefebvre's paradigm of the production of space (section 2.1) to its constant making by the actors (section 2.2). The *paradigme actoriel* recognises the existence of actors and their *marge de manoeuvre* to interact with space. The malleability of spatial environments opens the *chantier* of the societal convergence of individuals' use of their freedom in space: a habitat. The dialectical moments in Lefebvre's production of space are revisited with the system of concepts of Lussault and Lévy (Lévy & Lussault, 2003): space as a dimension of society and a multidimensional object, space as *idéel* and material, the couple of spatiality and space, the concept of habitat as a political requirement, the idea of spatial capital.

Chapter 3, "Urbanity at stake", locates the problematics of spatial justice at the main scale with which this thesis is concerned, that is, the urban scale. The themes that preoccupy the theory of spatial justice at this scale have been treated since the emergence of urban sociology (section 3.1). We find the more recent grounds for spatial justice in the heritage of Lefebvre's epistemic and political agenda for urban space (section 3.2). Detached from the original Marxist matrix, we retain the definition of the urban as difference brought together and the "right to the city" as a form of entitlement to concentration, against the inhabitant's exclusion from participating in the life of the urban society. We also recover the ethical appeal to the necessity of knowledge and a form of urbanism which is based on the explicit enunciation of the ideological implications of space. Density and diversity, degrees of urbanity and modes of living together, and the city as political project with *marge de manoeuvre*, transpose the Lefebvrian themes to the paradigm of actors that sustains this research (section 3.3). Spatial justice at the scale of urban society foregrounds the problematic of coexistence, in heterogeneous societies, of inhabitants with potentially divergent spatial practices and spatial conceptions. This underlies the importance of inclusive construction of a collective project where space is a resource and justice is the horizon. Freed from the centrality of the proletariat we can investigate a mode of urbanism where the ideality of all inhabitants matters.

Postulating the ethos as a social product implies recognising its historicity, whereby some conceptions may become less fruitful for approaching the social in the contemporary construction of ethics. Chapter 4, "Contributions from erudite discourses on justice", explores the contributions of the intellectual production of moral and political philosophy to society's construction of ethical values in contemporary societies.⁵ We

⁵ In this work we use the term *ethos* to name the ensemble of cultural productions which relate to the persuasive force of an argument, capable of orientating an ethical or moral action. It is a field more englobing than justice and ethics, including costume and habit as well as a politically constructed identification of a sense of rightness. For simplicity we do at times use justice – which concerns only part of the resources of the ethos – when ethos would be the more accurate term. This simplification occurs when the scope of

start by identifying that the (erudite or popular) recognition of such pragmatic – rather than a transcending imposition of norms – is a determinant feature of an epoch of ethics in the historicity of the ethos, opposed to morality as its predecessor (section 4.1). Through the hybridisation of languages originating in each field (that is, justice and socio-spatial theories), we attempt to translate the themes of *sociétalité* already alluded to (particularly in chapters 1, 2, 4 and 5): the horizon and the pragmatics of justice, and in particular how they rely on the interactions of actors, environments and social objects.

The exposition of the complete *sociétalité* of Amartya Sen's *Idea of justice* identifies the concepts of justice – the ideas of justice and the deontological components – that are used throughout the review of erudite discourses and the conceptions of the inhabitants of Porto (section 4.2). Sen is also the support to present the dialogue between affect and cognition involved in the reasoning of justice. This section is followed by the reconstruction of justice theories of incomplete *sociétalité*: Rawls's Justice as fairness (section 4.3), the Complex equality of Walzer (section 4.4), Taylor's Multiculturalism (section 4.5), Young's Politics of difference (section 4.6).⁶ The third group assembles theories with lower *sociétalité* (sections 4.7–4.11). A theory of justice capable of apprehending citizens' claims must go as far as their seeing that possibility. In this sense, discourses which do not conceive of the political function, or have a highly defective horizon of justice, are less ambitious than what contemporary societies demand and, we argue, less promising for the pragmatics of spatial justice. Through this angle, Utilitarianism, Marxism, Libertarianism, desert-based theories, Christian morality are briefly reviewed. The identification of the logics of these resources from the ethos is pertinent to interpret the inhabitants' discourses that might use them.

Chapter 5, *Space and justice, theories of an encounter*, starts by reviewing the approach to spatial justice in the recent work of Jacques Lévy, with whom this work has been constructed (section 5.1). This author defines spatial justice as a co-production between the individuals and the society, taking into account spatial productivity in the generation of resources for solidarity in the different dimensions of society. Spatial justice is seen as a composite object with a cognitive-objective case and an affective-objective facet. Lévy's contribution proposes a method of singular/universal thought. Among other concepts, the notion of public goods interprets Sen's idea capability, decoupled into competence and capacity. These two components of capability reflect the interrelation of spatiality and space, the individual and society, in objectives of development. This chapter also enters into communication with other authors working on spatial justice. Having reaffirmed Lefebvre's heritage, we present a selection of the existing literature (section 5.2): Harvey, Soja and Dikeç interpret Lefebvre's work in a divergent direction than the one of this thesis, while the work of Fainstein is tangential to Lefebvre's contribution to spatial justice. Despite the wealth of this ensemble of works, these theories pose unnecessary constraints to the horizon of possibilities of spatial justice.

The conclusion of part I presents, in fifteen statements, the ideas that we think are necessary to offer for a debate in the development of a theory of spatial justice.

Part II, "The voices of spatial justice. Discourses of the inhabitants of metropolitan Porto", develops the empirical chantier of this thesis. We are concerned with an encounter between space and justice pertinent

the communication is to locate the message in the plane of justice rather than space and when the distinction between ethics and morality is not central to the point which is being made. For the references supporting this definition of the ethos see section 4.1, "An approach to the social construction of the ethos".

⁶ This naming of the theories uses excerpts of the books, chapters or articles where the authors present their theories. "Justice as fairness" is the title of the first chapter of Rawls's *A Theory of justice*; "Complex equality" is the title of a Walzer's article; *Multiculturalism* is the title of a book edited by Charles Taylor; *Justice and the politics of difference* is the full title of the main reference this thesis uses to apprehend Iris Marion Young's idea of justice.

for the society. Ensuring this *pertinence*, in tension with the *coherence* and *accessibility* attempted in part I,⁷ leads to the construction of a concrete empirical object, based on the urban area of Porto.

Chapter 6, “Methodology, the construction of an empirical object”, presents the method and techniques used in the empirical work. This approach to spatial justice via the discourses of the inhabitants privileges ideality as the entry point to a systemic data collection, though the experience of the space of Porto is also part of our study. In the method section (6.1), we present the research questions and hypotheses, the choice of the city of Porto, the method of individual interviews and the cognitive demarche of explicative comprehension guiding the exploration of the corpus. A second section of the chapter (6.2) details the interview guide, the sampling strategy, and the quantitative technique of textometry used in the analysis of the corpus together with in-depth qualitative reading. The chapter also provides an overview of the resulting corpus (section 6.3). The rationales of the seven studies exploring the corpus are here introduced in chronological order. The text *Porto* (section 6.4) is a hybrid object, fed by many different sources. It does not intend to be the product of the systematic study of the inhabitants’ discourses of spatial justice yet. It is a description of the city of Porto from the perspective of the researcher, an informative tool for those who do not know the city or its recent transformation. In a way, this text substitutes an interview of the researcher to herself, as a non-permanent inhabitants of Porto, constructed in very favourable conditions of reflexivity and contact with the views of others. The “Narrative” text (section 6.5) is the last methodological element of this chapter. It exposes, diachronically, the research mobiles and the experience of the research process. It allows for subjective elements to emerge.

Chapter 7, “The *sociétalité* of spatial justice”, presents four views of the corpus. The first (section 7.1), dating from May 2015, identifies the initial interpretative hypothesis: there are degrees of *sociétalité* of spatial justice, denoting the inclusiveness of the other on the behalf of whom injustice is denounced and the complexity of space is mobilised in the demands of justice. We present twelve types, defined through the qualitative interpretation of the corpus, upon which are based the textometry contrastive analyses. The second text, “The words of spatial justice”, presents the study of the specific vocabularies of these twelve types (section 7.2). It organises the lexicon according to the semantic fields of justice and space and proposes to understand the discourses through the angle of *discursive registers* at play, and the complexity of the social to which the specific lexicon points to.⁸ The qualitative return to the corpus with this key raises the explicative hypothesis of the role of the spatiality – that is, of the experience of social realities through contact in space – in the construction of contrasting conceptions of spatial justice. A third text, “Ten encounters between space and justice”, presents the refinement of the types which results from the complete series of textometry studies and the qualitative reading of the corpus (section 7.3). The types are now seen as “pure” coordinates, attached to an affiliation from the spectrum of the ethos, including the traits of the relationship between actors, society and environments found in such resources (as seen in chapters 4 and 5). Though reflecting the variation of conceptions found in Porto, these definitions are theoretical objects that can be transposed – at least in the form of hypotheses – to other societies. A final section presents a synthetic portrait of the ideality of metropolitan Porto (section 7.4). We present our thesis: the capacity to imagine space as a resource for the society’s development project co-varies with the comprehensiveness of the ideas of justice implied in the horizon of progress of the reversal of injustice. We identify that there is a proper ethical capacity involved in telling the just (spatially) and that it admits varying degrees. This chapter ends with the geographical distribution of the conceptions of spatial justice in the urban are of Porto.

⁷ For the definition of these three poles of tension in the scientific demarche see section a. in this Introduction, “Realist constructivism for a society of actors”.

⁸ The notion of discursive register is explored in the section b. in this Introduction “Ethics of reconstruction and the plural rationalities of actors”.

Chapter 8, “Unjust spaces and their contraries”, presents two complementary entry points into the corpus. The “Social housing geotype” details how the interviewees who consider social housing as an injustice configure the space of the problem and propose a solution (section 8.1). Through this singular theme, we confirm that the passage from denouncing injustice to telling the just is not performed with equal deontological strength by all the interviewees. The last study, “Individual geotypes, the interspatiality of spatial justice”, tests the preceding observations across a full set of spaces (and their scales, metrics and substances) through the in-depth treatment of two contrasting interviews (section 8.2). It focuses on the interaction between the spaces mobilised by these two discourses in the identification of injustice, that it their interspatiality.⁹ We try to understand how the lived singularity of space intimately links the narrative of these inhabitants with their argumentation. We discover that the contrast between these two conceptions of spatial justice stems from the positive/negative signal of their attitude towards non-familiarity and difference (alterity). The psyches of the inhabitants seems to be involved in the relationship with space and justice. This relationship is part of the individual world-view.

The conclusion of part II observes the hybridity of the interviewees between one or more conceptions. The interpretation of the hesitations between different conceptions found in the corpus enables us to trace some prospective horizons for the evolution of the ideality of spatial justice in the society of metropolitan Porto. The remaining conclusions of the part II respond to the research questions posed at the outset of the empirical terrain, restating the main theses developed in chapters 7 and 8. The final conclusion tries to englobe the discoveries of this research through the concept of ethical capital and then reinjects it into the definition of the idea of a justice-minded political urbanism. Our work ends with the stabilisation of the theoretical relationship between the planes of ethos and space.

Before we dive into this journey, two further expositions regarding epistemology and researcher ethics are developed in this introduction. To understand the proposed dialogue between the “savant” products of intellectual labourers and citizens’ constructions – each with its specificities – it is important to define the epistemological model of realist constructivism (see section a. below). Finally, we present the idea of ethics of reconstruction that animates this research and how it relates to the plural rationalities of actors (see section b.). We assume that there is a tension between procedural rationality involved in discussing matters of justice, and the understanding of experience and thought of the persons with whom we converse in order to construct a thesis about their ethical-spatial ideality.

Epistemology and research ethics

« La reconstruction ouvre cependant à la raison une voie d'activation des charges utopiques diluées à travers des pratiques sécularisés. » (Ferry, 1996, p. 111).

a. Realist constructivism for a society of actors

To understand the proposed dialogue between the “savant” products of intellectual labourers and the citizens’ constructions – each with its specificities – it is important to define the epistemological model of realist constructivism.¹⁰ Constructivism, advanced among others by Jean Piaget, defines cognition as an attempt to explore reality using the constructive cognitive apparatus of men (Lussault, Constructivism,

⁹ By interspatiality we designate the relationships established between two or more spaces. For the development of the definition see section 2.2.1 in chapter 2.

¹⁰ Epistemology is here defined as theories on the conditions of the possibility of scientific knowledge (Ferry, 2005/2006, p. 2).

2013, p. 225).¹¹ This approach rejects the unveiling of existing reality as a purely objective discovery (positivism), emphasising the crafting of the object of knowledge by the knowing subject in a given historical context (p. 224).¹² The invention of the knowledge act – mobilising a creative, productive, and reflexive attitude (Lévy, 1999a, pp. 32–35) – recognises that reality exists independently from the observer (p. 46). The realist versant of constructivism not only postulates the constructed character of knowledge, but extends it to all actors (Lussault, Constructivism, 2013, p. 225). This epistemological paradigm responds to the presence in the social world of actors with linguistic competence, a capacity to act, and the potential of reflexivity (pp. 52–53).¹³ In the line of the pragmatic works of John Dewey or Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot, realist constructivism takes the actors seriously because the social is made of their reasons (Lévy, 1999a, p. 45).¹⁴ It is in this sense that the intentionality of the actors is an advantage of social science vis-à-vis the study of unintended natural phenomena. Through the reasons of society's actors, social science provides an entry point to the logics that influence the development of the objects of study (Lévy, 1994, p. 36).¹⁵

Social science developed under this model then implies the return of its productions to society so to enable a better action in reality (Lévy, 1999a, pp. 31–2, 45).¹⁶ This potential of valorisation by society determines three guiding principles for research activities (with polarising demands that the researcher must manage): coherence, accessibility, and pertinence (pp. 31–34).¹⁷ Coherence demands the production of new statements (within economic and homogeneous discourses), differing from existing representations (p. 32). Theory is the ensemble of statements together with their «mode d'emploi», helping users to make the rational and the non-rational dimension of men as well as non-scientific rationalities intelligible (p. 46). Accessibility regards communication with the general public and with the scientific community, inscribing its creative dynamics in a relationship with the heritage of several disciplinary grounds. Pertinence demands proximity with empirics so that its objects respond to existing problematics. Such present-day pertinence does not enclose the objects of social science to the virtualities of a future horizon. On the contrary, the access to the logics of the actors, their context of action, and the *marge de manoeuvre* or progress desired by society's members (Lévy, 1994, pp. 45, 137–139) opens the chantier to what looks possible in the eyes of society at a given time.¹⁸

¹¹ See Lussault's suggested reading: Piaget, Jean (dir.) *Logique de connaissance scientifique*, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Galimard, 1967.

¹² This activity is thus not entirely individualistic but social in nature, as underlined by Kuhn (1977).

¹³ 'These competences are part of Lussault's definition of an actor, individual or collective. The actors constitute the smallest unit of society, in permanent interaction (Lussault, Actor, 2013, pp. 52, 53). See development of the concept of actor in chapter 1.

¹⁴ Other authors in this path are Charles Peirce, John Searle, Jean-Marc Ferry or Isabelle Stengers (Lévy, 1999a, p. 44).

¹⁵ « L'intentionnalité – le fait que les actions humaines préexistent dans les représentations des agents sous forme de finalités de la volonté ou du désir et les transforment ainsi en acteurs – a été paradoxalement utilisée contre l'autonomie des sciences sociales... L'intentionnalité constitue en fait un immense avantage sur les sciences de la nature, qui ne peuvent pas compter que sur une indétermination générale » (Lévy, 1994, p. 36).

¹⁶ « Le constructivisme réaliste pose le travail scientifique comme une activité consistant à élaborer des objets nouveaux avec la finalité de permettre une meilleure action, idéale ou matérielle, sur le monde extérieur. » (Lévy, 1999a, p. 45).

The antinomy between fundamental and applied research is circumvented. There is no contradiction between the aim of "basic research" to contribute to a theory under construction (Patton, 1980, p. 152) and the objective of applied research to "contribute knowledge that will help people to understand the nature of a problem so that human beings can more effectively control their environment" (pp. 153–155).

¹⁷ « Pour avancer dans cette perspective volontairement modeste (on ne sait si on va bien faire mais on voudrais au moins éviter de faire des bêtises), proposons un cadre de base qui se compose de trois principes élémentaires définissant le travail scientifique comme action de production de connaissances pouvant être valorisées dans la société toute entière » (Lévy, 1999a, p. 31).

¹⁸ Lévy synthesises this idea:

« Ce réalisme assume le tournant linguistico-pragmatique, c'est-à-dire, le fait que l'ensemble du réel social est marqué dans toutes sa chair par la forte présence d'acteurs doués de parole. Cela a pour conséquence de complexifier l'objet, mais aussi de faciliter l'accès à ces logiques. » (Lévy, 1999a, p. 45).

b. Ethics of reconstruction and the plural rationalities of actors

The existence of actors with reflexivity implies a specific cognitive attitude. It also implies the realisation that the study of the rationality of the actors can make room for five different types in increasing orders of complexity (Ferry, 2005/2006, pp. 21–26).¹⁹ The first, *rationality in finality*, regards the comprehension of the means organising an action given a goal. It concerns technical, strategic, and instrumental reasons. The second, *nomological* rationality, regards the conformity of an action with social norms. The study of *axiological* rationality considers the consistence between an action and the system of values chosen by the actor.²⁰ The last level is that of procedural rationality. It is founded upon the distinction between “ethic of conviction” and “ethic of responsibility”. The latter goes beyond the recognition of one’s own values to consider convictions that are not one’s own (and without presuming such convictions, such as through the morality Golden Rule). Procedural rationality of the actor implies the predisposition to “form together a political will” (pp. 24–25).²¹ Ferry considers that this rationality responds to the problem of modern highly individualistic societies where the possibility to elect one’s values can near anarchy or “collective irrationality”.²² Procedural rationality is at the heart of the interrogation of contemporary political philosophy (p. 23). It is the type of rationality that the study of reasons of justice implies. It is bound with the discursive register of argumentation, obliging the parties to de-centre themselves, opening the way to universalisation (Ferry, 1996, pp. 56–57). It is the register of “formal rights, human rights, liberty, equality and other universalising values” (Ferry, 1995).

We are interested in a particular kind of reasoning attached to the realm of habit. Here, objectivity is not the sole legitimate register of a relationship with the world, and so, the construction of the empirical data will not obligate the interviewees to move strictly in procedural rationality. Another reason for this choice relies on the actual feasibility of doing otherwise. Indeed, Ferry associates the discursive registers of actors with a historical sequence of communicational attitudes: narrative, interpretation, argumentation, and reconstruction. These modes of discourse are “historical potencies forming identity and the comprehension of the world” (Ferry, 1996, p. 34).²³ They are also synchronic in the development of individuals or even in the unfolding of a communicative process (Ferry, 1995). From the diachronic reading of the history of societies, argumentation is the dominant contemporary register (Ferry, 1996, p. 35). The order of argumentation “is no longer an order of facts and events like that of narrative, nor is it an order of causes and laws, like in interpretation, but an order of reasons...” (Ferry, 1995). It translates the weakening of the common base of interpretation found in traditional societies.²⁴

Part of the epistemological model of realist constructivism is also the horizontality of the *idéel* and material spheres of social phenomena in the explication of the social.

¹⁹ In the French original version, the five types are: 1) rationalité en finalité, 2) nomologique, 3) axiologique, 4) argumentative and 5) reconstructive (Ferry, 2005/2006). Ferry presents two separate orders, one dedicated to the complexity of rationalities and another to discursive registers (Ferry, 1996; 1995). We try to synthesise these two propositions into one single structure, assuming that the discourse and the reasoning develop in pairs.

²⁰ It implies a superior reflexivity from the actor than the previous rationalities, for he may choose to deviate from norms, given reasons he considers to be satisfactory.

²¹ The transition between the two more complex types of reasons is operated by a fifth modality, an axiological rationality that activates responsibility without entering the ethic of discussion.

²² « D’où la question rémanente de la philosophie politique moderne et contemporaine, depuis Thomas Hobbes jusqu’à John Rawls, aujourd’hui : comment réaliser une communauté cohérente, un consensus politique dans les sociétés individualistes ? La solution à ce problème réside dans le principe d’une *rationalité procédurale*. » (Ferry, 2005/2006, p. 23).

²³ « Plus fondamentalement, ces modes de discours peuvent aussi être regardés comme des puissances historiques de formation d’identité et de compréhension du monde. » (Ferry, 1996, p. 34).

²⁴ « Les sociétés traditionnelles étaient suffisamment homogènes, en ce qui concerne les expériences vécues, pour que les histoires que l’on se racontait puissent aisément être comprises et partagées par les autres, elles étaient au fond typiques. De telle sorte que également, comme les expériences n’étaient pas très divergentes, et qu’il y avait un fond de sens commun assuré, par exemple, par

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Characteristics /Discursive registers	Narrative	Interpretation	Argumentation	Reconstruction
Modes of comprehension of the world	Event and intrigue	Destiny	Reason and law	History and language
Interaction between the parties	Telling/listening	Explain/understand	Public deliberation between proponents and opponent	Cooperative elucidation
Risks of violence in the register	Omission, indiscretion, lies	Excessive generalisation, deformation	Excessive inferences, isolation of arguments from the context	Susceptible to particularism
Sense of validity	Event (real or fictive)	Récit (signification)	Discourse with pretension to "intense validity" (scientific knowledge)	Discourse with pretension to recognition (mediated procedure)

Table 1 Four discursive registers and their characteristics (Ferry, 1995).

Ferry considers argumentation insufficient in the understanding of contemporary plural societies.²⁵ He observes that a reconstructive ethic is emerging as the predisposition of contemporary actors to use historic elements in the construction of a coherent identity, an identity which is mobilised in the connection with difference (Ferry, 1996, p. 32).²⁶ This register integrates all the previous three at a higher level of reflexivity and cooperation (Ferry, 1995).²⁷ It is marked by the willingness to collaborate and review one's perspective. Reconstruction proposes to "de-centre narratives", structuring them through arguments without losing contact with the lived singularity that intimately links narrative and argumentation. In other words, reconstruction fabricates a new narrative where the experience of the actors and the demands of reasonableness are tied together:²⁸

« C'est l'idée d'une relecture en profondeur de son propre récit, comme une « deuxième narration », mais qui a pris en compte le récit des autres, ainsi que les arguments susceptibles d'établir le juste et l'injuste devant tout un chacun. » (Ferry, 1996, p. 62).

Reconstruction can take the form of interpersonal communication and reciprocal recognition, opposed to the register of contestation, defence, and justification with which Ferry defines argumentation.²⁹ It can surmount the limitations of inconclusive argumentation by drawing attention to the background of lived

les religions, des croyances partagées, il était tout à fait possible de tirer des morales de l'histoire, des conclusions interprétatives de ces narrations, qui soient largement admises. Tel est le sens de la loi des sociétés traditionnelles. » (Ferry, 1995).

²⁵ We will see (chapter 4) that the liberal separation between the right and the good in Rawls (section 4.3) or Michael Walzer's pluralism of values (section 4.4) has attempted to respond to the ethical difficulties of this diversity.

²⁶ « C'est à l'époque contemporaine que la reconstruction est devenu elle-même un style. Cela vaut pour la littérature, avec le roman moderne, mais aussi en philosophie, avec la phénoménologie, et encore, dans les sciences humaines, avec l'herméneutique des traditions. Plus généralement, dans les différents domaines de la culture, jusque dans les pratiques institutionnelles, comme la justice, l'éducation, les actions sociales de réinsertion, les prises de charge psychothérapeutiques, sans oublier les stratégies plus politiques de restitutions des mémoires nationales ou de restauration d'identités culturelles menacées, le principe reconstructif se manifeste par la recherche d'éléments proprement historiques dont la récollection permet aux identités personnelles, individuelles ou collectives, de s'assurer face aux autres une structure cohérente et significative. » (Ferry, 1996, p. 32).

²⁷ « La reconstruction est un concept difficile parce qu'elle intègre tous les registres mais à un degré plus réflexif et plus coopératif. » (Ferry, 1995).

²⁸ In the vocabulary of Ferry, it is the idea of acceptability that brings us to the concept of reasonableness, which we will review in chapter 4 (see section 4.2.2 *Deontological demands of public reasoning*).

²⁹ This is illustrated with a "micro" case of an interpersonal communication in which individuals want to reach mutual understanding (Ferry, 1995).

experience against which arguments are accepted or not, lived as a violence or considered without force (Ferry, 1995).³⁰ The author clarifies: “the argument is subtle: the reasons in relation to which one consents to a norm, in argumentation, do not cover thematically the reasons for which one can accept such arguments” (Ferry, 1996, p. 110).

Ferry illustrates this effort of re-reading in depth one’s own narrative in the form of interpersonal communication. But he also includes cases where the effort of self-reflexivity and self-critique is addressed to the entire society.³¹ In our appropriation of the notion we imagine that the reconstructive ethic can be transposed to a spectrum of political modalities, including representative democracy and its support in public debate. Coherently, reconstruction should inform the knowledge that supports such public debate.

If indeed reconstruction is an emerging ethic in a society of actors, it results that the researcher can “propose an evaluation of the rationality manifested by the actor’s practice.” (Ferry, 2005/2006, p. 26)³² He can adopt an attitude of judgement of the validity of the reasons, but he cannot presuppose that his reflexivity is superior to that of the participants (p. 26).³³ From the description of Porto in chapter 6, we can hypothesise that several styles of rationality, expressed in different communicative registers, are synchronic in today’s Porto. To treat this spectrum of reflexivity, we have employed the “reconstructive ethic” as a cognitive style. In the scientific method deployed in this thesis, enhancing the understanding of the social implies changing oneself with the contribution of all the voices that enter into dialogue with us and are listened to with equal attentiveness. Reconstruction as a cognitive demarche also implies the possibility of finding veracity in all social positions with which to propose a new plausible synthetic reading. In the horizon of generalised reconstructive ethic among all actors, scientific knowledge of the social may

³⁰ « Donc, la reconstruction, quant à elle, s’engage toujours à considérer sous l’aspect de bonnes raisons les éléments qui, rétrospectivement pour les intéressés, fondent leur acceptation ou non-acceptation des raisons émises au cours d’une argumentation. C’est ça la réflexivité supérieure de la reconstruction par rapport à l’argumentation. » ; « Dans la réalité, qui n’est jamais, par définition, une situation idéale de parole, la reconstruction a une mission tout à fait légitime et indiquée dans les cas pratiques pour aller voir sous les arguments qui ont été acceptés ou rejetés quels sont les vécus existentiels, les expériences au regard desquelles les raisons sont vécues éventuellement comme une violence ou comme n’ayant pas de force, pas de poids. » (Ferry, 1995). « Même à supposer qu’ensemble nous ayons pu d’aventure approcher quelque chose comme une situation idéale, où tous les arguments à disposition de chacun auraient pu également être portés à l’appréciation de tous, et pris au sérieux, sereinement discutés, librement examinés, rationnellement pesés et justement sanctionnés en conséquence, par rejet ou acceptation, dans le cours du processus. Même dans cette situation idéale d’argumentation nous pourrions toujours réclamer une reconstruction. L’argument et subtil: *les raisons au regard desquelles on consent à une norme, dans l’argumentation, ne recouvrent pas thématiquement les raisons pour lesquelles on a pu accepter ces arguments.* » (Ferry, 1996, p. 110).

³¹ « Les défenseurs d’une éthique argumentative de la discussion ont certes raison de considérer qui suivre la « loi de l’argumentation meilleur », comme dit Habermas, oblige les parties prenantes à se décentrer, en vertu d’une force interne à l’argumentation qui, d’elle-même, ouvre la perspective universaliste, sans qu’il soit besoin d’importer du dehors des contenus idéologiques, tels que, par exemple, les droits de l’homme. Mais la conception d’une éthique procédurale centrée sur l’argumentation laisse dans l’ombre l’intuition de la reconstruction. C’est d’idée qu’aucun procès d’entente ne peut réussir, dans des contextes conflictuels marqué par le destin de violences passés, si les sujets n’ont pas préalablement consenti à une relecture en profondeur de leur propre récit. Cette condition autoréflexive et autocritique est requise pour qui veut communiquer dans la non-violence. Par exemple, se réclamer des droits de l’homme, c’est, pour un peuple, commencer par faire le récit de toutes les atteintes qu’il a portées aux droits de l’homme. » (Ferry, 1996, pp. 56–57).

³² « C’est pourquoi, à ce niveau de rationalité, l’objectivation habituellement opérée par l’interprète ou le chercheur en sciences sociales, devient problématique. En effet, l’acteur social est, par construction, « équipé » maintenant des mêmes compétences « rationnelles » (cognitives et communicationnelles) que l’interprète. Ce dernier ne peut donc se situer en posture de surplomb intellectuel par rapport à l’acteur. Ou encore : l’acteur social ne peut plus être « réduit » à un sujet à propos duquel on pourrait sans plus conclure à un déficit de rationalité ; car il faudrait alors pouvoir établir que les raisons dont dispose l’interprète sont par principe supérieures à celles dont dispose l’acteur. Or, celui-ci est reconnu dans son aptitude à argumenter, c’est-à-dire à contester, le cas échéant, les raisons, arguments et jugements de l’interprète en sciences sociales (au sens large). Maintenant, ce dernier peut toujours « proposer » une évaluation de la rationalité manifestée par la pratique de l’acteur. Mais alors, il doit de toute façon abandonner l’attitude méthodique du questionnement (attitude dite « performative », à la deuxième personne) pour une attitude d’évaluation et de jugement, portant entre autres sur la validité des raisons elles-mêmes (attitude « réfléchissante » à la première personne). » (Ferry, 2005/2006, p. 26).

³³ As narrated in chapter 6 (section 6.5), I have indeed experienced interpreting interviews in relation to which I had lesser reflexivity and was in deficit of information.

abandon its current pretension to superior validity.³⁴ In that horizon, the production and consumption of “truth” may become more continuous and (increasingly) accessible to all members of society.³⁵ Our attempt to take reconstruction as a research ethic is more modest. We have applied a reconstructive method in as much as we have read an ensemble of voices with the scope of forming a new representation with their maximum integration.³⁶ This reconstructive effort applies both to the consideration of the erudite and of the inhabitants discourses. With regard to the former, we will try to show that a body of existing literature on justice and spatial justice does not apprehend fundamental themes of *sociétalité* (for example, the interrelatedness of actors and society). We can hypothesise that might be the case among other citizens. We do not dilute in general veracity the specific order of the legitimacy of scientific discourse on the social. As we will see in the conclusion to part I, the teleological and consequential elements of spatial justice theory demand an argumentative rationality, which is not coincident with a purely comprehensive attitude (recognition or symbolic reparation). We assume that there is a tension between the objectivity involved in discussing matters of justice and the subjective understanding of the experience and thought of the human beings with whom we conversed in order to construct a thesis about their ethical-spatial ideality. Given the cognitive contract that underpins this study, we have tried to favour the objective inclination. This is not to say that future uses made of this knowledge does not move more fully within an ethic of reconstruction.

³⁴ Ferry opposes reconstruction to the appreciation of statements in the terms of true or false or to the exactness of a scientific fact:

« À travers des énoncés critiquables en référence au vrai et au faux, on met en question l’exactitude d’un fait scientifique, ou encore la justesse d’une norme juridique, et l’on discute afin d’établir ce qui est acceptable du point de vue rationnel. Le but et de se mettre d’accord sur la validité, et le schéma mobilisé est celui des prétentions à la validité élevées de part et d’autre. Ces prétentions problématisables requièrent, certes, un proposant et un opposant, et, dans cette mesure, il existe avec l’argumentation une forme d’ouverture intersubjective. Mais, là, les protagonistes de la discussion regardent, pour ainsi dire, dans la même direction. Cependant, la reconstruction appelle, au-delà de l’entente, la reconnaissance réciproque. Ici, les subjectivités s’ouvrent plus directement et plus profondément les unes aux autres. Ce sont les deux qui analysent et les deux qui reconnaissent. En écoute mutuelle... » (Ferry, 1996, p. 59).

³⁵ Ferry offers the example of negotiation of plural arguments in the topic “places of memory” (1996, pp. 37–54). Narratives about deportation camps having served both soviet and national socialist regimes can conflict when two historical periods advance their reasons to be remembered in the same space. Truth implies constructing a place of memory from the interrelation of different idealities. This example of dialogical registers of truth regards space, but with fewer productive stakes than the ones we are considering.

³⁶ In this process, my own view changed, responding to the predisposition of reconstructive ethics.

Other technical information

We have opted not to translate the French and Portuguese citations. Their role in this thesis is mainly one of attestation of our interpretation of the sources, delivered through the juxtaposition of paraphrases and original passages. In this context, we found it more accurate to avoid the interpretation involved in any translation work. With regards to the content of the corpus of interviews, we also thought that keeping the linguistic nuances of the discourses was best assured by quoting the passages in the original language. In both cases, we find that the ideas paraphrased in the main body of the text are sufficient for the reader who does not read French or Portuguese to follow the thesis argument. Unfortunately, this choice means that the citations' role of attestation may not profit all readers.

Citations follow APA guidance.³⁷ One exception regards the in-text citation for the entries of the *Dictionnaire de la géographie et de l'espace des sociétés* (Lévy & Lussault) in the 2003 and 2013 versions. Against APA guidance, we have kept the title of the entry in the reference, as it seemed more readable than the multiplication of reference twins (that is, citations with same author and year).

Throughout the manuscript, we make references to other parts of the text using numbers of chapters, sections and points. Sections refer to sub-chapters, indicated with a two level heading (i.e. 7.1). Points refer to passages within sub-chapters and are numbered with three heading with three (i.e. 7.1.1) to six levels (i.e. 7.1.1.1.1.1). For simplicity, the table of contents shows only levels one to four.

³⁷ The American Psychological Association style.

Part I: Erudite theories for an encounter of space and justice.

1 The premise of the concept of society

The idea of justice goes hand in hand with a social horizon of transformation of what is considered unbearable, unfair, or open to improvement. This imagination justifies drawing common objectives and mobilising common resources, that is, “solidarity in development” (Lévy, 2013b). Space brings to this idea the notion of an active relationship between society and its members, a productive interaction of social components in a positive sum game. Space leads us to think of justice in the context of the “actorisation” of society, to foreground its systemic contributions towards development. Space also mobilises ethics at the core of the political pragmatics required by its social construction of the world. These are central ideas to the notion of spatial justice explored in this thesis. They all stem from the postulate on the dialogic view of the relationship individual/society. This chapter presents this postulate with two parallel strategies. It starts by endorsing the concept of society within the *paradigme actorielle* advanced by Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault. This concept reflects the hybridity of social and spatial theory developed over the last forty years in francophone social science (Géopoint, 2016). It brings to the fore the couple sociality/*sociétalité* in the reading of the social.

We then engage with the diachronic evolution from antagonistic to dialogic views of the concepts of individual and society in a timeline that spans from mid-nineteenth century to present and includes Durkheim, Elias, Bourdieu, Lahire, and Boltanski and Thévenot. With the reconstructive attitude that animates this research, we note the contributions of each of these authors to the possibility of studying space and ethics as social constructions. Durkheim’s observation of the weakening of morality based on the conception of ideality as a social fact is foundational to our possibility of studying justice in the conception of ordinary inhabitants. Bourdieu’s notion of individual capitals denotes the tension between the present and the horizon of a just society that subsists in an epoch of actors. With Elias, we can imagine universal ethics as a prospective social fact. Finally, Lahire, Boltanski, and Thévenot pave the path for pluralism in the interpretation of individuality opened by the intensification of the individual and of society in contemporary societies. The last two authors are also a central reference to the epistemological chantier connecting social science and political philosophy in which this research takes part.

1.1 The social and the spatial in a dimensional paradigm

The encounter between the social and the spatial that underlines our *démarche* can be broadly introduced via a paradigm of multidimensional complexity of society as a totality (Lévy, 1994, pp. 19–21, 44–46). This generates an *outillage général* of a pan-social transdisciplinarity that enables viewing all social sciences through each other’s disciplinary lenses (p. 135). At the core of this idea is the enunciation of societal dimensions – economic, sociological, political, spatial, historical, and individual. If this division accepts the historically institutionalised division of knowledge (Foucault, 1966/2005, p. 255),³⁸ such a postulate is also a proposition to address the tension between theory and empirics. Jacques Lévy proposes a configuration of social reality as a hierarchy of three levels of societal explication – dominance, production, and

³⁸ Such a division is to be taken as an “operational table” enabling thought to order our world (Foucault, 1966/2005, pp. 47-49), but it does not follow that an object should remain prisoner to the field where it has initially been made intelligible.

organisation³⁹ – positioning the pertinence of dimensions at the intermediate level of production of societal goods (Godelier, 1984/2010). The production of goods, responding to specific problems of our living together, is the empiric function of each societal plane. The epistemic corollary of this idea is the development of distinct disciplinary fields in social sciences, each of which is a vantage point to study the society around a type of good and its specific requirements. If economy is the plane where wealth is produced, economics is the study of such a production in interrelation with that of other social goods. A similar association articulates sociology and social relations; geography and space; history and time; politics and political legitimacy; and psychology and the individual (Lévy, 1994, pp. 44–46, 102). The transversal relationships between dimensions is part of the model. Lévy clarifies that the choice of a disciplinary entry point does not entail the explanatory ascendancy of that plane, each dimension being simultaneously partial and global (p. 46). Inversely, each discipline should have “universalistic” ambitions (p. 70). The découpage per dimension allows an in-depth understanding of the reality respecting the internal *systemism* of the object of study. It also enables the generation of concepts with which to dialogue with other disciplinary lenses (economy, psychology, etc.).

1.1.1 Actors, objects, environments

Taking into account the actor and his actions is central to contemporary social science of space in its distancing from Paul Vidal de La Blache’s science of places. This paradigm studies the “human in his being primarily a social reality” (Lussault, Actor, 2013, p. 52). This *inflexion actorielle*, developed since 1970 and accelerated during 1980–85 (p. 53), defines the actor as an “actant with an interiority, an intentionality, a strategic autonomous capacity, an enunciative capacity [*capacité énonciative*]” (p. 52).⁴⁰ Intentionality regards the pre-existence of a representation of the action in the form of will or desire (Lévy, 1994, p. 36).⁴¹ The ensemble of competences that makes an individual an actor – linguistic competence, the potential of reflexivity and action – are virtualities constructed for and through socialisation, enacted in interaction with the social. Though with different registers, these potencies apply to both individual and collective actors. When several actors assemble their intentionality under one or several common features, they produce a different sort of action. They constitute a collective actor or operator, even when there is an internal divergence on the strategies of the group (Lussault, Actor, 2013, p. 54).⁴² The postulate of the existence of individual and collective actors does not imply equality of competence. We can talk of an uneven capital:

³⁹ On the higher level, that of “dominance”, the author places the most explicative factors of a society, while on the third level reside the organisational ones constituted by the ensemble of material structures and structures of the *idéal* through which the production of the superior levels takes place. The intentional subjection of level three to level two corresponds to the rejection of a Marxist model of explication, reducing the social production of goods to the problem of their distribution. For level one, we can read:

«...en élargissant une notion proposé par Maurice Godelier, les structures de fond, qu’elles soient idéelles ou matérielles. La dominance contient ce qui est plus structurant de la vie sociale : état du rapport avec la nature, mode et niveau de développement, avancement des sciences et des techniques, place relative de la fabrication et de la création, conception du monde. C’est l’architecture générale selon laquelle une société s’*autoconstruit*. C’est ce qui, présent chez tous les membres de la société, dans tous les objets sociaux, règle la posture générale de la société par rapport à son contexte (mémoire et projection, environnement naturel, autres sociétés » (Lévy, 1994, pp. 38–39)).

⁴⁰ *Actant*, which can be translated as *agent*, refers to a “social reality, human or non-human, having a capacity of action.” On the origin of his note on *actant* and the current meaning of this notion in social science, Lussault affirms:

« Cette notion, issue de la linguistique, fut travaillée par la sémiotique (Greimas, 1983) et ensuite transposée en sciences sociales (Latour, 1989). À l’origine, l’actant est une instance, quelle qu’elle soit, qui contribue au procès d’un programme narratif ; par extension, le mot en est venu à devenu à désigner toute entité définissable et distinguable qui participe à la dynamique et à l’organisation d’une action individuelle ou (et collective, qui est active dans un processus social, qui *opère* les actes. » (Lussault, Actant, 2013, p. 51).

⁴¹ « L’intentionnalité – le fait que les actions humaines préexistent dans les représentations des agents sous forme de finalités de la volonté ou du désir et les transforment ainsi en acteurs – a été paradoxalement utilisée contre l’autonomie des sciences sociales... L’intentionnalité constitue en fait un immense avantage sur les sciences de la nature, qui ne peuvent pas compter que sur une indétermination générale ... ». (Lévy, 1994, p. 36).

⁴² « Les acteurs mènent des actions ... collectives lorsqu’ils agissent intentionnellement de pair (ce que ne signifie pas toujours de façon convergente) avec d’autres acteurs au sein d’un groupe, latent, semi-organisé, avec lesquels ils partagent un ou plusieurs

« Il s'agit d'un capital, actualisable dans les interactions, inégalement distribué. Ceci pour bien faire comprendre qu'il n'est pas douteux que les sociétés sont stratifiées ; mais, toutefois, s'il existe des dotés et des démunis, les acteurs sont tous mous par le besoin et la volonté d'agir et même les plus faibles possèdent le plus souvent (sauf dans les cas limites) des compétences stratégiques, des marges d'actions, des capacités d'arbitrages et peuvent provoquer par leur actes (individuels et/ou collectifs) de puissants effets. » (Lussault, Actor, 2013, p. 53).

The explication of the social through the existence of actors demands two complementary concepts: objects and environments.⁴³ The concept of objects refers to the stability of a material or immaterial reality, which “enters in the systems of actions but does not have intentionality” (Ruby & Lévy, 2013, pp. 731–732).⁴⁴ It can be a law, a norm, a system of knowledge, a technique. An existing object renders new actions possible while resuming the accumulation of past activities. The apprehensible quality of an object depends on some form of continuity, but it does not close its destiny to transformation (p. 732). Objects are not dormant social products but have an active character (p. 731):⁴⁵

« C'est justement dans le rééquilibrage entre acteurs et objets que la sociologie des sciences et des techniques (développées notamment par Georges Simondon, puis dans un sens différent par Michel Callon et Bruno Latour) a mis en valeur le caractère actif des objets, actants parmi d'autres : ceux-ci ne sont certes pas des acteurs mais, qu'on les fabrique, qu'on les utilise ou qu'on tente de les détruire, ils constituent toujours des constructions sociales suffisamment complexes pour que leur destin soit ouvert ». (Ruby & Lévy, 2013, p. 732).

The notion of environment captures the malleability between actors and objects. Space, family, workplaces, schools are examples of environments. The notion recognises that interactions take place in englobing settings that the englobed can “grasp” (Lévy, Environnement, 2013, p. 343).⁴⁶ The notion detours the reading of the social from *determinism*, for it retains the interactive adjustment between the parts and the whole of society. It also distances the paradigm from *abstraction*, identifying the “conditions of possibilities of action” (p. 344).⁴⁷

Three recursive types of actions characterise the plasticity of the social world and its components: 1) it is society as a whole that models the environment; 2) the latter has an influence in the type of actors that emerge; 3) actors can modify the environment directly or via the political (p. 344).⁴⁸ The retroactions of the

caractères communs. L'action collective, pour résulter de l'ajustement des actions individuelles, est aussi portée par au actant particulier, le collectif lui-même. On peut, par extension, appeler acteur collectif cette entité. » (Lussault, Actor, 2013, p. 54).

⁴³ As developed in chapter 2, space can be considered as a social object, an actor, or an environment.

⁴⁴ « Réalité matérielle ou immatérielle construite, stable et isolable entrant dans des systèmes d'actions mais non dotée d'intentionnalité. » (Ruby & Lévy, 2013, pp. 731–732).

⁴⁵ « L'objet peut-être une chose (matérielle) ou une réalité immatérielle stabilisée et isolable (connaissance, norme, technique, schème d'organisation). Dans tous les cas, c'est une construction sociale qui incorpore de nombreuses actions passées et qui rend possible de nouvelles. » (Ruby & Lévy, 2013, p. 731). This definition recognises that objects, things, are not “posed”, they retain the quality of their human production (in the same sense that *oeuvre* extends the meaning of artist object) (p. 732).

⁴⁶ « Parmi les réalités sociales, un environnement est un englobant sur lequel l'englobé a prise. Il se différencie de deux autres composantes fondamentales du monde social ; l'acteur et l'objet. » (Lévy, De la morale à la éthique, 2013a, p. 343) ; « Si on identifie la performance propre des acteurs et des objets, on constate qu'il manque quelque chose.... Le monde social n'est pas fait que d'interactions. Il est aussi constitué de cadres relativement stables dans lesquels les interactions prennent place. La notion d'environnement s'applique à une grande diversité de réalités. L'espace, l'environnement naturel, la famille, un cadre de travail, peuvent être abordés comme des environnements. Une société est, typiquement, un environnement qui inclut et fédère d'autres environnements, mais aussi une entreprise ou le corps humain le sont aussi. » (Lévy, De la morale à la éthique, 2013a, p. 343).

⁴⁷ « Avec la notion d'environnement, les conditions de possibilités de l'action doivent être écartées à la fois du « déterminisme » qui hyostasie ces conditions et de l'abstraction qui fait comme si l'action se manifestait off-shore, hors sol. L'environnement définit un monde qui n'impose pas aux humains une “condition” métaphysique indépassable, mais un monde donc la plasticité a des limites, qui peuvent être de différentes natures. » (Lévy, Environnement, 2013, p. 344).

⁴⁸ « Concrètement, la relation acteur/environnement est caractérisé par une circularité de trois types d'actions, ayant chacune leur spécificité : I. c'est la société dans son ensemble qui modèle les environnements, II. qui à leur tour influent sur l'émergence et la

actors on the environment may be mindful of society as a whole as in the intervention through public policies (p. 344).⁴⁹ The actors are not univocal in this societal awareness nor do they show the same “points of balance” in the relationship with the environment. Submission, « prise », political action are different degrees of the theoretical symmetry between these *actants* (p. 344). The nature of the *actants* that influence environments is not restricted to englobed actors. Objects and institutions distant in time (and space) might also be of import (p. 345).⁵⁰ As we will see in the next chapter,⁵¹ the notion of environment is central to the concept of habitat, defining the possible compatibility between the actions of the actors (spatiality) and the resulting spatial layout (space) (p. 346).⁵² We will also see that actors, objects, and environments are useful in reading the imagination of increases in justice.⁵³

1.1.2 The political function of society

The fact that society can be composed of contradictory sub-systems (Lévy, 1994, pp. 66–67) opens a pertinent *chantier* on the societal convergence of individuals’ use of their freedom. The political function can be defined as the conversion of dissensions in dissensus and the work of a society’s actors to bring the latter into consensus:

« Dans le cas de la légitimité sociétale, l’objectif des acteurs consiste à transformer les conflits qui résultent des autres dimensions de la société : économique (richesse), sociologique (rapports sociaux), géographique (espace), historique (temporalité) et psychologique (individus) en accord sur la finalité qu’ils promeuvent. Il s’agit de traduire les dissensions en dissensus et ces derniers en consensus. L’unité n’est pas ici un présupposée mais une visée, jamais totalement réalisée. L’enjeu consiste dans la substitution éventuelle d’une légitimité par une autre, qu’elle soit portée par les intervenants reconnus de la scène politique ou par tout autre acteur qui offre une alternative de légitimité sociétale, qui affirme que sa gestion des consensus-dissensus produits par la mise en œuvre de ses finalités se traduira finalement par un renforcement de l’unité de la société. » (Lévy, 1994, p. 102).

This project – which can follow the multi-dimensionality of society – entails an unavoidable dialogue between society and the political. This dialogue calls for and exercises ethics (Lévy, 2013a, p. 38).⁵⁴ We can define ethics as the dynamic relationship between the self and the other. The otherness of ethical reflexivity is not only a matter of interpersonal relations but includes all types of environments and objects that

nature des acteurs, III. ceux-ci pouvant eux-mêmes les modifier directement ou rétroagissant via le politique. » (Lévy, Environnement, 2013, p. 344).

⁴⁹ Not all retroactions are guided by this awareness (Lévy, Environnement, 2013, p. 344).

⁵⁰ « Un environnement est un actant activé par des acteurs multiples, qui ne sont pas forcément inclus dans cet environnement. Les objets ou les institutions qui en sont partie prenante peuvent aussi exercer sur lui une influence à distance temporelle. » (Lévy, Environnement, 2013, p. 345).

⁵¹ See section 2.2.4, “Habitat calls for the political”.

⁵² « La notion d’environnement se révèle cardinale pour la géographie car le couple environnement/acteur est homologue au couple espace/spatialité. Le mélange de puissance et de fragilité que recèlent les environnements dans une société d’acteurs ouvre logiquement sur le débat autour du concept d’habiter. » (Lévy, Environnement, 2013, p. 346).

⁵³ In chapter 4, “Contributions from erudite discourses on justice”, we explore the import of these notions for the encounter between social and justice theories. In part II, “The voices of spatial justice. Discourses of the inhabitants of metropolitan Porto”, we use this intersection to interpret the empirical material of the terrain in Metropolitan Porto.

⁵⁴ « Plus on se rapproche des enjeux concrets, plus on rend possible une approche fondamentale, c’est-à-dire cohérente, libérée des antinomies scolastiques et intégratrice de matériaux empiriques passés, présents et à venir. C’est donc le résultat inverse de la vision dualiste habituelle, qui suppose de décliner le général en particulier, acceptant quelques pertes de substance au passage, le particulier impliquant inévitablement une dégradation du général.... Le début de ce parcours nous indique déjà que, plus on se tient précisément au contact de situations du monde contemporain dans lesquels se jouent des questions de valeurs, plus on se donne les moyens de proposer un cadre de pensée applicable à d’autres situations. C’est le couple de complémentaires singulier/universel qui est alors mobilisé. » (Lévy, 2013a, p. 38).

compose society (p. 125).⁵⁵ Ethics function as a kernel, a resource which actors can mobilise to make explicit the values they want to exercise in a given demarche.⁵⁶ This relationship between the self and the other connects ethics and politics in multiple ways. Lévy proposes four modalities: 1) in the use of collective resources towards a political project (public policy), ethics are a “technology” in the production of public goods, presupposing the definition of ethics before politics; 2) the political system can also appear before ethics as a producer of ethical pronouncements, “defining the values that institute social life” under the influence of society; 3) the political scene and public debate are the interface between the first and second modalities, making the production of ethics visible; 4) the political poses ethical problems as a social dimension among others (Lévy, *Société*, 2013, pp. 132–133).⁵⁷ In the first modality, justice coincides with public policy and opens into the second modalities as an ethical production through the political functioning of society (p. 133).⁵⁸

1.1.3 Open horizon

The theme of the horizon of society translates the idea of a movement of (social) reality (Lévy, 1994, p. 32). This movement can seem to detain invariants or stability when the speed of transformation is slow at the scale of human history, when diverse movements make each other’s effects null (p. 32). The notion is anchored in a reading of historicity of societies (pp. 36–37).⁵⁹ Historicity refers to the fact that social constructions have a temporal dimension marked, as suggested by Jacques Lévy, by four characteristics: irreversibility, acceleration, cumulateness and intentionality. Irreversibility contradicts cyclical views which externalise rhythm from history; acceleration makes of the intensity of historical dynamics a variable of study; cumulateness and intentionality are linked by the notion that the intentions that animate present day actions construct, through their sedimentation, part of a society’s future (Lévy, *Historicité*, 2013, pp. 506–507). Independently from the debate on the “historical sense” of such movement (either towards improvement, neutral, or pessimistic), the idea of progress clarifies the relationship between the expectations of society at time t_0 and the results at time t_1 (p. 42). The representations involved in the idea of progress can either be a part of a society’s *dominance* (that is, common to the entirety of its members)

⁵⁵ « La démarche éthique est un processus qui met en rapport dynamique permanent le moi et l’autre, ce dernier n’étant pas seulement un autre moi mais aussi toutes les espèces d’environnements et la société dans son ensemble. C’est pourquoi, la composante politique ne vient pas en second lieu, comme « gonflement » des relations interindividuelles, mais d’emblée. D’où l’importance du rôle de la liberté comme fondatrice de l’agir politique, comme le construit Hannah Arendt (1989 [1961-68] : 186-222). » (Lévy, *Société*, 2013, p. 125).

⁵⁶ « L’éthique fonctionne comme un noyau dur générant de multiples expressions au contact de différentes réalités sociales ayant leur propre logique. Elle constitue donc une ressource de consultation à fins d’explicitation, consistant à répondre aux acteurs qui s’interrogent sur le sens de leur démarche des questions du type : « Est-ce bien *cela* que vous voulez faire, est-ce bien ces valeurs que vous voulez mettre en œuvre? » (Lévy, *Société*, working version 2012, p. 133).

⁵⁷ « En tant qu’ensemble d’institutions de production de biens publics (notamment les « politiques publiques »), *I.* le politique peut être considéré comme un champ d’application de l’éthique, c’est-à-dire comme périphérie technique, située en aval de l’éthique, qui serait vue alors comme une technologie. À l’inverse, *II.* à travers des dispositifs de formalisation des énoncés éthiques, le politique, sous influence de la société dans son ensemble, se présente comme un lieu situé « avant » l’éthique : c’est alors le politique qui se localise dans un amont méthodologique en définissant des valeurs instituant la vie sociale, exprimées dans des « préambules » constitutionnels ou des « lois fondamentales ». En outre, *III.* en tant que scène publique, c’est-à-dire comme interface entre société civile et système politique (le « débat public »), le politique est le lieu le plus visible pour débattre des questions éthiques, donc comme l’endroit où se rend visible une fabrique de l’éthique, une traduction en temps réel des débats obscurs et indécis qui caractérise le cheminement éthique de la société. Enfin, *IV.* le système politique est un morceau de la société comme n’importe quel autre, dans lequel se posent donc des problèmes éthiques. » (Lévy, *Société*, 2013, pp. 132–133).

⁵⁸ « Ainsi, la question de la définition de la justice mérite tout spécialement d’être examinée comme une politique publique (relation I) et comme production d’éthique par le politique (relation II). » (Lévy, *Société*, 2013, p. 133).

⁵⁹ « Dans l’histoire de l’humanité, l’accumulation d’acquis, sans cesse enrichis et transformés, porte sur un grand nombre d’éléments du rapport au monde, y compris les techniques du langage et de la raison. Ces techniques ont une histoire, mais celles que possédaient Platon ou Confucius, nous pouvons dialoguer avec elles, apprendre d’elles, les faire progresser. Admettre cela implique de renoncer à l’idée d’*Homme* et à lui préférer un concept d’*humanité* impliquant l’historicité et ses quatre caractères [la complexité, l’accélération du mouvement, l’intentionnalité et l’irréversibilité cumulative]. L’affirmation de l’historicité de la raison constitue un enjeu essentiel dans le débat avec les philosophes, mais c’est plus largement de l’ensemble des productions humaines qu’il s’agit. » (Lévy, 1994, pp. 36–37).

or be located in the more conflicting level of production.⁶⁰ The idea of an open horizon is related to the finality of the actors. As the actors project their own actions, they also create expectations in relation to the social world where they act. In other words, among the actors' anticipation of the future figures "a certain idea of life in society", a properly societal projection that affects their actions (p. 43).⁶¹ If the finality of an action is not restricted to its immediate stakes but is informed by such a societal horizon, we can think that the representations of society's future reality influence the dynamic of society towards that horizon.⁶² In this view, understanding the ideas of the social dynamic in which citizens project their personal narrative is a prospective exercise, "an unavoidable demarche to predict the likely evolution of any system of actors with regard to a specific stake" (p. 43).⁶³

1.1.4 Sociality/*Sociétalité* of the social

The dialogic conception individual/society implies that the parts have autonomy and that they can change the ensemble, but the latter is nevertheless pertinent (Lévy, *Société*, 2013, p. 934).⁶⁴ Society is a common reality constituted by logics of ensemble, systematics at play. This collective quality is not restricted to states,⁶⁵ but it includes other totalities, such as culture, market, or history. The concept of *sociétalité* defines this facet of the social concerned with collective entities "irreducible to the sum of its [society's] elements" (pp. 934–935). It complements the notion of sociality which covers interpersonal relationships and collective experiences in an infra-societal environment.⁶⁶ *Societal* designates the inclusiveness and interactivity of social realities in a given arrangement. A high degree of *sociétalité* of a social reality translates an intense and active relationship between the whole and the parts. An environment can be societal (a city, a public space) or infra-societal (a socially homogeneous neighbourhood, a mono functional urban place). The political (a political space, a political stake) is by definition a societal entity.⁶⁷

1.1.5 Themes of the *sociétalité* of the social

In 1994, Jacques Lévy proposed a concept of society recovering the central themes of the Enlightenment – Reason, Humanism, and Progress. In the concluding chapter of the *Espace Légitime*, he identifies five foundational themes: the possibility of the scientific study of the social, the specificity of the political function, the interaction between the dimensions of the social, the irreversibility of history, and the

⁶⁰ For the distinction between dominance and production see first paragraph of the present section 1.1, "The social and the spatial in a dimensional paradigm".

⁶¹ « Parmi ce qu'on appelle les « attentes » de ces acteurs, figure en effet « une certaine idée de la vie en société », c'est-à-dire une ou des projections, cognitives et affectives, de la société dans son ensemble qu'ils vont chercher d'une manière ou d'une autre à faire vivre dans leur actions. Cet horizon *sociétal* représente la conception du progrès d'un acteur donné à un moment donné. L'analyse des rapports qu'entretiennent l'action de cet acteur et les images qu'il se fait de l'avenir souhaitable est un élément constitutif de son action, au même titre que la prise en compte par cet acteur des enjeux immédiats de l'action et des orientations des autres acteurs. Or cet élément dépende d'un *habitus projectif*, lui-même lié à l'image de la relation entre son destin personnel et la dynamique sociale. Autrement dit, tout acteur articule son idée du progrès avec ce qu'il croit être celle(s) de la société et cette articulation est une condition nécessaire à l'existence d'une société politique. » (Lévy, 1994, pp. 42–43).

⁶² « Compte tenu du rôle de l'intentionnalité dans la dynamique sociale, on peut penser qu'il existe un rapport entre la projection que fait une société de son existence future et la réalité de ce devenir. » (Lévy, 1994, p. 42).

⁶³ For the definition of the relationship between the reasoning of the actors and the prospective role of social science see section a. of the Introduction, "Realist constructivism for a society of actors".

⁶⁴ « Bref, dans la perspective d'un systémisme dialogique, il paraît possible de rendre compatible l'acteur et le système, l'autonomie des parties et la pertinence du tout. » (Lévy, *Société*, 2013, p. 934).

⁶⁵ States is here used in the political sense, as the translation of the French word *État*.

⁶⁶ We have chosen to translate the original word *société* into *sociality* as the English and French definitions are equivalent. The word "societality" does not exist in English and we have opted for keeping the foreign form *sociétalité*.

⁶⁷ The political can be seen as an object in the form of a functioning democracy comprehending all actors. But it is also an environment, in the public sphere and in the non-institutional versant of negotiation of coexistence in public spaces (see definition of public space and civility in chapter 3, "Urbanity at stake").

autotranscendence of the social (Lévy, 1994, pp. 429–430).⁶⁸ In order to pave the way for the chapters ahead, we present this thesis appropriation of these themes in the *societal* reading of the social:


Dimensional production of society regards the complexity of social goods created in the economic, social, spatial, historical, political and individual planes of society (understandable in an epistemic system of multiple dimensions). This complexity is apprehended in the notion of systemic goods which form one totality, albeit with contradictions and conflicts;

Actors is the theme recognising the existence of *actants* co-producing society as a whole with a potentially divergent and contradictory intentionality;

Systemic compatibility (between the parts and totality) refers to the malleability of the relationship between actors (individual or collective) and society (as stable objects of manifest collective logic) apprehended in the notion of environment. Despite the inherent difficulties of societal convergence, dialogic systematics render a coherent totality theoretically possible;

The *political function of society* addresses the empirical existence of social difference and conflict and participates in the collective construction of a totality. The political function responds to the social requirement of co-existence through non-violent resolution of such difference and conflict.

The notion of *horizon* captures the future projection of society and its members in the processes of auto-determination of society. This theme connects both desirability and possibility and can be mobilised to read the historicity of society as well as the openness of its becoming.



⁶⁸ « Cinq thèmes fondateurs peuvent alors être soulignés.

La possibilité d'une démarche scientifique (et non seulement philosophique, comme sur le social avec Hegel) ;

La reconnaissance des spécificités de la fonction politique (enrichie et mise en situation à la suite de Platon, Aristote, Bodin, Maquiavel, Hobbes) ;

L'interaction entre les différentes dimensions du social (avec les notions) de « *biens sociaux* » et d'acteur individuel ou collectif) ;

L'irréversibilité des grandes inflexions de l'histoire humaine (par opposition aux conceptions cycliques) ;

La possibilité d'une *autotranscendence* du social, permettant de mettre en scène l'intentionnalité des acteurs et la compétence assumée par les sociétés d'inventions d'horizons explicites figurant un avenir attendu ou espéré. » (Lévy, 1994, pp. 429, 430).

H (Horizon)	d (Dimensional production of the social)	A (Actors)	E (Environments) O (Social objects)	P (Pragmatics)
Open “devenir” of society.	Solutions of living together produce goods in each social dimension, creating complex systemic goods. Social objects beyond the cumulateness of interactions (sociality/ <i>sociétalité</i>).	The existence of intentional actors co-producing society with others. Individual multiple capitals enable the individual to interact with each social dimension of society.	Theoretical compatibility of individual and society across themes. That is, the possibility of a coherent totality, despite inherent potential of divergence, contradiction, and conflict.	Political function in the resolution of the living together.

Figure 1 Dynamic representation of the themes of the *sociétalité* of the social.

These themes are a file rouge in the construction of the encounter between justice and space proposed in this thesis. The reader will be able to learn of their declination into each of the theoretical angles of these works in the remaining chapters of Part I.

1.2 Other sociological contributions

1.2.1 Ideality as a social fact (Durkheim)

Durkheim (1858–1917) is the founder of the study of “Social Reality” composed of social facts to be known independent of introspection.⁶⁹ He introduces the idea of social phenomena external to individuals, whose subtract is not reducible to individual consciousness (Durkheim, 1894, pp. 9–11).⁷⁰ Liberating sociology from confounding pre-notions with the unveiling of facts (p. 11) demanded “studying facts from the outside” (p. 13).⁷¹ The constitution of sociology as a scientific discipline implied the scission between the explicative potential of social life by internal (individual) and external (societal) aspects, giving a leading weight to society.⁷² Social things external to individuals are not conceived of as potentially reabsorbed by individuals, for that would make the epistemic fields of sociology and psychology indistinct.

⁶⁹ Durkheim advances a method and rules of observation, which are applicable in spite of the internal or external consistency of social facts in study (1894, p. 10). We will recover this idea, which is useful in the enunciation of the *idéel* and material planes of space in section 2.2.2, “Space is *idéel* and material” (chapter 2).

⁷⁰ « Il n’y a plus guère de sociologues qui dénie à la sociologie toute espèce de spécificité. Mais parce que la société n’est composée que d’individus ..., il semble au sens commun que la vie sociale ne puisse avoir d’autre substrat que la conscience individuelle; autrement, elle paraît rester en l’air et planer dans le vide.... La proposition n’est, d’ailleurs, que partiellement exacte. Outre les Individus, il y a les choses qui sont des éléments intégrants de la société. Il est vrai seulement que les individus en sont les seuls éléments actifs. » (Durkheim, 1894, p. 11).

⁷¹ Referring to the importance of studying social thought as a whole (« la pensée collective tout entière »), Durkheim states :

« Il est inutile de montrer comment, de ce point de vue, la nécessité d’étudier les faits du dehors apparaît plus évidente encore, puisqu’ils résultent de synthèses qui ont lieu hors de nous et dont nous n’avons même pas la perception confuse que la conscience peut nous donner des phénomènes intérieurs. » (Durkheim, 1894, p. 13).

⁷² This conception can be covered by the umbrella term “holisme” (Corcuff, 2005).

Being observable and being regular are essential features of Durkheim's definition of social facts, extended to the comprehension of even the least tangible social objects.⁷³ This does not preclude the study of ideality (myths, legends, religious conceptions, "la pensée sociale"). Collective "social thought" expresses "the way in which the group thinks of itself in relation with the objects that affect it" (pp. 12–14).⁷⁴ Durkheim considers that particular consciousness is not relevant to the study of "social mentality".⁷⁵ Individual constraint indicates the presence of social facts as social mentality is "susceptible of exercising in particular consciences a coercive influence" (p. 14).⁷⁶ This coercive influence is not interpreted as the physical pressing of bodies upon others or even on volition. It is rather the force that group conscience exerts over individuals, via beliefs and practices which operate "from the outside" (p. 14). This definition of social facts goes hand in hand with the conception of the individual with restricted *marge de manoeuvre* in changing society.⁷⁷ The individual has some scope of appropriation of social things which are already there (Durkheim talks of "a spectrum of individual nuances" (p. 15)). Individuals participate in the cumulative practices which generate something else than the sum of those individuals' acts.⁷⁸ But "the material and moral supremacy of society upon its members" makes it difficult for an individual to transform society. With regard to religious and moral phenomena, the expected degree of individual variation is very feeble or null (p. 15).⁷⁹

1.2.1.1 The weakening of morality observed

Durkheim inaugurates the possibility to study intangible objects. Withholding a strict division between an inner and external dimension of beings (1894, p. 10),⁸⁰ his scientific method observes the things which

⁷³ As a result, socialising instances capable of producing regularities (society at large and its institutions) exclude all units whose influence is less sizeable, such as the intimate sphere of the individual and family.

⁷⁴ « Que la matière de la vie sociale ne puisse pas s'expliquer par des facteurs purement psychologiques, c'est-à-dire par des états de la conscience individuelle, c'est ce qui nous paraît être l'évidence même. En effet, ce que les représentations collectives traduisent, c'est la façon dont le groupe se pense dans ses rapports avec les objets qui l'affectent. Or le groupe est constitué autrement que l'individu et les choses qui l'affectent sont d'une autre nature. » (Durkheim, 1894, p. 12). Durkheim also hypothesises that both particular and collective representations might come to be explicated by common laws, he does not expect these "two reigns" to be made of the same matter (pp. 12–13).

⁷⁵ « Mais la pensée collective tout entière, dans sa forme comme dans sa matière, doit être étudiée en elle-même, pour elle-même, avec le sentiment de ce qu'elle a de spécial, et il faut laisser à l'avenir le soin de rechercher dans quelle mesure elle ressemble à la pensée des particuliers. C'est même là un problème qui ressortit plutôt à la philosophie générale et à la logique abstraite qu'à l'étude scientifique des faits sociaux. » (Durkheim, 1894, p. 13).

⁷⁶ « Il nous reste à dire quelques mots de la définition que nous avons donnée des faits sociaux dans notre premier chapitre. Nous les faisons consister en des manières de faire ou de penser, reconnaissables à cette particularité qu'elles sont susceptibles d'exercer sur les consciences particulières une influence coercitive. » (Durkheim, 1894, pp. 13, 14). Durkheim places this sign as an approximation relevant in the inaugural state of social science. He is willing to give it away to other types of signs, once discovered other means of recognising social facts where they are (Durkheim, 1894, p. 14).

⁷⁷ This *marge de manoeuvre* is presented to him at different levels in different social phenomena – some in economy, very little in religion and morality (Durkheim, 1894, p. 15).

⁷⁸ This definition of production of social facts restates their external character – the syntheses of several actions happening somewhere other than in the conscience of each. They institute a way of doing and thinking which is reachable outside each individual (Durkheim, 1894, p. 15).

⁷⁹ « De ce que les croyances et les pratiques sociales nous pénètrent ainsi du dehors, il ne suit pas que nous les recevions passivement et sans leur faire subir de modification. En pensant les institutions collectives, en nous les assimilant, nous les individualisons, nous leur donnons plus ou moins notre marque personnelle; c'est ainsi qu'en pensant le monde sensible chacun de nous le colore à sa façon et que des sujets différents s'adaptent différemment à un même milieu physique. C'est pourquoi chacun de nous se fait, dans une certaine mesure, sa morale, sa religion, sa technique. Il n'est pas de conformisme social qui ne comporte toute une gamme de nuances individuelles. Il n'en reste pas moins que le champ des variations permises est limité. Il est nul ou très faible dans le cercle des phénomènes religieux et moraux où la variation devient aisément un crime; il est plus étendu pour tout ce qui concerne la vie économique. Mais tôt ou tard même dans ce dernier cas, on rencontre une limite qui ne peut être franchie. » (Durkheim, 1894, p. 15n).

⁸⁰ While holding that division, he is nevertheless capable of imagining a "formal psychology", dedicated to discovering abstract similitudes between those two fields:

« On peut se demander si les représentations individuelles et les représentations collectives ne laissent pas, cependant, de se rassembler en ce que les unes et les autres sont également des représentations ; et si, par suite de ces ressemblances, certaines lois

individuals (within a group) confront themselves with as a marker of social facts. Durkheim makes it possible for morality to be studied from a sociological point of view. Morality is seen as a collective phenomenon explainable by societal factors such as economic and spatial organisation. In nineteenth century societies transiting from traditional to industrial forms of organisation, the author detects the passage from solidarity of proximity and similitude (“mechanical solidarity”) to looser forms of solidarity in denser and bigger spatial configurations (“organic solidarity”) (Durkheim, 1893/2004, cited in Marcel, 2006, 321).⁸¹ Durkheim’s study of the division of labour (which accompanied the densification of population through urbanisation) reveals the diversification of norms, excessive individuation and loss of society’s moral supremacy (Cosser, 1984, pp. 1–10). Durkheim evaluates economic interdependence as insufficient to guarantee social cohesion. In this perspective, excessive individuation is read as deviant behaviour or crime. The study of suicide and the concept of *anomie* illustrate the diagnosis of moral laxity of modern societies (Durkheim, *Le suicide*, 1897/1999 cited in Corcuff, 2005).⁸² Identifying society with the detection of individual constraint, Durkheim can not interpret the lifting of coercion – the weakening of morality – as a new epoch in the ethos. He nevertheless advocates “laic morality” to assure social bounds (Marcel, 2006, p. 321).

1.2.2 Individual capital and social life (Bourdieu)

Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) structuralist theory of the social is unsuitable to think of ethics spatially (1993; 1987). The author sees society as a set of relationships of exchange with a zero sum result. The idea of multi-faceted capital is an important key to Bourdieu’s interpretation of structural and cyclical factors in the perpetuation of individual and groups’ asymmetric profiting from society (1980; 1986).⁸³ Capital is defined as the capacity to interact and exchange with others in different social realms (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 47).⁸⁴ Economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capitals are seen to work in self-reinforcing ways through the investment in relationships of transmission. A higher capital in one dimension is seen to determine the endowment in another sphere. The ensemble of capitals is thus imagined as a balanced outcome, stable

abstraites ne seraient pas communes aux deux règnes. Les mythes, les légendes populaires, les conceptions religieuses de toute sorte, les croyances morales, etc., expriment une autre réalité que la réalité individuelle ; mais il se pourrait que la manière dont elles s'attirent ou se repoussent, s'agrègent ou se désagrègent, soit indépendante de leur contenu et tienne uniquement à leur qualité générale de représentations. Tout en étant faites d'une matière différente, elles se comporteraient dans leurs relations mutuelles comme font les sensations, les images, ou les idées chez l'individu. Ne peut-on croire, par exemple, que la contiguïté et la ressemblance, les contrastes et les antagonismes logiques agissent de la même façon, quelles que soient les choses représentées? On en vient ainsi à concevoir la possibilité d'une psychologie toute formelle qui serait une sorte de terrain commun à la psychologie individuelle et à la sociologie; et c'est peut-être ce qui fait le scrupule qu'éprouvent certains esprits à distinguer trop nettement ces deux sciences. » (Durkheim, 1894, pp. 12–13).

⁸¹ The transformation of the modalities of solidarity is inspired by the conceptualisation of the forms of association by Ferdinand Tönnies (1887/2002) theorised in the work *Community and Society. Gemeinschaft und Gessellschaft*.

⁸² We cannot extricate whether the empirical account of moral laxity was plausible at the time and place of study or ill-determined by the theoretical inability to accommodate individual competences within the concept of society and collective thought.

⁸³ When goods, such as culture, are visibly ever-expanding, Bourdieu resorts to a metaphor of inflation, whereby the new capitals are devaluated so that power asymmetry remains unchanged: “What I call the generalised Arrow effect, i.e., the fact that all cultural gods (...) exert an educative effect by their mere existence, is no doubt one of the structural factors behind the “schooling explosion”, in the sense that a growth in quantity of cultural capital accumulated in objectified state increases the educative effect automatically exerted by the environment. If one adds to this the fact that embodied cultural capital is constantly increasing, it can be seen that, in each generation, the educational system can take more for granted. The fact that the same educational investment is increasingly productive is one of the most structural factors of the inflation of qualifications (together with cyclical factors linked to effects of capital conversion) (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 56).

⁸⁴ “Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as *economic capital*, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the forms of property rights; as *cultural capital*, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the form of educational qualifications; and as *social capital*, made up of social obligations (“connections”), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the form of a title of nobility.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 47).

for the individual and for the group (p. 46).⁸⁵ As the individual social habitus reflects the personal embodiment of a group's capitals, the context and time of socialisation are determinant of the exchanges between an individual and society (pp. 49–50).⁸⁶ The notion of “predisposition” expresses the weight of the past over individual free will. Capital is seen as a consumption – an acquisition – rather than a production, rooted in economic capital (p. 54).⁸⁷ The role of the actors in one of re-production of the existing social order. Society is described as a panorama of fields, each champ marked by power struggle among groups (Lahire, 2011, p. 55), rather than cooperation.⁸⁸ These groups are defined as units of internal homogeneity (as encapsulated in the idea of groups' social habitus). They imply direct sociability and, in that context, individual obligation is bound to social capital (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 49–50).

We can find allusions to ideality in Bourdieu (for example, in the mental discipline exercised by the state upon individuals). But hidden interest, unperceived by the self, is the main drive for personal investment in transiting from one social habitus to another. While Bourdieu explicitly refutes a Machiavellian view of human beings,⁸⁹ we can question his encompassing of the wealth of human motivation involved in the complexity of ethics.⁹⁰ We can see that this theoretical lenses is not adequate to the thought of justice and space in a number of ways: the conception of society is not inclined to detect improvements in the lives of the least well-off; it evaluates the development of the more endowed individuals as illegitimate; the positive sum interactions of society members in producing development and justice are not part of the model; and the possibility of emancipation through peaceful cooperation between individuals from different groups is meagre.

1.2.2.1 Inequality of capitals in tension with a just horizon

Despite these limitations, there is a horizon of justice in Bourdieu. The work of the author is animated by the possibility to activate transformations of social inequality through the understanding (and denunciation) of the mechanisms that perpetuate present day asymmetries (the state is the main actor of

⁸⁵ “Capital, which in its objectified of embodied forms takes time to accumulate and which, as a potential capacity to produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded forms, contains a tendency to persist in its being, is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally possible or impossible.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 46).

⁸⁶ “On the other hand, the initial accumulation of cultural capital, the precondition for the fast, easy, accumulation of every kind of useful cultural capital, starts at the outset, without delay, without wasted time, only for the offspring of families endowed with strong cultural capital; in this case the accumulation period covers the whole period of socialisation.” (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 49–50).

⁸⁷ “So it has been posited simultaneously that economic capital is at the root of all the other types of capital and that these transformed, disguised forms of economic capital, never entirely reducible to that definition, produce their most specific effects only to the extent that they conceal (not least from their possessors) the fact that economic capital is at their root, in other words – but only in the last analysis – at the root of their effect.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 54).

⁸⁸ “The structure of the field, i.e., the unequal distribution of capital, is the source of the specific effects of capital, i.e., the appropriation of profits and the power to impose the laws of functioning of the field most favourable to capital and its reproduction.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 49).

⁸⁹ “It should be made clear, to dispel a likely misunderstanding, that the investment in question here is not necessarily conceived as a calculated pursuit of gain, but that it has every likelihood of being experienced in terms of the logic of emotional investment. This has not been appreciated by historians who (even when they are as alert to symbolic effect as E.P. Thompson) tend to conceive symbolic practices – powdered wigs and the whole paraphernalia of office – as explicit strategies of domination intended to be seen (from below), and to interpret generous or charitable conduct as “calculated acts of class appeasement”. This Machiavellian view forgets that the most sincerely disinterested acts may be those best corresponding to objective interest.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 57).

⁹⁰ It is interesting to note that Bourdieu distinguishes between political and ethical problems:

« Un des effets les plus pernicieux de l'enquête d'opinion consiste précisément à mettre les gens en demeure de répondre à des questions qu'ils ne se sont pas posées. Soit par exemple les questions qui tournent autour des problèmes de morale, qu'il s'agisse des questions sur la sévérité des parents, les rapports entre les maîtres et les élèves, la pédagogie directive ou non directive, etc., problèmes qui sont d'autant plus perçus comme des problèmes éthiques qu'on descend davantage dans la hiérarchie sociale, mais qui peuvent être des problèmes politiques pour les classes supérieures : un des effets de l'enquête consiste à transformer des réponses éthiques en réponses politiques par le simple effet d'imposition de problématique. » (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 4).

such transformations) (Bourdieu, 1993).⁹¹ The contribution of Bourdieu can be reabsorbed in the form of the tension between horizon and present. Without endorsing the fixation of individual capitals, it is possible to imagine a diversity of social positions inside society at a given moment. It is plausible that individuals do have different capacities to relate to society and that actualising what is possible requires different degrees of effort or expense of capital. We can open the concept of capital to variations between its facets. We can postulate its evolution as part of a co-production between society and its members, resulting in mobile social positions. With these reserves, the concept of capital remains central to approaching injustice and justice. We can hypothesise that it translates the imprint of experiences of different degrees of advantage and disadvantage (facility and difficulty) and that such a mark matters in inhabitants' conception of justice and the city.

1.2.3 The individual/society dialogic (Elias)

In *The Society of Individuals*, Elias (1897–1990) offers a multidimensional explanation for the subsistence of an ill-conceived opposition between the concept of individual and that of society.⁹² He attempts to reconstruct the understanding of these two terms without antagonism. Epistemologically, the conception of an individual without society corresponds to the division between an inner self and the outer world, which accompanied the genesis of scientific knowledge (of the physical world) during the Renaissance of Western societies (Elias, 1987/2001, pp. 106–107). In the liberation from theism, individuals affirmed the certitude of their existence through their inner experience of rationality and crafted a new self-consciousness of men, that is, as rational beings able to distance themselves from their surrounding environment in order to gain certainty through observation and thought rather than revelations of supra-natural truth (pp. 95–96). This progress also instituted an epistemic “invisible wall” between the knowing subject and the “outside” (pp. 106–107).⁹³ Such conception was deprived of a sense of development from child to adulthood. It also neglected in the role of relationship between the individual and others in such an advancement (pp. 111–112). The experience of this divide was not restricted to the savant of classical epistemology (Lock, Leibniz, Kant, and Hume), but marked a new epoch in ordinary men's self-image.⁹⁴ For Elias, “the feelings, the self-perception of the individual which present themselves in thought and speech as an encapsulation of his “inside” from the world “outside”, from other things and people” would be connected to a habitus of self-restraint and discipline imposed upon the individual in certain social

⁹¹ « Porter à la conscience des mécanismes qui rendent la vie douloureuse, voire inviable, ce n'est pas les neutraliser; porter au jour les contradictions, ce n'est pas les résoudre. Mais, pour si sceptique que l'on puisse être sur l'efficacité sociale du message sociologique, on ne peut tenir pour nul l'effet qu'il peut exercer en permettant à ceux qui souffrent de découvrir la possibilité d'imputer leur souffrance à des causes sociales et de se sentir ainsi disculpés; et en faisant connaître largement l'origine sociale, collectivement occultée, du malheur sous toutes ses formes, y compris les plus intimes et les plus secrètes. Constat qui, malgré les apparences, n'a rien de désespérant : ce que le monde social fait, le monde social peut, armé de ce savoir, le défaire.... S'il est vrai que la plupart des mécanismes économiques et sociaux qui sont au principe des souffrances les plus cruelles, notamment ceux qui règlent le marché du travail et le marché scolaire, ne sont pas faciles à enrayer ou à modifier, il reste que toute politique qui ne tire pas pleinement parti des possibilités, si réduites sont-elles, qui sont offertes à l'action, et que la science peut aider à découvrir, peut être considérée comme coupable de non-assistance à personne en danger. Et il en va de même ... de toutes les philosophies ... qui ... visent à invalider toute intervention de la raison scientifique en politique : la science n'a que faire de l'alternative entre la démesure totalisatrice d'un rationalisme dogmatique et la démission esthète d'un irrationalisme nihiliste ; elle se satisfait des vérités partielles et provisoires qu'elle peut conquérir contre la vision commune et contre la doxa intellectuelle et qui sont en mesure de procurer les seuls moyens rationnelles d'utiliser pleinement les marges de manœuvre laissées à la liberté, c'est-à-dire à l'action politique. » (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 944).

⁹² Social science controversy between collectivist and individualistic explanations of social reality is seen by Elias as reflecting opposition in political camps, troubled by affect in the context of the Cold War (1947–53).

⁹³ “The basic problem of epistemology corresponded to this form of human self-consciousness. It took its starting point from the absolute status conferred to the temporary self-detachment that is part of the act of cognition of what we call the “scientific” stage of development. It was based on the notion of a knowing subject which stands opposed to the world of knowable objects, from which it is separated by a broad divide. The problem was how the subject was to gain certain knowledge of objects across this divide.” (1987/2001, pp. 106–107).

⁹⁴ Elias considered such dualism, which is also one of opposed mind and body, persisting in the twentieth century (1987/2001, pp. 118–119) as attested in common language (p. 114) and in philosophical topics separating the self from the others, such as aloneness in Existentialism (pp. 114–118).

environments (pp. 114–116). This new epoch is explained through an ensemble of historical configurations – economic, social, political – setting up the conditions for a “social habitus”⁹⁵ on which individuals draw to construct their individuality. It is the common exposure to these conditions that ascertains the similarity of traits among a society’s members:⁹⁶

“If it [the notion of social habitus], and the very similar concept of the social personality structure are understood – and properly applied, it is easier to understand why the old habit of using the terms “individual” and “society” as if they represented two separate objects is misleading. One then no longer closes one’s eye to the fact, that is well known outside the field of science, that each individual person, different as he or she may be from others, has a specific make-up that he or she shares with other members of his society. This make-up, the social habitus of individuals, forms, as it were, the soil from which grow the personal characteristics through which one individual differs from other members of his society.” (Elias, 1987/2001, p. 182).

We can see that Durkheim’s division between an internal individual consciousness and collective representation working “from the outside” is rejected together with the institution of an individual and society as separate objects of understanding (Elias, 1987/2001, p. 32). An “inner” pure self on which the “external” society exercises influence or force gives way to the central role of relationships of one human being with others within a context of historical evolution.⁹⁷ A historical dynamic viewpoint – “a long term unplanned social process” – is central to the argument of Elias. As it furnishes the diagnosis and understanding of social processes, it also determines the adequate level of synthesis for the concept of society (1987/2001, pp. 162–164). The reality of “integration of Mankind”, i.e. the possibility to suppress distance in human relationships at the world level, detaches the concept of society from the geographical boundaries of a group’s self-perception as a self-sufficient social unit. Instead, society designates what throughout history has been the coming together of individuals in organised social life for the sake of survival. Elias calls this ensemble “unit of survival” and argues that the latest “integration advance” is global.⁹⁸ The first would have pressed individuals to reshape their organisation from the form of a clan and family to that of the state unit, the second from state to post-national units (Elias, pp. 165–167).

In spite of modern societies’ increased scope for differentiation and unicity, a “social personality structure” persists. The exemplary manifestation of this idea is the predisposition for the primacy of the I- over the we-identity. It reflects the evolution from traditional forms of social organisation in small units (clan, family, village) through to more complex, differentiated, and expanded (geographic and demographically) societies

⁹⁵ In the idea of social habitus, Elias includes not only a common language, the predisposition of a society to a certain balance between the I- and we-identities of the self, but also behavioural attitudes of adaptation to constraint in dictatorial regimes. “Access to knowledge, education, right of assembly and reunion” are among the factors determining a social habitus with reduced individuation (Elias, 1987/2004, pp. 238–240).

⁹⁶ That pre-scientific study called this similarity “national character” (Elias, 1987/2004, p. 239).

⁹⁷ Regarding the interaction between “inside” and “outside”, between “psychical” and “social” factors”, Elias states:

“The conception underlying all these ideas, the antithesis between the “pure self” – the subject of psychology – which enters relationships with other people as if from outside, and a society – the subject of sociology – which stands opposite the individual as something existing outside him, this conception ... proves inadequate if the field of enquiry is widened, if the individual does not start directly from himself and his own feelings in reflecting on society, but sees himself and his self-consciousness in the larger context of historical evolution. One might ask how and why the structure of the human network and the structure of the individual both change at the same time in a certain manner One finds, then – in adopting a wider, dynamic viewpoint instead of a static one – that the vision of an irreducible wall between one human being and all others, between inner and outer worlds, evaporates to be replaced by the vision of an incessant and irreducible intertwining of individual beings, in which everything that gives their animal substance the quality of a human being, primarily their psychical self-control, their individual character, takes on its specific shape in and through relationships with others.” (Elias, 1939/2001, pp. 31–32).

⁹⁸ This global integration corresponds to the emergence of the world-society (Guillemot, 2014), that is, a world space that displays the functions of society (economic, social, political, spatial, etc.) (Dagorn, 2013).

(state, supra-state entities, world society) (pp. 221–222).⁹⁹ At the summit of this path, an increased level of individuation in modern societies is at once a predisposition in the personality structure and a set of possibilities found in the societal environment: the loosening of family control over the individual, the differentiation of relationships made available to him, and the necessity of reflexivity through which the individual positions himself in the face of heightened diversity (Elias, 1987/2004, p. 265). But the new possibilities open to the individual are, according to Elias, only partially synonymous to an increase in liberty (1987/2001, p. 166). Indicative of a civilizational moment (pp. 176–183), part of a larger historical account, society, and individual need to adapt to increased complexity and the multiplication of levels of integration. This implies giving power to transcendental scales. Elias reflects on the empirical existence of groups which do not welcome this necessity.¹⁰⁰ The notions of “pressure of integration” and “lag effect” absorb this particular tension between the individual and society (these two entities have otherwise been made theoretically compatible). Though observing how dissonant groups in the past had been violated to accommodate such pressure, Elias seems to suggest that understanding the affective and symbolic role of groups might lead to a more efficient integration.¹⁰¹

1.2.3.1 Universal ethics as prospective social fact

That individuals tend to attribute a dominant value to their I-identity, partially due to their liberation from their group of origin is not seen as a new anthropological, immutable truth. Elias rather advocates more balance between the I- and the we-identities (Elias, 1987/2001): collective identity can simultaneously deflect existentialist despair and expand a group’s coherence to societal levels.¹⁰² In this context, the author recognises the ethical predisposition of an epoch to think of solidarity and responsibility at the world level. But Elias does not make such reflexivity correspond to a societal and political project within the individual.¹⁰³ He considers that such a project – a self-determined horizon – depends on a better understanding of humanity’s common route. Criticising Compté’s and Marx’s confusion between the author’s personal will and the direction of historical development, Elias suggests that social science can contribute to the understanding of the processes directing society in a given axis so that such a direction becomes open to the determination of society (1987/2004, pp. 218–219). In the meanwhile, the author sees the processes instituting society to be independent of each individual intentionality. Society’s course of development emerges as unplanned for and thus highly determined by the functioning of economic and geopolitical substances.¹⁰⁴ It is perhaps this reading that makes for a peripheral place of the ethos in *The Society of Individuals*. Elias’s dialogic view of an individual and society against history is nevertheless fundamental for the constitution of ethics as a regulatory object of society. That individual and society are two perspectives of the same dynamic reality, across interlocked spaces of different scales, is the pivot to seeing the universality of ethics as a societal construction. With Elias’ dialogic relationship between individual and society at multiple scales, we can think the universality of justice and its role in the regulation

⁹⁹ The unimaginable extraction of the individual from the clan, the family, or the State in Ancient Societies gives way to Renaissance’s possibility of social ascension independent from the group of origin, while the nineteenth century necessitates linguistic means to differentiate antagonistic ideals of “individualism” and “socialism” (Elias, 1987/2004, pp. 208–215).

¹⁰⁰ Group behaviour dissonant with bigger societal scales is illustrated with corruption practices. The reading of corruption emerges, Elias points out, when the interpretive code of loyalty towards the group, family, or clan is questioned by the society, that is, the expanded “unit of survival” (1987/2001, pp. 176–183).

¹⁰¹ In parallel, the author recognises the symbolic value of smaller affective bounds and their relation to historical memory.

¹⁰² The desirability of a collective identity depends on the configuration of the we-identity at a pertinent scale.

¹⁰³ We can interpret Elias’s advocacy for further knowledge of the evolution of society as an enabler of a political project over the course of development.

¹⁰⁴ Geopolitics are understood as an assurance of peace or increasing prospects of survival in the case of war.

of our living together as a prospective social fact (not a philosophical abstraction), interlinked with the progressive fabrication of the world-society.¹⁰⁵

1.2.4 Individual experience and plural stock of action (Lahire)

Lahire sees society and individuals “made” of the same experiences. In contemporary societies, the preponderant role attributed to relational experiences recognises that these take place in diverse social milieus.¹⁰⁶ This leads Lahire to a pluralistic theory on the scheme of actions and intentionality of each individual (Lahire, 2011, pp. 40–43; Lussault, Actor, 2013, p. 54).¹⁰⁷ Revising the influence of Bourdieu, the author joins Elias in refuting the incorporation of “social structures” inside the individual.¹⁰⁸ If “social structures” converge with the “cognitive structures” of individuals, it is because the latter are shaped by experience within the reality apprehended by the former (Lahire, 2011, pp. 310–311).¹⁰⁹ This model relates the individual and society through the development of the former in one or plural social environments.¹¹⁰ There is scope for the transformation of society’s objects by the individual, namely through cultural transmission and acquisition (p. 305).¹¹¹ Lahire theorises that if the frequenting of a group implies the propensity of an individual to construct a correspondent set of habits, then plural environments result in a plural stock of experiences and “schemes of actions” (p. 50). The understanding of actors mobilising a rich

¹⁰⁵ In particular, Elias refers the expansion of the sense of responsibility far beyond the frontiers of one’s country (1987/2001, p. 168).

¹⁰⁶ « La cohérence des habitudes ou des schèmes d’action (schèmes sensori-moteurs, d’évaluation...) que peut avoir intériorisés chaque acteur dépend donc de la cohérence des principes de socialisations auxquels il a été soumis. Dès lors qu’un acteur a été placé, simultanément ou successivement, au sein d’une pluralité de mondes sociaux non homogènes, et parfois même contradictoires, alors on a affaire à un acteur au stock de schèmes d’actions ou d’habitudes non homogène, non unifié et aux pratiques conséquemment hétérogènes (et même contradictoires), variant selon le contexte social dans lequel il sera amené à évoluer. On pourrait résumer notre propos en disant que tout corps (individuel) plongé dans une pluralité de mondes sociaux est soumis à des principes de socialisation hétérogènes et parfois même contradictoires qu’il incorpore. » (Lahire, 2011, p. 50).

¹⁰⁷ Referring to the work of Lahire, Lussault states:

« Si les hommes et les femmes, par le récit notamment, donc c’est une fonction éminente, régulent à la fois leur psychisme et leur système de relation au monde des phénomènes et construisent des histoires où ils apparaissent plutôt univoques et sur la même voie (de là procède l’illusion biographique, la puissance de cette fiction à fort effet de vérité), force est de reconnaître le caractère fragmenté de l’individu-acteur contemporain. Cette fragmentation ne signifie pas que l’individu est un tissu d’incohérences, ou que la personnalité – ce profil intégrateur offert à soi et aux autres, qui synthétise l’hétérogénéité de notre intériorité et celle de notre expérience du monde – n’a pas de sens. Mail il existe plusieurs instances, complémentaires et (éventuellement) conflictuelles au sein d’un même être humain, celui-ci devant composer avec cette diversité, qui informe toute expérience en même temps qu’elle résulte de l’expérience. » (Lussault, Actor, 2013, p. 54).

¹⁰⁸ Lahire considers Bourdieu’s use of the model of habitus a paradox in the reading of highly differentiated societies:

« Le paradoxe redise dans le fait d’avoir au bout de compte retenu le modèle d’habitus adapté à l’approche des sociétés faiblement différenciées (préindustrielles, précapitalistes) pour mener l’étude des sociétés à forte différenciation qui, par définition, produisent nécessairement des acteurs plus différenciés entre eux, mais aussi intérieurement. » (Lahire, 2011, p. 43).

¹⁰⁹ « « Structures objectives » et « structures mentales » ne sont pas deux réalités différentes, l’une (« structures mentales ») étant le produit de l’intériorisation de l’autre (les « structures objectives »), mais bien deux appréhensions d’une même réalité sociale. » (Lahire, 2011, p. 310). Social structures refer to the regularities which can be observed in the social world.

¹¹⁰ If Dubet places Lahire at a similar level of determinism as Bourdieu (Dubet, 2005), we can nevertheless detect a stronger presence of actors’ intentionality and arbitration in Lahire’s conception. For example, the focus on experience considers capitals altered in the process of transmission and “acquisition” (Lahire, 2011, p. 305). Lahire also detours from Bourdieu’s vision of state imposition of homogeneous and durable dispositions through mental and body discipline (p. 49).

¹¹¹ « Une fois encore, étrangeté de la “transmission culturelle”, la culture ne se “transmet” jamais à l’identique, mais se déforme en fonction des conditions de sa transmission et de la relation sociale qui s’instaure entre celui qui « sait » déjà et celui qui ne sait pas. La culture incorporée ne se « transvase » pas mais s’approprie et se transforme (cf. notamment Singly, 1996). Celui qui incorpore des dispositions sociales, des habitudes, des manières de voir, de sentir, d’agir, s’approprie des gestes, des raisonnements pratiques ou théoriques, des manières de dire ou de sentir, etc., en fonction de son stock d’habitudes incorporés au cours de ses expériences sociales antérieures. La métaphore de l’« héritage culturel » (ou de la « transmission culturelle ») élide les immanquables *distorsions*, *adaptations* et *réinterprétations* qui subit le « capital culturel » au cours de sa *reconstruction* d’une génération à l’autre, d’un adulte à un autre, etc., sous l’effet, d’une part, des écarts entre les présumés « transmetteurs » et les prétendus « récepteurs » et, d’autre part, des conditions (des contextes) de cette reconstruction. » (Lahire, 2011, p. 305).

repertoire requires a theory that encompasses different temporalities and registers of reflection and action (pp. 274–275).¹¹²

1.2.4.1 Heterogeneity of motives, an inconsistency of ethics?

The author sees individual coherence as an exceptional case in highly differentiated societies, requiring an enveloping of constancy and regularity of moral exposure (interpreted as coercive) (Lahire, 2011, pp. 40–41, 52). The model of Lahire does not preclude the search of coherence. We can indeed imagine that observed plurality reflects current possibilities for actors to dispose of reflexivity resources (including time) to bring their “worlds” (scheme of action, habits) to coherence. Even if we interpret Lahire’s individual heterogeneity with moderation, the plural model is momentous for the study of the social production of ethic. If heterogeneity of ideality seems contrary to the ethical coherence of value-laden actions, it might also be indicating the way in which individuals operate the substantiation of ethics. How do they identify values in concrete stakes? Do they mobilise different deontological rules in different situations? If so, is it possible to find an explicative pattern for the variation of ethical orientations “internal” to one individual?

1.2.5 Plural justifications in social environments (Boltanski and Thévenot)

If Lahire brings increased complexity to the reading of the actors, Boltanski and pluralise the interpretation of social environments. These authors position their approach in the sociological debate opposing “collectivists” and “individualists” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 25).¹¹³ They read individuals endowed with a set of sociological limitations rather than “free from all normative constraints who can follow the dictates of their personal appetites.” They also reject seeing the “social fact” as unrealistic generalisation (pp. 26–27).¹¹⁴ The authors articulate the individual and society by putting individuals’ moral competence at the centre of the “possibility of transcending the particular traits of persons and laying a foundation for agreement in what we shall call a *higher common good*” (p. 28).¹¹⁵ They argue that the agreement necessary for the interaction of people in society is treated by sociology on the basis of natural law, exempting it from analysis (p. 32). The authors address this lacuna by studying the capacity to reach an agreement between symmetric parties. Justice is understood as the property of bringing disputes to an end, constructing the social bound and contributing to social stability. The research programme seeks

¹¹² « Ce qu’il est capital en revanche d’appréhender le plus finement possible, c’est la part réflexive, calculatrice, planificatrice de l’action (moments où l’action se prépare, se calcule, se planifie, mais aussi où elle se réfléchit sur le champ ou après coup) et la part d’action préréflexive, non planifié, non calculée, selon les types d’action et les catégories d’acteurs considérés. Plutôt que de postuler a priori et une fois pour toutes l’existence d’une théorie de la pratique singulière (théorie de l’acteur rationnel, théorie de l’action planifié, théorie de la décision, théorie des jeux, théories du sens pratique, théorie de l’action situé...), il est préférable de reconstituer, selon les univers sociaux et les milieux sociaux, selon les types d’acteurs et les types d’action, les différents temps de l’action et les différents logiques d’action. » (Lahire, 2011, pp. 274–275).

¹¹³ “Contemporary social scientists often seek to minimize the diversity of their constructs by situating them within a single basic opposition. In one tradition, rooted in Durkheimian sociology, the ordering principle rests in the notion of the collective. In another tradition, any sort of order or equilibrium is construed as the unintended result of individual choices; this principle informs approaches that borrow the rational choice model from economics. Our own perspective, offers a third approach: we seek to embrace the various constructs (the collective and the individual) within a more general model, and show how each one integrates, in its own way, the relation between moments of agreement reaching and moments of critical questioning.” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 25).

¹¹⁴ The authors are referring to F.A. Hayek’s “Scientism and the Study of Society”, *Economica*, Vol. 9, No. 35 (Aug., 1942), pp. 267–291.

¹¹⁵ Moral competence appears as the capacity to distance oneself from one’s own particularities in order to identify goods in general terms so that they would resist scrutiny even from absent parties. That capacity is a prerequisite to economic exchange as a means to attribute a common value to merchandise. The acknowledgment of others and the consensual agreement on the value of goods detours from the centrality of the concept of self-interest (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 27; 2000, p. 209):

“We are not using the term “moral” here as it is used by certain theoreticians of liberalism, in the limited sense of having a benevolent predisposition that would compensate for self-interested greed. We shall try to show that moral capacity is presupposed in the construction of an order of market exchanges among persons, who must be capable of distancing themselves from their own particularities in order to reach agreement about external goods that are enumerated and defined in general terms.” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 27).

grand principles of justification in the argumentation of social sciences, political philosophy, and actors' interactions, establishing a bridge between the social sciences and moral philosophy (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000, p. 208).¹¹⁶ The judgments on subjects and objects by savants and ordinary people are also connected (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1983).¹¹⁷ At the centre of this study is the operation of "qualification" and its tension with demands of "common humanity" (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, pp. 11, 75, 145–156).¹¹⁸ Thévenot and Boltanski's method studies coding operations in statistical surveys, the historic development of socio-occupational categories, the resolution of disputes in situation, the analysis of seminal political philosophy works, and management manuals. Investigating "the sense of justice as it is displayed in ordinary situated disputes", the authors observe the operation of justification between persons in situations (of co-presence): a pragmatics (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000, p. 208; 1991/2006, p. 34).¹¹⁹ In doing so, they choose to avoid doubling the judgment of actors with their own judgment.¹²⁰ Boltanski and Thévenot detour from ordering the validity of existing ontologies:¹²¹

"The model does not posit any universals to begin with, but poses the universality as a horizon searched after by the agents. This approach is able to start from persons with different grammars of justice, and aims to clarify the differences and the points of convergence between these grammars." (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000, p. 210).

Boltanski and Thévenot propose a model of polity that accommodates a plurality of *worths*, governing social order in different situations. The model is not a dispositional one, applicable in all circumstances in which an agent takes an action or decision. It is bounded to areas of validity without being restricted to the local (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000, pp. 209–210). Pluralism regards differences in the way the sense of fitness and rightness is expressed when people criticise the actions of others or when they defend their actions against criticism. The model is based on a principle of plurality and asymmetry of worths. In other words, the fact that the "common humanity" of individuals does not translate in equal entitlement to uphold their

¹¹⁶ In *On Justification*, Boltanski and Thévenot study six philosophers (each of whom provides the principles of legitimate order of a world): Augustine's "City of God" (inspiration), Bossuet's "Politics" (domestic), Hobbes "Leviathan" (glory and fame), Rousseau's "Social contract" (general will), Adam Smith's "The wealth of nations" and "Theory of moral sentiments" (wealth) and Saint-Simons "Du système industriel" (industrial efficiency) (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006).

¹¹⁷ On a study based on the laboratory experimentation, in which research subjects are asked to classify an individual into social groups, the authors state: "the job of categorization in fact presupposes an ability to divide social space into discrete categories, and this requires participants to have a homogeneous representation of social space and of its divisions" (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1983, p. 646).

¹¹⁸ Sharing a common humanity is the first statement of the polity. It presumes that the members of the polity are capable of reaching agreement and assume the same conception of humans (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 75).

¹¹⁹ On the co-presence requirement, we can read: "focusing on associations capable of bringing about agreement and of being incorporated into judgments, we shall argue that the foregoing modalities refer to principles of justice (or of justness, a less incongruous term when a technical mode of justification is in question) that presuppose the presence of other people." (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 34). The idea of situated tests on the social order implies that persons are not pinned down to particular worlds and states of worthiness (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 215).

¹²⁰ "This reflection on the symmetry between descriptive languages or explanatory principles used by the social sciences, on the one hand, and the modes of justification or criticism used by the actors, on the other hand, made us particularly attentive to the tensions that permeate sociology when it claims to be reconciling a positivist conception of scientific neutrality with a requirement that it engages in social criticism. For critical sociology then confronts the impossibility of capturing the necessarily normative dimensions that support its contribution to the denunciation of social injustices; this impossibility leads it inevitably to place undue emphasis on the externalities of science in order to establish the legitimacy of its own practice" (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 11).

¹²¹ On the use of complementary "formal" elements to compensate for the absence of explicit universals and the kind of rationality supporting them, these authors state:

"The necessity to submit the development of the model to a formal construction directly derives from our will to take seriously the claims of justice made by the actors. We had to demonstrate the solidity of these claims and prevent them from being too easily reduced to hypocritical moves associated with the defence of particular interest or to unfounded illusions. To achieve this it must indeed be possible to demonstrate in what way they will satisfy certain condition of validity which support a demand of universalization, and to make explicit the kind of rationality on which they rely. This indispensable basis of a form of rationality that is defensible in all generality cannot be immediately demonstrated by a simple registering of the utterances of the actors, for these actors rarely make explicit the general principles of their actions. To correctly interpret the observations in the field, we had to have the possibility to link the empirically observable reality with formal models." (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000, p. 210).

vision in all circumstances. Compromise is at the core of the polity. The configuration of the situation by the parties designates the form of worth that ought to dominate in that context. The judgement operations described by Boltanski and Thévenot have a cognitive basis. They involve, on the one hand, a sense of evidence (“naturalness”) and the use of reason. The “naturalness” of argument relates to the operation of selecting relevant information and of coherent associations used to order subjects and objects. The authors postulate the possibility to generalise common *worths* to all human beings (Bolstanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 12).

The authors identify six *worlds*, each constructing the social order in a different way. The worlds or polities are characterised by a higher common principle (that is defended by that world); the associated common good; a state of worthiness (evaluating the contribution of persons to that common good);¹²² the corresponding investment formula (justifying different orderings of people despite their common humanity); and a political form of worth (that is, the collective benefit derived from higher states of some members) (pp. 74–79). Each of these polities defends only one principle as the common good and reduces the principles of the other polities to private goods (p. 78).

Worlds	1. Higher common principle	2. Common good	3. State of worthiness	4. Investment formula	5. Political forms of worth
Inspired	The outpouring of inspiration	The value of uniqueness inspired in others	Inexpressible and ethereal	Escape from habits, calling into question, risk	Augustine
Domestic	Engenderment according to tradition	Respect and responsibility	Hierarchical superiority	Rejection of selfishness	Bossuet
Fame	The reality of public opinion	Being recognised and identified	Famous	Giving up secrets	Hobbes
Civic	The pre-eminence of collectives	Relation of delegation	Governing and representing	The renunciation of the particular	Rousseau
Market	Competition	Buy, get, sell	Desirable	Opportunism	Adam Smith
Industrial	Efficiency	Control	Efficient	Progress	Saint-Simon

Table 2 Six worlds of justification: the plural polity model of Boltanski and Thévenot.

Discord is explained by the model as a conflict between two worlds or between two worths along which to qualify the disputing parties. Settling a dispute requires agreement on the most relevant worth to evaluate the situation at stake. A conflict is ended once the states of worthiness are ordered according to the common good of that world. Equity, the authors argue, demands that the gap between the worthy and the deficient be minimal, which is necessary for the convergence of judgement (p. 223).¹²³ The authors claim

¹²² “Worth is the way in which one expresses, embodies, understands, or represents other people (according to modalities that depend on the world under consideration). Worth is thus associated with the capacity for expression in general terms. The relation between people’s worth and their mastery of general forms is posited in each world, especially people’s ability to formulate utterances that are said to be general, authentic, true, and so on.” (Bolstanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 132). The state of worthiness is measured from the general to the particular; the more worthy are the “guarantors of the higher common principle” (p. 141).

¹²³ “Strictness toward the worthy and indulgence toward the deficient thus shatter the scale of the worthy and leave intact only the smallest possible distance between the worthy and the deficient. The convergence of judgements on this minimal gap, treated as natural, has to do with equity.” (Bolstanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 223).

that even universes associated with a preponderant worth (industrial and economic worth) do not deal without domestic values.¹²⁴

1.2.5.1 Common assumptions and the hypothesis of plural worths

Boltanski and Thévenot attempt to produce an encounter between social science and political philosophy. They place operations of justification of the ordinary people at the centre of that encounter. Our research can be seen as an extension of their demarche from the angle of space. We can then observe a number of shared assumptions between our project and Boltanski and Thévenot's work on justification (1991/2006):

- Taking seriously the competence and intentionality of people without resorting to a moral reading of susceptibility to corruption and interest (the specification of this capacity includes competence to switch between worlds, the immersion in the world that matters and the oblivion of the worlds that are not relevant in one arrangement (pp. 233–234);
- Identification of justice with the pursuit of universal justifications and the possibility of social convergence of diverse societies (the authors do work with a community shared symbolism) (p. 40);
- Rejection of relativism of values leaving attempts of conciliation in an impasse (p. 215);
- Historical circulation of societies' intellectual productions (p. 88);
- Articulation between materiality and ideality in issues of ethical dispute (p. 89).

It is then worth noting why we do not draw on this work more extensively. The difficulties it poses for our study are not the absence of *sociétalité*.¹²⁵ The grand absence in this model is spatial thought. Where do problems of distance fit among the polities of the model? What is the relationship of space with the worlds? Is space domestic (in association to affective bond), civic (listening to the citizen in oneself rather than the person), industrial (a combination of general interests with a particular interest) (pp. 83–121)? How do different worlds accommodate the interspatiality of social problems and their multiple scales? There is scope for questioning whether a model of separated polities is suitable to the resolution of spatial tensions. We cannot ignore, however, that pluralism of worths might have some import to our hypotheses.¹²⁶ Can resonance with a theory of justice remain unchanged for a single individual across the worlds of his discourse? Does the political-philosophical orientation of an actor vary with the substance of problems?

¹²⁴ This statement renders more complex Elias's decomposition of worths at different levels: economic and civic at the world level; domestic at the family and state level.

¹²⁵ Due to the nature of some of the polities (civic, market, industrial), a society's objects can be present in this environmental solution for disputes. The substance of arguments and the objects that qualify the situation can be societal even when treated as disputes in co-presence.

¹²⁶ See research questions and hypotheses in section 6.1.1, chapter 6.

2 Contemporary acquisitions of spatial thought

« *L'espace est (en) action(s), car il manifeste, ... l'indispensable et inlassable activité des êtres humains avec la distance et les places.* » (Lussault, 2007, p. 37).

This chapter traces the movement from Lefebvre's paradigm of the production of space to the *paradigme actoriel*. The dialectical moments in Lefebvre's production of space are revisited with the system of concepts of Lussault and Lévy (2003): space as a dimension of society and a multidimensional object, space as *idéel* and material, the couple of spatiality and space, the concept of habitat as a political requirement, the idea of spatial capital. The system of concepts issuing from this review supports the theoretical and empirical developments of this thesis.

2.1 Henri Lefebvre: the production of space

2.1.1 Puncturing the primacy of the *idéel* over material space

In a manner similar to Elias (2001, pp. 93–96) Lefebvre rejects the Cartesian division between a world offered to the senses and a world governed by the intellect. It is, however, from Descartes' provision of a first mature definition of space that Lefebvre proceeds with his epistemic endeavour. As part of Descartes' contribution to the secularisation of thought, space is defined as absolute – “as Object opposed to Subject, as *res extensa* opposed to, and present to, *res cogitans* [whereby] space came to dominate, by containing them, all senses and all bodies” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 1).¹²⁷ This breakthrough, Lefebvre argues, would develop a science of space that is emancipated from Metaphysics (Spinoza, Leibniz, the Newtonians) (p. 2). Initially organised by mathematics through topologies – which made the correspondence between spatial representations, nature, and social life increasingly difficult – this foreshadowing would be abandoned to philosophy. The philosophical re-appropriation of space would make it “a mental thing” – the ideal representations of space having priority over reality (pp. 2–3). The scientific project of Lefebvre in *The Production of Space* (1974/2009) can be described as the setup of the epistemic foundations of a unitary science of space that derives from that point in the history of Western Logos. As we have seen, Elias' epistemic turn¹²⁸ surmounted the division between an inner self and an outer context, making individual and society dialogical while acknowledging social relations as motors of both productions. In a similar manner, Lefebvre renders the relationship between the *idéel* and the material dialectic in the production of a society's space. He puts at the centre of such a *process* the social relations of production and reproduction, which are in line with his Marxist inspiration (though not exclusively).¹²⁹

In that move, Lefebvre rejects the opposition of a subject and an object, a critique he addresses to authors operating a division between theory or the mental space and the practice of space (this standpoint is attributed to Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes (1974/2009, p. 5)). The antinomy between “the thinking I and the subject of

¹²⁷ Lefebvre comments on the isotropic character of such a space: “the Cartesian notion of space as absolute, infinite *res-extensa*, a divine property which may be grasped in a single act of intuition because of its homogeneous (isotropic) character.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 13).

¹²⁸ This turn is simultaneously epistemological, that is, regarding the conditions of possibility of knowledge, and epistemic, in the form of the theory of the dialogical relationship between the social and the individual, as presented in section 1.2.3, “The individual/society dialogic (Elias)” (chapter 1). Given the scope of the present chapter, we retain the epistemic contribution.

¹²⁹ See definition of *idéel* and material in section 2.2.2, “Space is *idéel* and material”, in the present chapter.

thought” in knowledge production is also revisited, namely in the work of Foucault (pp. 4–6).¹³⁰ Dismissing the priority of the *idéal* is paralleled by the rejection of the priority of language over the remainder of social productions. As we will see later, the rupture in these dichotomies was expected to overcome the confusion between a social group’s ideology and theory, thought, or Knowledge (pp. 6, 9).¹³¹

As Lefebvre anchored *The Production of Space* in the Hegelian dialectical model, he also claimed the substitution of a transcendental content by reality’s antagonism; in particular, the opposition of a material production of space and the repressed spatial representations of men.¹³² If that model can be considered constructivist in the sense that the object of study is itself socially constructed by the actors¹³³, it is restrained by a reading of social relations under a Marxist productive system¹³⁴ (Lussault, Constructivism, 2013, pp. 225–226) and consequently, does not raise all the questions brought about by the potency of realism. That limitation has been lifted by a theory of social science of space based on the epistemological model of realist constructivism (Lévy, 1999a, pp. 39–47).¹³⁵

2.1.2 Space is socially produced

The unitary theory of Lefebvre argues that space is a social process (1974/2009, p. 15).¹³⁶ In this work, we retain the core of Lefebvre’s definition of space. Space is the product and the process, material and *idéal*, mobilised by society in its continuous remaking of the social relations that are necessary to the activities of men. In the exploration of this postulate, Lefebvre raises the hypothesis of space as being a code, with each society possessing the interpretative key to its space (p. 17).¹³⁷ Space becomes a source of auto-intelligibility. It is at times explained by society, enabling its comprehension without confinement in “unconscious” explanations (pp. 33–36), nor restriction against the

¹³⁰ On Foucault’s separation of the ideal and the material we can read: “Foucault never explains what space it is that he is referring to, nor how it bridges the gap between the theoretical (epistemological) realm and the practical one, between mental and social, between the space of the philosophers and the space of people who deal with material things. The scientific attitude, understood as the application of “epistemological” thinking to the acquired knowledge, is assumed to be “structurally” linked to the spatial sphere.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 4).

¹³¹ The primacy of the space *idéal* entangled with the imposition of ideology, at the basis of Lefebvre’s claim of a different function for Knowledge can be read in this passage:

“In an inevitably circulatory manner, this mental space then becomes the locus of a “theoretical practice” which is separated from social practice and which sets itself up as the axis, pivot or central reference point to “Knowledge”.... The quasi-logical presupposition of an identity between mental space (the space of the philosophers and epistemologists) and real space creates an abyss between the mental sphere on one side and the physical and social sphere on the other. From time to time and intrepid funambulist will set off to cross the void, giving a great show and sending delightful shudder through the onlookers. By large, however, the so called philosophical thinking recoils at the mere suggestion of any such *salto mortale*.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 6).

¹³² Lefebvre argues that the syntonics facets of space disappeared in the twentieth century and that three modernity aspects (bearing conflict) presented themselves to such theory-making, requiring a fresh (less simplistic than the then current) appropriation of Marx: the role of the state in a world-society, and the way in which it risked imposing and homogenising, thus immobilising society/history (inspired by Hegel); the persistence of the eruptive force of difference (inspired by Nietzsche), and the continuous pertinence of class struggle (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 23).

¹³³ « On peut refuser de cantonner le construit à la connaissance et choisir une approche qui postule que non seulement les objets de connaissance mais ce qu’ils visent, donc les phénomènes eux-mêmes, sont construits intégralement par les artifices des acteurs – donc les artifices cognitives déjà évoqués. » (Lussault, Constructivism, 2013, p. 225).

¹³⁴ « Notons que le paradigme de la production de l’espace, qui se diffusa dans les années 1970, peut être considéré comme un constructivisme dont les fondements marxistes imposaient le détour par la métaphore de la production matérielle, en référence évidemment à l’importance de la question du système productif chez Marx. » (Lussault, Constructivism, 2013, p. 226).

¹³⁵ Realist constructivism has been defined in section a. of the introduction, “Realist constructivism for a society of actors”.

¹³⁶ On the objective of the unitary theory:

“The project I am outlining, however, does not aim to produce a (or *the*) discourse on space, but rather to expose the actual production of space by bringing the various kinds of space and the modalities of their genesis together within a single theory.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 16).

¹³⁷ On the existence of specific codes to read space, in specific historical periods, we can read:

“If so, interested “subjects”, as members of a particular society, would have accessed by this means at once to *their* space and to their status as “subjects” acting within that space and (in the broadest sense of the word) comprehending it.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 17).

If it would be proven that such a code existed in the past, shared by inhabitants, politicians, and technicians (Lefebvre has in mind the Renaissance), the role of theory would be to study their emergence and decadence:

“If indeed spatial codes have existed, each characterising a particular spatial/social practice, and if these codifications have been *produced* along with the space corresponding to them, the job of theory is to elucidate their rise, their role, and their demise.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 17).

knowledge of “things in place” (p. 37). The objective of such a theory is not to construct a new discourse on space but to bring to light the actual production of space, focusing on the process of production (division of labour) and the reproduction (in a biological sense and through the organisation of social functions so as to maintain a hierarchical social structure) of capitalist and neocapitalist societies. The intersections of such relations, taking place in space and assigned to spaces, both in practice and symbolically, are at the core of understanding the social production of space (pp. 32–33). This is coherent with the primacy of language that Lefebvre wishes to overthrow; how space is produced becomes the central question (pp. 34, 37):

“[The production of space] is not the work of a moment for society to generate (produce) an appropriated social space in which it can achieve a form by means of self-presentation and self-representation – a social space to which that society is not identical and, which indeed is its tomb as well as its cradle. This act of creation is, in a fact, a process.” (p. 34).

The moments of such processes are theoretically immobilised by Lefebvre by putting in dialectic relationships three spatial spheres: the material, the ideal, and social spaces (p. 11). As Christian Schmid (2008) argues, understanding the tripartite dialectics of Lefebvre is not a simple exercise (p. 29).¹³⁸ To minimise risks of misinterpretation, we will support our reading with Schmid’s clarifications (p. 33).¹³⁹ The author advances a reading of the two triads of Lefebvre as having distinct epistemic foundations: *spatial practice, representation of space, and representational space* are anchored in Lefebvre’s theory of language, which is itself animated by that of Nietzsche (p. 34); the division between *perceived, conceived, and lived space* follows French phenomenologists such as Bachelard and Meaurio-Ponty. The recognition of these epistemic affiliations clarifies that the elements of the triad cannot be seen to constitute separate spaces (Schmid denotes that such a confusion is entertained by Soja’s interpretation of Lefebvre (p. 42)).

2.1.3 Three dialectical moments in the production of space

We can attempt to summarise the two triads in parallel, as they are responses to the same question of how actors produce space (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 37). We propose a simple interpretation, based on the way in which the dialectic refers to either alliance or conflict between spatial actors in interrelation (Schmid, 2008, p. 33).¹⁴⁰ This, it seems to us, is the root of the problem that spatial justice can help illuminate. Spatial practice – the first element of the first triad – concerns the friction with the material product of space (a space routinely used by inhabitants in the pragmatics of daily life) (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 38).¹⁴¹ This instance brings together the material infrastructure of space and its activation in actualised interactions and communications (in particular, those that sustain the reproduction of social order (Schmid, 2008, p. 36)). More than the product of a moment in time, spatial practice includes the accumulation of similar past interactions. Interestingly for our analysis, Lefebvre points out the role of

¹³⁸ Schmid notes, with regard to the confused interpretation of the dimensions of space:

“In Lefebvre’s work, however, these three dimensions exist in a state of uncertainty. Faithful to his epistemological premises, Lefebvre introduces them first as approximations. He explores their range of validity and modifies them in the course of his theoretical excursions. There followed then in the reception of the theory a near-total confusion of opinion about these three dimensions. The discussion ranged over all aspects of the three dimensions: their status, their inner construction, and their interconnections... The meaning of the three dimensions becomes clear only in the overall context of the theory, and can be reconstructed only out of Lefebvre’s entire work. In order to understand them, one has to begin with the dialectic.” (Schmid, 2008, p. 29).

¹³⁹ “Thus Lefebvre develops a three-dimensional figure of social reality. Material social practice taken as the starting point of life and of analysis constitutes the first moment. It stands in contradiction to the second moment: knowledge, language, and the written word, understood by Lefebvre as abstraction and as concrete power, and as compulsion or constraint. The third moment involves poesy and desire as forms of transcendence that help becoming prevail over death. Lefebvre, however, does not stop at this sublation in transcendence and poesy. He does not drift into metaphysics but returns again to practice and activity.” (Schmid, 2008, p. 33).

¹⁴⁰ In this passage, Schmid clarifies that each sphere is a moment of the production, whose linkages are covered by the circularity of the dialectic. The moments of the interaction can be in alliance or in conflict with each other (Schmid, 2008, p. 33).

¹⁴¹ “The spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectic interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it. From an analytical standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space. What is spatial practice under neocapitalism? It embodies a close association, within perceived space, between daily reality (daily routines) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places aside for work, “private” life and leisure)”. (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 38)

competence and performance in the ways in which society members relate to that space (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 33). Representation of space – the second instance of the dialectic – refers to discourses on space as well as the objects fabricated with them (buildings, maps, pictures) (Schmid, 2008, p. 36),¹⁴² including knowledge produced by the savants and used by *le politique*.¹⁴³ In Lefebvre’s interpretation, such an operation flattens the difference in the representation of space of a society’s members and has an unavoidable hegemonic facet (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, pp. 38–39). Finally, representational space¹⁴⁴ is the space lived in by the inhabitants and some actors who opt out of the hegemonic views practised in the second dimension (artists, some philosophers, and writers). By mobilising affective investments of images and symbols, this dimension captures all aspects of spatial reality that Lefebvre considers to be curtailed by spatial practice and representations of spaces (p. 39). Representational space appropriates the materiality defined in the first productive moment: drawing on Nietzsche’s *poesis*, it is a critique of Hegelian sublation as strictly ideal and immobilised in time (Schmid, 2008, pp. 30–32).¹⁴⁵ Lived or representational space is the locus of emancipation.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, Lefebvre recognises an interstice between the last two elements of the triad. While keeping the genesis of symbolism open (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 43),¹⁴⁷ he nevertheless states that this interstice is at once of the individual and of society, thus evoking social norms and values (Schmid, 2008, p. 37).¹⁴⁸

We can now turn to the second formulation of the triad – that of the interrelation of the perceived, conceived, and lived spaces. Perceived space is defined as an automatic pragmatic functioning (of the body, for instance) (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, pp. 38–40)¹⁴⁹ and deploys the important effect of materiality in human perception (Schmid, 2008, pp. 37–38). Inasmuch as an object, before existing, needs to be thought of (p. 40), conceived space is a reflexive instance regarding the participation of knowledge in the organisation (and oppression) of the other two spheres. Lived space corresponds to a sensed mode, which is potentially unproductive,¹⁵⁰ as in the subjective experience of one’s body in space, regardless of existing concepts, but not radically detached from them (Lefebvre recognises the role of culture in one’s intimate space (pp. 38–40)). Lefebvre points to the weakness of not considering the three dimensions alongside each other (p. 41), and Schmid sheds light on the nature of such interdependence: the materiality of human practice mediated by a body which is always in a space is dependent on a thought that conceives of such a practice and represents it – the lived element endowing the matter with subjectivity would not exist without the two previous moments (Schmid, 2008, p. 41). We can also infer that the historical remaking of space depends on the circulation of the three dimensions in a recursive loop, triggering new spatial productions.

¹⁴² “Conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artists with a scientific bent. All of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived This is the dominant space in any society (or mode of production). Conceptions of space tend, with certain exceptions to which I shall return, towards a system of verbal (and therefore intellectually worked out) signs.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, pp. 38–39)

¹⁴³ See definition of the political function in section 1.1.2, “The political function of society” (chapter 1).

¹⁴⁴ “*Representational spaces*: space as directly *lived* through hits associated images and symbols, and hence the space of “inhabitants” and “users”, but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who *describe* and aspire to do no more than describe. This is the dominated – and hence passively experienced – space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects. This representational spaces may be said, though again with certain exceptions, to tend towards more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 39).

¹⁴⁵ The idea of sublation is broadly referred to in the text *Science of Logic* (1969) by Hegel (translated by A. V. Miller) and its critique *Dialectical Materialism* (1968) (translated by J. Sturrock) and *Métaphilosophie*. More specifically, Schmid (2008) quotes Lefebvre in *Dialectical Materialism* with regard to the argument that a concept does not detain its project (p. 36).

¹⁴⁶ We chose not to emphasise Lefebvre’s association of this potential with an underground, marginal society, for the epistemology and research ethics endorsed in this dissertation define that the process of emancipation should be shared by all society members.

¹⁴⁷ “The question is what intervenes, what occupies the interstices between representations of space and representational spaces. A culture, perhaps. Certainly – but the word has less content than it seems to have. The work of artistic creation? No doubt – but that leaves unanswered the queries “By whom? And “How?” Imagination? Perhaps – but why? And for whom?” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 43).

¹⁴⁸ “In the third [dimension], the material “order” that emerges on the ground can itself become the vehicle conveying meaning. In this way a (spatial) symbolism develops that expresses and evokes social norms, values, and experiences.” (Schmid, 2008, p. 37).

¹⁴⁹ This interpretation is incorrect in light of contemporary knowledge of such phenomena; indeed, perception is already a mix of representations and sensorial primary emotions in the form of socially constructed feelings (Damásio, 1994/2003).

¹⁵⁰ There is a reference to the subtraction from the “bureaucratic society of controlled consumption.” (Lefebvre, 1970, p. 4).

If we understand that Lefebvre’s formulation is set to follow the experience of subjects as they meet the constraints of space (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, pp. 40–41), we can argue that such a political and scientific program does not necessarily lead to the carving of the three-dimensional spaces reviewed above.

	Perceived space Spatial practice	Conceived space Representation of space	Lived space Representational space
<i>Modus operandi</i> of actors	Pragmatic (action) (ex. inhabitants and technicians)	Decisional (knowledge and power) (ex. technicians and politicians)	Subversive (thought, feeling) (ex. inhabitants and artists)
Cognitive style	Objective		Subjective
Predominant sphere Material/ <i>Idéal</i>	Material		<i>Idéal</i>
Objects and expected use	<i>Extime</i> use (ex. networks of mobility)	(ex. buildings)	<i>Intime</i> use (ex. art, everydayness)
Relation to justice	Reproduction of society		Disruption of society

Table 3 Lefebvre’s decoupage of three dimensions of the production of space.

In the table above we can see the hybridity of the materials organised under each dimension. From Lefebvre’s definitions and illustrations, we can identify several themes: *modus operandi* of actors and their cognitive style, predominant sphere of ideality/materiality, degree of intimacy of the spatial object, relation to a horizon of social emancipation or justice. We can see how the modalities declining these themes do not follow the cut of the three dimensions.

We further integrate the three instances, recognising that if epistemic cuts are to be applied to space production, they should not isolate what is (potentially) constant in that process.¹⁵¹ As we will see in the next section (2.2, “Lussault, Lévy: the acting of space”), empirical works underlying the role of actors in the making of a society’s spatial system further destabilise this division. Spatial practice and lived space are not distinguishable on the basis of *modus operandi*, cognitive style, or preponderant material sphere or ideality. The space as experienced by inhabitants is neither just passive nor strictly poetic. It includes active choices (residence location, a mode of transportation, the places of social activities, and a *chosen mode of* behaviour in public space; all of which might be invested with varying degrees of creativity and symbolism, but also with pragmatism and political intentionality. By the same token, ordinary operations of inhabitants in their daily life make up the materiality of space, which is not, uniquely, the product of an elite group of politicians, planners, and architects.¹⁵² Surely, Lefebvre responds to the context of urban theory in the 1970s, when *system’s planning* indeed normalised as truth the representation of some individuals, who were supposed to hold the key of their societal time (Hall, 1988/1997).¹⁵³ Lefebvre identifies spaces of representation in the sense that they reflect a particular group rather than the entirety of the members of society.¹⁵⁴

If we retain Schmid’s perspective on the usefulness of the triad to depict the contradictions between social thought and social action (2008, p. 33), it seems to us that these lines of conflict mask a fundamental spatial problem of

¹⁵¹ For example, we know that Lefebvre’s interpretation of cognition as decomposable into separate moments is no longer a valid representation of our relationship with reality; the affective and the cognitive are more interlinked in a permanent communication.

¹⁵² We recognise that different actors impact space with different degrees of visibility and through different processes. The spectrum is broad, between repetition and duration of a daily commuter and the concentration of investments in centralised urban redesign.

¹⁵³ This was all the more critical as the positivistic approach blinded those actors from being aware of their own subjectivity.

¹⁵⁴ This argument still resonates today in our context of study, as Metropolitan Porto lacks the definition of political spaces of arbitration at a societal scale.

(urban) space: making compatible and coherent the spatial *actorisation* of the totality of society. The political solution of *auto-gestion* that Lefebvre anticipates reduces the potential tension between divergent spatial conceptions and spatial practices, by focusing on the superior power of the ideology of some over the rest of the society. As we see in Chapter 3, “Urbanity at stake”, Lefebvre nevertheless emphasises the extent to which the difference is at the core of the urban. Also, quite contradictorily, he advances the priority of the popular class as a redress to those who, historically, never had space made in their image.

As for the separation of knowledge from the other spatial levels, it is possible to conceive “representational spaces” of inhabitants as social facts; thus, they are a part of knowledge rather than opposed to it. We can also conceive of a reinvented proximity between different registers of truth, given that all rationalities are part of the making of society as a whole, through space and the political. This idea further opens the possibility of an encounter of spatial representations among different actors of society. But once we set out to discover, empirically, which representations emerge through the inhabitants’ voices, will they be compatible? If our study comes to demonstrate an ensemble of disparate spatial visions, how can this knowledge relate to institutional politics? Should some knowledge remain hegemonic? These questions are recovered in the second part of this thesis, in our empirical terrain on the urban area of Porto.¹⁵⁵

We will now review a theory of space which, multidimensional and continuous, is more suitable to address these questions. However, it is important to underline an ensemble of contributions that we retain from Lefebvre’s paradigm of the production of space. The dialectic articulation of Lefebvre’s instances offers the beginning of a joint thought of superstructure and infrastructure (Godelier, 1984/2010). Composed of *idéel* and material spheres, it is a result of men’s activities with distance and places in such a recursive dynamic that existing space is always a conditioner and enabler of present and future activities. As a social product based on social relations, it is something to be explained while it explains society (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 31). This makes phenomenology both societal – and not merely accessible through the senses of a selected literary sensitivity – and historical – the lived projection on space depends on the diachronic placement of the experience of each society member and of his epoch. On this last point, Schmid states:

“Lefebvre attempts consistently to maintain his dialectical materialist standpoint. In this way the epistemological perspective shifts from the subject that thinks, acts, and experiences to the process of social production of thought, action, and experience.” (Schmid, 2008, pp. 40–41).

Spatial productions are at once active processes of the individual and of society (Schmid, 2008, p. 39). Space is simultaneously at the core of individual life and at the heart of society.

2.2 Lussault, Lévy: the acting of space

2.2.1 Space is a dimension of society and a multidimensional object

Like Lefebvre, Jacques Lévy revisits the philosophical legacy of spatial thought with the definitions of Newton, Descartes, Berkeley, and Leibniz.¹⁵⁶ He does so in an effort of accessibility between philosophy and geography, and

¹⁵⁵ See chapter 6, “Methodology, the construction of an empirical object”.

¹⁵⁶ The author intersects it with the history of geography to arrive at the notions of absolute/relative spaces and positional/relational spaces, arranged in four pertinent approaches (Lévy, Espace, 2013, pp. 354–355). The most productive approach defines space as relative and relational. Relative, for it depends on the realities it deploys; relational, for it is produced through the relationships that spatial operators entertain with each other according to reasons themselves open to enquiry (rather than predetermined):

« Absolue/relatif porte sur l’existence d’un postulat affirmant l’existence de l’espace indépendamment des réalités qui s’y déploient. L’idée d’un espace absolu suppose qu’il existe un substrat intangible dans lequel toute répartition s’inscrit et qui, dans une large mesure, la détermine.... L’autre principe de classement (positionnel/relationnel) porte sur les liens existant entre les réalités spatiales. L’approche positionnelle définit un système de positions indépendant de la nature des objets concernés, qui subissent de par leurs caractéristiques de masse (Newton) ou de forme (Descartes) leur localisation dans le système. En revanche, le point de vue relationnel s’intéresse à la relation que les opérateurs spatiaux

like Lefebvre, Lévy proposes a theoretical model of space and an accompanying epistemology. In this section of the text, we detail the framework of spatial thought developed by the author in dialogue with Michel Lussault, within the cognitive approach of realist constructivism. Close to theories of complexity and recursive explanations rather than causalities (Morin, 1991; Lussault, Constructivism, 2013), the concepts of this theory make up a system. Their connections carry the relations found in the real that makes the toolkit pertinent. Very briefly and in line with the Lefebvrian heritage already underlined, we can say that this theory integrates the contemporary existence of actors producing their environment, whereby they create a space that affects their subsequent makings of society and of themselves.

In this perspective, space constitutes a dimension addressing the specific problems derived from the existence of distance between the objects of society in the face of which “social operators build ... strategies, actions, ideologies, technologies, knowledge” (Lévy & Lussault, *Espace*, 2003, p. 330). The problems created by the existence of distance are not reducible to difficulties of dispersion.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, Jacques Lévy postulates four values for distance (d in notations within brackets), corresponding to different types of solutions encountered by contemporary societies: travelling the extension between two social entities (mobility or $d = n$), maximum reduction of such spacing through concentration (co-presence or $d = 0$), isotropy as spatial indistinctness that makes as if distance did not exist¹⁵⁸ (ubiquity, $d\emptyset$), and finally, approaches that avoid interaction, creating an infinite distance irrespective of Euclidian actual values (enclave, $d = \infty$) (Lévy, 1994, pp. 65–68).¹⁵⁹ We can see that the problems of space can be made to depend on the representation of distance as desirable – when indeed proximity would be possible – or, reversely, a preference for its annulation.

This demarche assumes that an epistemic “decoupage” is a determinant of the understanding and explication of reality. A multidimensional view of society could be seen to call for a geometry of projection of a high number of dimensions into a reduced number of planes, accepting the deformation of that flattening movement. However, the spatial model we endorse can be described as an intersection of a multidimensional volume (more than four dimensions) by one plane, upon which a selection of elements from other planes is displayed without deformation. This implies accepting the sensitivity of the researcher in that reduction of empirical information (Lévy, 1994, p. 69). The crafting of a research object requires, then, an intentional decoupage. Defining space as social objects characterised by a minimum set of attributes – scale, metrics, and substance (Lévy & Lussault, *Espace*, 2003, p. 325; Lévy, 1994, pp. 69–73) – is a response to that problem, as captured in the idea of chorotype (Lévy, 1994, p. 81).¹⁶⁰ Substance is the attribute that most clearly results from the paradigm of a multidimensional study of society. Without breaching its totality, it corresponds to the vision of space as a component of the studied objects rather than a décor (Lévy & Lussault, *Espace*, 2003, pp. 328–329). Inasmuch as all other dimensions are implied in the unavoidable challenges of living together, they bear a spatial mark: “...each process implicating men also commits, inevitably, their modes of organisation and living together” (Lévy, 1994, pp. 20, 70).¹⁶¹ From this definition we conclude that the simple decomposition of substances is not always possible. Each elementary space can also be described by its scale, for the size of a space changes the societal processes in question, each scale raising specific problems (p. 70). The

entretiennent les uns avec les autres, en fonction d’une logique prédéterminée (Berkeley) ou d’un nombre indéterminé de logiques qui les animent (Leibniz). » (Lévy, *Espace*, 2013, p. 355).

¹⁵⁷ Lévy positions his argument against that of Henri Reymond, for whom the problem would be one of “espacement” (that we can translate from French into English as “spatial interval”). Jacques Lévy considers that it would be easy for society to produce congestion, thus the need to acknowledge sub-systems for which it is beneficial to oppose the promotion of interactions and the reduction of distances (Lévy, 1994, p. 66).

¹⁵⁸ Such as in the application of law.

¹⁵⁹ This passage quotes the diagram, “Les quatres valeurs-repères de la distance”, presented in *L’Espace Légitime* (Lévy, 1994, p. 68).

¹⁶⁰ Chorotypes show a value for scale, metrics, and substance:

« Avec une valeur pour chaque attribut, on peut alors fabriquer des espaces “basiques”, les *chorotypes*. Exemples: le territoire d’une société locale, un réseau individuel de connaissances, la société-monde comme réseaux. » (Lévy, 1994, p. 81).

¹⁶¹ My translation of the French original version:

« ...l’idée que chaque processus impliquant des hommes engage aussi inévitablement leurs manières de s’organiser et de vivre ensemble. » (Lévy, 1994, p. 20).

third attribute, metric, concerns the way in which distance is measured, admitting that Euclidian distance is reductive of how spatial operators (individuals, organisations, etc.) constitute their spatial capital, that is, their capacity to reduce distance in function of their intentionality (p. 71). Metric is way to apprehend the relationship between a place and other places (p. 78). Two values are particularly economic in detecting the metrics of a space: topographic and topologic. A topographic metric measures distance through continuity. It defines spaces of contiguity and exhaustiveness. Conversely, a topologic metric measures distance through discontinuity. It defines networks as spaces of connectivity between points (Lévy, 1994, p. 77; Topographie, 2013, p. 1015).¹⁶² To describe the internal metric of a space we can count with two concepts: the territory and the network (Topographie, 2013, p. 1015). A topographic inner metric – exhaustive and continuous – allows for the visibility of a territory (which does not imply absolute homogeneity inside territory). The inner topological metric describes a space with interruptions. Regarding the metric of the limits, the delimitation of a chorotype can be topological (a frontier) or topographic (a confine) (Frontière, 2013, pp. 413–416; Confins, 2013, pp. 221–222).¹⁶³ Spaces can be defined through the combination of topologic/topographic as the inner metrics of a space and as the metrics of its limits, producing four categories of spaces.

These values for a chorotype operationalise the rejection of three theoretical options: *fractalisme* (i.e. ignoring scale), *géographisme* (i.e. admitting one single way to measure distance), and *spatialisme* (i.e. treating spaces with general laws as if without substance) (Lévy, Chorotype, 2013, p. 177).¹⁶⁴ If chorotypes show a value for scale, metric, and substance, the geotype is an ensemble of chorotypes that studies their relation, that is, their interspatiality (Lévy, 1994, pp. 81, 85).¹⁶⁵ The geotype is determined by the problematic under study; it is intentionally crafted by the researcher (Lévy, 1999b, pp. 293–328).¹⁶⁶

Space is *idéal* and material From the epistemic foundations and the recursive process of space-making by societal actors results the fact that each spatial actualisation is simultaneously an ideality and a materiality. In *L'Homme Spatial*, Lussault (2007) explores the idea that what is less tangible is not absent from space. The author notes that (classic) philosophical antagonism between what only exists in the mind of men and reality is imported into the social sciences in the form of an antimony. The explication of the organisation of the world was attributed either to ideological superstructures or to material infrastructures. According to Lussault, this antagonism would be solved by

¹⁶² « Topographie et topologie s'oppose terme à terme. Ce couple est plus large que celui qui oppose territoire et réseau. En effet, territoire et réseau traduisent l'opposition entre topographie et topologie dans les métriques internes, tandis que confins et frontière l'exprime en matière de limite. » (Lévy, Topographie, 2013, p. 1015).

¹⁶³ Regarding the metric of the limits, the delimitation of a territory can be topological. In this case, a line or band defines an interior and an exterior (that is, we see discontinuity). The object of the frontier and its material solutions across geo-political history exemplify the limit as separation (Lévy, Frontière, 2013, pp. 413–414). A topographic limit can also border a territory through a confine which imprecisely demarcates the territory from another space (with which relates via continuity rather than rupture) (Lévy, Confins, 2013, pp. 221–222). The same distinction between confine (topographic limit) and frontier (topologic limit) applies to networks. In networks with topological limits (a frontier in a mobility network, for example), the divisive element is a point which disconnects the network from its potential expansion (Lévy, Frontière, 2013, p. 414). Urban networks are by definition heterogeneous, connecting points with different attributes. From this perspective we can expect to find topographic limits in networks (blurred discontinuity). Finally, the topological space of a network is often overlapped or contained in other spaces, therefore dispensing with the object of the limit (Lévy, Frontière, 2013, p. 415).

¹⁶⁴ The terms are retained in French.

¹⁶⁵ The term refers to the interaction between spaces. Three families are proposed, each of which presuppose a different type of crossing (franchissement): interface – the articulation of spaces focuses on the limit, which is also a conception of autonomy of that space; interlocking (emboîtement) – the relationship is marked by saut d'échelle, not necessarily hierarchical; cospatiality (cospatialité) – counting on a commutator (commutateur) to articulate overlapped spaces in the same extension (Lévy, Interspatialité, 2013, pp. 569, 570) The terms in italic designate the concepts as per the French original version. These definitions are expanding in chapter 8, section 8.2, "Individual geotypes, the interspatiality of spatial justice", when mobilised in the study of the interspatiality of spatial justice in the discourses of two individuals.

¹⁶⁶ « Les géotypes offrent donc des *découpages*. Ils en offrent toujours, condition qu'on donne à ce terme une signification plus large que celle du sens commun. D'abord à cause du "style" des frontières.... Ensuite parce qu'un géotype suppose la mise en relation de chorotypes distincts et donc ne se recouvrant pas. Comment se fait l'arbitrage? Nécessairement en fonction d'une problématique, d'une question posée à l'espace, et donc le géotype est la réponse. » (Lévy, 1994, p. 86).

The application of the two concepts in "Les promesses de l'improbable: espace et musique" to the study of the encounter of space and music is quite revealing of their analytical reach (Lévy, 1999b, pp. 293–328). We have used the concept of geotype extensively in the analytical work of this thesis, in particular in chapter 8, "Unjust spaces and their reversal".

Maurice Godelier, who extracts the *sphère idéal* of reality from the philosophical realm. Making the *idéal* a part of social science also opens the way for studying the circulation of all intellectual products, horizontally across dimensions, vertically in time, without restricting the use of such ideas to an elite group of mental labourers or social executives. When the *idéal* intersects knowledge, it sheds a new light onto the idea of multiple registers of truth.¹⁶⁷

Independent from the form of manifestation (in a concrete object or in an immaterial discourse), ideality refers to the thought of *a man* deployed for and through his productivity. This deployment makes for the existence of both spheres of social reality (Lussault, *Matériel/Idéal*, 2013, pp. 645–246):

« L'idéalité n'est pas l'instance des idées abstraites, mais la pensée, sous tous ces formes, (y compris celles qui fixent dans des énoncés matériels, comme les cartes, les peintures, les objets ou dans des dispositifs formels comme des bâtiments, des paysages), en acte(s) dans la construction et la stabilisation des agencements sociétaux et des pratiques des êtres humains. » (Lussault, Matériel/Idéal, 2013, p. 645).

Lussault summarises geography's incorporation of this dialogic relationship in response to an inheritance of excessive materialism (though without giving in to a subjective demarche). He states that ideality does not necessarily refer to an abstraction without empiric reference, nor to an embedment in a specific object. Those are all possibilities of the *idéal* and material hybridity of geographical objects:

« Cela a permis de poser le postulat heuristique de la nature hybride de l'espace qui combinent toujours, sans hiérarchie – l'idéal et le matériel.... Du fait du caractère hybride de la dimension spatiale de la société, le moindre espace constitue un agencement de formes et de structures matérielles, d'échelles variées, et d'idéalités, fort diverses, des moins réflexives aux plus objectivables, des plus singulières aux plus générales, des plus appuyées sur des lieux « sujets » d'images mentales et de représentations aux plus abstraites déconnectées d'un référent spatiale précis. La géographie s'avère une discipline ni matérialiste, ni idéaliste, mais participant de ce qu'on pourrait nommer un réalisme dialogique, dans la mesure où elle reconnaît la liaison permanente de l'idéal et du matériel et, par suite, le caractère toujours composite de ses objets. » (Lussault, Matériel/Idéal, 2013, p. 646).

This conceptual organisation of the real is not coincident with that of the couple material/immaterial. The latter focuses on degrees of “importance of masses and importance of energy” in explaining the resistance to change (Lévy, *Matériel/Immatériel*, 2013, p. 467).¹⁶⁸ The couple material/immaterial reflects the evolution of social sciences when it departed from a material point of view, which privileged economism as an explanation of the real. It also acknowledges the departure from an epistemology of natural sciences and their rejection of metaphysics. Such paradigm was attached in the first period to the experience of reduced freedom in the face of “superstructures”, in particular in the form of “biologic [sic.] and physical imperatives of survival” (p. 467) The maintenance of a materialistic-positivist approach becomes inadequate after the nineteenth century industrial revolution, when the intangible dimensions of culture (affective and cognitive, aesthetic and ethic) have clear effects in (secular) societies. Lévy points out how the “dematerialisation” of society as well as its capacity to change materiality increases the viability of transforming space. This potential is not necessarily actualised in practice. The reformulation of the inertia of societal transformation makes for the increased pertinence of the couple ideality/materiality.

2.2.2 Spatiality and space make society

The theory of space produced under a paradigm of realist constructivism presupposes the existence of actors with intentionality (that is accessed through their actions and their discourse), whose action is organised by and organises

¹⁶⁷ The advance of this concept can be relieved from the connotation of power struggle and oppressive intentionality, which is part of Foucault's conception.

¹⁶⁸ « On notera toutefois une tendance historique à l'inversion : plus la puissance matérielle des hommes augmente, plus la résistance au changement se décale vers le monde des choses inconsistantes du point de vue de la physique mais pas si aisées à « déplacer » pour autant. Du couple matériel/immatériel, qui permet de distinguer les activités impliquant des masses ou des énergies importantes des autres activités, on glisse alors vers le couple matériel/idéal, qui découpe le réel social d'une manière différente. » (Lévy, *Matériel/Immatériel*, 2013, p. 467).

space (Lussault, Actor, 2013, pp. 52–53). The couple of concepts spatiality/space has been developed by Lussault and Lévy to denote the intertwining of, on the one hand, the spatial expression of the individual and, on the other, the englobing spatial layout supporting or restraining individual choices – itself a product of the interrelations of all actors. Spatiality, then, refers to particular spatial qualities of an individual actor – its mode of inhabiting (Lussault, Spatialité, 2013, p. 948).¹⁶⁹ Spatial action covers the ensemble of the spatial implications of acts: “spatial layout, technologies and technique in the management of distance and spatial practice, languages, knowledge, ideologies and spatial imaginaries” (Lussault, Action spatiale, 2003, p. 42).¹⁷⁰ From the components of ideality present in this definition, it is relevant to clarify the understanding of spatial ideology and imagination. Ideology expresses the ensemble of ideas and judgements, enabling participation in the cohesion of a group (Lussault underlines the affiliation of the concept with Marx and Engels). It enables to “describe, explain, interpret or justify the situation of a group or a collective in space” (Ruby & Lussault, 2003, p. 481).¹⁷¹ Spatial imagination regards the faculty of constructing, mobilising, and articulating elements from this “museum of all images, past, possible, produced and yet to be produced” (Collignon, 2013, pp. 489–491).¹⁷² Collignon calls attention to certain studies that exclude spatial imagination from a *stricto sensu* cognitive activity, for the universalising requirements of the latter are not necessarily present in imagination (p. 491).¹⁷³ Our project does not leave imagination outside the scope of “universality” as that impoverishes the resources of emancipation that might exist in society. The potentiality and difficulties of bridging spatial imagination and justice ideas thus merit empirical investigation.

Space as an organised ensemble is offered to the activation of new spatialities in the figure of the environment. In the latter, each new spatiality participates in the process of spatial organisation (Lussault, Spatialité, 2013, pp. 948–949).¹⁷⁴ Even if the two terms of the couple spatiality/space are dialogical, space is expected to retain the idea of some stabilisation and increased intelligibility as an object. This apprehension is supported, though not exclusively, by its visibility and the inertia of materiality (p. 949). The notion of spatial layout or arrangement (*agencement*) denotes the constructed quality of space by the actors in a dynamic process, with some stable features, both in ideality and materiality. The concept of arrangement addresses the situational aspects of a spatial configuration, underlying the negotiation between these two spheres of space to be produced during action (rather than after).

¹⁶⁹ Note that the concept of spatiality can correspond to the spatial layout of a series of individual and collective actors – human and non-human (Lussault, 2007, p. 149). In the entry “Spatialité” of the *Dictionnaire de la Géographie*, two other significations are pointed out: the spatiality of a topic, related to the study of positions in space, and spatiality as the spatial dimension of any societal object (Lussault, Spatialité, 2013, p. 948). In the context of our topic, we will focus on the individual spatiality:

« Chaque acteur possède une spatialité propre, spécifique, construite dans l’action et qui articule des agencements spatiaux variés en agencement englobant. En ce qui concerne l’acteur individuel, cet agencement englobant manifeste son « habiter » et constitue, en tant que configuration spatiale stabilisée, intériorisée, et vécue, son habitat. » (Lussault, Spatialité, 2013, p. 948).

¹⁷⁰ Author’s translation from the original passage:

« Action d’un opérateur, envisagée sur l’angle de ses implications spatiales : agencement d’espaces, technologies et techniques de gestion de la distance et de la pratique spatiale, langages, savoirs, idéologies et imaginaires spatiaux. » (Lussault, Action spatiale, 2003, p. 42).

¹⁷¹ Ideology has “organising capacities”, playing a role in the history of a group:

« Système d’idées, de jugements et de valeurs, possédant des capacités organisatrices d’un group humain et des pratiques de ses membres. » (Ruby & Lussault, 2003, p. 481).

The authors cite Gilberte, Anne (1986). “Idéologie spatiale, mise en forme et portée pour la géographie”, in *L’espace géographique*. N°1, pp. 57–66.

¹⁷² Collignon defines this aptitude as mental and psychical, referring to the work of Gilbert Durand (1994) *L’Imaginaire*. Paris: Hatier. We can call it cognitive and affective, as per the definition provided in section 4.2.1.1, “Reflexivity of justice, affective and cognitive” (chapter 4, footnote 311). The exact expression employed by Collignon is spatial imaginary but we extend the notion to the act of imagination beyond the product. This more ample meaning is useful in the consideration of the inhabitants’ spatial justice conceptions.

¹⁷³ « Il importe de préciser qu’il existe aujourd’hui nombre d’épistémologies qui entendent restreindre l’imaginaire à un registre particulier des activités mentales et qui excluent de son champ l’activité cognitive *stricto sensu* et le domaine de l’éthique, au nom d’une nécessaire rationalisation et universalisation, aux yeux des tenants de cette épistémologie, des schèmes, idées, concepts, valeurs engagées dans ces domaines. » (Collignon, 2013, p. 491).

¹⁷⁴ « Symétriquement, chaque action qui procède de la spatialité est productrice de l’espace (sous la forme d’un agencement nouveau), qui s’inscrit et enrichit une configuration spatiale préexistante, accroît en quelque sorte la quantité d’espace présente dans une société donnée. » (Lussault, Spatialité, 2013, p. 948).

There is a departure from Lefebvre's "paradigm of production" (Lussault, Agencement, 2013, p. 43). The activation of space by actors in order for its configuration to become perceivable is also part of an *agencement*. It implies the ideas and discourses through which the actor apprehends a spatial disposition, the movement of the actor in space in line with those interpretations and the interface with other operators (and the reflexivity of the latter) (p. 46). Against a notion of environment as "sensible", the concept of spatial arrangement places the focus on the "social norms that impregnate acts".¹⁷⁵ Three registers capture the relationship of actors with space through the optic of spatial layouts: a material framework, a resource for the individual, an active support which can be an *actant*; an instrument of praxis in spatial and non-spatial objectives (in this perspective, the ideality is also enacted in spatial action "via languages of action"); a signification – space is a "fixating, condensing of values" (p. 43).

2.2.3 Habitat calls for the political

The couple spatiality/space can also be seen as the spatial manifestation of the historic construction of the dialogic individual-society that we have briefly traced with the support of social theory (chapter 1). The emergence of the individual can be empirically supported by the way in which purchasing power, real social mobility, transformation of family structures, and new possibilities of citizenship involve personal choice. They are opportunities of individuation across an ensemble of societal themes (Lévy, 1994, p. 140), correlated with an increase in spatial liberties of individuals (Bourdin, 2005).¹⁷⁶ In developed societies, a considerable number of individuals has some real options in residential locations. The study of these choices shows that such autonomy exists and that it gives way to different individual logics (*marché des norms*) (Lévy, 1994, p. 144). It expresses not only the economic capital and the way in which it conditions effective options, but also the strategy of exchange with other goods (pp. 94–95). The residential location is then eloquent of the translations realised by the inhabitants between realities situated on different planes (work proximity, type of housing, identity of place, accessed opportunities), as well as between norms and lifestyle models (p. 144).¹⁷⁷ The univocal quality of a spatial choice (in a moment in time, one residence corresponds to one location, even if there might be more than one) makes residential location an important information on the identity of the individual. It is the spatial facet of his global personality (pp. 93–94). The empirical study of practices of residential choice attests the competence of reflexivity that founds the idea of a society of actors. It can be formalised in a model of choice of spatiality, open to continuous arbitration (pp. 144, 238–241).¹⁷⁸ Space influences this spatiality, configured as it is by markets and other collective actors (for example, municipalities in the marketing of their image and political intentionality (pp. 144–146)).

This observation of an increased individuality in the spatial dimension of the individual¹⁷⁹ is paralleled by an increase in society, resulting from intensified social contact (labour division, complexification of activities and cooperation, education, innovation) and the lifting of communitarian constraints (Lévy, 2008, p. 12). In the midst of these two

¹⁷⁵ More broadly, the focus is placed on the ideality that breathes in those acts:

« Par rapport à la notion d'environnement sensible, qui considère la manière donc un individu en action élabore une configuration sensible qui exprime sa relation à l'environnement (au sens large de ce qui environne un acte), l'approche par l'agencement est moins marquée par l'attention portée à la question des sens. » (Lussault, Agencement, 2013, p. 46).

¹⁷⁶ The spatial individuation of the individual in the use of the metropolis is described by Alain Bourdin (2005) in *La Métropole des Individus*.

¹⁷⁷ Even if multiple criteria are taken into account, a definite position (per residence) needs to be determined:

« Ainsi l'espace de l'habitat peut-il se trouver affecté prioritairement par des choix qui valorisent la taille ou le type du logement, son statut d'occupation, le rapprochement du lieu de travail, la recherches d'opportunités offertes par une localisation ou encore l'appartenance identitaire à un lieu. Chaque logique peut s'opposer aux autres en fonction d'orientations générales qui impliquent une image de soi, un rapport au monde, une expérience. » (Lévy, 2008, p. 10).

¹⁷⁸ In the model proposed by the author, this choice is not fixed but reiterated. Indeed, given the continuous confrontation with available options and renewed occasions for revision of residence location, its maintenance or change is a continuous process of choice (Lévy, 1994, pp. 144, 238–239). According to the author, that revision measures cost of change in several facets of a global spatial capital: social, relational, housing, and environmental capitals of habitat (pp. 239–241).

¹⁷⁹ If this evidence privileges the figure of an individual inhabitant, Lévy has also shown how individuality affects space via the way in which the actors organise their political practice as individuals construct their citizenship by reflecting on the stakes of each decision, rather than aligning unambiguously with an existing political representation. This "pragmatic citizenship" includes political actions (street manifestations) and the construction of political actors (civic institutions) (Lévy, 1994, pp. 141–142).

social facts, apparently contradictory, the habitat is particularly pertinent to read the imbrication of space and spatiality (Lévy, 1994, pp. 141–142; Lévy, p. 346). The concept of habitat forwards the tension between space and spatiality, that is, the fact that space as a societal totality is not self-evident (the cumulative aggregation of spatialities does not necessarily produce a habitat) while also comprising an intimate relationship with space.¹⁸⁰ The notion of inhabitability implies the compatibility (a dynamic avoiding destructive logics) between the spatial practice of the actors and the resulting ensemble (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 231–232).¹⁸¹ This concept acknowledges that society can be composed of contradictory sub-systems (Lévy, 1994, pp. 66–67) and that the cospatiality of all actors is not unproblematic.¹⁸² In the face of “society as a contradictory dynamic, at once fragmented and unified, with an open *devenir*” (Lévy, Société, 2013, p. 945), habitat denotes the virtual compatibility between the part and the whole as a potential common resource to each of its actors and society in its totality. It follows that the concept of habitat does not serve to describe all environments existing in reality. It implies some level of regulation of spatial coexistence, opening an ethical *chantier* on the societal convergence of individuals’ use of their spatial freedom. A habitat is then an exacting concept in its virtuality, detaining the seme of a project that passes by the political and ethics. That project is not an external imposition of central political actors, but constructed by all actors as inhabitants and as citizens. It can be illuminated by the study of existing spaces, its urban qualities and how actors regard them as a potential, constitutive of their own strategies:

« Les acquis de la recherche en matière de mesure de l’urbanité, à travers l’accessibilité, les vitesses, les familles de métriques différentes, l’importance relative des espaces publics, en somme la connaissance de cette « forme urbaine » qui est aussi le fond de la carte urbaine ne peut pas être vue comme un simple repérage de l’arrière-plan des trajets individuels. C’est le potentiel qui définit la ressource d’habitabilité des lieux. C’est le référent à partir duquel les individus définissent leur stratégie d’habitat. C’est enfin l’enjeu des pratiques d’habitat, qui sont aussi la ville en train de fonctionner et en train de s’inventer. Plus que par surimposition d’une volonté politique extérieure, c’est en connaissant ces pratiques et leurs ressorts que l’on peut espérer créer les conditions d’éventuels infléchissements : tous citoyens qu’ils soient, c’est d’abord comme habitants que les habitants fabriquent leurs (et nos) espace de vie. » (Lévy, 2008, p. 15).

The notion of habitat is linked with that of place. Place refers to the existence of a space where distance is not activated, and where co-presence between at least two realities is brought forward. It presupposes the suspension of the relationship with other places in the area, which remains virtual. We do not retain the sense of spatial identity present in the Anglo-Saxon use of the term but rather that place is not necessarily local, that is, the smallest scale of a society. The *inhabitability* of a place denotes its capacity to constitute one of the habitats of different individuals and groups that frequent the place (Lévy, Lieu, 2013, pp. 612–613).

2.2.4 Spatial capital

It is a part of the idea of the individual actor that his autonomy is neither completely constrained nor completely free. In a society structured less by dual or tripartite positions and more by continuous points in a scale of increased capitals, the notion of “life cycle” or “biographical journey” acknowledges the sequence of choices under strategic horizons and multiple constraints (Lévy, 1994, p. 144). Instead of the determinism of class habitus, spatial capital appears as

¹⁸⁰ « Dans ce contexte, l’interface intime/extime devient cruciale. Or l’habitat se situe à cheval sur cette interface : ce sont à la fois l’individu et la société qui habitent et les lieux habités le sont tant par chacun que par tous. C’est dans la relation entre le logement et le reste de l’espace habité que se déploie cette interface. De fait, le logement se trouve conforté dans son rôle de plaque tournante de l’action individuelle, de centrale de « recharge de batteries » de l’acteur en dépit – ou plutôt en raison – du renforcement de la socialisation. » (Lévy, 2008, p. 12).

¹⁸¹ « On peut parler d’habiter lorsqu’il y a compatibilité entre l’agir spatial des composantes de la société et celui de la société dans son ensemble, autrement dit quand l’espace tend à être transformé en bien public. » (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 231–232).

¹⁸² This understanding of coexistence also applies to different societies in interspatiality, as denoted in the notion of political federation:

« La cohabitation non régulée reste possible soit si les relations intersociétales sont maintenues délibérément à un état de faible intensité (« chaos borné »), soit si les différences d’ethos entre les sociétés sont limitées. » (Lévy, Société, 2013, p. 164).

a resource to improve one's position in another social field (Lévy, 2008, pp. 73–74).¹⁸³ The regulation of distance through mobility is eloquent of different spatial capitals. The concept of motility acknowledges the difference between disposing of infrastructure and actually moving or being mobile.¹⁸⁴ Motility depends on accessibility to infrastructures (access); on the capacity to recognise the opportunity to move and on the skills to perform such movement (competences); and on the intentionality of movement and the effective experiences of mobility of a certain spatial actor (appropriation) (Canzler, Kaufmann, & Kesselring, 2008, pp. 2–3). The existence of material structures is not a guarantee of their actualisation by individuals with poor spatial mastery. But space is also an objective limit to the scope of individual spatial acts (Lévy, 1994, p. 247).¹⁸⁵ The use of spatial capital in the valorisation of space is an ability with varying degrees, not a blunt postulate of a society of actors.¹⁸⁶

« L'échelle et la vitesse nominale cessent d'être discriminantes, c'est plutôt la maîtrise des métriques (ce qu'on peut appeler, d'un mot valise, la métrise) qui se révèle décisive. Elle distingue ceux qui peuvent passer d'un lieu à un autre, d'une mobilité à une autre, d'un style spatiale à un autre tout en trouvant à chaque fois la posture qui valorise leurs autres capitaux sociaux : appropriation des ressources du lieu, capacité à se repérer dans un monde inconnu, faculté d'activer des ressources et des pratiques spatiales imprévues quand la situation l'exige. » (Lévy, pp. 68–69).

Though first conceived by Bourdieu as part of structuralism (1986, 1980),¹⁸⁷ the addition of a new layer by Lévy insists on the spatial affordance of actors with some independence from their endowment in other capitals. The concept draws on the model of an actor's ensemble of capitals and measures the ease in advancing his intentionality in the face of specific constraints of a social dimension, not necessarily spatial (Lévy, 1994, p. 71; 2008, pp. 73–74). We can, in the light of the more recent developments articulating individual competence and societal capacity,¹⁸⁸ propose spatial capital as a measure of a society's facility to mobilise its own spatial dimension in the achievement of its collective objectives.

2.2.5 Themes of the *sociétalité* of space

In the table below we find the five themes that decline the *sociétalité* of space: society's open horizon, the dimensional production of the social (the proper spatial dimension), the role of the actors in that production, the tension between the parts and the totality (spatiality and space) and the pragmatics towards the horizon.

¹⁸³ « Si l'on admet que la maîtrise de l'espace peut constituer une ressource sociale significative et transférable en d'autres ressources (économique, politique, etc.), on pourra parler de capital spatial, donc la mobilité est une composante.... On peut même formuler l'hypothèse que la mobilité constitue une ressource offerte à tous pour diminuer les écarts et rendre plus comparable les expériences des différents membres de la société. Les mobilités (au sens spatial propre) et les « mobilités sociales » (au sens figuré) ne sont donc pas sans lien. Le terme d'itinéraire peut synthétiser l'idée de parcours biographiques spatiotemporels, incluant des transformations du capital spatial, composante d'un capital social d'ensemble. » (Lévy, 2008, pp. 73–74).


¹⁸⁴ Being mobile acknowledges the predisposition of the actor to be affected by movement.

¹⁸⁵ « L'espace de l'habitat exprime la portée et les limites des individus en tant qu'acteurs. On y voit apparaître leur inégale dotation en capital spatial et leur utilisation différenciée de ce capital : se manifeste aussi leur identité sociale globale. Contradictoirement, l'espace de l'habitat fait apparaître le poids des structures objectives localisées : structuration de l'espace urbain, découpage des sociétés locales, qui s'intègrent dans les stratégies des individus et les infléchissent. L'habitat se présente donc de manière homomorphe aux processus politiques, qui organisent un espace situé, lui aussi, à l'interface des stratégies d'acteurs et des enjeux sociétaux. » (Lévy, 1994, p. 247).

¹⁸⁶ Lévy has worked with more detail on the notion of capital, in particular with regard to change of residential location (Lévy, 1993). Lévy acknowledges that spatial capital of habitat includes three capitals: 1) relational spatial capital, measuring the difficulty of the movement in relation to the degree of access to information; 2) "capital of housing", regarding all aspects around the idea of dwelling – from the net area, cost, and aesthetics of the housing unit to the affective weighting of interpersonal and biographic valorisations associated to the present habitat; and 3) the environmental capital, associated to practices of daily life (Lévy, 1994, pp. 239–240).

¹⁸⁷ See definition in section 1.2.2, "Individual capital and social life (Bourdieu)" (chapter 1).

¹⁸⁸ See point 5.1.2.2, "Sen: capability decoupled in competence and capacity", part of section 5.1, "Chôros, the programme for a comprehensive spatial justice theory".



H (Horizon)

d (Dimensional production of the social)

A (Actors)

E (Environments)
O (Social objects)

P (Pragmatics)

Open “devenir” of society, as the possibility of a spatial contract is publicly discussed.

Space organises the living together as society’s members co-construct solutions to the existence of distance.

Spatial capital apprehends individual ease in moving on the spatial plane. The intentionality of his acts is not necessarily spatial. Spatial capital also speaks about the overall capacity of the actor to co-produce and enjoy society.

The compatibility between spatiality and space is translated into the notion of habitat. Different spatial representations and values are implied in different choices of spatiality (including residential location in varying degrees of urbanity). These diversity might hinder the possibility of a habitat.

The political function in the resolution of living together depends on the definition of problems at a societal scale. Co-inhabitation implies the compatibility of freedoms which sets up challenges of justice beyond problems of scarcity.

Figure 2 Dynamic representation of the themes of the *société* of space.

3 Urbanity at stake

The thought on spatial justice developed in this work is focused on the specific scale of the urban society. The stakes of urbanity for spatial justice have been explored since the inaugural contributions of Chicago School to the problematics of city life with otherness. But it is in Lefebvre's epistemic and political agenda in *The urban revolution* (1970/2003) that we find the more recent grounds for spatial justice, as revealed by the centrality of the "right to the city" in the literature. In this chapter we interpret the heritage of Lefebvre, detaching it from the original Marxist matrix. Density and diversity, degrees of urbanity and modes of living together, the city as political project with *marge de manoeuvre* transpose the Lefebvrian themes to the paradigm of the actors that sustains this research. Freed from the centrality of the proletariat we can pursue Lefebvre's injunction for a mode of urbanism where the ideality of all inhabitants matters.

3.1 Simmel and Wirth: alterity in the city

The themes that preoccupy the theory of spatial justice at the urban scale have been treated since the emergence of urban sociology with the work of Ferdinand Tönnies, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, or Georg Simmel. City life with otherness, the relationship between the individual and society in space, is a transversal theme that has alterity as its conceptual core. We can introduce this concept with the work of Georg Simmel (1858–1918) and briefly note how it has been expanded by the Chicago School. When thinking of spatial justice in this intellectual context, the Burgess model comes to mind as it focused on the distribution of social differences in the city (Domingos, 2011, p. 143; Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1925/1984).¹⁸⁹ But Louis Wirth, Rob Park, and Ernest Burgess have also reflected on segregation, alterity, individuation, and implication of the individual in collective solutions. A brief passage in the work of Georg Simmel (1858–1918) and Louis Wirth (1897–1952) illustrates that these concerns were not restricted to a spatial projection of social inequalities but an interpretation of society as a whole. The experience of the city emerges as a maker of the individual and of society, resulting in the transformation of their ideality.

3.1.1 Metropolitan individuals vis-à-vis otherness and freedom

Georg Simmel observes that the implication of the metropolis in social organisation (economy, time, space) entails psychic traits common to its inhabitants (Simmel, 1903/2002). Simmel advances that the obligation of proximity between persons in the big city, involving multiple contacts and "sympathies, indifferences and aversions of the briefest as well as of the most enduring sort" lightens the emotional reaction of individuals in an urban sociality (p. 15). Distance and deflection from the other are seen as strategic in avoiding antagonism (p. 15).¹⁹⁰ Simmel also

¹⁸⁹ The Burgess model, with the centre in the business district (where no one lives), is surrounded by a first ring of residential areas of the low class ("unstable groups"), the middle class situated in the inner suburbs, and the high class in the outer suburbs (Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1925/1984).

¹⁹⁰ "If the unceasing external contact of numbers of persons in the city should be met by the same number of inner reactions as in the small town, in which one knows almost every persons he meets and to each of whom he has a positive relationship, one would be completely atomised internally and would fall into an unthinkable mental condition. Partly this psychological circumstance and partially the privilege of suspicion which we have in the face of the elements of metropolitan life (which are constantly touching one another in fleeting contact) necessitates in us that reserve, in consequence of which we do not known by sight neighbours of years standing and which permits us to appear to small town folks so often as cold and uncongenial. Indeed, if I am not mistaken, the inner side of this external reserve is not only indifference but more frequently than we believe, it is a slight aversion, a mutual strangeness and repulsion which, in a close contact which has arisen any way whatever, can break out into hatred and conflict. The entire inner organisation of such a type of extended commercial life rests on an extremely varied structures of sympathies, indifferences and aversions of the briefest as well as of the most enduring sort. This sphere of indifference is, for this reason, not as

theorises that weighting and measuring the definitions of equality and inequality would characterise a new type of rationality (p. 13).¹⁹¹ The author describes a form of sufferance, a solitude in the mass, a desire of liberation from homogenising forces that comes with new forms of the “socio-technological mechanism” (p. 11).¹⁹² But the city is also the locus of “a degree of personal freedom to which there is no analogy in other circumstances” (pp. 15–16).¹⁹³ This freedom results not only from the attributes of the territory of the city but also from cosmopolitan ideality (and how it expands space):

“It is not only the immediate size of the area and population which, on the basis of world-historical correlation between the increase in the size of the social unit and the degree of personal inner and outer freedom, makes the metropolis the locus of this conditions. It is rather in transcending this purely tangible extensiveness that the metropolis also becomes the seat of cosmopolitanism.” (Simmel, 1903/2002, p. 17).

This very brief note on the new psychic traits of metropolitan individuals brings us to the definition of alterity. In several dictionaries, we find the definition “state of being different”.¹⁹⁴ The term descends from the Latin word *alter*, which means “other (of two)” (Merriam-Webster.com, 2016). It has the same “alien”, which means “strangeness in the face of the different”. This activates the self in the apprehension of the other, relating both entities on grounds of non-familiarity. In the social science of space, alterity is regarded as a condition of heterogeneous societies. Establishing a relationship with different others is a requirement of social life, in the face of which actors may respond with positive or negative valuations. Alterity and otherness here are treated as synonyms. The idea is not associated with separation or deviation from norms.

3.1.2 Sociality and *sociétalité* in city life

Louis Wirth also notes the impact of city life on the relationship with otherness. In *Urbanism as a Way of Life* (1938), the attributes of an urban population in the city – number, density of settlement, and degree of heterogeneity – are seen as “conditioning factors of social life” (pp. 6, 9–10).¹⁹⁵ The city is marked by heterogeneity, proximity of the social entities that compose it, and “accentuated friction” (p. 1). From this definition, Wirth anticipates the voluntary

great as it seems superficially. Our minds respond, with some definite feeling, to almost every impression emanating from another person. The unconsciousness, the transitoriness and the shift of these feelings seem to raise them only into indifference. Actually this latter would be unnatural to us as immersion into a chaos of unwished-for suggestions would be unbearable. From these two typical dangers of metropolitan life we are saved by antipathy which is the latent adumbration of actual antagonism since it brings about the sort of distastefulness and deflection without which this type of life could not be carried on at all.” (Simmel, 1903/2002, p. 15).

¹⁹¹ “It has been money economy which has thus filled the daily life of so many people with weighting, calculating, enumerating and the reduction of qualitative values to quantitative terms. Because of the character and calculability which money has there has come into the relationships of the elements of life a precision and a degree of certainty in the definition of the equalities and inequalities and an unambiguousness in agreements and arrangements, just as externally this precision has been brought about through the general diffusion of pocket watches.” (Simmel, 1903/2002, p. 13).

¹⁹² “The deepest problems of modern life flow from the attempts of the individual to maintain the independence and individuality of his existence against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight of the historical heritage and technique of life.” (Simmel, 1903/2002, p. 11).

¹⁹³ “Political and familial groups began in this way as do political and religious communities; the self-preservation of very young associations requires a rigorous setting of boundaries and centripetal unity and for that reason it cannot give room to freedom and the peculiarities of inner and external development of the individual. From this stage social evolution proceeds simultaneously in two divergent but non the less corresponding directions. In the measure that the group grows numerically, spatially and in the meaningful content of life, its immediate inner unity and the definiteness of its original demarcation against others are weakened and rendered mild by reciprocal interactions and interconnections. And at the same time the individual gains a freedom of movement far beyond the first jealous delimitation, and gains also a peculiarity and individuality to which the division of labour in groups, which have become larger, gives both occasion and necessity.” (Simmel, 1903/2002, pp. 15–16).

¹⁹⁴ As found on Google Dictionary, the freedictionary.com, and oxforddictionaries.com.

¹⁹⁵ This sociological definition of the city accounts for the “cumulative accentuation of the characteristics distinctive of the mode of life which is associated with the growth of cities” (Wirth, 1938, p. 5). This definition also calls for a theory of urbanism, occupied with the discovery of “the forms of social action and organisation that typically emerge in relatively permanent, compact settlements of large numbers of heterogeneous individuals” (p. 9).

aggregation of individuals based on similitude (p. 11)¹⁹⁶ while making room for “juxtaposition of divergent personalities” (p. 15). The latter is seen as the basis of a prospective cultural uniformisation, such as the secularisation of life (p. 15). The author describes the resulting metropolis as a mosaic of social worlds whose contact is likely to produce a “relativistic perspective and sense of toleration of differences” (p. 15).¹⁹⁷

Urban space is expected to change sociality and *soci t alit * with an impact on the conception of the political: heterogeneity and heightened mobility influence the multiplicity of social groups with which one individual has affiliations. This correlates with the act of unbinding from traditions and sentiments, as well as the lesser manifestations of “being a true neighbour” (pp. 16–17). It is the concentric and hierarchical structures of such groups that are affected. Society as a whole “tends to break down the rigidity of cast lines” and to produce a more complex “class structure”. Expecting the intensity of interactions to increase the differentiation between individuals, Wirth also argues that the city requires the individual to give away “some of his individuality to the demands of the larger community” (p. 18). For instance, the need for responses to facilities of common use or the assumption of levelling influence by some institutions (school, press). The individual is portrayed as unstable in its network of belongings (p. 17), hindered in his reading of the “total scheme” that he is a part of. This makes self-awareness of the “best interest” difficult (p. 17) and results in a loose bound of common interest. Wirth speaks of the entrance of an individual in mass movements if he is to participate in the “social, political, and economic life in the city” (p. 18).

3.2 Lefebvre’s program for the urban

The scientific plan discussed in the previous chapter¹⁹⁸ is not dissociable from Lefebvre’s observation that society was becoming completely urbanised. The disappearance of agrarian space and the need for a reconceptualization – understanding the *urban problematic* as a global phenomenon – was then undeniable (Lefebvre, 1970, p. 15). Henceforth, “a highway, a supermarket in the country-side are all part of the urban fabric” (p. 4). The latter extrapolates the narrow recognition of the “built environment” to include all societal manifestations of concentration in the city as an organisational element of contemporary society (pp. 3–4).¹⁹⁹ Making apparent the blind field of such a spatial transformation claimed new forms of thought and analysis (pp. 1–6). Lefebvre poses the question: “can we achieve sufficient progress in theory and practice so that our consciousness can comprehend a reality that overflows it and a possible that flees before its grasp?” (p. 15). As part of the answer, he rejects the word “city”, seen as uncritical, a “definite *object*, a scientific object and [designating] the immediate goal of action.” He argues for the

¹⁹⁶ “The greater the number of individuals participating in a process of interaction, the greater the potential differentiation between them.... That such variations should give rise to the spatial segregation of individuals according to color, ethnic heritage, economic and social status, tastes and preferences, may readily be inferred.” (Wirth, 1938, p. 11). “Density, land uses, rentals, accessibility, healthfulness, prestige, aesthetic consideration, absence of nuisances such as noise, smoke, and dirt all determine the desirability of various areas of the city as places of settlement for different sections of the population. Place and nature of work, income, racial and ethnic characteristics, social status, costume, habit, taste, preference, and prejudice are among the significant factors in accordance to which the urban population is selected and distributed into more or less distinct settlements. Diverse population elements inhabiting a compact settlement thus tend to become segregated from one another in the degree in which their requirements and modes of life are incompatible with one another and in the measure in which they are antagonistic to one another. Similarly, persons of homogeneous status and needs unwittingly drift into, consciously select, or are forced by circumstance into the same area.” (p. 15).

¹⁹⁷ “The city consequently tends to resemble a mosaic of social worlds in which the transition from one another is abrupt. The juxtaposition of divergent personalities and modes of life tends to produce a relativistic perspective and a sense of toleration of differences which may be regarded as prerequisites for rationality and which lead toward the secularisation of life.” (Wirth, 1938, p. 15).

¹⁹⁸ See section 2.1, “Henri Lefebvre: the production of space”.

¹⁹⁹ “Agriculture production has lost all its autonomy in the major industrialised nations and as part of the global economy.... Even though local and regional features from the time when agricultural production dominated haven’t quite disappeared, it has been changed into a form of industrial production, having been subordinate to its demands, subject to its constraints. Economic growth and industrialisation have become self-legitimizing, extending their effects to entire territories, regions, nations, and continents. As a result, the traditional unit typical of peasant life, namely the village, has been transformed. Absorbed and obliterated by larger units, it has become an integral part of industrial production and consumption. The concentration of the population goes hand in hand with that of the mode of production. The *urban fabric* grows, extends its borders, corrodes the residue of agrarian life. This expression, “urban fabric”, does not narrowly define the built world of cities but all manifestations of the dominance of the city over the country.” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 3–4).

concept of urban or “urban society” – a “concrete abstraction” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 86–87) expressing new knowledge, the detection of virtuality, including that of an “urban practice” (Lefebvre, 1970, pp. 3, 16–17).²⁰⁰ This concept is not to be defined as an “accomplished reality, situated behind the actual in time (pp. 16–17)”, but as an opening into “the virtual and the possible object” (p. 15). The explicit reference of a spatial horizon for the urban society emerges:

“The urban (an abbreviated form of urban society) can therefore be defined not as an accomplished reality, situated behind the actual in time, but, on the contrary, as a horizon, an illuminating virtuality.” (Lefebvre, 1970, pp. 16–17).

3.2.1 Concentration: difference brought together

It is from this theoretical/empirical tension that we can understand the evolution from “the city” to the “urban”.²⁰¹ This historical development is traced by Lefebvre in the form of a time-space axis. Four partitions (and the three transitions between them) describe the evolution from “centrality” at a germinal stage through to its realisation (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 123):²⁰² the political city, the mercantile city, the industrial city, and the critical zone (or urban society as unrealised virtuality) (pp. 7–11). Following Lefebvre’s view of space based on social relations in agreement with a societal mode of production, these cities are more than a form of space; they are a form of society. Each has correspondent “modes of thought, action and life” (p. 32). The three transitions reflect the successive transformation of agrarian, mercantile, and industrial-based economies into proper urban productivity while shaping specifically spatial representations in the *idéal*.

In Lefebvre’s sketch of the time-space axis, we can read the concrete enactment of ideas gravitating around the notion of equality and difference in space. The agrarian period hierarchised space. Heterogeneity was then associated with particularities of the natural environment (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 125).²⁰³ Concentration is, in this period, associated with defence (Lévy, Ville, 2013, p. 1079).²⁰⁴ Later, the industrial city is marked by its attempt at homogeneity as “productivist” criteria were motivated by “the extension on a global scale of the internal organisation of the enterprise, of the “industrial division of labour” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 125–126).²⁰⁵ In the urban, space becomes “differential”. Centrality becomes concrete through “what is settled there [in space], that which is assembled and confronted by and in urban reality” (p. 125). A form of unspecific contents, where information, subjects, objects, technology, works, acts, situations are accumulated and transformed by their co-presence (pp.

²⁰⁰ “The expression “urban society” meets a theoretical need. It is more than simply a literary or pedagogical device, or even the expression of some form of acquired knowledge. A movement of thought towards a certain concrete, and perhaps towards the concrete, assumes shape and detail. This movement, if it proves to be true, will lead to a practice, urban practice, that is finally or newly comprehended.” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 5). “These terms are preferable to the word “city”, which appears to designate a clearly defined, definite object, a scientific object and the immediate goal of action, whereas the theoretical approach requires a critique of this “object” and a more complex notion of the virtual and the possible object.” (p. 15).

²⁰¹ It is Lefebvre’s intention of marking a change of epoch that makes for the rejection of the word “city” to define this object of urban space. The qualitative “urban” has the advantage of evoking the historical conditions of this spatial production. But the focus on the universal urban condition can still make place for the singular object that it manifests and constructs: the city.

²⁰² “With the first gathering and collection of objects existing separately in nature, from the first cairn of pile of fruit, *centrality* came into being and with it its virtual realization” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 123).

²⁰³ In the transition from the political to the mercantile city, the space outside cities was organised by a *topoi* – place-names determined by the attachment to the soil (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 7).

²⁰⁴ « Les fortes densités, manifestes dès le début et qui peuvent encore dépasser dans les grandes villes pauvres cent mille habitants/km², sont au départ la conséquence des contraintes de la défense. Dans toutes civilisations rurales, la ville est donc un élément périphérique mais indispensable, avec déjà des caractéristiques qui perdurent pour une part aujourd’hui. » (Lévy, Ville, 2013, p. 1079).

²⁰⁵ Lefebvre sees the intermediate passage from the mercantile to the industrial city marked by an attempt at homogeneity: “In a planned space, these *topoi* were mere accidents, vague commodities of a folkloric language; all places were homologous, distinct only in their distance from one another. Objective and measurable, space was represented only with reference to productivistic criteria.” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 125–126).

Lévy also presents the industrial period as a negative sum game, detrimental to the logics of high urbanity, in particular “creative alterity, aleatory encounters, the force of the *idéal*, the virtual other.” (Lévy, Ville, 2013, p. 1079). The features of industrial space were, on the contrary favourable to “programming, separation of functions, atomisation, domination by the material and the actualised” (p. 1079).

118–119). Centrality,²⁰⁶ encompassing copresence, is the necessary condition for relationship, which in turn produces eventfulness, chance, transmission, intensity, and thus possibility and creation (pp. 97, 118, 175).²⁰⁷

As the homogeneity of the industrial city is put aside by urban societies, Lefebvre asks: “centrality would produce hierarchy and therefore inequality. And yet, wouldn’t dispersion result in segregation?” (pp. 124–125). The authors responds that “separation” (or segregation) is the “enemy of assemblies and encounters” (pp. 124–125) and proposes “contrast” and “oppositions” to read legitimate urban differentiation (p. 125).²⁰⁸ Centrality is also the condition for the dialectical construction and manifestation of differences (of groups, of institutions, etc.). Following this argument, dispersion (that is, distance between difference) has a twofold consequence: the erosion of society as such, and the negation of access to centrality to at least a part of that difference (pp. 118–120, 175). Despite the observation that any point of the urban extension can virtually become central, attracting everything else (p. 96),²⁰⁹ centrality and periphery are bound to generate hierarchy and inequality (pp. 124–125), embedding the city with latent violence and conflict (pp. 120, 175).

What emerges from this sketch is a relational view of the urban, bringing together in one objet “the cumulative action of different actors and different times”:

“It’s not the “élan vital” of the urban community that explains the structures of space, as Marcel Poëte expressed in the language of Bergson. It is the result of a history that must be conceived as the work of social “agents” or “actors”, of collective “subjects” acting successive thrusts, discontinuously (relatively) releasing and fashioning layers of space. These major social groups, comprising classes, as well as institutions that cannot be adequately defined in terms of class character (royalty or municipality, for example), act with and/or against one another. From their interactions, their strategies, successes, and failures arise the qualities and “properties” of urban space. The general form of the urban encompasses these various differences by bringing them together.” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 127).

Not only is difference constitutive of the urban, but the urban is its bringing together (p. 127). The time-space axis is also one of integration with the other, from the oppositions between the inwardness of the political city and the confine of the excluded, the jointure of the urban and the rural, through to the constitution of the potential of centrality and risk of dispersion. The history of the urban sketched in this manner is that of how different groups and places evolved and eventually came to cooperate on a multitude of dimensions.²¹⁰ The political city and the village

²⁰⁶ Or, as the author maintains, the possibility of “polycentrality” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 97).

²⁰⁷ Lefebvre describes the transition from the industrial to the urban period with an explicit reference to the costs of distance: “Objective and measurable, space was represented [in the industrial city] only with reference to productivist criteria. While there is an advantage in consolidating all the social functions of production, it is not possible to do so. In the first place, when it is possible, we end up with the urban phenomenon. In the second, there are additional costs: the cost of space, the displacement of objects and information” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 125–126).

²⁰⁸ “Contrasts, oppositions, superpositions and juxtapositions replace separation, spatio-temporal distance” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 125). In the urban, “oppositions and contrasts replace solitary particularities (relative to the soil) [of the agrarian period]” (p. 126).

²⁰⁹ Such being the meaning of “urban space-time” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 116).

²¹⁰ The proposed axis of the history of the city starts with the coincidence of the “establishment of organized social life, agriculture and the village” and the political city in Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 8), a thesis that has since been explored by Edward Soja (2003). If the city detains a regulating power, centralising major projects such as irrigation and dams, villages “retain effective possession through the payment of tribute” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 9). Lefebvre points out that the social relations entertained in that context favoured the development of trade. Progressively, “initially confined to suspicious individuals, to “strangers”, they [the villages] become *functionally* integrated into the life of the city” without being allowed to integrate it politically (as in Greece’s Agora) (p. 9). The second point in the axis – the mercantile city – evolves from this arrangement. Initially relegated to “special parts of the city”, the underclass of merchants enters the city in the European Middle Age (in approximately the fourteenth century) (p. 10). As commercial exchange became the predominant urban function with a correspondent material organisation of space and its social usage (p. 10), the city-countryside opposition emerged as the inhabitants of the outer extension no longer worked for “territorial lords” but for the city (p. 11). Inversely, “the outlying area remained strongly heterotopic” (p. 129). With this transition achieved in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the city recognised this self-image by producing maps of itself. At this moment in time, as state hegemony joined both spaces (making use of their rivalry), “society no longer coincides with the countryside. It no longer coincides with the city, either” (p. 12). The third point, the industrial city is seen by Lefebvre as footloose, not attached by definition to intra-city or peripheral areas. The industrial city extrapolated existing cities and founded new cities, further integrating the non-city and the city (1970/2003, p. 13). After the industrial parenthesis, the fourth moment foreshadows a fully urbanised society, described as a dual double movement of implosion and explosion of the city and of the non-city (pp. 13–14). At the end of this period, the critical zone, contemporary to Lefebvre, loses the features inherited from the previous stage (p. 14).

controlled by the overlords, initially supported by feelings of strangeness and distrust, would progressively integrate the city and its surroundings. At the end of the merchantilisation epoch, “the importance of the city for the social whole became such that the whole seemed to shift.” (p. 11). The city “would no longer appear as an urban island in a rural ocean” (p. 11); the country becomes its limits, its horizon (pp. 7–14). The city appears “as an essential mediating force” (p. 12) enabling communication and encounter, as attested by the role of the streets (pp. 18–19). The urban is then a societal manifestation resulting from (and requiring) a transformed relationship continuously practised with the other. Confrontation with alterity is at the heart of the urban as had been seen by Simmel (1903/2002) and Wirth (1938).

Despite presenting the city as progressive development, the city is nevertheless seen by Lefebvre as a problem. The intensification of density – “of people, activities, wealth goods, objects, instruments, means and thought” (1970/2003, p. 14) – is paralleled by the dispersion of fragments of the urban – “peripheries, suburbs, vacation homes, satellite towns” (p. 14). Despite the positive virtual horizon, the urban is also the menace of chaos, “a colossal shapeless agglomeration” (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 97). It presents an abyss of “social emptiness”, filled in by rhetoric and ideology (p. 105). The concepts of isotopy, heterotopy, utopia are recurrent in the description of such a weave of potential and failure. These three instances appear in a suggestive relationship with the two triad already reviewed and share the same interpretative difficulties. We can attempt some clarification. The heterotopic literally means “the formation of tissue in a part where its presence is abnormal” (Heterotopia, 2016). Suburbs are heterotopic in the sense that they can separate people from full societal contact with the realities of the local society they belong to. The utopic activates the seme of perfecting (rather than the unrealisable). It emphasises the ephemeral, the volatile, as it rejects the stabilising features of state intervention in space. It reacts against a spatial practice of everydayness without opportunities for non-productive uses of the city. It goes hand in hand with the critique of the urban exposure to consumption and can be seen to correspond with contemporary geography’s concern for public space. The isotopic, literally “having the same place” (Isotopy, 2016), seems to express centrality, multi-functionality, and animated environments, contrasting with heterotopy: “Isotopies: places of identity, identical places. Neighbouring order. Heterotopy: the other place, the place of the other, simultaneously excluded and interwoven. Distant order.” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 128).

With these definitions and the layout of the urban problematic, we can address the concept of the “right to the city”. If Lefebvre does not explicitly address justice, we can nevertheless identify in this concept a clear ethical agenda – one that has driven a significant number of discourses on spatial justice.

3.2.2 The “right to the city” against exclusion from urban society

We have seen that Lefebvre’s concept of the city associates the relational quality of space to society’s productivity. This advantage, Lefebvre notes, is vulnerable to contradiction through segregation, tension, and conflict. Conflict is conceived as a function of the asymmetric political capital of “city makers”, and segregation coincides with the working class’ deprivation from making its space (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 127).²¹¹ At the centre of the Lefebvrian critique, we can retain the costs for everyday life produced by the spatial arrangements of professional top-down city makers, in particular, “the separation of life and activities”:²¹²

« Il suffit d’ouvrir les yeux pour comprendre la vie quotidienne de celui qui court de son logement à la gare proche ou lointaine, au métro bondé, au bureau ou à l’usine, pour reprendre le soir ce même chemin, et venir chez lui récupérer la force de recommencer le lendemain. Le tableau de cette misère

²¹¹ “If Paris is an example, the proletariat has not yet created a space. The merchant bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and politicians modelled the city. The industrialists demolished it. The working class never had any space other than that of its expropriation, its deportation: segregation” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 127).

²¹² Everydayness is the potential evacuated through segregation: “Everydayness is not found within the “urban” as such but in and through generalised segregation: the separation of life and activities” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 140).

généralisée n'irait pas sans le tableau des « satisfactions » qui la dissimulent et deviennent moyens de l'éluder et de s'en évader. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 108).

In this perspective, the right to the city proposes “a contractual system” demanding “not to be excluded from centrality and its movement, if only with respect to the decisions and actions of power” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 150, 194).

The role of centralities in supporting decision-making and power structures, namely the state and its subsidiary urbanism, is critiqued as authoritarian.²¹³ It passes urban ideology unchecked, that is, the absence of knowledge on the spatial evolution of society. It is in this context that we can read Lefebvre's agenda to reduce the state imprint and to give predominance to the level of inhabiting (pp. 80, 176–180). Lefebvre stresses that the then predominant logic of efficiency, functionality, and productivity²¹⁴ was unsuitable to tackle the problems of a completely urbanised civilisation (pp. 78, 97). The industrial strategy favouring the dominance of the global or public dimension, Lefebvre advances, should be inverted to give way to the habiting level (pp. 85, 89–90).²¹⁵ It is the unbalance of spatial capitals between inhabitants and professionals/politicians that makes the proletariat the central *actant*²¹⁶ of urban reform. But Lefebvre does not state the exclusion of other social groups:

« La stratégie urbaine fondée sur la science de la ville a besoin d'un support social et de forces politiques pour devenir agissante. Elle n'agit pas par elle-même. Elle ne peut pas ne pas s'appuyer sur la présence et l'action de la classe ouvrière, seule capable de mettre fin à une ségrégation dirigée essentiellement contre elle. Seule cette classe, en tant que classe, peut décidément contribuer à la reconstruction de la centralité détruite par la stratégie de ségrégation et retrouvée dans la forme menaçante des « centres de décision ». Cela ne veut pas dire qu'elle seule la classe ouvrière fera la société urbaine, mais que sans elle rien n'est possible. L'intégration sans elle n'a pas de sens, et la désintégration continuera. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 103).

If we can feel a tonality of class struggle, it is helpful to play it down as Lefebvre's appeal to revolutionary antagonism hinders the dialogic pursuit of society as compatibility between its parts and with the whole. As we have seen, difference is not a difficulty for Lefebvre, as the city is, primarily, an enabler of the social bond. Indeed, Lefebvre expects unavoidable difference in social contact to result in the levelling of some aspects of social life, such as the disappearance of religion.²¹⁷ From these considerations follows the point that the literal interpretation of an urban revolution – on the basis of the author's Marxist affiliation – can be set aside. The urban revolution traces the emergence of critical problems with the completion of the urbanisation process, which demands radically new solutions:

“Similarly, by “urban revolution” I refer to the transformation that affect contemporary society, ranging from the period when questions of growth and industrialisation predominate (models, plans, programs)

²¹³ For the sense of oppression in the 1970s of urban France, see Guy Debord's *The Society of the Spectacle* (1973).

²¹⁴ Between the 1960s and 1970s, after the Chicago and Pennsylvania theorists, systems planning comprehended regions, cities, and neighborhoods as subsystems which were impartially read through apparently scientific procedures: “...vast amounts of precise information were generated and processed in such a way that the planner could devise very sensitive systems of guidance and control, the effects of which could be monitored and if necessary modified” (Hall, 1997, p. 327). Planning within a positivist paradigm would later be acknowledged by Mannheim to be a value-laden activity, influenced by political interest and biased towards upper class interests (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 58–63, 166–169). In the same period, in the field of architecture Le Corbusier's functionalism gained momentum.

²¹⁵ As the city becomes a stabilised space, Lefebvre fears that it could become sterile. So even in a more equitable city-production scenario, he suggests a temporary space in a permanent turnover that he calls utopia (the place without a place seeking for a place), whereby the urban is appropriated by inhabitants and thereby liberated into desire, power, thought, and imagination. “To resolve this contradiction we can imagine the complete mobilisation, not of the population, but of space. A space taken over by the ephemeral. So that every place becomes multifunctional, polyvalent, transfunctional with an incessant turnover of functions; where groups take control of spaces for expressive actions and constructions, which are soon destroyed... In this way, utopia, an illuminating virtuality already present, will absorb and metamorphose the various topoi” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 130–131).

²¹⁶ See definition in section 1.1.1, “Actors, objects, environments”.

²¹⁷ This prospective observation is also attributed to Louis Wirth (1938), as reviewed in section 3.1.2, “Sociality and sociétalité in city life”.

to the period when the urban problematic becomes predominant, when the search for solutions and modalities unique to urban society are foremost.” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 5).

In other words, revolutionary solutions have a connotation of urgency (in this sense overthrowing established urbanism) and address the sudden and marked societal change of urban society. This interpretation detains the meaning of revolution, without evoking violence or non-political processes (Revolution, 2016).

3.2.3 The urban revolution: epistemic turn and political project

A spatial reform guided by a new episteme and a new political approach to the city are the core of the right to the city. Lefebvre questions: “isn’t thought characterised by the effort to reduce violence, beginning with the effort to destroy the chains that bind our thought?” (1970/2003, p. 6). The urban revolution is an epistemic rupture, as the author extends Marx’s critique on Hegelian idealism²¹⁸ to the review of the separation of knowledge (pp. 135–136).²¹⁹ Lefebvre initiates a reversal of Marx reading, ceasing to interpret the “urban and process of urbanisation” as superstructures of the mode of production. He advocates the relation between urban phenomena, relations of production, and productive forces so that a critique does not take the form of “complaining about alienation in industrial society (whether through alienating individualism or over-organisation) or wishing for a return to the urban communities of antiquity whether Greek or medieval.” (p. 139). He adds that “these so-called models are only variations of urbanist ideology” (p. 139). Anticipating the paradigm of a society of actors, Lefebvre states that when expert knowledge dispenses with the political function of society (by attending to representatives of institutional forms of political power), it gives in to ideology unsupported by the strange idea of imposing a space for the sake of happiness (p. 141). The new knowledge would be funded on observation, would mobilise urban sociology, art, and history of art – opens of *utopisme*²²⁰ – but also philosophy, leading to a new urbanism based on the explicit enunciation of the ideological implications of space (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 101). It implies a radical shift from the morality of good intentions (pp. 98–99), sensing, instead, what is already there as a beginning of a society’s movement (p. 101). Lefebvre speaks of transduction, a dialogue between theory and empirical observation, which would found invention in existing virtuality (p. 100).²²¹

We have seen that it is the importance of the city as a resource that inhabitants should have at their disposal that makes for the emergence of the right to the city. Lefebvre does not question how increasing the spatial capital of inhabitants would coalesce in the kind of spatial totality he has in mind. He calls attention to the fact that an urban space implies a revision of the production *idéels* coming from rural societies, where the « campagne » dominates the city.²²² The city requires revisiting the values, taboos, and prescriptions that, to a great extent, originated from

²¹⁸ In chapter 2, we have seen how Lefebvre innovates by separating space from metaphysics and bringing the superstructure and the infrastructure, the *idéal* and the material to a joint thought. See in particular section 2.1.1, “Puncturing the primacy of the *idéal* over material space”.

²¹⁹ We interpret the separation of knowledge as referring to excessive disciplinary endogeneity and as separation from political objectives (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 144). Lefebvre states: “His [Marx’s] critique of Hegelianism, economic science and history and its meaning enabled Marx to conceive of capitalist society both as a totality and as a moment of total transformation. Negativity would give rise to a new form of optimism. For Marx the negativity of radical critique coincided, theoretically and practically, with that of the revolutionary proletariat. The similarities and differences of this situation and the second half of the twentieth century would soon become apparent. To the Marxist critique of philosophy and political ideology, we can now add the radical critique of the reductive disciplines, the fragmentary sciences, which have become specialized and institutionalized.” (p. 135).

²²⁰ Of the new science, Lefebvre states:

« Il est même possible d’affirmer que le maximum d’utopisme rejoindra l’optimum de réalisme.” (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 106).

²²¹ «Elle [la transduction] introduit la rigueur dans l’invention et la connaissance dans l’utopie. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 100).

²²² “Nous achevons aujourd’hui l’inventaire des débris d’une société millénaire dans laquelle la campagne a dominé la ville, dont les idées, les “valeurs”, les tabous et les prescriptions, étaient pour une grande part d’origine agraire, à dominance rurale et « naturelle ». Des cités sporadiques émergeaient à peine à l’océan campagnard. La société rurale était (elle est encore) celle de la non-abondance, de la pénurie, de la privation acceptée ou refusée, des interdits aménageant et régularisant les privations. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, pp. 98–99).

²²³ The new *voie* for man imagined by Lefebvre contrasts with Le Corbusier’s tonality of how to create a new man through a new space, produced as the œuvre of an architect:

societies of scarcity, naturalising privation, interdiction, regulation (pp. 98–99). But Lefebvre also alerts that such a horizon is in itself the production of a type of man “capable of complex and transparent relations with ‘the world’ (himself and the environment)” (p. 98). Criticising the field of architecture, the author states that this transformation could not be made in spite of men:²²³

« L’humble habitant a son système de significations... Le fait d’habiter ici ou là comporte la réception, l’adoption, la transmission d’un tel système, par exemple celui de l’habitat pavillonnaire. Le système de significations de l’habitat dit ses passivités et ses activités ; il est reçu mais modifié par la pratique. Il est perçu... Les architectes semblent avoir établi et dogmatisé un ensemble de significations, mal explicité comme tel Ils élaborent non pas à partir des significations perçues et vécues par ceux qui habitent, mais à partir du fait d’habiter, interprété par eux. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 101).

We consider these Lefebvrian ideas as the foundation from which an emancipatory spatial project can be thought of today. Such a project needs to liberate itself from the dissonances between “spaces of representations” inherited from the past vis-à-vis the potential of contemporary spatialities.²²⁴ It recognises that such a change necessarily passes by society, rather than being imposed. Lefebvre is silent on the internal discrepancies that might exist in the *sphère idéal* of society, potentially revealed once hegemonic coercion is removed. He nevertheless points to the need of a political solution. Propensity of conflict in space is relegated to “a long political experience”:

“Seule la force sociale capable de s’investir elle-même dans l’urbain, au cours d’une longue expérience politique, peut prendre en charge la réalisation du programme concernant la société urbaine. Réciproquement, la science de la ville apporte à cette perspective un fondement théorique et critique, une base positive. L’utopie contrôlée par la raison dialectique sert de garde-fou aux fictions prétendument scientifiques, à l’imaginaire qui s’égarerait. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, pp. 105–106).

Politically, the right to the city demands an urban strategy of *self-management* “involving markets and the control of investments” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p. 150), “decisions and actions of power” (p. 194)”. Self-management is defined in very general terms as the effort of civic society to understand itself and work out its mode of existence (Lefebvre, 1979/2001, pp. 779–780).²²⁵ If the idea of self-management has anti-statist connotations, it is only insofar as the state was seen to repress civic society’s possibilities. The claim is not for the disappearance of the state (as proved by Lefebvre’s assignment of certain themes to be monitored at that level), but for the existence of an urban scale of

²²³ The new *voie* for man imagined by Lefebvre contrasts with Le Corbusier’s tonality of how to create a new man through a new space, produced as the œuvre of an architect:

« Celle [la voie] de la société urbaine et de l’humain comme œuvre dans cette société qui serait œuvre et non produit... Un homme urbain, polyvalent, polysensoriel, capable de rapports complexes et transparents avec « le monde » (l’environnement et lui-même). » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 98). Lefebvre proceeds by stating that is that alternative or else nihilism (p. 98).

« C’est donc de la journée d’un homme moderne qu’il faut étudier et il faut fixer les occupations ... qui s’inséreront entre deux sommeils, chaque jour, à chaque lever du soleil. Et s’occuper de l’homme, et non plus du capitalisme ou du communisme ; du bonheur de l’homme, e non du dividende des sociétés ; de la satisfaction à apporter aux profonds instincts humains et non de concours de vitesse entre les services commerciaux de deux firmes. Remettre l’homme sur ses pieds, ses pieds sur le sol, ses poumons en l’air, sib esprit sur le travail collectifs édifiant et l’animer d’une agitation individuelle féconde... S’occuper de l’homme ! C’est, alors, désigner et aménager les lieux et construire les vases qui contiendront des activités fécondes, C’est donc : *urbanisme* et *architecture*. » (Le Corbusier, 1933/1964, p. 70).

²²⁴ As part of this potential, Lefebvre signals the availability for encounter that could emerge at the horizon of urban life:

« Enfin, le besoin de la ville et de la vie urbaine ne s’exprime librement que dans les perspectives qui tente ici de se dégager et d’ouvrir l’horizon. Les besoins urbains spécifiques ne seraient-ils pas besoin de lieux où l’échange ne passerait pas par la valeur d’échange, le commerce et le profit ? Ne serait-ce pas aussi le besoin d’un temps de ces rencontres, de ces échanges ? » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 96).

²²⁵ “Each time a social group (generally the productive workers) refuses to accept passively its conditions of existence, of life or of survival, each time such a group forces itself not only to understand but to master its own conditions of existence, autogestion is occurring. This broad but precise definition shows autogestion to be a highly diversified practice that concerns businesses as well as territorial units, cities, and regions. This definition also includes all aspects of social life; it implies the strengthening of all associative ties, that is to say, of civil society. This theoretical definition points towards a practical struggle that is always reborn with failures and setbacks. Above all, this definition points to the fundamentally antistatist tendency of autogestion, the only efficient and active form of the famous “counterpowers”. (Lefebvre, 1979/2001, pp. 779–780).

collective decision, corresponding to the scale of the stakes (pp. 778–779).²²⁶ Self-management implies the capacity to put forward an overall program, a positive proposition, while rejecting the use of violence.²²⁷

“It is obvious that for [urban] strategy to succeed it must combine the “negative” [reference to the Marx’s foundation of revolution in negativity] forces of revolt against a repressive society with social forces that are capable of “positively” resolving the problems of the megapolis. This is no simple matter.” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 145–146)

We arrive at the terrain of our research. Lefebvre sketches the possibility of detecting and participating in the positive urban horizon of a society, through objective efforts of intelligibility of what is already there. We have seen that he does not explore, empirically, the hypothesis of unity of the *idéal*. Lefebvre associates the political exercise of auto-gestion with the “lived”, the “representational”. Lefebvre also spares these spheres from requirements of consistency and cohesiveness (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 41).²²⁸ However, he anticipates in somewhat contradictory terms, that letting people’s representations actively make the city would reveal the “satisfactions” that inhabitants construct in the face of the urban misery. The right to the city is, in fact, reconstructed from demands of what some call today (in an intellectual provocation) the “right to the village” (Landy & Moreau, 2015):

« Par des détours surprenants – la nostalgie, le tourisme, le retour vers le cœur de la ville traditionnelle – l’appel des centralités existantes ou nouvellement élaborées – ce droit chemine lentement. La revendication de la nature, le désir d’en jouir détournent du droit à la ville. Cette dernière revendication s’énonce indirectement, comme tendance à fuir la ville détériorée et non renouvelé, la vie urbaine aliénée avant d’exister réellement. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 107).

3.2.4 The reinterpretation of Lefebvre’s themes for a theory of spatial justice

The affiliation of the right to the city with the Marxist revolutionary theory is an ambivalent seed at the basis of the least productive lines of appropriation of Lefebvre’s heritage. Notably, this is an agenda for scholars understanding service to society as self-proclaimed representation of new forms of the underclass in the academic debate. A line of Lefebvrian intellectuals – animated by Lefebvre’s passages on the promise of the working class in the program of the right to the city – excludes the elements of a positive horizon for the (just) urban space. One that explores the making society and of oneself as a compatible complexity. We have argued that Lefebvre’s themes are open to a contemporary reinterpretation, which is in line with the theoretical framework of space presented in chapter 2 (and

²²⁶ “If the State occupies these three dominant sectors (energy, information technology, and links with the worldwide), if it holds these key positions, it can loosen the reins somewhat towards subordinate units, regions, and cities as well as businesses. As we have said, the State can control everything without needing to monitor everything. This is the crucial point, the trap. Everything depends on the degree of liberty accorded to, or rather conquered by, these units, which, taken together, constitute the country, that is, the nation and civil society. As with all democratic liberties and as with the rights of man and citizen, the space for initiative granted from above and by a sort of charter to the subordinate units may correspond more to ideology than to practice, more to illusions than to possibilities. In other words, this space for initiative (échelon) is at once the site (le lieu) and the stake (l’enjeu) of struggles.” (Lefebvre, 1979/2001, pp. 778, 779). The fact that the claim was delivered only in the form of a non-institutional political practice can be seen as a reduction of the full scope of self-management, for it extracts the idea of deliberation from the representative sphere. We can note that the contemporary interrelation of the city with the world contradicts Lefebvre anticipation of necessary mediation of the state, as cities start to emerge as proper urban actors in the international political scene. For example, the dual negotiation fronts of the Cop 21 – one led by the states, another by the cities – is a form of urban institutional political interface with the world.

²²⁷ Lefebvre comments negatively on how some youth groups consider any political program a treason. After pledging for the usefulness of studying the Americas, such as Marx studied England and the English Capitalism, the author states:

“It is a recognised fact that the Americas have entered in a phase of urban guerrilla activity.... Blacks in the United States who are locked in urban ghettos by a form of social segregation that is more powerful than legal integration have resorted to desperate acts. Many of those blacks, many young people in general, have rejected any political program and consider that the search for such a program to be a form of treason. They want to unleash violence in its pure state. ... Within the overall context, the relations between local authorities, the federal government and the states have become increasingly complicated. The largest cities (New York in typical) have become uncontrollable, ungovernable, a knot of problems that are increasingly difficult to resolve.” (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, pp. 145–146).

²²⁸ On the incoherence of representational spaces, Lefebvre states: “Representations of space are certainly abstract, but they also play a role in social and political practice: established relations between objects and people in represented space are subordinate to a logic which will sooner or later break them up because of their lack of consistency. Representational spaces, on the other hand, need obey no rules of consistency or cohesiveness. Redolent with imaginary and symbolic elements, they have their source in history – in the history of people as well as in the history of each individual belonging to that people.” (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 41)

how it reflects empirical knowledge of urban space that has been developed since Lefebvre's programmatic statements). These themes are the following:

- The city, as a relational object, at the end of an irreversible historical evolution, places social contact at the heart of its resourcefulness. Eventfulness denotes the conception of productivity as not necessarily efficient;²²⁹
- Inclusiveness in the urban spatial production is synonymous to being a part of society. This founds a strong argument in favour of concentration over dispersion and an inherently differentiated urban space (not equality of places);
- The city is made by its actors through the articulations between its inhabitants and the political (institutional and non-institutional), a unitary dialogue between heterotopy, isotopy, and utopia, through which the potential of the city is activated and enjoyed by all society members;
- A cognitive revolution in the conception of urban space and in the knowledge that supports the problematics of urban society, that is, a new role for the science of the city based on the detection of virtual developments of a society.

If these ideas are fundamental to our research, we will now seek a more synthetic formulation anchored in the concept of the city developed by Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault. The city offers a tense relationship with empirics declining the key concepts of space as a dimension of society, a multidimensional object, and the product of actors with some spatial capital.

3.3 Lévy and Lussault: a reconstruction of Lefebvre's heritage

3.3.1 Urbanity: density and diversity

In the theoretical construction of urbanity, Lussault and Lévy depart with Lefebvre from the attribute of spatial concentration in contemporary societies. They propose a different conceptual cut within the paradigm of multidimensional complexity of society in the moment of actors. Urbanity and its two indicators, density and diversity, define the urban as a condition of potential interaction of social realities. This coupling of concepts manifests "the sum of interrelations between objects of society inside a system", signalling the complexity of the ensemble (the *sociétalité*) beyond seeing the urban space as sociality (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1041; Lévy, 1994, pp. 80–81).²³⁰ Sociality here is defined as the ensemble of reciprocal actions on the proper social plane, between actors and their immediate environment, while *sociétalité* reflects the dynamics of a society as a whole (Lussault, Urbain, p. 1041). In this theoretical frame, high density is an urban solution that chooses to eliminate distance in order to resolve the difficulties raised by its existence. It privileges "coexistence, escaping the problems of distance through proximity" (Lévy, 1994, pp. 71–72). But density says nothing on the variation of those social objects, which is why it is articulated with diversity (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1040; Lévy, Ville, 2013, p. 1078).²³¹ Diversity accounts for the presence, in a portion of space, of the entire set of social realities available to a society at a given moment.

²²⁹ Lefebvre rejects the use of the word productivity, associated with imposed efficiency and absence of the ludic, spontaneous and playful. Eventfulness better apprehends Lefebvre's notion of resourcefulness, but we can also link this conception with productivity when the latter is founded on creativity.

²³⁰ « Par rapport à une définition présentant la ville comme « une organisation destinée à maximiser l'interaction sociale » la conception ici soumise gagne, certes, en complexité, mais aussi en précision en passant du « social » au sociétal. Ainsi, on dépasse le postulat que l'interaction sociale maximale serait, sui generis, l'apanage de l'urbain ... pour considérer que le couplage de la densité et de la diversité manifeste l'interaction sociétale, c'est-à-dire, la somme des interrelations des objets d'une société à l'intérieure d'un système. » (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1041). « On note alors une ligne de clivage majeure entre le social et le sociétal, entre des agrégats partiels d'objets sociaux [social] et des formations complètes qui disposent de l'ensemble des attributs d'une société [societal]. » (Lévy, 1994, pp. 81, 89).

²³¹ « Densité et diversité ne sont pas dissociables car une densité sans diversité fragmente l'espace en entités non sociétales disjointes et la diversité sans densité peut, à la limite, correspondre à un espace de distribution diffuse et aléatoire de ses composantes. » (Lévy, Ville, 2013, p. 1078).

Proper spatial variation is difficult to separate from substance in other planes (for example, of landscape, functions, architecture, and demographic composition, economic or political diversity) (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1040).²³² High urbanity depends on the strength of these markers but also on the intensity of their interaction. It is partially related to the potential of a spatial configuration (p. 1041).

Given these simple definitions, it is possible to read and compare cities using a set of geotypes.²³³ These geotypes are distinguished by a value of density and diversity, manifest in a spatial layout. They correspond to a specific situation in the continuous development of the process of urbanisation (p. 1041). Lussault and Lévy propose several progressions of degrees of urbanity.²³⁴ We retain, from the maximal value of urbanity, in decreasing order: central, suburban, peri-urban, and infra-urban. The central type corresponds to Lefebvre's centrality as potentiality vis-à-vis the deficits of *peripherisation*.²³⁵ The suburban is characterised by topographic continuity with the central geotype while the peri-urban presents physical discontinuity from the urban agglomeration. The infra-urban corresponds to a level of urbanity of very feeble *sociétalité* (pp. 1041–1042). These general figures are to function as ideal types; they do not reflect a particular mode of urbanisation (as does, for example, the historical centre or ludic-touristic urbanisation (p. 1042)). Their stabilisation in a given urban area at a given time is a production of the researcher, bearing in mind the pertinence of global comparability of the concepts in different empirical circumstances (p. 1041). The concept of centrality in Lefebvre does not necessarily coincide with the origin of a radio-concentric model (p. 1043).²³⁶ The ensemble of the geotypes propose an alternative reading which does not follow the *plan physiographique* of urban areas (p. 1043). That is, it does not establish a correspondence, term by term, to the succession of *faubourg*, the *banlieue*, the *campagne*, and the *rurbaine* (an undecided zone) (p. 1043). The *plan géotypique*, independent from localisation, reflects the common phenomenon of complex centralities²³⁷ and is more adequate to observe the “disparate assemblages of fractions distinguishable according to urbanity, without a clear global organising figure” (p. 1040).²³⁸

3.3.2 *Urbanité/s*, modes of living together

In this reading of the urban, the city is the part of the ensemble which has the strongest urbanity level.²³⁹ It tends to correspond to the central and suburban geotypes (in a combination of territorial and networked spaces). The city is an urban centre when it polarises the urban area. It can be measured by the functional logic of interdependence, as revealed by the effective mobility of its inhabitants (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1040). The city, the local urban society

²³² Lussault talks of intra- and inter-dimensional diversity (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1040).

²³³ Indeed, comparability of urban situations across locations and time is one of the advantages of the conceptual couple density/diversity (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1041).

²³⁴ See bibliography note for Lévy (1994) and Lussault (2007). Lussault also refers to two other publications: 1) « La ville des géographes » (Lussault, Body-Gendrot, & Paquot, 2000) in *La ville et l'urbain, l'état des savoirs*, and 2) « L'urbain : quelques mots pour le dire » (Cailly & Vanier, 2010) in *La France, une géographie urbaine*.

²³⁵ In Lévy and Lussault, the potential is not restricted to the ephemeral, given that the association of the material with the hegemony of power in spatial production has been breached in the actors' paradigm.

²³⁶ « Ainsi, au sein de l'urbain, la péripherisation peut se manifester partout, comme la centralité le peut également. Il s'agit d'un des caractères majeurs de l'urbanité contemporaine. » (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1043).

²³⁷ « Ce complexe, fréquemment hiérarchisée, associe des centres tant concurrents que complémentaires, localisées en des positions variées ; dans ce cadre, on peut insister sur l'importance de l'émergence, depuis les années 1960, des espaces de centralités en périphérie « physiographique », développées autour d'équipements et de services commerciaux de grande distribution, mais qui peuvent associer une grande diversité d'activités, connaître un réel affinement fonctionnelle, occuper une aire de grande taille, bref, s'éloigner du modèle du lieu de centralité secondaire, pour devenir un territoire de centralité affirmée et polarisante, qui rayonne par contact contigu et connexe sur de vaste périmètres. Si l'urbanisation contemporaine s'étale, parallèlement de nouvelles centralités apparaissent partout, ce qui complexifie les organisations spatiales car les polarisations deviennent multiples et font système. L'auto-centrage a cédé devant l'hétéropolarisation. » (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1043).

²³⁸ « Les organisations urbaines, considérées à la juste échelle de leur déploiement spatial... ne sont plus tant des aires radioconcentriques bien ordonnés et délimitées, que des assemblages disparates de fractions distinguables selon leur urbanité, sans claire figure organisatrice global » (Lussault, Urbain, 2013, p. 1043).

²³⁹ For recent statements on the societal resourcefulness of cities, see the film *Urbanité/s* (Lévy, 2014).

and the smallest societal scale all synonyms, expressing multi-dimensional interdependence and co-presence. Retaining the concept of the city refutes the hypothesis of a dilution of the city into the urban (Lévy, *Ville*, pp. 1078, 1081). It underlines the importance of the layout of material and immaterial elements that produce a situation, the configurations “that make of the city a city” (p. 1078). Its specificity (in relation to solutions based on mobility and telecommunication) is productivity, through the contact of alterity and creative activities (Lévy, 2013b, p. 70).²⁴⁰ The concept of the city reiterates that this spatial arrangement is at the heart of urban civilisation in the same way as the countryside was at the core of rural societies (Lévy, *Ville*, p. 1081). The city supposes a strong alterity, sufficient to “make society” (p. 1078).

The “model of Amsterdam” is employed by Lévy to designate the solutions of living together which take into account the making of society through concentration. It is symmetrical to the “model of Johannesburg”:

« *Le modèle d'Amsterdam prend acte que l'habiter urbain implique de faire société et d'entrer en société dans chaque moment du quotidien. Au contraire, le modèle de Johannesburg affiche un refus, chaque fois que c'est possible, des conséquences sociétales de l'option technique en faveur d'un espace concentré.* » (Lévy, 2012, p. 160).

The development of the model of Amsterdam is consubstantial to a set of features: auto-visibility, public space, civility, and public metrics of mobility.²⁴¹ The city is *autovisible*, offering its inhabitants the possibility of a permanent evaluation of the “quality of the methods of realisation of the being-together” (Lévy, *Ville*, p. 1080). This is particularly so in the public space.²⁴² Civility, the continuously negotiated coexistence between each society member and the others, renders the public space political, though not institutionally (Lévy, *Espace Public*, 2003, p. 338).²⁴³ The placement and movement of the body in these spaces express different degrees of engagement with society, from respect without responsibility (the tourist) to the consideration of all in each personal choice (the citizen) (p. 339).²⁴⁴ The Amsterdam model also implies mobility as collective spatial choice: the “quality and force of pedestrian metrics” (p. 339) and public rather than private solutions.

As in Lefebvre, we can see that the city demands non-static concepts capable of reading a mobile world (Lévy, 2013b, p. 100).²⁴⁵ The removal of agglomerating constraints, in particular changes on mobility speed and cost, shows that a model of concentration is not evident. It implies the convergent spatialities of multiple actors. The couple *allophilie/allophobie* – that is, the acceptability or non-acceptability of exposition to alterity – is a major differentiating

²⁴⁰ « La ville ne souffre donc pas du développement des deux autres modalités [de gestion de la distance] (mobilité et télécommunication), mais joue sa partie grâce à sa capacité spécifique, faite de concentration d'altérités et de frottement productifs. A développer les activités créatives cruciales pour le développement tel qu'il se joue aujourd'hui. » (Lévy, 2013b, p. 70).

²⁴¹ Dynamic public spaces correlate with the city attributes of density, diversity, self-visibility.

²⁴² In relation to self-visibility, we can read:

« Le fait que les acteurs de la ville la voient, dans son ensemble, en permanence, et que cette vision les accompagne, confortant ou perturbant leur relation à la société L'espace public, synecdoque de cette autovisibilité en est la quintessence. L'autovisibilité est fondamentalement politique puisqu'elle convoque chaque citoyen comme évaluateur permanent de la qualité des méthodes de réalisation de l'être-ensemble. » (Lévy, *Ville*, 2013, p. 1080).

²⁴³ « Le caractère « public » de l'espace vient de ce que, peu ou prou, du politique y circule ... sous la figure de la retenue silencieuse et de l'évitement circonspect plutôt que de la publicité citoyenne... La civilité, c'est *le* politique sans *la* politique. Cette manière non institutionnel de « faire de la politique » suppose une autre versant, explicite, qu'il soit gouvernemental (la réalisation et la gestion des espaces publics) ou citoyen (le civisme de l'engagement en cas de conflit sur l'usage). » (Lévy, *Espace Public*, 2003, p. 338). Public space illustrates how each individual makes space (p. 336) and it is indicative of the urbanity of the broader space of reference (p. 337). The tension between the individual and society, the movement of normative values in practice in public space can be observed through three couples: public/private; *intime/extime*; individual/social (p. 335).

²⁴⁴ « Si l'on imagine les différentes manières d'habiter un lieu urbain, on trouvera, au minimum de l'engagement, la position de *touriste*... et, au maximum, celle de *citoyen*, pour qui tout action personnelle est dirigée vers tous les autres. Entre les deux, le citoyen, par le fait même de son identification à la ville, à ses territoires comme à ses réseaux, intègre dans la moindre de ses actions la survie de ces espaces qu'il s'est approprié. » (Lévy, *Espace Public*, 2003, p. 339).

²⁴⁵ « Pour ce qui concerne la ville, l'objet de la science n'est pas donné. Le passé, le présent, le possible ne se séparent pas. C'est un *objet virtuel* qu'étudie la pensée. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 97).

axis of the spatial practices of the actors (residential choice, in particular) (Ourednik, 2009, p. 9).²⁴⁶ In this perspective, a high level of urbanity does not necessarily result from the juxtaposition of individual spatial freedoms. Peri-urbanisation is the exemplary case, associated with the deployment of an imaginary of the country-side held by (to a great extent) inhabitants with considerable economic capital but with a low cultural homologue (Lévy, Ville, pp. 1079–1080). We have seen that Lefebvre’s observes – without problematizing – that there might be several and divergent strategies inside the society (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 103).²⁴⁷ Lévy foregrounds that the invention of the individual implies, for social life, that his strategies are in tension with (some of) those of other actors (Lévy, 1994, p. 18; 2013b, p. 68).²⁴⁸ The fact that society is, at present, composed of contradictory sub-systems – including strategies which refuse a societal logics of space (Lévy, 1994, p. 66)²⁴⁹ – opens a pertinent *chantier* on the societal convergence of individuals’ use of their new freedom in space. The choice of a model of urbanity is to be determined by society. It implies a political space, capable of deliberating at the scale of the problems (p. 83).²⁵⁰ Defining that society, which is instable and virtually connected to other spaces (by virtue of the spatiality of its members and interspatiality in other substance-dimensions), is a difficult task, but not impossible (Lévy, Ville, p. 1080).²⁵¹ We have retained from the Lefebvrian account the concern about the inclusive participation in the production of space and, in that regard, of society *tout-court*. Lévy adds the political conflict that emerges with disparate spatial representations (and attitudes towards alterity) in a society with a generalised minimum spatial capital. A new level of technical spatial freedom calls for a new political redefinition of the terms of such liberty. The compatibility of spatialities and space emerge as the central theme of spatial justice.

²⁴⁶ The cumulative effects of these preferences have been modelled in the project “Our Inhabited Space”, developed by Chôros between 2005 and 2009. In the context of that project, we find the following definitions:

« Étant donné que la composition sociale d’un lieu constitue un critère majeur de son acceptabilité ou non-acceptabilité en tant que lieu de résidence, c’est par rapport à cet aspect que nous avons défini deux attitudes opposées : celle de l’*alophilie* et celle de l’*alophobie*. Pour cette raison, nous introduisons la notion d’*alophilie* et d’*alophobie*. Les termes sont construits à partir du grec ἄλλος, équivalent du latin *alius* : autre. Les individus alophiles recherchent un environnement résidentiel qui les expose à l’altérité, les individus alophobes cherchent à éviter un tel environnement. » (Ourednik, 2009, p. 9).

See also « La ville qu’ils veulent, la ville qu’ils font » (Lévy & Ourednik, 2011). On the participation of *alophilie* and *alophobie* in the individual strategies participating in the making of the city along these two models of urbanity, see also “Société” in *L’Humanité* (Lévy, Société, 2012 (working version), pp. 160–161).

²⁴⁷ The extent to which these divergences are expected to take place among the inhabitants is ambiguous, as the phenomenon is screened behind *rappports de force*:

« Seuls des groups, classes ou fractions de classes sociales capables d’initiatives révolutionnaires peuvent prendre les solutions aux problèmes urbains ; de ces forces sociales et politiques la ville rénovée deviendra l’œuvre. Il s’agit d’abord de défaire les stratégies et les idéologies dominantes dans la société actuelle. Qu’il y ait plusieurs groupes ou plusieurs stratégies, avec des divergences (entre l’étatique et le privée par exemple) ne modifie pas la situation. Des questions de propriété foncière aux problèmes de la ségrégation, chaque projet de *réforme urbaine* met en question les structures, celles de la société existante, mais aussi celles que l’on prétend imposer par la voie contraignante et institutionnelle à ce qui reste de la réalité urbaine. » (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, p. 103).

²⁴⁸ « Construire une maison en marge des villes, opter pour un style de mobilité, flâner dans l’espace public, sont autant d’actes apparemment individuels qui influent fortement, surtout bien sûr si beaucoup agissent dans le même sens, sur l’agencement générale de l’environnement spatial. Les spatialités, c’est-à-dire, les schémas d’action des acteurs et leur mises en œuvre, concourent à agencer l’espace, celui qui s’impose à eux, mais est dans le même temps fabriqué pas eux. » (Lévy, 2013b, p. 68).

²⁴⁹ « La spatialité d’une société se caractérise par la combinaison de sous-systèmes spatiaux contradictoires qui n’admettent pas nécessairement comme échelle pertinente la société tout entière, qui ne la reconnaissent pas forcément ou, en tous cas, pas toujours comme lieu. Si le rejet du social l’importe [la spatialité comme combinaison de contradictions...], cela se règle par la partition (« moi ici, toi là ») ou la compétition (« toi ou moi »), comme on le voit dans les logiques communautaires ou, plus généralement, holistiques. ... Lorsque, au contraire, la logique sociétale l’emporte, l’interaction, le mélange apparaissent comme les conditions d’un jeu à somme non nulle. » (Lévy, 1994, pp. 66–67).

²⁵⁰ This idea is more general than its application to urban space:

« L’auto-organisation de l’espace suppose, au contraire, une adéquation entre l’espace des problèmes posés à une société et l’espace de leurs solutions » (Lévy, 1994, p. 83).

²⁵¹ « On n’est pas pour autant démuné pour montrer que les espaces de solidarité, ceux où se posent en commun les problèmes des grandes équilibres : logement, emploi, formation, loisirs débordent des agglomérations morphologiques pour correspondre à des aires urbaines, souvent appelés « (functional) urban regions » en anglais, combinaison de territoires et de réseaux, constituée pour partie de sous-ensembles physiquement disjoints de l’agglomération principale. Il est donc techniquement tout à fait possible de faire correspondre le découpage politique à ces espaces « civilement » fonctionnelles. » (Lévy, Ville, 2013, p. 1080).

3.3.3 The city as political project with *marge de manoeuvre*

With the conceptual simplicity of urbanity – its coupling of density and diversity – one can follow the evolution of the urban, produced by a panoply of actors and the diversification of inhabitants' spatial practice. The concepts articulated with that of the city (public space, civility, self-visibility) give urban layouts and cities more *marge de manoeuvre* than the strict dependency on “means of production”.²⁵² Indeed, they reveal the existence of the political function in institutional (in the form of an agenda for urban governments) and non-institutional modalities (in public space and civility).²⁵³ The concept of legitimacy substitutes that of power (Lévy, *Légitimité*, 2013, p. 602)²⁵⁴ and liberates the study of the urban from what Lefebvre still carried from the Marxist matrix. It significantly opens up the spectrum of a discussion on a desirable spatial project. This shift is momentous for the conception of spatial justice. The multi-dimensional complexity of the urban recasts the pertinence of a debate on public versus private spatial operations, big versus small political and economic actors. Surely, in contemporary professional urban production, private entrepreneurship can be accompanied by a reduction of the virtual possibilities of places.²⁵⁵ Surely, the interspatiality of cities with the global economic space does make, at present, for a disproportionate bargaining weight of some actors over regular *citadins* and citizens, even when urbanistic participatory processes are legally available and even compulsory.²⁵⁶ But, if we follow Lefebvre's optimism and its tenacity (Lefebvre, 1968/2009, pp. 145–146), such imbalance need not be an irremovable *unfreedom* in the long run, and we can choose not to let it block our epistemic project.²⁵⁷ A focus on urbanity allows for the acknowledgment of impoverishments of the urban and its virtuality,²⁵⁸ and its impact in the least endowed members of society. It allows a social critique without resorting to accusations of the intentional domination of the city by an upper class. This is a frequent interpretation of Lefebvre's heritage, and we can indeed concede that some passages have that tonality, transpiring Lefebvre's Marxist inspiration,²⁵⁹ but it is incoherent with a fully ethical approach to the urban. This is not to say that corrupt actors do not exist, but an invitation to look for descriptions and explanations of space which do not pass by disclosing the secretive ill-intention of others. Avoiding the moral basis of the lack of virtue can significantly redirect our cognitive investment to comprehend the *marge de manoeuvre* available to urbanity, after the inhabitants' choice.²⁶⁰ Epistemically and politically, this changes the conception of the role of social science in social critique, in particular, it sets aside a nihilist project anchored in opposition and antagonism. The researcher can co-produce society, cooperate, dialogue, and support society in its definition of a positive horizon of change based on justice. As will emerge within our empirical study, this role foregrounds the values of the researcher, composed through his

²⁵² That is, more malleability than the reading of space through the lenses of hegemony and power that we have seen in Lefebvre.

²⁵³ See definition of the political function in section 1.1.2, “The political function of society”.

²⁵⁴ Legitimacy is the basis of political capital. The mechanisms of its circulation and the *scène politique* are the means to resolve an identified problem by society towards an acceptable coexisting of the existing contradictions (Lévy, *Légitimité*, 2013, p. 602). The concept of political legitimacy makes a place for the superior political capital of some actors, such as states, in as much as they impose decisions that issue from deliberative processes (Lévy, *État*, 2003, p. 342). Indeed, in the definition of state as an actor, we find the idea of potency related to the possibility to change reality:

« Les politiques publiques tirent l'essentiel de leur capacité à modifier le réel d'autre chose que la violence, mais un ensemble d'outils juridiques, de ressources budgétaires et de légitimité politique, "les deux premiers relevant de l'état. La notion de "dispositif de puissance" apparaît donc mieux appropriée pour décrire cet ensemble spécifique de moyens d'imposer des décisions qui caractérisent les états. » (Lévy, *État*, 2003, p. 342).

²⁵⁵ Namely, in the setting up of written norms on the use of public spaces.

²⁵⁶ See the text 6.5, “Narrative”, in particular the passage 6.5.2.2, “London, master planning and antagonistic voices”.

²⁵⁷ *Unfreedom* is a term used by Amartya Sen to refer to absent freedoms, for example his *Development as Freedom* (Sen, 2001). The notion has been more recently integrated in the concept of capability. See point 4.2.3.1, “The individual as an actor of justice: capabilities”.

²⁵⁸ For examples of observable impoverishments currently associated with private land ownership that can be analysed through a theory of urbanity, see “What kind of world are we building? The privatisation of public space” (Minton, 2006).

²⁵⁹ We frequently find a revival of Lefebvre along this line accompanied by the employment of terms such as hegemony, “commodification of the urban”, “domination and colonisation of the urban” (Kipfer, Schmid, & Goonewar, 2008). This is so even when the positive horizon of Lefebvre is actively recognised.

²⁶⁰ For example, this line of reasoning can open the way to juridical work, supported by a public debate, making some land ownership-based privatising actions illegitimate, without discarding the contributions of private investment to increases in urbanity.

cognitive and affective – dominantly objective – relationship with reality. In an epoch of competent actors, we expect the communication of where one stands to be an advantage in relation to a supposed axiological neutrality.

3.3.4 The definition of spatial justice, a starting point

With these initial propositions, we can see how urban space and justice approach a single problematic – that of coexistence in heterogeneous societies of inhabitants, with potentially divergent spatial practices and spatial conceptions. Urbanity offers for debate a number of topics where divergence is empirically confirmed at present: conflicting practises of mobility, incompatible preferences for degrees of urbanity as manifest in residential location, frictions between civility and incivility, the negotiation of their distinctive line (Lévy, 2013b). Spatial justice inherits these problematics from the dimension of space, but it injects the complexity of social justice concerns. As a starting point, we can admit that social justice is preoccupied by unequal capitals or the absolute deprivation of some of its members. We can see injustice as a reduced opportunity to participate in the production and enjoyment of the advantages of social life and imagine that space can be at the core of a solidarity project. In this perspective, spatial justice keeps us alert to the way in which exchanges between individuals and society, in and through space, can work towards a horizon of justice. We can study how spatial productivity can generate resources for solidarity, but we can also imagine that the participation in society through space is in itself a means of justice. With these ideas in mind, we will dive into the universe of the ethos comprising theories of justice and morality and try to apprehend their resourcefulness for our demarche. Only after exposing that theoretical toolkit will we revisit the existing erudite discourses intersecting space and justice (chapter 5).

4 Contributions from erudite discourses on justice

In this chapter, we are interested in apprehending the contributions of the intellectual production of moral and political philosophy to society's pragmatic of ethics, in particular, the treatment of the problematic of spatial justice. We start by identifying the (erudite or popular) recognition of such a pragmatic as a determinant feature of an epoch of ethics in the historicity of the ethos. We then propose to read existing erudite discourses on justice, exploring their potential contribution to such a pragmatic. In order to do so, we investigate their degree of *sociétalité*. Through the hybridisation of languages originating in each of the fields (that is, of justice and spatial theories), we attempt to translate the themes of a horizon, a pragmatic, actors, environments, and social objects for the plane of the ethos. Mobilising these categories produces the structure of the rest of the review. The exposition of the complete *sociétalité* of Amartya Sen's idea of justice is followed by the reconstruction of justice theories of incomplete *sociétalité*. Finally, a section is reserved to briefer accounts of theories considered less promising for the contemporary social construction of ethics.

4.1 An approach to the social construction of the ethos

Postulating the ethos²⁶¹ as a social construction implies recognising its historicity.²⁶² This proposition implies that the ethos is related with the features of the society which it is created to regulate. It also entails that the ethos – a collective, cultural product like others in the history of societies – is open to obsolescence, engendering a succession of “epochs”. In “De la morale à l'éthique” (2013a), Lévy situates the construction of ethics by society as the contemporary moment of this history. Morality and ethics are defined as concurrently “situated rationalities in a regime of historicity” (p. 37). If some actions comply with principles of both registers, Lévy argues, that apparent overlap emerges from the fact that there are common logics in different societies and that in all societies, “there is a case affective-objective that tells the just” (pp. 37–38).²⁶³ The specificity of ethics is the active recognition that ethical values and their substantive declination in social life are fabricated.

The proposed method for the fabrication of ethics is a pragmatic dialogue between universality and singularity. The idea of the singular is opposed to that of the particular, while integrating a part of its ethical intuitions. It insists on the complementarity between statements valid for all humans (universal) and the specificity of situations in which they are concretised and made effective. This pragmatic dispenses with particularistic reserves, understood as the

²⁶¹ Wikipedia's entry on “ethos” makes precise the Greek meaning of “accustomed place” and “custom, habit”, equivalent to Latin mores. The contemporary usage refers to the common traits of a group. It retains the meaning specified in the Aristotelian triad ethos, logos, and pathos of a compelling argument capable of orienting action, the persuasive force depending on a shared basis of meaning. Aristotle defines ethos as a mode of persuasion whose objective is to “inspire trust in his audience” (Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1380, cited in Wikipedia, “ethos”).

²⁶² The definition of historicity can be read in point 1.1.1, “Open horizon”.

²⁶³ « Le propre de l'éthique comme composante de la vie sociale est, par construction, ce qui ne relève pas du moral, comme composante concurrente et alternative de la vie sociale. » (Lévy, 2013a, p. 38).

restriction of validity of ethics to particular regions, epochs, groups.²⁶⁴ Ethics imply abandoning the contradictions of a moral dispositive that accepts exceptions to the exhaustive applicability of principles, namely the rescission of principles outside communities (p. 36). The universal/singular dialogue mobilises cultural productions with vocation of revealing the interrelatedness of each part with the social whole while identifying the stakes of each concrete problem (p. 38):

« Plus on se rapproche des enjeux concrets, plus on rend possible une approche fondamentale, c'est-à-dire cohérente, libérée des antinomies scolastiques et intégratrice de matériaux empiriques passés, présents et à venir. C'est donc le résultat inverse de la vision dualiste habituelle, qui suppose de décliner le général en particulier, acceptant quelques pertes de substance au passage, le particulier impliquant inévitablement une dégradation du général.... Le début de ce parcours nous indique déjà que, plus on se tient précisément au contact de situations du monde contemporain dans lesquels se jouent des questions de valeurs, plus on se donne les moyens de proposer un cadre de pensée applicable à d'autres situations. C'est le couple de complémentaires singulier/universel qui est alors mobilisé. » (Lévy, 2013, p. 38).

In this dissertation we argue that the intellectual inventions of theories of justice and the social science of space can both be useful in testing the dynamic inclusiveness of the other in society as a whole that is, testing ethics *tout-court*. Theories of justice are resources of explicitness that a society can use to define its project of habitat. Space is a resource for the pragmatic advancement of ethics as the substantive plane where universal principles are discussed, chosen, and concretised. The method universal/singular links ethics and knowledge at the root of a joint development of justice and social science. In this reading, the better a theory's response to the tests of singular/universal, the more it enables society to discuss its political problems. What is at stake is the encounter between political philosophy and social science in an epistemology of realist constructivism.²⁶⁵ Like Boltanski and Thévenot, we consider that social science shares with political philosophy the pursuit, in some form, of collective ordered coexistence of individual pluralism (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, pp. 28–30):

“Because each of these disciplines [economy and sociology] seeks to formulate laws according to which human beings enter into relationships, whether they come to terms in an expression of collective will or negotiate their acquisitive desires in a marketplace, each relies on a rule for reaching agreement (on collective identity or market goods); each refers to a universal form that extends beyond the idiosyncratic characteristics of particular persons. Our effort to bring to light the political metaphysics underlying both economics and sociology are complicated by the break with philosophy that allowed each of these fields to be constituted as a scientific discipline. Nevertheless, we should like to suggest that each one is a product of the political philosophy that served as its matrix and in which the underlying metaphysics is clearly discernible.” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 29).

The fields of political philosophy and social science can reconnect after the epistemic rupture that has been necessary to the foundation of the latter as a scientific demarche. In assessing the potential contribution of erudite discourses of justice to ethics, in particular through the practise of spatial justice, we go a step further and assume that theories of justice also imply a model of the social world, even if that is not always explicit. It is by investigating that model, albeit in an approximate manner, that we try to seize the import of justice theories for our scientific demarche and its potential appropriation by society. Lévy has initiated this path, exploring the compatibility between the individual and society in Spinoza and Kant and how they inaugurate an epoch of ethics in the erudite formulations of the ethos. Ricœur's work appears as the most developed formulation of morality without, however, abandoning that period. We now turn to the review of these ideas.

²⁶⁴ « *Universaliste/particulariste* : peut-on proposer des énoncés valables pour tous les humains ou reconnaître que ceux-ci ne valent que pour un groupe, une époque, une région particulières ? » (Lévy, 2013a, p. 20). This couple is presented as part of the project of dissolution of the unproductive aspects of the antinomy.

²⁶⁵ See definition in section a. of the introduction of the thesis, “Realist constructivism for a society of actors”.

4.1.1 Morality and ethics, two epochs in the historicity of the ethos

Lévy mobilises the thought of Spinoza (1632–1677), Kant (1724–1804), and Ricœur (1913–2005) in the proposition of the découpage moral/ethics as the two moments in the history of the ethos (Lévy, 2013, p. 37).²⁶⁶ The author reads the *apport* of Spinoza as the removal of “grand philosophical questions” from metaphysics to place them in the realm of empirical observation and theoretical construction (p. 24). Spinoza observed that the interest of the whole and that of the part can be compatible in the human world, where cooperation profits each member of the group (p. 23). Anticipating the conception of the individual with a social biography, Spinoza psychologised sentiments and attitudes, making it possible to imagine the production of values by the individuals (p. 24).²⁶⁷ Spinoza proposes articulating the “affective-subjective” (the universe of interpersonal relations) and the “affective-objective” (ethics) through a “horizontal and circular reflexivity” respectful of the need of sentiments but also of the possibility of an intelligent search for explications and principles capable to orient the spirit (p. 24).²⁶⁸ With Kant, Lévy underlines the construction of ethical statements of universal validity. The categorical imperative asserts the idea of ethics as a pragmatic. This pragmatic quality refers to the concrete configuration that demands an ethically guided action, but also to the fact that the universal to be acted is not already there but must be invented. In this context, the categorical imperative mobilises the capacity of man to be reasonable, that is, coherent in the application of his pronouncements to his own actions (p. 26). Kant also introduces individual autonomy in the process of fabricating ethics. Autonomy appears as an equivalent to freedom, but a freedom of all imagined from the outset as a compatibility between each of society’s parts (pp. 25–26).²⁶⁹ Finally, Lévy follows Ricœur in his attempt to differentiate morality from ethics. Lévy interprets *Soi-même comme un autre* (Ricœur, 1990) as an hesitation in the face of a dualist scheme of two powerful entities: a “sovereign Subject, more or less dynamic, on one hand, and the transcendent and immutable pronouncements [énoncés] on the other” (Lévy, 2013, p. 35). Lévy concludes that Ricœur persists on the “exteriority of moral imposition vis-à-vis the construction of ethics,” remaining incompatible with universality (pp. 29–35). It is the opposition between a dogmatic vis-à-vis a contractual understanding of ethics that is at stake (p. 20).²⁷⁰ Accompanied by plural sources of reflexivity and attentive to the circulation between different cultural productions, this ethical project of post-moral construction can concretise an “ethical turn” (pp. 38–39).²⁷¹

²⁶⁶ This text belongs to a manuscript in preparation where the bibliographic sources are not available. From the text we can nevertheless identify the following sources: Spinoza’s *Éthique* (1677), Kant’s *Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?* (1784) and *Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs* (1785), and Ricœur’s *Soi-même comme un autre* (1990).

²⁶⁷ « L’apport de Spinoza est précieux en ce qu’il déplace le processus de production des valeurs au cœur de la subjectivité des individus, c’est-à-dire au cœur du social. La construction d’une riche combinatoire à partir de composants pourtant très simples (corps présent/corps imaginé, joie/tristesse, désir/mémoire, ressemblance/simultanéité) lui permet de placer sur le même plan constructif des sentiments ou des attitudes qui appartiendraient à des mondes distincts dans la théologie morale de son temps, comme la « miséricorde » ou l’envie qui, chez lui, relèvent du même processus (III, 32, Scholium). Cette claire psychologisation du monde pouvait difficilement être acceptable par une tradition philosophique « continentale », qui, même laïcisée, a jusqu’à aujourd’hui défendu bec et ongles l’irréductibilité d’un Sujet propriétaire d’attributs dont il était exclu qu’on tentât d’en rechercher l’origine dans sa propre biographie. » (Lévy, 2013, p. 24).

²⁶⁸ « Au bout du compte, sa démarche conduit Spinoza à relier intrinsèquement les univers affectif/subjectif (le monde des relations interpersonnelles) et affectif/objectif (éthique), ce qu’il fait explicitement dans la quatrième et la cinquième partie du traité, sans s’interdire des prolongements dans le domaine proprement politique. Le cognitif et l’affectif sont eux-mêmes affectés par ce système d’équivalence puisque l’effort de l’esprit pour persévérer dans l’existence n’est rien d’autre que la quête de l’intelligence des choses (IV, 26). Toute la cinquième partie de *l’Éthique* consiste à montrer, en s’opposant à l’approche cartésienne d’un pouvoir direct (via la glande pinéale) de la raison sur les « esprits animaux », comment, par une intelligence respectueuse de la nécessité des sentiments, la raison permet une meilleure maîtrise des affects, notamment en mettant à disposition (V, 10, S ; 20, S) des explications et des principes qui permettent une orientation plus profitable de l’esprit. Ainsi une réflexivité horizontale et circulaire se révèle-t-elle plus efficace que le combat frontal entre la raison et les passions. » (Lévy, 2013, p. 24).

²⁶⁹ « La volonté autonome est synonyme de liberté, mais de la liberté de tous (Kant, 1785 : 54-56), ce qui signifie qu’on ne peut isoler la liberté d’une personne en la confrontant *a posteriori* à celles des autres. On s’écarte donc de la « règle d’or » « Ne fait pas à autrui... ». Ce n’est pas sous la figure de la transaction, généralisée en un univers de réciprocité imposée que se construit l’énoncé éthique, puisque, pour Kant, le contenu de cet énoncé suppose la commune liberté des autres et de moi-même parmi eux. » (Lévy, 2013, p. 26).

²⁷⁰ « *Contractuel/dogmatique* : est-ce la société elle-même qui convient des dispositifs éthiques ou faut-il admettre que, par révélation ou par un acte d’autorité extérieur, ceux-ci doivent lui échapper ? » (Lévy, 2013, 20).

²⁷¹ « Pour toutes ces raisons, il paraît raisonnable d’assumer le projet d’une éthique comme construction post-morale et le tournant éthique comme avènement de cette construction. » (Lévy, 2013, p. 39).

4.1.2 Putting traditional categories of political philosophy in dialogue

There is some violence in treating political philosophy with an interpretative vocabulary originating in social science, perhaps even a risk of over-interpretation. To nuance our ambition, we note that several authors internal to moral and political philosophy have initiated a reconfiguration of the categories traditionally polarising the spectrum: universal, particular, consequential, deontological, teleological, procedural, and substantive.

Van Parijs states that it is difficult to propose one system of classification of the theories of justice. A new author's discourse cannot be easily called *Ralwsienne*, *dowrkinienne*, or *nozickéene* (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 261).²⁷² Such a classification is disturbed by the fact that the authors are not univocal throughout their opus as well as the fact that different schools of thought show considerable internal variation. In this context, Van Parijs considers it useful to engage with existing traditional decoupages of political philosophy. Several couples are presented by this author: perfectionist vs. liberal, consequential versus deontological, *solidariste* versus *propriétariste* and retrospective or genealogical versus prospective theories.²⁷³ In the next section, we briefly explore the teleological, consequential and deontological facets of justice as well as the couple procedural/substantial.

4.1.2.1 Consequential and deontological facets of justice

Deontology vis-à-vis consequentialism traditionally opposes a just action according to the principles whose meaning is independent from the user (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 257; Lévy, 2013, p. 20).²⁷⁴ Consequentialism is associated with the appreciation of choices (often choices taken in the past) with regard to (obtained or expected) results (Pettit, 1996, p. 388). While implying the identification of desirable ends with which to qualify consequences as best or worse, these ends are seen as impartial (pp. 388–389).²⁷⁵ Approaching an action through its objectives or ends is commonly called teleology, in opposition to its effects (Lévy, 2013, p. 20).²⁷⁶ Privileging the specification of the good society has also been contrasted with defining the good through the free initiative of individuals independently from the right (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 224–254).²⁷⁷ In our work we assemble consequences and identification of desirable goods and propose to treat these two terms dialogically vis-à-vis deontology.

²⁷² Terms are kept in French as employed by Van Parijs (1991, p. 261).

²⁷³ The couple *solidariste* versus *propriétariste* is integrated into the comment on libertarian theories. A fourth couple – retrospective or genealogical versus prospective – is recognised by Van Parijs as less useful in procuring clarity in the reading of theories. This couple distinguishes between theories focused on entitlements justified “historically” and theories focused on desirable “end states” of society (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 254–255). In the section dedicated to libertarianism we see that genealogical theories are founded upon a problematic reading of historicity. In any case, Van Parijs clarifies that there is not a neat correspondence between *propriétariste* and genealogical theories, on one hand, and solidaristic and prospective theories, on the other. For example, the Lockean proviso breaches the strict genealogical quality of some forms of libertarianism (pp. 254–255).

²⁷⁴ « ... la distinction entre théories *déontologiques* – l'action bonne consiste dans l'obéissance aux principes, quelles qu'en soient les conséquences – et théories *conséquentialistes* – l'action bonne consiste à produire les meilleures conséquences possible. » (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 257).

Lévy proposes an arrangement of this couple as part of an ensemble of polarities including deontology vis-à-vis virtue. The latter sees “justice” dependent on the qualities of the actor:

« Vertu/déontologie : l'action juste est-elle le résultat des qualités de celui qui la mène ou l'effet de règles ayant leur signification propre indépendamment de celui qui l'applique ? » (Lévy, 2013, p. 20).

Jacques Lévy proposes the dissolution of this dichotomy. We can think that the application of deontological rules in a process demands the ethical mobilisation of the self (an actor's quality, in this sense “a virtue”) without detouring from the *a priori* definition of the “rule”.

²⁷⁵ Philippe Petit treats the definition of consequentialism in relation to the division between the good and the just. The author states that consequentialism implies an evaluation of the best consequences where a theory of the good is necessarily implied. However, the evaluator is neutral in relation to his personal affiliation with the identified good (Pettit, 1996, pp. 388–389). We can see that deontological elements of the principled conduct – neutrality in the identification of ends – are at stake. Petit is preoccupied with a form of neutrality where outcomes are not always collective, which adds more pressure on demands of neutrality than what we find necessary and possible.

²⁷⁶ « *Téléologique/conséquentialiste* : aborde-t-on l'action humaine par ses buts ou par ses effets ? » (Lévy, 2013, p. 20).

²⁷⁷ In covering similar ideas, Van Parijs actually opposes perfectionism to liberalism (rather than teleological or consequential vis-à-vis deontological). Teleological/consequential addresses more explicitly the idea of intentional objectives guiding action. We can propose a distinction

The force of the consequential argument, as so said, relies in the enunciation of universalisable values in such a manner that it commits actors to furthering the valued good for its qualities (rather than the formal extensiveness of a universal rule to the enjoyment of others) (Pettit, 1996, p. 393).²⁷⁸ This claim is situated in a debate between consequentialism and deontology where the latter is seen to obey the inner ethical command in actions of direct control, centred on the self (p. 390).²⁷⁹ In our view, nothing prevents deontology to include indirect power and effective power beyond sociality.²⁸⁰ Deontological elements can regard collective rules, and its focus on duty does not need to reflect an attachment to a personal position in the social world. The Habermas universalisation test, obliging the speakers to search for the unconditional pretension of validity of their statements, implies such a movement in relation to the personal “centre of gravity” of the Kantian universal law (Fortin-Melkevik, 1996, p. 809).²⁸¹

Kant inaugurates deontology by rupturing with a tradition that looked for the “good” outside the will (*volonté* in French) (Berten, 1996, p. 477). The “will” takes the position that Aristotelian ethics attributed to “reasonable desire”. While the latter is determined in the function of ends or “telos”, the will is defined in its relationship to duty and law. Desires are not a satisfactory basis for defining the good for they are many and they vary with individuals and remain attached to “empirical motivations”. In Kantian ethics, the “conscience of duty implies liberty in the determination of will by reason” (p. 477). Deontology brings to the fore a conscience of limits in the forms of rules, laws, prohibitions, limitations (p. 478). It fixes rights, which are *a priori* constraints on social choice, restricting certain possibilities (p. 477).²⁸² Berten notes that there is no reason why observing these rights would exclude instrumental links with desirable consequences (p. 477). The justification of deontological constraints welcomes information of associated outcomes (p. 481).²⁸³ We can then see that deontology does not need to be decoupled from effects. Indeed the

between teleology and consequentialism, by attaching the former to objectives founded upon existing norms and consequentialism to evolving reflexivity.

²⁷⁸ Pettit comments that the universalisation of judgment in deontology does not imply valuing the same thing, just accepting symmetric demands of others on the same terms. In the view of consequentialists, deontology supposes the possibility of enjoying justice independently from others (Pettit, 1996, p. 390). Consequentialism, on the other hand, is seen to face the challenge of justifying what characteristics make an option preferable, accepting that the universalisation is based on the desirability of such qualities, not on the formal obligation of extensiveness to other (p. 391):

« Supposons que vous agissiez pour le bien-être de vos enfants, et moi pour le bien-être des miens. Dans ce cas, il est tout-à-fait possible que nous obtenions un moins bon résultat collectif à l’égard de nos enfants que si nous agissons chacun pour le bien-être de tous. Mais il n’en sera pas ainsi si nous agissons avant tout en fonction de la considération, neutre par rapport à l’agent, selon laquelle il faut défendre le bien-être des enfants. » (Pettit, 1996, p. 393).

²⁷⁹ « L’option juste est déterminée par ce que l’agent doit à lui-même, ce qu’il doit à ceux qui dépendent de lui, aux personnes avec lesquelles il interagit ... Cela n’a rien à voir avec le bien du monde, envisagé dans une perspective plus indépendante de l’agent. » (Pettit, 1996, pp. 389–390).

²⁸⁰ With regard to the distinction between powers of direct control, indirect control, and effective power, we can read:

“Many of the freedoms that we exercise in society work through some process other than direct control.... The idea of effective freedom can be extended to more complex cases of societal arrangements, for example where the civic authorities looking after regional epidemiology arrange to eliminate local epidemics (what the people, it is known, want). The idea of effectiveness would apply to the group and its members, and effective freedom here takes a social – or collaborative – form, but it is still a case of effectiveness without any individual having any specific control over the societal decision.” (Sen, 2010, pp. 302–303).

²⁸¹ « Pour Habermas, comme pour Kant, le but de la théorie morale est d’établir un principe de base pour la délibération morale et pour le jugement à fin d’établir la validité des normes. Cependant, l’orientation dialogique de l’éthique de la discussion permet, d’une part, que la détermination de l’impératif catégorique soit validée dans une discussion argumentative et empêche, de l’autre part, que l’examen de la maxime se fasse sur une base de délibération privée.... Au lieu d’imposer à tous les autres une maxime dont je veux qu’elle soit une loi universelle, je dois soumettre ma maxime à tous les autres afin d’examiner par la discussion sa prétention à l’universalité. Ainsi s’opère un glissement : le centre de gravité ne réside plus dans ce que chacun souhaite faire valoir, sans être contredit, comme étant une loi universelle, mais dans ce que tous peuvent unanimement reconnaître comme une norme universelle » (Fortin-Melkevik, 1996, pp. 809–810) The author cites Habermas, J. (1986) *Morale et communication*. Paris: Éditions du Cerf. p.88.

²⁸² Berten cites Sen, A. (1993) « Les droits et la question de l’agent », in *Éthique et Économie*, Paris: Puf. p.117–158.

²⁸³ This information is a part of the solution to the problem of justifying deontological rules:

« Les droits eux-mêmes ont besoin d’être justifiés d’une certaine manière, et comment faire autrement qu’en faisant appel aux intérêts humains que leur reconnaissance promeut et protège ? » (Berten, 1996, p. 479) ; « De façon plus générale, la question d’un « fondement absolu » de l’éthique est cruciale pour un déontologisme qui se veut lui aussi absolu mais est aujourd’hui, comme toutes les questions de fondement, problématique. » (p. 481)

consequentialists/deontologists' presumption that rules commanding duty are unrelated to the effects of actions in the world bears little connection with the way in which contemporary societies debate on ethical issues (for instance, climate change) (Berten, 1996, p. 477; Pettit, 1996, pp. 389–390).

4.1.2.2 Procedural and substantive

Berten underlines that universalism and abstraction – provided they are not founded upon “natural law” – are the qualities that enable deontological principles to participate in pragmatics of deliberation (1996, p. 481).²⁸⁴ We will develop the approaches of Rawls and Sen, but we can use the contribution of Habermas to explicate the relationship between substantive and procedural elements of theories.²⁸⁵ Proceduralism emphasises on the “dispositive”, enabling the construction of ethical pronouncements by the interested parties, while the substantive is customarily seen to define ethical statements before debate (Lévy, 2013, p. 20).²⁸⁶ Habermas deontological principles are universal, but their contents are made substantive through an argumentative praxis developed in common with others.²⁸⁷ Taking into consideration the ensemble of contexts that give meaning to our actions does not oppose universal demands (Berten, 1996, p. 483). The room made for context requires procedures where the principle of universalisation is used in an inclusive pragmatic that constructs ethical statements while treating substantive matters.²⁸⁸ The Habermasian theory of communication seeks to “articulate the logics of the lived world and the system, of the good and of the just” (Fortin-Melkevik, 1996, p. 810).²⁸⁹

« L'éthique de la discussion de Habermas vise à dépasser l'opposition entre l'universalisme abstrait et le relativisme des éthiques contemporaines. Il prend la défense d'une théorie éthique cognitiviste contre le décisionnisme et l'émotivisme, d'une approche déontologique contre les éthiques substantielles, et, d'une approche universaliste contre le relativisme. » (Fortin-Melkevik, 1996, p. 809).²⁹⁰

In the first quote Berten cites T. M. Scanlon (1988), « Rights, Goals and Fairness » in *Consequentialism and its Critics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 74–92. The problem of contemporary justifications based on absolute fundamentals makes reference to J. Ferry (1994), “Philosophie de la communication”, vol.1. Paris: Éditions du Cerf.

²⁸⁴ Berten responds to three critiques addressed to deontology: formalism, that is, the idea that the principle of universalisation is not susceptible to offering concrete duties; excessive abstraction to guide action; and excessive inflexibility to a specific case (Berten, 1996, p. 481).

²⁸⁵ The Francophone literature opposes “the procedural” to “the substantial” (*substantiel* in French), but in Anglophone literature the latter appears as “substantive”. The meaning of “substantive” includes the juridical seme “pertaining to the rules of right which courts are called on to apply, as distinguished from rules of procedure.” It also shares the ordinary sense of “possessing substance; having practical importance, value, or effect” (Substantive, 2016).

²⁸⁶ « *Substantiel/procédural* : faut-il exprimer les énoncés éthiques avant tout débat ou mettre en place un dispositif permettant leur construction progressive par les intéressés ? » (Lévy, 2013, p. 20).

²⁸⁷ « L'éthique habermassienne est clairement déontologique : les normes morales sont des principes contraignantes, des obligations qui s'adressent aux individus de façon stricte. Mais le sens du principe morale n'est pas un absolu donné, il s'explique au contraire « à partir du contenu des inévitables présuppositions d'une praxis argumentative qui ne peut être menée à bien qu'en commun avec d'autres. » (Habermas, 1992, p.95) » (Berten, 1996, p. 482).

Habermas further specifies that the contexts taken in the elaboration of such principles – based on the conceptions of the good life – have to be diverse. Berten makes reference to Habermas J. (1992) *De l'éthique de la discussion*. Paris. Éditions du Cerf.

²⁸⁸ We can also observe that the principle of universalisation of Habermas comprehends both deontological and consequential views:

« Toute norme valide doit satisfaire la condition selon laquelle toutes les personnes concernés peuvent accepter les conséquences et les effets secondaires que (de manière prévisible) le fait que la norme a été *universellement* observée peut avoir sur la satisfaction des intérêts de *tout un chacun* (et les préférer aux répercussions des autres possibilités connues de règlement » (Berten, 1996, p. 482).

Berten cites Habermas (1986) in *Morale et communication*. Paris: Éditions du Cerf. pp.86-87.

²⁸⁹ « Par contre autres détracteurs de l'éthique de la discussion reprochent à Habermas de creuser un fossé infranchissable entre les principes valides et les contextes réels d'action ; or, un tel reproche néglige le sens même de sa théorie de la communication qui cherche précisément à articuler les logiques du monde vécu et du système, du bien et du juste. » (Fortin-Melkevik, 1996, p. 810).

²⁹⁰ We can see that Fortin-Melkevik opposes the substantive to the deontological. We propose to reconfigure the contextual proceduralism of Habermas to include substantive elements.

The ethics of discussion of Habermas is thus a central reference in the bringing together of universal principles and empirical singularity.²⁹¹ Proceduralism does not impede arriving at substantive definitions of rules. Universal concepts are useful in constructing concrete ethical statements.

4.1.3 The *sociétalité* of erudite discourses on justice

In the three sections that follow, we take a closer look into the contributions from the erudite justice thought to the fabrication of ethics.²⁹² We revisit a selection of theories of political and moral philosophy. The file rouge of this review is a question of empirical pertinence: how can each of the theories support society in the ethical turn through a continuous political endeavour? This is an englobing question that includes other interrogations. How to define deontological guidance when de-centring from one's point of view as an inhabitant might not be the pre-requisite to identify injustice? How to take note of the ethical reasoning involved in assessing justice as co-production between all actors of society? This focus on pertinence has a direct applicability in our research. We need a spectrum of ideas with which to interpret – and put in dialogue – the appeals and claims found in ordinary discourses on justice and injustice in the city.²⁹³ Coherence also demands that we identify theoretical incompatibilities between different currents of thought before they are put in contact with space.²⁹⁴ This is also a lesson we can learn from other attempts at importing theories of justice into urbanism.²⁹⁵

The universe of justice theories results from a continuous history of intense debate animated by disagreement. In some cases, debate leads to refinement of arguments or their dialogical integration. In other cases, the opposition remains. To trace the history of this dynamic is beyond the scope of this text. But some form of intelligibility on the grand lines of this polarised spectrum is necessary. For this purpose, we try to investigate the *sociétalité* of justice discourses. Evaluating the *sociétalité* of justice discourses is a project for a comprehensive research that cannot be fully developed here. Detecting a level of *sociétalité* in political philosophy can resort to the definition of society delivered explicitly, or derived from the implications of a theory's statements. A fine interpretation would require scrutiny of the original texts with respect to the presence of the ensemble of themes of *sociétalité* that we are working with (dimensional production, actors, objects, environments, pragmatics, and horizon). It can also follow the communicative tension, that is, the way in which critics have interpreted the concept of society in their predecessors and their responses to identified limitations. This literature review acknowledges this intentionality without having that ambition of such an exhaustive demarche.²⁹⁶

²⁹¹ In a brief note, Fortin-Melkevik summarises the Habermas method based on three theoretical orientations: theory of communicative action, transcendental pragmatic, and procedural philosophy (1996, p. 809). It would have been interesting to compare the communication theory of Habermas (Fortin-Melkevik calls it “théorie communicationnelle de la signification”) with the linguistic basis of interpretative semantics that have supported the analysis of our corpus. More globally, we recognise that it is a limit of this work not to explore the contribution of Habermas more deeply. This choice reflects the particular history of the thesis within conditions of feasibility, as presented in point 6.5.4.3, “1.5.4.3 Literature review of theories of justice”.

²⁹² Not all theories are of justice, but we accept this simplification as indicated in the Introduction of this work. Given the breath of contents at stake, we structure this review with different degrees of depth.

²⁹³ It should be noticed that the polarisation of existing justice theories on the basis of their *sociétalité*, while deducible from the content of the theories, was a result of an inductive process. It was the organisation of the empirical material (the interviews) per degree of *sociétalité* and its attachment to a main theoretical resonance that produced this structure of the literature. It is the synchronism of this manuscript – and its economy – that enables the presentation of this review in the first part of the thesis, prior to the empirical results that influenced its construction.

²⁹⁴ Consistency (Kuhn, 1977) or internal coherence (Lévy, 1999a, pp. 31–34) is here translated as the alignment of the implications of a theory with its own conceptions. We find this line of exploration of justice theories in Van Parijs (1991). We will see that libertarians and Marxists fail this test, but overall our focus is more on pertinence than coherence.

²⁹⁵ In particular, the difficulties raised by Susan Fainstein's import conflicting views of justice theory into urbanism, as presented in point 5.2.4.2 of chapter 5, “A non-polarised spectrum of the ethos”.

²⁹⁶ Following the thesis exam, I am currently in dialogue with Professor Erik Schokkaert to further develop this project.

In our reading of the *soci t alit * of theories of justices concepts such as deontological elements, universals of justice, comprehensive consequences are seen as qualifiers of internal components of theories of justice.

Concepts	Universal	Particular	Consequential	Deontological	Teleological	Procedural	Substantive
Retained seme	Meaning of ethical objects independent from user	Meaning of ethical objects dependent from user	Consideration of effects	Consideration of ethical constraints	Consideration of desirable goods	Social construction of values	Empirical pertinence of ethic

Table 4 Internal components to theories of justice, retained "semes".²⁹⁷

4.1.3.1 Dimensional production

Existing theories are not organised in the function of a paradigm of a multi-dimensional society. However, some insight can be apprehended through the theory/empirics relationship established by these constructions. Theories of justice propose ways to identify injustice and justice in empirical contexts, through the definition of universal concepts, substantive ideas, deontological guidance, or prospecting consequences. The way in which a theory constructs a relationship between these materials and the substantiveness of reality is central to the internal coherence of a theory. Noting this relationship is informative on the potential of a theory for being appropriated by society in the ethical production of goods across the multiple dimensions of society and thus used as a model for spatial justice.

4.1.3.2 Components of society: actors, objects, environments

In assessing existing theories of justice, it is possible to talk of their accuracy and scope.²⁹⁸ Accuracy translates the ability of a theory to think the *enjeux* of its singular applications while scope indicates the reach of problems that a theory can treat without entering in contradiction or finding the need to transform its characteristic features. The different approaches to political philosophy imagine different ways of increasing justice through the role attributed to actors, environments, and social objects. The model of society underpinning philosophical construction is not explicit in all the reviewed authors, but it is a feasible path for reconstructing their degree of acknowledgment of the complexity of the social and, in particular, the components of society. Here, we follow Jacques L vy's proposition to revisit the universe of the ethos from the angle of compatibility between the individual and society (L vy, 2013, p. 36; L vy, 1994, p. 143).²⁹⁹ This reconstruction is tentative (see synthesis in section 4.1.5).

²⁹⁷ For the definition of seme, see section 6.2.3, "Textometry, technique of corpus exploration", in chapter 6.

²⁹⁸ As we are operating a form of theory choice, it is possible to think of Kuhn's criteria (1977). Kuhn thinks of hard sciences and scientific objects relating to bio-physical realities, but we can, at least approximately, extend his criteria of theory choice to our domain: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. Accuracy translates the relation of truth that the theory establishes with observable empirical facts, that is, it assures that the attachment of the theory to the empirical world that it makes intelligible; consistency relates to the theory being internally coherent as well as consistent with accepted theories applicable to related aspects; scope regards the capacity of a broad theory to extend beyond the phenomena it was initially designed to explain; simplicity reflects the theory's ability to bring order to elements that would otherwise be isolated and confused; fruitfulness promises new findings or imaginaries in the construction of the social.

²⁹⁹ « Dans une strat gie d'action au sein d'un syst me capable de produire des jeux   somme positive, la coop ration (donc le « respect d'autrui ») peut  tre un bon moyen de servir ses propres int r ts. D'o  le d passement de la contradiction morale/int r t par une  thique (Lipovetsky, 1992)   la fois individualiste dans son horizon et soci tale dans son d roulement.... On peut souligner que les mutations de nos soci t s exercent un double effet sur ce rapport [individu-soci t ] : d'une part celui de promouvoir la cr ation individuelle comme principale activit  productive et de valoriser les productions syst miques impliquant la soci t  tout enti re ; d'autre part, par suite de la globalisation (mondialisation et temps long) celui de rapprocher l'universalisme abstrait de la morale et l'universalit  concr te de l'action. Tout cela contribue   rouvrir le chantier de l' thique. » (L vy, 1994, p. 143).

4.1.3.3 Pragmatics of justice: the political function of society and deontological components

The recognition of the political function of society (institutional or not) is fundamental for a theory to be placed in an epoch of ethics, recognising the discussable quality of values. The proposition of positive deontological elements is the specific justice translation of the necessity of an ongoing fabrication of ethics, articulating the universal and the singular of concrete stakes. We will observe that the recognition and valorisation of political processes does not always translate into useful theoretical guidance, which is why we do not conflate the political function and deontological elements in the treatment of the theme.

4.1.3.4 Horizon of justice

Deontological elements do not exhaust the necessary elements in the pragmatic of ethics. The horizon of desirability of development requires the ideas of justice such as liberty and equality, their facets and eventual trade-offs, to be clearly identified.³⁰⁰ The relationship of the theory with progress is paramount in the open possibility to articulate these universal materials into singularities. We will see that theories sensitive to the historical social construction of values do not always entail this possibility. An excessive closure of the materials of justice to present day realism – in particular, in substantive theories – can curtail the horizon of justice from its full potential. Both deontological elements (located in pragmatics) and ideas of justice (located in the horizon) are fundamental to thinking open problematics in changing times and locations. We can call these two families of materials (ideas of justice and deontological principles) universals of justice. This expression implies that the usefulness of these concepts to society depends on their substantive translation.

Fruitful justice theories promise increased convergence of society's points of view in a collective horizon of justice.³⁰¹ Antagonistic theories founded on the opposition of social groups are in this regard less promising. We can capture this idea with the concept of reasonableness, defined by Sen as a more exacting deontological demand than rationality, resulting from a process of public reason and inclusiveness of other points of view (Sen, 2010, pp. 195–196).³⁰² Reasonableness requires that there be no internal inconsistencies, but it also promises non-refutability from a variety of perspectives, as long as there is willingness to follow its argument. It defines the just independently from the social position of the speaker.³⁰³ This potential of consensus is pertinent in our attempt to identify frameworks of thought appropriate for society's political endeavour. Sen is the author who has more recently reconstructed the heritage of political theory to an open idea of justice. Not surprisingly, he provides the most complete set of universals of justice. We will use his definitions as a framework with which to read the absent/present elements of the horizons of justice in all the other theories.

4.1.4 Complete, incomplete, and low degrees of *sociétalité* of justice discourses

This exercise results in three different groups of theories, each of which are presented in a separate section of the chapter. The first, reviewing only one theory, exposes the complete *sociétalité* of Amartya Sen's idea of justice (4.2).

The author refers to the work of Gilles Lipovetsky (1992), *Le crépuscule du devoir: l'éthique indolore des nouveaux temps*. Paris: Gallimard.

³⁰⁰ These ideas are developed in section 4.2.4, "Interrelated ideas of equality and freedom".

³⁰¹ Fruitfulness can be seen as the promise to illuminate convergence in ethical construction; it regards the universals of justice. See note on Kuhn's categories in footnote 298 (Kuhn, 1977).

³⁰² See definition of reasonableness and other deontological elements in section 4.2.2 of this chapter, "Deontological demands of public reasoning".

³⁰³ Reasonableness is a deontological demand defined within a theory of justice, but we propose its understanding as a general indicator of the potential convergence of different argumentative positions. In this sense, it can be retroacted upon theories of justice, underlying their capacity to articulate demands of equality and freedom from different social positions without theoretical conflict. A similar argument is present in Van Parijs' reconstruction of the dialogue between Marxists and libertarians (without using the concept of reasonableness). Marxism cannot be reasonably expected to be endorsed by "capitalists", for the difficulties it poses to free transactions, in the same way as libertarianism cannot be endorsed by the poor in as much as it exposes them to a horizon without concerns of increasing their prospects.

This is the main source for our conception of a theory of spatial justice. The second family groups theories with incomplete *sociétalité*, though the reasons of this assessment are varied. We might interpret these theories to be underpinned by a restrictive complexity of the social due to the lack of an open horizon of possibility and desirability, bringing difficulties to the relationship between universals and singularity; or the misrecognition of the political function beyond institutional instances. The same applies to the comprehensiveness of the specifically philosophical materials: the absence of certain materials of justice, such as the ideas of liberty and equality and their multiple facets (denoting a poor accessibility with the heritage of political philosophy), or the absence of clear and strong deontological elements. Despite these limitations, we develop a reconstructive demarche that seeks to rehabilitate the productive elements of each theory (see “Theories of incomplete *sociétalité* in sections 4.3–4.6). The third family assembles theories with very low *sociétalité* (sections 4.7–4.11). A theory of justice capable of apprehending citizens’ claims must go as far as their seeing that possibility. In this sense, discourses which do not conceive of the political function or have a highly defective horizon of justice are less ambitious than what contemporary societies demand and, we argue, less promising for the pragmatics of spatial justice.

4.1.5 A synthesis of the spectrum of the ethos

	Authors or theories	Horizon of justice						Pragmatics of justice		Components of society		
		Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom (and personal liberties)	Well-being freedom	Aggregative goods	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
INCOMPLETE SOCIÉTALITÉ	C. S.											
	Sen											
	Rawls											
	Walzer											
	Taylor											
UNVIABLE SOCIÉTALITÉ	Young											
	Utilitarianism											
	Marxism											
	Libertarianism											
	Desert-based theories											
	Morality centred on charity											

Table 5 Elements of the horizon, pragmatics and components of society in ten coordinates of ethos. (Darker grey indicates central elements, explicit or with low level of reconstruction, lighter tone indicates secondary, ambiguous or highly reconstructed elements, white indicates absent elements of a theory).

Theory of complete *sociétalité*

4.2 The complete *sociétalité* of Amartya Sen's idea of justice

Amartya Sen's (2010) *The Idea of Justice* can be described as a worldly approach to justice in the dual sense that it is based on our world's injustices and it is global in scope, both in its method of construction and in the applicability of its propositions. Central to this pursuit is the role of reasoning, in the steps of the European Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (p. 5) and non-western philosophy from early and classical Indian jurisprudence (pp. xiv, xv) to Mohandas Gandhi (p. 210). We can hypothesise that one of the methodological strengths of Sen's work is the way in which he expands ethical sensitivity to Asian thought, beyond Rawlsian influence of western democratic tradition (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 26).

Earlier work from Sen on the capability approach has been considered as a normative framework, rather than a theory of justice (Robeyns, 2005; 2013).³⁰⁴ In the context of the social science of space, Sen offers a theory in the sense of a scientific production of clear statements and their *mode d'emploi*, helping the users to make intelligible the rational and the non-rational dimension of men as well as non-scientific rationalities (Lévy, 1999a, p. 46). Sen's theory of justice gives support to society's own production of justice in the identification of what the direction to increasing justice can be. The theory provides a transcendental horizon and pragmatics of justice, but it does not specify how these conditions of possibility are to be operated in detail.³⁰⁵

4.2.1 The universal/singular as the tension in theory/empirics

This openness can be better understood by reading the theory not only as a prescription for dedicated pragmatics of justice anchored in policy-making but also as a democratisation of the production of justice by all members of society. In this sense, the theory describes how society can co-produce justice in the dynamic interrelation of objects, environments, and actors. If political democratic functioning is central to this societal inclusiveness in the definition and realisation of justice, deontological elements and substantial looseness are fundamental to meeting the complexity of the social that the actors encounter in the reality of ethical deliberations. This type of theory does not fit well in traditional decoupages of justice thought. The theory is procedural (via the centrality of public debate), and while destined to make substantive translations only in its enacting (for example, in surveying and specifying capabilities for a given problematic), substantive information is a part of the method of its construction. It is deontological (via ideas of objectivity, reasonableness, impartiality) and concerned with the effects of the actions in the world (dialoguing with consequentialism); it is solidaristic and gives importance to responsibility of individual actors; it does not specify the good (non-teleological) but defines tools to identify the just (via the ideas of equality and freedom), which might exclude some ends and desires (it is liberal in the Rawlsian sense). This dialogic relationship is achieved through a specific relation between theory and empirics. We can call this method "universal complexity". The theory defines concepts, ethical universals bearing on content and on processes, but this

³⁰⁴ Ingrid Robeyns defines Sen's capability approach as "a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals about social change in society" (Robeyns, 2005, p. 94). According to Robeyns, the capability approach defines an "evaluative space" that "can serve as an important constituent for a theory of justice but... does not amount to a theory of justice" (p. 96). Robeyns pinpoints Sen's identification of the limitations of capability as the exclusion of aggregative considerations and of procedural components. This identification appears in texts published before "The idea of justice". Robeyns makes reference to Sen, A. (1995) 'Gender inequality and theories of justice', in M. Nussbaum and J. Glover (Eds.), *Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*, Clarendon Press, Oxford and Sen, A. (2004a) 'Elements of a theory of human rights', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 32(4), pp. 315–356). Ingrid Robeyns reiterates that Sen is not designing a full theory of justice in a more recent seminar (Robeyns, 2013).

³⁰⁵ According to Lévy (Lévy, Intervention in Géopoint 2016, 2016), and resonating the Kantian definition (Transcendental, 2016), transcendentalism regards the conditions of possibility of the human experience. The openness of a theory to the substantive auto-determination of society does not impede certain concepts to retain a transcendental quality associated with their universal application. Transcendental is defined here beyond the reduced scope of the conditions of possibility of the just associated with the definition of institutions ("transcendental institutionalism"). For Sen's critique of transcendental institutionalism, see section *Comparative, realisation-focused tradition of justice* in this chapter.

universality does not mean uniform thematic translations nor permanent empirical guidance. The theory proposes interrelated concepts of multiple components, which carry over the productive elements from a dense western and non-western heritage of political philosophy. These concepts also detain the complexity apprehended in the historical accounts of past and present persistent injustices as well as empirical observation of how certain societal arrangements advance justice (in many parts of the world).³⁰⁶ It is this tension between theory and empirical studies that makes the universals of this theory prompt to specific declinations in the reading of singular problematics. Working out the encounter between universals and singularity is not the role of the theory, but of citizens. We argue that Sen's theory is a fruitful source for the challenges that spatial justice theory needs to address. It offers the possibility to think of a broad scope of spatial (urban) problems without entering in contradiction or finding the need to transform its characteristic features. It proposes a framework with which we can read all the arguments of justice of one society (this statement is the result of our empirical exploration), increasing the potential of dialogue between different arguments. This possibility to read different political inclinations has been called "diplomatic" (Robeyns, 2013). Schokkaert also underlines how capability can be used to measure outcomes in different theories of justice (2007, pp. 6–7).³⁰⁷ For these reasons, Sen's work is the preeminent inspiration for our construction of an encounter with space. It is applied in our analysis to read the relationship between singularity of injustices and the rationalities of their justification.

4.2.1.1 Reflexivity of justice, affective and cognitive

Sen identifies a "sense of injustice" as the disturbance that human beings experience in the face of avoidable injustice. The author extensively illustrates how this sense of injustice has been essential in the pursuit of justice in the history of our world (2010, pp. 390–392).³⁰⁸ The integration of emotional reactions of indignation or revolt does not lead Sen to an intuitive approach. Instead, he explores the thoughts of Hume and Smith on the links between emotion and reason, giving the last word to reason (pp. 50–51). *The Idea of Justice* is significantly dedicated to the forms of reasoning involved in the conversion of an emotional signal of injustice into a reasoned and argued claim of justice (pp. viii, 4–5).³⁰⁹ The use of reason in "scrutinising ideology and blind belief" (p. 35) is driven by the reaffirmation of the Enlightenment, in particular Kant's advocacy for human reason.³¹⁰

³⁰⁶ The support of Sen's theory of justice by lessons of empirical experiences is not only illustrated, but explicitly acknowledged by the author (Sen, 2010, p. 354).

³⁰⁷ "The capabilities approach is not a complete theory of justice. Although the writings of people using it have an outspoken egalitarian flavor, in principle it can be integrated in many different theories. One can formulate a concave social welfare function in terms of individual capabilities levels. But functionings can also be the outcome measure used in the theory of equality of opportunity as introduced by Roemer (1998) or in theories of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, forthcoming). It is possible to trade off considerations of well-being or advantage for other dimensions (such as respect for political rights or for property rights). In all these cases, the specific application will depend on the exact content given to the functionings or capabilities themselves, which remains very open. Rather than a theory of justice, the capabilities approach is a proposal for the evaluative space which should be used for policy purposes." (Schokkaert, 2007, pp. 6–7). Erik Schokkaert is referring to Roemer, J. (1998). *Equality of opportunity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and Fleurbaey, M. and Maniquet, F. (forthcoming). *Compensation and responsibility*. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. North-Holland.

³⁰⁸ Indeed, Sen observes that motivational force in the public debate contributes towards major achievements, such as the removal of slavery by Adam Smith, Condorcet, or Mary Wollstonecraft (Sen, 2010, p. 21). Mary Wollstonecraft's plea for improvements in women equity is also extensively used as an illustration of this point (pp. 115, 390–392). The tone of those statements is also read in this passage: "It is fair to assume that Parisians would not have stormed the Bastille, Gandhi would not have challenged the empire in which the sun used not to set, Martin Luther King would not have fought white supremacy in 'the land of the free and the home of the brave', without their sense of manifest injustices that could be overcome. They were not trying to achieve a perfectly just world (even if there were any agreement on what that would be like), but they did want to remove clear injustices to the extent they could." (Sen, *The Idea of Justice*, 2010, p. vii).

³⁰⁹ "A sense of injustice could serve as a signal that moves us, but a signal does demand critical examination, and there has to be some scrutiny of the soundness of a conclusion based mainly on signals." (Sen, 2010, p. viii).

³¹⁰ Sen (Sen, 2010, p. xvii) supports this idea with a citation from the work of Christine Korsgaard:

"Bringing reason to the world becomes the enterprise of morality rather than metaphysics, and the work as well as the hope of humanity." Korsgaard, C. (1996) *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 3.

Using the couples affective/objective and objective/subjective, we can describe the reflexivity of justice as a dynamic triad.³¹¹ It involves the sense of injustice (affective register with varying degrees of objectivity/subjectivity), the confrontation with the descriptive knowledge of the state of affairs provoking such a reaction (cognitive-objective) and the reasoning and valuation choice that synthesises these two instances in the identification of action towards more justice (affective/objective).

4.2.1.2 Comparative, realisation-focused tradition of justice

Arguing for the use of reason (2010, pp. 34–36), Sen does not evoke “certainty in the truth of our conclusion” – which might indeed escape the complexity of truth in politics and ethics – but the need for a disciplined response to demands of objectivity (pp. 39–41).³¹² This and other “demands of justice” address the question of how justice should be advanced (p. 9) and how to choose among alternatives for a lesser unjust society (pp. 6–7). They lead to “ways of judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than aiming only at the characterization of perfectly just societies” (p. ix). This is a departure from the “transcendental institutionalism” or “contractarianism” developed by Thomas Hobbes and Rousseau in, respectively, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. More recent work by Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, David Gauthier, or Robert Nozick (pp. 5, 8) is also commented on by Sen as being excessively focused on defining the “perfectly just” and “getting the institutions right” (pp. 6–7).³¹³ That “arrangement focus”, Sen argues, neglects the role of human behaviour and social interaction in producing “the nature of a society” (p. 6)³¹⁴ and consequently, its degree of justice. Sen addresses two critiques to contractarian thought. The “critique of feasibility” argues against the superiority of one impartial principle of justice after reasoned deliberation (pp. 10–12). Sen holds the possibility of disagreement over the just criteria. He questions the Rawlsian primacy of liberty over equality (pp. 316–317) and makes room for utilitarian, economic egalitarian, labour right theorists, and no-nonsense libertarians as capable of providing arguments that survive scrutiny (p. 15). The “critique of redundancy” deals with the fact that defining the just is not sufficient when considering available choices with multiple dimensions impeding a ranking of proximity to the ideal (p. 16). It is also not necessary to know and fully agree on the perfectly just in order to decide on improvements of justice.

Sen proposes instead that the justice thought should be concerned with “comparisons of societies that already existed or could feasibly emerge” and the retreat of injustice rather than attainment of perfect justice (pp. 7–8). Adam Smith, Jean-Charles Borda, Marquis de Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill are brought together in what Sen calls a “realization-focused” tradition (pp. 91–96). Taking into consideration institutions, behaviour, and other influences in bringing about just outcomes, this “comparative approach” focuses on “actual realizations in the societies involved” (p. 9). The matter of justice theory becomes the forms of reasoning that “count in the assessment of ethical and political concepts such as justice and injustice” (p.

³¹¹ Cognitive/affective is a couple that “distinguishes two types of relation to the world, of actions and of ideality productions” (Lévy, *Cognitif/Affectif*, 2013, p. 191). The affective defines the following of inclinations (which are not restricted to personal ones), while the cognitive implies a distancing practice, constructing a “network of significations as independent as possible from the previous dimension” (p. 191). The couple “objective/subjective” is not equivalent to the cognitive/affective, but combines with its modalities to further discriminate the registers of human action (Lévy, 2013). The subjective assumes the specificity of the subject at the origin of an action or production, while the objective attempts a detachment, as far as possible, from that origin. These definitions show that objectivity is but one of “the figures of lucidity, of *explicitation* or of reflexivity” (p. 730) and not the sole contributor to science. If we associate these four modalities, we obtain four cases, categorising the types (which can be interrelated) of relationship with empirics. Jacques Lévy proposes to see art as a cognitive/subjective demarche, ethics, politics, and law as affective/objective, science and philosophy a cognitive/objective, interpersonal relationships as affective/subjective.

³¹² “The case for reasoned scrutiny lies not in any sure-fire way of getting things right (no such way may exist), but on being as objective as we reasonably can. What lies behind the case for relying on reasoning in making ethical judgements are, I would argue, also the demands of objectivity, and they call for a particular discipline of reasoning.” (Sen, 2010, pp. 40, 41).

³¹³ This does not prevent the author from drawing on the insight brought about by those philosophers, John Rawls in particular.

³¹⁴ Rawls and Kant’s are seen to provide “far-reaching analysis on the requirements of behavioural norms” but the expected perfect compliance with “behavioural norms” that would assure a just society worked from just institutions is counterfactual (Sen, 2010, p. 7).

viii).³¹⁵ In this pursuit, Sen draws on the analytical discipline of “social choice theory”, broadly concerned with “exploring ways and means of basing comparative assessments of social alternatives on the values and priorities of the people involved” (2010, pp. 17, 91; 1999). The social choice theory is defined as “a framework for rational and democratic decision for a group, paying attention to the preferences and interests of all its members,” addressing “the problem of arriving at aggregate assessments based on individual priorities in rather mathematical terms” (2010, p. 91–92). This mobilisation of formal thought within the theory of justice is supported by Sen’s revision of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (1999).³¹⁶ The new openings are based on the interpretation of the problem of impossibility as a positive result. Impossibility is seen by Sen as stemming from the load of restrictions associated with the bearing of ethical concerns. Sen sees that such concerns can be addressed by broadening the basis of evaluation to include the kind of information informal reasoning needs. Sen’s possibility of social choice is sensitive to comparisons of interpersonal advantage and attributes more weight on improving the prospects of those faring poorly in comparison.³¹⁷ The use of social choice theory is not intended as a substitute for social voice, but only as means of exposing to public discussion the issues that arise within the cogency of formal thought (2010, pp. 94, 110–111). In Sen’s words, the “bringing into focus questions that may not have been raised otherwise ... is one of the major uses of social choice theory in trying to clarify the issues involved and in attempting to encourage public discussion on those issues” (p. 314).

4.2.2 Deontological demands of public reasoning

This section of the text interprets *The Idea of Justice* in light of the themes of *soci t alit * presented in the previous chapters. Despite the focus on the comparative tradition, Sen mobilises insight from many contractarians when answering the question of how to protect the just from parochialism, irrationality, and vested interest (2010, p. viii). The proposed response relies on the use of reason, in particular, in the form of public scrutiny (p. xvii).³¹⁸ Sen identifies public reasoning with the practice of democracy and leaves no doubt about the dependency of justice from the political function of society. In this enlarged view, democracy is not defined in institutional terms, with reference to ballots and elections, but in a broader perspective as “government by discussion” (pp. 324, 326). Political participation, dialogue, and public interaction (pp. 324, 326) are weaved with the conditions of a functioning democracy: free speech, pressure for change, information availability, and freedom of dissent (p. 327).³¹⁹ Under these conditions, the pursuit of justice is an exercise of practical reasoning, involving an open level of agreement on what constitutes injustice (pp. 2–3). It is this evaluative exercise which calls for a “framework of public reasoning” (p. 89).³²⁰ The latter employs a system of deontological demands on social choice, anchored on reason as rationality, reasonableness, and impartiality.

³¹⁵ “... determining whether a particular social change would enhance justice (...) is central to making decisions about institutions, behaviour and other determinants of justice, and how these decisions are derived cannot but be crucial to a theory of justice that aims at guiding practical reasoning about what should be done.” (Sen, 2010, p. ix).

³¹⁶ The theorem states the formally impossible coexistence of four “mild-looking” conditions for social choice: “(1) Pareto efficiency, (2) nondictatorship, (3) independence (demanding that social choice over any set of alternatives must depend on preferences only over those alternatives), and (4) unrestricted domain (requiring that social preference must be a complete ordering with full transitivity, and that this must work for every conceivable set of individual preferences).” (Sen, 1999, p. 352).

³¹⁷ Regrettably, I don’t have access to the axiomatic reasoning and mathematical proof of Sen’s developments. It is important to clarify that the proposed developments do not concern the study of social choice through voting (which is a sub-area of social choice theory). It is not clear how this is expected to be translated into substantive terms. Does it mean that priority ought to be given to the preference of the least well-off exactly as it is voiced?

³¹⁸ “Despite the differences between the two traditions of the Enlightenment – the contractarian and the comparative – there are many points of similarity as well. The common features include reliance on reasoning and invoking demands of public discussion.” (Sen, 2010, p. xvii).

³¹⁹ Attributes of a functioning democracy, such as regular elections, opposition parties, basic freedom of speech, and relatively free media, promote development and enhancement in social welfare as reflected in the absence of famines in countries governed by such functioning democracy (Sen, 2010, pp. 342–345). Other important societal realisations where individual liberty is easily perceived are freedom from famine and war or freedom through education. For the interrelation of democracy and protective security, see (Sen, 2010, pp. 348–349).

³²⁰ We interpret the “framework of reasoning” as preconditions of thought that should be present on public debate. The situational cadre of public scrutiny, composed of substantive arguments and its tension to the theoretical concepts is then able to fix some ordering without infringing on the framework’s presupposition of openness.

4.2.2.1 Rationality, reasonableness, and impartiality

Beyond the narrow definition as intelligent pursuit of self-interest,³²¹ “rationality of choice” is understood as “a matter of basing our choices – explicitly or by implication – on reasoning that we can reflectively sustain if we subject them to critical scrutiny” (Sen, 2010, p. 180). In other words, it regards the survival of our objectives, values, and associated behaviour to our own scrutiny (p. 180). Simply put, rationality is the idea of justifying our reasons to ourselves. Reasonable demands are defined as more exacting than rationality:

“While survival to one’s own engaged scrutiny is central to the idea of rationality, taking serious note of critical scrutiny from the perspectives of others must have a significant role in taking us beyond rationality into reasonable behaviour in relation to other people.” (Sen, 2010, 197).

These demands require “willingness to modify our private demands in order to find a basis of justification that others also have reasons to accept” (p. 197).³²² Reasonableness can be defined as what others cannot reasonably reject, that is, the justifiable reasons we may construct having in mind the views of others. In the silage of Rawls, this idea is linked to demands of objectivity and acceptability in a public discussion (p. 42).³²³ It concerns impartiality seen as protection from “variations of personal interests and personal priorities” (pp. 44–46). Impartiality captures similar concerns to Rawlsian objectivity, but follows Adam Smith’s figure of the “impartial spectator” (pp. 44–45).³²⁴ Exposure to the views of others is seen to protect judgement not only from vested interest (bias), but also from “blind and unquestioning belief” (p. 36) (that Sen often calls parochialism (pp. 44–45, 127–130)). “Open impartiality” brings into question the legitimacy and obviousness of currently accepted practices (pp. 125, 131, 134). It requires the inclusion of arguments originating in “enlightened members” beyond the borders of a political territory. This openness asserts justice as a necessary evolving construction and the world as its englobing referent.³²⁵ Non-parochialism imposes listening to the views of others, in particular of those far and distant, and removes the plausibility of a debate within the strict community of direct experience of an injustice.³²⁶ The definition of objectivity is deontological and depends on procedural construction, bringing together the influence of Rawls and Habermas (p. 43).³²⁷ The central idea relies on “being reasonable in taking note of other’s points of view and in welcoming information, which must be among the essential demands of open-minded public dialogue” (p. 43). This specification of exacting deontological requirements does not resolve the “priority problem” between competing claims of justice with a closed system of lexically ordered values of justice. It enables actors to establish such priority in situations.³²⁸

³²¹ This definition is attributed to “Rational Choice Theory” (Sen, 2010, p. 179).

³²² “Indeed, as Thomas Scanlon has persuasively argued, “thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic level, thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject” (Sen, 2010, p. 197) Sen is quoting Scanlon, Thomas (1998). *What we owe to each other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p.5.

³²³ “The first essential is that a conception of objectivity must establish a public framework of thought sufficient for the concept of judgement to apply and for conclusions to be reached on the basis of reason and evidence after discussion and due reflection.” He goes on to argue: ‘To say that a political conviction is objective is to say that there are reasons, specified by a reasonable and mutually recognizable political conception (satisfying those essentials), sufficient to convince all reasonable persons that it is reasonable.’” (Sen, 2010, p. 42). Sen is quoting Rawls, J. (1993) *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 110, 119.

³²⁴ “Public reasoning is clearly an essential feature of objectivity in political and ethical beliefs. If Rawls presents one way of thinking about objectivity in the assessment of justice, Adam Smith’s involving of the impartial spectator provides another” (Sen, 2010, p. 44).

³²⁵ This openness impacts not only the identification of reasonableness, but also of feasibility: “...one of Smith’s major methodological concerns is the need to invoke a wide variety of viewpoints and outlooks based on diverse experiences from far and near, rather than remaining contented with encounters – actual or counterfactual – with others living in the same cultural and social milieu, and with the same kind of experiences, prejudices and convictions about what is reasonable and what is not, and even beliefs about what is feasible and what is not.” (Sen, 2010, pp. 44, 45)

³²⁶ This is a separate argument from the empirical fact that many justice problems are increasingly global in their origin and solution (Sen, 2010, pp. 402–403).

³²⁷ Sen observes that there is no opposition between the definition of deontological rules and the conditions of procedural debate. See definitions in section *Putting traditional categories of political philosophy in dialogue*, presented earlier in this chapter.


³²⁸ Rawls calls the difficulties of assigning weights to competing principles of justice “the priority problem”. The lexical order of Rawls’s two principles is a response to this problem, as we will see in the review of the author 4.3, “The transcendental institutionalism of Rawls, in particular point 4.3.1, “A deontological response to the plurality of valuable ends”.

Objectivity, then, is not defined in terms of correct description of objects. Given the way in which political judgement is not restrained to “factual beliefs” (p. 41),³²⁹ objectivity is compatible with affective relations in (and towards) social reality and it can bring to scrutiny the importance of subjective elements.


4.2.3 Society’s co-production of justice enhancements

Sen sees society as capable of deliberating among alternative choices in the face of a substantive problem. Following this assumption, justice theory not only prescribes the centrality of such a public endeavour, it offers conceptual support for an intelligible discussion on specific topics. But the centrality of the political function is not the only way in which Sen denotes the making of justice by society. The dynamic interrelation of actors, environments, and social objects accounts for justice as a proper social product. Increases of justice, assembling ideality and materiality, are diagonal products traversing all other productive spheres of society. The ideality versant of this product can be apprehended in the plane of the ethos as the progressive values of actors, resulting from their inclusiveness in favourable social environments and societal arrangements. These ideas are synthethises in the diagram below (fig. 3).

³²⁹ Sen underlines the contribution of Putnam in Putnam, Hilary (2004). *Ethics without Ontology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. “But despite some overlap between description and evaluation, ethics cannot be simply a matter of truthful description of specific objects. Rather, as Putnam argues, ‘real ethical questions are a species of practical question, and practical question don’t only involve valuings, they involve a complex mixture of philosophical beliefs, religious beliefs, and factual beliefs as well.’” (Sen, 2010, p. 41). Here, we could also follow Hanna Arendt’s non-coercive view of the relations between truth and political judgement (Arendt, [1961] 2006; d’Entreves, 2014).



CHAPTER 4. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ERUDITE DISCOURSES ON JUSTICE



Three instances help us apprehend the societal co-production of justice enhancements: 1) The individual actor possesses a set of capabilities, the special freedoms of personal liberty and social relations of co-operation with others (both as *means* and *ends*); 2) social environments capture social relations in the co-production of valuable goods. A special variation of this idea is the role of social relations in constructing social and ethical values. The latter participates in the valuation taking place in capability (1) and in regulating interpersonal relations (2); and 3) societal objects regard institutions and societal arrangements across society's dimensions (economic, political, spatial, etc.). The interrelatedness of these layouts supports outcomes of justice across the three instances. Democratic functioning and educational provisions (3) are central illustrations of this enabling quality. They have reinforcing links with all other objects while affecting the actors' capacities and social contact favourable to justice.

The actors' experience of agency freedom and of procedural equality depends of environments and objects (2 and 3). The same applies to the fruition of the particular freedom of accessing social life (a special kind of liberty that might be formulated on collective grounds). Just sociality and just *sociétalité* depend on responsible agency and the special case of reasonable individual choice (1). Individual liberty is, thus, in relation with aggregative (societal) outcomes (3), which are open to individual enjoyment (1) with others (2). Participation in social life requires from society the baseline conditions for its existence (3), including the possibility to deliberate publicly on the substantive declinations of all the universal components enunciated here.

Figure 3 Three components of society in the social enhancement of justice.

4.2.3.1 The individual as an actor of justice: capabilities

We have seen that the focus of realisation of justice theory treats the reasoning necessary to make choices towards the redress of empirical injustices. This approach to justice is interrelated with the “informational space” where such reasoning takes place:

“The need for an accomplishment-based understanding of justice is linked with the argument that justice cannot be indifferent to the lives that people can actually live. The importance of human lives, experiences and realizations cannot be supplanted by information about institutions that exist and the rules that operate.” (Sen, 2010, p. 18).

Capabilities focusing on “the lives that people are able to lead” (p. xi) are the informational basis of Sen’s theory of justice. Capability is a freedom-centred concept, defined as a person’s ability “to do things he or she has reasons to value” (p. 231). The development of the notion of capability emerges in response to the question “equality of what?” in liberal political philosophy (Robeyns, 2005, p. 104). It addresses the limits of resources and well-being in assessing individual advantage and disadvantage as social realisation (Sen, 2010, p. 231).³³⁰ The focus on the freedoms that people actually have requires an inclusive view of human life, which an end result in terms of pleasure or the Gross National Product per capita does not (p. 19). The centrality of freedom also emphasises the actors’ ability to choose what they value and what they do not (p. 232). Importantly, this liberty is not restricted to the pursuit of well-being or ownership of resources (pp. 18–19, 227).

The assessment of justice through capability brings in two important requirements: valuation and responsibility. The identification of a valued capability is subject to reasoning, through which it is scrutinised against bias and costume (pp. 237–238).³³¹ It implies the actor’s use of his power in a responsible way. Sen notes the importance of opportunity of “reasoned assessment”:

“In seeing freedom in terms of power to bring about the outcome one wants with reasoned argument, there is, of course, the underlying question whether the person has had an adequate opportunity to reason about what she really wants. Indeed, the opportunity of reasoned assessment cannot but be an important part of any substantive understanding of freedom.” (Sen, 2010, p. 301 (footnote)).

Capability grasps the fact that “being able to reason... makes us accountable for what we do” (pp. 18–19). Responsibility is the corollary of an “approach to justice that concentrates on substantive freedoms” (Sen, 2001, p. 289). The actor’s responsibility takes the form of duty and other deontological obligations (Sen, 1999, p. 3; Sen, 2001, p. 282),³³² but also of ownership of one’s own well-being. Capability departs from seeing persons “merely as patients to whom benefits will be dispensed by the process of development” (Sen, 2001, p. 289).³³³ This idea can be seen as

³³⁰ Sen criticises happiness and desire fulfilment as follows: “(1) being fully grounded on the mental attitude of the person, and (2) avoiding any direct reference to the person’s own valuation exercise – the mental activity of valuing one kind of life rather than another.” (Sen, 1999, p. 14). Sen calls the former the “physical-condition neglect” and the latter “valuation neglect”. He adds: “Valuing is not the same thing as desiring, and the strength of desire is influenced by considerations of realism in one’s circumstances. Nor is valuing invariably reflected by the amount of pain if the valued object is not obtained.” (Sen, 1999, p. 14). Robeyns adds that Sen also critiques the use of the utilitarian framework for empirical analysis in welfare economics, centred on income information as indicative of well-being and freedom. On the critique on resources metrics, Sen denotes Rawls’s primary goods as means and not ends of development, neglecting human diversity in the achievement of well-being and advantage (Robeyns, 2005, p. 97). “Sen is concerned not only with the information that is included in a normative evaluation, but also with the information that is excluded. The non-utility information that is excluded by utilitarianism could be a person’s additional physical needs due to being physically disabled, but also social or moral issues, such as the principle that men and women should be paid the same wage for the same work. (...) Thus the first strand of normative theories that Sen attacks are those that rely *exclusively* on mental states. This does not mean that Sen thinks that mental states, such as happiness, are unimportant and have no role to play; rather, it is the exclusive reliance on mental states that he rejects.” (Robeyns, 2005, pp. 96, 97).

³³¹ Such reasoning needs to observe the normative conditions specified above, in particular, its publicity.

³³² “As people who live – in a broad sense – together, we cannot escape the thought that the terrible occurrences that we see around us are quintessentially our problems. They are our responsibility – whether or not they are also anyone else’s.” (Sen, 2001, p. 282).

³³³ “An approach to justice that concentrates on substantive freedoms inescapably focuses on the agency and judgement of individuals; they cannot be seen merely as patients to whom benefits will be dispensed by the process of development. Responsible adults must be in charge of their own well-being; it is for them to decide how to use their capabilities.” (Sen, 2001, p. 289).

a broader movement of justice demarcated from a charitable stance (Levy & Lussault, 2003, p. 352), through an altered relationship between recipient and supporter (Lévy, 2012, pp. 138–139; Sen, 2001, p. 283):

“A division of responsibility that places the burden of looking after a person’s interest on another person can lead to the loss of many important things in the form of motivation, involvement and self-knowledge that the person herself may be in a unique position to have. Any affirmation of social responsibility that replaces individual responsibility cannot but be, to varying extents, counterproductive. There is no substitute to individual freedom.” (Sen, 2001, p. 283).

Despite being an approach to the evaluation of societies and social policy (Sen, 2010, p. 233), capability assesses justice with an individual metric (rather than groups) (pp. 244–247). The justification for this conceptual choice partially derives from the failure of an aggregate evaluation to account for the human experience of choice and freedom. The individual unit gives room to the valuation activity and its diversity between persons. It also acknowledges that distinct individuals have disparate capacities to convert existing resources into valued functions.³³⁴ Assessments of justice should not only consider the availability of resources but be sensitive to the contingent “characteristics of the respective people and the environment in which they live – both natural and social” (p. 254). Capabilities consider how these characteristics affect the conversion of “income and other primary goods into characteristics of the good living and into the kind of freedom valued in human life” (p. 254). The individual focus is also advanced as guarantee of equal value attributed to each individual life when the enjoyment of opportunity by each individual might perform independently from the aggregate results for a group (for example, due to gender bias (Sen, 1999, pp. 1–3)).

A further reason evoked against group capabilities concerns the theoretical problems of defining a person’s unique group membership, as individuals belong to many groups in our contemporary societies (Sen, 2010, p. 246). To choose “respective loyalties to different groups” is an important freedom that group capability would not envisage (p. 247).³³⁵ Empirically, Sen emphasises how the intellectual climate of divisiveness of societies into groups based on a single criterion as religious affiliation is at the very basis of much avoidable violence (Sen, 2007, pp. 59–83; 2010, p. 247). This rejection of group metrics cannot be interpreted as “methodological individualism” or a pretence separation of individual capability from society. The measurement of advantage on an individual basis does not imply the separation of the opportunity from society’s global set of dispositions, nor the enjoyment of capability in social isolation. Such focus guarantees equal value attributed to each individual life. Demands of opportunity to participate in social life and cooperation with others are also accommodated: being able to be a part of society plays an architectonic role in the theory.

Capabilities imply listening to the voices of people, taking account of the diversity of ends that reasonable people consider worth pursuing in their lives. Nevertheless, the ends worth pursuing are not, as we have seen, dispensed from reasoning and self-critique. The deontological demands on public reasoning towards societal development apply, first of all, to individual actors in their definition of their own values. We will now turn to the conception of such an exercise as a social practice.

³³⁴ There is a departure from Rawls’s excessive focus on primary goods here and more broadly, from the distribution of means to actual opportunities (Sen, 1999, p. 253): “In the exalted place that Rawls gives to the metric of primary goods there is some general downplaying of the fact that different people, for reasons of personal characteristics, or the influences of physical and social environments, or through relative deprivation (when a person’s absolute advantages depend on her relative standing compared with others), can have widely varying opportunities to convert general resources (like income and wealth) into capabilities – what they can actually or cannot actually do.” (Sen, 1999, p. 261). The information required to assess justice should consider individual capacity to convert available goods into the capability to live well (Sen, 1999, p. 358). Information on how personal and environmental features affect the conversion of resources into achievements requires attention to special needs in handicap and deprivation. In *Commodities and Capabilities*, Sen defines a set of capabilities in mathematical terms in function of personal features, command over commodities, and choice of functions (p. 9).

³³⁵ “Individual human beings with their various plural identities, multiple affiliations and diverse associations are quintessentially social creatures with different types of societal interactions. Proposals to see a person merely as a member of one social group tend to be based on an inadequate understanding of the breath and complexity of any society in the world.” (Sen, 2010, p. 247).

4.2.3.2 Societal objects as enablers of justice

The opportunities (virtual or actualised) with which Sen is concerned are far from being an individual isolated achievement. They depend on societal arrangements and involve the responsibility of society at large.³³⁶ In supporting “multiple interconnected freedoms”, society mobilises institutions acted on by the state, but not exclusively.³³⁷ IN coherence with the interface between freedom and responsibility, society and the state make for the viability of capability development and safeguarding in the form of “a supporting role, rather than one of ready-made delivery” (Sen, 2001, pp. 41–42, 53). Persons remain central actors in this form of co-production:

“The people have to be seen, in this perspective, as being actively involved – given the opportunity – in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs. The state and the society have extensive roles in strengthening and safeguarding human capabilities. This is a supporting role, rather than one of ready-made delivery.” (Sen, 2001, p. 53).

In comparative studies of relative and absolute capability of life expectancy in different regions of the world (China, India, USA, and different zones within those spaces),³³⁸ Sen maintains that “individual capability crucially depends on, among other things, economic, social and political arrangements” (Sen, 2001, pp. 41–53).³³⁹ The societal provisions supporting capability include “economic facilities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security” (Sen, 2001, p. 53; Sen, 2010, pp. 350, 354).³⁴⁰ Sen further advances that such “instrumental rights, opportunities and entitlements have strong interlinkages” (2001, p. 53). For example, expanding basic education can improve the quality of public debates (p. 296). The developmental role performed by these aggregate outcomes depends on institutional layouts, such as democratic systems, legal mechanisms, market structures, educational and health provisions, media and other communication facilities (pp. 38–40, 53)³⁴¹. Within the topic of justice, Sen stresses the impact of democratic institutions, opportunities for public reasoning, and free press in the formation of tolerant values (Sen, 2010, pp. 352–354).³⁴² The actors’ capabilities are part of the broader set of freedoms made viable by those aggregative outcomes.³⁴³ As Sen shows by example, these outcomes, their developmental effects, and the baseline societal configurations that they necessitate, call for a strong empirical study, not just theoretical argument.

4.2.3.3 Environments, tolerant values, and behavioural change

The societal support of individual freedom can also focus on the dynamic between actors and objects through the environment. As we have seen in earlier chapters, social environments are englobing contexts where social objects and the actors meet. Sen points toward the study of how societal realisations influence interpersonal relations and

³³⁶ “But the capabilities that a person does actually have (and not merely theoretically enjoys) depend on the nature of social arrangements, which can be crucial for individual freedoms. And there the state and the society cannot escape responsibility.” (Sen, 2001, p. 288)

³³⁷ “The institutions [providing multiple interconnected freedoms] can incorporate private initiatives as well as public arrangements and also more mixed structured, such as nongovernmental organisations and cooperative entities.” (Sen, 2001, p. 53).

³³⁸ Sen also evokes his study of cases where one could reasonably agree that a reduced presence of poverty and injustice prevail, despite low levels of Gross Internal Product (GIP) (Kerala model) (Sen, 2010, pp. 350–354).

³³⁹ Those studies are used to make the already conveyed point that “the instrumental role of distinct types of freedom [agency and effective opportunity] have to be considered, going well beyond the foundational importance of the overall freedom of individuals” (Sen, 2001, p. 53).

³⁴⁰ The provision of “widespread employment opportunities on which the economic and social viability of people depend” (Sen, 2001, p. 288), or the accessibility to basic schooling and health care.

³⁴¹ “Corresponding to multiple interconnected freedoms, there is the need to develop and support a plurality of institutions, including democratic systems, legal mechanisms, market structures, educational and health provisions, media and other communication facilities and so on” (Sen, 2001, pp. 38–40, 53).

³⁴² Examples are drawn from Indian history in overcoming religious and communal divisiveness.

³⁴³ The instrumental role in avoiding disasters should not blind the argument to the constitutive role of capabilities (Sen, Development as Freedom, 2001, p. 288).

individual conduct (inclusive in the processes that bring about those realisations).³⁴⁴ As a result of empirical studies, the author underlines the importance of circulating information on the viability of alternative behavioural attitudes, particularly, in entrenching unequal social relations and biased costume (Sen, 2001, p. 287).³⁴⁵ Another recurrent example of the actor-environment-object dynamic is the role of women empowerment policy (object) enabling female actors to retroact in society both through sociality (voice in family, social life) and *sociétalité* (public affairs, society's outcomes such as fertility rates)³⁴⁶:

“Also the empowerment of women, through employment opportunities, educational arrangements, property rights, and so on, can give women more freedom to influence the variety of matters such as interfamily division of health care, food and other commodities, and work arrangements as well as fertility rates” (Sen, 2001, p. 289).

The importance of this dynamic emerges clearly with regard to the formation of tolerant values through public debate.³⁴⁷ This debate treats the political function of society as an object and an environment. The practice of valuation advanced by the concept of capability is not one of secluded individuals (Sen, 2010, pp. 244–247)³⁴⁸. If social influence is an important aspect of value formation, the opportunity to be a part of such a collective construction is an important formal democratic right. Conceiving democracy as government by discussion acknowledges the centrality of social influence and advances its liberating role.³⁴⁹ Civil rights and political freedom are special kinds of capabilities essential to the process of development (given the interrelation of reasoned capabilities and public discussion) (Sen, 2001, pp. 288, 291).³⁵⁰ Treating the political function of society as a stable object acknowledges this special capacity. This function is also an actor (as it rearranges other social dimensions) and an environment, denoting the active transformation of values and attitudes that results from discussing with others and welcoming information. Public debate might increase the actor's awareness of social problems and enlarge their conception of what is of one's concern. This consciousness can influence the actor's predisposition to act more respectfully towards others and to engage in public pressure to improve the prospects of others.³⁵¹ Sen traces back such an interaction between public reasoning and behavioural change to Condorcet:

“Condorcet's emphasis on the role of individual and public reasoning on family decisions and social processes is well reflected in the theoretical underpinning of social choice theory as a general approach. Indeed, the basic connection between public reasoning, on the one hand, and the demands of participatory social decisions, on the other, is central not just to the practical challenge of making democracy more effective, but also to the conceptual problem of basing an adequately articulated idea of social justice on the demands of social choice and fairness.” (Sen, 2010, p. 112).

³⁴⁴ The empirical study here looks at the “constitutive role” of social arrangements in development.

³⁴⁵ Relations currently taken for granted in some societies and open to viable transformation are bonded labour or female inequality in interfamily distributions of commodities (Sen, 2001, pp. 112–116).

³⁴⁶ “Our power to intervene with effectiveness and reasoning can be substantially enhanced by the process of development itself. For example, greater female education and women's employment can help reduce fertility rates, which in the long run can reduce the pressure on global warming and the increasing destruction of natural habitats.” (Sen, 2010, p. 249).

³⁴⁷ Permanent societal debate treats the political function of society as an environment and an object.

³⁴⁸ The interpretation of a freedom-based conception of ethics as individualistic – advanced by some communitarians – is here clearly rejected (Bell, 2006). What is at stake is the possibility to take part in the social construction of ethical values, which are necessarily collective. To do so, the social contact with otherness is fundamental, and that is the main reason why communitarians' practices founded upon the normative idea of bordered cultural groups is incoherent with the advocacy of cosmopolitan value formation (that some communitarians endorse).

³⁴⁹ Societal influence can be coercive, as when the values that society seeks to communicate to individuals go against the sound freedom recognised in other parts of the world. Public debate in conditions of open impartiality is, according to Sen, an effective means to assure that societal influence is liberating.

³⁵⁰ “Such processes as participation in political decisions and social choice cannot be seen as being – at best-among the *means* to development (through, say, their contribution to economic growth), but have to be understood as constitutive parts of the *ends* of development in themselves.” (Sen, 2001, p. 291).

³⁵¹ Sen argues that the failures in Indian policies concerning “school education, healthcare, child nutrition, land reform, gender equity show deficiencies in public reasoning and social pressure not just inadequacy in political thinking” (Sen, 2010, p. 349).

This is coherent with the acknowledgement of justice and injustice as a social product, not the enforcement of progressive values by authoritative means of governance:

“The role of public discussion to debate conventional wisdom on both practicalities and valuations can be central to the acknowledgement of injustice. Given the role that public debates and discussions must have in the formation and utilisation of our social values (dealing with competing claims of different principles and criteria), basic civil rights and political freedom are indispensable for the emergence of social values. The choice of social values cannot be settled merely by pronouncements of those in authority who control the levels of government.” (Sen, 2001, p. 287).

4.2.4 Interrelated ideas of equality and freedom

“We have to consider both the freedom of action and the nature of the consequences and outcomes to have an adequate understanding of liberty. The upshot of this discussion is that both equality and liberty must be seen as having several dimensions within their spacious contents. We have reasons to avoid the adoption of some narrow and univocal view of equality or of liberty, ignoring all other concerns that these broad values demand. This plurality has to be a part of a theory of justice, which must be alive to several different considerations that each of these grand ideas – liberty and equality – invokes.” (Sen, 2010, pp. 316–317).

We have seen that Sen’s idea of justice appeals to openness, that is, the absence of a complete ordering between elements of justice, such as equality, liberty, or capability (pp. viii, ix, 295–296). This openness is paralleled by the possibility of plural reasons of justice observing the requirements of reasonableness, impartiality, and objectivity. This plurality might take the form of competitive claims, “each of which survives critical scrutiny, but yields different conclusions” (p. x).³⁵² But it can also prove that the appraisal of injustice is clear, irrespective of the “plurality of argument[s] without agreement on relative merits” (pp. 2–3).³⁵³ Coherently, the author refuses the absolute priority of some elements of justice over others. This is reflected in the capacious and intertwined definitions he provides for the concepts of equality and liberty (pp. 316–317). In the next passages and accompanying diagram (fig. 4), we present the interlinked components of equality and freedom. We also show that the development of liberty and equality are not separable. If empirical choices might imply privileging one over the other, in a given context and time, they are theoretically compatible.

Sen argues that the debate on the importance of equality needs to be substituted by the question “equality of what?”, since all justice theories demand equality in one form or another (pp. 293–294).³⁵⁴ There can be claims of equality in any “dimension”, and there can be conflict in the demands of equality (pp. 293–295). If equality is a broader idea than that of equality of capability, even the latter, central as it is to Sen’s theory, is not the supreme demand of justice (p. 295). We can look more closely at the materials of justice that compose the Senian horizon of justice. Components of capability (well-being freedom and agency-freedom), equality “on other grounds”, procedural equality, aggregative outcomes and personal liberty are central definitions to the remaining literature (as indicated in the synthetic tables opening this chapter) as well as to the exploration of our empirical material.

³⁵² This idea is illustrated in the parabola of the flute. Among three children, who should receive one handmade flute? Should it be the one who made it (entitlement to the fruits of one’s labour, in line with libertarian reason)? Should it be the poorest one (distribution improving the resources of the least well-off as per egalitarian reason)? Or should it be the one who knows how to play it (thus extracting higher enjoyment, in line with utilitarian reason)? (Sen, 2010, pp. 12–15).

³⁵³ “Arbitrary reduction of multiple and potentially conflicting principles to one solitary survivor, guillotining all the other evaluative criteria, is not, in fact, a prerequisite for getting useful and robust conclusions on what should be done” (Sen, 2010, p. 3).

³⁵⁴ “The demand for seeing people as equals (in some important perspective) relates, I would argue, to the normative demand for impartiality, and the related claims of objectivity (...) that is the kind of scrutiny that would be ultimately involved in understanding why each of the pre-eminent theories of justice tends to involve some way of treating persons as equal at some basic level (basic, that is, for the respective theory)” (Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2010, pp. 293, 294).

4.2.4.1 Equality of capability

The equality of capability is a type of equality focused on the substantive opportunities that individuals are able to enjoy (Sen, 2010, p. 295). This outcome can be measured either in terms of the choices that people effectively make (realisation aspect) or on the basis of the possibilities of making a choice irrespective of the use of that potential (opportunity aspect) (pp. 295–298). The idea of equality of outcome expresses the idea of measuring advantage at the end of a process, irrespective of the fairness and equity involved in those procedures. These outcomes “fall short in telling us enough about the fairness and equity of the process involved, or about the freedom of citizens to invoke and utilize procedures which are equitable” (p. 296). This focus on equality involves but one aspect of freedom:

“It cannot pay adequate attention to fairness and equity involved in procedures that have relevance to the idea of justice. While the idea of capability has considerable merit in the assessment of the opportunity aspect of freedom, it cannot possibly deal adequately with the process aspect of freedom” (pp. 295–296).

The fact that “capability does not speak in one voice” poses a complementary difficulty to restricting assessments of justice to equality of capability (p. 297).

4.2.4.2 Components of capability: well-being freedom and agency-freedom

The components of capability – well-being freedom and agency-freedom – might not point in the same direction (Sen, 2010, p. 250).³⁵⁵ Well-being freedom defines the effective welfare of individuals, irrespective of how that good state relates to the experience of having one’s values respected. Agency-freedom takes a conceptual note of the fact that not all free choices lead to well-being,³⁵⁶ calling attention to the valuation of the individual (pp. 287–289).³⁵⁷ It is also the corollary of responsibility. In this sense, capability fits into the broader conception of justice as comprehensive outcome. It takes note of the culmination result defined as available choice (freedom as opportunity, which itself is not the same as actualised achievement)³⁵⁸ and also of the nature of the processes that lead to these opportunities (p. 230). The focus on ends demarcates the theory from means-based perspectives (pp. 226, 233–234) and underlines agency-centred concerns (pp. 228–230).

4.2.4.3 Equality on other grounds

Equality on other grounds refers to the demands of “non-egalitarians”, based on the universal extension of a principle to all members of society. For example, equal protection from non-invasiveness of other liberties, such as the fruits of one’s labour (Sen, 2010, pp. 314–315).

³⁵⁵ “Sustaining living standards is not the same thing as sustaining people’s freedom and capability to have – and safeguard – what they value and have reason to attach importance to. Our reason for valuing particular opportunities need not always lie in their contribution to our living standards, or more generally to our own interest.” (Sen, 2010, p. 250). “The distinction is between the local authorities undertaking some policy on the grounds that this is what people want and would, given the option, choose, and the authorities undertaking that policy on the grounds that this would enhance, in the view of the administrators, the welfare of the people in the locality. The second is, of course, a worthy enough reason, but it is not quite the same reason as the first (even though the two arguments have causal connections since considerations of well-being may plausibly influence the choice – or would-be choice – of the people involved). (Sen, 2010, 303).

³⁵⁶ The distinction between fasting and famine is used by the author to illustrate this difference. Fasting expounds the absence of well-being freedom in the presence of agency freedom, while both components of liberty are absent in the subjection to famine.

³⁵⁷ “Agency encompasses all the goals that a person has reasons to adopt, which can inter alia include goals other than the advancement of his or her own well-being.” (Sen, 2010, p. 287); “Taking note of agency achievements or agency freedoms shifts the focus away from seeing a person as just a vehicle of well-being, ignoring the importance of the person’s own judgements and priorities, with which the agency concerns are linked.” (p. 289).

³⁵⁸ The focus on freedom values the possibility of a person to consider his choices irrespective of his actual taking, after that reflection, a particular opportunity in the form of realisation (Sen, 2010, pp. 235–236).

4.2.4.4 Procedural equality

Procedural equality regards “fairness and equity involved in procedures” (Sen, 2010, pp. 295–296). It complements equality of capability in the assessment of comprehensive outcome (pp. 22–23). It responds to the concern of non-discriminatory treatment – fundamental to the idea of impartiality – that leads to the predisposition to treat human beings universally as fundamentally equal beings.

4.2.4.5 Aggregative outcomes

Aggregative outcomes focuses on an overall superior advantage, dealing without interpersonal comparison in the measurement of the enhancements of justice (p. 298).³⁵⁹ This concept introduces the importance of looking into the types of outcomes, which implies that not all increases in capability should weigh similarly.

4.2.4.6 Personal liberty

Personal liberty, in line with Rawlsian heritage, should not be conflated as one opportunity among others. The importance of liberty surpasses the idea of advantage measured by the concept of capability (in absolute and relative terms) (p. 299) (p. 299).³⁶⁰ If the notion of capability accommodates particularistic translations of valued ends (compatible with the deontological demands identified above), liberty is defined as “shared equally by all,” rather than “being demanded for some but not for others” (p. 300).³⁶¹ This understatement of liberty abandons “Nozick’s attempt at seeing liberty in terms of each person’s rights, defined in isolation from each other” and “is not concerned only with the respective actions, but also with what emanates from those choices taken together.” (p. 315). In other words, personal liberty characterises freedom through the interdependence of the actors.

4.2.4.7 A synthesis of the encompassing ideas of freedom and equality

Despite the overlap between the contents of the encompassing ideas of freedom and equality, distinct concepts increase the intelligibility of potential conflicting claims (Sen, 2010, pp. 297–298).³⁶² In Sen’s plural theory of justice, the links between capabilities, equality, and liberty are integrated into a dialogical relationship. Sen repeatedly underlines that this theoretical plurality implies that the choice of the prevailing criteria will result from public scrutiny in specific cases.³⁶³ The problem of priority among the conflicting justice claims is not solved through aprioristic lexical

³⁵⁹ “Equality is itself not the only value with which a theory of justice need be concerned, and it is not even the only subject for which the idea of capability is useful. If we make a simple distinction between aggregative and distributive considerations in social justice, the capability perspective with its pointer to an important way of accessing advantages and disadvantages has implications for *both* aggregative and distributive concerns. For example, an institution or policy may well be defended not on the grounds that it enhances capability equality, but for the reason that it expands the capabilities of all (even if there is no distributional gain).” (Sen, 2010, p. 298).

³⁶⁰ “Liberty is indeed useful, like income and other primary goods, but that is not all that is involved in the importance of liberty, since it touches our lives at a very basic level and it demands that others should respect these deeply personal concerns that everyone tends to have.” (Sen, 2010, p. 299).

³⁶¹ “The exact extent of priority that may be given, in a particular case, to personal liberty would certainly be a good subject for public reasoning, but Rawls’s main success here [in the lexicographic priority on liberty] seems to me to lie in showing why personal liberty has to be given a pre-eminent place in public reasoning in general. His work has helped to generate the understanding that justice in the world in which we live demands a very special concern with liberties that all can share*” In footnote: “*Sharing is very important here, rather liberty being demanded for some but not for others (then ref to Mary Wollstonecraft’s criticism of Edmund Burke’s support of liberty without raising the liberty of slaves.” (Sen, 2010, p. 300)

³⁶² For example, procedural fairness and equity of outcomes might conflict with each other in a given policy; similarly, other demands of justice might dispute improvements in equality, such as the general enhancement of the capabilities of all (Sen, 2010, p. 298) or taking into account “efforts and rewards that should be associated to labour” (p. 297).

³⁶³ Unlike Rawls’s anticipation that the relative importance of different concerns might depend on the different stages of development, Sen observes how investing in some liberties that were historically associated with the latter stages of development can be crucial.

orderings. Disambiguation comes from assessing the type of outcomes of justice that are implied in different arguments and their role in increasing justice in our world.

However, we can hypothesise that an empirical investigation for specific dimensions of society may bring some economy of means in the practical use of the theory. We can ask whether a typology of conflicting claims emerges when this framework is used in the analysis of a specific society in a given time and space. We can also argue the confrontation of arguments with an epistemic model reduce the scope of reasonable alternatives and makes for some priority of arguments. In such cases, the perspective is that of the researcher taking part, as citizen, in public debate. In chapter 5 we argue that social science of space can produce a cognitive-objective model of the social world, offered to deliberations on justice. Social science of space can make a contribution to debating ethics substantively by producing knowledge on the synchronic systemic functioning of space (that is, how spatial societal outcomes are interconnected with the pursuits of spatialities of each part). It can construct prospective objects of ideality and materiality (potentially articulating different scales), put in relation with the historicity of a society's space. The spatial dimension of theory of justice is not only procedural but has a consequential approach, a realisation-focus. Proceduralism and consequential elements entre in dialogue.




Figure 4 Interrelated ideas of equality and freedom.

Theories of incomplete *sociétalité*

4.3 The transcendental institutionalism of Rawls

We have already commented on Sen's departure from Rawls "transcendental institutionalism".³⁶⁴ In this section, we briefly explore the contribution of John Rawls (1921–2002) to the relaunch of political philosophy in the 1970s, noting his critique on utilitarianism and the method of thinking political philosophy advanced in *A theory of justice* (1971/1999)

4.3.1 A deontological response to the plurality of valuable ends

Rawls defines the subject of justice as that of "the basic structure of society" or "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 6). The basic structure of society understood in this distributive manner is seen to influence "from the start" the life prospects of individuals. It is made the "first virtue of society", treating questions on efficiency, coordination, and stability as subsequent (pp. 6–8). For Rawls, justice is an important part – perhaps the most important – of social arrangements. But justice is less encompassing than a social ideal "defining all the virtues of the basic structure, together with their respective weights when they conflict" (p. 9). The author circumscribes the concept of justice as an incomplete element of what a full conception of society would be if it included a "vision of the way in which the aims and purposes of social cooperation are to be understood" (p. 9). This circumscription comes in response to Rawls's expectation of a plurality in valuable ends (p. 10). Neutrality in the face of different conceptions of the good life is, as underlined by Parijs, the defining feature of liberal theories (1991, p. 244).³⁶⁵ This neutrality is formalised in principles which specify the terms of association (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 10) without fully determining its valuable ends. The objective of such principles is to subtract arbitrariness "of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance... in a quest for political and economic advantage" (p. 14) (including the endowments of health and vigour, intelligence, and imagination (p. 54)). To pursue this idea, Rawls attempts "to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant" (p. xviii). Contract doctrine, Rawls argues, has the advantage of conceiving justice as rational choice, subjecting the conceptions of justice to explanation and justification (pp. 14–15).

Rawls argues with intuitionists, such as George Edward Moore (1873–1958) and David Ross (1877–1971)³⁶⁶ who claim that it is not possible to balance conflicting primary ethical principles through the construction of higher order criteria (pp. 30, 35).³⁶⁷ Intuitionists also find it impossible to define unique precepts to govern different situations.³⁶⁸ In contrast, Rawls states the importance of looking for higher order principles (p. 34). The driving ethical concern is to

³⁶⁴ See point 4.2.1.2, "Comparative, realisation-focused tradition of justice".

³⁶⁵ "Une conception libérale en ce sens est une qui s'interdit toute hiérarchisation des diverses conceptions de la vie bonne que l'on peut trouver dans la société ou, du moins, qui accorde un respect égal à toutes celles parmi elles qui sont compatibles avec le respect des autres." (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 244). This feature demarcates liberal from perfectionist theories of the "good life" (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 244).

³⁶⁶ In particular, Rawls (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 30) is addressing the views of these authors in the following works: Moore, G. E. (1903) *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge, The University Press; Prichard, H. A. (1949) *Moral Obligation*. Oxford, The Clarendon Press and Ross, W. D. (1930) *The Right and the Good*. Oxford, The Clarendon Press.

³⁶⁷ "Once we reach a certain level of generality, the intuitionist maintains that there exist no higher-order constructive criteria for determining the proper emphasis for the competing principles of justice." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 30); "Perhaps it would be better if we were to speak of intuitionism in this broad sense as pluralism. Still, a conception of justice can be pluralistic without requiring us to weigh its principles by intuition. It may contain the requisite priority rules." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 31). Note that while intuitionism is pluralistic, it is not in Sen's terms, given that this author emphasises on the use of reason and the criteria of reasonableness.

³⁶⁸ "Common sense intuitionism takes the form of groups of rather specific precepts, each group applying to a particular problem of justice. There is a group of precepts which applies to the question of fair wages, another to that of taxation, still another to punishment, and so on." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 31).

reduce our intuitive judgements' liability to particular interest, social position, costume, or expectation (p. 31).³⁶⁹ Such efforts are to be abandoned, Rawls notes, if they prove that ethical complexity cannot be comprehended in a systematic account (p. 35).

Conditions of fairness are imagined as "restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice, and therefore on these principles themselves" (p. 16). They refer to constraints on individual liberty and simplifications that citizens would consent to. They are defined through the "Original Position", a thought experiment of a hypothetical social contract among rational, cooperating, yet "disinterested", persons.³⁷⁰ In this situation, society members ought to choose among alternative principles those that should guide the design of institutions. To ensure an impartial choice, the consenting parties do not know details about the individual lives they embody, that is, they operate behind a "veil of ignorance" (pp. 118–123). This theoretical solution assumes that individuals are rational beings and possess a sense of justice (p. 11). The latter is expected to vary, as Rawls sees it attached to individuals' diverse "system of ends" (p. 25). In this condition, Rawls argues, different conceptions of justice would converge into one single concept (pp. 39–40). The veil of ignorance not only prevents narrow self-interest. More broadly, it liberates the principles of justice from the influence of "persons' conceptions of their good" in such a way that it can "represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice" (p. 17). This representation implies that systems of ends are not ranked in their value (p. 17). The concept is formalised into two principles of justice:³⁷¹

"First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all;" and second, "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality and opportunity" (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 266).

An important novelty of justice as fairness is its response to the "priority problem", that is, the difficulties of assigning weights to the competing principles of justice. Rawls's solution of two principles in a lexical order challenges utilitarian and intuitionist responses. Utilitarian thought circumvents the problem by assuming a mono-principle theory, systematising all judgements without relying on intuition (p. 36). Intuitionists assert that the use of reason provides no answer to such a problem (p. 36) and Rawls counter-argues that abandoning rationally constructed principles closes the means for rational discussion (p. 37). Rawls considers that a priority rule has to be agreed upon in the original position, because he expects intuitive judgement from different individuals to attribute different weights to different claims (p. 37). Furthermore, the author considers that such a priority derives from the same basis that sustains the content of the principles of justice, that is, expected agreement on equality in liberty and inviolability of human beings. Thus, Rawls advances the priority of equal liberty over the regulation of economic and social inequalities (p. 38). In exposing the priority problem, Rawls chooses to emphasise the object of "justice as fairness" as the setup of a system that procures rational convergence of justice ideas and their relative weights:

"Thus our object should be to formulate a conception of justice which, however much it may call upon intuition, ethical or prudential, tends to make our considered judgments of justice converge." (Rawls, 1971/1999, pp. 39–40).

³⁶⁹ "But not only are our everyday ideas of justice influenced by our own situation, they are also strongly colored by custom and current expectations. And by what criteria are we to judge the justice of custom itself and the legitimacy of these expectations? To reach some measure of understanding and agreement which goes beyond a mere de facto resolution of competing interests and a reliance on existing conventions and established expectations, it is necessary to move to a more general scheme for determining the balance of precepts, or at least for confining it within narrower limits." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 31).

³⁷⁰ "Disinterest" does not mean that individuals are egoistic and animated by values, such as the will of domination, but that they behave with indifference towards the ends of others (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 12). Even if those ends may be opposed, this position would nevertheless allow the parties to comprehend that "everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 13).

³⁷¹ Part (a) of the second principle is named "the difference principle".

4.3.2 Equality and freedom without aggregate outcomes

“Justice as Fairness” can be seen as a deontological critique of utilitarianism (Berten, 1996, pp. 478–479). As Rawls sets out to dismantle the dominance of utilitarianism, he points in tandem the insufficiencies of utilitarianism and of the concept of society that underpins utilitarian thought.³⁷² We can find the premise of the concept of society that inspires the reconstruction of this chapter (together with the empirical material gathered in Porto).³⁷³ In Rawls’s account of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism,³⁷⁴ a rightly ordered society accords to the principle of average utility (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 20). This principle is defined as the “greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it [i.e. to society]” (pp. 13, 20). “The good” is defined as the satisfaction of rational desire and “the right” as the maximisation of such good (pp. 21–22). Through the underlying conceptions of society, Rawls captures three contrasts between justice as fairness and utilitarianism:

“Implicit in the contrasts between classical utilitarianism and justice as fairness is a difference in the underlying conceptions of society. In the one we think of a well-ordered society as a scheme of cooperation for reciprocal advantage regulated by principles which persons would choose in an initial situation that is fair, in the other as the efficient administration of social resources to maximize the satisfaction of the system of desire constructed by the impartial spectator from the many individual systems of desires accepted as given.” (Rawls, 1971/1999, pp. 29–30).

The first contrast is the comprehensiveness of a horizon of justice. Rawls interprets the utilitarian priority of justice as a useful illusion rather than a foundational conviction. In particular, Rawls points out its weakness in guaranteeing “the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons” (p. xii). A true horizon of justice is incompatible with disregarding how the maximised fulfilment of desires is distributed among individuals. Furthermore, justice cannot accept seconding the inviolability of the claims of liberty and right of one person to increase aggregate social welfare:

“Each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice or, as some say, on natural right, which even the welfare of every one else cannot override. Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. The reasoning which balances the gains and losses of different persons as if they were one person is excluded.” (Rawls, 1971/1999, pp. 24–25).

The second contrast lies in how the parts and the whole are articulated in the utilitarian conception of society. Utilitarian thinkers extend to society the “principle of choice for one man” (p. 25). They imagine the decision of an individual regarding his welfare as a balance of satisfaction across present and future times. Accumulation of time in individual life is then made analogous to the accumulation of individuals in society (p. 21). The figure of the impartial spectator appears as the sympathy device capable of organising the many desires of society members into one coherent system (pp. 23–24). Accepting such a conflation, Rawls argues, “is not to take seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals, nor to recognize as the basis of justice that to which men would consent” (pp. 24, 26). The third contrast is apprehended by Rawls as a question of deontological vis-à-vis teleological theories. Utilitarianism is seen as non-deontological, that is, defining the right in total independence from the good and then making justice

³⁷² The presence of a concept of society in utilitarianism is an important achievement. We should note that in the context of its appearance, utilitarianism represented an important attempt to reduce intuition in moral judgements, extracting them from metaphysical and religious criteria (Kymlicka, 2002, pp. 10–52). The demand that the well-being of each society member should be taken into equal consideration is also noted in the review of Charles Taylor’s multiculturalism.

³⁷³ This premise is exposed in section 4.1 of this chapter, in particular point 4.1.3, “The *sociétalité* of erudite discourses on justice”.

³⁷⁴ Rawls refers to the following main sources: Sidgwick, H. (1907) *The Methods of Ethics*, 7th ed.. London; Sidgwick, H. (1883) *Principles of Political Economy*, Book III. London; Pigou, A. C. (1920) *The Economics of Welfare*. London, Macmillan; Sidgwick, H. (1902) *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, 5th ed. London. The first, Rawls indicates, summarizes the development of utilitarian moral theory; the second applies this doctrine to questions of economic and social justice. The last “contains a brief history of the utilitarian tradition.” (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 20).

equivalent to the maximisation of the good (pp. 25–27).³⁷⁵ Contract theory³⁷⁶ is deontological, establishing the priority of the right over the good (p. 27). Rawls states that his doctrine does not take “men’s propensities and inclinations as given,”³⁷⁷ but restricts desires and aspirations to those that respect the boundaries set out in the principles of justice (pp. 27–28). In this manner, it reduces the influence of “the natural facts and contingencies of human life in determining what forms of moral character are to be encouraged in a just society.” (p. 28). The definition of the good restricts both the ends of society that merit a place in justice and the morally worthy forms of character (p. 28).³⁷⁸ In other words, Rawls criticises utilitarianism’s void with regard to the political function (substituted by the technical calculation of utility) and the absence of ethical boundaries (deontology demands).

4.3.3 The role of actors and institutions in the conception of the just

Rawls initiates a dialogical reading of the individual and society.³⁷⁹ The agreement on the principles of justice depends on the conception of the co-production by all of achievements that provide mutual advantage, upon which relies the satisfaction and well-being of each member. The intuitive idea behind Rawls’s formalised system of thought is that men seek cooperation in spite of their different interests and are capable, for such a purpose, of self-imposed restrictions on their liberties. The hypothetical detour chosen by Rawls captures the expected voluntary adoption of obligations and constraints necessary to social life. In Rawls’s idea of society, the articulation of the whole and its parts is formulated as the liberal maximisation of individuals’ possibility to choose and change their life plan upon a background of liberty limited by the “agreed” principles of justice. From this brief account of justice as fairness, we can understand that Rawls envisions the possibility of compatibility between the individual (and other actors) and society as a whole. This compatibility is reflected in the content of the principles of justice – a part of a horizon where increases in equality and liberty are possible. The first principle of “equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all” (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 266) is the exact expression of that possibility. The difference principle adds to the importance of personal liberty the horizon of increased equality, while the second clause of the second principle assures procedural equality. This dialogic reading of the individual and society is restricted to the field of ethics, in the form of convergence of the conceptions of justice into one concept of justice. Rawls chooses to leave more substantive manifestation of such a convergence outside the theory. The device of the original position does not point to a continuous debate on what constitutes the good (beyond the non-infliction on the liberty of all) and leaves it open to the determination of individuals. Despite such an openness, some assumption of goodness supports the idea of converging debate in the original position. These presuppositions form what Rawls calls a “thin theory of the good”:

“...but to establish these principles it is necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the parties’ motives in the original position. Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of concept of right, the theory of good used in arguing for the principles of

³⁷⁵ In the definition of deontology, André Berten notes that Rawls considers utilitarianism as teleological. Teleological theories honour or promote a specific conception of the good – the maximisation of total or average utility in the case of utilitarianism – without restrictions on the means to achieve such results (Berten, 1996, pp. 478–479). Deontology covers an aspect of Rawls’s political liberalism – the absolute demand of respecting fundamental rights and the priority of individual liberty (p. 480) . But it does not imply consecrating individual freedom in the choice of good life in the way that Rawlsian political liberalism does (p. 480).

³⁷⁶ See Sen’s definition of contractarian theory in sub-section 4.2.1.2, “Comparative, realisation-focused, tradition of justice” and Rawls’s elaborations within such doctrine in point 4.3.1, “A deontological response to the plurality of valuable ends”.

³⁷⁷ The author illustrates this restriction of worthy ends with the “pleasure in discriminating against one another” (Rawls, 1999, p. 27).

³⁷⁸ “This priority of the right over the good in justice as fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception. It imposes certain criteria on the design of the basic structure as a whole; these arrangements must not tend to generate propensities and attitudes contrary to the two principles of justice (that is, to certain principles which are given from the first a definite content) and they must insure that just institutions are stable. Thus certain initial bounds are placed upon what is good and what forms of character are morally worthy, and so upon what kinds of persons men should be.” (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 28).

³⁷⁹ The Rawlsian critique on utilitarianism could be reconstructed as one of methodological individualism. With prudence, we can advance that utilitarianism does not recognise society beyond the sum of individuals. Furthermore, it does so without attributing equal weight to each of the members.

justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This account of the good I call the thin theory of the good". (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 348).

Rawls considers that we can expect every human being to rationally desire the development and satisfaction of one's capacities in association with others. This minimum definition of the good lies behind the specifications of "social primary goods": rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the basis of self-respect (p. 54). The openness and autonomy of a person's "life plan" leads justice to focus on the opportunity of attainment of satisfaction, not only on obtaining it per se (pp. 80–81). Rawls thus deposits the chances of justice on institutions. Though they are societal objects, institutions do not cover the full substance of social complexity. Social environments are acknowledged, notably in the effect of families and social milieus in the development of endowments, but they are not a part of the resources of justice.³⁸⁰ We can then consider justice as fairness as a response to the arbitrary aspects of the relationship actor/society, where environments and systemic social objects are not active forces of social transformation. This simplification of the behaviour of persons and the relationship between individuals and society is inconsistent with Rawls's consequentialist focus (pp. 26–27).³⁸¹ These limitations, derived from an insufficiently resolved tension between theory and empirics, are identified and addressed by Amartya Sen. The contemporary rehabilitation of Rawls by Sen can be seen as the substitution of a hypothetical agreement by a realisable one. It also involves extending deontological demands to all the actors involved in the ongoing development of social life. Ethical precepts are not restricted to guiding the setup of institutions, but they orient desirable individual conduct, social behaviour (sociality), and societal arrangements (*sociétalité*).

4.3.4 The continuity of "reflective equilibrium" in empirical problematics

Rawls draws on the contractarian tradition that places justice as a mental capacity (1971/1999, p. 42).³⁸² The test of existing principles of political philosophy against substantive political choices is named by Rawls as "reflective equilibrium". Made of philosophical thought and intuition, we have seen that a substantial knowledge of the world is only indirectly mobilised in the thin theory of the good. To be used by the philosopher and the educated reader, reflective equilibrium simulates society's choice when its members are capable of reasoned judgement and equal moral worth. The objective is to arrive at a conception of justice that matches our ethical sensibility in everyday judgements (p. 41).³⁸³ The point of departure does not assume that "our sense of justice can be adequately characterized by familiar common sense precepts, or derived from the more obvious learning principles" (p. 41). It then proceeds as successive confrontations of ethical intuitions against the principles of justice existing in philosophy's heritage or those proposed by the philosopher. The output of such a method can be either the readjustment of preliminary judgement to meet sound justice principles or the reformulation of principles to respect a restated ethical intuition (p. 43).³⁸⁴ Rawls leaves aside the question of knowing whether citizens would indeed arrive at the same principles. In the face of utilitarian dominance of philosophical tradition and the insufficiency of intuitionist and perfectionist views, reflective equilibrium and the original position are pertinent simplifications of a

³⁸⁰ It should be clarified that Rawls assigns momentous importance to environments in the identification of injustice but the solutions to justice which tend to be formulated under the two principles of justice are dominantly distributive, underplaying the social dynamic that potentiate increases justice. This dynamic has been reviewed in section 4.2.3, "Society's co-production of justice enhancements".

³⁸¹ When contrasting utilitarianism and justice as fairness, Rawls underlines that refusing the teleological basis of the former does not imply neglecting consequences:

"All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy" (Rawls, 1971/1999, pp. 26, 27).

³⁸² "And once we regard the sense of justice as a mental capacity, as involving the exercise of thought, the relevant judgments are those given under conditions favorable for deliberation and judgment in general." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 42).

³⁸³ "A conception of justice characterizes our moral sensibility when the everyday judgments we do make are in accordance with its principles." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 41).

³⁸⁴ "From the standpoint of moral theory, the best account of a person's sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium. As we have seen, this state is one reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception)." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 43).

society's sense of justice, serving as a beginning (pp. 42, 46).³⁸⁵ The conditions of feasibility privilege the point of view of the educated author and his readers:

"I shall not even ask whether the principles that characterize one person's considered judgments are the same as those that characterize another's. I shall take for granted that these principles are either approximately the same for persons whose judgments are in reflective equilibrium, or if not, that their judgments divide along a few main lines represented by the family of traditional doctrines that I shall discuss. (Indeed, one person may find himself torn between opposing conceptions at the same time.) If men's conceptions of justice finally turn out to differ, the ways in which they do so is a matter of first importance. Of course we cannot know how these conceptions vary, or even whether they do, until we have a better account of their structure. And this we now lack, even in the case of one man, or homogeneous group of men. If we can characterize one ((educated) person's sense of justice, we might have a good beginning toward a theory of justice. We may suppose that everyone has in himself the whole form of a moral conception. So for the purposes of this book, the views of the reader and the author are the only ones that count. The opinions of others are used only to clear our own heads." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 44).

This method has been appropriated by other authors as a part of a dynamic ongoing process of investigating the application of theoretical principles of justice to empirical problematics (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 15–27; Bret, 2016).³⁸⁶ Van Parijs restates that intuitions serve to evaluate the results that the application of principles of justice is expected to produce in a confrontation with empirical (prospective) tests.

4.4 The substantive pluralism of Michael Walzer

"Justice is a human construction, and it is doubtful it can be made only one way" (Walzer, 1983, p. 5). This statement is the cornerstone of Walzer's *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*.³⁸⁷ In this work, the author departs with a substantive account of the world (p. xiv) and arrives at a plural conception of equality. The central idea is that society produces a plurality goods, each entailing specific "distributive procedures" (p. 3).³⁸⁸ Different distributive criteria in different spheres are determined by the collective values and meaning associated to the social existence of a good (pp. xv–xvi). Walzer realises that the goods are produced by persons (pp. 6–7)³⁸⁹ and conceives social products as having both materiality and ideality:

³⁸⁵ "In presenting justice as fairness I shall contrast it with utilitarianism. I do this for various reasons, partly as an expository device, partly because the several variants of the utilitarian view have long dominated our philosophical tradition and continue to do so. And this dominance has been maintained despite the persistent misgivings that utilitarianism so easily arouses. The explanation for this peculiar state of affairs lies, I believe, in the fact that no constructive alternative theory has been advanced which has the comparable virtues of clarity and system and which at the same time allays these doubts. Intuitionism is not constructive, perfectionism is unacceptable." (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 46).

³⁸⁶ For example, Van Parijs' « Bref plaidoyer pour la philosophie politique, manière anglo-saxonne » (Van Parijs P. , 1991, pp. 15-27) or Bernard Bret (Bret, 2016).

³⁸⁷ Jacques Lévy raises the question of whether the *Spheres of Justice* can be considered as a theory of justice (2016, Informal conversation). I think that the substantiveness of the theory is stronger than the concepts that it articulates. But spheres, goods, tyranny, distributive principle, complex equality are conceptual tools interconnected to deliver a coherent framework to think about justice and its pursuits. In the perspective delivered by this work, not all elements of the theory call for the same level of endorsement, as is noted in the text. An important argument to see *Spheres of Justice* as a theory is the fact that it has been interpreted as such, at least in a part of the scientific community (Sen, 2010, p. x; Miller, et al., 1995). For example, its tribute to justice is, together with that of Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sander, associated with "variations of values between people in different communities" (Sen, 2010, p. x).

³⁸⁸ "Different political arrangements enforce, and different ideologies justify, different distributions of membership, power, honor, ritual, eminence, divine grace, kinship and love, knowledge, wealth, physical security, work and leisure, rewards and punishments, and a host of goods more narrowly and materially conceived – food, shelter, clothing, transportation, medical care, commodities of every sort, and all the odd things (paintings, rare books, postage stamps) that human beings collect. All this multiplicity of goods is matched by a multiplicity of distributive procedures, agents, and criteria." (Walzer, 1983, p. 3).

³⁸⁹ "People conceive and create goods, which they then distribute among themselves." (Walzer, 1983, p. 6).

“Rather, goods, with their meanings – because of their meanings – are the crucial medium of social relations; they come into people’s minds before they come into their hands; distributions are patterned in accordance with shared conceptions of what the goods are and what they are for.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 7).

Coherently, the focus of equality is not only on the possession of goods but also regards the “complex relation of persons, mediated by the goods we make, share and divide among ourselves” (Walzer, 1992/2006, p. 492). The author extensively discusses the productive facet of these goods. He does not abandon seeing justice as a distributive matter, though he states that such a distribution “has as much to do with being and doing as with having” (Walzer, 1983, p. 3).

4.4.1 Restricting the role of institutional politics in plural just distributions

Walzer’s understanding of political sovereign power makes it “not simply one among the goods that men and women can gain. State power is also the means by which all the different pursuits, including that of power itself, are regulated. Political power is the crucial agency of distributive justice; it guards the boundaries within which every social good is distributed and deployed” (Walzer, 1983, p. 281).³⁹⁰ The blockages on the use of superior political capital are primordial, as they “fix the boundaries of the state and of all the other spheres vis-à-vis sovereign power. We commonly think of the limits in terms of freedom, and not wrongly, but they also have powerful egalitarian effects” (p. 284). Referring to Edmund Burke’s definition of government as the “contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants,”³⁹¹ Walzer extends the understanding of wisdom to include not only that of the ruling class but the “community” as a whole. This expansion involves a common understanding of the “wants” of society and a continuous pragmatic of the social contract:

“Only its culture [of the community as a whole], its character, its common understanding can define the “wants” that are to be provided for. But culture, character, and common understanding are not givens; they don’t operate automatically; at any particular moment, the citizens must argue about the extent of mutual provision. They argue about the meaning of the social contract, the original and reiterated conception of the sphere of security and welfare.” (Walzer M. , 1983, p. 79).

An important aspect of this understanding of state power is the refusal of special knowledge, that is, “Plato’s account of politics as a *techné*, an art or craft similar to, though infinitely more difficult than, the ordinary specializations of social life” (p. 288).³⁹² It is for citizens to jointly determine ends and for politicians to make risks and implications of desirable destinations intelligible. Justice is conceived of as independent from a central plan of the distribution of goods (p. xv). This re-joins Rawls’s critique of the utilitarian efficiency-based view of society, attacking the reduction of politics as *techné*. The route of Walzer is however symmetric to that of Rawls as he places environments as the central *actant* of justice. The argument against the technocratic power is useful for thinking of a transition of justice to an epoch of actors.

4.4.2 Spheres, social dynamic in the co-production of complex equality

The author’s defence of complex equality is supported by a theory of goods, requiring to “map out the entire social world” (Walzer, 1992/2006, p. 496).³⁹³ This theory tries to “understand what it [a good] is, what it means to those to whom it is a good, [so that] we understand how, by whom, and for what reason it ought to be distributed” (Walzer, 1983, p. 9). It opens a *chantier* of empirical investigations into the reasons for distribution in the different spheres

³⁹⁰ The entire construction of Walzer was seen as a restriction to the need of sovereign power (Miller, 1995, p. 14).

³⁹¹ Walzer is citing Edmund Burke i (1910) in *Reflections on the French Revolution*. London. p.57.

³⁹² Walzer refers to the following texts of Plato: *The Republic* I 341-47, IV 488-89, *Georgias*, 503-8; *Protagoras*, 320-28.

³⁹³ “(...) different goods to different companies of men and women for different reasons and in accordance with different procedures. And to get all of this right, or to get it roughly right, is to map out the entire social world. (...) Or, rather, it is to map out a particular social world.” (Walzer, 1992/2006, p. 496).

(pp. 9–10).³⁹⁴ The notion of social sphere is applied to membership, security and welfare, money and commodities, office, hard work, free time, education, kinship and love, divine grace, recognition, and political power. In order to constitute a sphere, Walzer looks into practices – including equivalence and differentiation of human beings – regarding desired products. The author investigates how societies came to recognise a collective interest in questioning those practices. He sketches the historical processes that lead to the separation of a certain good from others with which it was previously confounded. This autonomy is an ongoing process, continuously reiterated as spheres are an open topic for political debate. The goods are of different natures, and the *exposé* is eclectic.³⁹⁵ Some goods are beneficial to society as a whole and demand a collective provision that is equally accessible to all society members (i.e. security and welfare, education, political power, and free time³⁹⁶). Some others are governed by patterns that are just if open to all, but do not demand equality of access, as in the meritocratic spheres of recognition (pp. 250–251) and office (pp. 130–132).³⁹⁷ What brings a sphere together is the production and distribution of a commonly identified desirable good (except for the negative form of hard work (p. 168)). This is so even if there is no consensus on how the desirable good is to be enjoyed by society’s members. The positive valuation of a good is marked by a history of unequal fruition. Walzer calls this asymmetry “tyranny”, defined as the use of superior standing in one of the spheres to gain advantage in a different field, subordinating the members possessing fewer goods.³⁹⁸ We can reconstruct the notion of spheres as a protection from the interference of capitals in other productive spheres (for example, independence of wealth and social status in accessing educational capital). If there is a positive horizon of justice in Walzer’s account, it is that of a society where persons are advantaged and disadvantaged in a variety of measures and no one scores at the bottom of such a composite scale (Walzer, 1995, pp. 291–292; Miller, 1995, p. 12). If the sphere of justice is a defence of equality, it is also an investigation of what it means to be an equal human being – “manifestly alike” – but also different from others (Walzer, 1983, p. xii).³⁹⁹

4.4.2.1 Distributive paradigm and systemic goods: the good of education

This is not the moment to detail the justice reflections attached to each of the sphere. We briefly comment on the sphere of education with the purpose of arguing that despite mobilising a vocabulary of distributive justice, Walzer’s thought on justice can be reconstructed under a paradigm of co-production. The sphere of education illustrates the

³⁹⁴ Miller (the editor of a collective commentary of Walzer’s ideas on pluralism, justice, and equality (Miller et al., 1995)) summarises some of the associations between spheres and the distributive principle: “In the case of medical care, for instance, the distributive criterion is need; in the case of money and commodities, it is free exchange in the market; in the case of education, it is equality at basic level; and capacity to benefit at a higher level.” (Miller, 1995, p. 5).

³⁹⁵ The materials for this construction are examples and illustrations drawn from the history of societies:

“rough sketches, sometimes focused on the agents of distribution, sometimes on the procedures, sometimes on the criteria, sometimes on the use and the meaning of the things we share, divide and exchange. These examples aim to suggest the force of the things themselves or, rather, the force of our conceptions of the things.” (Walzer, 1983, p. xiv).

³⁹⁶ Free time can be seen as an advantage to society and each member as long as it is associated with productivity (Walzer, 1983, pp. 188–189).

³⁹⁷ Recognition regards the free distribution of praise and blame and historically appears when rank societies are questioned (Walzer, 1983, p. 250). It is the outcome of “democratic revolutions of the modern period, which represent an attack on the whole system of social prejudgements and culminate with the substitution of a single title for the hierarchy of titles.” (p. 251). The present day risk is domination by professional status, which is not the same as free praise in another measure of social esteem (Walzer, 1983, p. 257). The sphere of office applies Rawls’s second principle (p. 132). Office is to be governed by fair procedures of appointment, rejecting inheritance. This sphere had its origin in the separation of religious office from positions in feudal hierarchies (p. 130). In civic society, an office calls for transparent procedures in assigning professional membership (pp. 130–131) and for an authority regulating selection processes. An authority that became “politicised, that is, made into a matter of public debate, subjected to governmental scrutiny and regulation” (p. 131). By this means, the office was outed of powerful private hands.

³⁹⁸ In a discussion with Jacques Lévy, Walzer points towards an interpretation of this theory as a theory of the republic. Avoiding one single axis of valuation impedes accumulated power, from which one single unity can dictate the norms and conduct across various fields of social life. The offered example is the communist party’s evaluation of bourgeois vs. proper science.

³⁹⁹ After the set-up of the two central questions of the book (which are “In what respects are we one another’s equals?” and “By virtue of what characteristics are we equal in those respects?”), the author initiates his reply: “This entire book is an answer of a complicated sort to the first of these questions (...). The answer has to do with our recognition of one another as human beings, members of the same species, and what we recognise are bodies and minds and feelings and hopes and maybe even souls. For the purpose of this book, I assume the recognition. We are very different, and we are also manifestly alike. Now, what complex social arrangements follow from the difference and the likeness?” (Walzer, 1983, p. xii).

way in which an objective of equality depends on its effective experience, which is known to require specific arrangements. Walzer argues that the good of education is the training of citizens. This demands the development of individual competences and citizenship: “the need for every child to grow up within this democratic community and take his place as a competent citizen.”⁴⁰⁰ This supports the importance of schools, attached to a corps of teachers and intellectual disciplines in general (Walzer, 1983, pp. 198–199). The relative autonomy of the sphere “is a function of what the educational process is and of the social goods that it involves as soon as it ceases to be direct and unmediated” (p. 198). Education depends on the existence of schools as environments capable of acting on actors and society.⁴⁰¹ Schools are intermediary instances between the family and society where inequality of capitals prevailing outside the classroom can be altered (pp. 199, 203).⁴⁰² Justice is achieved when students can have equal access to opportunities in their adult life, independent of some arbitrary attributes of birth (gender, wealth, and social status). Schools are not only means to produce equality of freedoms but also personal liberty. They foster the critical capacity of actors and enable them to make different choices than that of the family (two outcomes which can retroact upon society).⁴⁰³ Once assured of the existence of “strong schools”, the criteria that ought to govern the distribution of the good of education is the principle of “one child, one place”.⁴⁰⁴

With this example, we can understand that Walzer’s distribution is not understood simply as the allocation of resources. Implying a definition of the good of education, schools are concrete arrangements as objects (educational system) and environments. Enabling educational arrangements are not strictly sectorial, though thematic political decisions are relevant.⁴⁰⁵ Just solutions also include availability to learn in “a society organized to yield that freedom,” which bears links with a favourable job market and reduced social pressure on the prestige of office (Walzer, 1983, p. 213).⁴⁰⁶ From the standpoint of a clear definition of the good and the knowledge of available perfected arrangements, Walzer develops critiques of existing practices. He quickly arrives at the specifically spatial dimension

⁴⁰⁰ “In the case of basic education, the reason for bringing students together is need (we assume interest and capacity). What is crucial here is the need for every child to grow up within this democratic community and take his place as a competent citizen. Hence the school should aim at a pattern of association anticipating that of adult men and women in a democracy. This is the principle that best fits schools central purpose, but it is a very general principle.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 217).

⁴⁰¹ The Aztec “House of Young Men” (where knowledge on arts and crafts or the bearing of arms was passed on to children by ordinary citizens vis-à-vis special schools attached to religious institutions) illustrates a moment where both non-mediated and institutional arrangements of education were current practices. The author reserves the meaning of education only to the second case. This illustration helps us understand that education should, to an extent, liberate students from the pressures of their family and society, the inclination towards the social reproduction of parents (direct family transmission), and the maintenance of the status quo (Walzer, 1983, pp. 198–200). Students should be able of becoming who they want, since they are reasonably unrestrained by background economic and cultural contingencies. This is also why schools should be freed from activism and ideology (p. 223).

⁴⁰² “Schooling ceases to be the monopoly of the few; it no longer automatically commands rank and office.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 203).

⁴⁰³ “But schools, teachers and ideas create and fill an intermediate space. They provide a context, not the only one, but by far the most important one, for the development of critical understanding and for the production, as well as reproduction, of social critics. (...) But social criticism is the result of autonomy and doesn’t help to explain it. What is most important is that schools, teachers and ideas constitute a new set of social goods, conceived of independently of other goods, and requiring, in turn, an independent set of distributive processes.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 198).

⁴⁰⁴ The importance of equal treatment once inside the school system, at the level of social relations, is not synonymous to the undifferentiated treatment of all students. Walzer is egalitarian in Rawls’s sense in setting up the field and the objective of offices open to all at the end of public schooling. But inside the sphere, resources should be a function of need, which is compatible with the learning of all (Walzer, 1983, p. 199).

⁴⁰⁵ Drawing on a then recent study on equality and education in Japan, Walzer mentions the importance of teacher’s associations and their strength in opposing political and economic agendas, such as the lowering of academic demands.⁴⁰⁵ These demands are seen to have a role in the disposition of “students to see themselves as working together to master the curriculum” (Walzer, 1983, p. 205).

⁴⁰⁶ On the pressure of the office, we can read: “Suppose that offices were differently organized from the way they were in 1910, so that “boys” could move up (or around) within them. Suppose that the public schools were one – but not the only – way of finding interesting and prestigious work to do. Then *Crossgates* [the prep school leading to Eton and Harrow] might begin to appear as unattractive to parents as it was to many of the children. The “prep” would be less critical, the exam less frightening, and the space and time available for learning would be greatly enhanced. Even specialised schools require some freedom from social pressure if they are to do their work – hence a society organized to yield that freedom.” And he continues, restricting his purpose: “Schools can never be entirely free; but if they are to be free at all, there must be constraints on other distributive spheres, constraints roughly of the sort I have already described, on what money can buy, for example, and on the extent and importance of office.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 213).

of education (p. 224).⁴⁰⁷ He comments on the policies of school busing,⁴⁰⁸ the demography of neighbourhood schools,⁴⁰⁹ or the impossibility of residential choice and the resulting spatial segregation.⁴¹⁰ He pinpoints that if the objective of the school is to educate future citizens – to prepare them to make society – it is necessary for children to contact their co-producers of society. To bring “children together in ways that hold open possibilities for cooperation” (p. 224) is the main argument for a collective provision of schools and policies affecting their demography (p. 215).⁴¹¹ Solutions that support co-inhabitation in diversity acknowledge the permeability between actors (students, teachers, parents), the social environment (school, neighbourhood), and society (educational system, attitudes towards learning). The environment where educational experience is to be dynamically construed is paramount in the achievement of equality through the sphere of education (p. 215).⁴¹² This contrasts with the more limiting view of justice focusing on distribution of basic goods detached from the social environment where they are co-produced.⁴¹³

4.4.3 Absent positive deontological elements

Tyranny corresponds to the pursuit of unfair advantage, seeking to augment one’s economic, political, and social capitals by using them interchangeably without democratic control and beyond the limits set in a society’s ethical code. Political and economic corruption are abuses of this sort, but Walzer defines injustice as multiple forms of tyranny. A “perfect illustration of the tyranny of wealth and class over learning” is George Orwell’s frequency of a school where the greatest virtue was the anti-intellectual expectation of rich students to have money (rather than owing it) (Walzer, 1983, p. 212).⁴¹⁴ The concept of tyranny sees the historical root of equality as negative (p. xii). The origin of equality is the abolition of particular sets of differences that were, in specific times and places, enabling a

⁴⁰⁷ “One would also hope of a more direct assault upon tyrannical distributions in the spheres of housing and employment – which no educational arrangement can possibly repair.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 224).

⁴⁰⁸ The author detects the spatial problems that precede the need of compulsory mobility (critiquing in passing the non-reliance on the existing public transportation) (Walzer, 1983, pp. 221–223). He alerts us to the implications of the freedom of choice and the inefficiency of compulsory practices when co-inhabitation is not practised outside the school:

“The American experience suggests, moreover, that schools integrated by bringing together children who live entirely separated are unlikely to become integrated schools. Even strong schools may fail when they are forced to cope with social conflicts generated on the outside (and continuously reinforced from the outside). (...) This kind of imposition [state officials’ imposition of racial separatism] requires repair, and repair may now require busing. It would be foolish to rule it out.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 224).

⁴⁰⁹ The imposition of racial quotas is a solution that neglects the openness of neighbourhoods to all (Walzer, 1983, pp. 221–223, 225). If the purpose is to sample society, then that sample should be on the basis of different group ranges (social class, religion, ethnic group) and not just race alone.

⁴¹⁰ Walzer keeps a liberal stance on the existence of a diversity that allows parents to choose, but only if there is an effective choice of residence location (Walzer, 1983, pp. 218–219).

⁴¹¹ “The public schools have no a priori existence; they must be constituted and their students assigned by a political decision. We require, then, a principle of association. Who goes to school with whom?” (Walzer, 1983, p. 215). In the American case: “It was assumed that school districts geographically drawn would be socially mixed and that the children who came together in the classroom would come from very different class and ethnic backgrounds”. (Walzer, 1983, p. 224).

⁴¹² “The content of the curriculum is probably less important than the human environment within which it is taught. I is no surprise, then, that association and segregation are the most hotly contested issues in the sphere of education.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 215).

⁴¹³ As presented in the previous section (4.3), we have interpreted Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” in this direction.

⁴¹⁴ Walzer is referring to George Orwell’s account of his schooldays in Orwell, G. (1968). Such, Such were the Joys in *The collected essays, journalism, and letters of George Orwell*, edited by Orwell, S. and Angus, I. New York. Vol III.

group to dominate their fellows (p. xii).⁴¹⁵ It is the need to avoid the experience of subordination (p. xiii)⁴¹⁶ that calls for the protection of the sphere's autonomy – good per good, social meaning per social meaning. There is room for noting unintended unjust effects of social dynamics (for example, the effect of residential segregation in educational good), but the formal architecture of the theory gives dominance to restraining tyranny. Tyranny intends to be a deontological element (in the sense of providing constraining orientations), but it is attached to a negative view of ethical capacity. The foundation of the theory on an anthropological desire to subordinate others breathes a moral interpretation of intentionality based on evil.⁴¹⁷

We can ask whether tyranny restricts Walzer's horizon of justice to a negative one. We follow Miller when he observes that Walzer's horizon can be positively interpreted through the pivotal role played by equal citizenship (Miller, 1995, p. 12).⁴¹⁸ Equality of citizenship requires an ensemble of societal experiences in order to be an effective opportunity. In other words, justice requires the substantive assessment of singular social arrangements. Furthermore, pluralism cannot be confused with ethical relativism (Walzer, 1983, pp. 4–5).⁴¹⁹ The separation of the just from the unjust is necessary, and it appeals to deontological elements.⁴²⁰ It is then pertinent to question whether Walzer's construction is sufficiently robust to support the kind of procedures implied in these judgments.⁴²¹ Beyond tyranny, Walzer's construction defines plural criteria for distributive practices and optimum societal layouts. As these elements are substantive, their use in evolving scenarios is problematic. The normative specifications by Walzer do not acknowledge that a society's relationship with the good may change or that new risks to the autonomy between spheres may emerge. It is the reading of historicity and progress which is defective, as it focuses on social constructions of the past but not on the intentional projection of the future. The insufficiency of leaving the open *devenir* of society outside the theory can be apprehended in three arguments. These points support the idea that a historical account of justice is not incompatible with a scientific auscultation of present societies. 1) We have seen that the substantive apprehension of goods and their respective spheres resort to historical episodes, where blocked

⁴¹⁵ "The root meaning of equality is negative; egalitarianism in its origins is an abolitionist politics. It aims at eliminating not all differences but a particular set of differences, and a different set in different times and places. Its targets are always specific: aristocratic privilege, capitalist wealth, bureaucratic power, racial or sexual supremacy. In each of these cases, however, the struggle has something like the same form. What is at stake is the ability of a group to dominate their fellows." (Walzer, 1983, p. xii).

A negative view of equality as right differentiation also accepts as natural social behaviour the inclination to distinguish one individual from another based on different sorts of worth (Walzer, 1983, p. xi). Walzer states that "... distributive justice is (...) an art of differentiation" (Walzer, 1983, p. xv) on the basis of "all sorts and degrees of skill, strength, wisdom, courage, kindness, energy and grace", we will want to distinguish one individual from another." (Walzer, 1983, p. xi); and

"But though we cannot give everyone the same title, we know that we cannot refuse to recognize – indeed, we want to be able to recognize – the many different sorts and degrees of skill, strength, wisdom, courage, kindness, energy and grace that distinguish one individual from another" (Walzer, 1983, p. xi).

Being able to order persons seems like an impoverished motivation for seeking the just, contrasting with Sen's positive horizon of improbability of human beings given the opportunity. This interpretation is slightly exaggerated for expository purposes, but we recognise the Aristotelian precept of giving to each his due, which we have briefly annotated in the section "Morality centred on charity. This vision of justice as the ordering of persons in the function of worths is also found in the work of Thévenot and Boltanski (2006), as referred to in chapter one.

⁴¹⁶ Walzer clarifies that the main meaning of equality is not to suppress differences, but it rather means that "[t]he experience of subordination – of personal subordination, above all – lies behind the vision of equality... The aim of political egalitarianism is a society free from domination". (Walzer, 1983, p. xiii).

⁴¹⁷ See the section 4.11 of this chapter, "Morality centred on charity".

⁴¹⁸ Miller states, "citizenship in Walzer is more than a merely formal status; to be a citizen one has to have a certain conception of oneself as able to take part in the direction of society, and that is not possible unless one enjoys in civil society a position that supports such a conception." (Miller, 1995, p. 12).

⁴¹⁹ Walzer underlines, "... even if we choose pluralism, as I shall do, that choice still requires a coherent defense. There must be principles that justify the choice and set the limits to it, for pluralism does not require us to accept every would-be agent. Conceivably (...) there is a single kind of pluralism." (Walzer, 1983, pp. 4, 5).

⁴²⁰ We have seen that the distinction between just and unjust arrangements is treated with concepts such as need (of protection), equality (of citizenship), freedom (of exchanges), and merit (of office). The work of Walzer is consequential. The validity of "complex equality" depends on people who are no longer in unfavourable circumstances across all dimensions. That validity can only be tested through experimentation.

⁴²¹ This question is pertinent even if it is argued that there is sufficient proof to suggest that Walzer's agenda is a progressive one (Cohen, 1986; Miller, 1995, pp. 4, 8–9).

exchanges between different capitals have been instituted. If history is mobilised in support of a legitimate interpretation of the good of each sphere, the vulnerability of past conceptions to prejudice is not checked. 2) Concepts such as need, equality, or merit are evoked in association with the more or less consensual meaning of the goods at stake and the practices and processes that potentiate them.⁴²² The identification of the “common” is seen to be “closer” to the voices of ordinary people.⁴²³ In Miller’s view, there is a problem of pertinence when public opinion does not follow Walzer’s conclusions, for example, in the widespread role of desert in popular thinking (1995, p. 15).⁴²⁴ 3) Walzer assumes the participation of his subjectivity. He claims that his role is that of offering one interpretation of American society (Miller, 1995, p. 10).⁴²⁵ In the absence of a systematic method, the risk incurred by Walzer is to miss the wealth of positions in the space *idéal* of society, merged down in unverified generalisation. This is not to say that we expect infinite variations of individual values in a society’s ethos, but there might be fractures or ongoing mutations. Immobilising a “common” view can be blind to societal movements and fix historical contingencies as anthropological constants.

In *Spheres of Justice*, there is not a theoretical moment dedicated to defining the concepts involved in deontological demands. This absence seems at first coherent with the project of renewing philosophy by grounding it in a commonly shared conception of reality, through an interpretative historically rooted method. If ethical principles are conceived as related to other cultural productions and to the substantive wealth that brings them about, this does not entail that they are not defined as ethical objects within the history of their intellectual production. Walzer chooses to relate to the coherence of philosophical heritage through negativity and provides insufficient ethical insight to think of the justice problems of the open evolution of society. We consider, with Sen, that defining concepts – deontological guidance or the contents of a horizon of justice – can indeed clarify their relationship with substantive societal productions. As we have seen in Sen’s construction, the pragmatic declination of ethical ideas is compatible with their *a priori* unambiguous definition (open to revision, like any theory).

4.4.4 Puncturing the particular in the thought of justice

As we have seen in the introduction to this thesis, the empirical study explores how arguments of justice are attached to perceived injustices in the substance of space. We look into how individuals decline their justice conceptions into spatial terms, while resorting to their stock of experiences and particular knowledge. In some respects, we approximate the model of substantive theories⁴²⁶ that do not divide the objectives of justice from their concrete manifestations in social life. As we have seen in this review of Walzer’s *Spheres of Justice*, the author’s enterprise requires a methodological proximity with the empirical world:

“Justice and equality can conceivably be worked out as philosophical artifacts, but a just and egalitarian society cannot be. If such a society isn’t already there – hidden, as it were, in our concepts and categories – we will never know it concretely or realise it in fact.” (Walzer, 1983, p. xiv).

⁴²² Stating this idea, for the case of education, we can read: “But beyond that, there are a number of associative patterns and institutional forms that at least seem compatible with the education of democratic citizens” (Walzer, 1983, p. 217).

⁴²³ “One consequence of Walzer’s general approach to justice is that his account must remain closer to the beliefs and understandings of ordinary people than is usually the case with abstract theories of justice. Identifying the kinds of goods available for distribution and the criteria which are appropriate to each, means interpreting the culture of a particular society.” (Miller, Introduction, 1995, p. 3). Miller (Miller, Introduction, 1995, p. 3) cites Walzer in this regard: “The critic, Walzer says, “gives voice to the common complaints of the people or elucidates the values that underlie those complaints””. This is a citation from Walzer, M., *Company of critics*, p. 16.

⁴²⁴ Walzer prescribes the restriction of merit to the sphere of recognition (Miller, Introduction, 1995, p. 15).

⁴²⁵ “Walzer does not claim that there is any decisive test that could prove unequivocally that his interpretation of justice is the best available. In “Interpretation and Social Criticism”, he considers the problem of competing interpretations, and claims that the ultimate test of an interpretation must be its capacity to persuade participants in the culture at large that it gives the “best” reading of their beliefs.” The interpretation of a moral culture is aimed at all men and women who participate in that culture—the members of what we might call a community of experience. It is a necessary – though not sufficient, sign of a successful interpretation that such people be capable to recognise themselves in it.” (p. 28). (Miller, 1995, p. 10).

⁴²⁶ For the meaning of substantive and procedural, see section 4.1.2.2, “Procedural and substantive”.

A just society should not be a transcendental matter but should “interpret to one’s fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share” (Walzer, 1983, p. xiv). In this assertion of justice as a substantive social construction, Walzer is reacting against the tradition that, since Plato, assumes that “there is one, and only one, distributive system that philosophy can rightly encompass” (p. 4). More specifically, Walzer responds to the then recent Rawls’s arrival at the “system men and women would choose if they were forced to choose impartially” (p. 5).⁴²⁷ Walzer finds Rawls’s original political agreement behind a veil of ignorance insensitive to collective values and shared understandings (p. 82).⁴²⁸ He notes that the goods of a sphere imply specific discussions on the meaning of the social contract (p. 79).⁴²⁹

“Here, then, is a more precise account of the social contract: it is an agreement to distribute the resources of the members in accordance with some shared understanding of their needs, subject to the ongoing political determination of detail. The contract is a moral bond. It connects the strong and the weak, the lucky and the unlucky, the rich and the poor, creating a union that transcends all differences of interest, drawing its strength from history, culture, religion, language, and so on. Arguments about communal provision are, at the deepest level, interpretations of that union.” (Walzer, 1983, pp. 82, 83).

The hypothetical social contract, Walzer points out, sets aside the “particularism of interest”, but it does not address the greater problem of the “particularism of history, culture, and membership” (Walzer, 1983, p. 5).⁴³⁰ Rejecting transcendentalism is, in Walzer’s account, intrinsically linked to the pluralism of the distributive criteria and the study of specific societies and times (pp. 4–5, 8).⁴³¹

⁴²⁷ There is no doubt that *Spheres of Justice*, first published in 1983, responds to Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, which appeared in 1971. Walzer engages with Rawls’s thoughts on several occasions, including in the set-up of his construction.

⁴²⁸ “Once again, rational agents ignorant of their own social standing would agree to such a redistribution. But they would agree too easily, and their agreement doesn’t help us understand what sort of redistribution is required. How much? For what purposes? In practice, redistribution is a political matter, and the coercion it involves is foreshadowed by the conflicts that rage over its character and extent. (...) But the ultimate appeal in these conflicts is not to the particular interests, not even to a public interest conceived as their sum, but to collective values, shared understandings of membership, health, food and shelter, work and leisure. The conflicts themselves are often focused, at least overtly, on questions of fact; the understandings are assumed.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 82).

⁴²⁹ This note emerges during the exploration of the specificity of the sphere of security and welfare. Walzer describes this sphere in association with common provisions that found necessity in (and the result from) the practice of common life (Walzer, 1983, p. 65). This sphere brings together responses, such as armies, water distribution, healthcare, and retirement funds. Need is the fundamental criterion attached to the sphere, but it is not self-evident. It is always decided politically; its priority and the degree of its satisfaction as well are decided in this manner, not only for survival but also for a good life (pp. 67, 79, 83). In noting the non-reciprocal beneficial status of distributive practices, the critique by Walzer of the Rawlsian hypothetical social contract becomes acute:

“This is not a hypothetical or an ideal contract of the sort of John Rawls has described. Rational men and women in the original position, deprived of all particular knowledge of their social standing and cultural understanding, would probably opt, as Rawls has argued, for an equal distribution of whatever goods they were told they needed. But this formula does not help very much in determining what choices people will make, or what choices they should make, once they know who and where they are. In a world of particular cultures, competing conceptions of the good, scarce resources, elusive and expansive needs, there isn’t going to be a single formula, universally applicable.” (Walzer, 1983, p. 79).

⁴³⁰ “Today this system is commonly described as the one that ideally rational men and women would choose if they were forced to choose impartially, knowing nothing of their own situation, barred from making particularist claims, confronting an abstract set of goods [reference in footnote to *A Theory of Justice* of John Rawls]. If these constraints on knowing and claiming are suitably shaped, and if the goods are suitably defined, it is probably true that a singular conclusion can be produced. Rational men and women, constrained this way or that, will choose one, and only one, distributive system. But the force of that singular conclusion is not easy to measure. It is surely doubtful that those same men and women, if they were transformed into ordinary people, with a firm sense of their own identity, with their own goods in their hands, caught up in everyday troubles, would reiterate their hypothetical choice or even recognize it as their own. The problem is not, most importantly, with the particularism of interest, which philosophers have always assumed they could safely that is, uncontroversially set aside. Ordinary people can do that too, for the sake, say, of the public interest. The greater problem is with the particularism of history, culture, and membership. Even if they are committed to impartiality, the question most likely to arise in the minds of the members of a political community is not, What would rational individuals choose under universalizing conditions of such and such a sort? But rather, What would individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it? And this is a question that is readily transformed into, What choices have we already made in the course of our common life? What understandings do we (really) share?” (Walzer, 1983, p. 5).

⁴³¹ The first criteria that refers to the kind of pluralism implied is the dismissal of “a single distributive criterion or an interconnected set” (Walzer, 1983, pp. 4, 8). The second incorporates the importance of history:

“In the matter of distributive justice, history plays a great variety of arrangements and ideologies. But the first principle of the philosopher is to resist the displays of history, the work of appearances, and to search for some underlying unit: a short list of basic goods, quickly abstracted to a single good; a single distributive criterion or an interconnected set; at the philosopher himself standing, symbolically at least, at a single decision point. I shall argue that to search for this unity is to misunderstand the subject matter of distributive justice. (...) Even if we choose pluralism, as I shall do, that choice still requires a coherent defense. (...) But this would be a pluralism that encompassed a wide range of distributions. By contrast,

Walzer's association between deontology and teleology differs not only from Rawlsian justice as fairness but also from Sen's openness. We have seen that *The Idea of Justice* is conceived as guidance for the evaluation of concrete situations; the assessment itself being extrinsic to the theory. There is scope for the definition of the good, but it is always deliberative and potentially evolving. Contrastingly, Walzer keeps the relationship between theory and empirical substantiation within the theory itself. He calls this approach "particularistic", referring to its proximity with the empirical social world.⁴³² This endeavour is not without ambivalence. Walzer considers that pluralism is also (but not only) "a matter of implementing some singular principle or set of principles in different historical settings" (1983, pp. 5–6).⁴³³ The normative model governing each sphere defines a horizon of a universally desirable achievement, but the path is far from univocal. Walzer thus presents scope for singularity, asserting that the questions formulated by justice "admit of a range of answers, and there is room within the range for cultural diversity and political choice" (pp. 5–6).⁴³⁴ Walzer's use of the concept of "particularism" risks an interpretation of ethical relativism, which would have implications for a universalistic ethical project that he does not close (Renouard, 1996, pp. 2069–2070).⁴³⁵ However, this seems to be the interpretation made by several authors, including Sen's association of his work to that of communitarians such as Charles Taylor (Sen, 2010, p. x). Joining the communitarian reading, David Miller reads Walzer's pluralism as a dual concept, referring to diversity among communities and among the ideas governing different goods within one community (Miller, 1995, p. 2).⁴³⁶ For Miller, the first pluralism means "that there are no universal laws on justice," even if this interpreter also acknowledges that "Walzer conceded that some requirements of justice run across all cultures and may on that basis be regarded as 'a kind of minimal and universal moral code'" (Miller, 1995, pp. 1–2).⁴³⁷ We can shed light on the interpretation of Walzer's particularistic method by associating it with the reading of the pertinent societal units in his historic method. *Spheres of Justice* mainly focuses on the American society, not its internal infra-societal groups. We thus propose to read community and the communal as

the deepest assumption of most of the philosophers who have written about justice, from Plato onwards, is that there is one, and only one, distributive system that philosophy can rightly encompass." (Walzer, 1983, pp. 4, 5).

⁴³² "My argument is radically pluralistic. I don't claim to have achieved any great distance from the social world in which I live. One way to begin a philosophical enterprise is to walk out of the cave, leave the city, climb the mountain, fashion for oneself (what can never be fashioned for ordinary men and women) an objective and universal standpoint. Then one describes the terrain of everyday life from far away, so that it loses its particular contours and takes on a general shape. But I mean to stay in the cave, in the city, on the ground." (Walzer, 1983, p. xiv).

⁴³³ "It's not only a matter of implementing some singular principle or set of principles in different historical settings. No one would deny that there is a range of morally permissible implementations. I want to argue for more than this: that the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves - the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism." (Walzer, 1983, pp. 5, 6).

⁴³⁴ He illustrates this points for the case of school arrangements in the "sphere" of education:

"I shall argue that there is, given certain social conditions, a preferred solution to this problem, a form of complex equality that best fits the *normative model* of the school, on the one hand and the requirements of democratic politics, on the other. But there is no unique solution. The character of a mediating institution [which is the normative significance of the school] can be determined only by reference to the social forces between which it mediates. A balance must always be struck, different in different times and places." (Walzer, 1983, p. 216).

⁴³⁵ In a dictionary entry dedicated to the work of Michael Walzer taken as a whole, Cécile Renouard states (1996, pp. 2069–2070): "Cette perspective rejoint au niveau individuel ce que Walzer intitule "l'universalisme de basse altitude"; celui consiste, pour les membres d'une tradition donnée, à observer le comportement d'autres collectivités au sein de l'État et à s'enrichir de cette diversité, susceptible de contribuer à l'amélioration mutuelle des traditions (...): « cette façon de reconnaître la valeur morale possible de ce que les autres pensent et font est un trait crucial de l'universalisme de basse altitude, lequel surgit au sein de la tradition. » Et de proche en proche, pourrait émerger la condition d'une paix entre les traditions : « Quand les chauvinismes sont dépassés, qu'on on arrive à s'entendre par-delà les frontières et qu'il ne s'agit pas simplement d'accord pour résoudre un problème particulier mais d'ententes morales sur la façon d'agir dans le monde, il me paraît juste de parler de commencement d'universalisme. » (Cited in Walzer, Michael, W. (2002). Universalisme et valeurs juives, in *Raisons politiques* (p. 75-76). Paris: Puf Presses Universitaires de France). Walzer comments on the viability of a pragmatic ethical universalism but emphasises on the hypothetical status of a world community:

"And we would have to ask the members of this hypothetical community (or their hypothetical representatives) to agree among themselves on what distributive arrangements and distributive patterns of conversion are to count as just." (Walzer M. , [1992] 2006, p. 498).

⁴³⁶ As for the second form of diversity, pluralism, Miller considers that "in liberal democracies especially, but in other societies too, there are many different kinds of social goods (and evils) whose distribution is a matter of justice, with each kind of good having its own particular criterion of distribution. (...) And there is no underlying principle standing behind all these distributive criteria, no core idea which might *explain* [following an example given in the meanwhile] why honours are to be distributed in one way and medical care in another." (Miller, Introduction, 1995, p. 2).

⁴³⁷ Milles continues: "These include prohibitions against murder, deception, and gross cruelty." Miller is quoting Walzer, M. (1988). Interpretation and Social Criticism. In S. M. McMurrin, *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

the ensemble of interrelated members of society, involved in the collective production of goods, rather than a mark of intra-community similitude.⁴³⁸ In this view, the ambivalence relies less on the declination of ethical precepts in different substantive arrangements in different societies. As we have underlined, the historical study of the social construction of ethical values is not strongly associated with the evolution of society. Sen's account of the interspatiality of society is more accurate in detecting the possibility of an evolving, specifically ethical, horizon. In this horizon, singularity does not mean particularism, nor does it mean ethical relativism. Walzer helps us see the importance of moving the relation between theory and empirics from the couple universal/particular to that of universal/singular.

In the sphere of education, we have observed that society's components move across spheres. There is a theoretical incompatibility between the conception of society adopted in this work and Walzer's normative autonomy of goods and spheres (Walzer, 1983, p. 10). The deontological focus on non-invasiveness does not fit well a theoretical model of the systemic functioning of society in the production of goods (which can be co-substantial in different dimensions). As we have seen when reviewing the social and spatial in a dimensional paradigm, the individual's use of his capitals across different dimensions is factual and not necessarily unjust.⁴³⁹ We understand that the idea behind the tight-proofing of spheres is to prevent power abuses accumulated in one scale of worth to gain advantage in another dimension of social life. We are sensitive to the major abuses of political power (Miller, 1995, p. 14).⁴⁴⁰ Our own work expresses concerns with the risks of hegemony of intellectual capital. How can we differentiate useful from harming reciprocal influences of environments, societal objects, and the actors?⁴⁴¹ There is a problem of pertinence when Walzer's theory of justice does not allow one to distinguish positive from detrimental movements between society's spheres.

The Walzer appeal to the ideal of plurality is also found in Boltanski and Thévenot's observation that people come up with different demands and reasons of justice depending on the good (or worth) they are claiming. The work of these authors displaces the subjectivity of Walzer's interpretative work by the competences of the actors. The contribution of these authors to the understanding of justification lie on the opposite assumption of moral capacity. The explicative model proposed by Boltanski and Thévenot suffers, however, from similar difficulties. For example, we observe the same absence of deontological elements suitable to open pragmatics of justice and experiment difficulties in thinking of substantive problems that do not fit in their theoretical decoupage of the social into six worlds.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁸ This is coherent with Walzer's use of "communal" associated to public provision, which is open to all. In a passage commenting on the communal provision of schools, Walzer states, "For the community has an interest in the education of children, and so do the children, which neither parents nor entrepreneurs adequately represent [as implied in a public voucher system to access private schools]. But that interest must be publicly debated and given specific form. That is the work of democratic assemblies, parties, movements, clubs and so on, And it is the pattern of association necessary for this work that basic education must anticipate. Private schools don't do that. The communal provision of educational goods, then, has to take a more public form – else it won't contribute to the training of citizens." (Walzer, 1983, p. 219). We can read here that the community served by a school must include the kind of diversity and potential conflict that will demand and inform political debate, while providing the societal context whereby children will become societal beings themselves.

⁴³⁹ Using one's education, easiness in spatial mobility, or social contacts in order to organise one's life is not necessarily contrary to ethics. This has been illustrated for the action of residential choice. The threshold between ethical and sacrificial behaviours is nuanced, but it exists.

⁴⁴⁰ "Walzer is clear that "political power is always dominant – "at" the boundaries (of spheres), but not "in" them. The central problem of political life is to maintain that crucial distinction between "at" and "in" (quoting spheres, p. 15). What may be less clear is why he holds this view. ! The reason is that he is distrustful of political power, afraid that to allow the state to operate inside the spheres of justice would be to open the door to the simplest and worst form of tyranny: the coercive assignment of social goods. Complex equality is the full embodiment of the liberal 'art of separation' whose main achievement has been the limiting of state power." (Miller, 1995, p. 14) At the end of the quote miller points to Walzer's essay "Liberalism and the Art of Separation" and "Exclusion, injustice and the democratic state".

⁴⁴¹ Despite this critique, the notion of a *sphere* (or a social environment) can continue to be useful in capturing a topic of democratic debate.

⁴⁴² A brief review of this model is found in section 1.2.5, "Plural justifications in environments (Boltanski and Thévenot)".

4.5 Charles Taylor, infra-societal claims of justice

In what follows, we are interested in capturing one strand of the communitarian argument, developed since the 1980s in response to Rawls's universal principles of justice (Bell, 2006).⁴⁴³ Communitarianism has not been constructed as a systematic alternative to political liberalism. It is rather an umbrella, grouping a number of authors who sought to develop "particularistic" approaches to justice. Authors such as Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, or Will Kymlicka presume that the conception of anthropology and psychology underlying universalism is faulty (Berten, 1996, p. 480). The common argument is not only the social construction of values, but also the importance of some "unchosen" parameters in the construction of the self, such as the vision of the good life inherited from early experiences (p. 480).⁴⁴⁴ It is via this facet that the argument has ties with "politics of recognition", endorsing the importance of affective support of interpersonal relations with "significant others" (Honneth, 2004; Honneth, 1995; Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Charles Taylor (1991) establishes a critical dialogue with other works under the same epitome⁴⁴⁵ while giving insight into the problematics of defining societal scales of justice. The anti-communitarian critique sketched below is only concerned with the infra-societal scales (broadly speaking, these are smaller than the scale of one local urban society).⁴⁴⁶ As discussed earlier, there is scope for federation of political spaces with distinct substantive politics. The claim that a number of political ideas of a city-society differ from an otherwise "transcendent" state does not imply a communitarian political philosophy.⁴⁴⁷ The important caveat is that each political territory should be open to dialogue with the spaces required for its development (including the space of the world). Taylor's "multicultural argument" is thus unsound if applied to spaces inferior to the privileged scale of our work – the city. We have identified that societal scales deal with multi-dimensional interdependence and co-presence. These challenges require a non-fragmented set of values that citizens can use to guide the production of the objects that support and result from their co-inhabitation. If different "cultural heritages" exist, they should not be naturalised in the reading of the social that informs a theory of justice, but be a part of the horizon of transformation. Spatial justice thus faces the challenge of recomposing the urban scale even when, or precisely because, it is socially fragmented.

4.5.1 A procedural liberal pragmatic with collective claims of justice

Like Walzer, Charles Taylor uses materials which are not only philosophical but include claims of injustice from concrete people in concrete circumstances (Taylor, 1994, p. 62). In particular, the author seeks to formalise claims on behalf of groups, such as the Aborigine or French Canadians in Canadian constitutional debates in the 1990s.⁴⁴⁸ These collective claims are seen to defy the individualistic quality of rights in political liberalism (Habermas, 1994, p. 107). They also challenge liberalism's foundational separation between the right and the good (Taylor, 1994, pp. 57–

⁴⁴³ Communitarianism is seen as a critique both on deontological and consequentialist methods of justice thought (Berten, 1996, p. 480).

⁴⁴⁴ "Communitarians begin by positing a need to experience our lives as bound up with the good of the communities out of which our identity has been constituted." (Bell, 2006).

⁴⁴⁵ In the main source used in this review *The Politics of Recognition* (1994), Charles Taylor does not specify the authors envisaged in his critique, but we can recognise the arguments of Axel Honneth (2004; 1995; Fraser & Honneth, 2003). We re-join Taylor in his judgment that the extension of the emotional function of recognition to all social relations is condescending and patronising (Taylor, 1994, pp. 69–70).

⁴⁴⁶ See definition of the city in section 3.3.2, "*Urbanité/s*, modes of living together".

⁴⁴⁷ *Transcendence/immanence* is a couple denoting the relationship of domination between two spaces. In the case of immanence, it is the smaller space that dominates the bigger; in the case of transcending spaces, it is the bigger scale that imposes itself (Lévy, 2013, pp. 536–537).

⁴⁴⁸ "The fact is that there are forms of this liberalism of equal rights that in the minds of their own proponents can give only a very restricted acknowledgment of distinct cultural identities. The notion that any of the standard schedules of rights might apply differently in one cultural context than they do in another, that their application might have to take account of different collective goals, is considered quite unacceptable. The issue, then, is whether this restrictive view of equal rights is the only possible interpretation. If it is, then it would seem that the accusation of homogenization is well founded. But perhaps it is not I think it is not, and perhaps the best way to lay out the issue is to see it in the context of the Canadian case, where this question has played a role in the impending breakup of the country. In fact, two conceptions of rights-liberalism have confronted each other, albeit in confused fashion, throughout the long and inconclusive constitutional debates of recent years." (Taylor, 1994, p. 52).

59).⁴⁴⁹ Taylor argues that it is counterfactual to presume the neutrality of liberal societies vis-à-vis individuals sustaining different goods (pp. 56–57).⁴⁵⁰ As such, the author argues, certain members of society experience political liberalism as a form of “second-class citizenship” (p. 39). Politics of difference also seeks to recognise the contemporary development of the notion of identity and its appeal to uniqueness and “distinctness from everyone else” (p. 38).⁴⁵¹ In the view of the author, we live in societies of public good endorsed by a majority where certain members do not feel their specificity equally respected, but “assimilated to a dominant identity” (p. 38).⁴⁵² The theoretical argument developed to apprehend this sense of injustice is anchored in the idea of “equal dignity” that Taylor traces back to Kant and Rousseau (pp. 41–44, 48–51).

“For Kant, whose use of the term dignity was one of the earliest influential evocations of this idea, what commanded respect in us was our status as rational agents, capable of directing our lives through principles. Something like this has been the basis for our intuitions of equal dignity ever since, though the detailed definition of it may have changed. Thus, what is picked out as of worth here is a universal human potential, a capacity that all humans share.” (Taylor, 1994, p. 41)⁴⁵³.

Rousseau’s revision of dignity alerts one to the need to reconceptualise esteem so that the evaluation of men on such a basis does not give way to inequality. In Rousseau’s ideal republic, esteem is reconfigured in the light of interdependence with others, reducing one’s susceptibility to public opinion and favour, as the causes of alienation with oneself from one’s freedom.⁴⁵⁴

In the empirical claims of justice that Taylor seeks to justify what is at stake are not personal liberties. That is, the rights of a minority extensible and enriching for all members of society (for example, access to linguistic plurality or increased comprehensiveness of currently ethnocentric academic curricula) (Taylor, 1994, pp. 65–66). The right of the minority to arrive at a different substantiation “of a standard schedule of rights” evokes the protection of certain goods for the sake of “cultural preservation” and defends some societies’ legitimate pursuit to create members who identify themselves as such (pp. 52, 58–59). While recognising that such claims quickly conflict with individual

⁴⁴⁹ “Political society is not neutral between those who value remaining true to the culture of our ancestors and those who might want to cut loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development. It might be argued that one could after all capture a goal like survivance for a proceduralist liberal society.” (Taylor, 1994, p. 58).

⁴⁵⁰ “We might call this latter commitment “procedural,” while commitments concerning the ends of life are “substantive.” Dworkin claims that a liberal society is one that as a society adopts no particular substantive view about the ends of life. The society is, rather, united around a strong procedural commitment to treat people with equal respect. The reason that the polity as such can espouse no substantive view, cannot, for instance, allow that one of the goals of legislation should be to make people virtuous in one or another meaning of that term, is that this would involve a violation of its procedural norm. For, given the diversity of modern societies, it would unfailingly be the case that some people and not others would be committed to the favored conception of virtue. They might be in a majority; indeed, it is very likely that they would be, for otherwise a democratic society probably would not espouse their view. Nevertheless, this view would not be everyone’s view, and in espousing this substantive outlook the society would not be treating the dissident minority with equal respect. It would be saying to them, in effect, “your view is not as valuable, in the eyes of this polity, as that of your more numerous compatriots.”” (Taylor, 1994, pp. 56–57).

⁴⁵¹ “By contrast, the second change, the development of the modern notion of identity, has given rise to a politics of difference. There is, of course, a universalist basis to this as well, making for the overlap and confusion between the two. Everyone should be recognized for his or her unique identity. But recognition here means something else. With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else. The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity.” This statement is followed by a reference to the critique by Carol Gilligan of Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development on the grounds that it “privileges only one facet of moral reasoning, precisely the one that tends to predominate in boys rather than girls.” (Taylor, 1994, p. 38).

⁴⁵² Taylor states that liberal *blindness* is actually a reflection of particular cultures (1994, p. 44). We will argue below against the accuracy of Taylor’s concept of culture. In the meanwhile, we can continue to follow the author’s line of reasoning by reconstructing his point as the existence of some individuals who not endorse a majority’s conception of public good (without attaching this observation to cultural variations).

⁴⁵³ Taylor directs us to Kant, I. (1968) *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*. Berlin: Gruyter, reprint of the Berlin Academy edition, p. 434.

⁴⁵⁴ “Rousseau borrows the denunciatory language of the first discourse, but he doesn’t end up calling for a renunciation of all concern with esteem. On the contrary, in his portrait of the republican model, caring about esteem is central. What is wrong with pride or honor is its striving after preferences, hence division, hence real other-dependence, and therefore loss of the voice of nature, and consequently corruption, the forgetting of boundaries, and effeminacy. The remedy is not rejecting the importance of esteem, but entering into a quite different system, characterized by equality, reciprocity, and unity of purpose.” (Taylor, 1994, p. 49). The original quote is from Rousseau, J. (1968) Letter to M. D’Alembert on the Theatre, in *Politics and the Arts*, trans. Allan Bloom. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. p. 125–126.

freedom, Taylor sets out to find room for compatibility between the presumption of substantive collective claims and a liberal commitment to individual rights. This can be achieved, the author argues, by extending the reach of collective goals to include cultural projects (Walzer, 1994, p. 99). Taylor devises the political possibility of weighting claims of substantive differentiated treatment (on the basis of “cultural survival”) against other justice arguments, without presuming their respective strength (1994, pp. 60–61).⁴⁵⁵ The theory allows that in some cases individuals’ freedom can be prioritised over equality in liberty (for all members of society). In other words, Taylor defends society’s potential guarantee of some individuals’ freedom, irrespective of the possibility of universally extending these liberties to others.

4.5.2 Procedural equality restricted to institutional contexts

Against other developments of the theory of recognition, Taylor considers as problematic extending the requirements of equal respect (owed to persons) to the judgement of the things people make (1994, pp. 42–43).⁴⁵⁶ The presumption of equal worth of different cultural products is a deontological protection from prejudice, not a substitute for the pragmatics of evaluation and reflexivity (Taylor, pp. 66–68). Taylor claims the co-construction between different socio-cultural groups of the standard through which such productions can be assessed: a “fusion of horizons” (pp. 67, 69).⁴⁵⁷ He appeals to the study of the other instead of the mobilisation of a “north Atlantic” standard (pp. 71–73). From the idea of the “fusion of horizons”, we can reconstruct a claim for the equal right to influence society, a central concern for procedural equality.⁴⁵⁸ However, in thematic policies such as education and language, the author legitimises divisiveness between some communities and the rest of society (as in school differentiation). This indicates that individuals producing society by going about with their lives – in the *prise* over their environment – are not a part of the co-production of common standards. This production is assigned to the political, but not to social environments. When the role of social arrangements, such as education, is passive or negative in co-producing shared cultural standards, it is unclear how deliberation on these and other themes is expected to lead to political convergence. Procedural equality is seen in an institutional way, not as a comprehensive social realisation.

4.5.3 An immutable view of identity and culture: implications for freedom and for the pragmatics of ethics

Taylor’s main claim of procedural equality in political recognition is instigated by the conceptions of identity and culture as immobilised. Taylor sees the individual identity separated from society and assumes these two realities to

⁴⁵⁵ “There is a form of the politics of equal respect, as enshrined in a liberalism of rights, that is inhospitable to difference, because (a) it insists on uniform application of the rules defining these rights, without exception, and (b) it is suspicious of collective goals. Of course, this doesn’t mean that this model seeks to abolish cultural differences. This would be an absurd accusation. But I call it inhospitable to difference because it can’t accommodate what the members of distinct societies really aspire to, which is survival. This is (b) a collective goal, which (a) almost inevitably will call for some variations in the kinds of law we deem permissible from one cultural context to another, as the Quebec case clearly shows. I think this form of liberalism is guilty as charged by the proponents of a politics of difference. Fortunately, however, there are other models of liberal society that take a different line on (a) and (b). These forms do call for the invariant defense of certain rights, of course. There would be no question of cultural differences determining the application of habeas corpus, for example. But they distinguish these fundamental rights from the broad range of immunities and presumptions of uniform treatment that have sprung up in modern cultures of judicial review. They are willing to weigh the importance of certain forms of uniform treatment against the importance of cultural survival, and opt sometimes in favor of the latter.” (Taylor, 1994, pp. 60, 61). (Original version in American English).

⁴⁵⁶ “To the extent that this stronger reproach is in play, the demand for equal recognition extends beyond an acknowledgment of the equal value of all humans potentially, and comes to include the equal value of what they have made of this” (Taylor, 1994, pp. 42, 43).

⁴⁵⁷ He is referring to aesthetic products here and thus to affective-subjective judgements.

⁴⁵⁸ Indeed, the comments on immigration point in this direction: “It is so for the reason I mentioned above: that all societies are becoming increasingly multicultural, while at the same time becoming more porous. Indeed, these two developments go together. Their porousness means that they are more open to multinational migration; more of their members live the life of diaspora, whose center is elsewhere. In these circumstances, there is something awkward about replying simply, “This is how we do things here.” (...) The awkwardness arises from the fact that there are substantial numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that calls into question our philosophical boundaries. The challenge is to deal with their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles.” (Taylor, 1994, p. 62).

be stable. For Taylor, human life is of dialogical character (1994, p. 32),⁴⁵⁹ but in a rather restricted manner. It gives a predominant weight to inwardness in the formation of individuality (what the author calls “authenticity” (p. 31)), and sees social influence as “pressures of conformity” (pp. 29–30). Taylor stabilises the achievement of identity as something to be protected rather than exposed to continuous challenges and movements. It is as if the relevance of social relation were restricted to initial periods of human development (he talks of “genesis” (pp. 32–33)). In light of the dialogical relationship of the individual and society, this representation of identity is inaccurate. From this diagnosis, it becomes apparent that the advocated measures of cultural preservation are inconsistent. In particular, they do not address the claim of the politics of difference for increased room to particularism and distinctive treatment in individuated modernity (p. 38). Defending the desire for uniqueness of individuals is quite contrary to restricting the sources of individuality to closed cultural groups and spaces. Offering some groups the possibility “not to change” is a concern associated with the augmentation of their well-being freedom (in the form of cultural comfort of a minority) and of some agency-freedom (as the possibility to choose that way of being). This emphasis on the well-being freedom of some can be seen to imply a trade-off with agency-freedom (and its connection with personal liberties and capabilities) of society members in their ensemble. This is illustrated when the sustained policies prevent contact among certain societal products (as in language restriction) (p. 55).⁴⁶⁰ In the open movement of society (increasingly, at the scale of the world), to intentionally deprive individuals of social contact with the full potential sources of their identity is a removal of freedom.

Immutability is also a feature of the conception of culture, as revealed in the call for allowances towards untransformed perpetuation (Taylor, 1994, p. 40).⁴⁶¹ Culture appears as a product generated inside bordered territories of human association, rather than a transmissible and transformable product of ideality in humanity’s activities (Lévy, Culture, pp. 238–239).⁴⁶² Exchanges, travelling, diffusion of ideas and knowledge are not accounted for in the view of civilisations and sub-cultures. Taylor’s argument also contrasts with Sen’s critique on the division of humanity across one-dimensional spaces.⁴⁶³

⁴⁵⁹ Referring to the role of language, he starts by referring to the dialogical character of identity in a literal manner. He then extends it to the social relations involved in the construction of self-esteem (Taylor, 1994, pp. 25–26).

⁴⁶⁰ Daniel Bell summarises the englobing view of communitarians that underlines the cost of freedom: “So what remains of the communitarian conception of the self? What may be distinctive about communitarians is that they are more inclined to argue that individuals have a vital interest in leading decent communal lives, with the political implication that there may be a need to sustain and promote the communal attachments crucial to our sense of well-being. This is not necessarily meant to challenge the liberal view that some of our communal attachments can be problematic and may need to be changed, thus that the state needs to protect our powers to shape, pursue, and revise our own life-plans. But our interest in community may occasionally conflict with our other vital interest in leading freely chosen lives, and the communitarian view is that the latter does not automatically trump the former in cases of conflict. On the continuum between freedom and community, communitarians are more inclined to draw the line towards the latter.” (Bell, 2006).

⁴⁶¹ Commenting on the argument of temporary “reverse discrimination” to “level the playing field and allow the old “blind” rules to come back into force,” the author clearly states the value of immutable identity: “But it won’t justify some of the measures now urged on the grounds of difference, the goal of which is not to bring us back to an eventual “difference-blind” social space but, on the contrary, to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we’re concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it never be lost?” (Taylor, 1994, p. 40).

⁴⁶² We can contrast this conception with that of Jacques Lévy (Culture, pp. 238–239). Noting that the multiculturalism paradigm often treats cultures as “homogeneous fix essences, impermeable and detached from history,” he states: « l’espace des productions ou des consommations esthétiques est bien différent de celui des appartenances communautaires, tous deux entrant dans l’espace « culturel », si l’on définit dans son sens plus large [as « l’ensemble des productions idéelles disponibles dans une réalité social donnée].» (Lévy, Culture, pp. 238, 239). The definition of culture is anchored in the character of transmissibility, which implies some stability but also openness to transformation:

« On appellera *culture* ce qui est isolable, transmissible et éventuellement cumulable, dans les activités de l’humanité. Ainsi défini, la culture est donc une production, quelque chose qui peut être appréhendé indépendamment de celui qui la produit. On peut aussi ajouter, comme corollaire, que ce qui est culturel est ce qui se prête à la réflexivité. En effet, l’isolabilité des réalités culturelles, requise pour leur diffusion vers d’autres espaces ou d’autres temps, permet aussi d’autres relectures, des questionnements, des remises en cause, des évolutions ou même des révolutions. La culture ne peut plus alors être vue comme un stock immuable : elle comprend aussi les flux qui mettent ces stocks en mouvement.» (Lévy, Culture, pp. 238, 239).

⁴⁶³ See Sen’s comment of the concept of “clash of civilisations” (2010, p. 141), and in “Religious affiliations and Muslim history” (2007).

4.5.3.1 Equal solicitude in the pragmatics of ethics

Taylor's theory demands a political framework where group claims are potentially valid, rather than offset as inconsistent within a liberal society. This is a viable claim, which loses strength when anchored in culture and identity as closed conceptions. The specific demands on "cultural grounds" can be formulated as demands of collective enjoyments, detached from cultural immobility. There is another appeal that recalls the reconstructive ethics sustaining our work, equal solicitude. That is, equality of the social voice without presumption of an order of legitimacy on the basis of diverse socio-economic-spatial profiles, until an empirical test. It is similar to Rawls's presumption of equal moral worth.

Taylor adds to Walzer's complexity the realisation that once arguments are treated substantially, they may diverge. To deal with this divergence, Taylor introduces the idea that liberalism and a society of public good can coexist (1994, pp. 59–60). This compatibility demands proceduralism with the scope for producing common teleological standards (aesthetic, but we can extend it to ethics). Taylor feels the need to legitimise present day substantive demands of those who are not covered by the liberal model of individual rights. This is coherent with the project of allowing them to participate in the democratic debate. The problem resides in the fact that the concrete policy covered by such concepts is contradictory with the overall objective of co-production of an open horizon. Some illustrations legitimise social fragmentation and denote an immobilised reading of identity and culture. This observation alerts us to the need of theories of spatial justice to be able to think of the evolutions of society, desirable or likely, without blockages of present-day realism. Taylor also helps us see the disjunction that might exist between the theorisation of such a horizon (where the researcher's knowledge and values can participate) and the empirical spatial-ethical portrait of society, as it might stand at a given moment. In this tension resides the danger of a spatial justice theory being read as "normative", that is, telling society what the spatially just is, independently from society's own ethical valuation.⁴⁶⁴

4.6 The substantive urban model of Iris Marion Young

We have reviewed the theories of Sen and Rawls, which were both constructed on a Kantian basis, using deontological elements to guide, respectively, substantial proceduralism or institutional transcendentalism. We have seen that Walzer's theory has lesser philosophical consistency in the definition of the contents of justice capable of addressing a society with an open *devenir*. The idea of justice advanced in *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, by Marion Young (1990/2011), explicitly rejects a philosophical demarche, which brings the author closer to emotivism. The inclusion of Marion Young in our review is due to the centrality of her work in existing spatial justice theories. This aspect is justified by the philosopher's explicit use of the city while thinking of justice.

Iris Marion Young follows a substantive route similar to that of Walzer and Taylor. She concedes that there are good reasons to build transcendental theories of justice, identifying deontological rules for scrutiny against partiality (the author calls them normative) (Young, 1990/2011, p. 4). Young also considers that the just "is always situated in concrete social and political practices that precede and exceed the philosopher" (p. 5). Thus, some form of substantiveness is always necessary. The author considers that transcendental theories resort to social models without making them explicit and incurring risk of "recasting the given as necessary" (p. 5).⁴⁶⁵ She identifies the need

⁴⁶⁴ Luca Pattaroni, Jacques Lévy and Jean-Nicolas Fauchille have helped me to locate the presence of normativity in the provisional thesis submitted for the doctoral exam. The current and final version of this thesis attempts to correct the more ambiguous passages.

⁴⁶⁵ "While everyday discourse about justice certainly makes claims, these are not theorems to be demonstrated in a self-enclosed system. They are instead calls, pleas, claims upon some people by others. Rational reflection on justice begins in a hearing, in heeding a call, rather than in asserting and mastering a state of affairs, however ideal. The call to "be just" is always situated in concrete social and political practices that precede and exceed the philosopher. The traditional effort to transcend that finitude toward a universal theory yields only finite constructs which escape the appearance of contingency usually by recasting the given as necessary." (Young, 1990/2011, p. 5).

to depart with the empirical and to use social theory (p. 5).⁴⁶⁶ Her theoretical resources exclude Rawls, identifying the limits of the distributive paradigm when the goods at stake are not objects or material goods (she illustrates these goods with self-respect, opportunity, and honour) (p. 8). Young explicitly refers to her proximity with Walzer and his idea that concepts of justice are already present in society (pp. 6–7).⁴⁶⁷ Indeed, most of the lessons on the method extracted from Walzer are applicable to the writing of Iris Marion Young covered by this brief review. Like Taylor, the author follows the arguments of contemporary groups claiming justice, in particular, New Left social movements in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s (p. 3).⁴⁶⁸ As in multiculturalism, Young constructs her theory of justice to account for the existence of social justice claims on a collective basis. For her, minimally stable social groups exist and social justice should attend to this fact (p. 3). Rejecting the heritage of political philosophy and the objective of building a systematic theory, Young proposes the concepts of domination and oppression (p. 3). These two concepts are animated by meaning of differences, which Young defines following Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, and Kristeva (p. 7).⁴⁶⁹ The author has in mind gender, ethnic and sexual orientation as aggregating criteria for group politics. She naturalises the contingent attributes upon which individuals experience bias as the bastion of their justice claims. Young explicitly excludes her project from Kantian universalism and the dominance of reason and considers that feelings are a sound base for organising an approach to justice, rejecting the proximity between objectivity and justice (p. 4).⁴⁷⁰ There are no principles on which actors can draw to compose their ethical judgments. They can be strictly led by pride (p. 11).

4.6.1 The centrality of inclusive political participation at the urban scale

Despite incompatibilities between Young's approach and the Enlightenment reaffirmation in which this thesis seats,⁴⁷¹ her endeavour does raise some interesting questions, as the author uses the city to build her argument (and because despite the theoretical positioning, she Young does use the concepts of equality and liberty). We can, hence, reconstruct the purpose of Marion Young as the provision of a theory of justice destined to operate during the transition from the *gemeinsschaft* to the *gesellschaft*, from community to society. The role of groups in her construction is to recognise the empirical existence of infra-societal collective demands that do not go against that of others. She thinks that respecting groups opens them to otherness:

"This politics [of difference] lays down institutional and ideological means for recognizing and affirming diverse social groups by giving political representation to these groups, and celebrating their distinctive characteristics and cultures. In the unoppressive city people open to unassimilated otherness." (pp. 240–241).

⁴⁶⁶ "Normative reflection must begin from historically specific circumstances because there is nothing but what is, the given, the situated interest in justice, from which to start. Reflecting from within a particular social context, good normative theorizing cannot avoid social and political description and explanation. Without social theory, normative reflection is abstract, empty, and unable to guide criticism with a practical interest in emancipation." (Young, 1990/2011, p. 5).

⁴⁶⁷ "In his notion of interpretation as social criticism, Michael Walzer endorses a similar approach to moral reflection. The social critic is engaged in and committed to the society he or she criticizes. She does not take a detached point of view toward the society and its institutions, though she does stand apart from its ruling powers. The normative basis for her criticism comes from the ideals and tensions of the society itself, ideals already there in some form, in espoused principles that are violated, for example, or in social movements that challenge hegemonic ideas." (Young, 1990/2011, pp. 6–7). Reference to Walzer (1987) in *Interpretation and Social Criticism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p.61.

⁴⁶⁸ The starting question is "What are the implications for political philosophy of the claims of new group-based social movements associated with left politics—such movements as feminism, Black liberation, American Indian movements, and gay and lesbian liberation?" (Young, 1990/2011, p. 3).

⁴⁶⁹ She also follows communicative ethics of Habermas, though she rejects a homogeneous public (Young, 1990/2011, p. 7).

⁴⁷⁰ We can consider the concepts of *domination* and *oppression* as belonging to an epoch of morality. They suppress the deontological demands of reasoning and accept that the feeling of being oppressed is sufficient to identify a direction for justice.

⁴⁷¹ For the argument on the requirements of objectivity implied in justice, see points 4.2.1.1, "Reflexivity of justice, affective and cognitive" and 4.2.2, "Deontological demands of public reasoning".

4.6.1.1 The ambivalence of social groups and communities

The author proposes a vision of justice that is neither based on the individual-society nor on communities. She states that there is a third way to look into social relations (Young, 1990/2011, p. 226).⁴⁷² Young rejects society as a totality, identifying it with dangerous bureaucratisation (p. 236), lack of democratic procedures in favour of expert approach to policy making (p. 10), and associated cultural domination of some groups over others. But Young disagrees that a community can offer a viable model for “democratic policy”, for in practice it operates the exclusion of “those with whom the group does not identify” (p. 227).⁴⁷³ Young considers it possible that “if city politics is to be democratic and not dominated by the point of view of one group, it must be a politics that takes account of and provides voice for the different groups that dwell together in the city without forming a community.” (p. 227).

Marion Young advocates a difference-centred model for discussing and deciding on the “ends and means of collective life” (p. 251).⁴⁷⁴ This does not imply the autonomy of infra-societal groups, neither a form of “face-to-face” politics that Young actually considers antinomic to politics (p. 233).⁴⁷⁵ Instead, Young furthers the necessity of “large regional governments” (p. 242) as the first level of political autonomy. These governments are to make politics, understood in a broad way as the discussion of all topics subject to collective decision-making (a rule, a practice, a cultural meaning) (p. 9). It is in this context that Young’s defence of group difference takes place (p. 234).⁴⁷⁶ Groups should be given a voice in the political discussion of common problems at an adequate scale (p. 251).⁴⁷⁷ She opposes both national centralism and the self-segregation of communities (p. 242). Indeed, the author points out that autonomous suburban municipalities “exploit the benefits of the city without providing anything in return.” (p. 250).

4.6.2 A teleological argument of urbanity, centred on liberty

This argument is placed within a broader framework that stipulates city life as a normative ideal, defined as the “being together of strangers in openness to group difference” (Young, 1990/2011, p. 256). As part of what city life is about, Young underlines four virtues. 1) Social differentiation without exclusion, which refers to the fact that the contact with difference is unavoidable, irrespective of one’s affective comfort and cognitive understanding of the other. In

⁴⁷² “Many philosophers and political theorists criticize welfare capitalist society for being atomistic, depoliticized, fostering self-regarding interestgroup pluralism and bureaucratic domination. The most common alternative vision offered by such critics is an ideal of community. Spurred by appeals to community as an alternative to liberal individualism made by Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, and others, in recent years political theorists have debated the virtues and vices of communitarianism as opposed to liberalism (Gutmann, 1985; Hirsch, 1986; Wallach, 1987; Buchanan, 1989). Many socialists, anarchists, feminists, and others critical of welfare capitalist society formulate their vision of a society free from domination and oppression in terms of an ideal of community. Much of this discussion would lead us to think that liberal individualism and communitarianism exhaust the possibilities for conceiving social relations.” (Young, 1990/2011, p. 226).

⁴⁷³ “It should be clear from the preceding chapters that I share many of the communitarian criticisms of welfare capitalist liberal democratic theory and society. I shall argue in this chapter, however, that the ideal of community fails to offer an appropriate alternative vision of a democratic polity. The ideal of community exemplifies the logic of identity I analyzed in Chapter 4. This ideal expresses a desire for the fusion of subjects with one another which in practice operates to exclude those with whom the group does not identify. The ideal of community denies and represses social difference, the fact that the polity cannot be thought of as a unity in which all participants share a common experience and common values. In its privileging of face-to-face relations, moreover, the ideal of community denies difference in the form of the temporal and spatial distancing that characterizes social process.” (Young, 1990/2011, pp. 226, 227).

⁴⁷⁴ “It [autonomy] should be distinguished from empowerment, which I define as participation of an agent in decision making through an effective voice and vote. Justice requires that each person should have the institutionalized means to participate effectively in the decisions that affect her or his action and the conditions of that action. Empowerment is an open concept, a concept of publicity rather than privacy. Agents who are empowered with a voice to discuss ends and means of collective life, and who have institutionalized means of participating in those decisions, whether directly or through representatives, open together onto a set of publics where none has autonomy.” (Young, 1990/2011, p. 251).

⁴⁷⁵ “In my view, a model of the good society as composed of decentralized, economically self-sufficient face-to-face communities functioning as autonomous political entities does not purify politics, as its proponents think, but rather avoids politics.” (p. 233). The author further points that such model says nothing on the relation between small communities (p. 234).

⁴⁷⁶ “A more participatory democratic society should indeed encourage active publics at the local levels of neighbourhood and workplace. But the important political question is how relations among these locales can be organized so as to foster justice and minimize domination and oppression.” (Young, 1990/2011, p. 234).

⁴⁷⁷ “Empowerment means, at minimum, expanding the range of decisions that are made through democratic processes. Even if nothing else changed about the American political system, for example, extensive democratization would occur if the regulations and policies currently made by executive governmental authority were opened to democratic participation.” (Young, 1990/2011, pp. 251, 252).

other words, Young is sensitive to urban sociological diversity and the imperative of alterity, irrespective of degrees of *allophilie/allophobie* (pp. 238–239). 2) Variety or diversity in the form of urban functions and uses (p. 239). 3) Eroticism or the potential discovery of something new and exciting. It is seen as opposite to community, for it implies the pleasures of encountering subjectivities that are unfamiliar to us (pp. 239–240). 4) Publicity, which refers to public space's accessibility to everyone, where group difference is most apparent and where a group cannot dominate space (p. 240). From this reading of city life, which bears substantive similitudes to the cognitive model of high urbanity by Jacques Lévy,⁴⁷⁸ Young concludes that public space needs to be open to freedom and the diversity of ends and, hence, cannot be apprehended outside the politics of difference. In parallel, Young asserts liberty as the primary orientation of regional governments (p. 254). Indeed, in an anti-zoning appeal, she states that individuals and groups should be free to do what they want, where they want, "as long as their activity does not harm other agents or inhibit their ability to develop and exercise their capacities" (pp. 254–255).⁴⁷⁹

Young thinks it is possible to accommodate pluralism deliberately, but as soon as the city comes into discussion, she argues for the normative force of a model of high urbanity.⁴⁸⁰ To our knowledge, she does not elaborate on how these procedural and normative elements are to be articulated. Young suggests that a normative mode of social relations is based on city coexistence, its demands of public accessibility, and the heteronomy of the inhabitants. Other ambiguous elements regard Young's concession into some form of right to association based on similitude (promoting reproduction of social groups (Young, 1990/2011, p. 47)).⁴⁸¹ Young repeatedly alerts that group affinity should be temporary and feeble, avoiding the formation of inside-out exclusionary attitudes (p. 236).⁴⁸² She also notes the dangers of insisting on inner homogeneity of groups. These ambiguities are solved in practice as the author advocates a form of porosity between neighbourhoods, corresponding to a minimal form of societal inclusion through the contiguity of differing territories. With regard to the social evolution of culture and identity of these groups, Young is tentative. She considers that through interaction with otherness, some "traditional practices might change," but she also sees that city life is likely "to encourage group identification and desire for cultural nationalism" (p. 238).

We have seen that Young restricts the identification of injustice to the experience of subordination. This results from the rejection of transcendental contents of justice with which to describe with rigour the absent qualities of social and individual experience of injustice. From the nuanced empirical reading of the potential of the city for justice, this theoretical choice is perplexing. Group difference seems to be seen by the author as a necessary tool for solidarity. Indeed, Young restricts the ethical motivation and deontological imperatives for getting involved in voicing justice claims to those directly concerned. We could reconstruct some of Young's ideas as the claim to a form of civic society

⁴⁷⁸ In Jacques Lévy's thought (see, in particular, sections 3.3 and 5.1), the relationship between the cognitive model and the political function of society gives clear precedence to the latter. This clarity has not been contacted in the selected reading of the work of Marion Young.

⁴⁷⁹ "To conclude, consider some principles that regional representatives ought to follow. First, regions should promote liberty. Major capital investment decisions, development, construction, and planning decisions, I have said, should be public, democratic, participatory, and regional in scope. This does not preclude any and all manner of "private enterprise"—individuals and collectives engaging in a diversity of activities of their choosing for ends they privately determine. Government at whatever level—whether regional, state, or national—should protect and encourage the liberty of individuals and collectives to do what they choose within the limits of regulation and planning decisions. Individuals and collectives should not only be able to do what they want, but they should be able to do it where they want, as long as their activity does not harm other agents or inhibit their ability to develop and exercise their capacities." (Young, 1990/2011, pp. 254, 255).

⁴⁸⁰ We have seen (section 3.3, "Lévy and Lussault: a reconstruction of Lefebvre's heritage"), that if we take seriously the spatiality of groups with different attitudes towards society (proximity/rejection), they are likely to point to different models of urbanity. Their compatibility is then a political question, not normative.

⁴⁸¹ Young presents this idea as follows:

"I believe that group differentiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes. Social justice... requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression." (1990, 47).

⁴⁸² "These arguments against community are not arguments against the political project of constructing and affirming a positive group identity and relations of group solidarity, as a means of confronting cultural imperialism and discovering things about oneself and others with whom one feels affinity. Critique of the ideal of community, however, reveals that even in such group-specific contexts affinity cannot mean the transparency of selves to one another. If in their zeal to affirm a positive meaning of group specificity people seek or try to enforce a strong sense of mutual identification, they are likely to reproduce exclusions similar to those they confront. Those affirming the specificity of a group affinity should at the same time recognize and affirm the group and individual differences within the group." (p. 236).

that allows for (shared) singularities to exist. This appeal could be articulated from a society of individuals with multiple group affiliations and evolving sources of identity. Many of Young's views on the city are close to our own, which makes it all the more necessary to understand the differences in the construction of the argument. We do not think that a spatial justice theory can deal without a universal framework of justice thought, for otherwise arguments, even if progressive, cannot be discussed. We also think that the desirability of city life needs to be anchored in a cognitive model, based on the historical development of urbanisation and the empirical study of the interrelation of space with other productive dimensions (such as economy or psychology). However, such model interacts with the political function of society, shedding light on the implications of a society's choice. It does not lead, via a consequentialist route alone, to the authoritative determination of the spatially just.

Theories of lower degree of *sociétalité*

The theories and doctrines in this section are presented in briefer notes and do not always reflect the reading of one integral original text per author. We do not have the ambition to cover the existing discussions on each entry but admit that, for the sake of our inter-disciplinary project, it is necessary to venture an interpretation of the main characteristics of each approach to justice.

4.7 Utilitarianism

A note by John Dewey and James Tufts (1910) on utilitarianism is eloquent on the existence of a horizon of justice in the body of utilitarian theories.⁴⁸³ In the context of the nineteenth century English society, Dewey and Tufts comment that Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism requires that all institutions and customs should be scrutinised under the standard of their contribution to the equal right of well-being for each individual. Utilitarianism is a response to Bentham's observation that "every intuitional theory tended to dignify prejudice, convention and fixed customs, and so to consecrate vested interest and inequitable institutions" (Dewey & Tufts, 1910, p. 287). This motivation animated the rational exercise of expelling cultural bias and self-interest from the realm of justice and demanded the rigorous study of consequences (pp. 232, 235–236). To support this operation, the theory postulates the "utilitarian criterion", that is, maximising "collective well-being, defined as the sum of well-being (or utility) of the individuals that compose a given society" (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 32).⁴⁸⁴ The meaning of utility evolved from Bentham's concept of happiness to the lesser hedonistic view of Mill. In the latter, the pleasure of the intellect and of being moral also counts in the measurement of well-being (1991, p. 34). In contemporary "preferential utilitarianism" the interpretation of utility is that of individual rational desire. That is, every preference counts as long as it does not emerge from a cognitive error, unrestricted by ethical filters (preferences are rated based on their intensity) (pp. 34–35). The horizon of justice traced by utilitarianism thus demands that the well-being of each society's member should be taken in consideration on an equal basis. Utilitarianism has many nuances, each of which receive different critiques, including on the grounds

⁴⁸³ Utilitarianism was developed by David Hume (1711–1776), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1747), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900). The only primary source (briefly) contacted in this review is Mill's *Utilitarianism* (1861/2014).

⁴⁸⁴ « Préfiguré entre autres par David Hume (1739), véritablement fondé par Jeremy Bentham (1789), baptisé par John Stuart Mill (1861), systématisé par Henry Sidgwick (1874), l'utilitarisme peut se ramener à un principe for simple. Lorsque nous agissons, il faut que nous fassions abstraction de nos intérêts et de nos penchants, de nous préjugés et des tabous hérités de la tradition, ainsi que de tout prétendu « droit naturel », et que nous nous préoccupions exclusivement de poursuivre, selon la formule de Hutcheson, « le plus grand bonheur pour le plus grand nombre ». Plus précisément, il s'agit de maximiser le bien-être collectif, défini comme la somme du bien-être (ou de l'utilité) des individus qui composent la collectivité considérée. » (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 32).

of feasibility (definition and measurement of utility, interpersonal comparison).⁴⁸⁵ Despite this internal variation, classic utilitarianism has been considered inefficient, overall, in arriving at an evaluation of justice that points towards reducing discrepancies in social disadvantages (pp. 35–37, 43–46).⁴⁸⁶ Even if utilitarianism has tried to argue that happiness is correlated with socio-economic advantage, choices maximising utility do not work towards an egalitarian society (p. 56).⁴⁸⁷ Adaptation to poverty is one example of the insufficiency of utility (a mental state unit of measurement of advantage and disadvantage) in accounting for equality (pp. 44–46). We retain the ethical appeal of utilitarianism as the consideration of every society member in the decisions that justice thought ought to issue; that is, the existence of procedural equality. As the definition of collective well-being is only perceived as a sum of individual utility, the maximisation of an average measurement is defective in the pursuit of a horizon of equality. The freedom-related components suffer from the unfreedoms associated with inequality.

As we have seen earlier, the insufficient *sociétalité* of the concept of society in Mill's work has been criticised by Rawls on the basis of a centralised calculation of utility (Rawls, 1971/1999, pp. 24–30). Van Parijs also underlines that the characteristic feature of utilitarianism is the interpretation of a collective well-being in a univocal manner as an increasing function of individual utilities (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 58).⁴⁸⁸ We can see the undiscussable quality of the principle of utility, correlated with the looseness of the theory's deontological demands. Extracting the ethical force from an aggregate of individual advantage points to – without implying it – the evacuation of the political function of society. We have in mind the widespread use of utilitarian criteria in urbanism; for example, in traffic modelling seeking to maximise flow.⁴⁸⁹ It does not follow, however, that the utilitarian approach leads to technocracy, as utility functions can be mobilised to inform the public debate on available options and their consequences. The understanding of well-being implied in utility also translates a form of methodological individualism. It is possible to find Mill's employment of the notion of public goods, for example, when interrelating health, knowledge, and how our happiness depends on the survival of others.⁴⁹⁰ But there is feeble interrelatedness between the part and the

⁴⁸⁵ The critique on utilitarianism is extensive. We can focus on three aspects supported by Van Parijs' account of utilitarianism (1991). The first is the problem of an interpersonal comparability of utility. It emerges in the context of normative economics, which try to calculate pareto superiority. As he sets out to deconstruct the argument, Van Parijs states: « Certes, l'utilitarisme n'offre pas comme tel un programme politique ou économique concret. Mais il offre un critère plausible à l'aide duquel des programmes concrets peuvent être évalués de manière à que le « meilleur » d'entre eux puisse être identifié et choisi. » (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 35). In the face of the difficulty to compare utility between different persons, a second problem appears as utilitarianism attempts to either circumscribe its application to cases of unanimity (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 36–37) or accept indirect measurements (eventually reductive) (p. 43). Van Parijs finds it plausible that some definitions of the good be made based on human nature, accepting reduced certitude: « (...) [U]ne place est ainsi faite à une forme d'utilitarisme qui juge que cela a un sens de maximiser la somme des utilités, parce que cela a un sens de comparer les utilités d'une personne à l'autre. (...) la nature humaine étant supposée fondamentalement une, une question de ce type a un sens et elle en principe susceptible d'une réponse unanime. » (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 49). The main critique addressed to utilitarianism is on the basis of equality. Even if utilitarianism has tried to argue that happiness is correlated with socio-economic advantage, choices maximising utility will not work towards an egalitarian society. Adaptation to poverty is one example of the insufficiency of utility (a mental state unit of measurement) in accounting for equality (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 44–46).

⁴⁸⁶ The reconstruction of utilitarian arguments can go as far as giving some status to equality beyond classic utilitarianism (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 58). Van Parijs states that "utilitarisme moyen", evaluating the utility per head in each option, is such an exception. All other versions are realistically working towards non-egalitarian results (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 32–68).

⁴⁸⁷ Some contemporary arguments in the defence of utilitarianism emphasise the link between dynamic production of goods and utility when they are obtained from differentiated conditions, supporting effort, creativity, etc. The exploration of these arguments still concludes that the outcome of such dynamic processes do not necessarily lead to the improvement of the least well-off (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 56)

⁴⁸⁸ In the most compatible version of utilitarianism with egalitarian concerns, the principle of utility is formulated similarly to the Rawlsian difference principle. That is as far as one can go, Van Parijs states, in rehabilitating utilitarianism. Beyond this line, it loses the characteristic feature of interpreting collective well-being in a univocal manner as the increasing function of individual utilities (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 58). « On peut en effet reformuler comme suit le "principe de différence": l'égalité (des niveaux d'utilité) est toujours socialement préférable, sauf si une distribution moins inégalitaire permet (dynamiquement) d'améliorer plus efficacement le niveau d'utilité de tous. (...) Pour attendre ce résultat, il a certes fallu abandonner la maximisation de la somme ou de la moyenne) des utilités, mais il n'y a pas pour autant fallu renoncer à l'utilitarisme en un sens plus large mai encore précis : la famille de principes évoquée (y compris le cas extrême constitué par le « principe de différence » interprété en termes d'utilité) continue en effet d'évaluer divers états sociaux entre lesquels il s'agit d'opter *exclusivement* en termes d'une fonction croissante des utilités individuelles. » (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 58).

⁴⁸⁹ The dissociation between utility and the political function clarifies that being alert to procedural equality is not synonymous to being sensitive to the importance of democratic procedures and public good.

⁴⁹⁰ "Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and providence of individuals. Even that most intractable of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and moral education, and proper control of noxious influences; while the progress of science holds out a promise for the future of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe. And every advance in that direction relieves us from some, not only of the chances which cut short our own lives, but,

whole; individual's preferences and public good (or aggregate outcome). The usefulness of utilitarian thought is attached to a worldview where most individual's actions have little consequence for society at large (Mill, 1861/2014):⁴⁹¹

"The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to." (Mill, 1861/2014).

This passage attests the presumption of the generalised dissociation between each individual rational desire and the common objects that result from their realisation. This assumption is problematic in a society of actors and their making of society. As we have seen,⁴⁹² it is the interrelatedness between these two instances (and the contemporary increase in individual freedom) which becomes apparent through social and spatial theory. This strengthens the need for deontological elements, that is, binding orientations towards the inhabitability of a city by each and all of its inhabitants.

4.8 Marxism

Marx's (1818–1883) entire work studies the possibility to transform the world for human emancipation (Wolff, 2015).⁴⁹³ The author has, without a doubt, a horizon of a desirable society in his mind anchored in the idea that liberty should reign over necessity (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 151).⁴⁹⁴ The Marxist tradition identifies exploitation as "unjust", though the used terminology comes from the "surplus value theory of profit".⁴⁹⁵ Exploitation concerns the reading of capital accumulation of some at the cost of the worker's alienated labour (Wolff, 2015). In this view, capitalist profit results from the surplus work of the worker, performed beyond the socially necessary labour that creates the value of his wage (Wolff, 2015).⁴⁹⁶ To consider the basis for a theory of justice to be the reversal of exploitation, is but a hesitant statement (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 95–113). Parijs argues that this concept (exploitation) is an insufficient ethical basis for criticising capitalism (pp. 95–113). Several arguments are mobilised, both empirical and theoretical.⁴⁹⁷ The author contends the reading of exploitation as an appropriation of what workers are owed, as

what concerns us still more, which deprive us of those in whom our happiness is wrapt up." (Mill, 1861/2014). A deeper investigation of Mill's empirical view of society would be necessary to support this preliminary interpretation.

⁴⁹¹ Referring to the detachment between private and public interest in most of a person's choices, Mill states, "it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate and authorised expectations, of any one else." (Mill, 1861/2014).

⁴⁹² For the declination of these themes at the scale of the urban society see section 3.3, "Lévy and Lussault: a reconstruction of Lefebvre's heritage".

⁴⁹³ In Marx's eleventh thesis in *The Theses on Feuerbach*, we read: "the philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it" (Marx, 1845; Wolff, 2015).

⁴⁹⁴ « Le but ultime du marxisme n'est-il pas, en effet, la substitution d'un « règne de la liberté » au « règne de la nécessité » ? » (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 151).

⁴⁹⁵ Wolff (2015) recognises that Marx did not specifically term exploitation as unjust, but it seems like a reasonable interpretation of the ethical concern of his work.

⁴⁹⁶ That is, beyond the working time equivalent to the value of the commodities necessary to keep the worker alive for a day. As a result of exploitation, Marx sees some individuals (the proletariat) unable to choose to be free from the bare satisfaction of their needs.

⁴⁹⁷ As Van Parijs notes, there are labourers who become independent even when departing from a low economic capital. By sustaining the historical argument we can underline that this counterfactual information applies to contemporary uses of exploitation and class struggle in denouncing injustice in societies with public education and immaterial means of productivity, which do not follow the logic of linking capital accumulation and added value.

such a claim dissociates the social components participating in work (including savings and risk, attached to the role of the “capitalist”) (pp. 100, 102).

Lévy further explores the poor *sociétalité* of Marx’s concept of society. In a sketch of a critical assessment of Marxism, he details three *derives* from what this theory’s contribution to social science could have been:⁴⁹⁸ 1) *Economisme*, that is, the flattening of society’s planes into the hypostatised economic dimension, which is also a « *matérialisme* », that is, the focus on material productions vis-à-vis the *sphère idéal*; 2) *Étatisme/sociologisme ouvrieriste*, that is, the blocking of the political function of society; 3) *Structuralisme*, as the absence of historicity when defining a program (attached to revolution) of development from capitalism into another type of social organisation (Lévy, 1994, p. 428).⁴⁹⁹ Marxism also gives little orientation to the question of what is collectively desirable once it brings about “the inevitable economic breakdown of capitalism, to be replaced by communism” (Wolff, 2015). We do not know which ethical values Marx postulates as a part of communism, as the author “refused to speculate in detail about the nature of communism, arguing that it would arise through historical processes, and was not the realization of a pre-determined moral ideal” (Wolff, 2015).

Despite these limitations, Marxism is an undoubted coordinate in the accessibility of the field of justice theories. Interestingly, it has played an important role in developments of liberty-centred theories (the oppositional construction of libertarianism, in particular). Van Parijs follows this route of accessibility to discuss the justice content of socialism, defined through the foundation of an economic system based on collective property and the importance of the formal liberty of each worker (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 95). The author argues that socialism, if it is to sustain the end of capitalist exploitation, implies: prohibiting voluntary exchanges between individuals, interdicting private property (of means of production), and instituting the distributive formula “to each according to his work” (pp. 129–130).⁵⁰⁰ As noted by Nozick, “socialism should forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults.” (1974/1988, pp.203–204).⁵⁰¹ This argument is based on a contradiction between socialism and liberty (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 150, 152), implying socialism’s reduction of agency-freedom and personal liberty.⁵⁰² This critique has been counter-argued by Marxist philosophers, notably Gerald Cohen (1941–2009) and John E. Roemer (1945), as a necessary trade-off. In this line of thought, the reconstructed Marxist appeal is the pursuit of increased equality in the opportunities that people

⁴⁹⁸ « Le marxisme a enlevé une partie de sa force à la notion de totalité sociale en lui retirant la complexité. Si l’on s’intéresse à la société que Marx a vraiment étudiée, la « société capitaliste », la totalité sociale marxienne est fondamentalement unidimensionnelle et bloquée. Elle ne contient pas d’acteurs mais uniquement des structures se reproduisant mécaniquement (les rapports de production) et des substances transhistoriques (les classes). Marx a renversé l’usage de ses propres outils, les a retourné contre eux-mêmes : il a dédialectisé le capitalisme après l’avoir pourtant fait surgir, dans sa pensée, comme le produit des contradictions des époques précédentes. » (Lévy, 1994, p. 426).

⁴⁹⁹ « L’analyse des textes permet, même en tenant compte de tous les glissements de sens du « jeune » Marx à Lénine, de caractériser le concept de société par trois dérives qui lui retirent sa complexité : l’économisme, l’étatisme et le structuralisme. L’économisme écrase le social sur un seul de ses plans et dévalorise les autres ; il est aussi un « matérialisme » qui réduit le concept de production aux activités de fabrication et refuse d’y intégrer ses dimensions immatérielles et le domaine des représentations. L’étatisme, joint à un sociologisme ouvrieriste, a pour effet de faire l’impasse totale sur le politique et ses fonctions dans la société. Enfin le structuralisme, fondé sur l’« hypothèse ad hoc » de l’impossible autodépassement du capitalisme, refuse de prendre en compte une historicité concrète faite à la fois de continuités et de rupture, nie la cumulativité et la progressivité de la temporalité humaine et rend possible des interprétations millénaristes de l’idée de révolution. » (Lévy, 1994, p. 428).

⁵⁰⁰ “Ce que les marxistes s’assignent comme objectif ultime – le communisme entendu comme société pleinement libérée – n’est donc pas forcément fait pour déplaire à Nozick. C’est dans la mesure où ils promeuvent le socialisme comme le moyen de réaliser cet objectif que Nozick est persuadé qu’ils sont sur la mauvaise voie. Car le socialisme idéal, quelle que soit la formulation exacte utilisée pour le distinguer tant du communisme que du capitalisme, implique sans nul doute (1) la fin de l’exploitation capitaliste, (2) la prohibition de la propriété privée des moyens de production et (3) la distribution (de la plus grande part) du produit social selon la formule « A chacun son travail ». (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 129–130).

⁵⁰¹ As cited by Van Parijs from « Le socialiste devrait interdire les actes capitalistes entre adultes consentantes. » in Nozick (1974/1988), *Anarchie, État et Utopie*. Paris: PUF.

⁵⁰² «Pour que le produit soit distribué selon les contributions en travail (actuel), l’exploitation et la propriété privé des moyens de production doivent être interdites. Et cela ne peut que signifier la prohibition de certaines transactions, pleinement volontaires de la part des parties engagées. Pareille implication... met directement en évidence l’existence d’un conflit entre le socialisme et la liberté. (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 150) ; « Nier que notre liberté consiste à faire ce que nous désirons a toute chance de susciter la crainte que la liberté soit bientôt interprétée comme consistant à faire ce que l’avant-garde révolutionnaire sait qu’il est bon que nous fassions faire. » (p. 152).

have a real liberty of enjoying (pp. 157–158).⁵⁰³ We can then interpret that Marxism draws a horizon of equality and well-being-freedom (for a part of society) at the cost of agency-freedom and the personal liberties of all society's members. The partial liberty to be measured at the end of an egalitarian achievement is at the expense of the effective free choice of what individuals have reasons to pursue.

For the purpose of our project, it is relevant to note that owing the “means of production” might give an economic monopoly to one social group and excessive influence over other social planes, but this concession does not extend dominance of a group to the totality of society's dimensions. As we set out to discover legitimate denunciations of spatial injustice emerging from positions of different economic capital, we have reasons to expect that the Marxist grammar of injustice does not us allow to read the sense of injustice voiced by a significant part of Porto society. In the review of spatial justice theories (section 5.2 of the next chapter), we take note that this grammar is still present.⁵⁰⁴

4.9 Libertarianism

Libertarianism is a doctrine that places liberty at its core (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 116–120).⁵⁰⁵ The singular substantiation of this centrality clearly defies the traditional political *decoupage* left/right. The key idea of libertarianism is to consider the market as a normative principle, that is, as the sole mode of organisation of a complex society that does not infringe upon fundamental individual rights (p. 121).⁵⁰⁶ Libertarianism considers that we cannot know what will happen before individuals use their freedom (pp. 20, 22), which limits a prospective basis of society's interference towards justice. A libertarian just market in its own right dispenses state actions except, eventually, in minimal arrangements protecting private agencies that secure the application of contracts and property rights (pp. 118–119). In more extreme formulations, libertarianism re-joins the anarchist rejection of the state, contending that taxation for distribution are forms of extortion and forced labour (Sandel, 2009, pp. 58–74).

Libertarians state that theories of justice do not need to think of distribution according to “patterns” extrinsic to the market mechanism.⁵⁰⁷ The substantiation of rights is left open to whatever the actors in that market consider necessary to the pursuit of their cooperation. The assumption is that each individual has an equal right to dispose freely of its body and of its property, so to engage in free markets (Lamont & Favor, 2014).⁵⁰⁸ Liberty is thus connected with the participation in economic life. In this simplified conception of society, actors are the dominant components of social life, and, except for the market and minimal political instruments, the social collective objects are absent (including those in the form of developmental common objectives). The primacy of protecting individual rights does not leave any place for collective choice (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 64), eroding politics in lieu of the self-determination of society. We can complement this feeble idea of society with a reading on Nozick's conception of

⁵⁰³ « Une situation d'exploitation est, en partie, le résultat de ce que chaque personne choisit de faire avec sa force de travail et ses autres dotations et, en partie, le produit d'inégalités préexistantes. Même si ces dernières ne sont pas telles que l'une des parties n'a pas d'autre option que celle d'être exploitée, elles affectent profondément les possibilités offertes à chacune des parties, et ainsi la liberté réelle dont elles jouissent. » (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 157–158).

⁵⁰⁴ As it is explicit in the text, I have not invested, till the present, on an autonomous reading of Marx's work. In the brief review presented above, I rely on secondary sources only. This suffices for the objective of noting the insufficient complexity of Marx's conception of society. The distinction between the components of society present in the reading of Marx's contemporary society and the ones of the horizon is not worked out.

⁵⁰⁵ The term is intended to distance the doctrine from the ambiguities of liberalism, which, in the USA, serves to designate a spectrum of political attitudes from the moderate left to social democrats (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 116).

⁵⁰⁶ Van Parijs clarifies that the idea is not to see the market as the most efficient mechanism; the focus is explicitly on the foundation of individual freedom.

⁵⁰⁷ The rejection of the need for a patterned distribution on the basis that it creates an inexistent distributing actor shows well the extent to which totalities are absent from this theory.

⁵⁰⁸ According to Lamont and Favor, “Nozick takes his inspiration from John Locke's idea that everyone “owns” themselves and, by mixing one's labor, self-ownership can generate ownership of some part of the material world.” (Lamont & Favor, 2014).

social goods. The author takes into account the fact that there might exist goods that are collectively used before they are “originally” appropriated and that such a use might be vital. Nozick draws on John Locke to “handle correctly the cases where someone appropriates the total supply of something necessary for life” (Nozick, 1973, p. 75). He interprets the Lockean Proviso as the subjection of a just appropriation to the condition of not worsening the position of those who are no longer at liberty to use the property.⁵⁰⁹ But, as Van Parijs exemplifies, as long as some objects are to be commonly inhabited by society members (the examples provided are air and the city), the sole disposition of ethical norms regarding acquisition and property is insufficient (1991, p. 120).⁵¹⁰ The proviso says nothing on the freedoms of fruition and the production of those objects, which justice ought to assure (p. 120). Seeing the matter of social exchanges as a thing to be held in property does not address the complexity of social goods which are the indivisible results (and necessities) of human activity (including free trade) across a plurality of dimensions.

The reduced level of *sociétalité* of Nozick’s conception of society goes hand in hand with insufficient deontological elements and the non-debated quality of the minimally proposed ones. In narrower versions, normative principles are reduced to property rights in the form of “principles of transfer in holding” (Nozick, 1973). The latter neglect all other dimensions of society beyond economy. “Justice in holdings”, or justice in free intercourse, is to be evaluated with two main principles.⁵¹¹ The principle “of justice in acquisition” determines “the process(es) by which upheld things may come to be held”, and the principle of justice in transfer regulates exchanges in holdings (Nozick, 1973, pp. 46–47). As Van Parijs observes, these principles are insufficient to resolve conflicting liberties, as their ethical guidance to individual valuation only requires the formal extension of similar rights to others (1991, pp. 121–122). Sen talks of “equality on other grounds” when scrutinising Nozick’s non-invasiveness of other liberties (Sen, 2010, pp. 314–315). The illustrative case is a degree of entitlement to the fruits of one’s labour.

The theory is supplemented by a principle of rectification of injustice, proposing the use of historical information to deduce the holdings that would exist should a past injustice not have occurred (Nozick, 1973, p. 49).⁵¹² This principle ought to take precedence over “justice in holding” (p. 126),⁵¹³ and the author recognises that the extent of past injustices may be such that their rectification might require, temporarily, “a more extensive state” to redress them (p. 126).⁵¹⁴ Arguments against the feasibility of a calculation which attempts to redress past injustice point to several

⁵⁰⁹ The Lockean Proviso states that “an exclusive acquisition of the external world is just, if, after the acquisition, there is ‘enough and as good left in common for others.’” (Lamont & Favor, 2014). In Nozick’s interpretation we read: “A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing, will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened.” (Nozick, 1973, pp. 74, 75). There is an inconsistency here as the proviso is not disturbed by the removal of a liberty per se.

⁵¹⁰ « [R]ien n’exclut en principe, dans leur perspective, que toute terre habitable (y compris les rues, les parcs et autres lieux aujourd’hui publics) soit un jour la propriété privée de quelques individus. Si par hasard il venait à l’idée de ceux-ci d’imposer à tous les locataires et usagers de leurs biens l’interdiction de prononcer le mot « solidarité » ou d’écouter les disques de Bob Marley, il n’y aurait rien là pour offenser le libéralisme ainsi conçu (comme un « propriétéarisme ») » (Van Parijs P., 1991, p. 120). Van Parijs does not conceptualise this problem as regarding communal goods. He interprets “communal” as open spaces each social member can use in order to subsist and sees them less pertinent today than in hunter-gatherer and rural societies (Van Parijs P., 1991, p. 124). We can however reconstruct the sense of the communal in the form of public goods, regarding spatial resources (beyond materiality) necessary for the development of the individual and society.

⁵¹¹ A third principle determines that “... no one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of (1) and (2).” (Nozick, 1973, p. 47).

⁵¹² “This principle uses historical information about previous situations and injustices done in them (as defined by the first two principles of justice, and rights against interference), and information about the actual course of events that flowed from these injustices, up until the present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in the society. The principle of rectification presumably will make use of (its best estimate of) subjunctive information about what would have occurred (or a probability distribution over what might have occurred, using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken place.” (Nozick, 1973, p. 49).

⁵¹³ “These issues are very complex, and are best left to a full treatment of the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to a particular society, one cannot use the analysis and theory presented here, to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it. While to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make a more extensive state necessary in the short run in order to rectify them.” (Nozick, 1973, p. 126).

⁵¹⁴ “...given its particular history, what operable rule of thumb best approximates the results of a detailed application in that society of the principle of rectification? These issues are very complex, and are best left to a full treatment of the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to a particular society, one cannot use the analysis and theory presented here, to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it. While to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make a more extensive state necessary in the short run in order to rectify them.” (Nozick, 1973, p. 126).

limitations: the counterfactual description it requires, the lack of information it faces, and the overall magnitude of past injustices (Lamont & Favor, 2014). The principle of rectification reveals a static reading of the social, abstracting from the cumulative and progressive qualities of history (Lévy, 1994, p. 428). Compensation's appeal to equality is also internally incoherent with the idea of liberty as defined by libertarians. A retroactive equaliser cannot account for the freedom of the actors in using the resources available to them, had they not been usurped.

The central justice component of libertarianism is agency-freedom removed from a collective future-enabling potential.⁵¹⁵ The room made for "equality on other grounds" is based on the formal extension of such a freedom to all (independently of how different capitals translate that right into actual capabilities). The theory says nothing about the present-day experience of well-being-freedom, procedural equality, or enhancements of equality.⁵¹⁶ Like Rawlsian fairness, libertarianism is concerned with the set-up of institutions, not the actual functioning and realisation of society (Sen, 2010, pp. 84–85). It differs from Rawlsian transcendentalisms in the absence of environments in the identification of injustice and of collective objects in planes other than the economic.

Van Parijs defines proprietarian liberalism in opposition to solidaristic theories with a concern for redistribution:

« Ce que le libéralisme propriétaire a de spécifique apparaît nettement dès qu'on le compare avec le libéralisme solidariste. Celui-ci fait fi de tout entitlement préalable, de toute prétention présociale, et s'interroge sur ce qu'implique une égale sollicitude à l'égard de tous les membres de la société. La justice, ici va consister à distribuer d'une certaine manière – c'est le critère de répartition – une variable dont la distribution interindividuelle importe directement... c'est le distribuendum. Les nombreuses variantes du libéralisme solidariste diffèrent les uns des autres par les choix, essentiellement indépendants d'un de l'autre, du distribuendum et du critère. » (Van Parijs P. , 1991, pp. 250–251).

"Propriétaire" theories seek to legitimise pre-social natural rights, inspired by Hobbes and Locke, that is, entitlements that individual would dispose of should there not be a society (pp. 248–250). These entitlements are enhanced by the products of social cooperation, interpreted in an economic plane (p. 250).⁵¹⁷ Such entitlements take the form of property rights (radical libertarianism) or well-being (in the work of Nozick or Gauthier) whose violation is extortion. We can see that this fundament is a negation of society's mutualisation of resources.

4.10 Desert-based theories

We dedicate some paragraphs to clarifying the notion of desert, because its use is an important trait in the empirical discourses of our corpus. Desert is a concept used by several theories, including Aristotle, Leibniz, Mill, Sidgwick, and Ross (Feldman & Skow, 2015).⁵¹⁸ As Mill recognises, "the clearest and most emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind" is that "it is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether good or evil) which he deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil,

⁵¹⁵ If we recall that personal liberties include their extension to all, it is difficult to maintain that the concept is central to the theory when the concern for equality is minimal.

⁵¹⁶ On the last point, and at the end of the reconstructed debate between libertarianism and marxism, Van Parijs concludes,

"Le noyau de ce qui constitue à mes yeux la réponse la plus adéquate que la tradition marxiste puisse apporter au défi libertarien est qu'il importe d'abord de préciser l'objectif poursuivi, de spécifier le type particulier de société libre dans lequel il est jugé désirable de vivre. Et pour atteindre cet objectif le plus sûrement ou le plus rapidement, il n'est pas sage de n'avoir d'yeux que pour la liberté réelle de tous. » (Van Parijs P. , 1991, p. 163).

⁵¹⁷ « La société juste, ici encore, est une société qui permet pas qu'on l'on extorque à un individu ce qui lui revient en vertu de droits « présociaux ». Mais ce qui revient à chacun est maintenant défini comme la prétention légitime à obtenir la partie du surplus coopératif qu'un marchandage rationnel lui attribuerait. » (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 250).

⁵¹⁸ In this section, we do not explore an author delivering a formal and comprehensive account of a theory. If we ought to find a central author who inspires the doctrine, that would be Aristotle's teleological philosophy. We can deduce that the proximity between Aristotle and Aquinas, namely in the absence of a horizon of comprehensive equality, would not bring us near a valid proposition of a (contemporary) theory of justice. See section 4.11, "Morality centred on charity", in particular the passage on "natural law and the virtue of justice" (4.11.2.2).

which he does not deserve” (Mill, 1861/2014).⁵¹⁹ Rawls’s idea of fairness can be seen as a negative form of desert. He advances that “no one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favourable starting place in society” and that “undeserved inequalities call for redress” (Rawls, 1971/1999, pp. 86–87). Indeed, the horizon of fair equality and opportunity aims to reduce the arbitrariness of desert (p. 64).⁵²⁰ Rawls’s thought points to the insufficiency of desert vis-a-vis the concept of responsibility:

“The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.” (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 64).

We can propose to read responsibility as a dynamic involving individual, social environment, and society; and to consider desert as an intrinsic quality of a person, independent from social relations and societal influence (no environment and not society, only actors).

In attempts symmetrical to Rawls’s use of the notion, desert is defined as the entitlement to something (the object of desert), by someone (the deserter), in the function of a pattern of evaluation (the basis of desert) (Feldman & Skow, 2015). The desert basis can have several definitions (Lamont & Favor, 2014).⁵²¹ In critical views of welfarism, it is related to contribution to society (Lamont & Favor, 2014). This basis expresses “the concern that various forms of welfarism treat people as mere containers for well-being, rather than purposeful beings, responsible for their actions and creative in their environments” (Lamont & Favor, 2014).⁵²² There is empirical support for seeing distributive practices as disincentive to societal collaboration, as in the argument of “poverty trap” associated with social revenues for some (Van Parijs, 2013). The notion is not deprived of ethical appeal. But inasmuch as that idea of desert is attached to the reception of a tribute after one’s deserving attitude, it is not of much use in a paradigm of systemic goods (where the start and end are not necessarily identifiable).

As we have seen earlier, the use of desert is possible in theories of higher *soci t alit *. Boltanski and Th venot reframe the notion and its surrounding lexical field (worth, investment, “sacrifice”) on a plurality of dimensions, discussing the assignments of worth according to meanings and pragmatics, which are socially constructed in different social themes.⁵²³ Walzer makes use of the notion in the form of praise restricted to the sphere of recognition.⁵²⁴ The problem then is not with the semantic field, which indeed carries with it legitimate social differentiation, but with the use of the notion in non-societal frameworks. We should then be attentive to the uses of desert breathing insufficient systemic quality of social goods as well as their plurality and complex production; the merging down of the political into a sphere of interpersonal relations; and responsibility attributed solely to actors, neglecting both the societal

⁵¹⁹ As Mill continues this sentence, he emphasises desert’s relationship with direct reciprocity: “Speaking in a general way, a person is understood to deserve good if he does right, evil if he does wrong; and in a more particular sense, to deserve good from those to whom he does or has done good, and evil from those to whom he does or has done evil.” (Mill, 1861/2014, pp. ch 5, paragraph 7). The centrality of desert in the common understanding of justice, attached to Mill’s vision is noted by Feldman and Skow (Feldman & Skow, 2015).

⁵²⁰ “The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.” (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 64).

⁵²¹ Lamont and Favor synthesize a wide-range of definitions of basis of desert (Lamont & Favor, 2014). They cite Miller and Riley’s reward for contribution to the social work and Sadurski and Milne’s proportion to effort. The authors cite Miller, D. (1989) *Market, State, and Community*, Oxford: Clarendon Press and Riley, J. (1989) “Justice Under Capitalism,” *Markets and Justice*, John W. Chapman (ed.), New York: New York University Press, 122–162; Sadurski, W. (1985a), *Giving Desert Its Due*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel; Sadurski, W. (1985b), *Giving desert its due : social justice and legal theory* (Law and Philosophy Library, Volume 2), Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel and Milne, H. (1986) “Desert, effort and equality,” *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 3: 235–243.

⁵²² Lamont and Favor introduce a section dedicated to desert-based principles of distributive justice as follows: “Another complaint against welfarism is that it ignores, and in fact cannot even make sense of, claims that people deserve certain economic benefits in light of their actions (Feinberg, Lamont 1997). The complaint is often motivated by the concern that various forms of welfarism treat people as mere containers for well-being, rather than purposeful beings, responsible for their actions and creative in their environments.” (Lamont & Favor, 2014).

⁵²³ See section “Plural justifications in social environments (Boltanski and Th venot)” in Chapter 1.

⁵²⁴ We have seen that the author restrains the legitimacy of desert within a theory that foresees a just society as enacting a multi-dimensional concern for equality demanding other criteria, such as need and liberty.

context where individuals and collectives act and the cumulative effect of their previous experiences in the formation of their capital. Discourses of the ethos constructed positively (and strictly) on the notion of desert, which evade responsibility at the level of the individual, the social environment, and the society as a whole, are inaccurate for reading the social world, and its possibilities of justice increases. An approach to justice de-contextualising feasible standards with which to assess the performance of the actors is indeed very close to morality, as displayed, for example, in the contemporary survival of medieval Christianity. This alerts us to the importance that a theory of justice should not be solely constructed in function of the horizon. It can be fruitful to comprise the actual movement towards the horizon, where such issues of feasible demands on actors can be made visible and discussed.

4.11 Morality centred on charity

We arrive at the final section of this review of the universe of the ethos. This section explores the thesis with which we opened this chapter: the production of ethics opposes morality as its predecessor in the history of the ethos. We sketch Aquinas' ontology, exposing the connection between the medieval reading of the social world and the normative prescriptions it produced. The spectacular contrast between the thirteenth century society experienced by Aquinas and our own time helps us see the anachronisms of contemporary Christian-based morality centred on charity.

Making a detour through the discourse of Thomas Aquinas on morality further explores the historical situatedness of the component of the ethos. But the main justification for this passage is empirically driven.⁵²⁵ Indeed, after an initial frequentation of the corpus, it became evident that some discourses hardly resonated with any of the theories of justice reviewed at that time. Given the significance of the Catholic religion in the Portuguese society,⁵²⁶ we have observed the need of further insight into a moral discourse of Christian affiliation. Christianity cannot be described solely as a moral doctrine, for its normative commandments depend on theological faith. However, "insofar as it meets the acting, the being of man, the existence with others" (Boulnois, 1996, p. 304),⁵²⁷ we can expect Christian principles for human conduct to be empirically evoked from various standpoints: religious points of view, an explicitly atheist cosmology, or discourses which omit this information. The decoupage of non-theological philosophy vis-à-vis theist visions is not relevant to the hypothesis that elements of this coordinate from the ethos might have travelled to the ideality of Porto's society as contemporary moral figures.⁵²⁸ What interests us here is to prepare the ground for the empirical understanding of how such normative elements are mobilised in a contemporary sense of justice. Are they used to reflect on the self, or are they mirrored to evaluate others? Do they relate to the notion of individual rights absent in the historical context of their origin? Do they claim a role in the construction of a social or spatial

⁵²⁵ In any brief account of such an encompassing universe of discursive production, the choice of one author is a discretionary act. The development of Christian morality can be followed since the sacred canons in the last centuries of the pre-Julian calendar, through to their interpretations in the Middle Age. Inasmuch as medieval thinkers selectively integrated classical philosophy in the light of their own social environment and worldview, to extensively look at Christian texts would also imply a diagonal passage by classical authors – Aristotle, in particular. This text is, then, but a sketch based on very partial readings. These readings were oriented by the elements of the corpus, which we were trying to make intelligible.

⁵²⁶ Eighty one per cent of the population of Portugal considers itself Catholic according to Census 2011 (Wikipedia, 2015). Despite the separation between the state and the church since 1911, the presence of the Catholic Church in public education is institutionalised through the disciplinary curriculum of Catholic Religious and Moral Education (Educação Moral e Religiosa Católica (EMRC)) from the first to the twelfth year of the national curricula.

⁵²⁷ My translation of the original French version. We can read the original in this extended excerpt: « La morale ne fait pas partie du Credo, le christianisme n'est pas en son essence une morale, pas même une source transcendante de la morale. Il est une fois, non une loi. En son centre il proclame le salut et prétend y adhérer ; il n'exige pas la justice, mais promet le pardon, il ne condamne une faute, mais confesse le péché. Tout le discours de la morale chrétienne ne peut être qu'un discours du croyant sur le bien, sur la dette envers autrui et envers lui-même. Il ne serait être un discours politique, qui servirait du masque de Dieu pour s'imposer idéologiquement des règles morales. Et pourtant, dans la mesure où il rencontre l'agir, l'être de l'homme, l'existence avec autrui, le regard de la foi croise celui du philosophe et du moraliste. (...) Le christianisme encadre la morale, mais il n'en dépend pas ; il l'intègre, mais il la transforme. » (Descombes, 1996).

⁵²⁸ Given the conception of medieval thinkers in their *oeuvre* as complete ontologies, it is also meaningful to keep those components in a relational manner.

collective project? We now turn to the review of Aquinas' ontology, structured in Natural and Divine laws and the two corresponding central concepts of justice and charity.

4.11.1 Aquinas, a sketch of morality in the medieval age

Aquinas's (1225–1274) ontology cannot be considered as a theory of justice. Interpreted in the light of the medieval hierarchical society where “each had its own purpose, role, and function, achieving its own good by being ordered to the good of what can be called a sovereign “whole”” (Coleman, 2011, p. 182),⁵²⁹ it lacks the fundamental perspective of a future with increased liberty or equality. Some elements of Aquinas's thought are political, in the sense that they enter a debate on a mode of life that follows on from the activities of men of his time in bringing about a collective mode of existence.⁵³⁰ Topics such as rules on land ownership and use are considered by Jane Coleman as properly political, not only because they define a common destiny within a social “mode of life”, but also because they constituted, in medieval times, a proper debate among political scholars (Coleman, 2011). This debate is not a unified ideological doctrine but proposes a diversity of solutions on how to regulate the necessity of intercourse with other people (p. 182).⁵³¹ However, that political thought is framed within a cosmology that is deprived of the idea of an individuated individual who is capable of defining the pursuits of his life.⁵³² Ascribing (and accepting) obligatory roles to the lives of persons (p. 181) is foundational to the organisation of society in this period, and therefore, it is not possible to find signs of “the modern, Western, “liberated”, subjective individual” (p. 183). Liberated individuals “through a kind of equality, individual rights, and state law” could only emerge together with the historical conditions that brought about the American and French Revolutions (p. 181).⁵³³ Inexistent is also a horizon of symmetric social relations puncturing the naturalness of poverty. Distributive practices of almsgiving is the corollary of these “unthinkables”. Certainly, the role of God in supernatural happiness in the afterlife accompanies these absences. But, it is also arguable that medieval thinkers were concerned (within the possibilities of the status quo of their time) with “theories and practices that supported, rather than obliterated, the interests of the juridically unequal and presumed “voiceless”: the poor and the propertyless.” (p. 184).

⁵²⁹ “When one exams Christian political theorists we “are examining a period in which hierarchies were taken for granted, in which the universe itself was conceived as divinely ordered in terms of relationships between natural things and their originating source, each natural thing being subject to something higher than itself. Within this hierarchy, each had its own purpose, role, and function, achieving its own good by being ordered to the good of what can be called a sovereign “whole”. (...) The individual was conceptualised only as embedded within this holistic framework. He was considered to play his own role in the common and public welfare and where the coordinating direction of the whole was the remit of those with the power to make discretionary, but not arbitrary, decision for peace, security and justice of the whole community.” (Coleman, 2011, p. 182).

⁵³⁰ “What will be discussed is some of the definite forms of activity, definite forms of expressing their life, their *modes of life* that *followed on* from how they contrived their “survival” and physical “reproduction”. The “mode of life” is the domain of ethical, socio-political, and religious discourses of the period and, hence, it is where we will find “medieval political thought”. (Coleman, 2011, p. 182). Explaining the reconstruction of this thought from an ensemble of products which do not follow present day disciplinary decoupages, the authors states: “The spectrum of languages is the consequence of literate men having been educated in a variety of disciplines, including theology, canon and civil law, and university arts, faculty logic, natural science, and what they called practical moral philosophy. Practical moral philosophy was itself divided into three related but distinct subjects; what concerned the individual; what concerned the domestic and economic; and, lastly, what pertained to the political and civic.” (Coleman, 2011, pp. 183, 184).

⁵³¹ “Language, as an expression of practical consciousness, arises from the necessity of intercourse with other men, the necessity of their being social creatures, and during our period “material production” developed and the changes often served as the subject of intense debate: over property ownership; use; money; lending at interest/usury; obligations and obedience to authorities; the specification of reciprocal duties to others.” (Coleman, 2011, p. 182). The expression “material production” is a reference to Engels and Marx employment in: Marx, K., Engels, F. (1978) *German Ideology*, (ed.) C. J. Arthur. London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 42.

⁵³² “Medieval people were described by the writers we will examine as living together by means of reciprocal activities, where their mutual and hierarchically arranged duties were enshrined in law and backed up by sanctions for the non-compliant.” (Coleman, 2011, p. 182).

⁵³³ “The historical conditions that helped to bring about these revolutions showed that industry and commerce, serving world markets, rearranged the structures of different social status groups and within this came their members' respective “liberation” through a kind of equality, individual rights, recognized in unified state law.” (Coleman, 2011, p. 181).

4.11.2 Justice and charity in Aquinas' ontology

In Aquinas's work, theological, moral, and political ideas are studied, reflected on, and written in a relational manner. Jean-Pierre Torrell (1996), a contemporary expert on Aquinas, who is himself Dominican, argues that there is an understructure of "rational psychology" in Aquinas' study of human action, which can be considered a moral philosophy (p. 1953).⁵³⁴ This philosophy generalises principles of individual conduct extensible to all human life, which, in Aquinas's work, is entire humanity beyond the Aristotelian polis (p. 1949). This object of morality is not separable from the repercussions that individual acts have on the common good. As seen above, the political function of society is present and it intertwines morality and theology. Throughout, the existence of God and of the afterlife has implications on man's participation in the worldly affairs of society. It touches the entire enterprise of defining values that regulate the individual relationship with himself (individual sphere), with others (the sphere of sociality), and with society as a whole (the societal).

4.11.2.1 Natural law and the virtue of justice

Torrell explores the division of Thomism in eternal and natural laws and recognises Aquinas's conception of a margin of free act. Persons use morality to compare, hierarchize, and choose "worthy intermediate ends" that are not reducible to the final end of beatitude in the contemplation of God. To accommodate this dualism of terrene and divine ends, the anthropological view of man is made of two main faculties of the soul: will (*volonté*) and reason (*intelligence*). While the first is synonymous to man's orientation to supreme Good, the second captures man's orientation towards truth and adherence to the "first principles of reason" (Torrell, 1996, p. 1950). These principles, which are basically the capacity of man to distinguish good from evil and act accordingly, are to regulate a person's behaviour in what is left open to self-determination, even in medieval societies. It is in this sense that Torrell asserts the existence of individual liberty in Aquinas's conception of man:

« La volonté reste donc une puissance unique, mais la dualité fondamentale de ses actes permet la dualité de cette désignation. C'est cela même qui fonde la liberté : inscrite dans le mouvement nécessaire vers le bien qui définit la puissance appétitrice rationnelle, elle tient de cela même la capacité de n'être déterminée par aucun bien particulier. Lorsqu'elle choisit celui-ci ou celui-là, elle doit en fait lui conférer le surcroît d'amabilité dont on a besoin pour emporter son adhésion. D'où l'axiome toujours répété : Qualis est unusquisque talis finis uidetur ei (« chacun juge de la fin selon ce qu'il est lui-même »). D'où aussi la nécessité d'éduquer la liberté, car il lui arrive fréquemment de se tromper et de choisir un mal sous les apparences d'un bien. » (Torrell, 1996, p. 1950).

These faculties are complemented by passions, the third element of Aquinas's human psychology. Passions are defined as sensible appetites and embrace even the lightest emotional response, which is beyond the current definition of passion as an uncontrollable urge (p. 1950). These affective movements are seen as tending to a positive fruition, and they are neither good nor evil in themselves. They only enter the domain of morality as they enter human life, that is, as the actions of man have repercussions in the common life (p. 1952). Natural law thus responds to the external need to orient the participation of human beings in divine governance, mingling the virtuous prescriptions with those of civil law (Coleman, 2011, pp. 193–195). By following prescriptions of natural law, man becomes (at least partially) his own providence, in his personhood, but also as a member of a community (Torrell, 1996, p. 1952).⁵³⁵

⁵³⁴ « L'inspiration générale de la démarche est biblique et chrétienne, cela va sans dire, mais Thomas ne renonce pas pour autant à donner des règles qui valent pour la vie humaine en général. C'est dans ce sens qu'on pourrait parler à son propos de philosophie morale, c'est-à-dire de tout un soubassement naturel présupposé, que la grâce ne détruit pas, mais mène à la perfection. Ainsi l'analyse de l'acte libre n'a rien de spécifiquement chrétien et doit beaucoup à Aristote. » (Torrell, 1996, p. 1953). This statement introduces an argumentative line that explores the possibility to isolate the moral philosophy of Aquinas from his theological ideas. The author arrives at statements where the response seems to be negative, even if it is not put in these terms.

⁵³⁵ "Si la loi éternelle s'identifie au gouvernement divin, à la Providence, la loi naturelle en est une participation dans la créature raisonnable, de sorte qu'en suivant ses prescriptions qui, finalement, trouveront leur expression en diverses lois positives, l'homme est ainsi appelé à être sa propre providence. (...) cela ne concerne pas la personne dans son individualité seulement, mais bien dans sa qualité de membre, c'est-à-dire

The implications of man's conduct to others and society requires him to subject his passions to superior faculties by practising virtues (p. 1951). Virtues are instrumental (they are also the results of their own practise) in the perfecting ability of a person towards his own nature oriented to good (Torrell, 1996, p. 1951; Aquinas, 1274/2008, q. 62)^{536, 537} Aquinas conceives of four cardinal (that is, non-theological) virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The first two are located in the realm of the intellect, while fortitude and temperance are in the "sensitive appetite", that is, they regulate man's relationship with his emotions (Aquinas, 1274/2008, q. 58, a. 5).⁵³⁸ Prudence has the "architectonic function" of "directing the activity of reason;" justice performs "the objective regulation of operations in relation to others and to society;"⁵³⁹ fortitude belongs to the realm of personal discipline in the face of obstacles; and temperance moderates the pleasures that can distance one from the good (Torrell, 1996, p. 1953). Quoting Augustine, Aquinas summarises these general modes of virtue:

"The cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. On this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one man and another." (Aquinas, 1274/2008, q. 58, a. 8).

It is worth detailing the semantic content of justice as a moral virtue by annotating an ensemble of ideas. The matter of justice "belongs to those things that belong to our intercourse with other men." (Coleman, 2011, p. 182). It is a general virtue inasmuch as it directs all other virtues to the common good.⁵⁴⁰ The superiority of justice obtains from the achievement of a good, which is not only one's own but that of all and the effect of that common good in peace and in war (Aquinas, 1274/2008, q. 58, a. 12).⁵⁴¹ The other-regarding and collective object of justice is defined, following Aristotle, as "a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will" (q. 58,

engagée dans une communauté (nation ou famille humaine universelle). Si sa définition de l'homme comme animal « politique » conduit Thomas à reconnaître son inclination naturelle à vivre en société, il sait que sont agir a des répercussions inévitables sur la communauté dont il est membre. Œuvre de la raison, la loi a précisément pour but de servir la bonne vie en société, ce que Thomas appelle le bien commun (q. 90 a.1). » (Torrell, 1996, p. 1952).

⁵³⁶ In the references to the Summa Theologica, *q.* means question and *a.* means article. Note that the Summa has been written between 1265 and 1274. The bibliography only indicates the last year of writing.

⁵³⁷ This perfecting ability of persons towards their own nature oriented to the good is concretised in the developed of an "internal *habitus*" (Torrell, 1996, p. 1951).

"Virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." (Aquinas, 1274/2008, q. 62).

⁵³⁸ "Reply to Objection 2. Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude." (Aquinas, 1274/2008, q.58, a.5). "Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice." (Aquinas, 1274/2008, q.58, a.2).

⁵³⁹ « [La justice] qui a pour objet la régulation objective des opérations par rapport à autrui, soit aux personnes, soit à la société. » (Torrell, 1996, p. 1953).

⁵⁴⁰ "It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, 90, 2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good." (Aquinas, 1274/2008, pp. q.58, a.5) (Question 58 Justice, Article 5. Whether justice is a general virtue?)

⁵⁴¹ "If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person." (Aquinas, 1274/2008, pp. q.58, a.12).

a. 1).⁵⁴² Justice must proceed from reason, for it demands “to consider the relation of one thing to another,”⁵⁴³ that is, the comparison between a man and his due in external acts and external things (pp. q. 58, a. 8).⁵⁴⁴ In these judgements, the measure is no longer “the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard,” but emerges a “certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person” (q. 58, a. 10).⁵⁴⁵ In the context of measuring punishment, we can understand that this “certain equality” is not among individuals as the status quo participates in that “external” measurement (q.58, a.10).⁵⁴⁶

Mercy and pity, which are advocated in the precepts of charity, are regarded in relation to justice as secondary virtues. Justice is seen as more extensive, as it regards all voluntary exchanges, in particular trade. If mercy gives what is due to the other beyond ownership rights, it is not seen to alter the formulation of justice. The important feature is the free act of choosing to be “liberally beneficent” (q. 58, a. 11).⁵⁴⁷ In this sense, justice is a superior virtue extended towards everyone, not just to those capable of “liberality” in the face of the poor (q. 58, a. 12).⁵⁴⁸ Justice is joined in the intellectual realm by temperance (q. 47, a. 12). Its functions is not “to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means” (q. 47, a. 6). With that scope, it ought to seek advice that is necessary to inform good

⁵⁴² “Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (2). Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, “Rendering to each one his right,” since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others.” (...) “Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that “justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will”: and this is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that “justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice.” (Aquinas, 1274/2008, pp. q.58, a.1) (Question 58 Justice, Article 1. Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?) Note: the “Philosopher” is a reference to Aristotle.

⁵⁴³ “Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (Article 1).” (Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274/2008, pp. q.58, a.4) (Question 58 Justice, Article 4. Whether justice is in the will as its subject?)

⁵⁴⁴ “I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.” (Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274/2008, pp. q.58, a.8) (Question 58 Justice, Article 8. Whether particular justice has a special matter?)

⁵⁴⁵ “I answer that, As stated above (09; I-II, 59, 4), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard. | On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in Metaph. x [Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4: wherefore justice observes the real mean.” (Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274/2008, pp. q.58, a.10) (Question 58 Justice, Article 10. Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?)

⁵⁴⁶ Aquinas states that “the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual.” (Aquinas, 1274/2008, q.58, a.10) (Question 58 Justice, Article 10. Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?)

⁵⁴⁷ On the unequal experience of virtues between rulers and subjects, masters and slaves, we can read:

“I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject. | Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler “after the manner of a mastercraft” (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the subjects, “after the manner of a handicraft.” (Aquinas, 1274/2008, pp. q.47, a.12) (Question 58 Justice, Article 11. Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?)

⁵⁴⁸ “Reply to Objection 1. Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.” (Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274/2008, pp. q.58, a.12) (Question 58 Justice, Article 12. Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?)

judgment (q. 47, a. 8).⁵⁴⁹ Taken together, these two virtues bear some proximity with the ethical understanding of justice: the reasoned attachment to a form of enquiry and knowledge, and the importance of the common good (taking into consideration the whole and the parts). What is truly absent is the capacity to universally extend the measurement of the “due” of each individual to all members of society. In contemporary terms, Thomism does not comprise procedural equality nor a horizon of increased equality and freedom for all.

4.11.2.2 Divine law and the virtue of charity

We will now briefly review the non-deducible components of Aquinas’s ontology, which pertain to Divine law and its overarching idea of the insufficiency of man. Aquinas judges man incapable of perfecting himself only through human relations (with himself and others) and the enactment of cardinal virtues. Such an impossibility is explained through the existence of Satan (Torrell, 1996, p. 1951) and the feebleness inherited from the original sin (Coleman, 2011, p. 195). As divine law proposes a kind of happiness that man cannot attain by himself, theological virtues recognise this insufficiency of man in being moral. Charity, faith and hope deviate Aquinas from the Aristotelian concept of free act. A revealed end for the individual is very distinct from the natural purposefulness of the classic version of orientation to Good.⁵⁵⁰ The spaces of manoeuvre for human agency are now closed, as moral acts are directed by the rule of reason seen as the rule that directs to the end of God. Morality is, in the end, concerned with the distinction of the acts that lead to beatitude and those that elude it (Torrell, 1996, p. 1949). It is unrelated to “a subjectivism that would make man the measure of all things” (p. 1951).⁵⁵¹ Eternal law presupposes an immutable order of things for the ensemble of the universe, where each thing and each intelligent person has its and their due place. Acting by a sense of good demands compliance with this orientation (p. 1951). For Torrel, this obedience is not an external imposition but a fundamental relationship with the good that happens inside the person. It is a “morality of the spontaneous virtuous act” (p. 1951). The “rational principles” alluded to have a revealed component. If their practical application in singular concrete acts depends on a process – the idea of education of moral conscience (p. 1952) – that process seems to amputate individual appropriation.⁵⁵² Indeed, Aquinas conceives of moral conscience as a cultural product composed of hybrid materials. The *syndérèse*,⁵⁵³ moral knowledge, experience, convictions, opinions, all participate in achieving a judgement that directs an act (pp. 1952–1953). But the role of the individual is one of inheritance, not of dialogue with, nor fabrication of, what might become self-evidence in that process (p. 1953).⁵⁵⁴ This is contrary to the idea of freedom that we have reviewed at the outset of this chapter. Self-direction in liberty supports individual questioning and entitles persons to judge verity based on attestation. The substantive identification of five immutable inclinations of men follow from this perspective: inclination to good, maintenance of the self, sexual union and children education, knowledge of truth, and social life (Torrell, 1996, p. 1952; Aquinas, 1274/2008, q. 91, a. 3).

⁵⁴⁹ Question 47 Prudence, considered in itself, Article 8. Whether command is the chief act of prudence?

⁵⁵⁰ «À supposer qu’Aristote eût admis l’existence de la volonté comme appétit intellectuel (au lieu d’en être resté au désir), la définition de la volonté par son orientation au Bien change absolument de nature quand ce bien est identifié à Dieu lui-même et la béatitude à la vie en communion avec lui. » (Torrell, 1996, p. 1953).

⁵⁵¹ “Cela n’a évidemment rien à voir avec le relativisme moral ou un subjectivisme qui ferait de l’homme la mesure de toutes les choses. La raison est en fait elle-même mesurée par sa relation à son objet et finalement à la loi éternelle, qu’elle exprime dans la loi naturelle et à laquelle elle doit rester conforme. » (Torrell, 1996, p. 1951) and later on: « Il est vrai que son propos [in commenting the critique of some authors in considering Aquinas more Aristotelian than Christian] le pousse toujours à traiter les grandes attitudes typiques de l’agir humain, dans le souci de recueillir tout ce qu’il y a de valable dans l’héritage intellectuel et moral des penseurs qui l’ont précédé. Mais il ne reste sur le plan purement naturel de ces prédécesseurs, dès le point de départ de sa considération, tout ce qu’il reprend aux Anciens est littéralement subverti de l’intérieur par l’identification au Dieu de la révélation judéo-chrétienne du Bien que tout homme poursuit même sans le connaître. » (Torrell, 1996, p. 1954).

⁵⁵² In this interpretation, Torrel recognises the interdependence of the good and the true in substantive terms, the mingling of intelligence and will (Torrell, 1996, p. 1950).

⁵⁵³ *Syndérèse* is the part of the soul that explains this faculty. It is the competence to read the self-evidence of moral principles: « La *Syndérèse* est celui [habitus] qui saisit est formulé mles grandes principes de la vie morale qui portent en eux-mêmes leur évidence : il faut faire le bien, éviter le mal (q. 91 a 3). » (Torrell, 1996, p. 1952). The author is citing *Summa Theologica*, question 91 article 3.

Coleman proposes “jus” to translate the same idea (Coleman, 2011, pp. 191–192).

⁵⁵⁴ “[O]bjet de culture, la conscience ne fait pas obligation, mais la transmet.” (Torrell, 1996, p. 1953).

4.11.3 The anachronism of morality in contemporary social life

The contemporary reconstruction of the notion of charity can be seen as the motto for the Christian integration of moral thought (Boulnois, 1996). We retain the most frequent translation of *caritas* in modern languages as the expression “God’s love” (*amour de Dieu*) complemented by the biblical commandment of love for the other. Charity can be described as the theological virtue regarding the biblical triple signification of God’s love: God’s love in men, love of men for God, and the experience of these sentiments in the form of loving the other (Morfaux & Lefranc, 1980/2007, p. 75; Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 283).⁵⁵⁵ The idea of love of God that defines charity occupied a central place in religious intellectual construction during the middle age and its revision through to the eighteenth century. It is not easy to fix the movements between these three elements, their sequence reflecting different conceptions of acceptable motives, and the consequences of Man’s love for God.⁵⁵⁶ According to Aquinas, Man’s love is a response that is conditioned by the initial reception of love, which is deposited in human beings by God (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 284). In the revision of Aquinas’s work, Fénelon (1651–1704) and Bossuet (1627–1704) opposed each other on the basis of the legitimate expected rewards and accomplishments (pp. 284–285). If Fénelon admits that “the communication in the felicity shared in common” (with God) constitutes the ontological foundation of that love (p. 284), that presupposition cannot be seen as a motive for the friendship, for it would erode abnegation (p. 285).⁵⁵⁷ This renunciation is to be conserved in the devotion to the friend, one that dispenses of reflexivity insofar as thought impedes the abandonment to the spontaneity of love (p. 284). There is a strong emphasis on rejecting the instrumentality of love. Disinterest and indifference, renunciation and uncritical sentiment are the attitudes that accompany the love for God and through that, the love for the other. Schockenhoff clarifies the relationship between these two forms of love with the words of Bonaventure: “the movement of charity has God as an end, the neighbour as path” (p. 285).⁵⁵⁸

« L’image « chemin-fin » ne peut cependant pas être comprise dans le sens d’un rapport instrumental qui vise le prochain dans sa dignité de personne en en faisant le moyen de la relation à Dieu, celle véritablement voulue par celui qui aime. La caritas n’aime pas Dieu, pour ainsi dire, en utilisant le prochain comme matériau : elle touche le prochain lui-même. Elle est, comme le dit Thomas d’Aquin, un véritable amour de l’ami (amour amicitiae), qui veut le bien de l’autre au nom de lui-même. » (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 285).

In most medieval authors, this idea does not imply a type of equality between the self and the other, but it is interpreted as a hypothetical similitude of these two forms of love.⁵⁵⁹ The love for the self remains the root, the content, and the measure of the love for the other (p. 285).⁵⁶⁰ Positing the self and the other, not face to face but in

⁵⁵⁵ « Vertu théologique, qui est amour de Dieu, dans l’ambiguïté même de l’expression, amour de Dieu pour les hommes et amour de Dieu par les hommes, l’amour du prochain n’étant pas secondaire mais second, amour du prochain en Dieu. Dieu « ordonne que l’amour et la charité s’attachent premièrement à lui comme au principe de toutes choses, de de là ils se répandent par un épanchement général sur tous les hommes. » (Morfaux & Lefranc, 1980/2007, p. 75). « Dans ce contexte biblique, le concept “charité” est chargé d’une triple signification : il désigne l’amour créateur et rédempteur de Dieu pour l’homme, l’amour voué, en réponse, par l’homme à Dieu et, inclus dans cet amour-là, l’amour mutuelle que se portent mutuellement les êtres humains. » (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 283).

⁵⁵⁶ Severe conceptions exclude the pursuit of happiness in God’s love; pure love demands independence from any motive beyond God’s goodness, rejecting even the responsive purpose of loving back a God who loves men. This doctrine is attributed to Pierre Abélard (1079–1142) (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 284).

⁵⁵⁷ Fénelon opposes Bossuet, who thought it legitimate to aspire accessing the eternal by loving God:

« Fénelon rappelle donc à Bossuet, à juste titre, le mot de saint Thomas D’Aquin : « la charité atteint Dieu tel qu’il subsiste en lui-même, et non pas en tant que de lui quelque chose nous survient. » (Somme Théologique, II-II, 23, 6). » (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 285).

⁵⁵⁸ « Le mouvement de la charité a Dieu pour fin, le prochain comme chemin (saint Bonaventure, in Sent., III, 27, 2, 3) » (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 285).

⁵⁵⁹ « La plupart des auteurs médiévaux n’interprètent cependant pas le commandement biblique d’aimer son prochain comme soi-même dans le sens d’une véritable égalité, mais atténuent pour en faire un amour « semblable » pour le prochain, comparable à l’amour de soi (cf. Thomas d’Aquin, Somme théologique, II-II, 26, 4 ; 44-7 ; Bonaventure, In III Sent., 29, 1, 3). » (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 285).

⁵⁶⁰ « La primauté de l’amour de soi, qui s’exprime dans le principe « l’unité est plus que l’union », n’est pas conçue comme un énoncé étique, mais comme la description ontologique d’une tendance fondamentale naturelle qui est ainsi inscrite dans le chemin de l’amour : le ne-faire-un avec soi-même est plus originelle [in the sense of happening before, at the origin] que le ne-faire-qu’un avec le prochain. C’est précisément pour cette

the face of God, is a momentous geometry for the relationship with otherness.⁵⁶¹ The interpretation of the other necessary for practical conduct is, in moral doctrine, deprived from external resources to oneself. It implies the absolute acceptance of the other, and insofar as he is seen as the image of the self, it curtails the need to discover and understand that different other. Simultaneously, the projection of inner moral guidance on the other removes the horizon of self-determination and choice, which are necessary for the emergence of the intentional actor. The static relationship between these two instances is striking. In a brief notice describing internal de-solidarization of moral thought throughout the history of Christianity, Boulnois proposes to rehabilitate morality (Boulnois, 1996, pp. 304–310). The proposition insists on charity and reiterates the asymmetry between the self and the other. The latter remains a receptacle for one's presence (pp. 308–309).⁵⁶²

4.11.4 Themes of the *sociétalité* of morality (vis-à-vis ethics)

Christian doctrine did not start by problematizing the existing moral thought, but it gave a new form to the pagan content of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Boulnois, 1996, p. 305). Indeed, this *aller de soi* of Christian morality fits a more englobing absence of questioning,⁵⁶³ which marks the conformity with Christ in his protection from anxieties, faults, and doubts (p. 305). Morality in Christianity is a “moral sense”, which is occupied with the lessons of the sacred scripture on what a person shall do (p. 305). It is one of four aspects of Christian life: “the letter teaches the facts, the allegory what you may believe, the moral what you will do, the anagogy⁵⁶⁴ where you will tend to” (p. 305).⁵⁶⁵ Christian morality is restricted to the commandments and judgements on practices, in opposition to facts, beliefs, and ends – the latter pertaining to the domain of the afterlife. A measure of sociality, addressed to “practical wisdom”, morality can be seen as an endogenous form of relation with alterity. It neglects the observation of society as a whole, while restricting its judgments to individuals and the sphere of interpersonal relations. The internal coherence of a discourse produced in a moment where Christian morality coincided with the organisation of social life alerts to the inadequacy of moral thought to reflect on present-day societal challenges. At the end of this detour, the elements of morality that should not migrate to an epoch of ethics emerge quite clearly. They oppose, *term-è-term*, the societal features that we have observed at the outset of this chapter:

raison que l'amour de soi peut-être défini comme « forme et racine de l'amitié » et être pris pour modèle de la manière dont nous devons aimer notre prochain sans réserve et spontanément. » (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 285).

⁵⁶¹ « Le rapport que nous avons avec nous-même devient l'image originelle dans laquelle l'amour par lequel nous ne faisons qu'un avec l'autre trouve sa mesure.... De la même manière que le “comme-toi même” du commandement biblique de l'amour exige l'approbation sans réserve de ce qui est autre dans l'ordre de la coexistence humaine, le *propter Deum* garanti l'impossibilité mutuelle de disposer du partenaire humain de l'amour, dans l'ordre où tous deux se trouvent placés face à l'éternel. » (Schockenhoff, 1996, p. 285).

⁵⁶² Descombes mentions three dissonances: from the love of God to the absolute of grace, a torn happiness, the conversion of virtue in negation of the self (1996, pp. 308–309). Towards the end of the notice, we can read: « La recherche d'une nouvelle synthèse passe désormais par une analytique théologique, une analyse de l'être au monde dans la foi et la charité.... Plus fondamentale que l'intersubjectivité neutre est la polarisation de mes actes par le devoir envers l'autre. Autrui est le critère de l'action, il est antérieur à moi, c'est là ce qu'implique le concept de prochain : le prochain est un absolu, envers lequel nous sommes toujours en dette. Il n'est pas un masque pour tendre vers un idéal.... La fin de l'agir humain est la reconnaissance du fait qu'autrui me précède toujours. Elle n'est pas à atteindre par un effort de la volonté, mais à recevoir comme un don qui attend que je le remplisse de ma présence. » (Descombes, 1996, p. 309).

⁵⁶³ Boulnois sees evidence of this absent problematic in the lack of canonical texts on the topic:

« On trouve d'autant moins de traces théoriques de l'existence de la morale qu'elle est plus profondément et plus naturellement vécue. Ce sont donc autant les documents historiques qui nous permettent d'en déceler l'existence que les œuvres théoriques et les textes canoniques. Ceux-ci ne statuent que sur ce qui était mis en question. Ils se taisent sur ce qui va de soi. » (Descombes, 1996, p. 305)

⁵⁶⁴ In Wikipedia, we can read the following definition: “Anagoge... is a Greek word suggesting a ‘climb’ or ‘ascent’ upwards. The anagogical is a method of symbolic interpretation of spiritual statements or events, especially scriptural exegesis that detects allusions to the afterlife.” (Anagoge, 2016).

⁵⁶⁵ « Cette place [the place of morality inside Christianity], depuis l'Origène, est celle de l'un des quatre sens de l'Écriture. En effet, la morale apparaît principalement sur le titre de « sens moral » de l'Écriture, comme un des quatre aspects de l'interprétation de la vie chrétienne. Dans un texte de l'Écriture, « la lettre enseigne les faits, l'allégorie ce que tu croiras, la morale ce que feras, l'anagogie où tu tendras » (augustin de Dacie, cité par Henri de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale*, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1958-1964). » (Descombes, 1996, p. 305). The author is quoting Augustine of Dacia, cited in Henri de Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis*, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1958-1964).

4.11.4.1 Dimensional production of the social

The tension empirics/theory of contemporary Christian-based morality centred on charity is characterised by the use of an immobilised framework (that we have illustrated with the support of Aquinas) to read a social world which is radically different from the medieval society that such doctrine was created to reflect on. This fragility results in the validation of transcending values of theological non-discussible norms, substantiated in groups of similitude (rather than ethical constructions that are capable of convergence with the views of different others).

4.11.4.2 Components of society: actors, objects, environments

The conception of actors prescribes self-restraint towards the assumed good of others, which we have described as an endogenous attitude towards alterity. This contrasts with the view of reflective actors capable of inclusiveness of other views (through the use of expanded empirical information on the complexity of the social). We can expect that a moral stance is mobilised in treat the problems of direct sociability and the local common good (rather than problems of compatibility between the part and the whole at multiple scales).

4.11.4.3 Pragmatics of morality


The pragmatics of morality can be interpreted as individual conduct governed by disinterest in the substantiation of the good (rather than a continuous substantive pragmatic of all actors, using and producing shared universals in the reflexivity of each society, interlocked societies and prospectively, in the world-society).

4.11.4.4 Incomplete Horizon

The absence of a complete transformative horizon is inherited from the theist deployment of the afterlife. It naturalises some forms of injustice (inequality, procedural inequality, freedom and personal liberties) rather than the possibilities of an increase in worldly justice.

From this synthesis it is possible to categorise the theories presented in these chapter as pertaining to each of the epochs of justice. We propose to do such rearrangement in tension with our empirical work, that is, in function of the attributes of the theories that are more strikingly evoked in different conceptions of injustice and justice in habitat.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁶ See in particular section 6.3, "Ten encounters between space and justice".



	H (Horizon)	d (Dimensional production of the social)	A (Actors)	E (Environments)	H (Horizon)
MORALITY	Naturalness of injustice, absence of a complete transformative horizon inherited from the theist deployment of the afterlife.	Transcending values of theology non-discussible norms, substantiated in groups of similitude.	Self-restrained individual towards the assumed good of others, endogenous attitude towards alterity (endogenous resources in the reading of the social).	Dominance of sociality and the local common good; restriction of "justice" to interpersonal relations.	Individual conduct governed by disinterest in the substantiation of the good.
ETHICS	Open "devenir" of society, as the possibility of an increase in justice; theories of justice with complete and incomplete horizons.	Socially constructed values and their productive convergence into the goods of all social dimensions.	Reflective actors capable of inclusiveness of other views (expanded empirical information on the complexity of the social).	Singular substantiation of universalisable principles where the part and the whole are theoretically compatible (in sociality and <i>soci�t�alit�</i>) but also open to contradiction.	Continuous substantive pragmatics of all actors, implying circulation of shared universals in the reflexivity of society, interlocked societies and prospectively, in the world-society.

Figure 5 Dynamic interrelation of the themes of the *soci t alit * of ethos.

5 Space and justice, theories of an encounter

Before starting a brief account on the existing literature on spatial justice, it is perhaps useful to brush up the recent developments in the field. The particular combination of the words justice and space is found for the first time in Alain Reynaud's *Société, Espace, Justice* in 1981. David Harvey's *Social Justice and the City*, published in 1973, already approached the subject using the concept of territorial justice (Dufaux, Gervais-Lambony, Lehman-Frisch, & Moreau, 2009, pp. 36–37). The notion of spatial justice as a unified term was employed by Jacques Lévy in 1994 as part of *Le Tournant Géographique*. More recently, a multitude of discourses claims to be advancing the notion of spatial justice. In the Anglophone academic sphere, Edward Soja attributes the originality of spatial justice to the University of California, Los Angeles' faculty and to the Los Angeles labour movements (Soja, 2010). Soja sets forth the term as an umbrella for foregrounding forty years of thought on the links between space and justice. Authors such as Fainstein (2010), Lévy (2012, 2013, 2013b), or Dikeç (2007) have been developing the connections between spatial thought with very distinct, if not disparate, approaches.⁵⁶⁷ Lefebvre's "right to the city" is a federating theme of a number of actions. Examples of recent developments that draw on a Lefebvrian revival include the draft of the "World Charter for the Right to the City" by the Social Forum of the Americas and the World Urban Forum in 2004, and the formation of the Right to the City Alliance in 2007. We can also point to the Spatial Justice conference held at the Université Paris Ouest Nanterre in March 2008, counting the presence of Susan Fainstein, Edward Soja, Mustafa Dikeç, Peter Marcuse, and others. Stemming from the conference, the online magazine *Justice Spatiale/Spatial Justice* was created in 2009 to discuss and elaborate on the relations between justice and space across multidisciplinary debates.⁵⁶⁸ It is also a platform for a dialogue between francophone and anglophone intellectual environments. Some of these authors met, more recently, in the *Seminaire Penser l'espace* (2013, 2014), organised by Boris Beaudé (Laboratoire Chôros, ÉPFL) and Luca Pattaroni (LaSUR, ÉPFL). The seminar focused on "the valorisation of space as a pertinent dimension of justice, while avoiding the aporia of a spatialism that would deprive the very notion of justice of all of its heuristic strength." (Beaudé & Pattaroni, 2013).

In this panorama of apparent consistency, the plural positioning in relation to Lefebvre's "right to the city" helps to generate an understanding of the heterogeneity in the academic treatment of the topic. We start by reading the recent work of Jacques Lévy. With the theory of urbanity already reviewed, we reaffirm Lefebvre's heritage that guides, positively, the approach to spatial justice in this research. We then turn to lines of spatial justice that interpret Lefebvre's work in a dissonant direction (Harvey, Soja, Dikeç) or are only tangential to it (Fainstein). We resort, in this exercise, to academically disagreeing, responding to Jacques Lévy's appeal for productive confrontation.⁵⁶⁹ This effort of explicit enunciations deals with the impossibility to ignore the contradictions of cognitive activity in research contexts (Lévy, 2014). It does not claim to be irrevocably correct, but it sees one's critical thinking as a source of future collective developments.

⁵⁶⁷ As we will see in the remaining of chapter 5, the authors do not share a world view, which is known to hinder the communication (Pradeau, 2013).

⁵⁶⁸ For an introduction to the editorial line see « n°01. Avis de naissance » (Dufaux, Gervais-Lambony, Lehman-Frisch, & Moreau, 2009).

⁵⁶⁹ For the intermediate results of that process of disagreeing, see "A process of disagreement on Spatial Justice" (Póvoas, 2016).

5.1 Chôros, the programme for a comprehensive spatial justice theory

What follows is a sketch of a programme for a comprehensive theory of spatial justice. It interprets recent work of Jacques Lévy, but it is also an appropriation of the reflection developed in the last five years in the Chôros laboratory and its productive interactions with LaSur (Laboratory of Urban Sociology at the EPFL).⁵⁷⁰

In *Reinventer la France*,⁵⁷¹ Lévy (2013b) formalises new theoretical work on spatial justice while feeding public debate on a series of *questions de société*. He thus addresses the general public as *chercheur-citoyen*.⁵⁷² The reflection treats empirical problems, focusing on the role of space in the understanding – and potential remediation – of what is going wrong with France (pp. 7–32). This construction significantly advances the universal/singular approach to justice and space.⁵⁷³ Throughout, the author argues against an ideological and metaphysical projection of ideas of justice on space and insists on the identification of equality and liberty in concrete stakes. In that process, he identifies current arrangements in the material and immaterial spheres of space (in their relation to the *idéel*) and suggests how they are the actual producers of injustice.

Lévy observes the “national mythology” (Lévy, 2013b, p. 31) as the centrality of the scale of the state, both in the mediation of France with the world (in relation to which there is mistrust and a sense of autonomy) and in the resolution of “internal” problems. This leads to the circulation of the idea that society is a sub-product of the state, not an actor of its own development (pp. 17–24).⁵⁷⁴ Lévy argues that the project of universalism⁵⁷⁵ anchored in the ethical objective of surmounting contingencies might have justified political centralism in the past (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 25–26).⁵⁷⁶ But in a world of complex interspatiality and of competent actors, the principle of spatial uniformisation

⁵⁷⁰ It is not easy to acknowledge who contributed to which idea in this collective endeavour. If Lévy emerges as the central cited source, the contributions of Jean-Nicolas Fauchille, Boris Beaudé, and Luca Pattaroni are also to be acknowledged. I am thankful to the *apport* of these four interlocutors.

⁵⁷¹ My initial contact with this text was in the form of working papers. Two main sources, “Société” (2012) and “L’espace demande justice” (2011), contained some statements that do not figure in the published text (2013b).

⁵⁷² This specificity of the text poses two challenges. The first is to “extract” the conceptual import from the empirical French case, with the scope of transporting them in the form of theory; that is, keeping the potential to reason new empirical themes and studies. This difficulty is hence appropriate for the universal/singular approach. The second challenge regards the quality of the discourse which, in addressing the general public, does not have the same economy of means that other works of the author do. It is related to the view of the utility of social science.

⁵⁷³ We have defined the universal/singular method in section 4.1, “An approach to the social construction of the ethos” and in point 4.2.1, “The universal/singular as the tension in theory/empirics”.

⁵⁷⁴ The concept of development refers not to growth, as it does not concern the increase of “grandeurs” already existing, but to the change towards something considered better by the actors of development. It is multidimensional, not simply economic, and it is, by definition, a project of diachronic solidarity (as the investors of the present might not benefit from the results). It can also be solidary at present to the productive capacity, under conditions of autonomy and responsibility. (Lévy, Société, 2012, pp. 149–150): « Le développement peut être défini comme un changement voulu par les acteurs concernés permettant de rendre, de leur point de vue, la situation meilleure que celle qui prévaut. Le développement n’est pas réductible à la croissance économique, pour deux séries de raisons. D’abord, il n’est pas qu’économique, mais multidimensionnel. Il ne porte d’ailleurs pas seulement sur la société dans son ensemble mais peut aussi s’appliquer à d’autres environnements ou à des acteurs. Le développement peut être « personnel », « local », « durable » avec, dans chaque cas, des spécificités mais une correspondance avec la définition. Le développement comme mouvement auto-organisé vers le mieux constitue une orientation possible pour l’éthique appliquée au politique. D’où l’autre différence : le développement n’est pas qu’une croissance, c’est-à-dire une augmentation quantitative des grandeurs existantes. Il est aussi réajustement, dépassement, invention. » (Lévy, Société, 2012, p. 150).

⁵⁷⁵ The French Republican project of universality is defined as the attempt at homogeneous distribution of goods over the territory, which actually sustains injustice (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 154–155).

⁵⁷⁶ « La pensée d’État française, largement diffuse dans toute la société, a ainsi raisonné en inventant l’idée que l’“universalisme” (par opposition au “particularisme”) se confondrait avec l’État et aurait les mêmes limites. Tant la circulation des idées et des pratiques restait circonscrite et qu’il existait des frontières intérieures significatives, cela pouvait constituer une valeur crédible. On pouvait, avec un minimum de culot, présenter le centralisme comme une expression du principe de la nécessaire non contingence des orientations éthiques. Plus l’État contrôlait la société en l’uniformisant, plus on s’approchait de l’universalité. » (pp. 25, 26).

through state intervention proves contrary to the objectives of justice.⁵⁷⁷ Given the inadequacy of *étatisme* to read the problems of France and the possibilities of solutions, the point of departure is a new cognitive lens. Spatial justice is, at the outset, a question of interspatiality (*interspatialité*)⁵⁷⁸ (Lévy, *Interspatialité*, 2013, pp. 569–570). The identification of a space's specific problems and solutions passes by its relationship with other spaces.⁵⁷⁹ *Mondialisation*, Europe, relationship of the national state with local and regional powers, urbanity and urbanism are the thematic kernels of the debate (Lévy, 2013b, p. 28). Lévy proposes to read problems from the specific capacity of the geographer. There is an effort of *objectivation*, mobilising an epistemic system and opposing, when necessary, untrue spatial representations (for example France as a dominant rural space).

Coherently with the proximity between concrete problems and universal principles, Lévy contributes with operational solutions throughout *Reinventer la France*. The most englobing of those solutions, articulating the political space necessary to the procedural construction of spatial justice, are: 1) the invention of French political spaces, 2) submitted to a public debate with the participation of experts, civic society and the actors of the political scene; 3) the organisation of the architecture of political territories (and their competences) as autonomous and democratic structures (universal suffrage); 4) the definition of the principles of fiscal autonomy and responsibility of those territories; 5) the opening of a *chantier* of democratic definition of living together, respecting the principle of subsidiarity of the proposed levels of government/societies (national, regional, local). The first point raises the fundamental question of identifying what is societal and what is infra-societal (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 191–199), with implications for the choice of theories of justice (as seen in chapter 4)⁵⁸⁰.

5.1.1 The contribution of social science for debating ethics substantially

Despite bringing to the fore an objective regime of veracity, Lévy's scientific contribution is placed within the broader framework of public debate. Indeed, he rescues the *questions de société* presently treated by the political scene as peripheral or as techno-administrative (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 30–31). This is a line of continuity with the Lefebvrian project of democratisation of space:

« Comment mettre en œuvre des principes de justice ? Du fait même de la conception qui la sous-tend, la démarche de justice esquissée plus haut ne peut être descendante, octroyée d'en haut à des habitantes qui la subiraient. Son contenu concret et même ses principaux objectifs et ses règles d'arbitrage ne peuvent qu'être le résultat d'un débat et d'une délibération publics de grande ampleur... » (Lévy, 2013b, p. 191).

Spatial justice takes part, as means and ends, in the construction of a society's ethical turn. "Deliberating on a more consistent and democratic European government, on more autonomous regions, on public policy at world scale", debating on the natural environments of body and nature, all these topics pose ethical problems (pp. 29–30).⁵⁸¹ If

⁵⁷⁷ This is extensively exposed in *Reinventer la France : Trente cartes pour une nouvelle géographie* (Lévy, 2013b); one example is summarised in section 5.1.4.1 of chapter 5 of this thesis, "Social policy of housing in an urbanistic perspective".

⁵⁷⁸ See definition of interspatiality in point 2.1.1 of chapter 2, "Space is a dimension of society and a multidimensional object".

⁵⁷⁹ For example, in the critique of the *échelle unique* and of France's relationship with the World (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 17–28), we can see that a model of interface is less promising than the one of cospatiality and interlocking. We find a clear statement that cospatiality, for its increased dynamism, is more societal than the other modes of spatial contact:

« Une vie politique appelle, au moins en partie, des territoires aux frontières nettes: il fait savoir qui fait quoi à qui. Dans les conditions de la complexité spatiale, qui est l'un des modes d'existence de la société d'acteurs ouverte dans laquelle nous évoluons, il paraît souhaitable de construire des espaces politiques possédant le maximum de *co-spatialité*. La co-spatialité, c'est le partage d'un espace commun à tous, ce qui suppose que les spatialités de chacun communiquent avec celles des autres et fassent système entre elles. Le fait qu'il existe d'inévitables difficultés à cet exercice ne devrait pas empêcher qu'on s'y attèle. Car, si on ne le fait pas, on exclut par avance que l'architecture territoriale puisse servir au développement et à la justice. Si l'on admet que des découpages plus *contemporains* ne résolvent pas tous les problèmes, mais rendent les sociétés, à tous niveaux, plus réflexives et plus efficaces pour construire leurs projets, on peut aller de l'avant. » (Lévy, 2013b, p. 191).

⁵⁸⁰ See, in particular, section 4.5, "Charles Taylor, infra-societal claims of justice".

⁵⁸¹ They also have the particularity of escaping "the problematics of monetary fluxes" (Lévy, 2013b, p. 30).

responses are to be realised in social life, not by decree, they require the engagement of individuals. The methods and horizons of the political, and its production of society as a coherent whole, are at the centre of spatial justice:

“Toutes [les “questions de société”] posent des problèmes éthiques: par opposition à une morale faite de normes imposées et immuables, il s’agit d’inventer, à l’épreuve de situations nouvelles des réponses pour la construction desquelles l’engagement individuel est essentiel. Toutes rendent nécessaire une inventivité du politique dans ses méthodes comme dans ses horizons. » (Lévy, 2013b, p. 30).

This is a delicate demarche, reflexive and affective. It integrates the just and unjust of all the involved actors, the way in which their autobiography sustains their acceptance or rejection of legitimate arguments, leading to the repositioning of the dialoguing parties (Ferry, 1996).⁵⁸² Intersecting space with ethics is plausible on the basis of the objective versant of the affective and cognitive domains of its (to wit, of ethics) social production. But, as we have seen, the space of habitat is fabricated simultaneously by the intimate and the public; it has an undeniable subjective force. We have also seen that space is made of our mutual interrelations, and that a coherent direction in that making depends of some agreement on what is desirable and undesirable in a given society (and in federated societies). In this context, Lévy shows that social science can contribute to the search of an increased *sociétalité* by reasoning out the collective consequences of our spatial inclinations. This task asks from the reader no less than letting an objective exercise perforate the subjective relationship with space. In this ambitious program for spatial justice as an encompassing theory, the present research makes only a partial contribution. The scope of this work is not to confront the representations of space and justice with veracity, but to investigate how existing relationships with space might pose challenges and see opportunities to a spatial agenda supporting increases of justice. If justice theory brings an objective support in this effort, social science further strengthens the basis of judgment. Among other resources, it can use history and the perspectives offered by multiple scales of our common world.

We have seen that the *chantier* is to explore the connection of justice and space, rather than a projection of contents of justice into spatial objects or containers. This objective of this study does not impede the separate clarification of the lenses of justice and the lenses of space mobilised by spatial justice. As long as we do not re-extract ethics from its spatial interpretation, we benefit from zooming in into explicit theoretical objects coming from the universe of the ethos and theory of space. This separation should not be seen as disciplinary. Indeed, a part of the ethical concepts are original contributions of Lévy, as a result of the practice of theoretical opening to political philosophy. We will continue the exploration of the work of Jacques Lévy, with a particular focus on specifically urban themes.⁵⁸³

5.1.2 Justice lenses, ethical objects to think space

We have seen that Lévy draws on Kant’s universalism of the categorical imperative and on Spinoza’s possibility of a social construction of ethics. From the field of justice theories, the author resorts to Rawls’ idea of justice as fairness and Sen’s idea of capability. Lévy already detoured from Marxism (Lévy, 1994, pp. 425–431), and this current does not figure in spatial justice work, not even in the form of negativity. This is, as we will see in the next section of this chapter (5.2), a major digression from a significant part of the Anglophone literature on spatial justice.

⁵⁸² Here, we are referring to the qualities of a reconstructive ethic presented in point b., “Ethics of reconstruction and the plural rationalities of actors” in the Introduction of this thesis. We have seen that Ferry sees procedural ethics to demand superior reflexivity and inter-subjectivity than argumentation, narrative, or interpretation:

« La séquentialité des quatre registres définit une progression dans l’ordre d’une réflexivité et d’une intersubjectivité croissantes. » (Ferry, 1996, p. 61).

⁵⁸³ Despite the communication of scales alluded to above, it would not be of consequence for this project to comment on supra-urban scales. I do not have the empirical knowledge or theoretical tools to critically assess the arguments mobilised in those instances. For that reason, I will focus during the rest of the review on specifically urban themes.

5.1.2.1 Rawls: the procedural, the difference principle, the social contract

Rawls enters into the demarche through three main reconstructions. 1) The procedural, which Lévy interprets as a model of the continuous practice of justice (not resumed to the institutional setting at the outset of society). 2) The difference principle, as a concept that articulates the idea of equality and freedom in highly unequal societies (that is, temporary inequalities targeting increases of equality in freedom). Here, Lévy resumes the central geographical notion of spatial differentiation that we have sketched earlier (chapter 3). This step detours the literal reading of equality as uniformism of space. The author proposes, as a matter of public debate, the definition of what acceptable differences are and what are not. 3) The spatial contract, which is in line with the interpretation of the procedural clause. The spatial contract is an open *chantier*, evolving with the society's movement.

5.1.2.2 Sen: capability decoupled in competence and capacity

We observe a synthetic translation of Sen's theory, anchored in the concept of capability.⁵⁸⁴ The entire societal process of increasing capability is condensed in the couple competence/capacity. This distinction is developed in the unpublished text *Société* (Lévy, 2012, pp. 140–141). Lévy proposes a table with four "figures of exchanges between the individual and society" with which to work towards equality. They are structured along two axes: actual resources/virtual liberties, and public/private goods. Actual resources include direct distribution (private goods) and distribution of access (public goods), while virtual liberties are declined in competence (private goods) and capacity (public goods). "Competence" refers to the (cognitive) ability considered at the level of an individual, and "capacity" to the (generally conceived) ability relevant for both the individual and society (p. 141). The positioning of an ability between one category and the other depends on the capacity of the possessor to converge meaningfulness for the individual and for society. From these definitions, we can deduct that competence does not necessarily lead to choices compatible with public good, while capacity captures Sen's restriction of capability to reasonable valuation, one that includes society. A third notion might be useful in articulating the crossings of this couple, the notion of "ethical capacity" (pp. 140–141).⁵⁸⁵ In this context, spatial capital is a capability of individual autonomy (an expression of freedom) but also an inductor of reflexivity, benefiting society as a whole. It can be evaluated as the competence to coproduce an inhabitable space (following the definition of habitat as compatibility between spatiality and space) (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 214–216, 231–232).

5.1.2.3 Samuelson: public goods, recursivity in habitat

Underlying the notion of societal project is the idea of coproduction of public goods between individuals and society. One of the characteristics of these goods is that their universal diffusion results in an increased advantage for all members of society and not just for the direct recipients of solidarity. The concept of public good is accessible from different discursive registers, but Samuelson traces its use to welfare economics (1955). In Samuelson's definition, public goods have two characteristics: being non-excludable, that is, accessible to everyone, and non-rivalrous, meaning that the use of public goods by some does not preclude its use by others. But Lévy adds a third characteristic: the utility of public goods increases with the increase of the number of its users. Lévy's use of this concept emphasises the systemic production of these goods, mobilising individual responsibility and society's mutualisation of resources. "Systemic" refers to the quality of a social object, which is produced and consumed at the same time (like the city

⁵⁸⁴ The concept refers to Sen's definition understood as the freedom-based informational premise used for assessments of justice and development, without fearing their incommensurability and accounting for the incompleteness of metrics, such as income or basic goods (Sen, 2010, pp. 254, 261; Lévy, 2012, p. 167). We can also recall that the process depends on the competence of reasonableness in the valuation of the desirable. Reasonableness is closely connected with the opportunity to experience society. See the review of Sen presented in chapter 4, in particular the sub-section 4.2.3, "Society's co-production of justice enhancements".

⁵⁸⁵ Lévy illustrates this idea with literacy: It can be used to charge a bill or access the state of knowledge. Lévy affirms:

« Dans un cas, la productivité est mesurable à l'échelle de l'individu, dans l'autre, elle fait toujours sens pour l'individu mais aussi pour la société. Dans un cas, il s'agit d'une aptitude purement cognitive, dans l'autre plus générale. On peut, en ce sens, parler de capacité (à entrer dans un dialogue) éthique. » (Lévy, *Société*, 2012, pp. 140, 141).

and a society's culture), thus escaping a linear explication of its production. Systemic goods are societal by definition; that is, they configure multiple dimensions of reality (economic, sociological, political, material, cultural, individual) (Lévy, 1994, pp. 315–317). Knowledge, health, and politics are, in this sense, public goods (Lévy, 2012, p. 125; 2011, p. 53). The qualitative spatial – applicable to goods such as urbanity, public space, and mobility – is pertinent whenever the goods consider the specific logics of the spatial dimension of society. For example, social bonds woven in public space, the mingling of population diversity, and functions in serendipitous productivity (Lévy, 2011, p. 49). Space not only articulates an ensemble of public goods (mobility, environment), but it is also one public good when considered as a whole.

5.1.2.4 Lévy: equality, liberty, and responsibility

Lévy's theory is positioned as a part of a broader movement of justice demarcated from a charitable stance (Levy & Lussault, 2003, p. 352). Justice reconciles the joint improvement of equality and freedom through an altered relationship between recipient and supporter (Lévy, 2012, pp. 138–139). Lévy deconstructs the consensus on the antinomy of equality and liberty sustained by political and moral philosophy discourses as well as by concrete divides in European political life (p. 135). In these discourses, the author points out, demands for the correction of inequality through compulsory taxation of citizens contradict demands of freedom from state interventionism. Lévy dismantles this opposition with a double argument: (1) the incongruence of the libertarian rejection of state intervention with demands of protection for all citizens from the public and private domination, and (2) the inefficiency of an egalitarian project of public obligation of solidarity in the redistribution of wealth, often entrapping those attached to systems of assistance in circles of unproductivity and underdevelopment (Lévy, 2012, pp. 136–137). Instead, Lévy advances the mutualisation of some of society's resources in the contractual form of capability production. Moving from distribution of resources to the co-production of capability (between individuals and the society) presumes that the redistribution changes the competencies of the beneficiary – a point that brings together Sen and Lévy in opposition to Rawls. The capability perspective, Lévy concludes, introduces the responsibility of individuals, groups, or regions as a key idea of justice, calling for engagement and for increases in productivity of all and in particular those aided by society.

5.1.2.5 The interpretation of Sen's openness of lexical orderings

At this point, we can identify an important contribution of the ethical lenses in the definition of spatial justice. The idea of public goods articulates the openness of Sen's theory (substantive choices are individual and of society), but it significantly stabilises the hierarchy of the materials of justice. Intersecting justice with the substantive plane of space, which is also a system of intelligibility, makes societal compatibility an anchor for the researcher to position its productions (destined to enter in interaction with society, as already clarified). Public goods can be presented to public debate as legitimate constraints on individual liberty whenever that liberty is not compatible with space (and its *société*). But that compatibility is to be investigated at each concrete stake and over time, as new technical solutions might solve existing tensions at a given period.

With these resources, Lévy formulates a definition of spatial justice by the exclusion that emerges when thinking justice without space does not improve justice. But the author also hints at a positive definition. Spatial justice is the problematisation of habitat seen as compatible individual freedoms (spatiality) and coexistence in a systemic totality (space) (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 231–232), animated by a horizon of equality in freedom. It takes the form of a procedural demarche that treats the substantive definition of a "spatial contract" by society. It is supported by the enunciation of how spatial arrangements singularise ideas of justice, informed by the study of space (*idéal*, material and immaterial). It is in this sense that one can argue space to be a resource for justice. The city's multidimensional urbanity emerges as a virtual *actant* of justice.

5.1.3 City lenses, spatial substance of justice

5.1.3.1 Veracity and the political requirements of the city

We have seen that Lévy approaches the concept of the city with some of Lefebvre's foundations. For him too, the city is at once concrete and abstract – the tension between empirics and theory informs theoretical construction – and has a prospective quality. Both authors agree that the virtuality of the urban horizon uses observation of the movement of society. The idea of concentration as solution to distance is also common to Lefebvre and Lévy, but it appears in the latter as a function of the produced goods (diversity, density), interdependent with the spatialities of a society's actors. Where Lévy departs from Lefebvre, is in the fine investigation of intra-societal covariation of political and spatial identities.⁵⁸⁶ In the face of the findings of that research, it would not be possible to endorse Lefebvre's supremacy of the working class potential in bringing urban society into its fullest and out from chaos.⁵⁸⁷ Lévy's solution passes by taking seriously the competence of actors and the possibilities of a productive relation between society and the political sphere. Lévy brings to the fore the political requirements of the city and the necessity of a public deliberation at the scale of the problems:

“... les citoyens ne disposent pas de cadre leur permettant d'évaluer, de promouvoir ou de sanctionner les projets à l'échelle convenable: aucun lieu, par exemple, pour discuter des modèles d'urbanité, des choix de mobilité à l'échelle des métropoles.” (Lévy, 2013b, p. 188).

We have also seen that the concept of the city is, according to Lévy, coherent with the import of realist constructivism. It mobilises the multidimensionality of society, individual spatial capital and actions (resulting from and in society's space), as well as the role of history in clarifying the social construction of space and illuminating prospective directions. We have seen that the city is made of intense relations of sociality (that is, interactions between the individual and the environment) and *sociétalité* (that is, placing the individual in contact with the ensemble of attributes of that society). All these elements reappear in Lévy's work on spatial justice when looking at the city. Against the cumulative effects of individuals' spatial liberties, justice at the urban level requires a societal project of habitat. To make the urban a societal totality – that is, to formulate a coherent solution to living together – requires serious public debate on matters of coexistence between contradictory spatial liberties. Lévy's advancement of the notion of spatial justice in 1994 goes hand in hand with the question of defining the pertinent scale for the *gestion* of the city and the procedures that could lead to such decoupage (Lévy, 1994, pp. 289–290).⁵⁸⁸ Here, justice is less a problem of scarcity, as it is a motor of reinforced self-determination of an urban society, a synonym of development (Lévy, 2012, p. 151).⁵⁸⁹ Scarcity figures, indirectly, through the impossibility of ubiquity and

⁵⁸⁶ On the first explorations of the spatial dimension of the political (through electoral geography), Lévy resumes the intention of making an « exploration aussi approfondie que possible des individus-électeurs et l'étude de la relation entre la différenciation géographique de leur citoyenneté et leur propre identité spatiale » (Lévy, 1994, p. 16).

⁵⁸⁷ Here, we can call upon the research on residential choice discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2.4, “Habitat calls for the political”.

⁵⁸⁸ This accompanies the comment on the geographers' absence in a governmental initiative that opened the debate on a project of law on *aménagement territorial* between 1993 and 1995. An interface between the government and a variety of interlocutors (national leaders, local actors, researchers) offered the occasion to challenge the ruralist and nationalist representations that sustained the institutional discourse (Lévy, 1994, pp. 289–290). The more recent *Réinventer la France* still pursues the critique of *aménagement territorial* as an anti-city discourse (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 167–170).

⁵⁸⁹ In a dialogue between the political, ethics, and space, justice appears as a transversal plane. In this context, justice counts on development as a means for its achievement and development is a project animated by justice:

« Si on relie ces remarques à celles qui précèdent, on en arrive à l'idée que la dimension éthique du politique se situe à la rencontre de la justice et du développement. Comme la justice, le développement est à la fois un résultat, un processus qui parvient à ce résultat et une attitude qui permet ce processus. On serait pourtant tenté de considérer que « développement » et « justice » n'appartiennent pas au même registre. « Justice » est un terme qui renvoie au monde moral, au normatif, à l'axiologique. « Développement » relève de l'observation empirique et du cognitif. La justice est la justification du développement tandis que le développement est le moyen de la justice. Nous avons vu que la justice suppose une mise en mouvement conjointe de l'individu et de la société, mouvement à l'issue duquel les deux se seront trouvés modifiés. Nous avons vu également que ce qui distingue le développement de la simple croissance, c'est, notamment, le partage des biens accumulés. Justice et développement sont tous deux indissociables d'une image du futur ancré dans l'agir présent. Ces deux concepts sont donc plus que complémentaires. Ils sont deux manières, deux langages différents pour parler de la même chose, et c'est justement toute la démarche de ce livre que de s'employer à redécouper des objets en cherchant à dépasser des antinomies devenues improductives. En fait, ces deux termes peuvent

the urgency of making resources available to a solidarity project. As we have seen for the space of a national scale, the urban can be illuminated by social science of space but cannot substitute political deliberation. It can show the spatial representations that animate the production of space and put them in a historical perspective. It can clarify their implications to the goods produced or desired in other dimensions of society. In this regard, Lévy introduces an extensive account of the anachronism of coupling *étatisme* and a rural representation, in relation to the achievement of urbanisation in France. The idea of an agrarian space (with inherent constraints on mobility), coupled with the French Republican project of universality, presumes that equality has to be translated into the form of a homogeneous distribution of goods over the territory (2013b, pp. 154–155).⁵⁹⁰ When rurality and the reduction of injustice through attempts of isotropy are not empirically true, the floor is open to discuss the solidarity measures the society wants to enact in and through space.⁵⁹¹

5.1.3.2 Compatibility of spatialities and space in the city

We have reviewed the modalities of management of distance. They can be applied to the *plan géotypique* of the urban: the central geotypes express a model of copresence, the peripheral types introduce a combination of centrality and ubiquity through networks, the peri-urban and infra-urban near the enclave (Lévy, 1994, pp. 71–72). Different geotypes result from the choice of different models of urbanity, which are mutually exclusive. The author mobilises several arguments to place the city (that is, the urban and suburban geotypes) at the core of a desirable spatial project. In technical terms or in terms of efficiency, the city is the least expensive solution (in the overall social capital) to the problem of distance. It favours growth (Lévy, 2013b, p. 84), as attested to by its higher productivity per inhabitant (pp. 143–144).⁵⁹² The economy of surface and its positive impact on the quality of air, soil, and water are an environmental gain (p. 84) while reinforcing public metrics. Implied in such pedestrian mobility, exposure to high levels of urbanity sustains serendipity and creativity. These experiences, which are equally available to the rich and poor,⁵⁹³ construct an ethics of interaction; they constitute a cognitive and an ethical argument (pp. 87–88, 90, 131). Finally, two prospective claims⁵⁹⁴ are systemically interwoven with the above. The city is an important intermediary in an economy that is expected to be increasingly founded on intellectual capital (Lévy, 1994, pp. 328–329). The favour of cities on anonymity and their extended opportunities make them a more adequate environment

être vus comme des deux faces d'une même mise en mouvement. Quel est alors ce mouvement commun ? On va tenter de l'approcher à travers l'espace, comme environnement habité (voir chapitre 5). » (Lévy, *Société*, 2012, p. 151). « La justice est la justification du développement tandis que le développement est le moyen de la justice. » (Lévy, *Société* (working version), 2012, p. 151).

⁵⁹⁰ On the « aménagement territorial » misrecognition of [some] individual choices and responsibilities for one's location in the accessed level of urbanity, Lévy states: « Cet égalitarisme apparent serait en fait une inégalité. Il serait aussi inéquitable puisqu'il ferait comme si nous vivions encore dans les sociétés rurales dans lesquelles les habitants étaient assignés à résidence par les logiques agraires, ce qui n'est plus le cas aujourd'hui. » (Lévy, *Réinventer la France. Trente cartes pour une nouvelle géographie*, 2013b, p. 136).

⁵⁹¹ In the closing section of the book, Lévy states : « Dans un temps d'acteurs encore excessivement inégaux, le mouvement vers l'égalité qui contient au fond toute organisation sociale s'exprime inévitablement par une mise en tension entre autonomie des parties et cohésion du tout. C'est vrai pour les individus, c'est vrai aussi pour la relation entre sociétés emboîtées. Dans les deux cas, les actions de solidarité (comme la redistribution fiscale ou la péréquation territoriale) ne peuvent être automatiques, mais doivent être à chaque fois discutées explicitement et publiquement. On passe ainsi d'une posture d'uniformisation institutionnelle qui laisse prospérer de profondes inégalités à un projet d'équité fondé sur la différenciation dans le développement. » (Lévy, 2013b, p. 193). In the entry on spatial justice, we also find the idea of a balance between responsibility and solidarity as a political choice: « Il n'y a donc pas de solution "scientifique" en cette matière car, entre la part de choix de leur habitat, donc de responsabilité personnelle, que l'on attribue aux habitants d'une zone défavorisée et la part de liberté d'accès garantie, donc de solidarité, qui bénéficie à tous, le curseur peut être placé, pour chaque problème, à différents endroits. » (Lévy, *Justice spatiale*, 2013, p. 585).

⁵⁹² This point is sustained by the comparison of production and distribution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between the big cities and the remaining territories of the respective countries (Paris and France, Tokyo and Japan) (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 143–144).

⁵⁹³ Mixity in public space is a claim to equal access of places and is accordingly a form of equity (Lévy, 2013b, p. 117). For the public good of public space, we can read:

« La mixité n'est pas une politique de redistribution de biens privés isolables, c'est une contribution à l'égalité des accès et des capacités. L'espace public ne distribue pas d'argent aux pauvres, il donne aux pauvres comme aux riches la possibilité d'une expérience de la productivité et de la créativité par l'exposition à l'altérité. C'est tout ; ce n'est pas rien. » (Lévy, 2012, p. 160).

⁵⁹⁴ The author's study of the present society is anchored in the idea of irreversibility of history as a way to identify a horizon towards which society is developing (Lévy, 1994).

for a society of individuals, where the construction of identity through choice continues to replace the contextual determinism of habitat (p. 318). Inversely, the peri-urban is seen to impose spatial transformations that go against the purposefulness of cities. Specifically, mobility practices with origins beyond the suburbs, dominantly private, result in the following: the decrease in density and diversity (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 81–82, 139); the destruction of public space (p. 139); programmed use of the city centre by non-permanent dwellers and reduced serendipity (2013b, pp. 81–82; 2012, p. 161); environmental deterioration (2013b, p. 139); and negative impact on public transport (p. 139).⁵⁹⁵ In the case of the French, this access allows the peri-urban communes to benefit from a service towards whose provision they do not contribute (pp. 189–190). This aggravates the unbalance of current rules of peri-equation, which give centralities a disproportionately lower part of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (p. 136).⁵⁹⁶ An argument of inequality in the process of contributing to public goods joins the identification of negative externalities produced by peri-urban oriented spatialities.⁵⁹⁷ These observations bring the author to conclude on the mutual exclusiveness of these two levels of urbanity.⁵⁹⁸

5.1.3.3 A universal principle for spatial justice at the urban scale

The observation of this mutual exclusiveness – in the empirical-theoretical tension – meets the need of universal principle guiding evaluations of what contributes or detracts spatial justice in the city. Lévy proposes to consider, as a principle of justice, the spatial compatibility between individuals and the society, which we have explored with the notion of habitat and the stakes of urbanity.⁵⁹⁹ We have seen that, within the framework of a society of actors, the spatial actions of individuals matter for justice. They participate in the differentiation of spaces, which is then seen to produce justice and injustice (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 105–106). The demand for the ethical principle of concurrence of the actors' spatialities with a societal development project (pp. 243–244) thus defines spatial justice as the condition of possibility of equal liberty for each to construct the spatial practices of their choice, under the condition that these are compatible with the ones of others and the objectives of society as a whole (pp. 119–120). Spatial justice justifies development as increases in the capacities of all, inclusive of the least well-off. Spatial justice also takes note of the geographical position of the least advantaged segments of society (in terms of educational and economic capital, for example) and measures the direction of solidarity. In other words, it requires an analysis of the actual costs of producing public goods in different places and how that affects the actual population (for spatial justice does not regard equality between surfaces, irrespective of their demographics). This set of demands shows that redistributing towards the least dense territories is against “the idea we have of justice.”⁶⁰⁰ Finally, it is worth asserting that dealing with population density *is not* a utilitarian argument. It can sound like the minority of the *ruralist* is sacrificed to the benefit of those who can enjoy the urban. But the historical account of urbanisation and its intertwining with the other dimensions of society – in particular, the economic plane – shows that sustaining productivity there where it is fabricated is a societal argument. Bearing in mind resourcefulness through

⁵⁹⁵ Least innovation, reduced experience of serendipity, isolation of its inhabitants from the rest of society, and a concomitant increase in voting for the extreme right in agreement with a conservative agenda (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 85–86) are also pinpointed as negative qualities of the periurban.

⁵⁹⁶ This assessment of disproportionality is based on the superior values in city centres on the following parameters: cost of life, density of services per inhabitant, concentration of poverty, and productivity.

⁵⁹⁷ By spatialities, the author understands the spatial actions conceived of and implemented by the multiple actors that compose society (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 243–244).

⁵⁹⁸ It is unlikely that development in telecommunication (internet, in particular) and mobility (including drones for non-human mobility) will support the inversion of the interrelated advantages of cities (Dumont & Hellier, 2010).

⁵⁹⁹ See section 2.2.4, “Habitat calls for the political”, and section 3.3, “Lévy and Lussault: a reconstruction of Lefebvre’s heritage” (respectively in chapters 2 and 3).

⁶⁰⁰ After the analysis of the French fiscal system, Lévy states: « Au bout du compte, ce sont les contribuables modestes et moyens – les plus démunis étant un peu épargnés, car ils bénéficient des minima sociaux et des exemptions fiscales – des villes les plus productives qui fiancent à fonds perdus les territoires moins urbains et moins efficaces, contribuant en leur sein au confort de vie des habitants les plus aisés qui. A revenu nominal équivalent, disposent d’un pouvoir d’achat plus élevé que ceux qui vivent dans les grandes villes. Une formule brutale résume cette situation : les pauvres des régions riches paient les riches des régions pauvres, ce qui semble peu conforme à l’idée qu’on peut se faire de la justice. » (Lévy, 2013b, p. 152).

concentration is not a concession to the subjective preference of a group, the privilege of urbanites vis-à-vis the peri-urbans or infra-urbans. It is the proposition of a collective advantage for the society as a whole.

We can now revisit Henri Lefebvre's "right to the city". It is advanced, according to Lévy, as an example of what it means to "organize the territory in such a way that some of its components are effectively accessible to all" (Lévy, 2012, p. 154). As far as Lévy interprets it, the right to the city does not regard the access to a collection of dissociated objects located in the city,⁶⁰¹ but, conversely, to the (conditional) right to high levels of urbanity (Lévy, 2011, p. 49).⁶⁰² The main concern of a just space policy is – if a society accepts the proposition to see cities as collective advantage – to increase the levels of urbanity, to seek the maximisation of variety, coherence, and stability of social realities concentrated in a minimum area (Lévy, 2012, p. 156). In other words, to allow cities to be fully so, to wit, advantageous arrangements in relation to a space without concentration (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 81–82). This principle of producing centrality has three major implications: public policies should favour increasing urbanity in the city centre and suburbia (as it is more consequential to produce centrality where there is already a considerable degree of urbanity); they should discourage peri-urban dispersion; and they should privilege big cities, because size – other things being equal – affects the strength of urbanity (p. 79).⁶⁰³ The right to the city becomes synonymous with the principle of compatibility and responsibility, while considering the exclusionary impact of some urbanity features over the others.

Clearly, the priority of high urbanity over low urbanity is a political choice of a society, where the spatial representation and actions of the inhabitants preferring the "model of Johannesburg" loses legitimacy. If we have tried to argue for the ethical force implied in the "model of Amsterdam", the imagination of methods of spatial transition between models – a transformation which ought to be experienced as just – is far from evident.

5.1.4 Fundamental research and operational guidance

Below, we illustrate the proximity with the operational guidance issuing from the reformulation of spatial justice provided above. We summarise Lévy's advocacy for the transition from a "policy of social housing" to a "social policy of housing" (Lévy, 2011).⁶⁰⁴ This urbanistic solution should be capable of addressing the problems that a distributive a-spatial response has aggravated.

5.1.4.1 Social policy of housing in an urbanistic perspective

In France, since the 60s, the massive construction of the *cités HLM*⁶⁰⁵ has pursued the objective of rendering accessible adequate shelter to the greatest possible number of inhabitants (Lévy, 2012, p. 157). This project is recognised by many to have turned against itself. If we start with the description of the problem, Lévy's analysis of ghetto formation draws attention to the "actorisation" of the inhabitants who were able to leave the *cités* and chose to do so.⁶⁰⁶ The incapacity of the public sector to produce social housing in order to respond to the evolving demands of the inhabitants has a role in the progressive evening of the sociological profiles of these places. The sectorial answer by the public sphere should give way to the identification of a desirable "horizon that connects housing and the city." Lévy regards this horizon as a combination of securing access to housing while guaranteeing sociological

⁶⁰¹ He specifies these objects as neighbourhoods, networks generated by a mode of transport, type of activity (Lévy, 2011, p. 49).

⁶⁰² "The right to the city presupposes correctly identifying what makes a city a city, urbanity" (Lévy, 2011, p. 49).

⁶⁰³ Another set of recommendations concerns the conception of justice understood as the right to political self-organisation of cities, enabling their advancing of a legitimate development project (Lévy, 2013b, p. 188).

⁶⁰⁴ The basis of this text was submitted to the committee of the doctoral workshop Territórios (In)justos, organised by the Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa in January 2013. It thus refers to a section of an unpublished version of *Réinventer la France*, circulated among the members of the Chôros laboratory under the title « L'espace demande justice ».

⁶⁰⁵ HLM is the acronym for *Habitation à Loyer Modéré*, that is, rent-controlled housing.

⁶⁰⁶ Lévy does not mention the mortgage access to the private market, but it is an important aspect of this "actorisation" in many explications of "flights" of the low middle class from popular neighbourhoods to the suburbs and the periurban (Soja, 2010).

mixity (Lévy, 2011, p. 42). We should retain that a societal solution is contrary to pinning down the recipients of aid to reserved places, a separate market and a divided public (Lévy, 2011, pp. 42–43). Access to housing pertains to the set of basic rights necessary for the contractual entrance of all individuals into a development project. Lévy resolves this access with the project of a universal basic income (Lévy, 2012, p. 137). This freedom-based project of justice is advocated, among others, by Philippe Van Parijs (2004; 2013).⁶⁰⁷ To reach diversity implies avoiding concentration of the “rich” and “poor” in separate neighbourhoods (2011, p. 42; 2012, p. 157). Abundant support for individuals with the least economic capital may be mobilised so that affording expensive rents would actually be possible.⁶⁰⁸ The objective of mixity implies encouraging those with more capital to choose to inhabit poorer neighbourhoods (counting on the social group of the *bobos*) (Lévy, 2011, pp. 42–43). This increase in attractiveness takes housing as a component of the public good “urbanity” (Lévy, 2012, p. 157). It prioritises, from the spectrum of urbanism themes open to political action, those leveraging further increases in the level of urbanity: accessibility of public transports, better quality of cultural and commercial facilities, green spaces, better schools (Lévy, 2011, p. 43). This orientation, envisaging mixity and equity in the access to a unified housing market, supposes the influence over population settlement in city neighbourhoods, by urban governments. It includes highly differentiated fiscal control of the rental market and local governments’ autonomy to treat different parts of the city in a differentiated way. The right to decent housing as uniform distribution is transformed into the universality of the inhabitants’ access to the exercise of residential arbitrations. Lévy continues:

« Mais il faut aussi que le logement entre dans l’univers des capacités, c’est-à-dire contribue par le développement des individus qui y accèdent, au développement de la société dans son ensemble. » (Lévy, 2012, p. 157).

That is the significance of rendering the urban space attractive for whichever resident (independently of revenue). Understanding individual capabilities in relation to space also identifies the double error of policies of fiscal incentive to the creation of “unqualified” work in areas of unemployment.⁶⁰⁹ It destines those residing locally to low paid jobs and naturalises job-seeking marked by immobility and further confinement to the social universe of the ghetto (Lévy, 2011, p. 46).⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰⁷ See also Vanderborght, Yannick and Van Parijs, Philippe (2005). *L’allocation universelle*. Paris: La Découverte.

⁶⁰⁸ This idea is accompanied by the establishment of clear rules regarding access and exit of a solidarity system. Lévy imagines the reduction or indeed suppression of aid to the fixation of the poor in wealthy areas when that measure diverges from the goal of mixity (Lévy, 2011, pp. 42–43, 45–46). While mobility in residential locations might be unavoidable in evolving cities and their rental markets, to include that instability at the core of policy is not unquestionably just. For the concerns with unbalance of spatial capitals that guides my work, but also the importance of space in people’s lives and projects (including collective ones), I am more inclined to counterbalance measures of attractiveness to others neighbourhoods, rather than condition economic support to quotas of social mixity. What is important here is the theoretical argument of the quality of the urban to all residents, enlightened by objectives which are not strictly addressed to the least well-off.

⁶⁰⁹ Reference to the policy of « zones franches urbaines » in France, launched in 1996 (Lévy, 2011, p. 46).

⁶¹⁰ The method displayed in this example can be extrapolated to other goods, whenever conceived of spatially. For example, education becomes a spatial public good when political actions mind location in relation to the objectives of higher levels of urbanity and sociological mixity. These actions surpass physical infrastructure and can reach all elements impacting individuals’ arbitrations on the couple schooling-housing (Lévy, 2011, p. 48).

5.2 Lefebvre's heritage: divergent and tangential interpretations

Having reaffirmed Lefebvre's heritage, we will turn to the review of a selection of works on spatial justice. Harvey, Soja and Dikeç interpret Lefebvre's work in a divergent direction than the one of this thesis, while the work of Fainstein is tangential to Lefebvre's contribution. Despite the wealth of this ensemble of works, these theories pose unnecessary constraints to the horizon of possibilities of spatial justice.

5.2.1 Harvey's theory of injustice

5.2.1.1 Liberal promises, utilitarian limits

The starting point of Harvey, in 1973, is to "explore how ideas in social and moral philosophy... could be related to geographical enquiry and to those fields of intellectual endeavour, such as planning and regional science, with which geography has much in common." (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 9). The author considered a reasonable postulate "that principles of social justice had some relevance for the application of spatial and geographical principles to urban and regional planning" (p. 9). At the outset of the enterprise, Harvey narrates having explored moral philosophy as "a distinct field of inquiry through which absolute ethical principles can be laid down with the full force of moral law." (pp. 14–15). Those principles could then be used "to evaluate events and activities in the urban context" (pp. 14–15). Having identified the importance of connecting empirics and theory (or, in his words, of not pursuing this general goal in abstraction), Harvey studies, for the city of Baltimore, the impact upon individual revenues of locational choices in the urban system.⁶¹¹

Reflecting on the limits of classic location theory (and its criterion of efficiency) as the normative tool of geographical methods of analysis, Harvey attempts the juxtaposition of Rawlsian principles of social justice to the spatial analysis of urbanism and planning (pp. 9, 96, 118). Justice was "thought of as a principle (or set of principles) for resolving conflicting claims" emerging from "the necessity for social cooperation in seeking individual advancement" (p. 97). Harvey considers that such principles, conceived of in relation to individuals, need a geographical translation so as to reflect the negotiation between territories and the mediation of political authority governing these regions (p. 99). The author proposes the concept of "territorial social justice" defined as "the specification of a just distribution justly arrived at" (p. 98). This formulation entails a substantial component ("a just distribution") and a procedural facet ("to achieve a distribution justly") (p. 108). With regard to the substantial component, a just outcome requires the construction of evaluative criteria. Harvey resorts to the then recent developments of classic social contract and utilitarianism, namely by Rawls, Rescher, and Runciman (p. 98). He arrives at these points, in order of importance: need, contribution to the common good, and merit.⁶¹² Complementarily, the procedural facet defines the problem of territorial justice as the "design [of] a form of spatial organisation which maximises the prospects of the least fortunate region" (p. 110). Rawls' "difference principle" is translated into territorial terms as follows:

"Under conditions of social justice, for example, an unequal allocation of resources to territories and appropriative movements would be permissible if (and only if) those territories favored were able, through their physical and social circumstances and through their connection to other territories, to contribute to the common good of all territories." (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 116).

⁶¹¹ In chapter 2, Harvey accepts the comprehensive definition of income as command over society scarce resources and notes how it is subject to the costs of accessibility to those resources and to the price of the latter, which are unstable in the urban system (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 53). Harvey concludes, in the second part of the book, that income is dependent on the society which is being considered, as it relates to its dominant mode of production (p. 294).

⁶¹² Need is presented as 1) a present or predictable potential market demand, 2) a relative deprivation – that is need as it is felt – subject to the problem of false consciousness, and 3) need as defined by experts (pp. 101–105). Contribution to the common good is defined as the organisation of the spatial system, so as to optimally respond to need via interregional multipliers (pp. 105–106). "Merit" comprises the unequal distribution of resources to surpass natural or social difficulty posed to human activity (pp. 106–107).

After this promising kick off, Harvey undertakes an epistemological self-critique on the relativity of “territorial distributive justice.” He thinks that the mobilisation of a conception of social justice is arbitrary for such conception depends on “the social processes operating in society as a whole” and not on philosophical idealism (pp. 12–8). He understands that the encounter between justice and the city reveals the inexistence in social reality of the unbridgeable gap between value and fact (that had characterised post-Renaissance western philosophy) (p. 14). He sees that concepts of justice “relate to and stem from human practice rather than... arguments about the eternal truths to be attached to these concepts.” Harvey follows Marx, for whom “the act of observing is the act of evaluation” (p. 15).⁶¹³ Harvey is right in critiquing the projection of justice ideas into space through a logic that aggregates the general to the *idéal* and opposes it to the couple particular/material. His critique does not lead him to an adjustment towards the universal/singular method and the coupling of ideality and materiality in all spatial consideration. Instead, he diverts from a beginning of a dialogical reading of society and space into Marxist structuralism and economism. We now turn to look with more detail into the “liberal” and “socialist” formulations advanced by Harvey.⁶¹⁴

5.2.1.2 Sociétalité of spatial justice (liberal formulation)

In the liberal formulations, Harvey identifies that for most goods in the urban field there is no separation between private and public good (he calls these goods “impure goods”) (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 72). He detects that benefits can be derived from the urban in unpredictable ways (through what he calls “externalities”) (pp. 57–59). He conceives of the urban as a “gigantic resource system” (pp. 68–69),⁶¹⁵ acknowledging that different persons have different capacities and interests to put this resource to use (pp. 81–82). In this context, Harvey goes as far as seeing that the environment where one evolves is an important force in the development of a person’s cognitive skills (p. 84). In this perspective, segregation has an important effect not only in those skills but, more broadly, in cultural heterogeneity.⁶¹⁶ In turn, that absence of unity is seen to impact the “hope of arriving at a firm basis for making socially meaningful decision” (p. 85). Harvey sees environmental stimuli as part of the culture we want to have and the man we want to be, that is, “a gradual process of cultural evolution”.⁶¹⁷ The author states that this idea of

⁶¹³ “Questions of social justice are initially approached as if social and moral philosophy is a distinct field of inquiry through which absolute ethical principles can be laid down with the full force of moral law. These principles, once established, can then be used, it is supposed, to evaluate events and activities in the urban context. Implicit in this approach is the distinction between observation on the one hand and the values on the basis of which we place the stamp of moral approval or disapproval. This distinction between fact and value (which is consistent with the distinction between methodology and philosophy) is one of the innumerable dualisms which, as many philosophers have remarked, pervade post-Renaissance western philosophy. (...) Marx, however, collapses the distinctions and thereby proclaims the end of all philosophy. (...) [I] am now inclined to accept Marx’s view on the matter. This is not to say that ethics are redundant, for there is a Marxian ethics of sorts. But it deals with how concepts of social justice and morality relate to and stem from human practice rather than with arguments about the eternal truths to be attached to these concepts. For Marx, the act of observing is the act of evaluation and to separate them is to force a distinction on human practice that does not in reality exist.” (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 14–15).

⁶¹⁴ For the sake of this review we refer to the titles that Harvey attributes to his two approaches of spatial justice in the city (Harvey, 1973/1998).

⁶¹⁵ As to what concerns the city, resources are mainly isolable objects (a public facility, a highway) but include more systemic goods such as the quality of the built environment:

“The concept of resource as a commodity which enters into production is no longer adequate (...). Recently, the concept has been extended to things such as amenities and open space, but there is still an unfortunate tendency to think of resources as “natural”. I think it is far more satisfactory to regard the city as a gigantic resource system, most of which is man-made. It is also a localised resource system in the sense that most of the resources we make use of in the city are not ubiquitous and their availability, therefore, depends upon accessibility and proximity. The urban system thus contains a geographical distribution of created resources of great economic, social, psychological and symbolic significance.” (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 68–69).

It is the separation between production and consumption and the requirement of measurement that Harvey associates to the former that discourages this direction. He proceeds from the previous quote: “Unfortunately, when we get away from the simple production-based definition of resources to a definition linked to consumption, we increase the appropriateness of the concept by examining income inequality and distributions effects, but decrease our ability to define quantitative measures for resource availability.” (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 69).

⁶¹⁶ Anticipating the escalation of violence among subcultures, Harvey envisages reducing social contact between different communities (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 81).

⁶¹⁷ Citing Sommer (1969), Harvey reminds us, “the long-range question is not so much what sort of environment we want, but what sort of man we want” (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 173).

evolution does not admit relativism. It demands “a set of overriding cultural values which we wish to preserve and augment”:

“By the constant rearrangement of stimuli in the urban system we are provoking a gradual process of cultural evolution. Evolution towards what? One way of making sure that a subculture places no value upon open space is to deny it all experience of it. The evolution of the urban system, whether we like it or not, can lead to large sensory deprivation with respect to certain phenomena (such as clean air, wilderness, etc.) and overexposure to others (such as suburban vistas, air pollution, etc.). In the long run therefore, we must evaluate decisions about the growth of the city against a set of overriding cultural values which we wish to preserve and augment. If we do not do this, we may see the emergence of new sets of cultural values and, if present trends are anything to go by, there may lead to violent conflict and, perhaps, to an ultimate social self-destruction.” (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 85–86).

Harvey’s liberal project identifies the joint problem of justice and urbanism as that of a direction for a “coherent social objective” (p. 50).⁶¹⁸ However, the problems are posed without some important supports to spatial theory: the integration of social and spatial dimensions,⁶¹⁹ a stable concept of space,⁶²⁰ the dialogic of material and the *sphère idéal*,⁶²¹ and the differentiated articulation of distribution and production.⁶²² Drawing on utilitarian thought, Harvey further reduces the *sociétalité* of his proposition. We find the frustrated desire of a “welfare function for the urban system” (p. 51), the pursuit of commensurability and forecast of utility and sufferance, the problems of Pareto non-comparable alternatives (p. 79), the centrality of top-down actors. This is accompanied by the reductive role of the political, seen as a battleground between groups seeking to protect themselves from negative externalities or to benefit from positive ones, in particular, through the lobbying of richer groups (pp. 73–75). These marks of reduced *sociétalité* are crucial in abandoning the liberal project and its enormous potential. In choosing value relativism as the main argument for invalidating the liberal approach, Harvey states:

“I do not turn to it [Marxism] out of some a priori sense of its inherent superiority... but because I can find no other way of accomplishing what I set out to do or understanding what has to be understood.... The approach to urban society... provides a useful framework for understanding certain important mechanisms which operate within “the urban process”, but the distinction between fact and value as it affects the concept of income as “command over resources” again allows important questions to be swamped in helpless formless relativism to which no solution, apart from opinionated moral exhortation, appear possible.” (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 17–18).

Contouring the difficulties of Harvey implies addressing the problematics of value and truth. This work tries to rehabilitate the liberal project of Harvey by putting at the centre the social construction of ethics and spatial values.

⁶¹⁸ This identification relied on the dominance of the material sphere of space.

⁶¹⁹ He uses a model that did not make the social and the spatial dialogic: “Social processes and spatial forms, are, for the most part, distinct in our minds if not in reality and it has been a fundamental concern of mine for several years now to heal the breach in our thoughts between what appear to be two distinctive and irreconcilable modes of analysis” (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 10).

⁶²⁰ “Space becomes whatever we make of it during the process of analysis... the question of “what is space?” is therefore replaced by the question “how is it that different human practices create and make use of distinctive conceptualisations of space?” (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 13, 14). Space is not stabilised as a theoretical concept but identified with different modalities of its attributes. For example, space can be 1) absolute (“The property spaces, for instances, creates absolute spaces within which monopoly control can operate” (p. 14)), 2) relative (requiring relationship with other spaces and activating mobility and distance: “the movement of people, goods, services and information takes place in a relative space because it takes money, time, energy and the like, to overcome the friction of distance” (p. 14)), or 3) relational (the space is modelled in relation to attributes in different dimensions; for example, rent produced in the interaction of the market and retail potential and demographics (p. 14)). We could read these variations of space as the modalities of no-distance, space with activated metrics and space through the dialogue of the spatial dimension with other societal substances.

⁶²¹ His correction of the epistemic division between philosophy and social science fails to consider space as ideal and material. It remains materialisation of values, accompanied by the disappearance of philosophy: “a shift away from philosophical idealism towards a materialistic interpretation of ideas as they arise in particular historical contexts. (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 12–13). The fact that there was an unproductive dualism to be surmounted did not imply the death of one of the poles.

⁶²² He evolves from considering distribution and production as separate fields to read them as identical (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 15). The specificity of each mode of conception of interaction between society and individuals, or between different places, is not acknowledged.

5.2.1.3 The Marxist detour from space and justice

In what Harvey calls “socialist formulation”, he argues for the Marxist method of dialectical materialism in the comprehension of the “problems of the city” (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 286–287, 304).⁶²³ Harvey contends that capital does not flow according to the principles of territorial justice and that corrective distributive policies are bound to fail or backlash (pp. 112–113). Moreover, the elimination of scarcity and the employment of surplus in socially just ways are seen as antagonistic to market mechanisms (pp. 113–116). In this way, Harvey redefines the problem of spatial justice as the seeking of an alternative configuration of societal systems altogether (pp. 115–116) – a turn that he has developed until the present (Harvey, 2010). Similar to Lefebvre, urbanism is considered to be one of the structures of society. On the one hand, the physical form of the city organises production and patterns of social relationships through a distinctive spatial logic (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 196, 304–307). On the other hand, it is produced by society’s dominant concepts. When asked in whose image space is created, Harvey agrees with Lefebvre. The problem of urbanisation is that the created space does not reflect the wants of the inhabitants. This is seen to result not only from direct control of surplus by class power, whereby urbanisation is a form of fixed capital investment,⁶²⁴ but also from the fact that created space impacts individuals’ sensibilities, perception of need and aspirations, reinforcing dominant ideology (pp. 309–310). Lefebvre considers that the evolution towards urban society, superseding industrialisation, created the seed conditions for liberating city-making from this monopoly. Inversely, Harvey contends that urbanisation is still determined by the mode of production of industrial capitalism (in the forms of “spatial fix” and “creative destruction”⁶²⁵ (Soja, 2010, pp. 89–90). The latter has evolved into the political and institutional forms of neo-liberalism (Harvey, 1973/1998, pp. 311–313; 2010, pp. 130–131). This reading asserts the dominance of the economic plane upon the production of urbanism and does not consider the positive contributions of space and spatialities to society. The resourcefulness of Lefebvre – totality through social contact, productivity through concentration – is not part of Harvey’s Marxist conception.

5.2.1.4 *Sociétalité* of spatial justice (socialist formulation)

This approach reduces the role of ordinary individuals in shaping urban space through their intentionality. Harvey does not consider the inhabitants’ capacity of idealising the desirability of the city and of affecting its making in that direction.⁶²⁶ The *paradigme actoriel* is absent in Harvey’s concern with the existence of uneven capitals in shaping space. By asserting a structural causality of injustice, the author argues that justice in the urban can only be attained if the interrelated structures of society evolve into “something radically different” from capitalism (Harvey, 2010, pp. 228–231). He endorses the idea of the right to the city as the possibility to make the city and ourselves more after our hearts’ desire and underscores that such right demands political mobilisation and coordination of social movements at the global scale (Harvey, 2008; Harvey & Potter, 2009, p. 45). While we agree with Harvey’s critiquing

⁶²³ The attachment of urban injustice to space economy (p. 284) is criticised in the literature for being fundamentally aspatial (Soja, 2010). We can see that Harvey’s thought reflects the economism of Marx, the main theoretical resource in this period. See the section dedicated to Marxism in Chapter 4.

⁶²⁴ “Place-making, and the creation of a dwelling place that becomes the secure environment called house and home, is as extensive as capital accumulation in its impacts upon the land, even as the production of such places becomes a major vehicle for surplus production and absorption. The population of “the urban”, where most of the burgeoning population now lives, has become over time more closely intertwined with capital accumulation, to the point where it is hard to disentangle one from the other.” (Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital And the Crisis of Capitalism*, 2010, pp. 146-147).

⁶²⁵ Creative destruction defines, in Harvey’s terms, the aggregation of destructive and predatory actions that pave the way for capital circulation and reproduction, including war; use of land and resources at the expense of natural and cultural indigenous balance; demolition and reconstruction; construction of new towns; eviction and relocation of poor occupying valuable land – all permanently recreating the socio economic geography of land (Harvey, 2010).

⁶²⁶ We have presented these capacities extensively. See in particular section 3.3.2, “*Urbanité/s*, modes of living together” and the reference to « La ville qu’ils veulent, la ville qu’ils font » (Lévy & Ourednik, 2011).

the fragility of democratic processes in the production of the urban (even today, in our terrain), the solutions he propose are not anchored on “society’s movements” but on social movements⁶²⁷ and are liable to democratic deficit.

5.2.1.5 The “right to the city” as interrogation

We observe that the original problem raised by Harvey in 1973 – that of finding a collective objective for the urban – remains theoretically and pragmatically unresolved. It is unclear how Harvey expects Marx to help him find out the mental conceptions that connect justice and space in our time (as Marx himself thought that mental conceptions had to be created). Recently, Harvey perforates the structuralist view of society with the possibility of transformed mental conceptions and social relations. He enunciates them in the form of interrogations, while recognising that a communist approach does not tell how to organise space.⁶²⁸ When building new cities, there is a renewed opportunity to reflect on “what kind of people we want to be, what kind of social relations we seek, what relations to nature we cherish, what style of daily life we desire, what kinds of technologies we deem appropriate, what aesthetic values we hold” (Harvey, 2010, pp. 230–231; Harvey, 2008, p. 6).⁶²⁹ He gives little direction on the role of space in answering those questions.⁶³⁰ We can conclude that Harvey advances a theory on spatial *in*justice. But the reversal of the unjust does not provide us with a spatial ethical horizon or procedural guidance on how space and spatiality can construct a more just society.⁶³¹

5.2.2 Soja’s ambiguity on spatial legitimacy

5.2.2.1 The rehabilitation of the political

We will now turn to Soja’s approach to spatial justice. This author positions his work against Harvey’s support on Marxism. He justifies that choice with being not only a critical thinker⁶³² but also an urbanist. Taking these two roles seriously, means, for Soja, to “advocate the positive advantages of urbanism and regionalism”. He rejects “unfulfillable yearnings for total revolution” and focuses on “opportunities to engage in social action and spatial praxis that is not aimed exclusively at transforming capitalism into socialism *tout court*” (Soja, 2003, p. 271). He is interested

⁶²⁷ The Right to the City Alliance can be seen as an extension of urban claims to world level. This interpretation significantly enhances the representation of civic society. Harvey and Soja describe a coalition of non-profit organisations, activists, trade unions, community associations, and academia. They talk of cross-class and cross-sector pressure for the resolution of problems, such as homelessness and forced eviction. Transforming group-based social movement demands into world society civic movements would be a desirable prospect. The increased mixity of the sociological composition seems like a positive development in this direction, but it would require further investigation on the level of *soci t alit * of the approach and the inclusiveness of voices coming from different quarters of society.

⁶²⁸ His *Enigma of Capital* (2010), though retaining the explicative Marxist inspiration, does recognise that there is some articulation between spheres of human activity where something different might be evolving. But, for him, that is not the continuous movement of society, open in its future as it had been in the past.

⁶²⁹ “There have to be, finally, some loosely agreed upon common objectives. Some general guiding norms can be set down. These might include respect for nature, radical egalitarianism in social relations, institutional arrangements based on some sense of common interests, democratic administrative procedures (as opposed to the monetised shams that now exist), labour processes organised by the direct producers, daily life as the free exploitation of new kinds of social relations and living arrangements, mental conceptions that focus on self-realisation in service to others and technological and organisational innovations oriented to the pursuit of the common good rather than to supporting militarised power and corporate greed. These could be the co-revolutionary points around which social action could converge and rotate. Of course this is utopian! But so what! We cannot afford not to be.” (Harvey, 2010, pp. 230–231).

⁶³⁰ Harvey reiterates how private property and the market prevent radical egalitarianism in social relations and result in homelessness and gated communities in the spatial organisation (Harvey, 2010, pp. 231–233).

⁶³¹ Peter Hall notices (though not by addressing the work of Harvey in particular) Marxist critique leaves planners concerned with justice improvements with little marge of manoeuvre, since they “could never hope to divert the course of capitalist evolution by more than a millimeter or a millisecond... The Marxian logic is strangely quietist: it suggest that the planner retreats from planning altogether into the academic ivory tower” (Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow. An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design of the Twentieth Century*, 1988/1997, p. 371).

⁶³² He defines critical thought as seeking “knowledge that is not only accurate but also useful in changing the world for the better.” He claims inspiration from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory (Soja, 2003, pp. 270–271).

in “maximizing the possibilities for a flexible and democratic socialism within existing capitalist societies” (p. 271).⁶³³ Soja privileges Lefebvre’s dialectic balance of social and spatial causes over Harvey’s structural causality of injustice (pp. 100–101). Economic capital plays a role (Soja, 2010, p. 93), but not the sole. Soja thinks that “the more negative effects of globalization and the New Economy of flexible capitalism... can be effectively addressed by concerted political action.” (p. 270). The political function of society is completely alive.

5.2.2.2 City density as societal resourcefulness

Soja justifies the emergence of the notion of spatial justice in relation to the “spatial turn” across disciplines that span from archaeology to literary criticism. That is to say, a movement from the dominance of social historicism towards the willingness to think spatially, historically, and socially in equal terms (Dufaux, Gervais-Lambony, Buire, & Desbois, 2001). The spatial turn implied a thought change “from emphasising flat cartographic notions of space as container or stage of human activity or merely the physical dimensions of fixed form, to an active force shaping human life” (Soja, 2009, p. 32).⁶³⁴ Soja insists on a specifically spatial key of analysis whereby cities do not “hold societies” but are explanatory factors of societies. This appears in close proximity with a positive valuation of urban regions and the possibilities of urban and regional democracy (Dufaux, Gervais-Lambony, Buire, & Desbois, 2001).⁶³⁵ In “Writing the City Spatially” (Soja, 2003), Soja follows Lefebvre in seeing that “the development of society is conceivable only in urban life, through the realization of urban society” (p. 272). Like Lefebvre, he considers the city foundational of the society epoch in which we live (p. 272). Soja revives the ancient Greek notion of *synekism*⁶³⁶ to refer to the “conditions that derive from dwelling together in a particular home place or space” (p. 273).⁶³⁷ He associates it with the Aristotelian concept of Polis, implying an inaugural moment of “political and cultural confederation around a distinctive territorial centre: a polis, or metropolis (literally “mother” city)” (p. 273).⁶³⁸ For Soja, societal integration is not a moment in time but a continuous process of urban development, arising from “living together in dense heterogeneous urban regions” (pp. 273–274).⁶³⁹ Soja chooses to underline the stimulus of urban agglomeration as concentration (density), an advantageous response to the friction of distance (p. 274).⁶⁴⁰ Density is the main entry

⁶³³ “Am I then a Marxist urbanist as well? The answer is emphatically yes and no. I continue to be inspired by Marxism when trying to understand how contemporary urban life remains fundamentally capitalist, that is, when exploring the present in its stubborn continuity with the past. Insightful though this may be, however, it is not enough to make practical and theoretical sense of the present, and also leads too quickly to unfulfillable yearnings for total revolution. I depart then from the urban Marxism advocated by such scholars as David Harvey primarily in stressing the importance of the here and now, what is new and different in the contemporary world, and in using this understanding to rethink and revise all established epistemologies, Marxism included. My approach to the current era of globalization, economic restructuring and innovative informational technologies thus does not begin and end with demonstrating how effectively Marx captured capitalism’s essences and effects on urban life. I seek instead new and different opportunities to engage in social action and spatial praxis that is not aimed exclusively at transforming capitalism into socialism tout court but at maximizing the possibilities for a flexible and democratic socialism within existing capitalist societies.” (Soja, 2003, p. 271).

⁶³⁴ This change is backed up by three principles: the ontological spatiality of being, the social production of spatiality, and the socio-spatial dialectic (Soja, 2009, pp. 33–34).

⁶³⁵ Like Lévy and Lussault, he helps us see that cities can be entire regions.

⁶³⁶ The actual original word is *synoikismos*, but Soja adapts it to ease the pronunciation (Soja, 2003, p. 273).

⁶³⁷ The idea had been used by the geo-historian Thucydides (c. 460–c. 400 BC) to refer to a “process of societal consolidation and centralisation in two ways, as a physical agglomeration of people and as a form of political unification, noting that these two forms of coming together do not always take place at the same time” (Soja, 2003, p. 273). *Synekism* designates the advantages of “the coming together... of proximate communities, neighbourhoods, villages, towns into a single urban political unit, an urban polity” (Soja, 2003, p. 273).

⁶³⁸ Soja underlines that foundation to involve “the creation of a civil society, concepts of citizenship and democracy, family and identity, creativity and innovation, the foundations of city-based and city-generated civilization” (Soja, 2003, p. 273). We have seen in the previous chapter how these inventions were incomplete, given the Aristotelian view of society as highly discriminating against upon contingencies of birth (slave, gender).

⁶³⁹ “In my more assertively spatial reformulation, *synekism* is no longer confined to the moment of city formation but is seen as a continuous and highly politicised process of urban growth and development, a dynamic process that provides a constantly evolving source of stimulating social synergy and is part of the very essence of urban life. Formulated in this way, *synekism* involves the creativity, innovation, territorial identity, political consciousness, and societal development that arise from living together in dense heterogeneous urban regions” (Soja, 2003, p. 274).

⁶⁴⁰ “The basic notion of agglomeration economies builds on the savings in time and energy that derive from clustering things together rather than spreading them out. Clustering and nodality represent a fundamental and strategic human response to the friction of distance that affects all life on earth, even though the reasons for such behaviour often remain out of conscious awareness.” (Soja, 2003, p. 274). He recognises that the reasons for innovation and societal development in cities are not well known: “Just exactly how such savings in time and energy are actually

point to his view of urbanity. While noting Jane Jacobs' developments on the association of density and cultural heterogeneity as primary triggers of the "spark of city economic life" (p. 276),⁶⁴¹ diversity does not figure explicitly in the definition of *synekism*.⁶⁴²

Soja's approach to justice in the city endorses Lefebvre's differentiated space and the virtuality of the city. The author juxtaposes this resourcefulness with the problem of what he calls "uneven geography". As exposed in *Seeking Spatial Justice* (Soja, 2010), "geographically uneven development... is a contributing factor to the creation and maintenance of individual and social inequalities and hence to social and spatial injustices" (p. 72). Soja anchors injustice on the separation between the production of a differentiated space and how people with different capitals can benefit from it.⁶⁴³ The concept of spatial justice – "an explicitly spatialized concept of justice" – is then associated with opening up new potentials in the domains of theory, political action, and empirical analysis on the consequential injustice of urban restructuring (Soja, 2009, p. 31). The expectable balance between these fields is disproved by a register that assumedly addresses a public of political activists (p. 8).

5.2.2.3 Rawls through negativity: Iris Marion Young

Soja's approach to justice theories situates Rawls through negativity. The critique of Rawls is seen as an important stimulus to the development of specifically geographical theories of justice (Soja, 2010, pp. 75–78). Soja denotes the a-historical and a-spatial quality of the philosopher's construction, "leaving almost untouched the major sources and causes of inequality" (p. 77). Soja sees Rawls's treatment of unfair outcomes as static, neglecting the processes that produced them (p. 77).⁶⁴⁴ We can recognise the critique of "institutional transcendentalism" addressed by Sen to justice as fairness. Soja then resorts to the alternative offered by Iris Marion Young's substantive approach.⁶⁴⁵ The urban interpretation of Young's deviation from Rawls reflects the ambivalence of *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Young, 1990/2011). As we have seen earlier, the substantive normative horizon of the city integrates a third via of looking into social organisation, in-between communities and society.⁶⁴⁶ When Soja talks about regional democracy, he seems to be taking into consideration Young's demands that justice, even when enunciated on collective terms, needs to relate to the whole of society. But, in Soja's extensive account of urban and global social movements, what is at stake is Young's appeal to the possibility of uniting groups upon a cross-cut motivation for struggle (Soja, 2010, p. 78).⁶⁴⁷ It is the concept of "oppression" (which indeed Young makes central to her discourse) that Soja recovers.⁶⁴⁸

translated into creativity and innovation is not well understood analytically, but again we can intuitively grasp the existence of some causal link between the two." (Soja, 2003, p. 275).

⁶⁴¹ Soja refers to Jacobs, J. (1969) *The Economy of Cities*. New York: Random House.

⁶⁴² As we will see in what follows, Soja does not pay specific attention to sociological mixity.

⁶⁴³ "The geographies that we have produced will always have spatial injustices and distributional inequalities embedded in them. Stated somewhat differently, location in space will always have attached to it some degree of advantage and disadvantage (Soja, 2010, pp. 72, 73). In this sense, "unequal individual or collective advantage and opportunity can be seen as spatial injustice" (p. 73). As far as Soja keeps the differentiation attached to the opportunity of people and not to space, we can consider his approach compatible with the possibility that spatial capital can serve to gain advantage through mobility. This implies displacing the reading of space as "location" to techniques of distance.

⁶⁴⁴ Though Rawls is alive to the participation of basic goods in social integration (which presupposes some social conversion of resources), it is true that his approach does not expand on the dynamic realisation of justice, correcting that fragility is one of the purposes of Sen's realisation-based approach to justice.

⁶⁴⁵ See review of this work in the section 4.6, "The substantive urban model of Iris Marion Young", in chapter 4.

⁶⁴⁶ Infra-societal groups are not strictly communitarian as they result from choice of association, even if some of the basis of association is not a choice (gender or ethnicity).

⁶⁴⁷ "This prevailing view of homogeneous community, Young argued, frequently failed to see the political potentialities of pluralism and the heterogeneous mixing of social groups, as might occur, for example, in coalition building" (Soja, 2010, p. 78).

⁶⁴⁸ Young is not interpreted through her concern for heteronomy of individuals inside the city. This seems to be a common interpretation in the urban field. Fainstein also notes, in reference to *Justice and the Politics of Difference*:

"Under this conception (of social justice as respect for difference) the argument for justice shifts from a fair distribution to "social differentiation without exclusion" (238). Emancipation, for Young, lies in the rejection of the assimilationist model and the assertion of a positive sense of group difference wherein the group defines itself rather than being defined from the outside (172)." (Fainstein, 2010, p. 43).

Young's work is seen to extend the sense of oppression beyond exploitation (in Marx's terms) to include basis of race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation (pp. 78–79). This extension, Soja argues, contributes to the spatialisation of justice through the "search for large-scale sources of pluralistic solidarity" (p. 79). The idea of shared experience of urban problems and its symbolic force, regardless of specific identities and geographic location – the urban spans from one's own body to the world (p. 109) – is at the core of the abundantly illustrated case studies of coalition building.⁶⁴⁹ Coalition through spatial strategy, Soja concludes, is the best application for the notion of spatial justice (p. 11). Coherently, internal homogeneity of communities is not problematic for Soja, even when he comments on the formation of regional democracies "from the bottom up" (Dufaux & Soja, 2011).⁶⁵⁰

5.2.2.4 *Sociétalité* of spatial justice: the absent spatiality of the inhabitants

The paramount example of this use of "spatial justice" is the legal struggle of the Bus Rider Union, a grassroots organisation that in 1996 won a lawsuit against the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Association, on the basis of the unjust use of public resources in transit planning. The project of an underground system (paired with the increase of bus fares) was considered to harm the urban poor, which relied on the bus services to pursue their livelihood, while benefiting the residents of the well-off suburbs of Los Angeles. The definite argument seems to have been the time it would take to cover the gigantic urban area of Los Angeles with the dense network of metro lines. The evaluation of this implication does not mobilise the argument that everyone, including "the poor" of the future, could have benefited from this urban investment.⁶⁵¹ The urbanity model of Los Angeles – its residential typology of four-fronted terraced houses chosen by the poor and rich alike – did not seem to be questioned either.⁶⁵² Soja's arguments of spatial justice are restricted to furthering the interests of the least advantaged groups without investing these concerns from a lens of spatial public goods (Lévy, 2012, pp. 155–156).⁶⁵³

We have seen that Soja conceives of the city as an advantage.⁶⁵⁴ The vision of space is interactive between social, economic, and spatial dynamics. The case studies, however, show that the notion of socio-spatial dynamics is somewhat metaphorical. It seems that the production of space through interactions between actors and the environment is not fully developed. Soja considers that the "views from below" are interesting, but only insofar as they do not deconcentrate one's attention from macro theory.⁶⁵⁵ The couple spatiality/space is loose; the

⁶⁴⁹ Examples include United Farm Workers (UFW), Bus Riders Union (BRU), Justice for Janitors (JJJ) (Justice for Cleaners in the UK), Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), The Living Wage Campaign, Metropolitan Alliance, and Right to the City Alliance.

⁶⁵⁰ "But what's happened in Los Angeles is regionalism from below. The book *Seeking Spatial Justice* spends a lot of time on the social movements in Los Angeles, and these are community-based regional movements. And there is even a new concept called "community-based regionalism" that's been coming out of Los Angeles and the Bay Area, and spreading to other cities as well. And this is another way of trying to achieve regional democracy. It's not just the top-down process. It's got to combine top-down and bottom-up, as they say. And so, this is what I'm talking about, among other things, an adaptation to this new regional urbanization process that is not the same as what we've all been taught in our schools to be the universal kind of urban form." (Dufaux & Soja, 2011).

⁶⁵¹ In Soja's account of the lawsuit, there are no developments on whether different traces of the metro network could have served the poor, the middle-class, and the rich alike.

⁶⁵² With a travel grant from the *Académie suisse des sciences humaines et sociales*, I had the opportunity to visit Los Angeles. It became clear that the housing fabric inevitably increases the difficulties of distance (electric infrastructure, mobility), which this society needs to meet.

⁶⁵³ « Il est frappant de constater que dans ces trois cas [Bus riders union, anti-walmart opposition and Right to the City Alliance against eviction of color young people], on pourrait contester l'affirmation selon laquelle la satisfaction de la revendication formulée par ces acteurs apporte davantage de justice. On pourrait même parfaitement soutenir qu'il s'agit plutôt d'une action corporatiste de groupes d'intérêt opposés à des projets d'intérêt public. La préoccupation de la justice se trouverait alors plutôt chez leurs opposants. Le problème soulevé par les exemples utilisés par Soja, c'est qu'il semble raisonner comme si une ville n'était qu'une collection d'objets (quartiers, réseaux générés par un mode de transport, type d'activité), isolables et sans rapport les uns avec les autres, alors que l'avantage comparatif de la ville porte au contraire sur les liens faibles offerts par l'espace public, sur le mélange des populations et des fonctions, sur le caractère à la fois systémique et imprévisible (sérendipité) de sa surproductivité. » (Lévy, 2012, pp. 155–156).

⁶⁵⁴ We can notice the value assigned to Harvey's thoughts on the interdependence of social justice and efficiency (Soja, 2009, p. 86). Harvey acknowledges that social justice-minded distributive principles are not independent from efficiency for a drastic reduction on the available resources to be distributed – should they be severely impacted by the application of such principles – would not result in a more just outcome (Harvey, 1973/1998, p. 97).

⁶⁵⁵ "The six discourses I will be presenting are aimed at making sense of the whole urban region, the spatiality and sociality of the urban fabric writ large. They are precisely the kinds of discourses being hammered at by those micro-urban critics who see in them only the distorting, if not

relationship between “stables structures” and everyday life is optional and not a theoretical statement. That consequential geographies can be changed through human agency (Soja, 2010, p. 105) seems to mean that individuals can improve what they find unjust in space primarily as citizens. It is their direct relationship with the political scene – using space as a mobilising and communicative tool (Soja, 2010, p. 34)⁶⁵⁶ – that is foregrounded, not their spatiality as inhabitants.

5.2.2.5 The “right to the city” as a reversal of (empathic) sufferance

Soja associates the dual potentiality of constructed geographies (oppressive or liberating) with the particular interpretation of Lefebvre’s “right to the city”. The city is a “potent battleground for [class] struggles seeking greater democracy, equality and justice” (2010, p. 96),⁶⁵⁷ The coupling of Lefebvre and Iris Marion Young focuses on the potential of spatial justice via the idea that groups should have a direct voice in political controversies. Soja and Los Angeles activists (and academia) see that those groups can follow the geography of world economy and become global networks with increased negotiating leverage. This renewed optimism seems to reduce theoretical drive. Soja follows Young where she is less interesting, indeed moralistic. Eviction, closure of industry, big retail centres are amoral, because we are sympathetic with the group of people that suffer from these events, and this feeling dispenses rational justification of one’s judgement. It also feeds antagonism between social groups and sanctions the refusal to listen to other voices. Young and Soja are membership-entitlement theoreticians, where the far and distant seem to have little to say to our reasoning from our emotional reaction. Communication, knowledge, and cooperation are not brought to their fullest potential in identifying injustice and in orienting the just. And so, the questions left unanswered by Lefebvre, the challenges of coexistence of potential different spatial representations at the centre of urban dynamics, are not satisfyingly addressed (Soja, 2003, p. 275).⁶⁵⁸ In the lenses of justice mobilised by Soja there is no *garde-feu* against corporative interests of the complaining groups. Despite the rehabilitation of the political, Soja does not construct a theoretical framework with which to argue the spatial legitimacy of justice demands.⁶⁵⁹

5.2.3 Dikeç: the ideality of places without a comprehensive social voice

Mustafa Dikeç started his academic career with a PhD thesis supervised by Edward Soja. The initial matrix of thought is similar to the one we have just reviewed (in section 5.2.2). He emphasises the dialectical relationship between space and injustice. In the recognition that “justice has a spatial dimension to it” (2001, p. 1179; 2009a, pp. 72–88), Dikeç distinguishes two angles. “Injustice of Spatially”, referring to the use of a spatial perspective to discern injustice in space, and “Spatiality of Injustice”, designating the fact that there are causes of injustice which have a spatial

repressive, gaze of authoritative masculinist power, the masterful «view from above». A primary tactic in fostering these often reductionist critiques of macro-level theorizing has been a kind of epistemological privileging of the experience of the flâneur, the streetwandering free agent of everyday life, the ultimate progenitor of the view from below. There is undoubtedly much to be gained from this ground level view of the city and, indeed, many of those who focus on more macro-spatial perspectives too often overlook the darker corners or everyday life and the less visible oppressions of race, gender, class, and sexuality. What I am most concerned with, however, is the degree to which such micro-level critiques have been unproductively polarizing critical urban studies, romancing agency and the view from below to the point of labelling all macro-level perspectives taboo, off-limits, politically incorrect.” (Soja, [1997] 2010).

⁶⁵⁶ Configuring the struggle over geography as “not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about form, about images and imaginings” (Said, 1993, cited in Soja, 2009, p. 34).

⁶⁵⁷ “What is especially attractive to me in Lefebvre’s concept is that it’s rooted in taking control over the social production of social space, in a kind of consciousness and awareness of how space can be used to oppress and exploit and dominate, to create forms of social control and discipline.” (Dufaux, Gervais-Lambony, Buire, & Desbois, 2001, p. 3).

⁶⁵⁸ “As I read him, Lefebvre is saying that human society, indeed all forms of social relations and social life, originate, evolve, develop and change in the materially real and socially imagined context of cities. They do so through what he would call the social production of urban space, a continuous and contentious process that is filled with politics and ideology, creativity and destruction, and with the unpredictable interplay of space, knowledge and power—if you will allow me a little plug for Foucault’s version of synekism.” (Soja, 2003, p. 275).

⁶⁵⁹ The lack of normative aspects on what makes space just is worrying when social movements are subject to partial representativeness of the civic society. There is expectation that these movements will converge with institutional politics at the urban scale. In any case, democratic processes can benefit from stringent theoretical constructions.

explanation (2001, pp. 1792–1793).⁶⁶⁰ In that initial period, Dikeç interprets Lefebvre’s right to the city and right to difference through the motto of struggle:

“In claiming these rights, a notion of spatial justice might serve as a mobilizing discourse through the cultivation of a spatial sensibility towards injustice and a spatial culture to fight against it.” (Dikeç, 2001, p. 1791).

The empiric that serves as a background to much of his thought is the space of the French *banlieues*. In the book *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics and Urban Policy* (2007), Dikeç wrote on the political and social effects of the French *Politique de la Ville in the banlieues*, exploring the interaction between the French tradition of republicanism, the political scene, and the planning policy’s construction of geographies of exclusion. He develops the notion of “remainders” to designate the “remaining” inhabitants in those territories, who cannot escape from a space of disadvantage, while also adducing that the same “remaindered”. The latter refers to exclusionary practices supported by segregating discourses. Dikeç points out how the evolution of the *Politique de la Ville* between 1981 and 2006, from Mitterrand to Sarkozy, lost relational concerns becoming increasingly circumscribed. It is this process of territorial demarcation that Dikeç considers problematic. Resorting to Rancière’s conception of a “police”, Dikeç concludes that the injustice of spatiality results greatly from the processes through which hegemonic spatial orders are naturalised – concerns obliterated and geographies of closure justified (Dikeç, 2009b, p. 88). He sees spatial justice as “a critique of systematic exclusion, domination and oppression, which are reproduced, among other things, by the police order that has been consolidated” (p. 88). According to Dikeç, the assertion of French values, the designation of territorial boundaries, the public information on delinquency rates are all likely to deteriorate the space *idéal* of the *banlieues*.⁶⁶¹ The production of French *Banlieues* as distressed areas, whereby the state massively influences what becomes a collective imagery, is considered to be a single-sided act.⁶⁶² Mobilising the ethical appeal of recognition and equal solicitude, the author tries to articulate the injustice denunciations delivered in his terrain from the actors with lesser political capital (Dikeç, 2007, pp. 152–153).⁶⁶³ He pinpoints the reason for revolt as unemployment, the experience of the place stigma, absence of responsibility, and excessive urban policy (pp. 154–158).

Dikeç’s work on spatial justice opts for an imbalance between material, immaterial, and ideality angles of justice with an overemphasis on the latter. The spatiality of the inhabitants configuring the *banlieue* (which is not restricted to the spatiality of its current residents) does not emerge. The role of the more stable structures (space) is also not

⁶⁶⁰ The first approach regards injustice *in* space, and the latter refers to the process that produces space, injustice *through* space (2001, pp. 1792–1793).

⁶⁶¹ The passages from interviewees’ quotes in *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics and Urban Policy* (Dikeç, 2007) suggest that the author focused on some youth groups, not on a cross-age sampling of the population, nor a cross-social group (within the available diversity). The ideality of a place is also constituted by what society thinks of it, and there is no account (except reliance on the media) on how France sees the *banlieues*.

⁶⁶² “An aesthetic regime is a regime of sensibility. This means that we have more than mere sensory experience of phenomena; this sensible experience is also related to ways of rationalisation and conceptualisation so that it makes sense. “Sensibility to a phenomenon”, Rancière (2007:9) writes, “is always linked to the modes of naming and rationalising it”. This is what I try to capture with the term “sensible evidences”: they are available to the senses and they make sense. Here the term evidence also needs to be understood in a double meaning as invoking a quality of obviousness and also a quality of providing a ground for judgment: it is evident and it is evidence. My argument, then, is that ideology works through what it makes available to the senses and what it makes to make sense. This is what I mean by ideology as an aesthetic affair. Once ideology is understood in this way, the focus of ideological critique becomes how sensory and sensible experiences are made common (which, of course, does not necessarily mean that everyone will interpret them in exactly the same way). It is highly emblematic in this sense that one of the first actions of Nicolas Sarkozy when he took office as Minister of the Interior in 2002 was to modify the periodicity of the publication of delinquency figures, and to make them publicly available more frequently (Le Monde 31 May 2002).” (Dikeç, 2009b, p. 31).

⁶⁶³ The terrain followed the riots of 2005. In the chapter “Voices into Noises: Revolts as Unarticulated Justice Movements”, Dikeç states:

“(…) this chapter is not about “justice movements” – organised or in the making – as such. It is about the nature of the revolts in the banlieues of French cities since the 1990s and the responses of the French state to them. Such incidents (..) are not social movements in the more conventional sense either, if we follow Buechler’s definition of social movements as “intentional, collective efforts to transform social order” (2000, 213). They are neither pre-conceived nor organized, and they are not articulated as collective efforts aimed at transforming the established order. However, I will try to show, they are not intrinsic acts of violence neither. They all mobilise with a demand for justice and as reaction against perceived injustices. “Let justice be done” of “*J’ai la haine*”, as we heard – again – during the revolts in autumn 2005. Unarticulated as they are, such incidents are nevertheless episode mobilisations that manifest contention and raise certain claims.” (Dikeç, 2007, pp. 152, 153).

described. The analysis of the preponderant role of the state in the production of injustice tends to reduce spatial complexity to matters of spatial representation. As the craft of this research shows, we do think that ideality matters and so does its circulation in political discourse, policy, and society. We also understand that one work cannot easily cover the entire complexity of space. We can nevertheless retain as critical kernel – which Dikeç shares with Soja – the exemption from listening to the problems of society as they are perceived by its members, considering voices coming from different social positions.

In Dikeç's more recent work (2009b; 2013), the author consolidates his main theoretical source in Rancière. It is the paradigm of the actors that is under questioning (Lévy, Rennes, & Zerbib, 2007). The possibility to gather insight in his work for an approach to justice centred on the individual/society dialogic becomes rather narrow. It seems, at the first reading,⁶⁶⁴ that the approach to politics as “aesthetic regimes” (Dikeç, 2009b, pp. 29–30) attempts to dislocate ethics from the case cognitive/objective into the affective/subjective.⁶⁶⁵

5.2.4 Fainstein: the just city as *techné* (nonreformist reform)

Susan Fainstein's work can be seen as an attempt to render justice substantial by thinking of urban themes. We have tried to locate the contributions on the field of spatial justice theory by considering the thread line of Lefebvre's interpretations. To place the contribution of Fainstein in that scheme opens a new category. While some ideas of Lefebvre are present in her work,⁶⁶⁶ it is mainly through the critique of Lefebvrian revivals that Fainstein can be positioned in this review. Fainstein constructs her work negatively in relation to Harvey and other neo-Marxists' conception of the city as a motto for permanent struggle. The author specifies the restriction of her project to what seems achievable locally (at a municipal or regional level) without resorting to revolution, in a context of capitalist urbanisation in wealthy, formally democratic Western countries. She observes, following Martha Nussbaum, that people do not want to live in permanent revolt (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 5, 17–20)⁶⁶⁷ and rejects Harvey's argument that “a Just City has to be about fierce conflict all of the time” (Harvey & Potter, 2009, p. 47). Stating that justice does not depend “on a revolutionary consciousness among the exploited” (2010, pp. 40–41), Fainstein is alive to the idea that increasing the prospects of the least well-off is a matter of the urban as a whole and not the defence of some particular groups.⁶⁶⁸ *The Just City* (2010) is an important reorientation in the Anglophone literature, detecting the insufficiency of neo-marxism to think of the possibilities of space and urbanism in the improvements of justice. Fainstein is guided by what she names “nonreformist reform” or “realistic utopianism”, that is, relating “politics to vision” and “policy to justice” in order to achieve a more just society (pp. 19–20).⁶⁶⁹ The author does not position her work explicitly in relation to a paradigm of actors. In several instances, she transpires disbelief regarding individuals' reflexive competence as well as the existence of ordinary political intentionality. Fainstein questions Fisher and Forrester's (the proponents of deliberative planning) assumption that “people's views are informed through interactions with other” rather than “fixed preferences, based on self-interest that can simply be registered” (p. 28). The post-positivistic approach of communicative rationality, claiming the necessary subjectivity of knowledge and

⁶⁶⁴ The philosophical field in which Dikeç moves lies outside the theories of justice and hence, does not fall within the scope of this study.

⁶⁶⁵ I cannot relate to this discourse because the baseline assumption is that ethics, as aesthetics, is a multiform geometry and that there are no societal concepts that can possibly guide justice. Every societal effort at improving justice, depending on the subjectivity of the recipient, can be converted into a feeling of injustice and consequential, self-exclusion from society.

⁶⁶⁶ Fainstein briefly defined the right to the city as “the inclusion of all city users within the space of the city, regardless of their cultural differences” (Fainstein, 2010, p. 70).

⁶⁶⁷ Referring to Martha Nussbaum's view that people do not want to be in revolt permanently, she adds that “transformational movements aimed at a more egalitarian society must find a rationale based in human motivation rather than historically inevitability and, if not committed to or expecting revolution, must seek to achieve their aims through politics” (Fainstein, 2010, p. 19). On Nussbaum's approach to justice see also *The Quality of Life* (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993), *Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice* (Nussbaum, 2002), and *Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach* (2011).

⁶⁶⁸ This concern was confirmed in a conversation between myself and Susan Fainstein during the *Seminar Penser l'Espace*, 2014.

⁶⁶⁹ The line of argument is that “democratic revisionists [who] shared an emphasis... on morality and ethics as opposed to science and materialism, and on human will and cross-class cooperation rather than irresistible economic forces and inevitable class conflict”. Fainstein (2010, 19) quotes Sheri Berman (2003) from “The Roots and Rationale of Social Democracy”, in *Social Philosophy and Policy*.

how it informs value judgements is, in Fainstein's view, too susceptible to power unbalance. The author also fears that "after deliberation has run its course, people may still make choices that are harmful to themselves or to minorities" (p. 30). The value of democratic processes in assuring contact with the views of others is thus underplayed. The hesitations detected in Fainstein's writing depart from forty years of work in planning theory and the practice of urbanism, developed as separate investigations (p. ix). If these experiences cannot be easily discarded, we can read her choices in relation to the route we have been proposing and can identify some unexplored alternatives. Fainstein does not engage with a geographical theorisation of the urban.⁶⁷⁰ The scope of her theory comprises of the reflective input of only a part of the society's actors (whom we can call spatial professionals): Fainstein does not extend her survey of urban empirical knowledge to the inhabitants.⁶⁷¹ This access to the urban is marked by realism, which does not consider how all actors might behave in different scenarios. For example, in relation to the case made against participatory urbanism, we might imagine that a framework of real collective responsibility for choice might produce other empirical results.

5.2.4.1 Making values explicit in urbanism

From this perspective, Fainstein raises interesting questions for our topic. In particular, she realises that deliberative procedures in planning cannot substitute for explicit enunciation of desirable achievements in the city. Fainstein's theory of the just city aims to "provide a guide to what to do if justice is the first evaluative criterion used in policy making" (Fainstein, 2010, p. 6). She thinks it crucial to bring justice to the fore in a context where economic growth is the primary argument underpinning urban development. Fainstein disagrees that the promotion of social prosperity can be achieved through a trickle-down effect from the "urban renewal" projects she studies in cities like New York or London (pp. 2, 3).⁶⁷² However, she also finds it unproductive the way in which "progressive urban scholars react to the accompanying neoliberal ideology through critique rather than the development of counterideology" (p. ix). She observes that the neo-Marxist rejection of explicit ethical formulations supports the nonappearance of normative judgements, which are nevertheless involved in urbanism (p. ix).⁶⁷³ Coherently, her goal is to surpass such reluctance to specify values. The author seeks to influence planners and policy-makers to voice the ends in relation to which they measure efficiency and effectiveness of means (p. 9).

5.2.4.2 A non-polarised spectrum of the ethos

Almost forty years after Harvey's liberal articulation of social justice and the city, Fainstein states, as Harvey did, that intersecting urban theory and theories of justice requires a substantive theory:

"...making justice the first principle by which to evaluate urban planning and policy is essential and is not met without ascribing to it a substantive content" (Fainstein, 2010, p. 13).

⁶⁷⁰ She does not mobilise social science as spatial theory.

⁶⁷¹ The empirical basis of her work is gathered in research that listened to "city builders", understood as "developers, officers of financial institutions, public and private-sector planners, chartered surveyors, politicians, community leaders, and knowledgeable observers" (Fainstein, 1994, p. 17).

⁶⁷² Case studies of justice and injustice in the city include major projects increasing disparity between "the haves and the have-nots" while using public money, elimination of land use that sustained ethnic jobs to the benefit of speculative developers, the black and white divide, the withdrawal of affordable housing from the stock, and strategies of isolation of major projects from public debate (Fainstein, 2009, pp. 66–67). For more details on the empirical research, see *The City Builders* (Fainstein, 1994). In particular, Fainstein criticises the focus on growth as the sole argument underpinning of "investments in infrastructure, subsidised and regulatory relief to property developers and firms, and city marketing... office led development, Festival retail malls, sports facilities, "tourist bubbles", clustering of related industries, nurturing the creative class, and arts and development" (Fainstein, 2010, p. 2). She proceeds, "Except in wealthy enclaves, the desirability of growth is usually assumed, while the consequences for social equity are rarely mentioned."

⁶⁷³ "Increasingly, however, the latent normative judgements that had always underlain Left analysis have become manifest. It is my hope to add this explication and to provide a set of principles that planners can apply to their activities" (2010, p. ix).

She also sees that substantiveness quickly leads to questions on the social quality of values and on the possibility of the universal philosophical construction. She follows Mannheim⁶⁷⁴ in arguing that “the historical situatedness of concepts does not preclude the possibility of a transcendent [sic.] ethic, for this ethic will be reshaped and reinterpreted within differing historical realities” (p. 11).⁶⁷⁵ She claims to endorse Kantian universalism and the socially constructed quality of values. We observe, however, that Fainstein cultivates exceptions to the value of democracy, which can be interpreted as loosening an ethic of universal imperatives.⁶⁷⁶ With support to Rawls, Mannheim, and Habermas, the author postulates a hypothetical consensus on ethical values as the condition of possibility for thinking the justice substance of space. Drawing on the Habermasian norms of communicative action, she states:

“The thesis that the application of a concept of substantive justice can be based on consensus draws on a Habermasian formulation of what people would be persuaded to desire were they in a situation governed by norms of sincerity, truth-telling, and rationality.” (Fainstein, 2010, p. 13)⁶⁷⁷

Fainstein does not explain where the consensus comes from.⁶⁷⁸ She quotes Harvey’s assumption that despite the varied meanings of justice in different contexts (place, time, individual), everyday life relevance and straightforwardness of the concept in political mobilisation cannot be ignored (Harvey, 2002, p. 398, cited in Fainstein, 2010, p. 11).⁶⁷⁹ She refers, without critique, to Harvey’s substantiation of Young’s six forms of exploitation in spatial terms.⁶⁸⁰ From this idea of expected consensus, she attempts to identify the criteria of justice in the field of urban space and to argue for the lexical ordering of those principles. In this exercise, Fainstein significantly enlarges the spectrum of theories of justice (in relation to Harvey and Soja’s work). She considers Rawls’s justice as fairness, Habermas’s ideal speech situation, communitarianism (inter alia, Sandel and Walzer⁶⁸¹), and other poststructuralist critiques (Young).⁶⁸² From each of these paradigms, Fainstein isolates a criterion and specifies its meaning in urban terms. She proposes three values of justice. They are presented in parallel, without considering their articulation in

⁶⁷⁴ The text Fainstein follows is “The Sociology of Knowledge” (1938) from *Ideology and Utopia*.

⁶⁷⁵ Fainstein further specifies that, in Mannheim, the identification of ethics passes by “the acquisition of perspective” so as to overcome the “talking past one another” of groups in conflict.” We can see the proximity with the notion of reasonableness (2010, p. 11). Fainstein also derives that the consequence of universalism is the radical extensiveness of ethical judgements (though emphasising critique rather self-critique): “there is no ‘other’, whether high or low on the social hierarchy, so privileged as to be immunized from outside criticism” (2010, p. 12). She also briefly alludes to the passage of a discourse based on “freedom from” to one of self-development and duty (2010, p. 12).

⁶⁷⁶ Fainstein presents the relationship between the values of the just city as a trade-off with an indicative lexical ordering. Their final hierarchy depends on the circumstances (2010, p. 33). As I will develop below, Fainstein attributes the positive or negative outcome of bureaucratic decisions vis-à-vis the importance of democracy to be a contextual indeterminacy.

⁶⁷⁷ Fainstein (2010, p. 13) clarifies that this summary draws on an account by Hilary Putman in *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy* (2002).

⁶⁷⁸ She is sensitive to the post-positivism critique of the social sciences and its implication for rejecting policy as quasi-sciences (2010, p. 25). Inspired in Dewey and Habermas, that critique appealed to involve “a mix of value statements, empirical evidence, and subjective perceptions” that could only be pondered through argumentative practices without a technical or power hierarchy (2010, pp. 25, 26).

⁶⁷⁹ The citation is from David Harvey’s (2002) essay “Social Justice, Postmodernism, and the City” from the book *Readings in Urban Theory* (edited by Susan Fainstein and Scott Campbell).

⁶⁸⁰ Harvey derives from the work of Iris Marion Young six propositions to govern a just planning and policy practice that incorporate these “everyday meanings.” These are, in brief, the nonexploitation of labour power, the elimination of forms of marginalisation of social groups, the access to political power and the self-expression by oppressed groups, the elimination of cultural imperialism, the humane forms of social control, and the mitigation of the adverse ecological impacts of social projects (Harvey 2002, pp. 400–401, cited in Fainstein, 2010, p. 11).

⁶⁸¹ See clarification that places Walzer as a collectivist, not a communitarian in the section 4.4, “The substantive pluralism of Michael Walzer” in chapter 4, in particular the sub-section 4.4.4, “Puncturing the particular in the thought of justice”.

⁶⁸² The capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum (2000) and Amartya Sen (1992) is evoked (Fainstein, 2010, p. 4), but the relationship between space and capabilities is not investigated. The capability approach is used as a model for legitimising substantive yet universal values of justice applied to the urban realm: “My argument... is that we can list criteria by which to formulate and evaluate policy comparable to Martha Nussbaum’s listing of capabilities even if we cannot go as far as specifying programs. The particular policies that best satisfy this criteria will vary according to time and place, but the fact that we cannot specify ex ante the most progressive policies does not mean that we cannot establish bases of judgment” (Fainstein, 2010, p. 85). While Sen’s *Idea of Justice* was published in 2010, much of the contents of the book had already been exposed in his *Development as Freedom* (1999). Not without consequence, liberty is not a central idea in Fainstein’s construction. Equity is defined not through the achievement of liberty and opportunity but with the satisfaction of basic goods. If the latter is defined in an extended manner to include non-material goods, the examples provided are often actualized resources not virtualities (capabilities).

the field of the ethos where they originate. As we will see below, unproductive antinomies are carried from their transcendental formulation into spatial substance.

5.2.4.3 Embedding justice in space: a fixed substantiation

Fainstein arrives at three criteria – equity, diversity, and democracy – whose furtherance in the incremental adaptation of policymaking (mainly by planners) is expected to lead to a more just city (Fainstein, 2010, p. 19).⁶⁸³ Equity incorporates the problem surrounding Rawls’s justice as fairness and “refers to a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favor those who are already better off at the beginning” (p. 36). Distributive practices by the state are assumed to increase equality of outcome in the form of access to urban benefits, while concerns for the unjust beyond economic deprivation enter the argument through the multiforms of “non-material oppression”, as advanced by the poststructuralist critique (p. 42). Equity does not involve a systemic view of the city, and objects such as social housing are thought of without regarding the urbanity level of their location (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 77–82). Diversity is mainly an anti-communitarian value. Fainstein seems to have hesitated in her valuation of the *Gemeinschaft* (community), as she is alive to “communal sentiments towards preservation and membership in a group of like-minded people” (p. 82).⁶⁸⁴ She discusses the questions of community heterogeneity, self-segregation, and internal repression and eventually argues for cosmopolitanism. She concedes to postmodern and poststructuralist demands of recognition by giving importance to culture as an infra-societal product in the form of “inclusion of all city users within the space of the city, regardless of their cultural differences” (p. 70). This translates into the possibility of accepting homogeneity in the social composition of neighbourhoods, the right to inhabit in groups of commonality. Despite these nuances (and their ambiguity), Fainstein states that the “culture fix” in the work of Fraser, Young, and Seyla Benhabib in advancing group affiliation cannot be integrated into justice (pp. 47–48). Democracy relates to the collaborative planning model developed in the 1960s and 1970s in line with Habermas’s communicative action. It is interpreted as inclusiveness in urban decision-making (p. 52). Fainstein does not endorse that widening democracy will reduce inequality (p. 49). Giving substantial examples of conflict between equity, diversity, and democracy,⁶⁸⁵ Fainstein clearly states that equity is the preferable value and often uses it as a synonym of justice (pp. 12–13).

5.2.4.4 Relativistic deliberative practices versus the progressive values of the thecné

Within the planning imagination Fainstein utilises, diversity appears associated with coercive measures, such as desegregation of schools (she pinpoints how they proved inefficient in several cases studies). The conundrum then resides in the value of democracy vis-à-vis equity. Fainstein keeps the ponderation between equity and democracy within the discipline of planning and overlooks the possibility of allowing planners’ values to participate in just processes (Fainstein & Campbell, 2002/2012, p. 11). Perhaps the representation of the figure of the planner prevents seeing this actor as a co-producer of the outcome (Lévy, 2015). In this context, she accounts for the role of ordinary inhabitants in space production through participatory practices or the general idea of “control of one’s surroundings” (Fainstein, 2010, p. 82). The author does not mobilise the full *marge de manoeuvre* of spatiality. If this is an assumed

⁶⁸³ “This then is the purpose of this book – to recommend nonreformist reforms directed at improving the lives of residents in cities within Western Europe and the United States. I is my hope to shift the conversation within discussions of planning and public policy towards the character of urban areas, lessen the focus on process that has become dominant within planning theory, and redirect practitioners from their obsession with economic development to a concern with social equity.” (Dufaux, Gervais-Lambony, Lehman-Frisch, & Moreau, 2009, p. 19).

⁶⁸⁴ In a recent exchange, there is a confirmation on the devaluation of communitarianism. Fainstein disagrees on the value of strong ties opposed to weak ties, pointing towards the history of warfare among communities and the first objective of governance to be maintaining peace. Using her empirical rootedness, she pinpoints, “we observe a fade-away of race in the US... In the past, Italians have been considered as a cultural group, now they are just white.” She understands that there might be a clash between the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie and those who want to attach the meaning of life to their identity, forgetting the economic structure. But Fainstein contends that attending to cultural differences might be disastrous to equality. She sees Rawls as a liberal and a pluralist – individuals having a number of different attachments, not one of them being “the” identity. Notes from personal communication with Fainstein in *Seminair Penser l’Espace*.

⁶⁸⁵ “Any attempt to maximize the values of equity, democracy, and diversity simultaneously presents vexing problems of reconciling their multiple meanings and conflicting agendas as well as identifying a coherent social force to press for them”. (Fainstein, 2010, p. 52).

path from the outset, it has important consequences when the author deliberates between technocratic decisions and democratic processes. Fainstein traces the evolution of modes of rationality in planning theory in five moments, to be surpassed by the model of the just city (pp. 58–63, 166–169).⁶⁸⁶ 1) comprehensive land use planning (until mid-1950s), 2) systems planning (early 1950s), 3) Mannheim’s reaction to positivism, 4) deliberative and communicational planning (1960s and 1970s), and 5) urban growth paradigm (from 1980s). In this progression, we can note the recognition of planning as a value-driven activity. Overthrowing the veil of pretence objectivity (moment three), the author notes, has been followed by distrust on top-down procedures (moment four).⁶⁸⁷ As a reaction, deliberative planning emerges in the 1960s and 1970s.⁶⁸⁸ The effectiveness of that model is called into question, as the hold of world economy upon contemporary city-making creates but a tight margin for debate and choice (moment 5). Fainstein states:

“The postwar history of urban regeneration programs has involved a repetitive group of conflicts. Generally they can be encapsulated in the phrase growth versus equity. They can take the form of downtown versus the neighborhoods; demolition versus preservation; community stability versus population change; institutional expansion and subsidized construction of sports facilities versus investment in social housing, education, or community facilities; expressway construction versus public transit; mega events versus locally oriented festivities. The argument from equity normally takes the second position in each of these dichotomies, but, within capitalist cities that are competing with one another for investment, a reflexive opposition to inducements to investors may leave cities with very little to redistribute.” (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 80–81).

In her project of substituting the market-led agenda by justice concerns, Fainstein hesitates in keeping the heritage of deliberative planning. The mismatch between the theoretical requirements of democratic deliberation and reality, extensively presented throughout the book (pp. 24–30), leads Fainstein to the conclusion that in unequal societies, democracy and justice are at odds with each other (p. 30).⁶⁸⁹ She addresses a set of questions to the communicative paradigm and finds them unanswered (pp. 28–35): How to resolve conflicting views specified either by self-interest or by genuinely different contents of justice within different communities? How to achieve a proportionate representation of a constituency at all scales affected by a decision? How to protect the least critically equipped against demagoguery and speech distortion? How to assure that the opinion of the majority is the long-term, most

⁶⁸⁶ First, until mid-1950s, *comprehensive land use planning* is guided by supposedly unbiased experts in the name of public interest – planning processes are exempted from justification of content of methods. Second, after University of Chicago and Pennsylvania theorists, *systems planning* comprehends regions, cities, and neighborhoods as subsystems, which are impartially read through scientific methods – alternatives are modeled and tested using modern statistical and economic analysis. Third, Mannheim’s critique on positivism renders planning a value-laden activity, influenced by political interest, reason, and comparative analysis accept the impartial expertise of the educated elite. Fourth, in the 1960s and ’70s, claims of bias towards upper class interests transform planning into a deliberative and communicational activity, public interest is substituted by targeting the disadvantaged. Fifth, from 1980s to present, urban growth paradigm, planning legislation is adapted to favour corporative investment (pp. 58–63, 166–169).

⁶⁸⁷ Systems planning refers to the embedding of the planning process in a logical positivist approach, whereby it turns “into an apparently scientific activity in which vast amounts of precise information were generated and processed in such a way that the planner could devise very sensitive systems of guidance and control, the effects of which could be monitored and if necessary modified” (Hall, 1988/1997, p. 327).

⁶⁸⁸ The theory of deliberative democracy was the response that political thought gave to the 1960s and 1970s New Left claims for participatory democracy beyond representation (The Just City, p. 27), to the opposition to “interest-based public choice paradigm and its conservative tendency” (The Just City, p. 28) and to the urban revolts that erupted in that period (The Just City, p. 27). As Peter Hall further describes, the emergence of bottom-up planning from the ashes of the positivist paradigm which had been sustaining the legitimacy of both social sciences and the *systems planning*⁶⁸⁸ since the early 1950s. Hall synthesizes this phenomenon under three main themes of protest, endorsed by Fainstein’s narrative (pp. 56–63): the dismissal of expert-based, top-down planning of any kind; the rejection of the pseudo-science discourses as they concealed the possibility of ethical criticism; and the urban riots revelation of unimproved cities and dismembered inner-city communities, where the effects of planning had not been neutral (Hall, 1988/1997, p. 332). The left wing reaction, Hall proceeds, was to “call on the planners themselves to turn the tables, and to practice bottom-up planning by becoming advocate-planners” (Davidoff, 1965, cited in Hall, 1988/1997, p. 322).

⁶⁸⁹ Fainstein argues that just processes do not necessarily lead to just results and alerts about the dangers of deviating from discussing the substance of policy (p. 24). She is concerned with power imbalance “in a society where resources are privately owned and controlled” (2010, p. 28) and with further arguments of false conscientiousness and control of media by the “dominant elites” (2010, p. 31). She also seems to have observed that the results of debate tend to be conservative (2010, p. 28). She points to the existence of illiberal social movements (anti-abortion or anti-immigration sentiment in the United States and Europe) and the fact that citizens too, not just elites, “can be misguided and self-serving as indicated in the prevalence of NYMBYism within forums of popular participation” (2010, p. 32).

equitable solution and that populism does not harm minorities?⁶⁹⁰ How to deal with co-optation⁶⁹¹ and achieve “more than token public participation” (p. 29)? More broadly, how to achieve background conditions of equality?

If empirics discourage a procedural approach to justice, Fainstein is further animated by the antinomy between processes and outcomes in planning theory. She contends Patsy Healy’s articulation of both instances, arguing that focusing on processes tends to obliterate the object of the city and the explicit enunciation of objectives (p. 9),⁶⁹² Fainstein impoverishes the ethical force of her substantive project by assuming as progressive her own values and the ones of the professional voices contacted in her investigations.⁶⁹³

“Although a commitment to democratic values for their own sake counters a call for benevolent despotism and leads us to wish for citizen input, we cannot deny out of hand that insulated decision making may produce more just outcomes than public participation.” (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 32).

5.2.4.5 Contouring the “right to the city”

The substantive values identified by Fainstein are not used to guide the evaluation of the justness of projects and policies in real debates. Indeed, they appear as an argument to bypass the difficulties encountered in democratic procedures, particularly, in non-progressive contexts and unbalances of economic power. Fainstein’s intention is not to be authoritarian, but to deal with imperfections of the present society in a pragmatic way. Her position still implies the priority of *thecné* over the political. The author privileges decisions of professionals while making room for the oppositional figure of urban social movements to counteract impartiality and authoritarianism (p. 34). By restricting the “right to the city” to the existing revivals, in particular the movement of the Right to the City Alliance (p. 5), Fainstein contours the spatial and political contributions of Lefebvre.⁶⁹⁴ The blind spot is the role of ordinary inhabitants’ spatialities in a horizon of societal integration through space. This reflects some absences of the approach: the lack of an urban systemic model, and the secondary role of the interactions between inhabitants and their environment. By fixing the meaning of justice in the city within the theory, Fainstein closes the moving horizon of the joint production of ethical and spatial values by society. Excessive realism takes as postulate what could be the targets of transformation towards a more just space. The resources for improving justice might suffer from the demarche. The *a priori* substantiation of criteria can discourage scrutiny in the evaluation of advantages and detriment of urbanistic projects.⁶⁹⁵

⁶⁹⁰ In a footnote, Fainstein (2010, p. 30) refers to Mill’s (1951) fear of “the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling” as found in *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*.

⁶⁹¹ Here, it is relevant to notice the realisation that though participation started with the intention of allowing the least integrated to have a say in the future of their cities, nowadays, it is often dominated by educated groups with a protective attitude of their own privilege, as in the cases of NIMBYism (Fainstein, 2010, p. 32).

⁶⁹² “In a recent reformulation of her ideas concerning collaborative planning, Healy (2003, 110) counters my argument that planners should intrude in the planning process and advocate for the application of normative concepts of the just city. She contends that: “concepts of the “good” or the “just” were themselves constructed through relations of knowledge and power... [But] the process of articulating values and the manner in which these might become embedded in established discourses and practices were important. In other words, substance and process are co-constituted, not separate spheres. In addition, process should not be understood merely as a means to a substantive end. Processes have process outcomes. Engagement in governance processes shape participants’ sense of themselves.” (2010, p. 9) Citation from: Healy, P. (2003) “Collaborative Planning in Perspective”, in *Planning Theory* 2, n°2, 101-124.

⁶⁹³ This is not just a theoretical impoverishment. Assuming the progressive values of planners attributes the task of telling the possible to the present day interpretation of a segment of society. This restricts the utopian horizon of society to an extent. This interpretation draws on a personal exchange with the author on the occasion of the Séminaire Penser l’Espace in Rolle, Switzerland in July 2014.

⁶⁹⁴ In “the just city”, she defines the right to the city as “the inclusion of all city users within the space of the city, regardless of their cultural differences” (Fainstein, 2010, p. 70).

⁶⁹⁵ The way the three criteria of the just city are applied suffers from this choice: can we really know by principle that a stadium cannot benefit a place by increasing its visibility and integration in the city? Or can we state that social housing investment is always a priority? Another target of Fainstein critique is large-scale retail. We agree it is likely to hinder the city, not because it is private-led but because its location is likely to favour private mobility, sprawl, and homogeneity of functions, reducing diversity and public space.

Fainstein opens up a horizon of possibilities for the just city. She removes the dependency of the increments of justice from revolution. She deviates from the Marxist strand of spatial justice to explore some *marge de manoeuvre* within urbanism. The author opens up planning theory to a wider spectrum of theories of justice. She identifies the need to think beyond procedural objectives to include comprehensive realisations. She confronts some of the implications of that thought, such as the relationship between value and truth, and the conflict between the justice criteria of different theories of justice. She insinuates the impossibility of valuing communitarianism and, importantly, alerts us to the inherent quality to the “social design” of places of some constraint on agency-freedom.

Despite these advances, we cannot talk of a politically defined spatial *devenir*. As noted by Luca Pattaroni,⁶⁹⁶ space does not appear as a support for “making the common”. Fainstein focuses mainly on the relationship between the citizen and the political sphere, as well as between the least-advantaged inhabitants and planning officials. Space is not seen as a relational product or a societal totality. Not taking in consideration the full complexity of individual spatial acts – in particular their *sphère idéal* – is then seen as plausible in accelerating the implementation of a progressive planning agenda. Susan Fainstein encloses the “just city” within planning, tangentially with Lefebvre’s heritage of leaving spatial options to be politically chosen by the society.

5.3 Sociétalité of spatial justice

The table below draws the panorama for the existing discourses connecting space and justice, which we have reviewed in this chapter.

Authors in spatial justice	Justice lenses (ethical objects to think space)					City lenses (spatial substance of justice)				
	Recourses from the ethos	Liberty and equality	Deontological elements	Spatial responsibility in co-production of spatial justice	Constructed quality of spatial responsibility	Possibility of a horizon of justice (without revolution)	Political function	Inclusiveness of different angles of society	Space as recourse for justice (access)	Space as resource of justice (virtuality)
Lévy	Rawls									
	Sen									
Harvey (liberal)	Rawls									
	Mill									
Harvey (Marxist)	Marx									
Soja	Young									
Fainstein	Rawls/Habermas									
	Young									

Table 6 Themes of spatial justice in existing erudite discourses. Darker grey indicates central elements of the theories, explicit or with low level of reconstruction; lighter tone indicates secondary, ambiguous or highly reconstructed elements; and blanks indicates absent elements from a theory.

The observation of this table tells us that the resources of the ethos influences the *sociétalité* of spatial justice. The latter reflects the completeness of the ideas of justice of the former. Determinant for the non-technical definition

⁶⁹⁶ Intervention in Séminaire Penser l’Espace, July 2014, in Rolle, Switzerland.


and non-fixed substantiation of spatial goods are also the positive deontological elements of the mobilised ethic objects and the weight attributed to the political function in the possibility of a horizon of justice. The more open to society determination is the definition of a spatial project, the more ethically demanding is the procedure towards its definition. This reflects the mobilisation of justice theories, and how far their inclusiveness of the views from different angles of society. Co-varying with these ideas is also the concept of spatial responsibility in the production of spatial justice and correlates with the importance attributed to the actors.⁶⁹⁷

This table also clarifies the similitudes between Lévy's approach and the liberal project of Harvey. Mobilising Sen or/and Rawls denotes these authors' concern about the participation of individuals in the making of society. This explains while most authors see space as a matter of access rather than the virtual potentiality of space. The increased level of substantiation of Sen corresponds to the movement from distribution to co-production, which is only present in Sen and Lévy. The line of investigation adopted in this research is coherent with the democratic focus, but also reflects the theoretical possibility of a spatial totality, in ideality and materiality, with which to envisage the prospect of a non-fractured social world.

For these reasons, it seems to us that pursuing the *sociétalité* of spatial justice should be alert to five themes. They are systemically related, but each of them brings a specific focus to the complexity of space and justice: the possibility of a spatial horizon of justice, the role of space in the production of a just society, the role of the actors in that production, the tension with the present and its problematics of incompatibility, the imagined pragmatics for seeking spatial justice. The themes also denote the plural tensions that traverse the encounter of space and justice in society: injustice/justice (horizon)⁶⁹⁸; tradition/progress (production); objective/subjective (actors); space/spatiality (whole and parts); political/veracity (pragmatics).

⁶⁹⁷ We have seen that there is a nuance between understanding actors as citizens or as citizens/inhabitants, as seen in the differentiation between the political resourcefulness of space in Dikeç and Soja.

⁶⁹⁸ That is, the fact that sensing the unjust is not the same as defining the just.



H (Horizon)

d (Dimensional production of the social)

A (Actors)

E (Environments)

P (Pragmatics)

O (Social objects)

<p>Open "devenir" of society, as the possibility of a project of habitat spatial justice, publicly deliberated.</p>	<p>Justice is a co-production of capacity between the individual and society, where space is a recourse (access/virtual).</p>	<p>Individual deontology (universal principles, substantiated in singular cases taking two forms):</p>	<p>Spatial values might constitute contradictory subsystems, hindering spatial contributions to justice.</p>	<p>Political function implies non-technical determination and non-fixed substantiation of spatial-ethical goods. Inclusiveness of points of view of all citizens/inhabitants in public debate.</p>
<p></p>	<p>The resourcefulness of the city (urbanity and public goods) is a specifically spatial contribution to justice.</p>	<p>Principle of compatibility of space and spatiality</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>
<p></p>	<p></p>	<p>Principle of federation of spaces (co-spatial and interlocked)</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>

Figure 6 Dynamic interrelation of the themes of the *soci t alit * of spatial justice.

5.3.1 Transition to Part II

At the end of Part I of this thesis – *Erudite theories for an encounter of space and justice* – and with the words of Fainstein still echoing, we can introduce the focus of this research. Our hypothesis is that justice cannot be made without society nor without its movement, however slow. We are interested in the project of constructing universally shared spatial values as the means and ends of justice. Rather than assuming that the values and knowledge of planners are bound to conflict with the society's least progressive views, we can try to understand how society thinks and identify the exact dissensus that might exist with regard to citizens' reflexivity on their city and its urban problems.⁶⁹⁹ The applicability for the outcome of the spatial justice theory is not a return to unidirectional participation. We can imagine procedural urbanism reinvested with some of the themes already advanced: the need of legitimate political spaces of deliberation, the centrality of informed public debate, the mobilisation of a method of reflection bringing singularity and universality. But there is an open scope in the theory. We can postulate the possibility of planners and social scientists to figure their substantive values explicitly in a symmetric relationship with inhabitants and politicians. We can also foresee that all involved parts in public deliberation can transform their perspectives along the way in unimagined ways.

The study of the full scope of this virtuality would require exploring procedural urbanism, under conditions of an in vivo debate. Our empirical study on the society of the urban area of Porto is more modest. We seek to interpret the society's movement by listening to what its members have to say on the *idéel* and material spheres of space within and beyond the "confines" of their personal spatial experience.

⁶⁹⁹ It should be noted that the neglect of social science does not seem to be a conviction of the author, just an intended result of the particular journey that supports her contribution. Indeed, the author was enthusiastic about our demarche and found it very pertinent in the current academic panorama of Spatial Justice (Personal conversation, July 2014).

Conclusions of Part I

I. A theory of spatial justice

We have seen that the notion of spatial justice is recent and most of the work has been absorbed in neo-Marxist terms or affiliated to the politics of difference. This doctoral work, together with Jacques Lévy and the spatial justice pole of Chôros, makes an effort to redefine the *enjeux* for thinking justice with a spatial lenses. What follows are a series of statements that can be derived from the precedent literature review on society, space, the urban and the ethos. This presentation profits from the implications for thinking justice spatially that emerge from the empirical work in part II of this thesis. These implications can be argued from the premises of *sociétalité* reviewed so far. We can then venture at the formulation of the problematics in a theory of spatial justice in the city. Though spatial justice can be configured at a multitude of scales, our contributions does not control for the implications of theorems beyond the local scale of an urban society.

- 1 It is necessary to define a political territory at the urban scale in which the objectives of spatial justice are treated as political.

As advanced by Jacques Lévy more than twenty years ago, the first demand of spatial justice is the necessity of public debate leading to the formation of political spaces. The latter should reflect the scale of societal problems at the urban scale as well as society's self-understanding of itself as such. The definition of this space configures a territory of no exceptions in relation to society's objectives of spatial justice. Given the universal/singular declination of ethical precepts, this exhaustive validity does not imply an undifferentiated treatment of that territory, but the reflective alignment of differences with explicit political objectives. The increased autonomy of local political spaces implies the increased responsibility for the consequences of a society's spatial choices.

- 2 Spatial justice regards the convergence of spatiality when space is a resource of development.

Space enables to see justice as a collective outcome, even when measured at individual level. A horizon of increased justice in the enjoyment of social existence situates the living together with the other at the centre of the construction. This expands the distributional focus on basic goods to include the awareness of a complex system where the individuals and society co-produce social goods. Space does not distribute objects to the poor, but rather creates resourceful systems which all inhabitants can co-produce and enjoy. The *sociétalité* of space focuses justice less on problems of scarcity and more on difficulties in living together with others. At the core of spatial justice is convergence of plural relationships with space, whether these are heterogeneous valuations of urban models, civilities, or different conceptions of solidarity between spaces.

- 3 Spatial justice principles are not strictly distributive.

The co-production of social goods through space makes spatial justice a solidaristic theory (Van Parijs, 1991, pp. 248–250) but the exchanges between individual and society are not reduced to the distribution of positional objects. They include systemic resources (Lévy, 1994, pp. 39–40). This does not exclude the need to deliberate the spatial translation of equality and differentiation in access to spatial objects. The interrelation of distributive themes (a network of hospitals) with the coproduction of spatial public goods (health, but also public space, environmental quality, and public mobility) is a chantier for continuous exploration. In this reflection, increasing the *distribuendum* towards the least-well off might not be the

determinant principle of spatial justice. Indeed, we can imagine spatial justice actions where the *distribuendum* for the poor remains intact, as advantage raises for all.

- 4 Spatial justice foregrounds the political arbitration of a project of habitat in institutional and non-institutional environments.

The political dimension of society responds to the diversity of society's actors, valuing individual freedom and its translation into different (potentially conflicting) spatialities and implied urbanity models. The political dimension acknowledges the existence of competent actors who demand democratic decisions in the definition of an open evolution of the society. The political determination of a horizon is at stake not only through the actions of "big actors" (for example in unitary urbanistic projects) requiring public debate but also in the deployment of the actors' intentionality in their spatial choices. In the former, political arbitration is associated with an institutional set-up, while the latter is form of non-institutional political reflexivity and action.

- 5 Spatial justice is a universal-singular pragmatic, supported by universals from theories of justice of high *sociétalité*.

A theory of spatial justice is necessarily procedural. These processes demand at once universal concepts, capable of identifying collective objectives for development; and deontological elements, with which society can reflect on the substantive translation of universals into concrete social choices. Theories of justice are not all equally pertinent to think of the present and future societies. In the juxtaposition of ethical objects with the reading of a spatial problematic, the adequacy of the mobilised social science theory matters. Political philosophy's encounter with space demands from the former the explicit conception of society underpinning its construction. Such conception needs to account for the contemporary possibilities of a society. The accuracy, scope and fruitfulness of a theory of justice in today's ethical pragmatics depends from its comprehension of the active role of actors upon social environments and of the existence of systemic outcomes. An economic relationship between universals and singularity also requires the recognition of historicity and an open *devenir*. The substantiation of universal instruments into singular contents needs to accompany the development of society, its horizon of possibility and of desirability. Theories proposing deontological orientation and ideas of justice in strong accessibility with the heritage of justice theories are, in this regard, more robust than substantive theories. This ensemble of traits can be considered the degree of *sociétalité* of a theory.

- 6 Social science of space produces a cognitive-objective model of the social world, offered to deliberations on justice.

The complexity of the social involved in a spatial emancipatory project has a cognitive dimension and is open to a scientific demarche. Social science of space can make a contribution to debating ethics substantively by producing knowledge on the synchronic systemic functioning of space (that is, how spatial societal outcomes are interconnected with the spatialities of each part). It can construct prospective objects of ideality and materiality (potentially articulating different scales), put in relation with the historicity of a society's space. The actors' conceptions of spatial justice (which have a role in the anticipation of future developments in the society) is part of the cognitive-objective content of spatial justice. A spatial dimensional theory of justice is not only procedural but has a consequential approach, a realisation-focus. Proceduralism and consequential elements are in dialogue.

- 7 Spatial justice enunciates deontological demands guiding proceduralism.

Realisation-focus proceduralism calls for deontological elements addressed not only to institutional actors but to all citizens. The idea of systemic compatibility of the parts and society – the articulation of spatiality with the desirable product of space at different scales of action – becomes a deontological principle. While deontological specifications necessarily bring in a some of constraint, the dialogical relationship between the individual and the society can remove a sacrificial outlook from these demands. It opens the possibility

where certain spatial layouts potentiate personal liberties and increase collective advantage (aggregate goods) together, eventually with egalitarian effects. Deontology applies not only to institutions (social objects) but acknowledges the role of actors and environments in the co-production of a more just society. The corollary of individual agency-freedom in making urban space is individual spatial responsibility. Procedural rationality involves both consequential and deontological demands.

8 Self-interest is not antinomic to spatial deontological compliance.

When ethical guidance is to be thought of in terms of the compatibility of the parts and the whole disinterestedness or impartiality may be insufficient or impertinent. Quite on the contrary, the interest of citizens in enlarged social wholes can be motors of justice, corresponding to the acknowledgement of the interrelatedness between the self and society as a whole. This awareness can be mobilised in the individual's spatiality and in his political pressing for justice.

9 Reasonableness is an exacting deontological demand useful in telling the just.

Reasonableness is a more exacting demand than rationality. It requires that our arguments are such that they cannot easily be rejected by others. That is, our reasonable conceptions imply an effective and/or hypothetical incorporation of points of views that are different from our own. Such comprehensiveness of perspectives is an important objective of procedural justice.

10 Spatial justice conceives of a continuum between the spatial goods and the just.

The horizon of society is open to debate and so is the identification of possible and desirable goods, informed by cognitive-objective elements. These goods constitute contemporary interpretations of consequential elements, and respond to the idea that to produce a habitat society needs to have, at each moment, some shared idea of what it values as spatial objectives. Despite the centrality of freedom, the theory we propose is not fully liberal, in the sense of Rawls, where the goods are detached from the right.⁷⁰⁰ Surpassed the dichotomy between consequentialism and deontology, we can state that there is a continuum between the identification of spatial public goods and the just. In this perspective, we can argue that, for urban substances of justice, concentration of difference in high urbanity is a public good.

11 The substantive declination of spatial goods is open to the evolution of the historicity of societies.

Despite the possibility to define substantive goods, a theory should not close what is open to historical development. The trade-offs of justice cannot be permanently specified within a theory. Ethical sensitivity may become more refined and exacting as society progresses. Contingent configurations of spatial incompatibilities might also be open to technical development. A theory of spatial justice accompanies the evolution of spatial justice conceptions of the society (due to the interspatiality city/world, spatial justice theory at the urban scale can be developed to accompany the fabrication of the world-society).

12 Spatial justice can be seen as one among an ensemble of dimensional theories of justice.

The principle of a systemic cognitive-objective model informing public debate can be extended to all dimensions of the society. A pan-theory of justice can be composed of an ensemble of dimensional theories, progressively interrelated. Empirics/theory from a multiplicity of disciplinary angles can facilitate the visibility of the consubstantiated stakes of justice in the different dimensions of the society. In this sense, spatial justice makes an original contribution to justice, but it does not intend to exhaust the full complexity of the intersection of justice and the social, empirically and theoretically.

⁷⁰⁰ As we have developed in section 4.3, Rawls endorses that "justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of good" (Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 347).

13 Reflective equilibrium in dimensional theories of justice shifts the approach to reality from general-particular to universal-singular.

The method of reflective equilibrium recognises the unavoidable participation of affective elements in ethical judgements.⁷⁰¹ The method does not seek to control how an illustrative case which defies, emotionally, a rational principle, relates to an organised reading of the social world. That is, reflective equilibrium currently structures a relationship between empirics/theory which is based on the couple of cognitive attitude particular-general. The participation of one (or several) explicit cognitive models at work in dimensional theories of justice situates the empirical test of ethical intuitions in an ordered episteme. It alters reflective equilibrium from a relationship general-particular to one of universal-singular.

14 Spatial justice conceptions of a society can have two layers, “productive” and “dominant”.

We can translate Rawls’s differentiation between thin and thick theories of justice into seeing the conceptions of spatial justice in a society as part of a “productive” and a “dominant” layer. The dominant layer (thin), includes what, in a society-time, is considered stable and consensual. The production layer (thick) includes the objects of instable valuations. The explicit assumption of a social model guiding each contribution to justice (from social science or political philosophy) should state what is placed by the authors in each theory’s layers.

15 The developmental stakes of spatial justice demand the synchronicity from the productive to the dominant layer of spatial justice conceptions.

From this double-layered horizon of spatial justice, a project of habitat demands the invention of politics operating the synchronicity of spatial models circulating in society. The *enjeux* of public deliberation and policies of habitat is to transpose spatial “aggregative goods”, on which there is dissension or movement (thus locating the conception of these goods in the productive layer), into the dominant of the “public goods” layer (universally experienced and capable of orienting the horizon of spatial justice in a society). In this proposition, public goods are non-excludable, non-rivalrous and of increased advantage for all whenever their diffusion is intensified. They are also universally perceived and experienced as just.

⁷⁰¹ We have seen Van Parijs’s appropriation of reflective equilibrium. The author analyses the strength of the original arguments, counter-proposals, revised thesis of theories. In that exercise, as means to exact the contradiction of theories in their own terms, he confronts the ethical intuitions underlying those debates with the working out, for specific cases, the consequences of the application of the theoretical principles.

Part II: The voices of spatial justice.
Discourses of the inhabitants
of metropolitan Porto.

6 Methodology, the construction of an empirical object

We are concerned with an encounter between space and justice, which is pertinent for society. To ensure this pertinence, a concrete empirical object is necessary, counteracting the reflexivity of coherence and accessibility (which has been deployed in part I of this dissertation). The reality of reference for the construction of our geographical object is the urban area of Porto. The angle through which we apprehend Porto is that of the inhabitants' discourses on spatial justice, which are in tension with the theoretical premises already developed and towards the production of theoretical statements on spatial justice. This chapter discourses on the practice of scientific research. It concerns the methodology employed in the construction of that empirical object.

Defining the method of a research starts by identifying the research question – what is it that we want to know from the contact with empirics? This question guides the main choices through which empirical information is gathered. In the first section of this text, we thus define that we want to know how individuals problematize injustice through space and that we choose to fabricate a qualitative corpus of individual discourses through an interview-based study method (section 6.1). After justifying the investment on individual discourse (rather than a collective discursive pragmatic), we formulate the research questions and the hypotheses that we pose to the corpus. We could claim that these hypotheses are deducible from theory while incorporating some inductive elements from previous knowledge of the city. However, for communication economy, the hypotheses are presented at a higher reconstructive level and are informed by the knowledge we have produced throughout the entire spectrum of the research activities. The method section is completed by a description of the cognitive demarche that guides the exploration of the corpus. In the second section (6.2), a series of reflections are dedicated to techniques consolidates the coherence of the method choices. In this section, we present the interview guide, the sampling strategy, and the quantitative technique used in the analysis of the corpus. The third section (6.3), presents an external perspective of the corpus that results from the previous decisions without diving into its qualitative content. At this point, we also present an overview of the activities with which we have explored this corpus. The next section (6.4), offers a description of the city of Porto from the perspective of the researcher, an informative tool for those who do not know the city or its recent transformation. This description is verbal, in the form of a text, and visual, through maps and diagrams. Finally, the subjective elements that participated in the crafting of this research are offered as a resource of objectivity (section 6.5). They inform the reader of the personal inclinations of the researcher at several stages of the process. The evolution of the researcher's regard on the object of study throughout the project also gives a measure of feasibility to inter-disciplinary studies that start from zero in new scientific disciplines. It is our belief that this information can be of use to others, by puncturing representations of research processes which do not correspond well to inter- and post-disciplinary projects.

6.1 Method

The research motive is anchored in the researcher's experience, while practising urbanism, of the need for a basis of substantive values on which to base legitimate decisions taken on behalf of others. The knowledge we have set out to obtain responds to this lacunae. Within these operational lenses, we can see situate this research in response to Lefebvre's injunction to understand the "level of inhabiting" whereby the ideality of inhabitants substitutes technical

views or political ideologies of only some actors. Having in mind the societal retroaction of this research, we seek to produce instruments useful in the diagnosis of spatial injustice. In this perspective, we respond to Sen's acknowledgment which asserts that the assessment of justice cannot make abstraction from what is valued by individuals, while alerting that such knowledge cannot substitute for the continuous exercise of individual valuation and society's political choices.

6.1.1 Research question and hypotheses

These objectives all point to the same project of fundamental research. We want to know whether space matters for justice in the perspective of the inhabitants of the Porto metropolitan area. Given the function of regulators of co-existence with others shared by both space and justice, our hypothesis is that individual assessment of injustice reflects the social construction of space and of ethics (H1, Table 7). That is, we expect that the ideality produced in these two planes to be somehow connected in judging injustice in space and, eventually, in the imagination of increases in justice in or through the spatial dimension. From this assumption, we want to know how individuals problematize injustice through space. For this purpose, we gather empirical material by listening to what the inhabitants have to say about injustice (and justice) in their habitat (discursive pragmatic). The approach to spatial justice via discourses privileges ideality as the entry point to a systematic data collection. Our empirical study of Porto is fundamentally based on interviews, but the observation of the materiality of space is also part of the method. We observe the places where the sampling of the interviewees leads us, and though less systematically, we visit the places about which the participants talk. Privileging a discursive data gathering does not entail any priority between the *idéal* and the material spheres of space that actually figure in the collected data. Indeed, individuals are expected to move freely in between these spheres.

If space is expected to be connected in the judgement of justice, how do individuals configure such spaces of injustice? Which scale, which metric, which substance, which interspatiality between spaces is considered unjust? Which absent universals of justice justify such evaluations? We hypothesise that it is possible to identify not only an ensemble of unjust spaces, but also their reversal, that is, spaces seen as more just. If this articulation is minimally coherent, then individuals have a model that they use to assess injustice in space and imagine increases in justice in this social dimension. We can call it the "spatial justice conception" (of each interviewee or a group) (H2, Table 7). This conception may be characterised by the combination of a (yes or no) value or a (qualitative) description for each of the five themes of *sociétalité* identified in part I.

We can also hypothesise on how individual conceptions of spatial justice relate to each other and to society as a whole. Is there one spatial justice conception for the society of Porto? Or are conceptions typified per group or perhaps even individualised? We have postulated that the ideality mobilised in the identification of spatial injustice is socially constructed. Based on the theory of space we are mobilising, such ideality is not detached from the materiality of space, both components are experienced and produced in the acts of the actors with space. We can then hypothesise that in a society with a minimum threshold of common social experience (where space is effectively open to co-production by all society members), the conception of spatial justice of all citizens has a shared basis. In this case, the ethos and the spatial are foundational to city-society and belong to the level of dominance.⁷⁰² One dominant mode of regulating distance corresponds to a common reasoning of spatial injustice (H3a, Table 7). Inversely, in societies where space operates divisiveness between social realities, we can expect an increased divergence between the conceptions, potentially with no overlapping elements. In this scenario, the relationship of a society with the ethos and with space might be visibly evolving (H3b, Table 7). As we see in the text describing Porto (section 6.4), the city has a significant variation of urbanity levels but also significant mobility between the degrees of urbanity, indicating some social contact. Our terrain is open to the validity of these two hypotheses (H3a and H3b).

⁷⁰² From the view of society defined in chapter 1, we can deduce that dominance does not mean immobilisation, but that it is slower in transformation in relation to the speed of change of other societal productions.

As the individual is the smallest unit of society, we can raise the question of convergence/divergence at this scale. For one individual, do we find the same ethical principles in different substantive declinations of spatial justice or do we observe pluralism of argumentative registers? As we have seen in chapter 1, Boltanski and Thevenot's conception of pluralism of worths and Lahire's individual heterogeneity, have an import to our hypotheses.⁷⁰³ We can imagine that there are shifts between spatial conceptions associated to different "social universes" (H4a, Table 7). We can also raise the hypothesis that there is a coherence assuring all singular-universal variations of spatial justice, that is, a single political-philosophical orientation of an argument independent from the substantial focus of the themes (H4b, Table 7).

Question	Hypotheses
Q1: Does space matter for justice in the perspective of the inhabitants of the Porto metropolitan area?	H1: Yes, given the function of regulators of co-existence with others shared by both space and justice, the inhabitants' assessment of injustice in space articulates these planes in a coherent fashion.
Q2: How do individuals problematize injustice through space?	H2: The planes of ethos and space are connected in the ideality of the inhabitants. They configure a model used to assess injustice in space and imagine increases in justice in this social dimension. From individuals' discourses, it is possible to characterise spaces of injustice (scale, metric, substance, and interspatiality) as well as their reversal, that is, spaces seen as more just.
Q3: Is there one spatial justice conception for the society of Porto?	H3a: The conception of spatial justice of all citizens has a shared basis. H3b: There is divergence between different conceptions of spatial justice with little overlapping elements.
Q4: For the smallest unit of society, do we find convergence between the ethical principles mobilised in different substantive declinations of spatial justice?	H4a: Political-philosophical orientations of an argument depend on the substantial focus of the themes. We can talk of the pluralism of argumentative registers, associating different spatial justice conceptions to different social universes. H4b: There is coherence – political-philosophical conception, a stabilised relationship between different ideas of justice – in the multiple singular-universal declinations of spatial justice.
Q5: How can we comprehensively explain our empirical object?	H5: The inhabitants' construction of spatial justice problems can be accounted for through the dynamic interaction between actors, environments and social objects experienced in their life trajectory within a society and the resulting set of individual capitals.

⁷⁰³ Boltanski and Thevenot's conception is presented in point 1.2.5, "Plural justifications in social environments (Boltanski and Thévenot)" and Lahire's in point 1.2.4, "Individual experience and plural stock of action (Lahire)". In the narrative text (section 6.5) we can see that we have attempted to reflect these hypotheses (H4a and H4b) in the stronger structure of an initial interview guide (the first interview guide, is presented in annex C). The attempt has since been abandoned in favour of a more open investigation on the importance of space for justice.

Table 7 Research questions and hypotheses.

Finally, how do we explain the ensemble of responses to these research questions? In the explicative comprehension of our empirical object we can make use of the dialogic view of individual/society.⁷⁰⁴ The hypothesis is that we can explain how the inhabitants construct spatial justice problems through the dynamic interaction between actors, environments and social objects experienced in their life trajectory within a society, as well as the resulting set of individual capitals (H5, Table 7). Though biographic accounts are not the informational focus of our *terrain*, we can be sensitive to the imprint of the stock of experiences within a social world in explaining the way in which inhabitants problematise urban space through a justice lens.

Table 8 below provides the detailed research questions posed to the corpus during the analysis of the discourses. Answers to these questions are found in chapters 6 and 7.

Horizon	Dimensional production	Actors	Environment and social objects	Pragmatics
<p>Is there a horizon of justice?</p> <p>If so, how does space enter into that horizon (or in the “reversal” of injustice)?</p>	<p>Are there collective logics identified?</p> <p>What is the role of high urbanity in assessing justice and injustice?</p>	<p>On behalf of whom do individuals claim justice or denunciate injustice?</p> <p>Does the interviewee consider himself an actor of space and justice?</p>	<p>Which incompatibilities are identified between actors, environments, and objects? How do individuals configure spaces of injustice? Which scale, which metric, which substance, which universals of justice? Which interspatiality between spaces is considered unjust?</p>	<p>Is it possible that the conceptions of spatial justice are compatible?</p> <p>Is it possible to universalise the claim of spatial justice, the reversal of the spatial injustice of each of the conceptions?</p>

Table 8 Questions addressed to the corpus on spatial justice.

6.1.2 Empirical referent, the urban area of Porto

The reality of reference for the construction of our geographical object is the urban area of Porto. There are affective reasons for this choice, but there also are arguments sustaining our expectation that Porto is a proliferous terrain to explore the problematic of spatial justice. Porto is a city with a recent history of reduced political constraints on individual spatial liberty. It presents contrasting urbanity levels and an important extension of low urbanity. At the outset of our study in 2011, after a period of decay of the central geotype, there were signs of a reversal, a renewed interest for high urbanity. In the period where our empirical terrain takes place, the society also experienced its interspatiality with the economic space of the world and the interlock of the political spaces Portugal/Europe. The financial crisis, burst in 2008, has had repercussions in its fragile economy and the Portuguese government signed in 2011 a Memorandum of Understanding with the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund (Troika). The speed of the transformations issuing from the co-governance, between Portugal and

⁷⁰⁴ This hypothesis is theoretically informed by the individual/society dialogical model reviewed in chapter 1. See, in particular, section 1.1, “The social and the spatial in a dimensional paradigm”, point 1.2.3, “The individual/society dialogic (Elias), and point 1.2.4, “Individual experience and plural stock of action (Lahire)”.

Europe, of the national space (program of economic and financial assistance) eluded serious public debate, and the developmental outcome of the many reformist policies enacted between 2011 and 2014 is far from consensual.⁷⁰⁵ Like the rest of the national territory, the metropolitan area of Porto saw the application of a set of reforms with spatial implications: the rearrangement of networks of spatial objects (health services, schools, post office, and court rooms), policies influencing spatial dynamics (rental market, urban rehabilitation policies), and the redefinition of infra-societal political territories (fusion of *freguesias*⁷⁰⁶ and municipalities). Despite the reduced public debate, this reality confronts the society of Porto with the insufficiency of its productivity and, in some regard, with the unsustainability of its spatial layout. If we recall our definition of the problematic of spatial justice as the convergence of spatialities and space when the latter is seen as a resource of development, it should be clear that the study of the spatial-ethical configuration of this society is not only pertinent but urgent. In 2009, the first spatial project defined at the metropolitan level was published (Sá, Portas, & Domingues, 2009). Our hope is that this project will involve a broader public debate on the compatibility between spatiality and space, a debate to which we seek to contribute with the portrait of Porto's society construed here. Finally, we can point that Porto is a society where the movement from community to a society of individuals is not fully achieved, which complicates the temporality of the society and raises new theoretical questions.

6.1.3 The method of individual interviews

The existing literature on spatial justice lacks the transversal empirical study of individual ethical-spatial conceptions, and when it does consider ordinary voices, it focuses on the claims of specific groups without concern for complete coverage of significant variations within a society (see chapter 5). Given this status of knowledge on spatial justice, a study of society as a whole through its smaller unit covers unexplored ground. Auscultating society with this objective of inclusiveness implies defining the societal scale while being open to significant variation of social capitals.⁷⁰⁷ A part of the argument constructed in Part I points to the importance of deliberative pragmatics of a spatial contract. We have, however, opted for an interview-based study, investing in the access to individual discursive logic. We have advanced the importance of controlling the sampling of society while assuring equality of communicative opportunity (thus seconding a method of collective focus groups).⁷⁰⁸ We were also not assured that existent forums were representative of Porto's society.⁷⁰⁹ Our results show that this was a pertinent choice. In the exploratory stage of spatial justice, the priority has been placed on understanding how each individual conceives spatial justice with minimal interference from group interactions or unequal speech competence. The method does not comprise the mutual listening of conflicting parts nor the movement of existing views in that encounter (Ferry, 1996).⁷¹⁰ The cost

⁷⁰⁵ Some authors pinpoint the lack of knowledge on the modalities of enactment found in the program of economic and financial assistance (Programa de Assistência Económica e Financeira), its revisions, and its impact. A forum on public policies was organised in 2014 with the participation of scholars and researchers to debate the execution and impact on the program in its multiple sectorial axes (Silva & Rodrigues, 2015, pp. 27, 28).

^{706/706} *Freguesia* is the smallest administrative level of Portugal, resulting from the subdivision of the municipality, as defined by the 1976 Constitution. It can be translated as "parish" or "civil parish" (Freguesia, 2016).

⁷⁰⁷ For the concept of societal scale see the definition of the city in section 3.3.2, "*Urbanité/s*, modes of living together". For the definition of the concept of spatial capitals see chapter 1, point 1.2.2, "Individual capital and social life (Bourdieu)" and 2.2.5, "Spatial capital".

⁷⁰⁸ In the reading of Porto's society with which I departed to this study, I had sufficient knowledge of the society to consider that equality of political engagement accompanying competences (including communicational) and requiring opportunities (awareness, time availability), were counterfactual.

⁷⁰⁹ The meagre existence of (inclusive) democratic forums at the scale of the metropolitan area of Porto is also an important factor in seconding the study of existing public reasoning. I have only surveyed one civic association at the supra-municipal level, which is concerned with environmental questions: Campo Aberto (<http://www.campoaberto.pt/>). I was mildly familiar with the associative world at the infra-urban level. In the context of *Manobras no Porto* (see section 6.5), I had frequented two cultural associations in a popular neighbourhood. I was astonished with the communicational difficulties of the group, which easily fell into misunderstanding breaking the communication bound. In the same project, but from the angle of the actors of the artistic and cultural scene, I had also observed the engagement in controversy. Note that a focus group was initially imagined as a complement to the interview corpus, but its realisation was not feasible.

⁷¹⁰ The definition of the types of rationality underpinning this method choice is delivered in point b. of the Introduction, "Ethics of reconstruction and the plural rationalities of actors".

of this choice is the absence of a test on the public acceptability of the conflicting diagnosis of injustice and propositions of the spatially just.

The interview guide aims to place the participant in a position to talk about problems that raise questions of injustice in what he considers his habitat. We can recognise the import of a reconstructive approach. We are not studying the facticity of the interviewees' points of views, but are allowing the emergence of a wealth of materials. The focus on the rationalities of the actors of this method is coherent with realist constructivism and the paradigm of actors.⁷¹¹ Here, "rationalities" include not only argumentative reasons. By focusing on the role of an inhabitant – rather than a citizen – the individuals are given the opportunity to relate their subjective experience of space to the universal requirements of ethics. We try to construct the portrait of the connections between space and justice, as they are pertinent to the society of Porto. Technical details on the interview guide can be seen in the second section of this chapter.

6.1.4 Corpus exploration

The method choices described above results in a corpus that we have explored through a spiral of activities of interpretation and explanation. The analysis articulates quantitative treatments with the qualitative reading of the corpus.⁷¹² Successive productions attempt a progressively more refined relationship between singular observations and universal theoretical objects. Here, singular refers to a cognitive demarche that does not proceed by abstracting from the particular to the general at the cost of the wealth of reality. It avoids discretionary selective processes that are subjective to cognitive bias (Lévy, Général/particulier, 2013, pp. 423–424). Instead, it operates by generating explicative logics from singularities without reducing them to their most frequent features (Singulier/universel, 2013, pp. 927–928). The analysis seeks to interpret the discourses of the individuals by focusing on their rationalities while mobilising an empathetic non-evaluative attitude. Explication is at stake whenever cognition focuses on the plausible reasons for what is observed (regularities, discontinuities, and correlations). From the latter we can generate logics that are expected to uphold beyond the particularities of their observation, that is, we construct theoretical objects that are capable of enlightening other empirical explorations.

6.1.4.1 The cognitive demarche of explicative comprehension

The cognitive attitude we have described above corresponds to the pursuit of "explicative comprehension", defined by Max Weber (1864–1920) at the beginning of the twentieth century. This possibility of knowledge construction results from the evolution of an epistemology of social science, which is autonomous from that of natural sciences. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) initiated this path when he named the sciences of social, political, and cultural reality the "sciences of the spirit" (*Geisteswissenschaften*) (Mesure, 2016).⁷¹³ Dilthey opens the rupture between the latter and hard sciences (Ruby & Lusssault, 2013, pp. 568–569). He contests the import of the model of an abstract "subject of knowledge" and of universal "laws of experience" (a reference to Kant's definition of knowable reality) to the scientific study of social reality (Ferry, 2005/2006, p. 4). Dilthey presents the "sciences of the spirit" as "the formalised result of a social knowledge constituted in a milieu of lived experienced shared by the members of a community, which presupposes language and communication" (p. 4). Interpretation and comprehension in the "sciences of the spirit" are then opposed to observation and explication in hard sciences. This passage from monism to dualism⁷¹⁴ advances the method of comprehension of meaning or sense. Contributors to this hermeneutical method include the school of German historical thought (Ranke, Droysen), *Historisme* (Dilthey, Misch), and néo-Kantisme (Rickert, Cassirer, Nathorp) (p. 31). For the endorsers of a "hermeneutic circle", interpretation is a "holistic" act where the

⁷¹¹ See definition of these terms in point a. of the Introduction, "Realist constructivism for a society of actors".

⁷¹² More details on the technique of textometry are presented in point 6.2.3 (chapter 6), "Textometry, a technique of corpus exploration".

⁷¹³ Sylvie Mesure makes reference to the publication of Dilthey's *Introductions aux sciences de l'esprit* in 1883.

⁷¹⁴ Monism is the conception of one single method of scientific knowledge, that of the hard sciences, while dualism recognises the specificity for the study of the social world and the requirement of a different epistemological base (Ferry, 2005/2006, pp. 5, 11–16).

part and the whole are apprehended in tandem, within the context and with other “texts” (p. 31). The social is accessed through the comprehension of the motives and reasons of men, rather than the “formal causes” of social action as external facts (pp. 27–29). Causes are understood as “conditions of possibility” (p. 28) and the necessity of the participation of the interpreter is instituted (p. 30). The transition from monism to dualism also couples the “sense of validity” of sciences with their societal interest (pp. 34–36). Differential methods are attached to different senses of validity and follow the logic of the activities to which their scientific statements refer (p. 36). In this perspective, the interest of hard science is instrumental, that is, to manipulate nature as a resource for men. Social science studies the activities and the rationalities of actors with the scope of enlarging our mutual comprehension as human beings, with the practical interest of enhancing “concerted action”. These activities of reference are, for Ferry, communicational. Social science is not a technique, but a practice that presupposes dialogue. Ferry limits dialogue to the non-manipulative action based on interpretative knowledge without the implications of explication:

« La “technique”, technê, concerne l’ajustement des moyens en vue d’une fin non discutée ; la « pratique », praxis, est l’idée de l’action commune concertée en ce qui concerne le but même à atteindre. Cette praxis suppose alors le dialogue, lexis. De fait, les énoncés des sciences de l’esprit ne servent pas à accroître notre puissance de manipulation (du moins, en principe), mais à élargir notre capacité de compréhension réciproque entre des mondes culturels différentes. » (Ferry, 2005/2006, p. 35).

Max Weber revisits the contribution of hermeneutics, rebalancing the orders of ideality and materiality in the constitution of objects which had been under the influence of Hegelian philosophy (p. 29).

« Notre dessein n’est nullement de substituer à une interprétation causale exclusivement “matérialiste”, une interprétation spiritualiste de la civilisation et de l’histoire qui ne serait pas moins unilatérale » (Weber, 1904/1985, p. 226).⁷¹⁵

Weber’s method breaks the antinomy between the comprehension of meaning and the explication of historical and social facts (Delmotte, 2005/2006, p. 52).⁷¹⁶ The author claims that to know social, cultural, and historic phenomena is not reducible to the interpretation of their meaning (p. 53). It is possible to look for causes if the scientific demarche is understood as epistemically and politically open. Social science is seen as always partial, unachieved, and open to the future evolution of the history of societies (pp. 54–55). In this context, Weber conceives objectivity as a form of relationship with the values of the researcher (Raynaud, 1996, p. 2074). In crafting a research object – in the necessary reduction of social reality – the researcher resorts to what he finds important and of interest (Delmotte, 2005/2006, p. 56).⁷¹⁷

The conciliation of interpretation and explanation as two cognitive processes became actual with “explicative comprehension” (Ruby & Lusssault, 2013, pp. 568–569). Comprehension in social science is defined as an interpretation of the meaning that individuals give to their actions, from the point of view of the researcher, who lives in a certain epoch (Delmotte, 2005/2006, p. 57). Interpreting is not revealing a latent sense contained in the traces of human activities (as practised in hermeneutics and psychoanalysis), but the cognitive demarche that draws on the wealth of meaning of individuals’ representations (Ruby & Lusssault, 2013, pp. 568–569). That empathic approach, intrinsically uncertain (even equivocal) is complemented by the explication of the same object (Lévy,

⁷¹⁵ Florence Delmotte (2005/2006, p. 57) cites: Weber, M. (1904/1985). *L’Ethique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme*. Paris: Presses Pocket.

⁷¹⁶ Weber noted that the difficulties and blockages faced by natural and human sciences are similar (Delmotte, 2005/2006, p. 53).

⁷¹⁷ In Weber, the development of scientific study demands axiological neutrality beyond that initial moment where the subjectivity of the research participates (Delmotte, 2005/2006, pp. 54–56):

« Nous ne pensons pas que le rôle d’une science de l’expérience puisse jamais consister en une découverte de normes et d’idéaux à caractère impératif d’où l’on pourrait déduire des recettes pour la pratique ». Weber, M. (1904, 1st edition). L’objectivité de la connaissance dans les sciences et la politique sociale », Essais sur la théorie de la science, Paris, Presses Pocket, p. 122. Cited in (Delmotte, 2005/2006, p. 54).

This statement should be framed within Weber’s view of the inevitability of a “polytheism” of values and the inherent “specialisation of ethics” (Raynaud, 1996, p. 2073).

2013b, pp. 385–386). Explanation can be defined as a process of knowledge centred in the comprehension of reasons (without implying linear causality, reductive of human intentionality) (pp. 385–386). Understood without determinism, “causality” relates the interpretation to the friction of reality (Delmotte, 2005/2006, pp. 58–59).⁷¹⁸ It is the idea of law and its immobility that is rejected, given the possibility of men changing the course of history (pp. 53, 59). Discovering regularities and correlations (at a given time) under inevitably incomplete knowledge allows for the universal import of the realised observations.

6.2 Techniques

6.2.1 Interview guide

To describe the general configuration of the interview guide, we can present it as an exploratory interview in the sense that it does not determine the pertinent themes to be developed by the interviewee.⁷¹⁹ Despite a concern for spontaneity, the interview is semi-structured. It cannot be considered an “open interview” due to the researcher’s explicit request that the participant should talk about injustice and habitat. The interview guide is best explained as a sequence of levels of increased presence of the interviewer (levels 1, 2, and 3). The interview is then a construction between the objectives of the research and the predisposition of the interviewees.⁷²⁰ It is composed of an initial instruction (level 1), an ensemble of probes (level 2), four relaunches (level 3), and a section on spatial biography.⁷²¹ The initial instruction given to the participants is to converse on problems that raise questions of injustice in what the participants consider to be their habitat. From this cadre, the interviewee freely chooses the stories, interpretations, and arguments – an interrelation of experience and worldview – with which he diagnoses injustice and enunciates the removal of the unjust or the virtuality of the just. The general tone of the interview is conversational, but the engagement in a symmetric transformation of both interviewer and interviewee’s points of view is minimal. It is a not confrontational interview.

6.2.1.1 Instruction (level 1)

For the procedural concerns related to equality explained above, we wanted to be in the position of conducting the interview with minimal adjustments (which would require judging on the capacity of individuals to receive a certain formulation). This care was also present in identifying the pertinent scale of the space of inhabiting. From some pre-studies of Porto, we knew that some people consider to be living in villages or outside Porto. We planned for a pre-instruction question; while preparing ourselves for the conversation, we asked which place the person felt he was an inhabitant of. The elements of this response are then used to formulate the instruction. The instruction juxtaposes the semantic fields of *inhabitant*, *injustices*, and *problems* to allow for the connection between space and justice to emerge. This juxtaposition serves as an entry point to the stakes of urbanity while directing the interviewee to comment on what, according to his ethical values, is judged unacceptable. It is important to note that when we stabilised the interview guide, we did not know that there is a theoretical difference between asking the just and

⁷¹⁸ In the case of Protestantism and capitalism, the method does not conflate one phenomenon upon other through relationships of equivalence or necessity, but mobilises both “planes” in their contribution to the comprehension of society.

⁷¹⁹ For the position of this approach in the ensemble of social science qualitative techniques, see Kvale & Brinkmann (2009a), Kvale & Brinkmann (2009b), Miles & Huberman (1994) and Patton (1980).

⁷²⁰ The considerable restraint exercised by the interviewer is to guarantee that “the subject bring[s] forth the dimensions he or she finds important in the theme of inquiry” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009b, p. 31).

⁷²¹ The term *consigne* in French expresses the request made to the interviewee. It prevents the tonality of the question from seeming like a question. The proposed translation for the word “instruction” should then not be read as an order but as something that retains the same of instructive solicitation. The term *relance* in French expresses the necessity to introduce new stimuli to the conversation after the interviewee exhausts the previous instruction. The translation into relaunching denotes the interference of the researcher in the ensemble of the exchange.

asking the unjust.⁷²² We hypothesise today that the argumentative register (subjection to universalisation tests) and the reconstructive predisposition (considering other peoples' views) might be higher when the semantic field is that of justice.⁷²³ When appreciating our results, we take into account that the interview guide may not have put the interviewees in the most favourable condition for their "procedural rationality" to emerge. This non-optimal setting for the emergence of objectivity did not impede the interviewees to discuss justice, if they found it pertinent. Given that it was used with no variation with the entire sample, the interpretation of the instruction is already an important information on how individuals relate justice, injustice, and space.

6.2.1.2 Probes (level 2)

Probes are questions which develop themes raised spontaneously by the interviewee in level 1. We used three probes. A general request of in-depth exploration of the topic (e.); a verification of whether the issue constitutes a matter of justice or injustice (j.); and a question on sentiment, that is, the emotional magnitude of the reaction enacted by the topic (s.) (the acronyms in parenthesis refer to figure 7 in the next page). The request of precision on whether an episode or argumentative theme raises questions of justice or injustice (j.) is generally interpreted as a demand of justification, through which interviewees tend to increase the objectivity of their statement. The question on emotion raised by injustice (s.) acknowledges our uncertainty about the relationship between affective and cognitive components of justice. It proved useful in showing the coherence of individuals. Different spatial justice registers find different modalities to respond to this probe. The last two probes are often the locus where the justice substance appears more vividly. These probes constitute a second level of interference by the interviewer. As a rule, this probing does not introduce new lexical elements as the interviewer repeats expressions used by the interviewee.⁷²⁴ The identification of the "topics" to be probed implies a minimum level of interpretation "on the spot", identifying what constitutes separate problems for the interviewee. The interviewees often corrected this interpretation when several empirical referents were actually provided in the illustration of the same problem. Figure 6 shows the "decomposition" of themes during the interview. The letters e., j., s. correspond to the three probes indicated above.

6.2.1.3 Relaunches (level 3)

The relaunches pose explicit requests on societal problems, on justice, and on space. The four relaunches have the following foci:⁷²⁵ 1) "forces" the individual to consider society as a whole; 2) spurs the topic of ongoing urban transformation;⁷²⁶ 3) asks of topics where the individual might be hesitant in bringing them about due to uncertainty of judgement; and 4) asks for the characterisation of the just translated into space (the scale remains the one defined in the pre-instruction). The new topics raised in this section are explored with the same probes indicated in level 2.

6.2.1.4 Spatial biography

The last part of the interview concerns some spatial biographic information. It is very minimal in dense interviews and more extensively used only in the cases where the interviewee has difficulties in approaching space and injustice in the previous sections of the interview.

⁷²² See chapter 8, "Unjust spaces and their reversal", in particular point 8.1.2, "Telling the just from the unjust at the urban scale".


⁷²³ For example, we could have asked, "Which place do you feel you are a citizen of? How do you think [*toponym*] could be more just?"

⁷²⁴ This choice made the corpus suitable for a textometric analysis.

⁷²⁵ There were occasions when it was not possible to pose all relaunches, in particular, when level 1 and 2 were already long. Even when time constraints were known, the priority was given to the completion of a more spontaneous discourse before moving to level 3.

⁷²⁶ In exploratory interviews, the question on "change" proved to be fruitful in obtaining fine descriptions of decreases and increases in the levels of urbanity and their evaluation.

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Pre-instruction

Relaunch 1

Relaunches 2, 3 and 4

Figure 7 Illustration of notetaking during the interview. The vertical lines of each landscape page mark the succession of new "topics". The letters e., j., and s. indicate probed information. We can also read the response to the pre-instruction and the position of the relaunches.

6.2.1.5 Interview guide (in English)

	Presence of the interviewer	Request	Formulation	
Instruction and probing	Level 1	Pre-instruction	<i>Which place</i> do you feel you are an inhabitant of? *The answer to <i>which place</i> provides the toponym(s) used in the instruction.	
		Initial instruction	I would like you to talk about the main problems of [toponym(s)*]... You know... injustices...	
		Internal relaunch	...About things that should not be the way they are and that ought not to be like that...	
	Level 2	Probes	e.	Can you explain that a bit more?
			j.	Does that problem raise questions of justice or injustice? <i>or</i> Do you consider that situation unjust?
			s.	How does that make you feel?
Relaunches	Level 3	<i>Relaunches</i>	1	Can you tell me about a problem of the city that you think affects everyone, the entire society?
			2	Is there anything else that is starting to change?
			3	Do you have any other concern on which you do not yet have a clear opinion... that you do not know whether it raises questions of justice or injustice?
			4	How would [toponym(s)*] be if the society would be more just?
	Level 4	Probes		e., j., and s. as per level 2. Example: "Earlier, you referred to the example of the School of Fontinha. Do you think that case raises questions of justice or injustice?"
			Closure	Is there anything you would like to add on this theme?
Spatial biography	NA	Residential choice	Have you always lived here? Affirmative: Do you like to live here? Why? / Negative: Why did you choose to live here?	
		Spatial practice	How is a normal day in your use of the city? In case of the expansion of space: In these places, do you see other type of problems that raise questions of justice or injustice?	

Table 9 Interview guide (in English).

6.2.1.6 Interview guide (in Portuguese)

	Presence of the interviewer	Request	Formulation	
Instruction and probing	Level 1	Pre-instruction	De <i>onde</i> é que se sente habitante? *The answer to <i>onde</i> provides the toponym(s) be used in the instruction	
		Initial instruction	Eu gostava que me falasse dos principais problemas de [topónimo(s)*] ... Assim... de injustiças...	
		Internal <i>relaunch</i>	... coisas que não deviam de ser assim, que não podem mesmo ser assim...	
	Level 2	Probes	e.	Podia-me explorar isso um pouco mais?
			j.	Esse problema levanta questões de justiça ou de injustiça? <i>or</i> Considera essa situação uma injustiça?
			s.	Como é que isso o faz sentir?
Relaunches	Level 3	<i>Relaunches</i>	1	Podia falar-me de um problema da cidade que ache que afecta toda a gente, toda a sociedade?
			2	Há mais alguma coisa que comece agora a mudar?
			3	Há alguma preocupação em relação à qual ainda não tenha uma opinião clara, ainda não saiba se levanta questões de justiça ou de injustiça?
			4	Como é que seria [toponym(s)*] se a sociedade fosse mais justa?
	Level 4	Probes		e., j. and s. as per level 2. Example: “E há pouco referiste o exemplo da escola da Fontinha. Achas que este caso levanta questões de justiça ou de injustiça?”
Closure			Gostaria de acrescentar alguma coisa em relação a este tema?	
Spatial biography	NA	Residential choice	Sempre viveu aqui? (Sim) Gosta de viver aqui? Porque é que gosta de viver aqui? (Não) Porque é que escolheu viver aqui?	
		Spatial practice	Como é que é um dia típico seu em termos de uso da cidade? In case of expansion of space: E nesses lugares, vê outro tipo de problemas que levantem questões de justiça ou injustiça?	

Table 10 Interview guide (in Portuguese).

6.2.2 Sampling of the interviewees

We have also seen in the research hypotheses that we do not expect one single conception for spatial justice to prevail in the entire society. We have underlined the central concern for inclusiveness of significant variations of such points of view, rather than privileging the angle of a particular group. These concerns informed the sampling of the interviewees, covering varied combinations of socio-economic spatial profiles.⁷²⁷ The notion of capitals (see chapters 1 and 2) keeps us alive to the impact of experiences in multiple dimensions of society in the development of an

⁷²⁷ Patton calls the criterion “maximum variation sampling” (Patton, 1980, p. 172).

individuals' spatial and ethical values without prejudging on which dimensions will be of import in the explicative comprehension of our object, Porto.

In order to maximise the variation of socio-economic spatial positions within society, we have developed an ensemble of mapping exercises (these elements are presented in section 6.4.2).⁷²⁸ The first map (fig. 10) defines the territory which is considered to be the functional urban area.⁷²⁹ It is based on the commuting movements, for work and study, as per available census information from 2011. The map includes nineteen municipalities⁷³⁰ and a total of 3.7 million inhabitants⁷³¹. Our proposition includes Lousada and Penafiel beyond the seventeen municipalities of the administrative definition of the metropolitan area.⁷³²

A second exercise (figure 11, section 6.4.2) intersects data on population density and real estate's cost of land, desegregated at the unit of the *freguesia*. Density is taken as an approximate indicator of the urbanity level. Cost of land is considered as a quantitative marker synthesizing the social value of space, reflecting both objective and subjective factors of that valuation. Varying a spectrum of land values and density is expected to cover not only different economic capitals but also different spatial values of the actors, including their preferences *géotypiques*. This map is simplified in a diagram where ten zones of relevant diversity of land-cost/density are identified (Fig. 4 below). We can see that many *freguesias* from different municipalities fall within the same zone. The choice of the actual interviewees' location within these zones has a degree of arbitrariness, which is inherent in the sampling of an interview-based study. This selection was practical: from equivalent *freguesias*, we chose the ones where the social network of the researcher's acquaintances made the process of finding interviews simpler. We sought to cover, per selected area, one or more couples of interviewees with contrasting profiles:⁷³³ a "typical profile" and a contrasting one.⁷³⁴ While we did not seek statistical representation of the sample – which would be inadequate for our method – we minded the density of the areas being sampled and included more couples from denser zones. As the sampling evolved, we sought to equilibrate gender and age. The sampling obeyed two further conditions: the interviewer did not know any of the interviewees and the interviewees did not know each other. Whenever necessary, we reached inhabitants via local associations or the *Junta de Freguesia*.

⁷²⁸ For detailed information on the definition of the area of study see annex A.

⁷²⁹ We have seen the definition of the urban area measured by the functional logic of interdependence, as revealed by the effective mobility of its inhabitants.

⁷³⁰ The technical details of map construction are presented in annex A as well as the questions left open by our choice.

⁷³¹ More precisely 3,704,306 inhabitants.

⁷³² Póvoa de Varzim, Vila do Conde, Trofa, Santo Tirso, Maia, Matosinhos, Valongo, Porto, Paredes, Gondomar, Vila Nova de Gaia, Espinho, Santa Maria da Feira, Arouca, São João da Madeira, Oliveira de Azeméis and Vale de Cambra.

⁷³³ Patton illustrates the "typicality" of an interview as a rich person in a rich area (1980, p. 173) and contrasts it with "deviant" profiles (p. 169).

⁷³⁴ In order to operate this selection, I have studied the distribution of economic and educational capital at the scale of the *freguesia*. I have constructed four social profiles based on the aggregation of socio-economic groups according to the approximate average salary and educational level. The correspondence between professional and educational groups follows the definition in the new International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), referred to as ISCO 88 (COM) (Elias & Birch, 1994). We have decided not to include these maps in the thesis for four reasons. 1) This level of rigour was inadequate for the method of data collection at stake. 2) As there were mediators between myself, the interviewee finder, and the interviewee, I am not sure that the descriptions of typical and contrasting profiles issued from this mapping exercise were actually of use. I am under the impression that the "popular" representations of rich/poor were the prevailing criteria, translated into different economic, professional, and educational characteristics in different zones. 3) The maps also present several inelegant choices. Most information on economic capital is not publicly available at the level of *freguesia* (for example, taxed income per family). ("Agregados familiares por escalões de rendimento: IRS Modelo 1+ 2"). Mapping professional groups with the associated average salary would have been an interesting approximation. Influenced by the nomenclature, I have chosen to map socioeconomic groups, a derived indicator from three simple indicators: profession, situation in profession (self-employed, employed person, etc.), and number of workers in the company/institution. The source for average monthly net income is the ICOR (Survey on Income and Living Conditions), and it does not provide a classification by socioeconomic groups. Most socioeconomic groups are composed of professional groups with salaries in the same range. Heterogeneous socioeconomic groups that combine professions fall within professional groups with contrasting average salaries were left out from the mapping exercise (six of the twenty seven groups). The group of inactive individuals has also been omitted from that representation. The map represents 88% of the working population and 49% of the total population living in the represented areas. 4) Finally, the maps used a "fond de carte" which does not cover the entire study area, but zooms in to encompass the municipalities where I had chosen to do the interviews. What is important to note is that this imperfect exercise assured that I was sampling very diverse profiles.

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




Figure 8 Diagram with zones used for sampling the interviewees.



Population density (inhabitants/km²)



Data: Census 2011, INE, Portugal

Figure 9 Residential location of the sampled interviewees. Couples of contrasting economic/educational profiles.

6.2.3 Textometry, a technique of corpus exploration

Textometry is a quantitative technique of textual analysis, a part of “textual statistics”.⁷³⁵ A foundational work is Lebart and Salem’s *Statistique Textuelle* (1994), based upon the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure.⁷³⁶ Textometry proposes “procedures of filter and statistic calculation for the study of digital texts” (Pincemin, 2011).⁷³⁷ Pincemin underlines the more recent affiliation of textometry with the development of interpretative semantics by François Rastier.⁷³⁸ In this line of exploration, the technical claim of textometry is to make available the description of textual elements beyond the unit of the word. According to interpretative semantics, the access to meaning can “mobilise punctuation, a verbal aspect, a morpheme, a prosodic profile, a rhythm, a typography, a page layout” (Pincemin, 2012, p. 10).⁷³⁹ In this sense, textometry extends the principle of lexicometry (the measurement of the frequency with which words occur in text) to any lexical unit (lemmas, repeated segments, grammatical codes, initials/final characters of lexical form, etc.). The principle of textometry is that calculations of frequencies, specificity scores, and other quantifications of textual information can help the researcher describe and assimilate the corpus. Textometry does not substitute the need for extensive contact with the text nor an interpretative activity (Lebart & Salem, 1994, p. 16).⁷⁴⁰

A central concern of textual statistics is to explore the corpus of written texts without presuming an analytical ontology, distancing itself from content analysis (Lebart & Salem, 1994, p. 13; Pincemin, 2012, pp. 10–11).⁷⁴¹ The computer assisted technique seeks to avoid the coding of qualitative discourses, in particular, the flattening of linguistic complexity there where the heuristic value of open answers resides (Lebart & Salem, 1994, p. 31).⁷⁴² Textometry thus proposes the use of a software to support the manipulation of complete textual information throughout the analytical process (pp. 31–32). Lebart and Salem insist on the delay of the interpretative moment,

⁷³⁵ This choice partially results from experimenting with the qualitative data analysis software ATLAS.ti (<http://atlasti.com/>) to treat an experimental round of ten interviews, in 2012. The use of that technique had proved difficult for me to surpass the coherence of each interviewee towards engaging observations at the level of the full corpus.

⁷³⁶ Lebart and Salem point to the organisation of linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure in six domains:

« [1] – la phonétique étudie les sons du langage, alors que la phonologie étudie les phonèmes c'est-à-dire les sons en tant qu'unités distinctives. [2] – la lexicologie étudie les mots, dans leur origine, leur histoire et dans les relations qu'ils ont entre eux. [3] – la morphologie traite des mots pris indépendamment de leurs rapports dans la phrase. Elle étudie les morphèmes ou éléments variables dans les mots ; morphèmes grammaticaux (désinences ou flexions) et morphèmes lexicaux. [4] – la syntaxe étudie les relations entre les mots dans la phrase (ordre des mots, accord). [5] – la sémantique étudie la signification, le contenu du message. [6] – la pragmatique étudie les rapports entre l'énoncé et la situation de communication. » (Lebart & Salem, 1994, p. 13).

⁷³⁷ We propose “digital text” as a translation for the expression used in the original French source, *textes numérisés*.

⁷³⁸ Pincemin (2012) points to the foundational text: Rastier, F. (1987). *Sémantique interprétative*. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France.

⁷³⁹ « La sémantique interprétative s'intéresse au sens. Selon elle, le sens peut s'élaborer à partir d'indices morphologiques, syntaxiques, phonétiques, etc. Il peut être transversal aux catégories grammaticales, mobiliser au même titre une ponctuation, un aspect verbal, un morphème, un profil prosodique et rythmique, une typographie, une mise en page (Bourion 2001, Malrieu & Rastier 2001, Beaudouin 2002, Valette 2004, Loiseau 2006). La textométrie est en mesure de prendre en compte des descriptions du texte de toutes natures, pour peu qu'elles soient explicitées par un codage du corpus. » (Pincemin, 2012, p. 10).

⁷⁴⁰ « En revanche, l'indépendance des méthodes de la statistique textuelle vis-à-vis de la phase dite de "compréhension" des textes ... n'est bien entendu que transitoire : les résultats acquis à partir de comptages et de traitements statistiques automatisés constituent seulement des pièces supplémentaires à verser au dossier du traitement global de l'information de base. » (Lebart & Salem, 1994, p. 16).

⁷⁴¹ The objective of de-ontology of interpretative semantics and textometry is also pointed out by Pincemin:

« La démarche sémantique proposée par la textométrie est tout à fait en accord avec la demande de « dé-ontologie » formulée par Rastier. Il s'agit bien d'éviter toute préconception réductrice, on veut surtout rester au plus proche du texte et ne pas commencer par l'étudier à travers le prisme d'une ontologie. Ainsi, dès ses débuts, la textométrie s'est fait une spécialité du traitement des questions ouvertes dans les enquêtes, pour éviter le postcodage des réponses (entre l'enquête et l'analyse) qui efface des variations d'expressions potentiellement significatives (Lebart & Salem 1994). » (Pincemin, 2012, pp. 10, 11). The cited the work of Lebart and Salem is a part of our bibliography.

⁷⁴² « Lorsque le questionnement permet des réponses composites, complexes, floues, d'une grande diversité, l'information est littéralement laminée par le post-codage; et c'est pourtant dans ce cas que la valeur heuristique des réponses libres est la plus grande (...) les réponses doivent plus fréquemment qu'on ne le croit conserver leur forme, leur texture, leur tonalité, pour être vraiment comprises par le chercheur. Les réponses complexes, même formées de juxtapositions d'éléments faciles à codifier, seront de toute façon fort difficiles à exploiter. » (Lebart & Salem, 1994, p. 31). The authors also point out that coding tends to eliminate rare, original, and unclear responses: « Les réponses rares, originales, peu claires en première lecture sont affectées à des items "résiduels" qui sont donc très hétérogènes et perdent de ce fait toute valeur opératoire. » (Lebart & Salem, 1994, pp. 31, 32).

making the tool a means to “extend the domain of controllable and reproducible analysis” (p. 135).⁷⁴³ Pincemin clarifies that such objectivity does not dispense a constructive approach from the outset (Pincemin, 2011).⁷⁴⁴ The hypothesis from which to define an entry point into the analysis and the succession of analytical activities result from reflexivity, not from an automatic determinism of the machine (Pincemin, 2012, p. 6). If the return to the original text is consensual in the community of textual statistics, Pincemin insists that a previous – and continuous – frequentation of the corpus is crucial for the construction of the analysis. The reading of the textometry results “in context” is enabled by functions of “assisted reading” offered by several software.⁷⁴⁵ Such exhaustive contextualisation of lexical occurrences is attached to the determinant role of the totality of the corpus at each stage of the analysis (Pincemin, 2011).⁷⁴⁶ The “principle of architextuality” characterises the semantic determination of each text (interview) by the entire corpus while in turn modifying the sense of other texts that compose the studied ensemble (Pincemin, 2011).⁷⁴⁷ The statistical functioning of textometry based on a “specificities model” is the concretisation of this principle (Pincemin, 2011). This probabilistic model evaluates whether the frequency of a form in a certain part of the corpus is proportionate to the size of that part, while considering the frequency of the form in the full corpus (Lafon, 1980, p. 136).⁷⁴⁸ This approach can also be called contrastive or differential as it detects what differences each of the parts have from the rest of the corpus. It is possible to obtain a list of positive and negative specificities of each part using a partition of the corpus. We can read the list of positive and negative specificities longitudinally and transversally, identifying the nuclei of meaning. In interpretative semantics, this operation corresponds to the analysis of *semes* and their aggregation into isotopies.⁷⁴⁹ *Semes* refer to contents; they are an element of the signified and not of the

⁷⁴³ « La complexité de l'information et la multiplicité des points de vue possibles ne permettent pas de proposer une voie unique menant du problème à une solution définitive. Dans ce chapitre, nous allons au contraire tenter de reconnaître divers chemins permettant de reculer quelque peu le moment de la nécessaire intervention interprétative de l'utilisateur. En somme, on ambitionne d'étendre le domaine de l'analyse contrôlable et reproductible, ces deux vocables peu élégants étant peut-être moins polémiques que les qualificatifs objectif et automatique... » (Lebart & Salem, 1994, p. 135).

⁷⁴⁴ « L'analyse textométrique procède également d'une démarche construite : on ne peut pas fournir un corpus, « faire tourner » le logiciel, et récupérer le résultat comme produit fini. Chaque étape suppose des choix et implique l'utilisateur, et bien souvent la dynamique de l'interprétation procède par ajustement progressif des données et des calculs : on retrouve très concrètement l'interprétation comme action et comme geste qui affine dynamiquement sa trajectoire. » (Pincemin, 2011).

⁷⁴⁵ For example, TXM function “concordance” enables the retrieval and parallel reading of all passages of the corpus with a chosen pivot form accompanied by the left and right contexts of the occurrence (each of which is with an editable number of words).

⁷⁴⁶ « La textométrie compte, situe, caractérise, des unités dans et par des contextes. Or justement « la compréhension du texte [...] procède par contextualisation et *intertextualisation* » (Rastier 2001 : 93). Cela se déploie à tous les paliers, se reformulant en autant de principes (Rastier 2001 : 92) : le principe de *contextualité* (« deux signes ou deux passages d'un même texte mis côte à côte sélectionnent réciproquement des éléments de signification (sèmes) [...] »...), le principe d'*intertextualité* (analogue pour deux passages de textes différents), et le principe d'*architextualité*, selon lequel tout texte plongé dans un corpus en reçoit des déterminations sémantiques, et modifie potentiellement le sens de chacun des textes qui le composent. » (Pincemin, 2011). The cited work by Pincemin is Rastier, F. (2001). *Arts et sciences du texte*. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France.

⁷⁴⁷ « Quant au principe d'*architextualité*, le fonctionnement statistique du corpus de référence en est une concrétisation : en effet, tout texte inclus dans le corpus apporte sa contribution aux fréquences globales, et réciproquement, se trouve caractérisé par rapport à ces fréquences globales. Le choix du corpus de référence conditionne l'interprétation, et un texte reçoit autant d'éclairages possibles que de contextualisations pertinentes en corpus. Par le biais du corpus de référence, le global détermine le local, et l'analyse est la mise en évidence de formes qui se détachent sur un fond (Rastier 2001 : 42 sq.). » (Pincemin, 2011).

⁷⁴⁸ For more details on the model see annex D.

⁷⁴⁹ Isotopies are ensembles of different words sharing one or more semes (basic meaning trait) that give a direction to the reading of a text: « Isotopie, subst. fém. (...) b) Ling. Ensemble redondant de catégories sémantiques qui rend possible la lecture uniforme du récit, telle qu'elle résulte des lectures partielles des énoncés et de la résolution de leurs ambiguïtés qui est guidée par la recherche de la lecture unique » (A.-J. Greimas, Pour une théorie de l'interprétation du récit mythique des Communications, t. 8, 1966, p. 30). » (CNRTL, 2016a). In Wikipedia, we can read a more illustrative presentation: “In a story, we detect an isotopy when there is a repetition of a basic meaning trait (seme); such repetition, establishing some level of familiarity within the story, allows for a uniform reading/interpretation of it. An example of a sentence containing an isotopy is I drink some water. The two words drink and water share a seme (a reference to liquids), and this gives homogeneity to the sentence. This concept, introduced by Greimas in 1966, had a major impact on the field of semiotics, and was redefined multiple times. Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni extended the concept to denote the repetition of not only semes, but also other semiotic units (like phonemes for isotopies as rhymes, rhythm for prosody, etc.). Umberto Eco showed the flaws of using the concept of “repetition”, and replaced it with the concept of “direction”, redefining isotopy as “the direction taken by an interpretation of the text!” (Wikipedia, 2016, Isotopy (semiotics)).

signifier. These minimal units of sense can be nuclear (specific to a lexical unit) or contextual, when meaning appears through its joint occurrence with other elements.⁷⁵⁰

Overall, through its statistical functions but also the non-linear assisted reading of the corpus, textometry offers the possibility to reduce cognitive bias in the selection of relevant segments of texts. Our corpus is suitable for this exploration as we have constructed an exchange between the interviewer and interviewee that avoids the introduction of new vocabulary. As such, textometry can study the text produced by the interviewees with confidence on the significance of its lexicon. Before we turn to the brief presentation of how we sought to explore this potential, a word on the choice of the specific software that we have chosen, TXM. TXM is an open source software, resulting from a collaborative project federating research and technical developments of the main teams working in textometry (<http://textometrie.enslyon.fr/>). It has been designed to gather most of the available statistical algorithms in the market into one single public platform. This spirit of democratisation of textometry is also present in the offer of initial training and technical and theoretical support throughout the analysis from an extremely responsive team.⁷⁵¹

6.3 Corpus

The realisation of the method and techniques described above – that is, the encounter between our intentionality and the empirical reality of Porto – produces a corpus with an ensemble of features that we can describe before we dive into its content. It constitutes forty nine interviews, corresponding to eight hundred pages of transcriptions and approximately 600,000 words.⁷⁵²

From initial impressions, we can also say that it is a heterogeneous corpus. Diverse responses to the pre-instruction locate the interview in different “places of inhabiting”; the topics of discussion are varied, and the fluency and ease of oral communication contrast. We also sensed varying degrees of responsiveness to the instruction, from cases of resistance – or better, insistence on not having anything to say on such matters – to cases where participants unfolded three hours of *exposé*. Though the average extension of an interview transcript is approximately of 10,548 words, the contribution of each interview to the overall mass is highly variable. Eighteen interviews have lengths above the average against thirty one shorter discourses.⁷⁵³ The interview length is subject to idiosyncrasies. It can barely serve as a sign of whether the topic speaks to the interviewees. Cases of interpellation might indicate reflexivity, the perceived abundant injustices in their habitat, availability to discuss, or the talkative character of the interviewee. Interviewee response length can also be a linguistic feature (verbosity vis-à-vis the economy of means). It might as well reflect a discursive register: dense narratives based on first-hand contact with spatial injustices might be longer than argumentative discursive approaches.

⁷⁵⁰ « Sème (linguistique) Unité minimale de signification, trait sémantique pertinent dans l'analyse du sens d'un mot. Soit l'exemple du lexème fauteuil. Les sèmes pertinents sont: « destiné à ce qu'on s'y assoie », « avec dossier », « pour une personne », « avec bras », « sur pied(s) » (B. Pottierds Trav. Ling. Litt. Strasbourg. 2 n o1 1963, p. 14). L'unité sémantique de base est le sème, élément de signification minimal, qui n'apparaîtra comme tel qu'en relation avec un autre élément qui n'est pas lui: il n'a de fonction que différentielle et, de ce fait ne peut être saisi que dans un ensemble organique, dans le cadre d'une structure (J. Courtés, Introd. à la sémiot. narrative et discursive, 1976, p. 46). Sème contextuel. Sème déterminé par le contexte. Sème nucléaire ou spécifique. Sème propre à une unité. V.sémantème B et sémème.» (CNRTL, 2016b). A sémème is the ensemble of messages that a word can have: « Ensemble des sèmes d'un lexème constituant son sens ou l'un de ses sens. Nous considérons le mot, ou plus exactement le lexème (unité minimale du discours) comme une collection de sèmes (unités minimales de sens), dont les uns sont nucléaires, les autres contextuels, le tout produisant un effet de sens ou sémème » (CNRTL, 2016c).

⁷⁵¹ I am thankful to the TXM team of the École normale supérieure de Lyon for supporting my analytical practice using textometry. In particular, I am thankful for the theoretical clarifications of Serge Heiden and Pincemin Bénédicte and the technical support of Matthieu Decorde and Alexey Lavrentev.

⁷⁵² The lexicometric main features of the corpus are a total of 625,677 words, 20,079 different forms, and the maximum frequency of a form is 61,808 occurrences.

⁷⁵³ Interview E50, exceptionally shorter, is approximately 10% of the average extension. Between E59 and E18, the length varies between one third of the average and one and a half times that length. The upper range, between E42 and E44, nears two times the average. The observation that the corpus presents a wide array of interview extensions is important in the interpretation of specificities.

6.3.1 Overview of corpus studies

The cognitive demarche of explicative comprehension unfolds through seven exercises with different degrees of inter-dependence. In the construction of the present thesis manuscript, different emphasis have been given to the various aspects of this process (see table XX).

Corpus studies	Method	Narrative	Reconstruction	Diachronic empirical observations
	Chapter 6	Chapter 6	Chapters 7 and 8	Annex E
Study 1	6.3.1.1	6.5.6.2	NA	E.1
Study 2	6.3.1.2		NA	E.2
Study 3	6.3.1.3		7.1 + 7.3	E.3
Study 4	6.3.1.4		7.2	E.4
Study 5	6.3.1.5		7.4	E.5
Study 6	6.3.1.6	6.5.6.3	8.1	E.6
Study 7	6.3.1.7	6.5.6.4	8.2	E.7

Table 11 Presentation of corpus studies: method, narrative, empirical chapters and annexes.

The first two exercises (studies 1 and 2) have been entirely absorbed into subsequent studies. In the next two points (6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2), we take the opportunity to annotate the lessons extracted from these two studies, and we will not resume them in the next chapters. Exercises 3, 4, 6 and 7 are only briefly annotated in this chapter as they occupy the rest of Part II (chapter 7 and 8). Results of exercise 5 are integrated throughout the reconstructions presented in chapter 7, in particular in the reading of continuity and discontinuity in the space *idéel* of Porto (7.4). Further information on the unfolding of the analysis, in particular with regard to personal ethics and methodological reflection, can be read in the narrative section of this chapter (6.5). Detailed information on all studies and further attestation of the results are presented in Annex E.

In the overview presented below, each summary ends with the main contribution of the respective study for the research.

6.3.1.1 Study 1: qualitative reading

The first analytical moment corresponds to the reading and listening of the corpus with two parallel functions: deepening the qualitative knowledge of the corpus and preparing the corpus for quantitative work. During this initial qualitative frequentation of the corpus, a summary of each interview was written. That document is an initial data reduction of about fifty pages. This data reduction represents the second level of reconstruction of the material – the first being the probing during the interview as illustrated in figure 7. This summary of the “cases” treated in each interview does not keep the original wording of the interviewees. While that would have been preferable, we found it difficult at that stage to segment the original discourses into extracts containing the core of each problem.

The technical preparation of the corpus included the completion of the initially inaudible parts; correction of mispronunciation and spelling mistakes; inclusion of annotations on the pragmatics of the discourse (truncation, noise, interruption, cries, etc.).⁷⁵⁴ We have also introduced sections with regard to the levels of presence of the interviewer, as defined in the interview guide.⁷⁵⁵ The edition of the written corpus ended with its import into TXM.

⁷⁵⁴ The software used for transcribing and editing the corpus was *Transcriber* (<https://sourceforge.net/projects/trans/files/transcriber/>).

⁷⁵⁵ We have opted to use the complete interviews for the study of frequencies rather than frequencies relative to the extension of levels 1 and 2. The need for the interviewer to mobilise the relaunches does not correspond to a transformation in the tonality of the discourse (at the level of the signified).

That operation automatically categorises all words with a morpho-syntactic tag and a lemma.⁷⁵⁶ Certain grammar categories have been corrected manually.

- This exercise confronts us with the extensiveness and heterogeneity of data and launches the first interrogations between selection of segments (signifier) and interpretation of the meaning of the texts (signified).

6.3.1.2 Study 2: Corpus bipartition with lexical motive “just”

After a period of non-systematic exploration of the software, we set out to benefit from the statistical strength of textometry. As seen above (section 6.2.3), this involves the partitioning of the corpus, which in turn requires some criteria for the aggregation of the several interviews. Illustrating the grouping of an open question of a survey, Lebart and Salem propose two main criteria on which to operate a partition: 1) the use of external variables such as socio-economic profiles, and 2) the study of the behaviour of a lexical profile (1994, p. 33).⁷⁵⁷ Given the exploratory quality of the research, we chose to avoid pre-judging on the explicative relevance of social variables. The second proposition was the basis of an initial bipartition of the corpus. In this second exercise, we studied the distribution of the lexeme “.*just.*”,⁷⁵⁸ that is, words such as *justice*, *injustice*, *just*, and *unjust* (as well as other derived forms and truncated appearances).

We knew from the qualitative frequentation of the corpus that this lexeme can be used to refer at least to three different semes: 1) justice as a moral virtue,⁷⁵⁹ 2) justice as the juridical field associated to the practice of law (without necessarily implying a development project), and 3) justice as ethical judgement of societal questions. We did not anticipate a straightforward relationship between signifier and signified but expected two observations: a) high frequencies of the lexeme “.*just.*” to be an indicator of the importance of the third seme, and b) low frequencies to be associated with the first meaning. This experimentation with frequencies confirms that indeed discourses with a “direction” of moral virtue under-employ words from the family of justice. However, the reverse is not observable. Interviewees who seemed highly sensitive to societal questions figure in the group of low frequencies. This indicates that at least a part of the corpus is using a different vocabulary to express justice concerns. We have scrutinised two interviews in this second group to try to understand their lexicon of justice. This reading establishes the idea that the wealth of language defies the manual selection, pertinent for the full corpus, of words responsible for the resonance of an interviewee’s discourse with a political philosophical orientation.⁷⁶⁰

⁷⁵⁶ The module of Portuguese grammar tagging was *Treetagger* (<http://gramatica.usc.es/~gamallo/tagger.htm>).

⁷⁵⁷ « On peut tout d'abord, prenant en compte les connaissances antérieures sur le thème étudié, utiliser, avec ou sans croisement, les critères jugés les plus discriminants. (...) On peut au contraire faire une typologie directe (sans regroupement préalable) des réponses à partir de leurs profils lexicaux (cela n'a de sens que si les réponses ne se réduisent pas à deux ou trois formes), puis sélectionner les catégories les plus liées à cette typologie, pour procéder ensuite à des regroupements utilisant ces catégories.» (Lebart & Salem, 1994, p. 33).

Significant contrasts within the corpus requires more than a tripartition between high, medium, and low frequencies of a single lexeme. It is unclear how the authors expect the behaviour of a lexical motive to produce a complex partition. A possibility would be to expand the study of lexical motives to several and intersect the ensembles produced by the magnitude of frequencies for the chosen words. As will become clear at the end of this section, the choice of initial lists of words is problematic in a corpus with a very high level of heterogeneity.

⁷⁵⁸ .* indicates, in Corpus Query Language (CQL), the request of all the words containing the segment of a word, possibly starting or ending with a different sequence of characters. The specific query on “.*just.*” produces a lexicon of forty seven forms. They have been edited to exclude derivatives from “justify” (*justifica*, *justificar*, *justificação*, *Justificava*, *justificam*, *justificaria*, *justifica-se*, *justificasse*, *justifique*) and “adjust” (*ajustar*, *ajustam*, *reajustamento*). The final list yields twenty six forms.

⁷⁵⁹ This sense has been reviewed in section 4.11, “Morality centred on charity”, in particular, in point 4.11.2, “Justice and charity in Aquinas’ ontology”.

⁷⁶⁰ Three observations were made at that time. 1) Key passages are often expressions of three to five words whose form vary slightly within the interview, potentially escaping validation through repetition (e.g.: “eles ficam com... mais coisas que nós”, “passa à frente dos outros”, “eles tiveram muito e estes não tiveram nada”); 2) Some candidates to isotopies are banal words, potentially widespread and unsuitable to reveal the specificity of a type of discourse. They are also potentially unstable in their semantic value across the corpus (e.g.: “outro”, “falta”, “haver”, “sem”, “não está bem”, “dificuldade”); and 3) Interesting words are actually hapax, which are irrelevant in the context of the full corpus (e.g.: “gritante”, “premente”).

Despite this imprecision, we have completed the exercise by assuming its approximative quality. Grouping the interviewees according to high and low frequencies (of the lexeme under study), we have obtained a list of positive specificities of each group.⁷⁶¹ The rough observation of these lists raised the hypothesis that there is a polarity in the corpus between a narrative discourse (often based on the problems of the self or its acquaintances), on the one hand, and a more decentred argumentative discourse (using a panoply of semantic indicators of justice), on the other. It became clear that the fine correspondence between frequencies of certain words and “the tonality” of a discourse ought to stem from the analysis. We then abandoned Lebart and Salem’s suggestion to use lexicon profiles to produce the first baseline partition. We suspended the intention of carrying out the same exploration for a lexeme of space. Qualitative reading emerged as a sounder investment as a means to produce the sought partition of the corpus. We then moved into the qualitative exploration of the signified.

- This exercise alerted us to the need to include morality in the field of ethos (initially, we only considered theories of justice).⁷⁶²

6.3.1.3 Study 3: Typology of ways to connect space and justice

In this exercise, we have constructed a qualitative interpretation of the corpus, proposing a manual aggregation of individual discourses. The exercise produces a new data display, compressing the summaries of the interviews produced in study 1 and initiating a comparative comment. The filling in of the table uses the rough division of the corpus produced in study 2. We have started with a group of individuals scoring low in the relative frequency of the lexeme “just”, then approached the ones scoring high (10+10 interviews). This allowed an initial write-up on the modes of connecting justice and space. This proposition was densified and corrected in a second iteration comprising the remaining twenty nine discourses. The exercise was accompanied by the punctual reading of the original transcriptions. This process led to a partition into twelve groups. As the naming of the types indicates (see section 7.1), the common denominators are hybrid though they tend to denote the central source of spatial injustice in the discourse. As we will see in later development, the texts of each type also resonate with one or several theories of the ethos. This transversal synthesis of the corpus into typologies of discourses is necessarily interpretative. It processes very extensive qualitative material: the full corpus and the full theoretical toolkit. The approach is necessarily susceptible to an involuntary selection of information to compose a coherent story, the use of prototypes and exemplars, the neglect of ambiguity, and a diminished sensitivity to quantity (Kahneman, 2011).⁷⁶³ The commonality bringing together the interviewees under the same type does not cover the full spectrum of problems discussed by the interviewees: we are still susceptible to a particular/general cognition. In as much as the typology is used as a hypothesis for quantitative exploration, the risks of inaccuracy and bias are acceptable at this stage.

- The observations of this study have been crucial to the construction of the thesis. This study stirs the empirical contribution and leads to the premise polarising the existing universe of theories of justice and morality and of theories of spatial justice.

⁷⁶¹ The list of the interviewees in each group is accessible in annex E.2.

⁷⁶² In the original document where this observation has been registered, we can read the following: “Hypothesis of a strand of evaluation which is based on morals/religion. There are values of concern for the other which are an inheritance of religious thought, not enlightened by the idea of common good and solidarity for the sake of development and achievement of equality but by the idea of moral obligation in the face of punishment (needs clarification), implied the acceptance of poverty” August 2014.

⁷⁶³ This series of fragilities is inspired by the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky presented in *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (Kahneman, 2011). Five different types of bias are at stake: 1) involuntary selection of information to compose a coherent story, 2) use of prototype and exemplars and little integration of information, 3) interpretation of causes and intentions where there is little or no information on those, 4) neglect of ambiguity, and 5) diminished sensitivity to quantity.

6.3.1.4 Study 4: Lexical specificities of types

The previous exercise reduced the density of the corpus while giving a direction to its interpretation. It composed twelve manners in which space and justice are connected. In the fourth analytical exercise, we test this hypothesis by dividing the TXM corpus into the corresponding twelve parts (each of which includes all the interviewees classified within a type). The objective of this partition is to study the lexical specificities of each type and investigate if it contrasts with the ensemble. As we have seen above (6.2.3), the specificity model allows for the interpretation of the parts and the whole to interact in the construction of the interpretation. Reading the list of positive and negative specificities transversally (across types) and longitudinally (through the type) enables the reorganisation of the list of specific words into groups of similar or approximate *semes*. This study confirms that each type has at least a section of specific words whose meaning relates to the interpretation we proposed to the type. In other words, several isotopies support the identified ways in which space matters for justice and injustice.

This new angle of observation has the advantage of bringing the entire textual ensemble to the attention of the researcher. The trade-off of this globality is the loss of semantic accuracy. Given the length of the lists of positive specificities (in the magnitude of one to three hundred per type), it is not possible to verify the activated seme in each contextual occurrence. We could verify some of the occurrences, but not exhaustively. Given that TXM is being used as an exploratory device of what is a fundamentally interpretative demarche, it is possible to accommodate this limitation. Furthermore, the potential inaccuracies of semantic ambiguity have different weights in different observations: some “full words” are more univocal than others; absent forms are informative, independent of the particular seme being activated elsewhere; and meaning also emerges from grammar categories.

- In this study we could observe the hybridity of some types. This can be interpreted as the ambiguity of the type (or some of its members) or be a consequence of misinterpretation and mal-positioning of some interviews in the typology. This question demands further investigation on how the stock of specific words is actually used within a type, motivating the fifth study.

6.3.1.5 Study 5: Histograms of the relative frequencies of specific words

In the previous exercise, a “contrastive analysis” of the types identified the specific words of each type and evaluated their semantic relation to the qualitative interpretation of the types. In the present study, twelve histograms show the relative frequency per interview of the lexical profile of each type. The objective is to investigate whether positive specificities of a type represent a higher part of the stock of words employed by each member of that type, in contrast with the magnitude of frequency of the remaining corpus (for the same lexical profile). This bulk verification changes the unit of measurement from the specificity score to relative frequencies. Relative frequencies reduce the magnifying of contrast that is inherent in the probabilistic model.⁷⁶⁴

The histograms change the interpretation from groups of expected homogeneity identifying, for most types, a leading interviewee. They near “ideal types” in the Weberian sense.⁷⁶⁵ This exercise moves from the reading of the corpus as sets of monolithic blocks of separate discourses to a more continuous geometry. Some individuals are exemplary representatives of a coordinate in the panorama of discursive variation, while others give signs of hybridity. This exercise also identifies some distortions that we can attribute to a subjective inclination of the researcher. Openness to the possibility that individuals from different educational backgrounds could belong to the same type occasionally leads to excessive association based on common empiric referents, rather than the conception of spatial justice.

While this study progresses the explicative comprehension of the corpus, some technical doubts remain. We could imagine, for example, that subgroups of words are responsible for the attachment of the interview to a type, rather

⁷⁶⁴ See annex D for mode detail.

⁷⁶⁵ Max Weber’s “ideal types” result from the selection and over-emphasis of certain aspects of the observed reality with the scope of enabling comparison and understanding. The types need not be perfectly embodied by the specific individuals categorised within the type.

than the global high frequency of the majority of the forms of the lexical profile. Some explorations of this doubt have been developed using factorial analysis (Study 5.2 in annex E.5.2). This analysis identified the words that were actually shared between the members of a type. It also maximises discrepancy within the type and it has been used mainly as a tool assisting qualitative reading.

- This exercise brought the exploitation of the quantitative exploration of the corpus to a satisfactory point. From this achievement, it seemed important to return to qualitative analysis with a specific topic, where we could be more attentive to the interpretative issues still at hand.

6.3.1.6 Study 6: Transversal theme, social housing geotype

This transversal analysis, as the title indicates, focuses in one theme in order to study in more detail the conceptions of justice and space. Almost all interviewees who brought up the theme of social housing considered it an unjust space, including those who talk about it “from the inside”. This dominant judgement merited a longitudinal analysis, producing a thematic “geotype”.⁷⁶⁶ In these conditions, it is possible to analyse how the singularity of injustice (attached to the specificities of an environment and the subjectivity of its perception) dialogues with the rationality of its justification (where universals of justice are enacted). We are now parted from a particular/general cognitive approach. We abandon the spectrum of theories of justice to focus on Sen’s construction. The latter proves fruitful in the effort of intelligibility of all conceptions of the spatial injustice of Porto. Sen’s theory offers a systemic account of the interrelations between the grand ideas of justice (freedom, equality, process, outcome, responsibility) with which to observe their presence/absence in the discourses. At this point, we are confident about the superior *sociétalité* of the theory.

- It is at this moment that the reconstructive ethic is more developed. We can learn from all social positions that form together the complex diagnosis of the spatial injustice of social housing policies.

6.3.1.7 Study 7: Longitudinal individual geotypes

This exercise investigates the hypothesis of internal coherence of the individuals’ discourses by reconstructing the full set of problematic chorotypes presented by two interviewees (as per research hypotheses H4a and H4b). These interviews were chosen because they focus on a variety of scales, placing the city in relation to other spaces. These two speakers had been placed in different types.

- The exercise of “Individual geotypes” deepens the comprehension of individual logic and advances an explanatory relationship between ethical capital and individual experience, relating the former to the ensemble of individual capitals.

6.4 Porto

This text does not have the ambition of describing the “truth” of Porto, which would be antinomic to the objectives of this research. The kind of objective description that I find necessary in the information of public debate on spatial justice, measuring existing degrees of urbanity and proposing a clear plan *géotypique*, is a chantier for collective production, well beyond the feasibility of my own work. Porto is the city where I grew up and if we recall Lefebvre’s hypothesis of space as being a code to society (Lefebvre, 1974/2009, p. 17), then my subjective interpretation of

⁷⁶⁶ See definition in chapter 2, point 2.2.1, “Space is a dimension of society and a multidimensional object”.

Porto is also part of the verity of Porto.⁷⁶⁷ In this sense, I have opted by a hybrid text which uses both subjective and objective resources in the presentation of the city. This text seemed necessary as a resource of objectivity. It provides a register from which the reader can appreciate the influence of my interpretation of the city as it participates in the exploration of the corpus. I try to read the metropolitan space through the dynamics between a material layout, the spatialities of actors, the object of planning and the resulting space, at the moment of the terrain. It is possible to initiate the reading of Porto as an utilitarian city, where the weak interrelatedness between the parts and the whole is practised with a certain naturalness.

Given the acceptability of some subjectivity in this text, it is written in the first person singular.

6.4.1 Verbal description

6.4.1.1 A material layout of dispersion...

We have seen that space can be apprehended as an object, the englobing spatial layout (itself a product of the interrelations of all actors) supporting or restraining individual choices. Through this lens, describing space privileges what, in a given moment, has stability or visibility. In this sense, the material imprint of the urban agglomeration offers a first synthetic view. The urban process that took place since the 1950s, and intensified in the first decade of 2000s, can be described as a “conglomeration *in situ*”. That is, the expansion of the built fabric without a corresponding significant demographic growth (Chatel, 2012, pp. 553–554): a layout where routes and all minimally inhabited nodes become part of the continuous built extension, in the absence of important demographic or productive pressure.⁷⁶⁸ The northern region, where the metropolitan arc of Porto is located, lost about 75.000 inhabitants between 2001 and 2015, through low natality rates but also the migration of about 10.000 inhabitants.⁷⁶⁹ Yet, it is in this period that takes place the most expressive morphological expansion, from 750 km² to 3800 km² (Chatel, 2012, p. 576).⁷⁷⁰

While urban expansion is a phenomena observable in the recent urbanisation of all European cities, it has different weights in different cities, when combined with the explicative force of other two “epochs of urbanisation” (pp. 553–554). To wit, the first epoch of densification of the city-political space until the XIXth century and the second stage of extrapolation of the city *intra-muros*, due to demographic explosion and surface requirements attached to the industrial period. The dominance of the first epoch is illustrated by Paris, an agglomeration where a dense centre accumulates diverse time periods, population and sources of productivity (demographic growth surpasses the consumption of surface by the built fabric with high densities in both centre and suburbs). The paradigmatic case of the second modality is the conurbation of the Ruhr valley, a conurbation with several centres of similar size and complementary functions. In 2010, Paris, the Ruhr and Porto have morphological agglomerations of approximately the same size (p. 555)⁷⁷¹. Contrastingly, the total population of Porto conglomeration is 2.8 million against 10 million inhabitants in Paris and 9 million in the Ruhr valley (p. 554).⁷⁷² We can note that in the same year the PIB of Paris is

⁷⁶⁷ I have lived uninterrupted in Porto until 2002. I have then lived in Ferrara, London, Geneva and Brussels. My view of Porto carries these experiences as well as the way in which I contacted with Porto during the doctoral research.

⁷⁶⁸ « Le conglomérat [of Porto] est bien le fruit d’une urbanisation relative au treillage, et qui commence à la fin du 20^{ième} siècle : l’extension du bâti prévaut sur la croissance démographique, dans un milieu rural dense. L’urbanisation se fait par ponction de la population rurale, comme dans le cas de l’exode rural, mais dans le cas du conglomérat, ce n’est pas par concentration et par un mouvement centripète, mais par déconcentration et par des mouvements centrifuges. » (Chatel, 2012, p. 579).

⁷⁶⁹ Source: “Saldos populacionais anuais: total, natural e migratório”, INE, PORDATA, 2016 (<http://www.pordata.pt/>).

⁷⁷⁰ « L’agglomération de Porto illustre ici le conglomérat : son expansion entre 2000 et 2010 modifie tout à fait l’échelle d’observation pertinente. En 2010 l’agglomération s’étend sur 3800 km², divisés en 691 ... *freguesias* Dix ans auparavant, ce sont 750 km² et 201 unités locales agglomérés. » (Chatel, 2012, p. 576).

⁷⁷¹ This comparison is based on the definition of urban agglomeration provided by the INSEE and used in the data source of the cited study (e-Geopolis) (Chatel, 2012, p. 255).

⁷⁷² The data source of Chatel’s original maps is e-Geopolis, 2011.

more than 45 000 Euro per inhabitant while Ruhr and Porto productivity rates are, respectively, in the magnitude of 37.000 and 20.000.⁷⁷³

This model of a three stages of development is also supported by Portas, Domingues and Cabral (2003, pp. 16–17).⁷⁷⁴ They consider the specificity of Portuguese continental urbanisation to be the overlap between the transition from industrial into a services-based economy and the fragmentation and diversification of layouts of the third stage (pp. 16–17).⁷⁷⁵

6.4.1.2 ... acted by actors...

Portas, Domingues and Cabral (2003) interrelate the materiality of space with the plural logics of small and medium economic actors. They pinpoint how the actors adapt to the new organisation of production, in particular distribution and consumption, making the conurbation through re-shaped programs (retail, and leisure functions) or new ones (business centres, logistic platforms, science and technology centres) (p. 39). Locating these objects in tangent to the highway infrastructure, economic actors affect the location of jobs and reinforce car-dependent mobility (p. 39).⁷⁷⁶ Real estate developers also seize the demand for residential preference in the “extensive urban”, namely through the construction of mono-functional residential area (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, pp. 44, 46)⁷⁷⁷. The materiality of this process assembles industrial logics and historically nuclear fabrics, and combines the extension along the road axes with dispersion adjacent to secondary and tertiary mobility networks. This built fabric is permeated by fragments of agricultural, forestall or abandoned plots of non-constructed areas (p. 47).⁷⁷⁸ Despite the impressive (visual and experiential) mark of these deconcentrating spatialities, the economic dimension based on service activities is restricted to a central pole (Porto, Matosinhos, parts of Maia and Vila Nova de Gaia)⁷⁷⁹ and to network of nodes of higher urbanity (or its potential) associated with “consolidated cities” (Espinho, Santa Maria da Feira, Póvoa de Varzim) (Sá, Portas, & Domingues, 2009, p. 10). It is the fabric of secondary productive activities that characterises the areas of lower density (Santa Maria da Feira and Oliveira de Azeméis, to the south of Porto; part of Matosinhos and Maia, to the north; Santo Tirso, Trofa, Paços de Ferreira, to the northeast of the central pole) (p. 10). There is intense land consumption for industrial use in Matosinhos and Maia⁷⁸⁰, which are part of the urban pole. Within the category of heavy infrastructure with high potential of increases in urbanity, are also located in the area:

⁷⁷³ Source: Citybench, Espo 2016 (<http://citybench.espon.eu/citybenchwebclient/#>).

⁷⁷⁴ The first urban explosion of the “inherited city” is linked to the transition to industrial societies. The transition from the latter into a services-based economy configured mature metropolises already with individual and collective models of mobility but keeping and reinforcing the monocentric model. From mid 1990s to present takes place the conglomerating phenomenon (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, pp. 16–17).

⁷⁷⁵ “O território continental português não escapa às tensões da terceira onda de urbanização. Como noutros países de desenvolvimento retardado e Estado-Providência incipiente, sentiu tarde as duas primeiras e, com a abertura ao exterior, a terceira veio sobrepor-se-lhe sem lhe dar tempo para perceber as diferenças: mal terminavam os grandes (mas poucos) bairros sociais e ainda se tratavam muitos ditos de “gênese ilegal”, e já estavam as auto-estradas, as actividades logísticas, os *shoppings* e multiplex, os parques temáticos, golfes, condomínios, etc. a colonizar os hinterlands entre cidades; formando novas centralidades *ad hoc* e vias rápidas urbanas, à mistura com as salvaguardas dos centros históricos e reservas ecológicas.” (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, pp. 16–17).

⁷⁷⁶ During the *terrain* I could understand that collective transport in the suburbs is operated by private companies and is more expensive than more central public mobility. Private busses are not coordinated with public mobility networks.

⁷⁷⁷ “...all these areas have been densified based on an intense process of diffuse rural industrialization, which, in the most significant case of the *Médio Ave*, dates back to the mid-nineteenth century with the textile and clothing industry. It is a territory where most of the population and employment is located “between cities”, mixing types of urbanization relatively known: linear densification along national and municipal roads; reinforce of old “towns”...; nucleation in strategic points of the road network (the case of Trofa recently elevated to municipality), and, a little everywhere, densification of a type of rural settlement historically scattered in the valleys and a half-slope ... and administratively cut by parishes of small size.” (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, p. 46). (My translation from the Portuguese original version).

⁷⁷⁸ The mode of agricultural exploitation of the northern region was based on the “minifúndio” which is a small scale family-based mode of production.

⁷⁷⁹ These observations are based on an ensemble of maps produced by Portas, Domingues and Cabral as part of the *Plano regional de ordenamento do território do Norte (PROT-NORTE). Relatório Síntese - Modelo Territorial* (2009).

⁷⁸⁰ Land consumption for industrial use represents 14,03% of the surface of Matosinhos and 9,25% of the municipality of Maia, , corresponding to the international port, *Porto de Leixões*, a petrol refinery and the international airport (gestluz & inpublic, 2008, p. 27).

the International airport (*Aeroporto Francisco Sá Carneiro*) and the recent passengers port (*Terminal de Cruzeiros do Porto de Leixões*).

The hyper-centre of Porto has been hindered in the conglomerating process and many actors chose or felt coerced to leave this place of residence for the *banlieues*.⁷⁸¹ From the opinion circulating in society (and from the observation of the city) it is possible to advance many reasons for this spatiality. I can point the choice of young families to build a new house in proximity to the progenitors in previously “rural areas” (in some cases, the property is owned by the family). This strategy can respond to economic viability and/or affective attachment to place.⁷⁸² The project of property ownership and certain housing typology, fuelled by access to credit and private mobility is a part of the European explanation of peri-urbanisation and also present in metropolitan Porto. The absence of an affordable and dynamic rental market in the hyper-centre, and material decay of the residential fabric (considered by many as below acceptable living standards) pushes out those who would have preferred to remain in the central geotype. This scenario includes relocation in social housing estates, predominantly in less dense and diverse places. These movements are experienced as unfreedoms. This feeling may translate urban-*philia* (recognising the spatial qualities of place) or the distress provoked by the discontinuity of a communitarian model of affective attachment with place of origin.⁷⁸³ Voluntary relocation in market or social “collective housing” is also seen by some as an opportunity to live in anonymity. Symbolic factors – being part of people with “another culture” – seem to matter in part of the reasoning of residential choice that I could contact. Objective motivations for residential de-centralisation in association with job location in the dispersed arrangement described above are also reasonable explanations.

6.4.1.3 ... with a detrimental impact in the hyper-centre.

At the moment of Porto application to world heritage in 2008, 36% of the buildings in the historic centre were nearing ruin (Loza, Guimarães, & Moura, 2008).⁷⁸⁴ A deteriorated built fabric, a deserted city after the evening departure of commuters, a public space saturated by car presence characterise the hyper-centre at the end of the first decade of this century. To tackle the necessity of public intervention in urban regeneration and the rental market, the *Assembleia da República* approves the creation of *sociedades de reabilitação urbana* in 2007. The assembly also changes the urban rental law in 2008 and mobilises fiscal incentives (Alves, Pereira, & Rafeiro, 2015, pp. 237–238). None of these measures produced the desired dynamism, with the few results being the work of institutional actors. By 2010 the situation had not changed, despite the impact of reduced access to credit and the role of family debt in increasing the demand for rented housing. The lack of confidence of the proprietors in the tenants has been pointed as a reason for the blocked rental market. Lengthy eviction processes and weak capacity to enforce contracts demotivate property owners from responding to the demand.⁷⁸⁵ More recent measures restated financial support, abbreviate eviction processes, simplify the administrative procedure of rehabilitation projects, and give access to credit and direct European funding. These proposals targeted housing degradation and the construction market but did not intend to challenge the imaginary of access to housing property. The measures added by Troika in the context of the Memorandum of Understanding (2011) changed the orientation of these policies to the objective of

⁷⁸¹ The evolution of the population of Porto and its *banlieues* has symmetric signals since the 1960s (Chatel, 2012, p. 580).

⁷⁸² The self-constructed aesthetic of many houses supports the first observation, the second appears in our corpus.

⁷⁸³ In this passage I am making use of the residential choice of my acquaintances as well as the Miragaia case study (see section 6.5 of chapter 6).

⁷⁸⁴ The justification for building decay that circulates in public opinion attributes it to the policy of frozen “rents”. The diagnosis underpinning recent policies attempting to make the rental market more dynamic indicates that situations of low rents are at present insignificant (Alves, Pereira, & Rafeiro, 2015).

⁷⁸⁵ Alves, Pereira, & Rafeiro point to an inter-ministry study (Alves, Pereira, & Rafeiro, 2015, pp. 237–238).

transforming the modality of housing access to the rental market.⁷⁸⁶ Troika also planned for the gradual lifting of controlled rents.⁷⁸⁷

6.4.1.4 Public space

Many small and big economic actors have recently directed their intentionality to invest in the city, co-producing an increase of urbanity. Big economic operators such as Ryanair and EasyJet, have opened low cost flight bases in the airport *Francisco Sá Carneiro*. The Ryanair service, launched in 2005, has expanded in 2009 to include sixteen destinations, just as Porto entered the list of World heritage sites. Today it directly connects Porto to thirty six European cities.⁷⁸⁸ Even if circumscribed to the *Baixa*, the environment has today a different tonality than it did ten years ago. Ground floors, which had been closed off from the street with retail bankruptcy or shopping centre relocation, are reactivated. Diverse retail, restauration and hostels, but also the vitrines of “creative industries”, give signs of this inflection. Many of these spatialities choose *o Porto dos Almadás*, counting on a network of material support of public space: piazzas, streets and small gardens.⁷⁸⁹ This support was initially constructed through one of the first European “embellishment plans” and it has been recently reinvested as part of the project of Porto European Capital of Culture 2001. Nightlife returns to the hyper-centre, after having shifted from the historic centre to ex-industrial buildings bordering the first ring road of Porto (Via de Cintura Interna, VCI). The temporary density and social diversity associated with night-life is perceived by some to conflict with residential use. It is heavily fed by private mobility, with piazzas and sidewalks converted into car parking. Fluxes seem to have origin in the suburbs or beyond, and indicate a certain valorisation of high urbanity for at least part of the residents in these geotypes. Day time public space has denser and more diverse users, together with long-installed spatialities of card playing in non-mixed public space (in terms of gender and age). Tourists co-inhabit with the *intime* use of many spaces. At times, the desired normativity is imprinted in space with written prescriptions. The beaches also seem to be in transition from local group ownership to metropolitan public space. The *Parque da Cidade* is used by diverse groups, receiving part of the “picnic” spatiality which used to be exclusively suburban and periurban practises (*Pinhal*).

Agencements such as cultural festivals and parties,⁷⁹⁰ sports manifestations and events (watching football games has become a public practice) and *São João* (the popular party honouring the patron saint of the city) are feeble indicators of the capacity of coexistence of the metropolitan society. They draw an impressive part of the society to the hyper-centre and have constructed specific civilities, responding to the contact of this heightening of social diversity and density. In *São João*, the custom is to hit the head of other co-inhabitant with a screechy plastic hammer and to make them smell giant garlics. The streets are invaded with tables, chairs and charcoal barbeques for grilling sardines. Loud music, concerts and balls take place in small piazzas and terraces. The organisation of the party is acted differently in distinct zones of the city. Despite some neighbourhood involvement, the balls can be the targeted to specific “publics”, for example the gay community. Some inhabitants contacted in the *terrain* of Miragaia experience the gay

⁷⁸⁶ They include increase in property taxes (Imposto Municipal sobre Imóveis (IMI)), penalisations for buildings kept vacant and burdens on new indebteding for the purpose of housing acquisition.

⁷⁸⁷ This measure had not been enacted in 2015. The effects of the policy on the economically most fragile populations is unknown. Alves, Pereira and Rafeiro raise suspicion on the capacity of the demand to absorb the cost of rents (Alves, Pereira, & Rafeiro, 2015, p. 258).

⁷⁸⁸ Dublin, Liverpool, Stansted, Lübeck, Bremen, Dortmund, Hahn, Weeze, Baden-Baden, Nuremberg, Memmingen, Bergamo, Bolonha, Roma, Eindhoven, Maastricht, Bruxelas, Charleroi, Lille, Beauvais, Vetry (Disneyland), Estrasburgo, Tours, Dole, La Rochelle, Bordéus, Marselha, Carcassone, Clermont-Ferrand, Saint Etienne, Barcelona, Palma de Maiorca, Valência, Madrid, Tenerife, Gran Canaria, and Faro.

⁷⁸⁹ The Almadás were two urbanists confided by the king D. José I with the mission of setting the structure of Porto public space outside the medieval wall. Converting the tax on Port Wine trading with England (*Companhia Geral das Vinhas do Alto Douro*), the “embellishment plan” (1760-1840) opened new arteries, piazzas and gardens; invested on public buildings (including the first Cristal Pallace); and installed systems of public tram, public lightening, and water infrastructure. The Almadás set up the first layer of what is today the hyper-centre of Porto metropolitan area. This experience makes use of Lisbon’s lessons when reconstructing the *Baixa Pombalina* after the earthquake of 1755 (for example, through instruments of land expropriation). The bridge that connects the municipalities of Porto and Gaia is also from this epoch, as are the train lines to Póvoa de Varzim, and Douro e Minho.

⁷⁹⁰ An impressive case is the 40 hours “open house” of the contemporary art museum of the city (Fundação de Serralves). *Serralves em Festa* takes place once a year. The last edition of June 2016 attracted 161.244 visitors.

frequenting of the neighbourhood ball with pride, making a point of communicating their capacity to “accept” this social group and his temporary inhabiting of “their neighbourhood”.⁷⁹¹ Despite being invested by groups, the party is marked by their permeability. *São João* is an arrangement with potential to bring-together non-communicating groups during the rest of the year and upgrade their visibility of society. Collaboration of unknown persons in the launching of paper hot balloons is a momentarily heightening of the *sociétalité* of Porto.

6.4.1.5 The object of institutional planning

Against popular representation, the conglomeration of Porto is not due to the late enactment of the planning system nor (at least not exclusively) the contouring of its force. As noted by Campos and Ferrão (2015), the beginning of Portuguese institutional spatial thought goes back to the middle of the nineteenth century and the planning praxis is in force before the major period of urban expansion (p. 8). The authors’ genealogy of Portuguese territorial planning helps us to see a number of characteristics which may be explicative of our empirical object. They portray the difficult embedment of urbanistic reasoning, taking decades before it could discipline edification and urban development (p. 8). The privatistic culture of property ownership, the strength of real estate interests and the absence of an imaginary of the city as collective construction are also noted in different moments of that history. A strong tradition of centralism is responsible for a deficient articulation of scales and for sectorial public works. The dichotomist conception of rural-city (low and high urbanity) produced separate laws, distinct professional bodies and dual government organisms, each of which responsible for either “environmental” sites or the city.⁷⁹² This made the intermediate degree of urbanity, which were not covered by these two institutions, exempt from spatial political intentionality, at a time when urban areas were responding to the rural exodus of the 1950s and 1960s. It is only in 2005 that urbanism and environment are brought together under the same ministry, though keeping the traditional asymmetry of the policies, reinforced through the different binding statuses of the European plans.

In 1982, the figure of the *Plano Director Municipal* (PDM) is introduced (pp. 13–14). It reflects the decentralisation precept that accompanied the change from authoritarian regime to democracy after the revolution in April 1974. The PDM recognises the role of the municipalities in promoting urbanistic regulation and social and economic development (p. 14). It proposes an integrated view of the territory at the scale of the municipality, including an array of degrees of urbanity among which “rural areas” (until then “urbanised” by private actors only).⁷⁹³ The PDMs are generalised in the 1990s and become a condition for accessing European funding.⁷⁹⁴ These plans, based on land use, are “regulatory instruments” with little strategic vision.⁷⁹⁵ They favour urban expansion when there were signs of demographic decline, degradation of central areas of urban agglomerations, and negative environmental impact

⁷⁹¹ While some sociologists proclaim the death of the freguesias in Porto historical centre as places of cohesive sociability, (Pereira, 1994; Pinto & Pereira, 2011; Pereira, 2011), local residents express the desire for animation, in parallel with the longing for the past (where, we know, identity, values, and conduct in space were coherent inside the neighbourhood).

⁷⁹² Since mid-nineteenth century and until the end of the years 1990s, spatial policy is organised in a dichotomist structure of governmental responsibilities, fed by (and consolidating) distinct disciplinary and professional cultures. The institutionalisation of what would become the “environmental” arm of spatial development begins with the *Política Agrícola e Florestal*, approved in 1864 (Campos & Ferrão, 2015, p. 8). Initially the domain of agronomy engineering and silviculture, it comes to include landscape architects in the beginning of the twentieth century and, more recently, the bio-physics. This arm is occupied with zero or low urbanity levels. The urbanistic arm, starting with the promulgation of the *Política Urbanística*, also in 1864, is from the outset dedicated to higher level urbanity, in particular the “city centres”. Initially influenced by the professional bodies of architects and civil engineers, it integrates the social sciences later in the twentieth century (p. 24). In 1965, unregulated private initiative by land owners and real estate promoters is sanctioned by the *Operações de loteamento urbano*. This figure allowed for plots falling outside the jurisprudence of municipalities (which were interdicted by the central state to regulate non-urban land) to be planned and developed by constructors (p. 10).

⁷⁹³ Decreto-Lei n.º 208/82, de 26 de Maio.

⁷⁹⁴ In this decade the PDM are made compulsory to all municipalities after having been initially required only for Lisbon and Porto.

⁷⁹⁵ They also had little influence on the constructed typology (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, p. 77).

from previous dispersion.⁷⁹⁶ Through this feeble political objects, a utilitarian model of low constraint on individual liberty was re-asserted.

Except for the debate on the PDM,⁷⁹⁷ institutional spatial policy is marked by the lack of democratic opening which did not favour the emergence of a debate on habitat. The absence of an explicitly discussed spatial project leaves unchecked the ethical values commanding decision-making. The promulgated norms were, until present, unable to articulate individual spatial freedom with a dynamic avoiding destructive logics, which is particularly visible in the hyper-centre. The European umbrella of the concept of “territorial cohesion”⁷⁹⁸ legitimises the hesitation between contradictory strategies and models of inhabiting while financing its actualisation. In this context, Porto urban society evolves for decades without reflecting on how the systemic requirements of the city ought to raise some constraints on the spatial choices of the actors.

6.4.1.6 Europe as an actor

Since 1986 Portugal participates in the non-binding creation of a European spatial project.⁷⁹⁹ That scheme imagines dynamic, attractive and competitive cities as well as the “endogenous development” of diverse rural areas. The partnership “city-countryside” is valued together with the efficient use of infrastructure and resources (Ferrão, 2010, p. 81).⁸⁰⁰ The channelling of European funding, managed by the Portuguese state until 2000, oscillates between logics of efficiency and of “equity” (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, p. 87). Traditional sectors (housing, education and health) but also new investment sectors (culture, leisure, young and elderly population support) are co-participated investments (p. 87), constructing networks that try to counteract the impossibility of ubiquity. Many of these objects are under-used (pp. 88–89) and their location reveals the absence of inter- or supra-municipal coordination. Since 2011, the reduction of public expenditure implied in the Memorandum of Understanding has entailed a revision of many of these networks. Health services, schools, post office, court rooms, are all revised in a short period of time.⁸⁰¹

Efforts of “territorial equity” (in the sense of liberal Harvey) meant the construction of thousands of kilometres of road and water infrastructure in that period.⁸⁰² The massive investment in the high speed road network (part of the national sectorial planning) has been thought of with some independence from existing centralities and the new knots have stimulated new urbanisation (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, p. 72). Such neutralising of the cost of distance relies on private mobility while public local mobility faces the difficulties of such expansion. Territorial cohesion is here translated as the entitlement to certain spatial objects independently from their public cost and from the evaluation of the legitimacy of the urbanistic process giving rise to such spatial expectation. The third framework of European support (2007-2014) operates a spatial turn, as the regions are now responsible for part of

⁷⁹⁶ The first generation of plans of municipal planning was permissive of abundant and disperse new construction associated to private initiative within the limits of each property (Oliveira, 2007-2008).

⁷⁹⁷ The PDM is subject to “public discussion”, though the extent of actual participation is questionable. In any case, the plan’s municipal scale precludes the questions of urbanity models to emerge in their most contradictory facets. Infra-societal are also recent initiatives of participatory budget. For example, Cascais (a municipality of the metropolitan area of Lisbon) destined, in 2011, 1, 5 million euro to be assigned by the *municípios*, restricting the amount of each project to 300.000 euro.

⁷⁹⁸ Evrard, Schulz, and Nienaber (2015) provide some references to the debate on the concept of territorial cohesion and its ambiguity.

⁷⁹⁹ The first product of this project is the *Esquema de desenvolvimento do espaço europeu*, by the European Commission, in 1999.

⁸⁰⁰ For the European scale, the objective is that of a network of multiple poles, counteracting the centre-periphery, and passing by transnational infrastructure networks.

⁸⁰¹ The urgency of the matters does not seize the occasion for public debate on spatial models. Another revision of the memorandum is the redefinition of the local administrative territory (fusion of *freguesias*).

⁸⁰² With the second developmental framework Portugal builds 7.129 Km of road and 3.587 km of water distribution (Source: <http://www.ifdr.pt/content.aspx?list=1&menuid=221>). The *terrain* of this project shows that the infrastructural response includes residents contributing with professional work or through the provision of material resources, extracting it from economic societal production. As of 2012, there is resistance of part of the population to connect to the public network (according to the directors of the urbanism of the municipalities of Trofa and Santo Tirso).

the operational plan, and the urban becomes a central object.⁸⁰³ This change in the political scale directs the investment to public mobility – the metro of Porto – and public space. The Douro river sides and the ocean front are invested with extensive networks of material support to public space. Some of them are highly successful but the dispersion makes the exploitation of their full potential – through diverse social contact – difficult. The value of small and medium sized towns is still manifest in this development framework.⁸⁰⁴

6.4.1.7 The non-discussed urban scale

We have seen that the constitution of spatial planning, its empirical objects and political architecture, have made the periurban geotype a dead angle of policy. Public works of national tutelage remained until recently centralist and closed to inter-sectorial dialogue and to external scrutiny.⁸⁰⁵ The scale of the functional urban area has been absent from the process. Attempts at inter-municipal frameworks were inconclusive in the sixties and the model of technocratic and centralised governing of urban processes prevails until the 1980s when the autonomy of municipalities took over (Campos & Ferrão, 2015, p. 11). The metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto are created in 1991 as a collective person of public right, constituting “a specific form of association of the municipalities of the territorial units”.⁸⁰⁶ The *Área Metropolitana do Porto* (AMP) is composed of a metropolitan council (deliberative), an executive commission and a strategic council for metropolitan development (a consulting body). Its mission is presented as the elaboration of a public plan for the territory and the coordination of public policies of the municipalities. The metropolitan council is composed by the presidents of the municipalities – without a direct election – which expresses the ambiguous engagement in a supra-municipal joint political venture (AMP, 2016).⁸⁰⁷ In the list of the AMP competences there is no reference to objectives of citizenship participation. In the absence of a political space at the urban scale, the municipal strategy often in comprises competition between municipalities (rather than cooperation).⁸⁰⁸ Visible to both public opinion and expert diagnosis is the “trade-off” between Porto and Vila Nova de Gaia:

"[Gaia] receives the people who left Porto and seek new ways of living, among other [things, they seek] the proximity to the beach and the quality of public space. Cheaper land for people who build and who want access to property, good accessibility.... New ways of living. I insist. Single family housing ... Young families seek that at the level of the coast." (Simões, 2012).⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰³ In the 1980s, regional commissions (*Comissão de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional* (CCDR)) are created to receive part of the competences of the regional directions of the national urbanistic planning agency (renamed *Direção Geral do Planeamento Urbanístico* in 1976) (Campos & Ferrão, 2015, p. 15).

⁸⁰⁴ Valuing medium cities outside metropolitan areas has been a priority since the second framework for European support (1994-1999). The POLIS program (2000) invests in the urban requalification and “environmental” valorisation of the city centres of about 30 medium and small cities (Campos & Ferrão, 2015, p. 26). The plan is relaunched in 2007 as part of the framework 2007-2014 and includes the axis of inter-urban requalification as well as networks of cooperation directed to competitiveness and internationalisation (together with the rural-urban integration) (p. 26).

⁸⁰⁵ “The interventions of the Central State, although strongly structuring, but too sectorial, overlap (with different degrees of coherence) to summations of municipal policies, with rarely consensual interventions at metropolitan level or decentred tutelage from Central State.” (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, p. 39). They authors add that the lack of multi-scale evaluation is characteristic of public intervention, but not of private actors (who think the micro and the macro together).

⁸⁰⁶ The initial nucleus of the Metropolitan Area of Porto (AMP) included Gondomar, Maia, Matosinhos, Porto, Póvoa de Varzim, Valongo, Vila do Conde e Vila Nova de Gaia (lei n.º 44/91). The last two alterations to the legal status of the AMP are from 2008 (Lei n.º 46/2008, de 27 de Agosto) and 2013 (Lei n.º 75/2013, de 12 de Setembro). The current definition of the AMP brings together seventeen contiguous municipalities: Póvoa de Varzim, Vila do Conde, Trofa, Santo Tirso, Maia, Matosinhos, Valongo, Porto, Paredes, Gondomar, Vila Nova de Gaia, Espinho, Santa Maria da Feira, Arouca, São João da Madeira, Oliveira de Azeméis and Vale de Cambra.

⁸⁰⁷ Interview conducted in 2012 with the heads of urban department of the municipalities of Maia, Trofa, Vila Nova de Gaia, Santo Tirso and Gondomar indicate that urbanism is still dominated by concerns of each of the infra-societal units, though in some cases there is ambiguity.

⁸⁰⁸ For example, local competition between municipalities is exercised by waiving the municipalities’ entitlement to the *Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas Singulares* (IRS).

⁸⁰⁹ “[Gaia] recebe população que saiu do Porto e que procuram [sic.] novas formas de habitar, entre outras a proximidade com a praia e a qualidade do espaço público. Território mais barato para quem constrói e depois para quem acede à propriedade, a boa acessibilidade. ... Novas formas de habitar. Insisto. Habitação unifamiliar.... As famílias mais recentes procuram isso, ao nível da costa.” (Simões, 2012). The interviewee goes on to

6.4.2 Non-verbal description




Figure 10 Mobility in the northern region of Portugal. Part of population travelling to work or study outside the municipality of residence (in percentage). Sources: Census 2011.

explore what he sees as a Portuguese pattern of inhabiting, of lesser density. He thinks one should question, but not contradict just for the sake of contradicting: "People have reason in what they look for." (Simões, 2012).




Figure 11 Area of sty and land cost. For the definition of the area of study see annex A.




Figure 12 Area of study and distribution of high educational capital.

CONNECTING SPACE AND JUSTICE IN METROPOLITAN PORTO



Figure 13 Diagram of distribution of high educational capital.

6.5 Narrative

This text was the first element I wrote as part of the thesis manuscript. It has not been edited to reflect the developments during the writing process. There are some dissonances with regard to the final thesis defended in the rest of the manuscript. Within the scope we attribute to this text, this gap is also an information. The text starts with biographic aspects that I perceive to determine the motivation to construct this research object. I then present the professional experiences which counted in the solidification of my motivation, leading to the application to the doctoral program Architecture and Sciences of the City (EDAR). Segments 6.5.3 to 6.5.6, tell the story of learning how to do social science of space by doing.



Figure 14 Sequence of research activities and acquisitions vis-à-vis the structure of the dissertation. On the left we can see the diachronic development of the research project while the synchronic structure of the dissertation is shown on the right. The arrows indicate how the realisations in each stage influenced and integrated the coherence of the ensemble.



Figure 15 Diagram of research activities, planned for in the initial research project, entitled “Which ideas of spatial justice do individuals conceive of as they construct their urban practice?” (Póvoas, 2011).

6.5.1 The anticipation of ethics

In the milieu where I grew up, it was uncommon not to be subjected to catholic education via parents’ intentionality. Among my playmates, many of whom were cousins, my sister and I were often the only atheists. In public school, and before puberty, only two or three classmates were not frequenting the facultative discipline of Catholic Religious and Moral Education. My mother Isabel could liberate herself from religion through observation, concluding from her catholic school experience, that believers do not held superior virtue. Often, it was quite the contrary... From this revolution, she remained however attached to moral principles. Isabel’s choice to hold on to moral values was, at least partially, affected by spatial capital. She narrates experiencing distress when she first moved to Porto from a small town in Douro e Litoral, alone, at the age of 14 years old. She described the pains of appearing in public spaces where she thought herself inferior to others, perhaps provincial. With the death of her father soon after, Isabel

decided to immobilise the values she had received from him and she hold this promise throughout until today. She met many difficulties in living by the standards of a dear person born in the late nineteenth century. My observation of her adult life's obbeyance of moral principles, pushed me to look for an alternative for my own ethical conduct. This partially explains my wholehearted adherence to the division of the spectrum of the ethos into two different modalities of relationship with the world and with oneself.

I have then been educated without a catholic referent but with vivid moral values. I was taught to think freely (but not to exchange freely on what one thinks); to think honestly (but to act in such a manner that it is clear to others that my intentions are honest); to give and share with others (but not to ask them how they want to be helped). Through the practice of charity, which it was lived as pleasurable, I was sensitised to inequality and developed a sense of responsibility for the poor. The contortionisms that resulted from these ambivalences have fed personal questioning on many planes. Eventually, I was able to start moving from an epoch of morality to one of ethics, though in many regards, and in many circumstances, I am caught up by old representations, which at times transpire in my scientific writing. The transition of my space *idéel* from morality to ethics is not fully achieved, as some recent episodes of the story narrated below show. Perfectionism, which sustains much of this research, can indeed be seen as the incapacity of arbitration and insufficient self-determination of the compliant virtuous Christian moral person.

My personal experience is also important to explain my valuing of individual freedom above group identity. I grew up in a family valuing blood ties, with strong obligations within the family and gravitating individuals. I have struggled greatly with this communitarian background, though I was certainly too libertarian, as any child learning to co-exist. My many experiences outside this context supported my discovery of the ethical route in fabricating one's room for freedom, compatible with responsibility. As I realise the contributions of contacting other modes of (social) being to this process of personal determination, I cannot possibly agree with political measures sustained to intentionally deprive other children, teenagers and young adults from these multiple sources of identity. This is the affective-objective basis of my critique to infra-societal theories of justice, based on identity and cultural protection. This is not to say that affective connections and family bounds are not valuable and kept, but they should, I believe, result from a reiterated choice of both parts, based on communication rather than self-evidence.

6.5.2 Autumn 2008 – September 2010

6.5.2.1 Porto, architectural studies

The second experience relevant to understand the present research project concerns my master in architecture, at the Faculty of Architecture of Porto. The master's object was my own architectural studies and it constituted the first construction of reflective distance with regard to the expectations I had on space (Póvoas, 2006). Encouraged by my master's director, Architect Manuel Mendes,⁸¹⁰ I took seriously my own questioning on the aesthetic and ethical responsibility of architects. I constructed an ensemble of conceptual couples⁸¹¹ with which I revisited my productions of the previous five years of work (formal texts, journals, drawings and design projects). That conceptual apparatus, appropriating readings on philosophy (Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Guattari), phenomenology and theory of perception (Gaston Bachelard, António Damásio), anthropology (Marc Augé) and architecture theory (Juan Navarro Baldeweg, Philippe Boudon, Georges Teyssot, and Ignasi de Solà-Morales) was somewhat inadequate for the task and still metaphorical in the treatment of space. However, it was foundational of important realisations, however

⁸¹⁰ The professor encouragement was relevant in a context which was not particularly inviting of that kind of approach. It should be noted the strong disciplinary focus of the School of Porto: offering some windows for reflective opportunities and artistic self-development, these enter in tension with the absolute priority required by project design (immense workload resulted from the mimetics of professional practice) and the school's commitment to sensitising students to the particular aesthetic of the work of Álvaro Siza Vieira. These comments do not include to teaching on urbanism. Being approached mainly in the fifth year of studies I did not directly experience the approach to urban planning as I was in mobility under the Erasmus, in the Università degli Studi de Ferrara, Italy.

⁸¹¹ Space more abstract than concrete/space offered to the experience; architectonic space/architectural space", *espace du dedans/espace du dehors, espace lisse/espace strié*.

convoluted in their formulation. These would converge into four possibilities for the pursuit of my personal investment in space. I designated those options as variants of an enlarged definition of architecture, metaphorically named as houses: 1) theory of architecture (*House-ideas, Architecture of thought*⁸¹²), 2) design of architecture (*House-house: architecture-building*), 3) artistic spatial projects (*House-Person. Other Architecture*), and 4) urbanism/social Science (in-between *House-house* and *House-Person. Urban project*).

The first two “houses” were rejected, as they relied on presuppositions that did not convince me, as in the problem of indeterminacy of architectural meaning in the face of aesthetic openness to the subjective experience of others. I distanced myself from much of theory of architecture, seen as the projection of erudite ideas into architectural space with insufficient empirical tension. I also got disinterested by design even if the master concluded on the right to pursue architecture as an artistic practice of creation of architectural spaces, with lesser theoretical pretensions. The third possibility brought forward my interest for thought and self-awareness amongst the inhabitants of a place, sketching the existence of what is called, in this dissertation, the *sphère idéal* of space. This sphere was then conceived as the expectation to interfere with individuals’ mental processes through interactions happening in space. Summering my previous intellectual discoveries, in the PhD motivation letter, I wrote:

“If these authors helped me to visualise a contemporary mode of being which does not subjugate self to external forces of massive homogenization, and cultivates freedom as a mental capacity, they also broke the bond to physical space. Theoretically, the space of the virtual, understood as the space of what can possibly be conceived, made physical space redundant.” Application to EDAR, April 2010.

The interest in co-presence was now explored in the form of public space ambiance that I thought to intensify the possibility of encounter. This evolved from initial explorations of design-based support to encounters in buildings (in the line of phenomenological approaches of Herzberger, Christoph Alexandre or Aldo van Eyck). The new formulation was closer to the idea of a curatorial urbanism of events and their material (ephemeral) support,⁸¹³ (inspired by artist such as Diller and Scofidio). Later I would find the opportunity to explore this perspective in the context of *Manobras no Porto*,⁸¹⁴ which would be determinant in fixing the *terrain* of this research.

Having been inspired by Le Corbusier’s endeavour to assign architecture with self and life enhancement qualities, liberate and inspire through beauty and harmony, I had quite a distance to trail before I could qualify what I then called “humanistic vitality” as illusory statements. The influence of space in society had to be looked for elsewhere. Readings on Foucault (1966/2005; 1986/2001) introduced me to a mode of subjectivity that did not preclude the study of commonalities. They opened up a *chantier* of another mode of rationality, where it seemed possible to bypass the focus on my own individuality and contact contemporaneity. I could then articulate my inclination for the *sphère idéal* of space, and the pursuit of a new connectedness with empirics:

“The personal narrative of the inhabitants, with all their permutations of image and word, became points of access into inner perceptions of reality, framed by life, self and place.” Application to EDAR, April 2010.

⁸¹² I would name this rejected *chantier* “House-ideas, Architecture of thought”, alluding to the constructed character of the communication of an architectural message. It was not an efficient use of the word “ideas” for the ideal sphere was much more present in what I called “House-person, Architecture other”.

⁸¹³ Spinning from a workshop with Jean Philippe Vassal, I would test this idea by building an installation of suspended trees over an often desert piazza, as a call of attention to this available yet underused public space. The brevity of the effects of the project, and the trade-off of length of the stimuli vis-à-vis time of investment, were rather unconvincing.

⁸¹⁴ The festival was the specific response to regional policy prescribing the creation of favourable conditions to the emergence of a Cluster of Creative Industries in the North of Portugal (defined by the Strategic National Framework for the North of Portugal 2004-2013 in “O Novo Norte Programa Operacional Regional do Norte”). With Ana Pedrosa and Carlos Martins, I was an informal element of initial brainstorming exchanges regarding the nature of the festival. I would not integrate the formal committee group, which was significantly enlarged to contributors from Porto artistic and scientific community. Instead, I applied with José Roseira to the open call for artistic projects, with the scope of directly experiencing a participatory two years project: Miragaia.

I identified urbanism with this objective of increased rationality. Attached to the resolution of pressing problems, it emerged as a field that requires study so that a common ethics is possible. Urbanism concretised the rejection of architectural reverie, the decision to give a worldly direction to knowledge and enticed a relationship between the space *idéel* of the individual and the environment:

“Essa questão remete para a precisão de um entendimento de urbanismo, que não se está em grau de expor. Mas percebe-se uma inclinação por entre as possibilidades de escala, de nível de proximidade e distância com os lugares, e com o tempo. Estará a considerar-se mais o “projecto urbano” e menos o urbanismo “tradicional” de feitura de planos. Mas mesmo nesse último - ao ausentar-se desse contacto directo, na concepção do pensamento distante - se prefigura facilmente a manutenção da paixão (de novo ideal) do efeito de transformação/melhoramento. A ligação das práticas de melhoria da “casa-casa” com desejo de oferta à “casa-pessoa” passam pela facilitação de atingimento de condições de liberdade com a redução das exigências que o meio requer ao corpo e à mente para que se adaptem e - por mais que essa prática da casa-pessoa passe pela ideia de liberdade como independente do espaço concreto e (ainda independente, mas mais dificilmente) do espaço social e económico - não pode escusar-se a denúncia, e trabalhe as limitações objectivas que existem onde devia acontecer a fruição dos direitos.” (Póvoas, 2006).

Despite a rather hermetic tone the master’s written work presented signs of a rupture between “the good, the beautiful and the just” (Lévy, 2016). We can observe the germ of the present research: the societal transformative potential of space, the empiric object of the city in relation to the *sphere idéel* of the individual-society, and the need for an objective knowledge construction anchored in the epistemology of social science.

6.5.2.2 London, master planning and antagonistic voices

The definite choice of abandoning architecture for urbanism would lead me to applications for graduate studies in the United States. After a failed attempt at pursuing urban planning studies in the USA,⁸¹⁵ the accessible experience was to work as a “master planner” in a London-based firm.

I integrated teams answering to large multinational stakeholders and worked on urban places, mainly in the United Kingdom. This expanded the contact with empirics where I detected three dialogical problems: insufficiently democratic processes,⁸¹⁶ a reductionist conception of space, excessively focused on design and anchored on a dominant notion of authorship; and the lack of a legitimising theoretical framework for decision making. Indeed, I felt powerless in crafting an opportunity for a socially minded agenda... in the face of a client-led brief and in the dialogue with efficiency arguments led by technical experts (for example, traffic modelling and market studies). I was also aware that, should I be able to decide without those constraints, I would immerse in uncertainty.

“If a private investment claims to benefit local businesses, how do the latter need to change, perhaps losing their identity, to adjust to new competitors? If social housing is proposed, how does that equip the deprived groups to overcome their social exclusion? If enlivening and thriving atmospheres are to be created, what is the degree of artificiality vs. genuineness in the social habits and lifestyles that are being fostered? If an area is to become more secure or efficient, which informality and expressions of diversity are to be eliminated?” Application to EDAR, April 2010.

If these interrogations transpire that I held spatial ontological immutable values (making some of these questions rhetorical)⁸¹⁷, they also defied *spatialism* of urban regeneration.

During this period I was living in London, exposed to its enormous intellectual resources. Through “Architects without Borders UK” I briefly explored the routes of participatory design in development contexts (Salvador da Bahia, Brazil).

⁸¹⁵ I saw applications to graduate studies rejected in Columbia, UCLA, and Pennsylvania.

⁸¹⁶ Despite the compulsory figure of planning consultation, I perceived a narrow scope for public interference with client agenda.

⁸¹⁷ We can note the presence of the idea of identity (here of traditional retailers) and genuineness of social relations.

In that travel I discovered Amartya Sen “Development as Freedom”. In the evening public lectures of the London School of Economics, I contacted readings that came to be fundamental ingredients of my work (the London launches of Amartya Sen’s “Idea of Justice” and Soja’s “Seeking Spatial Justice”). In the *School of Life* I also attended Roman Krznaric’s course on Politics, where I first learnt of the existence of Hobbes and Locke and wrote my first political speech against Tesco supermarket shops.

Sensing “a problematic relationship between the forces that shape cities and their less evident consequences”, I submitted an application for doctoral studies at the EDAR, in the spring of 2010. At that time my motivation could be described as the desire to change society through space in the form of alternative urbanism practice,⁸¹⁸ outside determinisms of economic worth. Sen’s preoccupation with the “restriction of freedoms in the lives of individuals and groups” was already present as well as the focus on the “aspirations of citizens”. Without apparent antinomy, that liberal strand was paralleled by neo-Marxist influences (Harvey, Sinclair, Castells, Sassen, Boaventura Sousa Santos). The contact with part of London’s “cultural class” (Hackney’s artistic scene, TINAG and Spirit of 68), made me sensitive to the existence of a social group wanting to increase their scope of action in city-making. I described my position as ambivalent. At my eyes, a critique of “neoliberal urbanism” was necessary.⁸¹⁹ I was not attracted by an opposition between the *revolutionaries* of the cultural class and the rest of society (as I also belonged to the *conformist* professionals). From my contact with these two groups, I could see a shared basis of motivation and imagined a collaboration as a way to explore what urbanism would be like in a different economy:

“AP: My participation in the Spirit of ’68 discussions has been rooted in personal ambivalence. While discussing alternatives to the neo-liberal production of our times I was simultaneously working for an architects’ practice co-responsible for the masterplans of the 2012 London Olympics and its legacy, the resistance to which is mentioned here. This ambivalence enabled me to sense what motivates the members of groups that are often regarded as radically opposed to each other. In exemplary cases, I observed the same intellectual rigour, dedication of enormous amounts of personal time and eagerness among them to challenge the top-down directives through any breach or opportunity. Such empirical observations suggest a common feeling of entrapment. This shared feeling is the basis for the evolution from tactics of opposition to tactics of collaboration, an abandonment of puritanism that recalls Sennett’s claims in The Uses of Disorder” (Carter, et al., 2011).

This position founded a parallelism between perspectives of social groups, which sensitised me to the role of social experience in developing a deontological strong reasoning.

The first formulation of the research project, elaborated during the first semester at the EPFL, was a comparative assessment between alternative and mainstream urbanism practices. I was sensitive to the fact that the existing alternative practices were not necessarily systematic but I thought I could reconstitute their objective contribution without challenging their ideological import. That first project was based on what I could imagine before the investigation rather than enunciating a truly open question (and failed to be funded).

6.5.3 October 2010 – February 2011

6.5.3.1 Ordinary voices (I): the discovery of the “society of actors”

This was impelled element by the discovery of the “society of individuals”, even if the text of Elias would not be read until much later. The idea of a spatial actor was then contacted via Jacques Lévy’s *Echelles de l’Habiter* (2008) and

⁸¹⁸ “Part of this activism takes the form of intersector movements...and interdisciplinary spatial practices with artistic and political dimensions”, funding application under the title “Capitalist production of space and counter movements. Social impact of mainstream and counter-practices of urban regeneration: for a critical reading of the British scenario.” September 2010.

⁸¹⁹ At that time I wouldn’t call it societal. I recognise my critique of that period in Bourdin’s “Urbanism after the crisis” (2011).

Alain Bourdin's *La Métropole des Individus* (2005).⁸²⁰ This idea met no resistance, even if apprehending the full scope of its implications would take longer. The arguments for a spatial translation of an increased individual autonomy in the composition of the habitat were consistent.⁸²¹ However, the determinant aspect of my adherence was subjective. Indeed, the idea of an individual with a high degree of autonomy aligned with my own spatial experience: choosing to leave Porto, then London, and, more profoundly, my challenges to *habitus* of different groups (family, educational and professional *milieux*). Readings and discussions on Pierre Bourdieu would later confirm the unsoundness of structuralism that I sensed through my own biography.⁸²²

It is clear that the discovery of the society of the individuals was not compatible with the terms in which the research question had been formulated in the previous stage. I further distanced myself from perspectives condemning any urban project as, by principle, unjust. Commenting on those views' restriction of the role of urbanism in the process towards a more just society, I wrote:

“Urbanism, as the structuring of space as conceptualised above, is “a vantage point from which to capture some salient features in the social processes operating in society as a whole” (Harvey, Social justice and the city, 1974/1988, p. 16) and illuminates how capitalism innovates, destroys and rebuilds for its own perpetuation. Harvey’s analysis of the successive crisis of capitalism and the increasing social polarity developed in the Western world since the 1970s describes the application of capitalist neoliberal principles to the acts of building and rebuilding urban settlements. The continuous expansion of fabricated landscapes through a process of “creative destruction” reveals the function of urbanisation under capitalism governance as the one of a “spatial fix”: producing wealth, absorbing capital surplus, guarantying capital flow, utilizing labour force and securing social order. Such function of the contemporary, but also historical manipulation of urban space,⁸²³ at odds with what men need in order to fulfil themselves under enabling conditions of justice, precludes, at first sight, any positive contribution of urbanism for the seeking of social justice. It is the conception of space as mirror of the whole society that is employed when advancing the need to evolve to an anti-capitalist social order.”⁸²⁴

It took a discussion with Jacques Lévy to definitely abandon the pretension of the “cultural class” (and my own) to represent the spatial values of society at large. To understand that my critical perspective on urban production was not knowledge constituted a first epistemological step into social science of space. This entailed another maturation, from the good into the just: good intentions cannot occupy the place of others' intentionality. Together, Jacques and I posed the problem of the research as that of knowing what justice in the city is about for ordinary actors.⁸²⁵ The path constructed that far was useful in the critical review of the existing main literature on spatial justice: David Harvey's *Enigma of Capital*, Edward Soja's *Seeking Spatial Justice* and Susan Fainstein's *The Just City*. I criticised these attempts at theorising spatial justice as ideologically driven, bypassing the plurality of voices of ordinary citizens. I interpreted these works as a selection of the principles of justice (from the available theories) the authors were

⁸²⁰ “The research acknowledges the framework of a “society of individuals” (Elias, 2004) applied to the study of the urban (Bourdin, 2005), whereby the making of the latter is at least partially determined by autonomous choices of its inhabitants, aligned more with their self-image than external impositions. Moreover, it is underscored that individuals do so with extraordinary complexity⁸²⁰ (Lévy, 2008, p. 10). In the context of this research, we retain Bourdin's definition of individuation less in the sense of the form of the contemporary metropolis, where the spectrum of offered ambiances would respond to the growing demand of spaces and practices that support the construction of identity through differentiation. We are rather interested in the role Bourdin attributes to the process of rationalisation of choice, through which the individual constructs meaning and a relationship with the others, outside traditional normativity.” (Póvoas, 2011).

⁸²¹ For the arguments of solubility of movement, possibility to choose one's practice at different degrees, acknowledging segments of society with restrictive resource-capital, see section 2.2 of chapter 2, “Lussault, Lévy: the acting of space”.

⁸²² See section 1.2.2 of chapter 1, “Individual capital and social life (Bourdieu)”.

⁸²³ Harvey concludes that “patterns in the circulation of surplus value are changing but they have not altered the fact that cities – those “workshops of civilisation” – are founded upon the exploitation of many by the few. An urbanism founded upon exploitation is a legacy of history. A genuinely humanising urbanism has yet to be brought into being” (Harvey, 1974/1988, p. 314).

⁸²⁴ This passage is quoted from coursework in urban sociology, “A critical comparison of David Harvey and Edward Soja theoretical frameworks”, written in January 2011.

⁸²⁵ The centring of the research project on the topic of Spatial Justice was also influenced by the conversations with my dear colleague Jean-Nicolas Fauchille and his research *La justice spatiale comme pragmatique. Une approche expérimentale de réagencement de la carte hospitalière Suisse* (Fauchille, 2016).

agreement with. Those principles were presented as finished, substantive and deductive elements, overhanging the specifically spatial contribution for a theory of justice (Póvoas, 2011).⁸²⁶ Though this initial laminal review was misinformed by my representation of scientific objectivity (through which I would put myself outside knowledge production), the interest of keeping disparate theories on board and re-constructing them through the demands of our fundamental research project was an important realisation.

6.5.3.2 *Terrain* (I): topographic, infra-societal places (Miragaia and Leça da Palmeira)

To understand the choice of Porto as the *terrain* of the research, it is useful to dedicate a few words to the description of a parallel project, *Miragaia*⁸²⁷, a documentary film about a *freguesia* of Porto historical centre. Co-developed with José Roseira (2012), it is part of the urban festival *Manobras no Porto*. The documentary investigates the idea of future that the users of the *freguesia* of Miragaia devise for that territory. Initially, I thought that both projects could coincide in terms of data gathering opportunity.

Miragaia explored the master's hypothesis concerning the emancipatory potential of the immaterial dimension of space. The project expected that a (supposedly) collective process of dialoguing and filming one's habitat would lead to revising the representation of space. There was a tonality of action research (Stringer, 1996):

*"... the renovation of a group, unstructured through a long process of abandonment and (mutual) removal from the rest of the city. As a process, the exchange requires the reciprocal recognition of the involved parties, leading to gains and changes on either sides, denying the possibility of perpetuating identity and tautological collective structures of representation, unavailable for change."*⁸²⁸

The film *Miragaia* was a favourable context to base the doctoral project on action research. I have rejected that approach as it seemed less apt to questioning the motivation that drives an investigation. This choice was coherent with doubting the singularity of my perspective (rather than seeking to make it represent society). The rejection of any particular group's claim to the exclusive truth of what the just is, would also thinner the weight of "pragmatic sociology", that I contacted via Luca Pattaroni (Pattaroni, 2007; Trom, 1999; Breviglieri & Trom, 2003). Pragmatic circumstances, where discourses emerged "in context", had the advantage of reducing the artificiality of the researcher presence, but they could not guarantee the inclusion of all relevant points of view.

Underpinning the choice of a contrasting *freguesia* to that of Miragaia (Leça da Palmeira) was the idea that the society of the Metropolitan Area of Porto is experiencing a metamorphosis with a spatial and individual dimensions: an increasing degree of mobility of its inhabitants together with the development of individuation (Boudin, 2005), entertaining the disappearance of a "territorial model" of inhabiting. The space of study consisted, then, in two places at the scale of the *freguesia*, which were seen to reflect different stages of that metamorphosis (Domingues, 2011).⁸²⁹

⁸²⁶ "In several instances of the literature, the unit of the individual has been brought to the discussion, but the plurality of individuals' voices has never been placed at the centre of a theoretical construction. For example, Harvey observed that considering just distribution at the regional scale of analysis does not imply "justice achieved for the individual", nor does it take into account the meaning of benefits as they relate to the inhabitants' personal preferences and values (1974/1998, pp. 98,99). Fainstein's pursuit of a fully-fledged substance of the just city, drew mainly on other theoreticians and while utilizing her own empirical studies she did not resort to the knowledge of the regular citizen. Fainstein's procedure leads to ... magnifying unresolved problems such as those of technocracy, democracy and common good. In parallel, we have underlined that (spatial) ethics should emerge from human practice rather from "eternal truths" (Harvey, 1974/1998, pp. 12-3), casting doubt on the epistemological correctness of the attempts to a context-transcending view on justice which result from a combination or pre-selection of congruent theories of justice. Similarly, we have observed the contingency of the principles arrived at, which ultimately depend on the particular behaviour of the involved actors, pointing towards contextual constructions of the theory. By adopting a grounded theory methodology and framing the research in the society of individuals, the research addresses these two lacunas of the literature. Expanding on Lefebvre's (and, to an extent, Soja's) idea that spatial individual agency has a role to play in the contemporary dynamics of space and justice, we are lead to explore how normative judgements of the common person emerge in relation to the practice of everyday life." (Póvoas, 2011).

⁸²⁷ The documentary is available, in Portuguese, at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70utZhsyEHo&feature=youtu.be>

⁸²⁸ This passage is cited from one of the projects repost, dating from March 2011.

⁸²⁹ Miragaia, located in the historic centre, is exemplary of the "consolidated city" that lost residential use to the suburbs, without gaining a new vitality (until the recent boom in tourism and night life). Leça da Palmeira is an urban *freguesia*, recently converted into high-end residential

“Miragaia is assumed to be predominantly a territory of proximity, hypo-mobile, with a strong correlation between space, identity and community belonging while Leça da Palmeira is regarded as a residential point in the networks of a hyper-mobile population, whose identities are potentially autonomous from the surrounding....” (Póvoas, 2011).

Even though this spatial delimitation of the study encompassed spatial practices in both territories and networks, the conception of these places was a topographical one. The choice of the *freguesias* presupposed that a territory could be characterised by a predominant mode of inhabiting, giving tacit preference to spatiality of residents vis-à-vis other city users. Though the sampling criteria sought to represent non-residents,⁸³⁰ the making of the city of those mobile individuals was not considered beyond the border of the *freguesia*. This reflected difficulties in integrating: the city as composed of networks and territories, the interrelation of spatialities and space, space as a relational and dynamic configuration (there was a dominant of positional realities).⁸³¹

Empiric spatial referents entered twice in the object of study defined in this stage: in the form of the material of spatial justice (expected to emerge in the discussion of particular places) and as the spatial practice of individuals. The latter was seen as an interpretative filter, clarifying what was private and public interest in the discourses of the inhabitants (that a value of justice could be at once individual and societal was not conceived of). This enunciation of the terrain could be reconstructed under a hologramatic idea, whereby the part can include the relevant phenomenon of the whole. However, the methodology as it was then detailed refutes this interpretation. The plans of ethnographic residence in small places within the *freguesias* and the objective of mapping the “reality” of the *freguesias* are quite informative that the object of study was, then, confined to the two topographic, infra-social places (Miragaia and Leça da Palmeira).

Making an object of study from the *sphère idéal* of a society was not a straightforward construction. It implied distinguishing two elements: the *terrain*, constructed through sampling from the society under study; and the object of study, to wit, the ideality of Metropolitan Porto, in tension with the materiality/ideality of the spatial referents considered relevant to the topic by the research participants.

6.5.3.3 Approach to data collection (I)

Table 12 presents the arbitration between methods of data gathering and the type of information that I expected to emerge in different situations.⁸³² The type of information is not conceptualised, but it shows the concern with objective and subjective facets of the individuals’ experience of spatial justice:⁸³³

“By metrics, or informational framework, I mean the production of knowledge on the spatial values held by the society of the Metropolitan Area of Porto. Spatial values, understood as the result of the inhabitants’ political reflection on the urban qualities they prefer, are the metrics with which to evaluate different urban projects with regard to spatial justice.”⁸³⁴

quarter (it used to be an industrial area). Leça da Palmeira is animated by a diversity of uses (International Port, exhibition centres, and re-invested public space along the beach).

⁸³⁰ Some coherence was sought through sampling criteria: 50% residents and 50% non-residents (work, leisure).

⁸³¹ The object of study did not concern the network of spaces as informed by spatial profiles. I overlooked the potential difference between the extensions of the *freguesias* and the spatialities of the interviewees.

⁸³² The expected wealth of information was structured as spatial description, biography, spatial practice, reactions (in the face of injustice). The registers of justice and injustice were declined between expectations, reasoning, claims, suggestions, decisions, legitimacy, dialogue and dispute. The goods expected to emerge through the combination of these elements were organised into private, common and public goods.

⁸³³ For definition of procedural rationality see point b. in the introduction, “Ethics of reconstruction and the plural rationalities of actors”.

⁸³⁴ This citation has been extracted from coursework on qualitative methods: “The construction of research design. A process of methodological concern and theoretical refinement”, written in 2012.

The tension between justice reasoning (procedural rationality) and the subjective aspects of spatial experience were assumed in this choice. Epistemologically, this lead to the demarche of reconstructive ethics.⁸³⁵

Table 13 concerns the same palette of situations of data collection, and associated methodological trade-offs. At the end of this arbitrage, I gave priority to “inclusiveness” of voices, controlling the sampling of the society and providing for the least possible unconditioned expression of each individual’s perspective (as described in point 6.1 of the current chapter).⁸³⁶

Data gathering situation	Registers of information, spatial lens				Registers of information, justice lens							Goods of spatial justice		
	description of territory	life story	urban practice	reaction to spatial injustice	expectations	reasoning /rationale	request/claim	suggestion	decision	legitimacy	dialogue / dispute	private good	common good	public good
Interview	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Light
focus groups	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark
assembly	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Light	Dark	Light
public «events»	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark
public service to inhabitants	Light	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Dark	Light	Light
conversation /debate	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Dark	Dark	Dark
meeting urbanism professionals	Dark	Light	Light	Light	Light	Dark	Light	Dark	Dark	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Dark

Table 12 Expectation of registers of information in different data collection situations (March 2012). (Dark and light grey indicate, respectively, high and medium expectation of information to emerge in each method of data gathering. Blanks indicate expected absent information).

⁸³⁵ The concept is defined in section b. of the introduction, “Ethics of reconstruction and the plural rationalities of actors”.

⁸³⁶ Tables produced in the context of the qualitative research syllabus, under the supervision of Prof. Matthias Finger. The original tables have been edited to eliminate redundant information.

Data gathering situation	Advantages						Comments
	control of individual sampling	real situation	guarantee of inclusiveness	individual wealth of information	no guaranteed access to public good	freedom from internal group pressure	
interview							Best compromise between rigour and wealth of data.
focus groups							Use in case of need to confront different points of views.
assembly							Second best, according to wealth and pertinence of data.
public «events»							Can use the discussion from meetings of action-groups to investigate if discourse changes in groups.
public service to inhabitants							Excluded, as covering similar info to interview, but with reduced wealth of information.
conversation /debate							Can be used as observation to prepare interviews in different regions, but not as part of main corpus of discourses.
meeting urbanism professionals							Excluded, as assembly is a better option providing information on current urbanistic affairs.

Table 13 Advantages of approaches to data collection, pondered during method choice (March 2012). (Dark and light grey indicate, respectively, high and low certainty regarding the presence of the different advantages; blank expresses expected absence.)

6.5.3.4 Epistemology of social science (I): fact versus perception

The elements just narrated, partially circumstantial, fixed three key components of the research project: the topic of Spatial Justice, the entry point through the discourses of the inhabitants (collected in individual interviews) and the *terrain* of Porto *freguesias*. At this point, I imagined truth to be identifiable by comparing the interviewees' perception with facts. The latter would be visible in the *terrain* through direct observation. The *regime de verité* was placed outside the perception of citizens, and restricted to the small *terrain* (that is, detached from other scales and their complexity). I expected the pertinent spaces for the interviewees' idea of justice not to surpass the territory of residence.

The diagram with the succession of research activities as it was initially imagined can be seen in figure 15.

6.5.3.5 The encounter space and justice (I): asymmetry concrete space/abstract justice

In the object of research constructed in this period, space was imagined as the visible component of justice and injustice, in the simple sense that it would be possible to photograph it (which is not the same as assuming that it was only a material problem). The space that interested me was urban space, but its focus was explicitly non-architectural. I imagined that interviewees would talk about spatial arrangements dependent on a certain materiality, but also on issues of co-presence (security concerns) or of political organisation of space (the fiscal system). As for justice, it was conceived of as a set of formal components, rather than contents, produced outside society. Whether there is a correspondence between contents of justice as identified by the individuals and those of political theory was a truly open question. The umbrella of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967a; 1967b; Charmaz, 2006) that I claimed in the research proposal (Póvoas, 2011), had to do more with the rejection of existing spatial justice theory

(as see in 6.5.3.1) than with the refusal of concepts in the identification of the just.⁸³⁷ I imagined I could resolve the problem of such identification through the pragmatics of the discourse: an answer to a question on space and justice had to be about space and justice. The societal demands of justice were only mildly integrated. Until very recently (see point 6.5.6.5) the sense of disturbance, anger, outrage and other intense emotional tones were taken to signalise the unjust (the triad of the dynamic reasoning of justice was not active).⁸³⁸ The passage by a grounded theory formulation, where justice would be communicated *in vivo* in disjunction with a conceptual vocabulary, reflects research inexperience. The analysis was a mysterious productive black box from which evidence would emerge. This representation would last until the period April 2013/December 2014, when it was confronted with practice.

Justice and space were expected to be related in two modes. The first would be a joint idea – “spatial justice” as such – existing in people’s minds in an abstract manner. The second modality had to do with the involvement of justice in the description of spatial arrangements. If we push this relationship between the planes of justice and space near the edge of over interpretation, we can see things in this way: there was an asymmetry between the level of concreteness and conceptualisation that each of the planes could achieve. While space was seen as necessarily attached to an empiric referent, justice was an apparatus organising the interrogation of reality, but not *in it*. Underlining this misconception – and replacing both space and justice as social constructions, part of reality – is important for the development of spatial justice, as the asymmetry concrete space/ abstract justice is a common representation in erudite and non-erudite discourses. This difficulty can be seen as the tendency to see the topic through a general/particular cognitive demarche, rather than a universal/singular approach.⁸³⁹

6.5.3.6 Research hypotheses (I): spatial capital and variation of arguments in context of argumentation

In this period, there was the explicit hypothesis that ideas of spatial justice co-vary with urban experience, at different levels of mobility and individuation. From the preliminary field work in Miragaia I would formulate the following hypothesis: the level of individuation/mobility of the individual⁸⁴⁰ was expected to translate into 1) the existence of possibilities of choice and 2) personal easiness in the face of alterity and in the reach of self-image as a societal actor. The combination of these characteristics was thought of to influence the capacity to distinguish the just from self-interest.

The major elements of the thesis conclusions as it stands today were already present, though they were not properly conceptualised (some were still metaphoric). The relationships between each of those elements has not been observed as hypothesised.

An inexplicit hypothesis was enunciated in the separation of data gathering in two different context of argumentation. In the individual interview, describing the injustice/justice based on existing problems was expected to focus on the self, while focus group would be able to bypass the circumscription of self-interest. There was an expectation of conflict between perspectives delivered in these two contexts.

6.5.3.7 Societal usefulness (I): localised practical return, direct reciprocity

“Which ideas of spatial justice do individuals conceive of as they construct their urban practice? A grounded theory of spatial justice in the contrasting places of Miragaia and Leça da Palmeira.” (Póvoas, 2011)

⁸³⁷ I have always considered the import of theoretical fundamental ideas in identifying the just; the grounded approach was never a good way to encapsulate what I was intending to do and it did not survive the first year exam.

⁸³⁸ For the three moments participating in assessments of justice, see point 4.2.1.1, “Reflexivity of justice, affective and cognitive”; for the concept of reflective equilibrium, see point 4.3.4, “The continuity of “reflective equilibrium” in empirical problematics”.

⁸³⁹ The universal/singular approach is found in 4.2.1, “The universal/singular as the tension in theory/empirics”.

⁸⁴⁰ This mobility, I annotated, was to be measured in several dimensions of space (though it was not clear what mobility in social and mental space were).

The research question, as cited above, was not put in contact with the objective of a context specific return in form of urbanism orientation. In the planned coincidence between the research *terrain* and the production of the documentary *Miragaia* (point 6.5.3.2), the return of research to society was imagined through direct reciprocity. The idea of “balanced cultural exchange”, embodied in the reflective moment of the interview and collective production of the film, presumed that the experience of being a protagonist and producer of an artistic object was a universal opportunity of self-development. The actual realisation and public exhibition of the documentary *Miragaia* indicated that this expectation was not true. Indeed, it was not observed for the majority of the participants I worked with.⁸⁴¹ This experience raises interesting questions on the role of cultural capital and individual reflexivity (at the outset of such processes) in such participatory practices. It also questions the constancy and duration of processes, if they are to enrich the cultural and reflective endowments of the participants.

6.5.4 March 2011 – March 2013

I associate the change between these two consecutive periods (October 2010–February 2011/March 2011 – March 2013) with the modification of the *terrain*, namely the abandonment of *Miragaia* and *Leça da Palmeira* for a sampling of spatial variation in the Metropolitan Area of Porto.

6.5.4.1 *Terrain* (II): Metropolitan Area of Porto, cartographically defined

This enlargement of the place of study happened in two axis, more or less indiscernible: one regards the concept of space, the other the spatial variation likely to give access to different discourses on spatial justice.

The concept of city was now defined more clearly. It included all degrees of urbanity, eroding the frontier between a consolidated and expanded city (and eliminated its opposition to rural spaces, which can be seen areas with zero urbanity). The definition of the *terrain* gives priority to the functional over political or administrative delimitation of territories.⁸⁴² The correct concept resolved the incongruences noted in the previous definition of the empirical *terrain* (6.5.3.2). If I presumed that the spaces people knew (from direct experience) would determine the contents of the interview, the networked spatialities (of daily life) implied an area of study covering the extension where those movements take place.⁸⁴³ In parallel, I considered that content of spatial justice was likely to vary in function of degrees of urbanity. Portraits of Portuguese cities (Portas, 2011, p. 12; Domingues, 2011, p. 40) helped me to see the pertinence of allowing for justice problems in the non-consolidated city to emerge, reinforcing the limitations of *Leça da Palmeira* and *Miragaia* (both *freguesias* are part of the central geotype). This literature on Portuguese cities (and on Porto) was expanded by readings on the Chicago School of Sociology and Lefebvre’s account of centrality vs. periphery. Progressively, the city emerges as the pertinent scale where to detect the variation and distribution of socio-economic-spatial profiles expected to influence different conceptions of spatial justice. As I put it then:

⁸⁴¹ After several attempts at collaborative work, José Roseira and I gave up on organising ateliers where the participants would be co-producers of the documentary. The participation was restricted to the moment of the filmed interview and contact with the results of that work. The interest in watching the movie was very feeble or absent. A great number of the interviewees did not watch any fragment despite frequenting, on a regular basis, the lower floor of the building of its public exhibition. It might be possible that our approach was inadequate, though disengagement has been witnessed in a number of other projects of *Manobras no Porto*. In the exhibition of the documentary in public space, the images and music caught the attention, but I am under the impression that it was at the expenses of the voices and message represented.

⁸⁴² The common representation that confounds cities with municipalities is surpassed, which is not evident for a non-geographer. Later I would take my own past mis-conception into account, when constructing the interview guide:

“While the unit of the municipality does not have theoretical importance in this study, it is likely that people identify their place of residence, work, etc. with particular municipalities (or *freguesias*) and organise their narrative in function of these units. As such, questions will ask about specific cities that people know well through their experience rather than refer to Porto Metropolitan Area. This common-sense unit is also present in the conception of the urban planners professionals, who, despite verbalisations of the need for inter-municipal projects, privilege the care for the city they are responsible for, reaffirming this unit in the tension between neighbouring or competitive cities.” Personal notes, August 2012.

⁸⁴³ It should be noted that the objective of studying justice in the city – or urbanism as the disciplinary folder of the project – expected the empirical material to concern mainly the urban scale. This expectation was disproved through the analysis of the corpus. See in particular conclusions of study number 7, “individual geotypes”, presented in section 8.2 of chapter 8, “Individual geotypes, the interspatiality of spatial justice”.

“Two assumptions lay at the basis of the need for covering spatial variation. The first expects that the spaces people experiment and know will inform the things they talk about when asked to talk politically about space. Individuals will have at their availability the space of their personal experience and the spaces of others’ experiences that they witness in their specific exposure to the urban. The second assumption has to do with the hypothesis that different possibilities of choice in the organisation of one’s use of the city, and particularly the place of residence, affect one’s judgement of the city. This may be so due to differences of quality in the places where one affords to live but also to the influence of one’s economic advantage or disadvantage in forming a view on who is responsible for the production of urban goods and which distributive criteria should attach to them.” Personal notes, August 2012.

Porto Metropolitan Area becomes the object of the *terrain*, initially defined as an administrative territory, then evolving into the functional area (or an attempt at the definition of the function area). The circumscription of the terrain now included a diversity of socio-economic-spatial profiles, which were sampled through topologic discontinuity. At this moment in time, there were no developments on the epistemology of social science underpinning the research. Inevitably, the enlargement of the terrain was source of new questions: How could I possibly know this immense area, so to compare perception and facts? As a way to approach this difficulty I conducted interviews with professionals of the planning departments of a set of municipalities, seeking to apprehend the experts’ views on the problems of the respective municipality.

By then I had also opted out the study of spatial practice as a research axis. Though the robustness of our conclusions could have benefited from knowing more on the individual relationship with space, the data gathering as it was planned was not highly pertinent. The time scopes of spatial practise that I had anticipated to cover (with the objective of mapping the spatialities) was the weekly use of the city and, for the previous year, movements beyond the city. As seen in the conclusions of this work,⁸⁴⁴ it is the overall (spatial) biography that is informative in the understanding of the conceptions of spatial justice. The “milestones” of this spatial life tended to emerge spontaneously in the interviews.

The experience of the time-cost involved in data gathering and mapping, as tested in the terrain of *Miragaia*, also counted in the abandonment of this informational focus. The broadening of the literature, and the way in which it expanded the array of pertinent hypotheses, seconded the importance of exploring the coherence between ideas of spatial justice and spatial behaviours.

6.5.4.2 Epistemology of social science (II): from “positivism” to constructivism

Once the terrain had been defined (the sampling criteria of Metropolitan Porto was now coherent with the theory of urbanity and with the research questions at hands), I focused on the construction of the interview guide. The exercise was not straightforward. As I did not expect that people would understand an explicit injunction to talk about “spatial justice”, the guide required oblique entry points. Back and forth movements between several interview guide design (preliminary exploratory interviews, semi-structured guide, more open protocol), fieldwork, interview analysis and reflective reconstruction of these activities characterise an epoch of experimentation, often proceeding by trial and error.

This stage was affectively charged. The enthusiasm and confidence with which I had traced the grand lines of the project gave way to a period of anxiety, low-esteem and isolation.⁸⁴⁵ The characteristics of overture and reflectivity,

⁸⁴⁴ See in particular section 8.2.2, “Interspatiality of justice imagination, a world-view”, the conclusion of part II and the final conclusion.

⁸⁴⁵ The impact of my cognitive path on my emotional life certainly played a role in the difficulties met at this stage. As my *soci t alit * increased, so did my perception of the constructed character of opinions. In the initial accommodation to this idea, I ceased to trust in the opinions of friends and family, in particular those related to self-image. I was not able to frame the idea of individual autonomy within a reasonable openness to influence. The fact that the socially constructed was not seen as equivalent to truth raises questions on the role of epistemology in psychological and social life.

as well as the importance attributed to theory, which had enabled reorientations of my cognitive path so far, were now burdensome, bringing the experience to the brink of tolerable hardness.

I explain this epoch with the maladjustment of the epistemological attitude. For simplicity, we can call that attitude positivist, even if this epithet is a bit too severe: I never saw my topic emptied of its human complexity and I could sense the fabrication of the research. In this sense, I was not at odds with a constructivist approach. There was, nevertheless, an effort in trying to control all methodological decisions,⁸⁴⁶ which neglected the possibility of arbitrating on my object of study, rather than having it revealed – or exclusively imposed – by its inner logic. A specific difficulty was the distinction between what should be left open for discovery and what, from existing theory of justice and space, could orient qualitative enquiry. This distinction involves a set of competences which were immature at this moment in time: theory choice, the tension between theory and empirics, the articulation of concrete and abstract facets of the object of research, the trade-off between hypothetic-deductive and exploratory approaches. The development of the interview method at this stage would cost the exploratory nature of tool. For the initial semi-structured interview guide see annex C.

6.5.4.3 Literature review of theories of justice

The different extensions of the accounts of justice presented in chapter 4 show that it is not feasible to claim equal intellectual comfort in all these theories. The literature review is potentially when of the riskier aspects of doing interdisciplinary research covering domains outside one's familiarity. As noted by Prof. Eirk Schokkaert in the oral exam, "there are entire PhD's dedicated to some of these paragraphs". Despite the discomfort of not being absolutely certain about the interpretation of all my sources, I have persisted in the task, as I saw no other way of doing what I had set out to do. For the sake of transparency, it is nevertheless important to state that the comprehension of the theories reflects different degrees of investment which were greatly influenced by the history of this doctorate, including its progressive discoveries.

I have read Sen's *The Idea of Justice* (2010) thoroughly, several times, and supported the interpretation of this book with further readings, as advised by the author. This is theoretical body I am the most comfortable with, as attested by the bibliography and the extension of section 4.2 of chapter 4, "The complete *sociétalité* of Amartya Sen's *The idea of justice*".

I have extensively read John Rawls's *A theory of justice* (1971/1999), grasping its main elements in a first reading, revisiting it later for the comprehension of its dialogue with the intellectual heritage Rawls was communicating with. Nozick (1973), Walzer (1995; 1992/2006; 1983; 1988), Taylor (Taylor, 1994; Habermas, 1994; Walzer M. , 1994), Iris Marion Young (1990/2011) and Honneth (Honneth, 1995; Honneth, 2004; Fraser & Honneth, 2003), received less prominent treatments, contacted in articles and book sections. Habermas was initially studied via secondary sources (Soja, 2010; Fainstein, 2010), then further revisited through its treatment by Sen. Few primary sources on Habermas were also contacted (1996/1998a; 1996/1998b). Aquinas was also studied via a combination of selected primary sources and existing interpretations of medieval political and moral philosophy. Marxism and utilitarianism were dominantly studied via secondary sources. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the *Dictionnaire d'éthique et de philosophie morale* and *Van Parijs's Qu'est-ce qu'une société juste ? Introduction à la pratique de la philosophie politique* (1991), were used to clarify certain elements of my theoretical interpretations.

6.5.4.4 Research hypotheses (II): the hypothesis of pluralism

At this stage I held several epistemic approaches to the construction of my hypotheses: a pragmatic tradition (following Thevenot, Boltanski, Walzer, and Dewey), a comparative approach (inspired by Sen and Lévy) and a transcendental paradigm (by then associated with Ricœur and Rawls). If the latter was somewhat at odds with the

⁸⁴⁶ In particular, an attempt to anticipate the potential of knowledge included and excluded in each possible method choice.

substantive objective of the project,⁸⁴⁷ the pragmatic and comparative ways of defining the just seemed promising. Data from preliminary interviews influenced my interpretation in spatial terms of *On Justification* (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) and *Spheres of justice* (Walzer, 1983), where justice values (or arguments), socially constructed in specific societal milieu (a political space, a dispute between social actors) bear a close tight with the concreteness of those contexts. I formed the hypothesis that different ways of considering space (function, scale, productive relation to society) would influence the variation of arguments across urban topics. I thought that testing this “hypothesis of pluralism” required controlling of conditions of comparability of arguments for different topics (for example on housing, transports, schools, etc.). This constrained the interview guide to become semi-structured:⁸⁴⁸

“In this view of a pluralism of worlds entangling a pluralism of goods, it does not make sense to attempt to qualify persons according to the political-philosophical orientation of their arguments, independent from context. Accordingly, the family of ideas of justice – for example, families of libertarian, egalitarian, communitarian, or meritocratic ideas – is not expected to remain unchanged for a single individual, in a certain biographic moment. The nature of a person’s arguments will change depending on the situation. Establishing a parallel with Boltanski and Thévenot model, I wondered whether different ways of looking into space – attributing it different roles in the production of different goods – could be the aggregating factor of variation of arguments.” (Póvoas, 2013b)

The comparative approach of Sen’s work – by then thought harmonious with Jacques Lévy’s theory of spatial justice (2011; 2012) – offered a framework for reasoning on alternatives posed to society in conditions of public scrutiny. It originated two further lines of query, one identifying capabilities (as valued qualities in the city), the second attempting to understand how urban qualities imply the self and the other, the individual and society. If these two lines were not synthesized *a priori* but imported into the guide questions, that choice accounted for the contradictions likely to emerge from the intimate aspects of inhabiting and the collective inhabitability of space. Here I counted on two presupposed associations: that the content of justice claims would be absent urban qualities, thus varying with place of residence and making spatial experience paramount in identifying injustice; and that the claims of justice would be sensitive to the interconnectedness between space and spatiality.

These two approaches were seen to imply different informational focus, which I was unable to hierarchize based on the interface between theory and initial observations from preliminary interviews. The resulting interview protocol was rather inelegant. From several problems I could identify in the protocol, the major was perhaps the inability to detach the interview questions from the hypotheses, so that room was made for the interviewee to determine the field of pertinence of his discourse (Robert & Faugeron, 1978, p. 57).⁸⁴⁹ I have complemented this experimentation with a process of reflexivity. It involved the transcription and analysis of the interviews already realised; a public presentation on the construction of the semi-structured interview; the longitudinal reading of answers per questions; readings on the methodology of research dedicated to the representations of justice (Kellerhals & Languin, 2008; Kellerhals, Coenen-Huther, & Modak, 1988; Robert & Faugeron, 1978); and wrapping up these materials in the writing of an extensive piece of text, discussed with several interlocutors. At the end of this process, I would walk myself out of a state of confusion, choosing an inductive, rather than hypothetic-deductive, approach to reasoning.⁸⁵⁰ At the end of that stage I abandoned the productions where I experienced the vivid sensation of intruding in the

⁸⁴⁷ Via Sen’s partial integration of Rawls perspective, a third line of query did not seem necessary.

⁸⁴⁸ For detailed information on this (abandoned) interview guide see annex C.

⁸⁴⁹ The reading of the methodology of *La justice et son public. Les représentations sociales du système pénal* (Robert & Faugeron, 1978) was enlightening in this regard :

« En bref, il s’agit de laisser la personne interviewée déterminer elle-même le champ pertinent de son discours, sans l’enfermer à l’avance dans le cadre standardisé d’un questionnaire. » (p. 57).

⁸⁵⁰ Even if I experienced strong discomfort when listening to the interviews, I trusted the encouragements received from my academic entourage: Jacques Lévy found the material interesting, Luca Pattaroni underlined that even a bad interview always had important things to teach us, Boris Beaudé reassured me that the interview is an imperfect, however necessary tool for some research objects.

interviewees' coherence.⁸⁵¹ I opted for an exploratory (almost) open interview with reduced presence of the interviewer and abandoned the structured investigation of the hypothesis of pluralism.⁸⁵² The final corpus was nevertheless capable to provide responses to this hypothesis (as exposed in section 8.2, "Individual geotypes, the interspatiality of spatial justice").

This experience participated in the evolution of the idea of scientific knowledge in social science, and transformed the representation of rigour. We can wonder whether, had an entire corpus been constructed on the basis of the semi-structured protocol, the perception of that data would have been more satisfactory. Would a transversal analysis allow for the reading of grand interpretative lines with the confidence that the contact with a small sample of interviews could not sustain? Perhaps, but I doubt that it would have allowed understanding how the actors articulate their sense of spatial justice, resorting not only to their experience but also to their cognitive model, which was not part of my hypotheses. The chosen protocol also allowed the emergence of the relevant scales of spatial injustice far beyond the city, breaching the circumscription of spatial justice to the urban that I was inclined to pursue. It must be of value that methodological revision allows the logic of the object to destabilise the representations of the researcher.

6.5.4.5 Societal usefulness (II): a portrait towards *l'autotranscendence du social*

In parallel to the methodological progress described above, I reflected on what it meant to "take seriously the claims of justice made by the actors" (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000, p. 210). I understood that it would not be possible to verify the truth value of all statements, in particular when interviewees exploded the borders of urbanism and made the object of study navigate in waters outside my expertise. Revising the model of veracity that I held in the previous stage, perception was now at the centre of this work and scientific truth evolved into the interpretation of that perception, as accurately as possible. This operated a division between geographical truth and the *shpère idéal* of space on which I focused the data gathering. In a research poster prepared with Jean-Nicolas Fauchille on the ongoing research of Chôros pole "spatial justice" we proposed the following triad:

"We conceive a full theory of spatial justice as composed of three fields of interaction: the political field, concerning the identification of desirable ends for society in terms of spatial justice (equity, freedom, increased individuals' capabilities, democratic political functioning, solidarity/ social cohesion are redefined as spatial constructs); the empirical [systemic] field, understood as the study of how this ends are mediated by space that is, how the social, economic and physical dimensions of space interact to produce these social goals (mobility, serendipity, public space, productivity, we shall call them goods); and the [individual] metrics field, uncovering the spatial values that result from the inhabitants' political reflection on the urban qualities they prefer. An evaluation in terms of spatial justice compares alternative urban projects in relation to this framework of spatial values." (Póvoas & Fauchille, 2012).

Though recognising the congruence of these fields, my qualitative enquiry could not encompass the systemic focus. In understanding this limitation I benefited from the project *La justice spatiale comme pragmatique. Une approche expérimentale de réagencement de la carte hospitalière suisse* (Fauchille, 2016). Indeed my colleagues Jean-Nicholas Fauchille and Ogier Maitre supported their enquiry of the justice arguments deployed by citizens with regard to hospital distribution with a model that enables confrontation with the public cost of several hypothetical spatial arrangements.

The removal of geographical truth from the conception of my object of study was at first, rather disruptive. As we have seen above, I was moved by an operational objective which seemed incompatible with the results of the

⁸⁵¹ Among the difficulties experimented during the analysis I signalled the interviewees' understanding of questions (vagueness, length, without "resonance") and impromptu protocol alterations to assure communication flow, affecting comparability of answers. Interpretative difficulties included uncertainty on the relevance of contents vis-à-vis the possibility of "induced answers" (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).

⁸⁵² It is not without interest to note that part of the miscommunication that took place between me and Jacques Lévy at that time had to do with his qualification as "open interview" of protocols without any instruction. As such, our common use of the term semi-structured interviews corresponded to different techniques.

fundamental approach I was developing. *L'Espace Légitime* (Lévy, 1994) convinced me of the possibility that studying the dialectic of ideality and materiality of space might be worthwhile as it could enlighten the self-visibility of a society and thus its capacity of *autotranscendence*. This opening surpassed, by large, my political competences. This can be seen in the way in which I expected discovering a consensus capable of informing a political spatial contract (inexplicitly dispensing with the use of politics). Being able to consider the interest of the actors' discourses (as described in 6.5.3.1), was not equivalent of making them a societal phenomenon in its own right.

At this stage I understood that my research objectives required improving my poor democratic stance as well as new efforts to improve my knowledge of the world. If I defined as minimum objective some progress in my ability to understand contemporary *actualité*, I could not compress years of disinterest in following the world political scene and lack of practice in political positioning. This created a dissonance between a superseded motivation and a new formulation of societal usefulness. This incompetence delayed the movement into a fully constructivism paradigm.

6.5.4.6 The encounter space and justice (II): the *persée* of universal/singular

From the developments taking place in this period (March 2011 – March 2013) follows a better integration between the planes of space and justice. At that stage I could identify three ways of mobilising space in the identification of injustice:

“The first, that I will call “properly spatial”, refers to the spatial dimension of society that derives from “the fact that there is distance between the objects of society”. This dimension is one among the whole set of cutting planes that we can use to understand the totality that is society (example: Desertification of interior regions). The second form of considering space, that I will call “space as a projection”, takes it as a context, an indicator, a surface where causes external to space are projected, omitting the activities of human beings with distance and with places (example: Political management of public goods menaces their existence). [The third], cases of spatial public goods [are manifest when] we are in the presence of public goods that incorporate space (notion of spatial public goods in the sense advanced by Jacques Lévy (example: Desertification of the centre of Porto). (Póvoas, 2013c).

6.5.5 April 2013 – December 2014

Most of this stage was dedicated to interview conduction, preceded and followed by writing exercises of position taking in relation to Jacques Lévy's theory of spatial justice. Such critical approach was, at least partially, a response to an external stimulus. Within the context of an EDAR Winter Seminar, Jacques Lévy encouraged researchers and doctoral students to practise the confrontational implication of a constructivist approach (2014).⁸⁵³ If the topic of my response (Póvoas, 2013/2016) is indicative of the relatively small contour of my research context, the construction of an oppositional argument embraced the new challenge of confronting my own ethical intuitions.

6.5.5.1 The encounter space and justice (III): openness to plurality and public debate

A sense of discomfort with the implication Jacques Lévy's conception of spatial justice drove this critical exercise. Two concepts were at the basis of disagreement: public goods and differentiated development⁸⁵⁴. I did not distinguish

⁸⁵³ ... rather than ignoring the contradictions of cognitive activity in research contexts (and expecting a harmonious accumulation of successive contributions), knowledge production depends of a critical regard of one's contemporary thinkers (Lévy, 2014).

⁸⁵⁴ There was an importance limitation in my interpretation of the idea of differentiated development stemming from the mingling of inhabited and political spaces. I identified political territories with (among other criteria such as self-recognition and language) the functional space of cities as networked systems. Inhabited territories were correctly seen as places with one or more nuclei of superior density around which aggregated broader areas inclusive of varied spatial operations of the actors of that local society. These political territories were conceived as urban places (central and suburban) bordered by confines of no-man's land, begging to fall into political oblivion. Privileging high degrees of urbanity was wrongly interpreted as the exclusion of peripheral spaces not from urban policy but from the political map. It was this representation that gave rise to the idea that any policy privileging cities would imply an abandonment of the meandering areas. There is a link between these two arguments as accepting policies sustaining exodus into urban areas can be seen to eventually result into virtually uninhabited territories, thus excluded from political participation. I cannot totally liberate myself from this representation for it entails being able to draw the political map of Portugal and its confines. My exaggerated interpretation can be read here: *“The idea of responsibility seems to imply that individuals should accept*

between political controversy (where the researcher-citizen should position himself) and the actual interpersonal communication to others of necessary limits to their individual freedoms (that is, the affective cost of communicating the justice in removing assistance policies from inland Portugal or in criticising the spatial practises of some of my colleagues living in the peri-urban). Furthermore, I was troubled by the fact that some of the reforms that were actually taking place in Portugal at the moment of writing⁸⁵⁵ were coherent with Jacques' argument, de-legitimising part of the sufferance I was witnessing in my fieldwork in Porto (as a result of such policies):

"In exploratory interviews I have come across complaints that qualify as unjust precisely the type of measures that Lévy advocates in his writing. The closure of schools based on frequency of use⁸⁵⁶ is criticised on the basis of unequal treatment of part of the population; migration from places of origin to denser cities is described as imposed spatial sufferance; insufficiency of road networks and public transportation in periurban areas is judged discriminating. These instances demonstrate that, in the inhabiting of cities and in social science, the same topics matter in considerations of spatial justice. Nevertheless, the disagreement on the diagnosis of injustice by these citizens and by Lévy needed some thought, if I were to integrate my findings into the theoretical framework of the author, with which I agree to a great extent." (Póvoas, 2013/2016).

My argument has been developed in several stages,⁸⁵⁷ during a particularly challenging phase of my personal life: conducting intensive field work during pregnancy; moving from Geneva to Brussels and loss of social capital of proximity; facing the unknown of parenting... In the several versions of that essay I gave a considerable importance to the way in which spatial capital affects people's choice of residence and, therein, imposes limits on a spatial justice theory based on the primacy of individuals' responsibility for their spatiality. I would argue that even though Jacques Lévy's arguments are legitimate,⁸⁵⁸ they can be seen to restrict the right to urbanity on the basis of desert, supported by the notion of inequality of spatial capital that takes place in residential choice (even if through immobility). I was having in mind the autochthonous population, currently attached to those peri-urban and hypo-urban places, for whom moving to the city would be a disproportionate effort, in relation to the choice of an urbanite.⁸⁵⁹ In the same article, I would write:

"The ideas we have just reviewed—mutual exclusiveness of high and low levels of urbanity, compatibility of individuals' spatialities and society's objectives and responsibility of spatial actors—point towards the legitimacy, perhaps necessity, of reducing societal obligation in guaranteeing unconditional access to public goods in (or from) certain places. This can be seen as a differentiation in

the consequences of choosing their geographical positions (even if through immobility). For example, they should accept unequal access to public goods (2013b, pp. 135–136). Moreover, if we hypothesise on a region's failure to design and execute an autonomous development project, the primacy of responsibility appears to admit that certain regions are more justly resolved by not soliciting further assistance and accepting, instead, their non-liveability. In fact, Lévy postulates a threshold of a minimum level of urbanity below which a space of biographic scale (region) would not provide the necessary resources for the development of his competences and capacities throughout life (Lévy, 2013b, pp. 79–80). (Footnote: Placing the hypothesis of failure should not ignore the several solutions advanced by the author to enable smaller cities to reach this threshold (Lévy, 2013, pp. 80–81)." (Póvoas, 2013/2016).

⁸⁵⁵ See section 6.4.1 for some of the austerity measures decided by the government coalition of Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Popular Party (CDS-PP) with Troika.

⁸⁵⁶ "The revision of this network, alike the geographical reordering of health centres, hospitals, courts of law or post offices, takes place in the context of the reduction of public expenditure agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Portuguese Government and the European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund (Troika) in 2011."

⁸⁵⁷ The first stage (November 2012 – January 2013) ended with the public presentation of a paper in Lisbon and in Role in January 2013 (Póvoas, 2013/2016); the second stage was formalised in a lengthy article planned for EspaceTemps.net, submitted on the 29/11/2013, then retrieved in March 2014); the third stage consisted in the inconclusive revision of article, accompanied of informal discussions with Jacques Lévy (November 2014). The fourth stage consisted in the writing of a post-scriptum for the article, accessible in the essay A process of disagreement on Spatial Justice (Póvoas, 2013/2016).

⁸⁵⁸ Three main arguments were synthesised from Jacques Lévy's model of equity based on differentiation in development (2013a, p. 193): 1) the mutual exclusiveness of urban and periurban spatial solutions, 2) the principle of compatibility between individuals' spatialities and a society's spatial project, and 3) the primacy of responsibility that stems from the joint improvement of liberty and equality through the production of capability.

⁸⁵⁹ Note that I avoided commenting on the extension of the *ordre de grandeur* of the population that falls into this category for, as far as justice is concerned, utilitarian arguments of the highest utility for the greater number is, in my personal ethics, excluded.

access to goods based on desert, the basis of desert being the alignment or misalignment of choice of residence location with what seems to be best for society. The introduction of merit in the theory is contradictory with the general agreement of the author with the Rawlsian egalitarianism. In fact, Rawls's famous principles of justice are intended to correct the ethical difficulty of merit, that is, arbitrariness in social differentiation (Rawls, 1999).” (Póvoas, 2013/2016).

Later, I would realise I had somewhat regressed to the virtuous defence of the persons with the least capital had outweighed the transversal auscultation of society.

Another point of disagreement was articulated with an interrogation on the consistency of the cognitive support of the political argument. I expressed that I was not convinced by evidence on the systemic advantages of public good (indeed a symptom of the conception of proof in scientific knowledge I held at that moment), considering it a normative concept. I expounded this point as follows:

“To explore the desirability of urbanity, Lévy mobilises the systemic quality of these spatial public goods, goods without an origin between their production and consumption, without divisibility of the good in parts. It is in this context the “right to the city” does not mean the access to a collection of dissociated objects located in the city but, conversely, the right to high levels of urbanity.... The incompatibility of low levels of urbanity (inferior to that of the suburbs) with the city – is argued in general terms and though I cannot refute it, I am not convinced by the empirical support, in the face of the trade-off against liberty that is at stake.... When Lévy states that justice resides in the successful development of the city as a city, he advances directions for this development which are integral to the concept city: high level of urbanity, public mobility, or sociological mixity. This concept, the author claims, was constructed in a process of empiric observation, and “eidetic reduction”, that is, a conceptual construction (Lévy, 2012, p. 167). However, can we sustain that a concept constructed in this fashion detains normative value? Where, in the tension between observations of reality, extrapolation into the future and conceptual reduction that integrate justice categories, is the identification of desirability encountered?” (Póvoas, 2013a).

In the evolution of the article, I came to understand that matters of political opinion are not matters of truth, that there are reasons to distinguish knowing, thinking and judging.⁸⁶⁰ I changed my mind to consider it positive that an “enlightened member” of society (to use Sen’s vocabulary) would try argue persuasively for a new spatial representation of France. This shift in my critique implies drawing a subtle but important line between the persuasiveness of an argument and imperative normative prescriptions. Despite these advances, I continued to think that the work in *Réinventer la France* was not synonym to advancing theory. A theory of spatial justice should, in my eyes, offer the possibility to recognise as unjust all types of spatial sufferance, and not only the ethical sensitivity of persons capable of articulating the just in a manner compatible with urbanity. Furthermore, realist constructivism should be inclusive of arguments which, however unreasonable, shed light on the perfectibility of our cities.⁸⁶¹ We can see that the ideas, proposed in this dissertation, of a distinction between telling the unjust from telling the just (explored in chapter 8), as well as of the constructed ethical capital (see final conclusion), provide answers to these concerns.

A third critique was more vaguely articulated in relation to time and historicity of societal change:

“What I disagree with is the primacy of individual responsibility implied in a contractarian view of the investment of society in individuals’ capabilities and the territory they inhabit. Lévy presents a counter-argument: by considering individuals’ fragility and preserving them from putting their identity in movement, we are importing the problem into the solution. In the just society of that horizon, individuals

⁸⁶⁰ “The trouble is that factual truth, like all other truth, peremptorily claims to be acknowledged and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very essence of political life. The modes of thought and communication that deal with truth, if seen from the political perspective, are necessarily domineering; they don't take into account other people's opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of all strictly political thinking”. (Arendt & Kohn, 1961/2006).

⁸⁶¹ I had in mind the limitations some high density areas with regard g to some valued spatial attributes such as perception of children’s autonomy or quality of air.

would universally enjoy a truly enabling spatial capital which would make them fully responsible for their choices. But today, that is not empirically true. Not all actors have the same ability to make the choice that best serves them and society. They would, in a politics of justice predominantly anchored in the idea of development solidarity, be unfairly conditioned by capability inequality. It is a problem of temporality, but can a theory of justice, a construction that excels through the tension between the empiric and the theoretical, disregard the difficulties of the movement towards a horizon? Am I betraying justice consequentialism by overriding evidence on the detrimental effects of assistance? Am I exaggerating human fragility? Am I retreating into the first epoch of justice [a discourse of consolation targeted to communities]? I think that a concern for background capabilities inequality and how they impact “spatialities” and the enjoyment of space is a reasoned concern and, as such, a matter of ethics which I do not find resolved in the lines of this theory.” (Póvoas, 2013a).

Again, there was in this critique a germ of what became an important element of the theory of spatial justice advanced in this thesis. To wit, the definition of a movement between the productive and dominant layer of spatial justice conceptions and the inventiveness of processes targeted at accelerating the movement from the first into the common basis of ethical-spatial sensitivity of a society (see points 14 and 15 in conclusions of Part I).

Though the “historical” argument only specifies the tension of solidarity between Portugal’s coastline vis-à-vis the interior, there was also an inexplicit reference to European support of Portuguese development. I represented Portuguese society underdeveloped in relation to some segments of European society, as if belonging to a different epoch of the world-society. In this sense, I transferred the idea of responsibility in development from Portuguese regions and cities to matters of obligations of solidarity between different European regions.⁸⁶² Reading individual development as a corollary of societal development, I saw the conditions of such empowerment curtailed by the subjection of politics to the fast temporality of economy and finance, implied in the Troika reforms. The invisibility of these concerns, and the way in which the argument eroded specificities of scale and analysis of interspatiality, were indeed problematic. The text suffered from excessive generalisation between empirics and theory. There is work to be done in distilling spatial reform which was indeed necessary from that which I can still read as a compression of historical time, democratically fragile (Silva & Rodrigues, 2015).⁸⁶³

I eventually chose to delay the publication of this “...process of disagreement on Spatial Justice” (2013/2016) until after the interviews analysis, without suspecting that that the study of the corpus would significantly displace the position argued that far. The exercise brought me some significant advances. Thereafter assumed Sen as a complement to Jacques Lévy’s ideas of spatial justice. Through this dialogue of sources I consolidated the priority of self-determination of society over technical knowledge and comforted the interest of making social science a reflective device, not a *têchne*.

6.5.5.2 Epistemology of social science (III): suppressing the researcher

I have talked about the integration of the imperfectability of the interview and how I came to understand that a good instrument of query implies trade-offs and some risk taking, that is, choice in the construction of the research object. I have also presented the acquisition of a relationship between knowledge and politics as depending of democratic deliberation. The objective of revealing a pure consensus, the pirouette capable of putting knowledge to use without implying politics was then superseded by the idea of offering a meta-theory capable of framing public debate.

Contrasting with these developments was the continued expectation that the analysis of the discourses would dispense with the active participation of the researcher. After a period listening and reading the 49 voices of the

⁸⁶² This parallel did not mobilise the idea of arbitrariness in inequality, which I saw not to apply to the scale of the country (there is a political history and responsibility behind present circumstances).

⁸⁶³ I still think that the time-frame of reform obliterates the necessary temporality for consistent public debate. The realism of current austerity policies is coerced by the economic component of our world society which is not, presently, sufficiently subjected to political intentionality.

corpus I have entailed a quantitative analysis using textual statistics.⁸⁶⁴ Two inexplicit hypothesis – one on spatial justice theory, the other on linguistics – informed the initial analysis using textometry. I had anticipated that ideas of justice and ideas of space would emerge in parallel and that this would translate into the proximity of words belonging to each of the semantic fields. The wealth of natural language to communicate meaning defied such *a priori* while new interpretative difficulties emerged. The heterogeneity of the corpus in terms of linguistic capital, raised suspicion on the correspondence between signifier and signified, that is, on the correspondence between signs in natural language and concepts of space and justice. The practical impossibility to verify all the occurrences in their contextual meaning raised doubts on reading local employments of words as indicative of the global perspective of each interviewee. We should be reminded that I was working with the hypothesis that there were internal contradictions within one interview (see point 6.5.4.4).⁸⁶⁵

Several attempts to use the statistic software while reducing as much as possible my input were accompanied by the vivid realisation that I was not moving any further in the understanding of my object. I concluded – with the help of Jacques – that I had to reverse strategy and use my synthetic capacity to propose interpretative and explicative hypotheses of the empirical material, postponing the use of the quantitative tool to test for the effect of affect.

6.5.6 January 2015 – September 2015

6.5.6.1 Epistemology of social science (IV): the cognitive/affective participation of the researcher

The main achievement of this period regards the definite abandonment of any vestige of the positivist representation of scientific knowledge. In this stage I develop a spiral of analytical exercises, each of which drawing on previous understanding, but testing it through a different access point.⁸⁶⁶ Through this practice, I consolidate the idea that the robustness of an interview-based empirical study stems from the arbitration between strengths and weaknesses of several entry points into the corpus (and their articulation in time). I thus synchronise the idea of objectivity with the previous methodological acquisitions. Towards the end of that process, I would formulate the representation of research objectivity as follows:

“The representation of research as a spiraling process of activities of explanation and activities of interpretation. There is the implication of the incompleteness of each of these activities. This is not erased by the succession of those complementary moments, because decisions taken in one moment have to deal with the absence of that future complementary knowledge. One possibility is to reduce [decision] as much as possible, working with exhaustiveness, which is always reductive in relation to the object under analysis, so never an absence of choice The time lapse is at once a mechanism for accepting “imperfection”, in the nature of approximation and in the operation of hypothesis or questions (clarify); and the condition for changing the representation of rigour. To allow definition in incompleteness, the productive gesture (writing, selecting, reading, talking, and thinking, concluding) requires arbitrariness, which might be experienced in an explicit or inexplicit manner. Dealing with that arbitrariness or unknown is, for me, at the core of the idea of subjectivity in social sciences. It is the intervention of the person that makes those cognitive operations, their intellectual history, not only in the knowledge they possess, and their instrumentality, but mainly in their experience of thought. How they organize their movements between intuition and verification; contact with the sources and memory synthesis; acceptance of “good enough” or resolution of abandonment of working paths. This is completed by the sense of realist expectations of the scientific community that a person belongs to at a given moment. And what they like and attracts their attention (not necessarily, it can be a discomfort to be surpassed).” Personal notes, May 2015.

⁸⁶⁴ That choice had been suggested by Jacques, given my tendency to analytical exhaustiveness.

⁸⁶⁵ To that indeterminacy I had added the question on whether the interaction of the conversation would transform the perspective of the participant, as the interview unfolded.

⁸⁶⁶ See summary of entry point to the corpus in points 6.3 of this chapter, “Corpus” and 6.3.1, “Overview of corpus studies”.

6.5.6.2 Types and TXM

The *Types* exercise attempted to find some common denominator between the individuals of the corpus, aggregating them into “ideal types” of discourses on spatial justice.⁸⁶⁷ This exercise was object of doubts on its accuracy. It was followed by a test using a software of textometry. On the doubts raised during this process we can read:

“In order to produce more nuanced types of discourses I have considered studying patterns of co-occurrence based on lists of isotopies of space and justice. Given the problematic relationship between signifier and signified, identifying that vocabulary required two steps. Firstly, moving back to a qualitative reading of the interviews raising hypothesis on those isotopies; secondly, returning to a quantitative investigation of which, among those words, were useful to describe the different discourses in the corpus. I have experimented that method on a selected sample. A series of observations raised doubts with regard to the economy of the approach. The wealth of language did not fit the cleanness of the method. Here are four observations that lead to the abandonment of this approach: 1) Key passages are often expressions of 3 to 5 words whose form varied slightly within the interview, potentially escaping validation through repetition (ex.: “eles ficam com... mais coisas que nós”, “passa à frente dos outros”). 2) Some candidates to isotopies are banal words, potentially widespread and unsuitable to reveal specificity of a type of discourse + stability of meaning (ex.: “outro”, “falta”, “haver”, “sem”, “não está bem”, “dificuldade”). 3) Interesting words are actually hapax, irrelevant in the context of the full corpus (ex.: “gritante”, “premente”). 4) Qualitative reading makes it hard to disregard arguments to focus on indicators of argument. Complex ideas of spatial justice that started to emerge in this fashion do not observe the proximity (in words) of a words referring to space and another to justice, as I had hypothesised (ex.: “eles tiveram muito e estes não tiveram nada”).” EDAR Annual Report, March/2015

At the end of that process, I identified four grand ways of conceiving space, evolving from spaces as objects without distance to society’s space, paralleled by four figures of the name in which injustice is being denounced, from the person to the indecomposable individual-society (interviewee and his acquaintances, the community, the individual and eventually the individual-society.). I would state this observation as follows:

“The approximation to the corpus through the types revealed that there is a clear correlation between the sociétalité of the space and the types of arguments of justice. There is a progression of the articulation of the desired/needed from the point of view of the person without involving the other (except as a figure of the oppressor) to the articulation of the desirable as a political and societal project. This progression co-varies with the successive complexity of substances that participate in the descriptions of those spaces. In the first positions, individuals focus on their relationship with the habitat (individual plane and properly spatial plane and eventually the social sphere); while civic, political and economic spheres will only be added to the description in the interviewees taking a cap of citizen.” Personal notes, June 2015.

These results represented an important research advance. However, the way in which I initially circulated those observations into ethical and interpersonal planes, was rather upsetting. In a formal presentation of the status of my work to Chôros laboratory, I communicated that disturbance in these terms:

“... Jacques help me formulate the hypothesis that spatial justice, seen through the society of Porto, could be described as a succession of positions along the diagonal that crosses two main quadrants: no space and no justice; and space and justice. In the lower left extremity of the graph we have the interviewees that articulate the desired or the needed from the point of view of the person (affective/subjective relationship with injustice) without involving the other, except as a figure of an oppressor. We have seen how space is not very present in there. In the upper right extremity we have those that articulate the desirable as a political and societal project from positions of higher spatial awareness. I will now talk about my concerns with this hypothesis. The first one has to do with the fact that these two quadrants exclude the combination of injustice and no space. That is not true, in a

⁸⁶⁷ This study is presented, without reconstruction (that is, through the original materials produced in spring 2015) in section 7.1, “Inclusiveness of justice, complexity of space”.

context of economic depression, everyone's talks about unemployment and poverty. As I worked with contrast, I did not focus on capturing the fine variation of arguments around those issues, which might indeed be interesting. The second concern has to do with an immanent risk that this succession of sociétalité of the positions is interpreted as a hierarchical progression, in the sense that Amartya Sen talks of a historical direction for justice. In his idea of justice, furthering justice implies moving from the parochial – "blind an unquestioned belief" – should give way to reasonableness, that is, the effort of objectivity, impartiality and inclusivity of the perspectives of others. It is important to say that, in Sen's, that trajectory of mobility and development is self-determined by society through public scrutiny, fed by positions of enlightenment. I was highly uncomfortable with that risk [the statement that some people are more able than others of discussing the just], which implied stating that some people's ideas of justice were less reasonable and adequate for society than others. These thoughts made it clearer to me that I want to be able to build a panorama which treats equally the different points of view, including of those who are very far from what could be the summit of that hypothetical arrow." (Póvoas, 2015).

There was an imprecise formalisation of what came to be accepted as a factual observation of different degrees of ethical capitals. An incomplete understanding of Sen's idea of a direction for justice lead me to conclude that such observation would necessarily imply a historic evolutionary perspective that would close the horizon of justice to be determined by a restricted group of more sophisticated *urbanites* vis-à-vis the parochialism of the rest of the Porto society's sample. This idea was ethically disquieting. It was also affectively costly. It was uncomfortable to become equipped to read the vocabulary and arguments of the people I like, and some of my own thoughts,⁸⁶⁸ as they distanced from the summit of the progression. In a clumsy incorporation of my observations, I found it troublesome that my work would result in a *grid de lecture* containing some reasons to curtail my willingness to listen and understand others in an inclusive manner. Furthering the study of the corpus was motivated by this affective response as well as methodological concerns. Cognitively, I wanted to further the comprehension of the identified co-variation between the *sociétalité* of the ideas of justice and the complexity of the conception of space. Affectively, I wanted to reflect on how I could continue to learn from subjects with different ethical capitals, including the persons in my emotional environment. It is at this point that the idea of reconstructive ethics (Ferry, 1996) enters in the research.

6.5.6.3 Social housing geotype

I have attempted to mobilise the concept of reconstructive ethics (Ferry, 1996) by giving equal weights to all the arguments of the corpus with that is, reconstructing them so that they are brought to the same linguistic register (without breaching the coherence sensed in the ensemble of the interview). The idea of putting the arguments in apposition implied selecting a topic – social housing.⁸⁶⁹ Bringing into dialogue discourses delivered in an interpretative, narrative or argumentative level used a conceptual framework: Jacques Lévy's theory of space and Sen's theory of justice.⁸⁷⁰ In this exercise,⁸⁷¹ denunciations of injustice enable us to apprehend what the inhabitants' value in space, for them and for others, as well as how they justify – cognitive and affectively – the appropriateness of those values. These justifications includes important information regarding what goes wrong with the solutions of social housing.

⁸⁶⁸ I had spent considerable time arguing for individual liberty in the face of public goods and it was confirming my self-perception of political immaturity to discover my position just below that summit.

⁸⁶⁹ Several reasons supported the choice of the topic: the existence of arguments from virtually all members of the corpus with regard to this theme, the comfort I felt with the topic (given its proximity with architecture and urbanism) and the easiness to find the arguments in the corpus (more dynamic problems are harder to locate).

⁸⁷⁰ The choice of Jacques Lévy's theory of space and Sen's theory of justice is argued, respectively, in chapters 2 and 4. It is interesting to point out that the analytical experience of shedding light on all points of view encountered in the corpus from Sen's theory helped me realise the latter's superior capacity to participate in the converge of the society's points of view, when such convergence is necessary for the living together.

⁸⁷¹ For the reconstructed version of this study (that is, synchronised with all other thesis developments) see section 8.1 of chapter 8, "Social housing geotype".

This exercise was initially developed in an attitude that contained moral elements, as it removed the arguments from the political field plane they could be de-legitimised. As such, the initial geotype organises the claims of justice into three components, with different gradients of openness to an ethical debate (and, consequently, varying degrees of closure to normative belonging to a given foundation):⁸⁷² “Freedom in space” claims liberties (agency-freedom and wellbeing-freedom) implied in co-presence and in neighbouring conditions. The entitlement to a space of existence protected from fear for one’s personal integrity echoed the sense of justice as *Nyaya*, where a historically located sensitivity justifies immediate remedy, irrespective of perfect consensus in the public sphere.⁸⁷³ “Capability in space”, sets up a field of public deliberation as well as of negotiation in copresence when the impossibility of equality of certain capabilities becomes visible (civilities, lifestyle). A third group, “capability through space”, concerns the cases where space itself is seen to be a component of the global set of opportunities individuals are able to enjoy, with an instrumental role and tied to a sense of future. It can benefit from knowledge of how space functions to deliver societal objectives and opens up the arena where public debate is conceived in tension with knowledge. These three components were articulated with different roots of spatial incompatibility: pluralism of preferred models of inhabiting (as they are manifest in residential choice and in the use of common and public spaces); the epoch implied in the demanded capability (a community is no longer possible in the historic centre of Porto); economy and efficiency in urban dynamics (whose worth society might decide to compromise for ethical reasons).

In this study I found common ground on the transversal capacity to denunciate injustice on the basis of well-being freedom. Despite this commonality, the geotype could be synthesized into two mutually exclusive chorotypes: an urban scale, topologic space with presence of aggregative goods, a neighbourhood; and a topographic space without aggregative goods.⁸⁷⁴ I observed that interviewees mobilised more or less complete sets of justice ideas and that not all the inhabitants could evoke societal realisations nor the role of space in those achievements. By the end of this exercise I explained the variation of the corpus through the existence of an ethical capital. Its initial definition reflects my parallel readings on child development and formation of moral values, through a constructivist perspective of progressive enlargement of spheres of empathy (Gopnik, 2010; Piaget, 1948,1972; Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977):

“Ethical capital: the capacity to test or claim the possibility of generalisation to others of what one individual of group claims for himself. That capacity seems to involve a certain educational level, abstract reasoning ... and a certain spatial capital, that is, the opportunity to have contacted alterity in order to enlarge the basis of similitude (or social group of belonging) involved in processes of empathy and [in the transition] ... from processes of empathy to processes including cognitive operations involving concepts such as that of society ... [from] the scale of the family to world-society.” Personal notes, June 2014.

A socially constructed ethical capital was a finer treatment of the idea of “equal moral worth”, conform to my empirical observations.⁸⁷⁵ Foundational to the idea of equality, the predisposition to treat human beings universally as of equal worth is integrated into the idea of equality of capitals posited at the horizon of societal realisation, not at a point of departure. I conjectured ethical capital in systemic interrelation with other capitals and hypothesised that a poor capital could, at least partially, depend on relative deprivation in other planes (reflexivity and individual will are likely to play a role). While I continued to justify my resistance to making justice blind to the arguments delivered from less ethical positions, I displaced my focus into new research questions. Can society invest in a horizon

⁸⁷² For the accuracy of this narrative and to appreciate the implications of a movement from a moral to an ethical stand of argument, it is important to note that this removal from discussion was reflecting my own values, rather than an observation of a common feature, concluded from the study of the corpus

⁸⁷³ This historical sensitivity is formed through open impartiality, and it is not necessarily restricted to local common sense.

⁸⁷⁴ For the definition of the couple topographic/topologic see point 2.2.1 in chapter 2, “Space is a dimension of society and a multidimensional object”.

⁸⁷⁵ The notion of “equal moral worth” is endorsed by Rawls, as reviewed in point 4.3.4 of chapter 4, “The continuity of “reflective equilibrium” in empirical problematics”. The similar idea of “common humanity” is at the basis of Boltanski and Thévenot’s construction, as seen in point 1.2.5 of chapter 1, “Plural justifications in social environments (Boltanski and Thévenot)”. For developments on the notion of ethical capital see “Conclusions of Part II” and “Final conclusion”.

of equality of ethical capital, through space? Can the development of the inhabitants' spatial representation reduce the feeling of injustice in the face of geographic reality? Which kind of experience and policy could support such development? Pedagogy? Spatiality? Space? Given the congruence of ideas of space and justice, would the techniques behind such spatial developments entail an ethicization of society? Initial explorations of these questions retreated within the *spèere idéal*, affected by my preference and the field of my most developed competences.⁸⁷⁶

6.5.6.4 Individual geotypes

The exercise *Individual geotypes* consisted on the synthesis of two interviews, trading-off the coverture of the full corpus by a detailed access to complete interviews. It responds to three objectives, which were not explicit upfront. The exercise started by trying to answer whether the covariation between space and justice was coherent across all the problems treated by a single interviewee. The hypothesis of pluralism sustained that different ways of "considering space" would influence the variation of arguments across urban topics.⁸⁷⁷ If I had put aside the priority of responding to this question, this hypothesis nevertheless restrained generalising from the observations of previous studies. This hypothesis could now be resumed, as I became increasingly able to reconstruct comparable chorotypes on a basis of scale, disrespecting, to an extent, the pragmatics of the discourse. On the antipodes of what I had wanted to control in the past, it is not the same "empirical case" which makes for the comparison between arguments but how interviewees construct different "cases" from the same spatial referent (Europe, world) or, put differently, how they attribute different empirical correspondences to concepts. The idea of a geotype treating the interspatiality between the different chorotypes (that we can possibly detect) in the discourses is the answer to the interrogation on "internal" pluralism of the spatial justice conception of two interviewees.

The second objective of this study was a transversal regard with the explicative purpose of understanding how the conception of spatial justice is constructed. I chose to study two discourses which I sensed to be symmetric. I presumed the pertinence of contrasting educational capital and spatial biographic elements, which were communicated along with their argumentation (similarity in international travels, contrasting lengths of *séjour* in foreign cities, peri-urban and urban actual residences). Choosing interviewees who debate the freguesia, the municipality, but also Portugal, Europe and the world, I accepted to surpass the scale of urbanism, to which I had restricted the scope of previous analyses.

A third objective regards the theoretical and methodological implications of an ethical capital for a theory of spatial justice. Making intelligible the socially constructed character of justice configures deontological strength as a potential, rather than factual universal competence. Defined as the capacity to protect oneself from bias and assuring universal inclusion of others, equality of this competence is a societal desirability. It raises the question on how the just can be deliberately constructed, and stresses the conflict of injustice denunciations, when delivered from different conceptions (and the varying degrees of their *sociétalité*). Based on this study, Jacques Lévy verbalised that telling the just is not the same as telling the unjust, against what the construction of the word "unjust" (from the same lexeme and inverted prefix) points to in the natural language use of the notion. Reversing spatial conditions restricting individual's perception of injustice is not a corollary of the just, for that response might compromise other important justice elements and justice done to others. The question then emerging was to distinguish the just from the unjust.

With this question in mind, I tried to establish thresholds of argumentative legitimacy. I look closely at the display of individuals' arguments across the two interviews, testing them in terms of objectivity, reasonableness and

⁸⁷⁶ Somewhat responding to the pressure that justice is nevertheless about telling how to reduce injustice, I formulate the possibility of experiencing the just only at the level of representation. Though I do not decouple ideality from spatial experience, at this point I underplayed policies influencing a material space in favour of policies favouring the positive experience of alterity: diversification of spatial profiles of mediators (in policies intervening in space making through the use of facilitators), incitement to contact with different spaces, creation of contents of geographic pedagogy in association with civic ethic...

⁸⁷⁷ This hypothesis is treated in point 6.5.4.4 of this text, "Research hypotheses (II): the hypothesis of pluralism".

impartiality. In doing so, I realised that the *regime de vérité* was no longer situated at the ideal level of representation, but at the interface between affective (of the interviewee and my own) and cognitive judgments. The latter had been excluded from the research object since the definition of the research usefulness as a portrait towards *l'autotranscendence du social* (as seen in point 6.5.4.5). In the face of chorotypes that greatly surpassed the city, I had to assume my level of geographical knowledge, however imperfect, and form a political opinion, however immature.⁸⁷⁸

I concluded that some spatial models are more aligned with the reality of a globalised world than others and such feature is associated with the reasonableness of justice claims. A model integrative of multi-dimensional substances, capable of conceiving networks (and not just territories), and relating spaces in terms of co-spatiality/interlocking (and not just interfaces) is more susceptible of identifying as political scales truly societal spaces, inclusive of otherness. Thinking about capability, liberty and public good in that complex spatial framework enhances reasonableness of arguments, that is, arguments which, at my eyes, are less restrictive of their potential acceptability by others. The more integrated the conception of the individual and society as indiscernible in development – which is a corollary of being able to argue in terms of societal advantage – the looser the tension between elements of justice, once substantivized in spatial terms.⁸⁷⁹ The presence of the idea of individual-society as part of the conception of spatial justice, removes the likelihood of reasonable rejection of an argument on the basis of *transcendence* of the public realm by private demands of inhabiting.

The exercise “Individual geotypes” integrates space and justice by mobilising the interviewees’ explanation of the world. The observation of degrees of accuracy in the geographical competence of the individuals (and their impact on political views), demanded reflection on the relationship between knowledge and politics, or, in other words, between the affective and cognitive facets of spatial justice. Informed by knowledge, consensus is not closed by it, while the political is the antinomy of making prevalent the opinion of some without consideration of competitive views. How can we, then, help to frame reasoning on spatial justice in political forums (at the relevant metropolitan scale)? Which categories, respecting the integration of justice and space, can clarify the antinomies between citizens? How can we signal the potential incompatibility of their claims?⁸⁸⁰ In response to these questions, the ten coordinates intersecting space and justice, offered in chapter 7 (point 7.3), aim to function as typical conceptions of spatial justice, potentially present beyond Porto, in other empirical contexts.

6.5.6.5 Proto-conclusions

In their ensemble, the corpus studies make it possible to see that the conceptions of space and justice, as they are readable in people’s discourses, meet at a profound junction. I have hypothesised that this can be explained by the use, in their construction, of the same dialogical elements: the idea of the *other* affects the predisposition for equality (justice) and, being a synonym to the level of alterity of the interviewee, it affects its inhabiting preferences (*allophile/allophobe*) (space); reflexivity (and the way in which it is a corollary of ethics/justice) seem to have a role in the composition of reality models thus impacting the complexity of space. These combinations, conflating affective-objective predispositions and their cognitive-objective intellectual support shows that spatial justice does

⁸⁷⁸ In the appreciation of the reasonableness of the arguments, I have used a multiplicity of strategies: 1) looking for untrue elements (for example, the competition in the fishery industry between Portugal and Spain seen as worsened after the integration in the European Union); 2) recognising my limited knowledge and researching clarifying information (for example: what was the level of consensus at the time of the adherence to Europe? Information: Portugal did not pass a referendum as other countries’ adherence to the EU); 3) confronting an argument with alternative accounts within the corpus or my own (for example: generalisation of preference of women to abandon their careers to raise children at home, whenever possible).

⁸⁷⁹ We observe increased compatibility between individual spatial liberties, the sort of spatial capability for which equality is claimed and systemic goods.

⁸⁸⁰ I have rejected the supremacy of higher ethical capitals which would fix an *a priori* societal project. In the view of justice that sustains our work, the horizon of the just needs to be jointly defined from the diversity of positions held by its members.

not respect the Kantian division between, on the one hand, an empiric world and the theoretical categories that allow its apprehension; and, on the other hand, moral/ethical intuitions (Kant, 1781/1998).

If I detected an overlap of justice and space in the *sphère idéal*, these reflect the reciprocal demands of these two societal constructions upon each other. On the one hand, space demands from justice a vantage point from where to evaluate the trade-off between plural spatial demands. Space also questions some deontological devices as means to control self-interest and discriminatory processes (ideas such as content-independency and impartiality do not survive well spatial substantiation).⁸⁸¹ On the other hand, justice requires that the categories used to identify what, in space, is indistinctively advantageously for the individual and for society, be open to the construction of consensus.⁸⁸²

The specificity of thinking justice in spatial terms does not reside on a different relationship between empirics and theory. We have seen that most justice theories support themselves on empirical substance, a model of the social world. It is perhaps the inter-spatiality – the reality of existing relations between the far and the near, the small and the bigger interrelated places – and the tension between spatiality and space – the reality of a dialectic between the individual and society in space – that makes for the friction of existing justice theories and space to produce new categories of thought. These categories should make it possible to construct a theory without opposing “thin” and “thick” objects of the social work while sustaining the openness of public debate and the open evolution of society.⁸⁸³

6.5.6.6 Hermeneutics and interpretative research

The main difficulty of this research is that its object is not observable. Even if we do believe in certain coherence between what individuals do in their daily lives and what they think is ethical, some topics relevant for spatial justice fall outside their field of practice. We then need to devise methods to access individuals’ ideas. Thought is the ultimate phenomenon of this qualitative study. Like for empirical phenomena, we believe that thoughts “exist not only in the [researcher’s] mind but also in the objective world – and that some lawful and reasonable stable relationships are to be found among them” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 4).

⁸⁸¹ In spatial terms, the principle of content independency associates the just with the universalisation of the right to find a spatial response to the personal liberty claimed in one’s own name, independent of the spatial content of that liberty. Universalising one’s justice claims to others faces the problem of diversity that we have studied in this research.

⁸⁸² As public advantage is not universally perceived, it seems cautious to keep universality outside the concept that seeks to construct convergence. The notion of public goods is well at the centre of this question.

⁸⁸³ For the conclusive formulation of this proposition see points 11 to 14 of the “Conclusions of Part I”.

7 The *sociétalité* of spatial justice

It is worth recalling that, at the outset of this thesis, we have postulated the ethos and space as separate planes. Ethics are present in the properly political plane, and, via the non-institutional versant of the political function, in all social dimensions consubstantial with space. We have, however, created two viewpoints to try to seize the specific contributions of each plane to understand how the actors think social life. We have also mentioned in several occasions that an intuition of multiple degrees of *sociétalité* of the conceptions of spatial justice has informed both the exploration of our empirical object and the construction of the literature review presented in part I. This construction investigates the hypothesis that the way in which justice theories mobilise a view of the social world must bear some proximity with the way in which the inhabitants assess in their habitat, identifying injustice in space, and imagining more just spatial arrangements or layouts.

This chapter has some diachronic elements, though the objective is to synchronise all empirical observations in theorems of spatial justice, levelling theory and empirics. In the section “Inclusiveness of justice, complexity of space” (section 7.1), we briefly review how the hypothesis of *sociétalité* of spatial justice conceptions emerged.⁸⁸⁴ We also present the initial typology of the ways to connect space and justice, which, as seen in the overview of the corpus studies, this typology is used as a hypothesis for quantitative exploration (point 6.3.1.3). The proposed types are revisited in the second section of this chapter, “The words of spatial justice” (section 7.2), presenting the observations that result from the use of textometry.⁸⁸⁵ A revised typology is proposed in a third part of the chapter (section 7.3). The point of arrival is not only a refinement and improved communication of the initial typology. The proposed portrait of “Ten encounters between space and justice” advances more accurate affiliations with justice theories and changes in the assessment of the *sociétalité* of some types of discourse. As the succession of our discoveries are tied to the products of the textometry activities (and the initial typology investigated through that technique), it is necessary to ask the reader to follow this original materials: an approximation from lesser to more synthetic types. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 keep the types in the order of their discovery.⁸⁸⁶ The reconstruction presented in section 7.3 explores the formalisation of the degrees of *sociétalité*. It is supported by the theoretical framework developed in chapters 4 and 5. This formalisation also tries to distil between the conception of spatial justice of the “coordinate from the ethos” and the chorotypes of spatial injustice that result from the encounter with the city of Porto. If this section produces a contrasting panorama, the final text of this chapter (section 7.4), traces the continuities and discontinuities found in the ideality of Porto society. This chapter identifies the core elements of response to the questions raised at the outset of the empirical work.

⁸⁸⁴ More information on study 3 is included in E.3.

⁸⁸⁵ Complementary information to study 4 can be obtained from annex E.4.

⁸⁸⁶ As described in chapter 6, the composition of the types move from a selection of discourses with low frequency of words derivative from “just” (producing types 1 to 4 and 6). It then proceeds with the treatment of the discourses in high-relative frequencies of the same lexeme (producing the types 5.1 to 5.3). The remaining discourses have produced 2 new types with low use of the lexeme (8, 10), and two with high frequencies of derivate forms of justice (7, 9).

7.1 Inclusiveness of justice, complexity of space

In the first section of this chapter, we assume the provisional interpretation of the corpus, quoting the description of the twelve ways to connect space and justice as they were immobilised in an oral presentation delivered in April 2015.⁸⁸⁷ The cognitive demarche is general/particular (rather than a universal/singular approach).⁸⁸⁸ It is accompanied by a set of visualisations produced at that time. What emerges in these materials is the co-variation of degrees of inclusiveness of justice with the complexity of space. We can see that the broader the inclusiveness of the other in one's reflexivity on habitat, the bigger and more complex the spaces of injustice configured by the discourse. The size of the social whole with which the individual sees himself concerned with is related to the level of *sociétalité* and complexity with which space is conceived. The more there is justice, the more present is space.

7.1.1 First qualitative definition of the types

Now I will briefly describe the diagram on the slide, as an introduction to the 12 types that resulted from this exercise (numbered 1 to 10 as type 5 is subdivided in 3)... These titles are rather eclectic, and not conceptual. They were the expressions that helped me to capture the core of the type.

In "Little place, mainly family" (T1), the interviewees are absorbed by personal issues (sickness, lack of money, unemployment), there is literally no "space" for space in the spontaneous answer and no explicit arguments of justice.

"Invaded in the immediate environment" (T2), refers to the cases where space – from which the interviewees cannot escape – is an extension of the body, impregnated with the feeling of being menaced in one's integrity.

"Goodness and charity in relationships" (T3) is a type where the interviewees describe several problems with the common aspect that the intentionality of the actors who participate in those problems is reduced to their lack of moral behaviour: they are greedy and mean. The judgement of the good is close to Saint-Thomas Aquinas and morality.

"Longing for place of belonging" (T4). In this type, the cause of sufferance lies in place of transformation when seen from a sense of obviousness of living in one's place of birth or of long-time residence. I found here an articulation of Honneth's justice as recognition.

In "Desirability of development", the main argument stems from a conception of urban features as goods – seen as objects or services – which should be universally made available across the territory. This type is subdivided into 3.

The first sub-type – communitarian (5.1) – it is held by individuals with strong identification with their community of origin. The desirability of development is legitimated as the need for conditions to remain in their land as well as to put their land in the "map". I found here an articulation of Honneth's justice as a recognition to Rawls' distributive justice (applied to the territory).

The second sub-type – unsatisfied local residents (5.2) – brings together people who desire those objects but speak from an individual standpoint, and not a communitarian stance; so, it is the distributive idea that is present and the recognition aspect is not.

⁸⁸⁷ There was a thirteenth type with one interview that was so ambiguous that it resisted classification. This type appears in the detailed studies which was included in the annexes XXX as "Ambiguous". The integral version of this presentation can be accessed in "Space and Justice. Experiences and discourses of Porto inhabitants" (Póvoas, 2015).

⁸⁸⁸ The universal/singular approach is defined in point 4.2.1, "The universal/singular as the tension in theory/empirics".

In the third sub-type – satisfied (5.3) – the interviewees underline their benefit from the proximity of densified areas. At the risk of caricature, here there are no arguments of justice.

In “Urbanity as good” (T6), I have put together the interviewees who share two main aspects: the existence of a horizon of equality among individuals (rather than among places) and the positive valuation of – though they only rarely put in these words – urban public goods of universal access (to the inhabitants of Porto Metropolitan area). Urbanity as good resonates with Lefebvre’s right to the city and Jacques’ public goods.

“Space participates in capability” (T7) shares with the previous type the horizon of equality between individuals. It distances from that type in the fact that, according to these inhabitants, spatial experience has a role to play in emancipation from inequality, together with education. These people tend to think that solidarity is not enough. As per Jacques’s idea of co-production of capability, we need an altered relationship between recipient and supporter (Lévy, 2012, pp. 138–139).

In “Telos of the city” (T8), there is a positive valuation of the city centre of Porto as the place where the city’s purposefulness should be realised by and for the “citadins”. That purpose is the living, working, and meeting of its people. Injustice resides in the corruption of the virtue of the city, including other users and uses. We find Aristotle’s definition of justice in relation to fitness for purpose.

In “Meritocracy” (T9), I am thinking of Nozick’s critique of distributive justice, as the interviewees naturalize – to an extent – inequality between people. The city is a place born out of work and will naturally reflect how different people engage in that sphere.

Finally, the type “Not speaking in the name of others” (T10), which is composed of only one person, resists the interview instruction. As the interviewee does not have anything to disturb her, she has nothing to say. I only know about Durkheim’s concept of Anomie very superficially, so I have put it in grey, to try and capture the absence of social ethics and concern for the other....

Based on these observations, Jacques helped me to formulate the hypothesis where spatial justice, seen through the society of Porto, could be described as a succession of positions along the diagonal that crosses two main quadrants: no space and no justice; and space and justice.

At the lower left extremity of the graph, we have the interviewees who articulate the desired or the needed, from the point of view of the person (affective-subjective relationship with the injustice) without involving the other, except as a figure of is oppressor. We have seen how space is not very present in there. At the upper right extremity, we have those who articulate the desirable as a political and societal project from the positions of a higher spatial awareness.” (Póvoas, 2015).



Figure 16 Original structure of types showing covariation of space and justice (January 2015).




Figure 17 Sketches at the basis of observation of realisation of space and justice (January 2015).The sketches are organized by increased scale of main unjust chorotype of each type of discourse.

	OBJECTS WITHOUT SOCIETY		SPACE WITH SOCIETY			
	NO SPACE	BODY ENVIRONMENT	PLACE (within an area)	ARCHITECT. OBJECT	PLACE (within a city)	CITY
Universal moral values	T3 Goodness and charity in relationships					
Person / family	T1 No Place, mainly family	T2 Invaded in the immediate environment				
Group defined values Community			T5.1 Desirability of development		T4 Longing for place of belonging	
Group defined values "Citadins"					T8 Telos of the city	
Individual values			T. 5.3 Satisfied with development T10 Not speaking...		T9 Meritocracy T5.2 Unsatisfied residents	
Society values	Promiscuity of spheres			Aesthetics and heritage		
Society + Individual values						T6 Urbanity as good T7 Space participates in capability

Figure 18 Diagram of types showing covariation of space and justice (April 2015). In the vertical axis we can read the inclusiveness of the other mobilised in the enunciation of value-judgements, while the horizontal axis presents the modalities of the conception of space. "Promiscuity of spheres" and "Aesthetics and heritage" are themes emerging in several types.

7.1.2 Interpretative hypothesis

The materials presented above attest that the types can be organised progressively, into increasingly more encompassing conceptions of space and of justice. In this quote, we can access the hypothesis of co-variation of space and justice to be pursued in the rest of the chapter.

"The first observation that helped me in this exercise, was the idea of a progression of space. This hypothesis emerged with the sketches that I drew to help me understand how an interviewee is conceiving the space in his problem. If, at first look, this progression seems to be in terms of scale, it is indeed a matter of the levels of sociétalité/sociality of the spaces. An increase in scale of the space considered pertinent to explore a problem is but a sign of an increasing level of complexity of the models of society and space used to explain reality." (Póvoas, 2015).

7.2 The words of spatial justice

« Le langage qui intéresse le géographe n'est pas seulement celui dont il se sert, mais aussi celui des sociétés qu'il étudie, car l'analyse du langage d'un groupe donne accès au monde dans lequel vit celui-ci. Les mots, en fait, ne désignent pas des objets déjà là : ils font plutôt venir à l'être certaines configurations du monde réel, ou, dirait-on de manière plus constructiviste, ils produisent le monde. » (Staszak, 2013, p. 541).

This second section presents the study of the lexical specificities of each type.⁸⁸⁹ We investigate whether the specific words revealed by TXM relate to the proposed interpretation of the type and whether the specificities contrast with the vocabulary of the remaining corpus.⁸⁹⁰ As described in the overview of the corpus studies (point 6.3.1), we have used TXM to divide the corpus into thirteen parts,⁸⁹¹ each of which includes all the interviewees classified within one of the twelve types. The work presented here rewrites the results of the textometry exercise in light of the theoretical architecture that has been developed since. It is a fundamental step in assuring the accuracy of the observation of covariation of space and justice. Reading the list of positive and negative specificities transversally (across types) and longitudinally (through the type) enables the identification of the nuclei of meaning that are responsible for the interpretation in each of the semantic fields.⁸⁹² In other words, the exercise makes a distinction the isotopies between those which give an interpretative direction to the conceptions in the plane of ethos and those which apprehend the plane of space of the social. The epistemic model of multi-dimensional society prevents complete dissociation of substances from different dimensions in space. The substance of unjust chorotypes can include spatial and non-spatial elements (on economic, social, individual, and political dimensions as well). Despite these semantic co-occurrences, it is possible to keep the isotopies associated with the plane of ethos – words that express judgement – apart from words with semes of place, distance, urbanity, or no-spatial substances of space. We investigate these planes separately, not because they perform as such in the discourses, but to attest that the correlation of space and justice is not a by-product of a qualitative treatment of the same set of data (as if projected into different planes of analysis to suit the researcher's intentionality).

As we have glimpsed in the studies 1 to 2,⁸⁹³ there are interviewees who mobilise a horizon of justice, but that is not a constant feature of the corpus. In some types, we detect the specific semes of equality and capability, in some other, these “universals of justice” do not belong to the semantic specificities of the discourse. Contrasting is also the seme of negative judgement and criticism vis-à-vis propositions of directions for improvements (which we interpret as the presence/absence of a positive horizon of justice). The semantic fields of ethos is also accounted for through deontological elements. In this textometry reading of the corpus, we have resorted to “diagonal” indicators, linked with the communicative strategy of the interviewees, that is, different modes of rationality pointing to the various discursive registers.⁸⁹⁴ Through this angle, we have contrasted the linguistic marks indicating the level of presence of the enunciator in the discourses. The lack of personal and possessive pronouns and co-occurring verbs orients the interpretation (without determining it) to more de-centred modalities of spatial justice (and vice-versa). The plural/singular declination of these two grammar categories also helps locate the discourse in a realm of individual versus collective justice claims. We have seen that procedural rationality implies making arguments which

⁸⁸⁹ For the concepts of textometry used in this chapter, such as that of isotopy and seme, see point 6.2.3 of chapter 6, “Textometry, a technique of corpus exploration”.

⁸⁹⁰ In this exercise, we are interested in the ensemble of words which are overemployed in relation to the rest of the corpus- We read as specific all words with a specificity score above 3. For the statistical meaning of this value see annex D.

⁸⁹¹ The thirteenth part corresponds to an ambiguous interview which, at this point, remains uncategorised in the proposed typology.

⁸⁹² To make sense of the “lexical profiles”, I have removed the words from the TXM output lists (ordered by specificity score). In this exercise, we are not comparing the force of the specificity score within a type or across types.

⁸⁹³ For considerations on studies 1 and 2 see points 6.3.1.1, 6.3.1.2 and 6.5.6.2 (chapter 6) and annexes E.1 and E.2.

⁸⁹⁴ For the link between modes of rationality and discursive registers see point b. of the Introduction, “Ethics of reconstruction and the plural rationalities of actors”.

resist the tests of universalisation. It is the register that political philosophy associates with the study justice. Its presence in the discourse can be seen as an overall mark of epoch of ethics vis-à-vis morality.

The plane of space is identified in words with an explicit spatial seme (for example, city, place, zone, urban, country, Europe). This gives an indication of the scales considered pertinent to discuss injustice and habitat.⁸⁹⁵ We can grasp the reference of high urbanity through the objects, services and events that individuals place in the existing or desirable spaces. At this point, we do not assess whether the conception considers density and diversity indissociably, but we annotate whether the objects evoke a sense of materiality (the mass and energy of spatial physical infrastructure) vis-à-vis the intangible sphere of space.⁸⁹⁶ References to mobility help us understand if distance is activated and whether networks are part of the spatial conception. Common nouns referring to the actors, and their interactions in and through space, give an indication of the complexity of non-spatial substances of space.⁸⁹⁷ This isotopy, that we have named “non-spatial substance of space”, allows us to see that the more societal the conceptions are, the more they allow a distinction between the two planes. When the interviewees can explain injustice through the social, they also resort to the materials of justice to identify the lacunae to be transformed in the horizon. The presence of empirical endogenous resources and the acknowledgement of a social construction of values with others (requiring a universalising rationality) are the definite traits which distinguish pre-ethical and post-moral conceptions of spatial justice.

The interpretations of the lexical specificities according to the lenses of ethos and of space are synthetised in table 14. This figure orders the types by decreasing absence of the identified semes. These observations are exposed in detail in points 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 below. A conclusive passage (7.2.3) underlines the role of spatiality in the construction of spatial justice conceptions.

⁸⁹⁵ Toponyms confirm the interpretation made with regard to the information on scale. Our knowledge of their density/land value gives us the predominant geotype that matters for injustice.

⁸⁹⁶ Objects which are theoretically associated with high urbanity are at times seen by the interviewees as positional, that is, independent from the spatial realities (and degree of urbanity) that produce them. This is only an approximation to their systemic view of space.

⁸⁹⁷ The actors and objects enter in the spatial conception denoting the complexity of substances of the social involved in assessing justice and injustice (as well as the possibility of coexistence of such entities). They could have also been projected onto the ethical plane, as an indication of the encompassment of actors involved in the assessment of injustice. We have opted for the first geometry. In theory, the reference to actors and objects does not mean that they all provoke an affective response of injustice. Indeed, we have seen with Sen that some consequences might not be unjust if they are not under someone’s effective power. Also, the interviewees have the possibility to talk about other spaces and then to compare them with Porto, while not necessarily extending their ethical concerns to the others in these spaces.

Type	The plane of ethos						The plane of space				
	Horizon of justice			Deontological elements			Scale	Metric and substance			
	Positive horizon	Equality	Capability	High presence of the enunciator (I)	Absence of the enunciator (we)	Discursive register		Presence of the societal urban scale	High urbanity with intangible sphere	Activation of distance	Networked metrics
6	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/A/R	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
7	Dark grey	Light grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/A/R	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
5.2	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/A	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
5.3	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/A	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
9	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/A	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
8	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/A	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
4	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/A	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
5.1	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/A	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
3	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/I	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
2	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/I	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
1	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N/I	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey
10	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	N	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey	Dark grey

Table 14 Positive specificities of types: semes identified through the lenses of ethos and space. Dark grey indicates presence, blanks represent absence while light grey indicates ambiguity. The discursive registers are represented by the first letter of each modality: narrative (N), interpretation (I), argumentation (A), reconstruction (R).

7.2.1 Specific vocabularies: the planes of ethos and space (first typology)

7.2.1.1 [T1] In Little place, mainly family

7.2.1.1.1 The plane of ethos

In type 1, judgement is delivered through an affective-subjective language, predominately negative. Words from the lexeme “.*just.*” are not a part of the lexicon of positive specificities. Verbs expressing affective evaluation (*gosto*) and indicating sufferance (*desesperado, custou-me*) show that it is the self as a person who is mobilised in the *exposé*. Specific words are also personal and possessive pronouns are used in first person singular (*Eu, meu, comigo*), denoting a strong presence of the enunciator within the matter of the discourse. This is confirmed by the corresponding verbal forms (*tenho, estou, posso, vou, sei*). Pronouns in the third person singular (*Ele, ela, ele*) are also found as the means through which the speakers identify other actors involved in their accounts. The register is narrative and no specific vocabulary emerges to communicate a positive horizon of justice.

7.2.1.1.2 The plane of space

Type 1 has only one spatial object within its specific words: the object of the house. There is one activation of distance, through the use of toponym to designate other places rather than residence (*Praceta, Miragaia*).

7.2.1.1.3 The non-spatial substance of space

In type 1, we observe the saliency of kinship figures, denoting poor of the actions comprised in space are reduced to sociality (*filho, mãe, ex-mulher, mulher, avó, meninos*).

7.2.1.2 [T2] Invaded in the immediate environment

7.2.1.2.1 The plane of ethos

This type shares the same traits with type 1 (*eu, me, mim; andei, sei, vi, tenho, fui, faço, levei, vim, moro, cheguei, apanhei, posso-lhe, estou*). The only variant is that the third party includes both singular and collective instances (*eu, me, mim; Eles, ele*). Words from the lexeme “.*just.*” are absent.

7.2.1.2.2 The plane of space

Type 2 refers to the environment at to the scale of the body (*corpo*) and the neighbourhood of residence (*bairro, aqui*). It lists a number of physical components, of buildings (*parede, portas, janela*) and the city (*casa, casas*). This denotes a dominant focus on the material sphere of space. As in type 1, there is a minimal activation of distance through the use of toponym beyond residence (*Rua, Avenida, Música*). Part of type 2 has a seme of physical city patrimony (*Patimónio, restauro, Cristal, fachadas*), which was not acknowledged in the initial typology and indicates the possibility of internal division of the type.

In type 2, there is a seme of physical spatial destruction and invasiveness and occupation of environment (*destruição, destruído, arrancar, destruir, ocupados, ocupam, vender, polícia, delinquência, droga, mercadoria, overdose, Polícia, ladra, obrigados, matar, porrada*). This points to matters spatial justice defined as *unfreedom in space*. As we have noted in the introduction, spatial injustice and actors of society comprised in the overall discourse are coincident.

7.2.1.2.3 The non-spatial substance of space

Other social actors involved in the account of type 2 are the Gipsy and drug dealers accompanied by an isotopy of depreciation (*raça, escumalha, [essa] gente*). This is complemented by the references to groups sharing a condition of fragility with the speaker, even if the grounds of that debility are uncommon (*cego, ceguinho, pobres, cegos*). The spatial and ethos are both present in this vocabulary as the basis of moral concern for the other is similitude vis-à-vis an incompatible set of actors.

7.2.1.3 [T3] Goodness and charity in relationships

7.2.1.3.1 The plane of ethos

Type 3 is also marked by a discourse in the first person vis-à-vis a third singular party (*eu, me, Eu, mim, minha, comigo; ela, ele*) and derivatives from justice are absent. It is accompanied with a normative language (*humildes, correctas, sinceras*) and judgement of moral unworthiness (*maldades, avareza, vergonha*). The discourse register is “*nomologique*”. An isotopy of absolution is present (*perdoava, arrependeu-se*) as well as a catholic kernel (*Deus, rotários, fé, esmola, catequese*). It is “*misery*” that conveys negative judgement, not injustice.

7.2.1.3.2 The plane of space

Type 3 constructs isotopies with marks of a rural epoch (*terreno, poço, caminhos, aldeias, campo, carrinho, aldeiazitas, bouças, couves, lavrador, batatas*). The “*house*” is still a positive specificity. Distance emerges through references to proximity and movement (*pertinho, deslocação*) as well as metrics of networked mobility (*[linha] férrea/comboio, autocarro, carro*).⁸⁹⁸ There are references to freguesias (*Silvalde, Leça, Milhundos, Rande*) and municipalities (*Espinho, Penafiel, Sesimbra*)⁸⁹⁹ and one reference to an urban park (*Sameiro*).

7.2.1.3.3 The non-spatial substance of space

Type 3 presents a sense of kinship (*marido, irmão, filha, mulher, tio, filho, neto*), indicating the importance of affiliated persons to the self when talking about habitat. Other social entities in contact in space have a sense of negative affective charge. We observe the belittling naming of other actors: “*ladies*” (co-inhabitants of higher economic capital), “*little people*” and complot (*senhoras, gentinha, complô*). We note that the designation of Type 3 has a juridical sense, indicating justice as a legal matter in order to resolve conflict in transactions between actors (*senhoria, assinou, senhorios, conhecimento, aluguei, senhorio, despejo, comprou, assinou, aluguei; indemnização, divórcio, advogada, tribunal, recurso*).

The spatial and the ethos are communicated in these words. Spatial conception does not comprise the possibility of co-existence of different actors in space. This fractured social coincides with the absence of a collective positive horizon for justice. As in the previous type, we observe the encounter between ethos and space in an epoch of morality

7.2.1.4 [T4] Longing for place of belonging

7.2.1.4.1 The plane of ethos

The discourse is delivered from a collective voice, as marked by the overemployment of “*us*” (*nós, Nós*) accompanied by abundant verbs conjugated in the first person plural form (*recuperámos, erámos, fazermos, somos, podemos, víamos*). Justice and its derivative forms are not a part of the lexicon of positive specificities. The sense of the judgment evokes complexity (*complicado, problemático*) and negative transformation (*priorar*). An isotopy of common names denote an increase of objectivity, that is, the recognition of reality outside the perception of the observer (*realidade, fenómeno, reflexo, transformações, relação*). There is a sketch of an argumentative register. It is accompanied by more explicit values: we observe sensitivity to social differentiation (*privilégio, pobres*)⁹⁰⁰ which is not an unambiguous activation of the sense of equality. There is an isotopy on how injustice affects others, which we can read as sensitivity to capability (*afectou, capacidade, chance, perspectiva, possibilidades, dificuldades, possibilidades*

⁸⁹⁸ All references on train and bus are from E26. The first accounts for the difficulties in accessibility to central geotypes, while the latter for difficulties of mobility in a low density zone.

⁸⁹⁹ We know these places are of low and medium densities.

⁹⁰⁰ I had put in explanation an important isotopy for the comparison with the sense of virtuality in other groups:

[*económicas*]). This register is paralleled with affective-subjective evaluations (*Mal, duro, terrível*), which are not exclusively negative (*extraordinário, maravilhado*).⁹⁰¹

7.2.1.4.2 The plane of space

Type 4 is marked by the over-presence of toponym referring to neighbourhoods - territorial metrics - within the municipality of Porto (*Foz, Miragaia, Castelo do Queijo, (bairro de) Xangai, Aleixo*). There is an isotopy on the beach (*Praia, areia, bairros, maré, balnear, casa, praias, pesca, banheiros, esplanadas, ambiente, bandeira, gelado, gelados, mergulho*). The place adverb “*cá*” and the name “*zona*” are positive specificity of the type, signalling the non-activation of distance and dominance of the topologic metric. An isotopy of markers of urbanity is associated with the transformation of places (*hostels, turista, boom, cinemas, chocolataria, ouriversaria*). There are also mentions of the built fabric (*Elevador, habitadas*). There are no mentions of the city or municipality.

7.2.1.4.3 The non-spatial substance of space

Type 4 has a rich vocabulary of social actors, presented in general terms (*pessoal, garoto, homem, miúdos, gajo*), or in specific roles (merceeiro, taqueiros⁹⁰²). Some institutional entities designate collective actors (*autoridades, cooperativa*)⁹⁰³. It is possible to identify an isotopy of social contacts extrapolating interpersonal relationships of sociality (*negócios, reuniões, contactos, proposta, concurso, democraticamente, ouviu-nos*).⁹⁰⁴

7.2.1.5 [T5.1] Desirability of “development”, communitarian

7.2.1.5.1 The plane of ethos

The communitarian type is marked by first person collective pronoun (*nós, Nós, nossa, nosso, conosco*) and the negative specificity of third person pronouns. As in type four, verbal forms are conjugated in first person plural forms (*temos, termos, somos, vamos, conseguimos, tivemos, tínhamos, fomos*). Words from the lexeme “*.*just.**” are absent. Type 5.1 forms an isotopy expressing judgement in relation to unequal advantage (*carências, limitações, desvantajoso*). This points to the interpretation of justice on a comparative basis, activating the seme of equality (we know from the qualitative reading that the comparison is in between places, and not individuals, where the facets of equality are incomplete). There is a seme of equivalence, possibility and improvement indicating that the discourse has raised to an argumentative level, at times evoking public good (*[saúde] pública*). These isotopies point towards the existence of an idea of progress (we will see that it is not at a societal scale). The interviewees call it “development” (*desenvolveu, desenvolver*).

7.2.1.5.2 The plane of space

5.1 is dominated by references to parishes, both through the employment of the word “*freguesias*” and respective toponym.⁹⁰⁵ This infra-societal scale is also accompanied by the word “*lugar*”⁹⁰⁶ (accompanied associated toponym). There are also some toponym referring to places at the scale of municipality (Gondomar, Paredes, [Vila do] Conde). These references point to municipalities with contrasting levels of urbanity, concluding peri-urban and infra-urban

⁹⁰¹ They tend to qualify individual persons.

⁹⁰² “Tasqueiro” (owner of a popular bar) still has affective connotation as it refers to the social status of groups co-inhabiting in rich zone of Porto. With the crises and the emergence of nightlife, the “rich” and the poor have become owners of bars, equal in their economic role.

⁹⁰³ *Autoridades* refers to the police, and it is used in the theme of public space insecurity. It was the “us” who had to resolve the problem, not the authorities: “Eu tive que resolver esse problema, não foram as autoridades. Tive que arranjar meia dúzia de amigos para andarem aí por cima até encontrar os fregueses, que eram sempre os mesmos! Os gabirus da Pasteleira. Escusado será dizer, sentiram-se muito mal vir para aqui, então deixaram de vir cá. Não foram as autoridades. Nós temos que zelar da área que nos envolve.” (E48).

⁹⁰⁴ Type 4 talks of the attempts to remain in business in gentrified areas.

⁹⁰⁵ *Canidelo, Cova, Covelo, Baguim, Pedro, Sousa, Ferreiró, Sobreira, Vila, Beloi, Passal, Poço, Vicente, Afurada, Lixa, Gandra, Tardariz, Tinto, Freixo, Ave, Bagunte, Carvalhal, Melres, Mirandela, Recarei, Junta, Freguesia*. Except *Afurada* and *Freixo*, the other freguesias belong to non-central geotypes.

⁹⁰⁶ “Lugar” (place) is used in these cases to refer to places smaller than the freguesia.

areas.⁹⁰⁷ There is an isotopy associated with “rural” spaces (*terreno, terra, terrenos, água, águas, serra, campo, terras, lagoa, serras, aldeias, minas*). There is some vocabulary expressing proximity/concentrations (*junto, polo*). Sets of words such as roads, highway, swaeage, indicate towards the focus on networked and material spatial infrastructure (*Estrada, ponte, auto-estrada, PT, mini-hídrica, ETAR, Marina, marina, saneamento, arruamentos, EDP, estradões, barragem, viária, fossa, estradão, sumidouro, pista, REFER*). Locational facilities are also positive specificities (*Serviços, EB [escola], instalações, posto (de saúde), cemitério, lar, IPSS, [Casa do] Povo*).⁹⁰⁸ References to public mobility also emerges (*carreira, Gondomarense, STCP*); distance is evoked. Europe, Arabic and Asian countries Romania and Angola also emerge as positive specificities.⁹⁰⁹ The overemployment of “country” (*país*), that is, at a national scale, is specific to this type. We cannot know in this study what the interspatially between the several scales at play in the discourse (see section 8.2).

7.2.1.5.3 The non-spatial substance of space

In type 5.1, we find the use of the term “community” (*comunidade*). Specific to one interviewee, we also read the designation of the inhabitants by the name of the freguesia where they reside (*canidelendes*). We encounter the ethnic seme (*cigana, etnia, cigano, sapos, feirante, rótulo, mediadores*).⁹¹⁰ A considerable part of the stock of specific words is dedicated to political actors (*políticos, autarquia, autarca, Assembleia, República, presidente, PSD, governantes, Menezes, Presidente [da Junta], Secretário*) vis-à-vis the population (*população*). These actors point to political spaces of the freguesia, the municipality, and of national scales. These is an isotopy dedicated to the “aggregation of freguesias” and are in favour of decentralisation (*descentralização, agregação [de freguesias]*).

There is a dense isotopy dedicated to the local economy, both in its promising and difficult sectors (*agricultura, agricultor, empreendimento, exploração, companhias, explorar, máquina, fabricam, laborar, abastecimento, mineiros, ourives*).

Merging the ethos and space, there is a an isotopy on the seme of territorial cohesion (*subsídio, aproveitados, atrasar, favor, serviço, projecto*).⁹¹¹ It co-varies with the development seme, which is already treated in the ethos.

7.2.1.6 [T5.2] Desirability of “development”, unsatisfied inhabitants

7.2.1.6.1 The plane of ethos

This type does not use pronouns to refer to the components involved in its accounts of injustice in habitat. Verbs are conjugated in the first person, but they are not narrative (*referi, ouço, ouvi, estou, temo*). It overemploys the word “injustice” that is, a negative derivative from the lexeme “just”. Positive *semes* of justice are activated through more specific isotopies. Type 5.2 explicitly uses “equality”, “social” and “values”. Part of the vocabulary expresses competence, its potentiality (*vantagem, potencia*) or hindrance (*difícil, incapaz, falta, desvantagens, asfixia*). The discourse is constructed in an argumentative register.

⁹⁰⁷ Vila do Conde centrality has high density; the northern part of Gondomar also, the rest of the municipality has lower values. Paredes has low density

⁹⁰⁸ We can recall the EU cohesion funding addressed these territories in the form of hard infrastructure and ubiquitous efforts of public facilities mentioned in section 6.4 (chapter 6).

⁹⁰⁹ *Europa* (E42 only); *países, árabes, europeus* (E42 only), *asiáticos, União [Europeia]* (E47).

⁹¹⁰ E47 is a candidate to join type 4. He also holds an ambiguous position between the emergence of the individual and the valuation of the community. He does not want to be treated together with the “stigma” attributed to other groups, but wishes to retain and value some collective traits originating in group embedment (including some violence). He charges both the society members who holds the stigma and the individuals/subgroups as unjust that give reasons to that negative perspective. He evokes the need for mediators. He also describes using violence to fix problems of co-presence.

⁹¹¹ We know from the corpus frequentation that they conceive of development in a register of heteronomy. We have also mentioned in chapter 7 how the peri-urban and infra-urban have been invested with European cohesion funds.

7.2.1.6.2 The plane of space

In type 5.2, the dominant toponym are municipal.⁹¹² The importance of this scale – which is infra-societal – is confirmed by the use of common names (*ciudades, concelho, concelhos, sítios, cidade*).⁹¹³ Portugal is an overemployed word by the type. The supranational scale includes Iran, “Chinese” and Africa. An isotopy is dedicated to diversity of functions and activities (*andebol, jogar, skate, natação, balizas, hipermercados, infantário, hipermercado, escalada, cultura, correios, comércio, Shopping, ballet, dança, grafitar, pistas, actividades, jogos, parque, (Parque) Urbano, Multimeios*).⁹¹⁴ There are also references to spatial infrastructural objects (*hospital, pediatria, Hospital Santos (Silva)*). Distance is communicated through metrics of private mobility (*estrada, estradas, portagens*) and references to time-distance (*minutos*).

7.2.1.6.3 The non-spatial substance of space

Type 5.2 refers to the social groups of *ermesindenses*, identifying inhabitants in relation to their place of residence and the Chinese as a non-compatible other.⁹¹⁵ Kinship does not form an expansive list but it is present (*família*). Other common names refer to society actors as “inhabitants”, “persons” and “system” (*habitantes, pessoas, Sistema [político]*). These designations point to the perception of communal ensembles,⁹¹⁶ but they do not presuppose, by their sole employment, a systemic conception of society nor an agreement with solidarity.

5.2 overemploys an isotopy of development, implicating growth and creativity (*melhores, entendimento, crescimento, investimento, evolução, projectos, implementar, criar, tecnologia, criatividade, ideias*). There is also a seme dedicated to the economic crises of the country and its local effects (*dívida, dívidas, fechou, estrutural, emigraram, euros, emprego, dinheiro, exportar, dinheiros, caro, bancário, decréscimo, dividendos, Sonaes, empresas, pagar*).

7.2.1.7 [T5.3] Desirability of “development”, satisfied inhabitants with increased urbanity

7.2.1.7.1 The plane of ethos

This type also uses the pronouns I/they (Eu, Eles), pointing in the direction of a discourse in first person vis-à-vis a third party. We can detect concerns for equality in public space (*elite, VIP, elitista*).⁹¹⁷ There is also the occurrence of “compensation” and “constraint”. Abundant forms communicate just or agreeable evaluations of habitat (*justo, bom, ótimo, bem [humano], normal, cómodo*). The term “competence” is employed to qualify the absence skills of the actors in causing such injustice.⁹¹⁸ If we compare this type with the previous, we can see that it is less congruous. Though the contextual reading of some of the words, we could identify that some of the members of these types have been misplaced.⁹¹⁹ The plane of space

⁹¹² Ermesinde, Espinho, Trofa, Valongo, Gaia, Amadora.

⁹¹³ The infra-municipal includes two references (*Guetim, Anta*).

⁹¹⁴ We know from qualitative reading that the absence of these functions is denounced. We will see that although many of these activities are urban productions they are seen as objects that can be “encouraged” by municipal actors or even “distributed”.

⁹¹⁵ Perceived as unfair trade competitors through the local “Chinese shops”.

⁹¹⁶ Here, I make use of the distinction between community and communal that I have made when treating Walzer’s use of the terms (section 4.4) I had proposed to read communal as the characteristic of having been produced collectively in the society rather than a mark of intra-community similitude. The activated seme is that of public provision. In this particular analytical context, I use communal in opposition to collective, the latter implying the comprehension of a systemic functioning of society (in particular of urbanity).

⁹¹⁷ We will see that there is a chorotype about the topic of private retailer’s separation of elite and non-elite zones in terraces and bars.

⁹¹⁸ Employed only by E22.

⁹¹⁹ The presence of “bem humano” in E36 indicates that the full type is not located in an ethical period. There are some uncontested human goods with which one can evaluate the course of society. Commenting on the lack of resources of Portugal, to enact “human good”, E36 states: “Humano é ver as coisas com rectidão e com a pretensão do Além, porque quem não for e andar aqui ad hoc e não soube, não ligar nada, salve-se quem puder, isso já não interessa a repartição para essa gente, fiz-me entender? É preciso trilhar os caminhos certos!”. (E36).

This interviewee is affiliated with type 3, and is clearly misplaced.

Type 5.3 is a hybrid in its spatial isotopies. We find both the unit of *freguesia*,⁹²⁰ reference to some municipalities with high urbanity (Maia, Penafiel, and Porto), and to Portugal. We find indicators of a positive valuation of diversity (café, piscinas, Ecocentro, ISMAI, teatro, ringue, cinema, comercial, banco, desportivo, futebol, Instituto, parque, cafés, pavilhões, ginástica, Industrial, context, Vivaci, Lar, movimentação, passatempo). We know from the reading of the occurs that these words are now accompanied with a positive evaluation of their existence rather than absence).⁹²¹ Non-urbanity marks are also found (*bouças, aldeia, campos, milho, terra, trigo*). We find private metrics of mobility (*carro, estacionamento, estacionamentos, estacionar, trânsito, viaduto*) and public ones (*pé, metro, comboio, via-férrea, linha, caminho-de-ferro*). We also find the national scale (*nação*). As in the ethical plane, the type is less consistent, resonating both with type 3 and 5.2 (even with 6 in the importance of equality in public space), though with an inverse signal for the judgement of space, which here tends to be positive.

7.2.1.7.2 The non-spatial substance of space

5.3 refers to the actors of space in general terms (*população, populações, gente, jovens, juventude*). There are some political actors (president,⁹²² *governo*). One family designation (*irmã,*), one economic actor (*empreiteiros*), and a religious groups (*freiras*) cover the remaining actors. We identify the same internal diversity acknowledged for the ethos and for the properly spatial.

5.3 also approaches development (*desenvolvimento, melhor, inovação, reconstrução, evoluído*) and Portugal's debt vis-à-vis Europe (*deveres, [pedir ao] estrangeiro*). A chorotype (which had been overlooked in the study) concerns the effects of development on natural environment (*atmosfera, Terra, aviões, ozono, energia, petróleo, solar, camada*). We can consider that the societal substance of space is hybrid.⁹²³

7.2.1.8 [T6] Urbanity as good

7.2.1.8.1 The plane of ethos

Type 6 also does not use terms from the lexeme “.*just.*”. There is a proliferation of isotopies capturing the plural facets of the notion of justice, delivered as a positive horizon (*melhoria*). There is a seme of virtual rather than actualised resources of justice (*oportunidades, capacidade, acesso*). An isotopy on equality appears (*idênticas*), and it includes equality in public space (*público, públicos, [acesso] generalizado*). “Solidary” and words with a similar seme (*distribuídas, ajudada, sociais, social*) and “individualism” are also positive specificities.⁹²⁴ There is an isotopy expressing simultaneously positive achievements and spatial layouts (*harmónica, integrado, organizada, qualidade*). The negative counterpoint of these facets of justice is also present (*decadência, excluídas, dificuldades, incapacidade, desarmonia, condicionados*).⁹²⁵ Overemployed verbs appear in the first person singular (*lembro-me, lembro, fico*). This indicates that even discourses with a dense explicit vocabulary of justice, strong responses to deontological demands) use their experiential to capture justice and injustice in space. Specific verbs also include plural forms, indicating the inhabiting of space by other people (*relaxar, viverem, usam, sintam*). The register is

⁹²⁰ Castelo, Labruge, Vinhais, Santa Maria(?), Ermesinde, Verde, Gueifães, Vermoin, Barca, Gemunde, Gondim, Escura, Folgosa, Avioso, Benfica. Except Ermesinde, they are located in suburban and peri-urban geotypes.

⁹²¹ The list includes: café, piscinas, Ecocentro, ISMAI, teatro, ringue, cinema, comercial, banco, desportivo, futebol, Instituto, parque, cafés, pavilhões, ginástica, Industrial, context, Vivaci, Lar, movimentação, passatempo.

⁹²² “President” refers either to the municipality (E22) or the *freguesia* (E51).

⁹²³ As the interviewee with a superior sociétalité migrates from the group into 6 and 7, type 5.3 lowers the complexity of social world, but retains the possibility of compatibility of the actors in space.

⁹²⁴ We know from the reading that solidarity is a positive value, vis-à-vis the critique of excessive individualism.

⁹²⁵ “Inseguro” is somewhat foreign to the enunciated semes, as it evaluates a perception by restricting it to the self. This term is used by candidates to leave the type (E35 and E23)-

argumentative/reconstructive including both cognitive appreciations (*factor, sistemas, rigor, desmazelo*) with narrative components. There are affective reactions in the face of the observed (*bestiais, impotente, preocupação*).⁹²⁶

7.2.1.8.2 The plane of space

Type 6 talks about Grand Porto. Interviewees refer to this functional urban scale explicitly or through multiple juxtaposed references to suburban and central municipalities (*Porto, Gaia*). There is an ensemble of words referring to space – the word “*espaço*” is used – and to the city and its places (*urbana, cidade, zona, zonas, sítio, centro, tecido, bairro, bairros*). Toponym mainly refers to places located in the central geotype (*Boavista, Ponte, oriental, Fontinha*), including public spaces (*[Parque da] Cidade*). Urbanity products are referred to (*lojas, Livro, livrarias, espectáculo, Coliseu, cultural*). Public and private metrics of mobility at the urban scale are also positive specificities (*vias, Circunvalação, Via (Norte), peões, Cintura*). Civility emerges in relation to private mobility (*pisca, piscas, civismo*). There is a sense of positively valued historic dimension of space (*memória, tradicional, história, histórica*). Pollution, drugs, and criminality are also treated phenomena.

7.2.1.8.3 The non-spatial substance of space

Type 6 declines collective actors in a conceptual manner (*peessoas, organização, individual, sociedade, utilizador, idosos, cidadão, colectiva*). There are also references to the actors of the political scene (*Rui (Rio), autárquica, deputados*). The substance of economy is treated at superior scales, evoking the functioning of finance (*mercado, produtores, finança, impostos, oferta, indústrias, produtos, rendimentos, capitais; actividade, incentivo, económica, investiu, financeira, relance, preços*). We find as specific forms verbs expressing dynamism and interaction (*obriga, gera, contribuir, construir, partilhar, alargar*).

7.2.1.9 [T7] Space participates in capability

7.2.1.9.1 The plane of ethos

“Injustice” is a positive specificity (*injusto, injustiça*). Type 7 distinguishes necessities from non-necessities goods (*essenciais, desnecessárias, falta, necessário*) and evokes gratuity (*grátis*)⁹²⁷. These are but diagonal references to the concern with equality. There is a dual approach to negative judgment: one evaluative of the other actors (*malandros, incompetência, [pouco] profissionais*), another linked to the idea of consequence (*circunstâncias, consequências, consequência*). The discourse is marked by argumentative signs of *axiological* rationality (*concordo, acho, noto, Concordo*) and by emotional tones (*desgraça, feia, aflição, receio*). “Minhas” (mine) is also a positive specificity, indicating that there is not a “de-centring” of the full discourse. These marks do not point towards the interpretation proposed of the type.

7.2.1.9.2 The plane of space

Spatial referents are hybrid. We find the municipal scale (*Lousada, Espinho, município*) and freguesias (*Anta, Fânzeres, Pedrouços, Avioso*). We also read designations to places with a sense of “locality” (*localidade, lugares, local, vilas, localidades, sítios*) and town (*vila*)⁹²⁸. Designations to activities are overemployed (*vólei, piscine, workshops, CinAnima, desporto*). There is an explicit reference to proximity (*próximas*). Schools are treated as objects and locations (*escola, salas, educadas, bens, perspectiva, aprenderam, [cursos] profissionais*).

7.2.1.9.3 The non-spatial substance of space

Type 7 has abundant verbs expressing the activities of others (third person and infinitive forms). This is interpreted as sensitivity to the making of space by the actors (though not necessarily all inhabitants) (*pôr, acontece, fazem, acabam, meteram, consultar, abrir, gerir, apoia, manda, estivessem, leva, reclamam, determinar, abriu, metem, serem, fechou, houve, ouviu, evoluir, sabiam, mexer*). In type 7 there is a sense of kinship (*gêmeas, bebé, filhas*,

⁹²⁶ It should be noted that an affective reaction was a part of the probed information (see interview guide in chapter 6).

⁹²⁷ From the reading, we know that gratuity refers to free access to urban activities.

⁹²⁸ Local here does not refer to the conceptual meaning as societal space. In natural language, a “locality” tends to refer to an infra-societal place.

sobrinha, pais, filha) but also collective and individual actors involved in the central preoccupation with education (*criança, crianças, adultos; director*). The central preoccupation with the good of education has a dedicated nuclei (*escola, salas, educadas, bens, perspectiva, aprenderam, [cursos] profissionais*). It appears both in relation to kinship and to social “evolution”. The economic substance is present (*lucro, incentivos*). Specific economic actors are evoked (*Casino, CAF, Violas, Brenha*). The state is a positive specificity designating, more narrowly, the public function and, in some cases, an englobing entity representing society’s resources (*Estado*).⁹²⁹ This variation indicates that several conceptions of society might be at stake.

7.2.1.10 [T8] Telos of the city

7.2.1.10.1 The plane of ethos

The lexeme just is not a part of positive specificities. Mixed subjective and objective elements are found in type 8 (*linda, lindo, alegre, bonito, saudades*).⁹³⁰ Words derivative from justice are absent from the positive specificity list. A set of words expresses negative judgements without aspiring to argumentative soundness (*porcaria, circo*). Another sub-set explicitly refers to nomological marks (*valores, universais, verdadeiro, incorrecto, corrupção, desrespeito, errado, correcto, condeno*). They point to the non-discussable trait of a moral epoch. An ambiguous reference to ethical consensus, consequence, and perception is also present (*vivável, consenso, percepção [de injustiça]*).⁹³¹ The discourse assembles narrative and argumentative registers, under a rationality which is dominantly non-procedural.

7.2.1.10.2 The plane of space

The “Telos of the city” talks about cities identified as the central geotype (*Porto, Matosinhos*). It refers to a variety of city places (*Foz, Ribeira, Passeio Alegre, Belo, Praça*). The type is marked by the overemployment of the term “city” (*cidade, cidades*) and designations of public spaces (*jardim, avenida, rua, marítima*). There is a set of words employed in the description of recent city transformation (*bicicletas, bares, hotel, restaurantes, copos, shoppings, diversão, Raynair, turistas, voos*) as well as signs of persisting degeneration (*pombas, gaivotas*).⁹³² Spatial objects involved in civility also emerge (*chá, lixo*). There are also references to space as dissociated objects (*casas, andarinho*). The seme of patrimony is present (*histórico, históricos*).

7.2.1.10.3 The non-spatial substance of space

In the Telos of the city, the opposition between actors of low and high capitals emerge visibly: the people (*gente, povo*) vis-à-vis big actors (*proprietários, corporações, senhores, burguesia, senhorios*).⁹³³ It strikes the absence of individual actors and any form of designation with a seme of society as an ensemble. The political seme appears as an accusation of mal-governance (*governadas, (sem) modelo*), including purposeful hindrance of private interest (*pressão, coimas*). The interpretation of affairs is based on interest and corruption (*interesses, corrupção, controle, máfia, tráfico*). We will see that the affiliation of the author is with Walzer’s invasiveness of spheres.

⁹²⁹ “O desinteresse que eles mostram seja por que ... até, até politicamente, os jovens neste momento são muito pouco interventivos! Eles não se ... não se preocupam muito com o que se passa, porque acham que essa coisa da política, isso é uma coisa ... isso é um mundo à parte " Eles estão lá, eles ... ", não é? " O, o Estado não somos nós, são aqueles que estão lá sentados é que são o Estado " e portanto ... eu acho que a crise veio despertar alguma coisa boa nas pessoas e uma das coisas boas que eu posso encontrar nesta crise é que muita gente percebeu que o Estado é ele, que ele é que faz parte dessa coisa chamada Estado, que até aqui acho que as pessoas não tinham muito esse, ainda esse sentimento achavam que " Ah, o dinheiro ... " (E29/AP).

⁹³⁰ We know that these words are used to evaluate the lost qualities of the city, which results in the overall judgement of "the city is dead".

⁹³¹ Here, the ambiguous semes are uttered by the same interviewee so it is not a problem of type formation.

⁹³² This interpretation stems from the object of Porto was presented in section 6.4.

⁹³³ *Senhorios* is used by the entire type. In E12 it relates to the cost of rents, in the E59 to the need of work in the built fabric to be paid by the owners, in E30 to designate the manoeuvring of law by the state to affect proprietors. In all cases, it is an antagonistic relationship between the social actors that has been established.

7.2.1.11 [T9] Meritocracy

7.2.1.11.1 The plane of ethos

The isotopy of words expressing judgement juxtapose with “injustice”, “difference” and “easiness” (*injustiças; diferenças, diferença; fáci*⁹³⁴). This points the interpretation towards the desert-based consideration of “differences” to be not necessarily unjust. There is a focus on the values and principles in individual conduct and education. There are some emotional notes in the face of what is considered unchangeable (*pena*)⁹³⁵. There is no positive horizon of justice, nor marks of a concern with equality. Verbals marks are self-referential (*acho, espero, tento, continuo, tive, ajo*).

7.2.1.11.2 The plane of space

Type 9 overemploys tow toponym (*Guimarães*, a municipality and *Canelas*, a freguesia). There is an explicit reference to the city and to the “bairro”. Markers of urbanity are reduced to retail (*lojinha, peixeira, [grandes] superfícies*).⁹³⁶ The dominant isotopy refers to the impact of private mobility on security and children autonomy (*rotundas, semáforos, acidentes, atropelamentos, autónomo, movimento*).⁹³⁷ If some public behaviour is considered to be negotiable (priority man and women) – indicating the conception of society as moving – some other is of the order of civility (*grávida*).

7.2.1.11.3 The non-spatial substance of space

Type 9 uses the terms “society” and “socialist-liberalism” with a seme of globality.⁹³⁸ There is a seme on education and competence production (*Educação, educação, infância, educar, vivência, línguas, génese, reflecte-se, oportunidade*). It points to the comprehension of the role of interaction between individual and the social environment in the production of competence. However, such reading is not extended to all society actors.⁹³⁹ An isotopy on contribution and merit denoting a reading of individuals with the choice to be autonomous in the society (*trabalha, escolhemos, empreendedor, empreendedora, privilegiadas, vontade, trabalhou, motivos, prioridades, sorte, preguiça, dependerem*). More englobing issues are perceived through how they affect these individuals, as witnessed in the topic of insecurity (*assaltos, insegura*).

7.2.1.12 [T10] Not speaking...

7.2.1.12.1 The plane of ethos

Type 10 presents a discourse in the first person (*meus, Eu*). From the occurrences of specific words, we can recompose the following expressions: “*não faço ideia*”, “*não me incomoda*”, “*não sei*”), expressing non-resonance with the topic of the interview. The interviewee does not contain any specific words with a seme of judgement, except the ambiguous word “weird” (*estranho*), comforting the interpretation of anomie.

7.2.1.12.2 The plane of space

Type 10 has 4 words with a seme of space: “here”, “beach”, Matosinhos and Leça all of which refer to the spatiality of the interviewee. The non-spatial substance of space is absent.

⁹³⁴ We know from the qualitative reading that the seme of easiness or carelessness, expresses a choice not to participate in society productivity.

⁹³⁵ “Pity” occurs adjacent to statements of what is considered unchangeable:

“pena, é pena ... mas pronto. Não se consegue mudar o mundo!” (E16).

⁹³⁶ The singular case criticised here is the disappearance of traditional retail.

⁹³⁷ The qualitative reading shows that these references to public mobility do not distance the empirical object of reference from the residential block.

⁹³⁸ From the frequentation of the corpus, it is clear that these interviewees do have some concern for the society, but they do not conceive of it in a systemic fashion.

⁹³⁹ The notion of capability is not restricted to the individual, there is a sense of retroaction in the society.

7.2.1.13 Ambiguous interview

Our study comprised of a thirteenth part with an ambiguous case that we could not locate in an existing type but that did not raise new approaches to the intrastation. The discourse opposes the I/they (as found in 5.3). The non-spatial substance of space is absent.

7.2.2 Discursive registers and complexity of the social

Following the diagonal observations on the sematic field of the ethos (the semes of “horizon of justice” and the deontological signs), we can observe that for similar sensitivity to the themes of *sociétalité* of ethos, we find a corresponding combination of scale, metric, and substance. There is a beginning of a pattern relating the universals of justice, deontological elements, and the presence/absence of attributes of the space (urban scale, high urbanity with intangible sphere, networked metrics, and the complexity of non-spatial substance). We see that there is a divisive line between the existence/non-existence of a positive horizon of justice. The contrasts emerge between the discourses with positive specificities forming isotopies which clearly belong to a universe of justice, and those where those *semes* are ambiguous or bluntly absent. This division is paralleled by whether the conception includes high urbanity with an intangible sphere or not. The discursive register has the same signal as the complexity of the substance of injustice. With regards to the non-spatial substance of space, the conceptions of society without totality contrast with the references to englobing entities. The latter diverge on whether they activate a seme of systematics or totality.

Table 14 summarises and reorders the correspondences found between lenses of ethos and space,⁹⁴⁰ paving the way for a more synthetic treatment of these discursive coordinates (discussed in the next section, 7.3).⁹⁴¹

Types 6 and 7 present a more complete horizon, where equality and capability figure explicitly.⁹⁴² The discourse is argumentative and the rationality is procedural, that is, implying the formation of a political will. It includes narrative traits,⁹⁴³ and we find the mobilisation of axiological marks (values of the actors). Types 5.2, 5.3, and 9 express incomplete or timidly positive horizons of justice.⁹⁴⁴ They are marked by relativity of values (axiological) without pointing to the need for convergence between points of view. In the discourses of 4 and 5.1, the presentation of a positive horizon is anchored in collective voices defined at infra-societal scales.⁹⁴⁵ The register is narrative and argumentative, and the rationality is nomological, although the degree of “unquestionable values” is higher in 5.1 than in 4. The absence of a positive horizon (1, 2, 3 and, 10) is associated with narrative and argumentation, but, in any case, without procedural rationality (practical, and nomological rationalities dominate).⁹⁴⁶ Type 8 shares the traits of this last ensemble, although there are some breaches towards a positive horizon as well.⁹⁴⁷

We have seen that our interview guide makes given room for narrative, interpretative, and argumentative registers without maximising the demand for procedural rationality. We could have expected that it conduced to a view of

⁹⁴⁰ The attributes categorising space refer to the urban scale. We have observed that individuals talk about an ensemble of scales and we resume interspatiality of these spaces in section 8.2.

⁹⁴¹ Some detailed comments can help us relate these observations to the hypothesis raised in study 2. With the exception of type 6, the absence of words derived from the lexeme “just” is indicative of the overall deontological strength of the conception (see annex E.2).

⁹⁴² Types 6 use “concepts” of justice and some narrative marks. Type 7 adds signals of axiological rationality (“I think”, “I consider”) to explicit *semes* of justice. The narrative tone is still present.

⁹⁴³ This reflects, in part, the construction of the interview guide (see point 6.2.1).

⁹⁴⁴ Types 9 is also marked by the presence of the speaker and some (though less extensive) lexicon of justice.

⁹⁴⁵ The specific words of type 4 are not “conceptual”, but some *semes* of justice appear with some ambiguity. Type 5.1 activates the universal of equality (between places) and the idea of progress. The emergence of an argumentative register in these two types is paralleled by a narrative voice which is declined in the plural.

⁹⁴⁶ The absence of universals of justice articulated with narrative and interpretative linguistic marks are found in types 1, 2, and 3.

⁹⁴⁷ Type 8 shares marks of normativity, together with more explicit vocabularies of justice. Here “universals” co-exists with nomological views.

justice inescapably associated with the individual dimension of space and its affective-subjective relationship with habitat. We observe that many individuals can detach themselves from their personal affects when thinking about space and justice. This observation is not extensible to the full corpus, nor the entirety of one interview. Different themes show variation in detachment from subjectivity.

These observations show that argumentation is not equivalent to procedural rationality as the latter implies openness to the social fabrication of values. We also see that procedural rationality is not synonymous to the absence of affective discursive elements, as personal experience of space is mobilised in identifying the just and the unjust. As we have seen in Sen’s account, telling the just implies the affective-objective mediation between one’s emotional signal in the face of an injustice (affective-subjective), and the information accessed in a cognitive-objective mode of rationality. It is not unsurprising that we find linguistic traits of a narrative register in all the types. The presence of this narrative register is not *per se* an indication of absence of procedural rationality of the discourse. The exclusiveness of that register is, however, an indication of the lower capacity to reason according to deontological demands. We can state that there exist varying degrees of capacity in telling the just. This approximation is still insufficient to investigate which exact “universals of justice”⁹⁴⁸ are present or absent in the discourses, and how they are declined spatially. That detailed observation is further developed in the next section (7.3).

Types/ complexity of space	Kinship	Partial <i>other</i>	Community	Actors in political, social, economic dimensions	Englobing ensembles ⁹⁴⁹	Collective entities and individual
6						
7						
5.2						
5.3						
9						
8						
4						
5.1						
3						
2						
1						
10						

Table 15 Types and specific words: references to social actors as indicator of the complexity of space.

⁹⁴⁸ We have called the two families of materials of justice (ideas of justice within the horizon and deontological principles) universals of justice.

⁹⁴⁹ Here we use englobing in the ambiguous sense of “communal”, which is not coincidental with community or society. See the distinction between community and communal in the review of Walzer’s *Spheres of Justice* (section 4.4).

Scale	Body	House	Infra-municipal place ⁹⁵⁰	Municipality ⁹⁵¹	Urban area	Portugal	Supra-national
6							
7							
5.2							
5.3							
9							
8							
4							
5.1							
3							
2							
1							
10							

Table 16 Positive specificities: spatial references to spaces. The plane of space can also be observed through the spectrum of scales considered relevant to discuss habitat, justice, and injustice. We can propose the following groupings: very small environments (1, 2); infra-societal places, some of them urban (3, 4, and 10); infra-societal places co-occurring with supranational spaces (5.1)⁹⁵²; municipalities (8, 9); places of ambiguous *sociétalité* co-occurring with Portugal, and eventually supra-national scales (5.2, 5.3); and urban places and urban area (7, 6).

The study of the positive specificities of the types shows that the proposed typology is not the most synthetic. We identify different degrees of internal consistency of the types, giving way to their refinement, presented in the next section. Several types approach the topic with the same combination of registers, the same deontological force, and similar degrees of complexity of their conception of space/society. We also observe the hybridity of some types (in particular 5.3 and 7)⁹⁵³ with regards to the initial interpretation of these discourses. This can be interpreted either as the ambiguity of the type or of some of its members. This question demands further investigation. It is qualitative, supported by the quantitative representation of how the stock of specific words of each type is used by the corpus (see results of study 5 in annex E.5). The rows of tables 14, 15 and 16 are presented in the order of refined types, as developed in the next section of this chapter (7.3).

7.2.3 The role of spatiality in the construction of spatial justice

The TXM-based exercise presented above studies the language of spatial justice as means to correct eventual fragilities of the initial interpretation of the corpus. The observation of the lexical planes of justice and space in the discourse of the inhabitants detects the deontological strength of justice claims to co-vary with the degree of complexity of space. The qualitative return to the corpus with this interpretative key in mind advances the explicative comprehension of how different spatial justice conceptions are constructed by the actors. The inhabitants interpret and make space with resources of ideality (ideas from the ethos and spatial ideology, with different degrees of *sociétalité*) and they may reinforce or revise such predisposition through continuous spatial experience, increasing

⁹⁵⁰ Freguesia, infra-freguesia place and places within the city, with varying urbanity levels.

⁹⁵¹ Whether municipal toponym refers to the places within a functional urban spaces or claims of *cidadinité* at this scale (irrespective of urbanity level) is not given by the mere employment of the terms. It requires an interpretative gesture present in the text.

⁹⁵² See individual geotype for articulation of scales in an interviewee from this group.

⁹⁵³ Type 5.3 and 7 shows traits of both 5.2, 6 and 8. They have since been revised. See section 7.3 for final typology.

or decreasing the *sociétalité* of their spatial justice conception. If spatialities are important explicative factors, the spatial affiliation – the place they feel that they inhabit – is determinant in the establishment of the scale of justice as societal or infra-societal. The covariation of space and justice also has to do with the construction of a cognitive model explaining injustice empirically. In the absence of this model, the existence of injustice is flattened in the realm of the moral fallibility of others. We can see that such predisposition affects the scope of possibility of justice, explaining the varying consistency of justice arguments. Given the role of social contact in the construction of a spatial justice conception, the resources of ideality and stock of experiences count. There seems to be two directions in explaining how the ideality of the ethos and spatial experience restrict conceptions to low levels of *sociétalité*. From the experiences of low global capital, the reduced or oppressive experience of the social seems to confirm the available ethos, localised in an epoch of morality. From the experiences of social comfort, the predisposition in ideality seems to surpass the empirical wealth (potentially accessible through the spatiality of the inhabitant)⁹⁵⁴. From the position of advantaged capitals, spatiality can be either very high or very low, as individuals have more resources to manage their exposure to otherness and, in some cases, stage their withdrawal from the society. In between these poles, there seems to be a progression between the *sociétalité* of spatial experience (as indicated by the scale of the space considered a habitat) and the reasonableness of spatial justice conception. Counting on an ideality open to otherness and on extensive practice of space seem to be two factors influencing a positive experience of social contact. These three aspects are a source of inventiveness of the just. We can hypothesise that the exposure to high levels of urbanity counts, both as the environment where more societal resources of the ethos circulate (see section 7.4), and as a milieu favourable to “societal” spatialities.

⁹⁵⁴ As indicated in the methodology chapter (section 6.1), the research participants provide some description on their lifestyle, which includes information on opportunities for varied social contact. This information is not exhaustive and the explicative potential of spatiality deserved future exploration.

7.3 Ten encounters between space and justice (final typology)

In this text, we explore the *sociétalité* of the conceptions of spatial justice, moving freely between universals of justice and the components of the social world (actors, environments and social objects). We refine the interpretation of the discourses by deepening their encounter with the coherence of their respective “erudite resonance”, that is, we establish a connection with theoretical constructions of the erudite conceptions of justice and spatial justice (chapters 4 and 5). The synthesis of this connection can be seen in table 17. We identify ten coordinates, four placed in an epoch of ethics, and four counterparts in the morality field. Two coordinates at the threshold of the transition are presented in a pre-ethical field. The types can be seen as particularly clear positions in these two fields, but the interviewees can occupy different points, or be in transition between the two moments (of the proposed division of the historicity of the ethos). The exposé of each coordinate starts with a table comparing the original erudite resource from the ethos and the interpretation found in the inhabitants’ voices. A second set of tables present the known attributes of the spatial identity of the individuals who, for their coherence, most contribute to the definition of the spatial justice conception. These attributes are: the I/we identity, which is informed by the discursive register;⁹⁵⁵ the scale of inhabiting, corresponding to the answer to pre-instruction;⁹⁵⁶ the scale of evoked spatialities, which we derive from biographic information;⁹⁵⁷ a comment on global capitals, synthetizing information on socio-economic indicators;⁹⁵⁸ the valuation of high urbanity, resulting from the interpretation of the interview by the researcher; and, finally, the geotype of residence, combining the spatial indicators of density and land cost with the information collected in the researcher’s visit to the place of residence. In the legend of these tables, we indicate the interviewees who embody the coherence of the type and those who have this coordinate as secondary affiliation (we will call them “hesitant” members of the type).⁹⁵⁹

The textual description of each coordinate starts with a more universal presentation of the type which has the potential of being use as concepts of spatial justice, transposable to other empirical contexts. Then, introduced by a *tag in italics*, it follows the presentation of the main spaces that pose a problem to each of the conceptions of spatial justice (we call them “chorotypes of injustice”); as well as their “reversal” into what the inhabitants consider to be more just. The synthesis table “What matters for justice in space” (7.3.3) provides an overview of these problems. The contrast between the themes of chorotypes of injustice and of justice – urbanity models, distance, co-presence, procedural injustice, or a-spatial difficulties – reflects the conception of spatial justice used in the inhabitants’ interpretation of the urban area of Porto.

⁹⁵⁵ The discursive registers have been commented in the previous section (7.2).

⁹⁵⁶ The pre-instruction is defined in chapter 6, section 6.2.1, “Interview guide”.

⁹⁵⁷ This information is provided spontaneously by the interviewee or in response to the interview section dedicated to spatial biography.

⁹⁵⁸ Annex B, “Socio-economic-spatial indicators of the interviewees”, allows for the comparison of these typical profiles with the ones of the other members of the type (and vis-à-vis the remaining sampled members of the studied society).

⁹⁵⁹ For the distribution of the interviewees among all coordinated, according to primary and secondary conceptions see table 36 in annex 5. (section 5.2).

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Conceptions of spatial justice	Universals of justice										Components of the social world		
	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
City Sen													
Urban Rawls													
Mill of plural geotypes													
Desert-based a-spatial													
Walzer <i>citadin</i>													
Hyper-central Taylor													
Peri-urban Taylor													
Young from the ghetto													
Aquinas at the confine of the city													

Table 17 The inhabitants’ discourses on the spatial dimension of justice: ten conceptions. Universals of justice (ideas of justice present in the horizon and deontological elements) and the components of the social world mobilised in the conceptions. Dark grey indicates present elements, blanks represent absences while light grey indicates ambiguity.

7.3.1 Coordinates after the puncture of morality...

7.3.1.1 City Sen

Resources from the ethos	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Sen													
Inhabitant													

Table 18 Erudite theories of justice and discourses of the inhabitants: “City Sen”.

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	I	Urban area	World	High	Positive	Central

Table 19 “City Sen”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E37, E22. Hesitant members of the type: E29, E45, E52.

This type appears in its most explicit manner in only a couple of interviews, but there are components and intuitions of the interrelation between objects, actors, and environments in some of the themes of less societal formulations of other interviewees.

In this type,⁹⁶⁰ space is an active resource in the realisation of justice objectives. We are in the universe of Sen’s comprehensive development, where the dynamic interrelation of actors, environments, and social objects accounts for justice as a proper social product. Through this dynamism, the actors are placed at the centre of the production of justice, moving from distribution to a paradigm of co-production. This type takes into consideration existing spatial contradictions or conflicts, then subsequently, makes comparison and choices. The relationship with distance of the urbanity model of Amsterdam is the one identified with justice. The treatment of injustice at the metropolitan level does not project social differences into space. We are in the universe of Lévy’s coexistence of individuated actors in a systemic totality (space), animated by a horizon of equality in freedom (Lefebvre’s “right to the city”). Urban space appears as intangible resourcefulness, demanding a political project of habitat.

7.3.1.1.1 Urbanity (conflictual urbanity models and lack of capability)

These inhabitants are preoccupied with unequal capitals or the absolute deprivation of some of Porto members, in the context of serious unemployment rates. If the economic dimension of Portugal is recognised as a major causality of injustice, it is seen to stress upon spatial injustices that already existed at the urban scale (before the economic crisis, burst in 2008). Porto unjust space is made of closed groups with corresponding homogeneous places (suburbs and social housing estates). Different layers that do not contact each other hinder the necessary stimuli for the development of the society.⁹⁶¹ We can see injustice as a reduced opportunity to participate in the production and enjoyment of the advantages of social life, with consequences for individual autonomy and the society’s

⁹⁶⁰ This coordinate results from refinements of types 6 and 7 (as presented in section 7.1 and 7.2) and redistribution of their members.

⁹⁶¹ There is a hesitation between a model of integration of the least well-off and one co-production of a joint development. For these reasons, our interpretation has played down the force of personal liberties and agency-freedom in the universals of justice mobilised by this type. (see table 17).

development. Improving justice can occur through the inclusiveness of all inhabitants in favourable social environments and societal arrangements. Space is not only a material resource, but also an *actant* of ideality (increases of justice assemble ideality and materiality).⁹⁶² The imagination of increased productivity through social contact in space is not fully explored (the value of spatial productivity generating resources for solidarity and progress is present in not unambiguous).⁹⁶³ The specificity of this type is a concern for how reduced urbanistic quality poses difficulties to the lives of its inhabitants. Disorder in the suburbs, urban landscape, visual discomfort, and inadequate communication axis, they all create *unfreedoms* and sufferance to the lives of people.⁹⁶⁴ Space is a material which provides active support for individual freedom and it needs to be structured, ordered, and removed from a “casuistic” production. The metro is considered to be the best recent public investment in the region. The role of the political dimension in achieving compatibility between space and spatiality is institutional. If spatial planning is central to justice, counteracting present “urban disharmony” we find different scopes given to the *téchne*.⁹⁶⁵

7.3.1.1.2 Distance (ghetto, lack of capability)

Some interviewees describe “social exclusion” as a form of inactivity of the actors, trapped as the recipients of inefficient transfers from society’s resources of solidarity. Though interviewees might tell us not to know how to solve the problem, they clearly point to the necessary implication of the actors in a horizon of increased justice. No distributive practice can “integrate” without the actors’ cooperation. As space is an instrument of social praxis, environments cannot be decoupled from the objectives of justice. A non-diverse school or neighbourhood of uniform low social capitals are seen to reinforce the non-societal model of future adult citizens.⁹⁶⁶ There is internal variation with regard to the trade-offs between the facets of liberty and equality which is required by the policies towards justice imagined by these inhabitants.⁹⁶⁷

7.3.1.1.3 Distance (enclave in ideality)

Visible to these inhabitants is the overall low ethical capital of their society (in absolute terms, and in comparison with Europe). They also appeal to the deontological responsibility of all actors, in the form of increased cooperation and civic participation in social life. The non-institutional political function is also claimed.

7.3.1.1.4 Political space (transcendence of Lisbon/Portugal, lack of participation is unjust)

The need for a metropolitan spatial project appears to be associated with the metro light rail network, accompanied by the critique of excessive transcendence of Lisbon/Portugal over Porto development. The political function is present in the demands of more autonomy in the allocation of structural funds, but it does not take the form of claim for the inclusive political discussion of values.

⁹⁶² For example, the absence of certain European ideas in Grand Porto is seen as unjust (see individual geotype of E37 in section 8.2 of chapter 8).

⁹⁶³ For this reason, we have reduced the force of aggregative goods vis-à-vis Sen’s original conception (see table 17).

⁹⁶⁴ The threshold of order of what is considered as a productive environment varies. E22 considers that Ermesinde is already an environment of quality, offering well-being, happiness, and resulting in higher productivity; things are better, it is progress. E37 considers that the overall metropolitan area is faulty; the societal scale of the transformation is noted.

⁹⁶⁵ The impressive contrast of values in place in Porto society is clearly not acknowledged in a part of the type. As in Lefebvre, the difficulties of convergence are not fully acknowledged. In other cases, the need to debate at regional level is clearly stated.

⁹⁶⁶ In this topic, we find Walzer’s just arrangements as a strong intervention of society between the family and the future citizens.

⁹⁶⁷ For the policies suggested by this type with regard to social housing see section 8.1 of chapter 8, in particular point 8.1.1.1, “City Sen, a horizon without the space/spatiality of social housing”.

7.3.1.2 Urban Rawls

	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Rawls													
Inhabitant													

Table 20 Erudite theories of justice and the discourses of the inhabitants: “Urban Rawls”

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	I	Municipalities	–	High	Positive	Central, suburban

Table 21 “Urban Rawls”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E18, E24, E52, E57. Hesitant members of the type: E15, E16, E22, E23, E25, E32, E34, E35, E45, E55.

This type⁹⁶⁸ is distinguishable through its members concern for the least well-off, procedural equality and the mobilisation of some deontological constraints on individuals (which are more demanding than those of the discourses we have affiliated with Mill, but less than in the city Sen). Space is implied in justice as a form of actualisation of equality in liberty, assessed between individuals. Justice consists of equal rights to a set of spatial liberties open to all and compatible with those of other users. Space is relational, but the open transformation of society through co-presence is not strengthened. Space, in particular public space, is an object where the achievements of justice can be displayed (rather than realised). The resource of the ethos is Rawls’ justice as fairness. Concerns for quality and freedom are articulated in the absence of the continuous active role of environments in the production of justice. For Rawls, environments seem to be important at some point in the biography of citizens, but they are not permanent *actants* of justice, enablers of capability. As in political liberalism, the interrelation between the parts and the whole is not maximal, notably through the absence of systemic goods in the comprehensive realisation of justice. This type also reflects Rawls’s ambiguity with regards to the continuous fabrication of the social towards the convergence of collective values. This is reflected in the hesitant necessity to hierarchize urbanity models and spatialities.

Rawls’s defence of a separation between the right and the good, which we have seen to be problematic when applied to space, is here endorsed, even when conflict is annotated. This discourse is distinguishable from other with lower spatial justice *sociétalité*, for the importance of personal liberties (that is, freedoms extensible to all). This conception of the resourcefulness of urban space for justice also breathes a positive conception of the social bound, the intuitive idea that men seek cooperation, in spite of their different interests and inclinations.

7.3.1.2.1 Co-presence (insufficient public space)

Space participates in the horizon of justice, at the scale of municipality. There is awareness of the interrelation of municipalities, but the project of an integrated metropolis is ambiguous. Some features of the urbanity model of Amsterdam emerge as a part of the just city, as a response to the objective of equality: the universal access of the

⁹⁶⁸ This coordinate also results from refinements of types 6 and 7 (as presented in section 7.1 and 7.2) and redistribution of their members.

inhabitants of the city to public space and to public mobility. Public space makes it possible for people to use the city without economic distinction (access to leisure and cultural spatialities).⁹⁶⁹ Public space is the englobing instance where the society can read the existence of social disparities and feel concerned about how society is doing in this regard.⁹⁷⁰ Objectives of spatial equality are not extended to instrumental opportunities (focus on well-being and not on capacity). Space can “suspend” the existence of social differentiation in individual capitals, irrespective of what takes place in its remaining dimensions.

7.3.1.2.2 Co-presence/urbanity (conflictual civilities)

The non-institutional political function of public space is present in critiques of incivility. It is not fully developed, as it is associated with the perpetuated private metric of mobility and the absence of an explicit appeal to the social construction of collective values. There is no proposal of justice here, reflecting Rawls’s model’s failure to account for the behaviour of the actors in the achievement of justice.

7.3.1.2.3 Co-presence and urbanity (*ghetto*, no urban quality)

There is a certain economism in the reading of spatial inequality.⁹⁷¹ The existence of neighbourhoods with concentration of wealthy or poor is a “screen” where one may read social disparities in other dimensions. For this conception, social housing estates are goods that evidently intersect habitat and the horizon of equality. Though the ghettoization problems of social estates are known, an assessment of injustice is not applicable to Porto, where they are located in central geotypes. Social housing remains the embodiment of pursuing further equality in the city. This assessment of justice changes in hybrid versions, (cases in which it is not pronounced from central geotypes).

7.3.1.2.4 Urbanity/procedural (conflictual urbanity models)

Resonating with Rawls’ advances in relation to utilitarianism, the interrelation between the parts and the whole is recognised without achieving systemic goods. This type does not extend the concept of public good to high urbanity, and is hesitant in the face of need to hierarchize the legitimacy of conflicting spatialities.⁹⁷² The type makes room for spatial solutions which seems to be incompatible with the spatial values that he or she holds.⁹⁷³ The idea that people value different things is an indicator of ethics, the recognition that valuation is not transcending, and thus, not necessarily consensual. But, it also breathes liberal acceptance of different substantiations of the good. We can find appeals made to a denser metro system constituting of an alternative to the car but also the legitimization of a system of high speed roads (without tolls) between the polarities of urban area. Coherently with Rawls’ advancements in relation to utilitarianism, there is a recognition of the importance of some “thin” constraints.⁹⁷⁴ The positive valuation of the city strengthens the importance of regulation, strategy, and transparent processes (implying less corruption).

⁹⁶⁹ The threshold of sufficient provision varies within this type of discourse (some members of the type claim more, some find the existing layout just).

⁹⁷⁰ The function of increasing social pressure for justice is furthered by Sen. Through social contact in public space, these inhabitants feel mobilised to participate in civic society, but the available practices are still based on the tradition of almsgiving. In this type, then, such pressure for justice is associated to the model of personal involvement in practises of assistance.

⁹⁷¹ In some passages of the type, we find explicit references to Marxism-Leninism. Space is the background against which co-inhabitation of two groups of population with contrasting purchasing power can be seen: a historic centre with new luxury commodities targeted at tourists vis-à-vis local residents (where the latter are *unfree* to enact a type of consumption they are in contact with). The type emphasises equality and well-being freedom in space, which are characteristic Marxist materials of justice. We also observe a preponderant reading of space as a social object, marked with a realistic stability over the malleability of its transformation (we have seen how the dominance of social objects is a mark of Marxism). However, these conceptual affinities and explicit vocabulary are not sufficient to identify this type of Marxism without ambiguity. We do not find an oppositional tonality against other social groups, or exploitation/revolution (as we have encountered in the translation of Marx into space, as seen in the literature of spatial justice). When wild capitalism is mentioned, it is not accompanied by a moral critique of market exchange between the actors of the society.

⁹⁷² For example, this type associates the retail decline in the central geotype with shopping centres’ competition, located in the suburban and peri-urban areas. City centre emptiness, vandalism, suburban areas without urbanity are seen as the results of this dispersal. Despite seeing this antinomy, market worth and other inhabitants’ preferences are evoked in its legitimation: these spaces respond to to an existing demand, such as extended opening hours and security.

⁹⁷³ In these valuations emerge the role of memory and history in centralities, stabilised in traditional retail and historic buildings, to which the interviewees assign an affective charge.

⁹⁷⁴ For example, the isolation of inhabitants in the periphery is seen to result from insufficient spatial constraints.

Spatial planning appears to be a form of shared responsibility between planning authorities and individuals⁹⁷⁵. The demand of constraints on individual spatial freedom is argued as an enlightenment of each inhabitant's interest (given the complex outcomes that ordinary actors cannot anticipate with their own means). Despite this appeal, the acceptance of private mobility and of different urbanity models is coherent with the Rawlsian (expected) compatibility of individual substantive spatial goods. But, it also reflects the friction with the existing city, a complex composition of urban geotypes: these inhabitants invoke realism.⁹⁷⁶

7.3.1.2.5 Distance (cost of ubiquity and social isolation)

This group is ambiguous with regards to the full development of the Amsterdam model of urbanity inside the metropolis. However, these interviewees are explicit critics of efforts at ubiquity outside of what they consider to be the city. The recent investment in facilities such as multi-purpose pavilions, auditory, "junta de freguesia" is seen as unjust for the public expenditure which they involve (in construction and maintenance).⁹⁷⁷ In some voices (closer to the previous type), the social isolation of the least-well off is also evoked. The lack of social contact is seen to hinder access to information and increase susceptibility to an adaptation below legitimate entitlements. Investments in ubiquity are explained through short-term economic interest, but also through the recognition of emotional attachment of the local authority to the local population who demands them. Spatial unproductivity is not evoked and mobile services and reach-out policies are seen as sufficient to allow individuals to reside where they live at present. If the focus on public space clearly values the possibility of coexistence of the society as an ensemble, we do not observe the same translation when distance is activated. Here, the objectives of justice do not explicitly include the convergence of society as a totality.

7.3.1.3 Mill of plural geotypes

	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability (competence)	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Utilitarianism													
Inhabitant													

Table 22 Erudite theories of justice and the discourses of the inhabitants: "Mill of plural geotypes".

⁹⁷⁵ Urban dispersion is explained through corruption and the lack of planning regulation. The possibility of political actors to change rules in self-serving ways, the unequal application of rules across society members, and the sole criteria of economic profit from urbanisation are all seen as unjust. See section 6.4, "Porto", for a brief characterisation of the planning system to which these interviewees allude (in particular point 6.4.1.5, "The object of institutional planning").

⁹⁷⁶ For this group, the dispersion of the metropolis is a reality. Policies discouraging private mobility, which these inhabitants understand having some fundament, are not considered to be realistic. Introducing tolls in the highways connecting several poles of the metropolis is unjust. The free alternatives are not seen as roads (they became streets through the process of urbanisation), and a high-speed connection is still valued. Furthermore, public transport is far from performing at a level dispensing with private mobility. According to the spatial horizon of these interviewees, some professions will always require private mobility (like that of architects checking their works in peri-urban places).

⁹⁷⁷ These are precisely the same investments on which the "suburban Taylor" makes justice in the territory depend.

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	I	Municipality	Supra-national	Medium (in descent), low or medium/low	Positive	Suburban, central (outside the pole)

Table 23 “Mill of plural geotypes”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E39, E46 for “dissatisfied”; E51, E58 for “satisfied”. Hesitant members of the type: E11, E13, E20, E21, E23, E25, E27, E28, E32, E35, E36, E47, E50, E53, E59.

In this type,⁹⁷⁸ the political legitimate scale is seen to be the municipality, read as a city in its own rights, irrespective of its position in the *plan géotypique*⁹⁷⁹. This discourse resonates with Harvey’s “territorial equality”, and its utilitarian/liberal matrix. As in the discourse of the liberal Harvey, the urban is positively valued as a “resource system”, but this conception is not attached to the systemic functioning of the city. The urban is considered as material (and in some cases virtual resources) that should be universally available independently from density. We find the attempt at juxtaposing Rawls’s first principle of justice to the city (open access to equal opportunities) without evoking the difference principle. It is, then, the utilitarian tonality that prevails.⁹⁸⁰

There is a horizon of justice, focused on procedural equality: equal treatment of different municipalities (without consideration of societal scales) and of different residents. The actors’ capacity to make society and space is not extended to all inhabitants. In particular, the conception differentiates between the *marge de manoeuvre* of high and low economic capitals. Political actors emerge as distributive operators, compensating for the reduced *actorisation* of the inhabitants. There is some recognition of the potential participation of inhabitants creating urbanity, but only if supplementary economic support is distributed (by the municipalities). We have seen that the conception of a gesture maximising the satisfaction of each component of society is the trait of utilitarianism. This spatial justice conception does not formalise the utilitarian criteria of maximising the sum of well-being of each individual in a given society. However, we can deduce that position from some statements where the inhabitants explicitly legitimise, in tandem, contrasting demands of spatial well-being (rural/urban spatialities). This goes hand in hand with the positive valuation of procedural equality and a feeble conception of the society’s political function. We do not find appeals for compatible spatialities or any deliberation towards convergent societal objectives. The absence of spatial constraints is reflected in the silence with regards to civilities. Looser deontological constraints are visible in the way in which this conception produces different spatial justice assessments, depending on the geotype of residence (and the overall capital of the speaker). We can divide the type between the “unsatisfied” and “satisfied”, reflecting the available urbanity of their residential location.⁹⁸¹ This type does not hold a negative view of the coming together in social life, but it does not make a positive value out of copresence either. Diversity is valued favourably, but very high densities are ambiguous or valued negatively. This discourse can go as far as seeing space as a resource for individual competence, but it does not activate the counterpart of the concept: capacity as a collective

⁹⁷⁸ This type results from the re-arrangement of types 5.2 and 5.3 (sections 7.1 and 7.2 for the descriptions of such original types).

⁹⁷⁹ See definition in point 3.3.1 in chapter 3, “Urbanity: density and diversity”.

⁹⁸⁰ We do not find the Rawlsian concern for egalitarian outcomes, nor trade-offs with objectives of reducing social discrepancies. This is particularly so when discussing topics of non-spatial redistribution.

⁹⁸¹ There is also an internal variation with regards to the material versus virtuality of resources which does not affect the kind of spatial solutions advocated.

instrumental outcome.⁹⁸² As we have seen in the review of utilitarianism, there is a presumed dissociation between each individual’s rational desire and the common objects that appear from their cumulative realisation.

7.3.1.3.1 Urbanity/distance (several declinations)

When speaking from the suburban positions, the spatial contribution to increase justice is seen mostly as the expansion of freedom of well-being. Justice demands ubiquitous or reasonable time-distance accessibility to a number resources.⁹⁸³ Part of the resources are objectified, while others are valued for their virtuality. There is a beginning of a transition to a universe of spatial capability, through the notion of competence. The argument for the latter is centred in the competences of kinship, and it is unclear whether they are seen as extensible personal liberties of all. Requests of more diversity are paired with the denunciation of losses of density, in particular, with the flight of young inhabitants to central geotypes and foreign cities. When this conception is experienced from the locations that saw their urbanity level raise, it sees no spatial injustice.⁹⁸⁴ In some cases, there is a comparison with the areas of lower urbanity, producing the judgement of desertification of “rural” areas as unjust. This type of discourse also incorporates the inhabitants which lost positions of higher urbanity but who have adapted to new places of residence.

7.3.1.3.2 Political space (transcending municipality over the *freguesia*)

This conception is sensitive to the notion of political autonomy of the municipality, as expressed in the evaluation of the upgrade of *freguesias* to municipality as just.

7.3.1.3.3 A-spatial (causality of poverty, lack of economic capital to choose spatial identity)

Poverty and unemployment are present as a background national problem. Their causes are not treated spatially, but some spatial consequences are observed. The lack of agency-freedom of young generations in leaving the house of their parents and choosing their own spatial identity is evoked. Seeking such agency has conducted part of the inhabitants to leave Portugal. This prospect of leaving the national space for economic reasons is seen as coercion (lack of agency and well-being freedoms).

7.3.1.3.4 Procedural (lack of transparency in processes of ubiquitous efforts and a-spatial distributions of solidarity)

In this environment of spatial sufferance, there is an outrage in relation to the current distributive policies to social-welfare recipients (in which the speaker is not included). Mistrust also affects the assessment of spatial planning procedures, in particular in ubiquitous efforts.

7.3.1.4 Desert-based a-spatial

	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Desert-based theories													
Inhabitant													

⁹⁸² The difference between these two versants of the concept of capability is described in point 5.1.2.2, “Sen: capability decoupled in competence and capacity” (chapter 5).

⁹⁸³ For a list of the demanded resources see lexicon of type 5.2 and 5.3 in the previous section of the chapter (7.2).

⁹⁸⁴ Maia is the exemplary case. It was a municipality in the first suburban ring of the metropolitan area which is now a part of the urban pole. An acceptable level of urbanity, treated as satisfying, is also found in central geotypes outside the urban pole (Penafiel).

Table 24 Erudite theories of justice and discourses of the inhabitants: “Desert-based a-spatial”.

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	I	Municipal	–	High economic capital (experience of ascension), educational capital varies	NA	Central

Table 25 “Desert-based a-spatial”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E16, E55.

The inhabitants endorsing this spatial justice conception⁹⁸⁵ talk about Porto-municipality.⁹⁸⁶ Urbanity and distance are not part of their concern with spatial justice; they focus on the co-presence and non-spatial dimensions of injustice. Commenting on their reduced contact with other social realities, they are hesitant about a positive horizon of justice. On one hand, some equality in participation in society (based on productivity) is desirable and possible. On the other hand, momentous inequality between individuals, with different willingness to engage in society’s productive sphere, is unavoidable and acceptable. With regards to the first pole, they conceive of the state as an actor compensating from unequal backgrounds and imagine some solidarity investments in the form of basic goods and capabilities (mainly through education). In the second pole, they emphasise the autonomy of the actors. What brings together these two poles is a lack of active role of environment, which, as seen, is a mark of both Rawlsian egalitarianism and desert-based theories. The recognition of the role of education as a potential *actant* of the desirable transformation implies the mutualisation of some resources, which places part of this discourse in alignment with the difference principle.⁹⁸⁷ The internal ambiguity of the type is solved when we focus on the properly spatial dimension. Here, the discourse is clearly affiliated with desert-based theories. The interviewees can accept momentous social difference when they read it through the lenses of intrinsic quality of persons (in some other passages they can evoke the existence of a history of social differentiation).

This discourse has some libertarian similitudes. It appeals to equal rights of disposing oneself, evokes an incongruent sense of historical minimum compensation for existing disparities, and gives a momentous place to individual autonomy. However, the type has superior *sociétalité* than libertarianism. It is not the protection of one’s holdings which motivates the argument, but a sense of injustice for the poor who make an effort vis-à-vis those who are unproductive. These interviewees give some thought to correcting such asymmetry at the low end of the social stratification. This type does not appeal to a change of paradigm in the modalities of solidarity (from distribution to co-production), but we could reconstruct the critiques as a hint in that direction. This position, articulated from an I-identity, recognises that values are fabricated and that they can change. These interviewees have punctured the universe of transcending moral values, but they have not fully developed their ethical capacity as they do not evoke the collective quality of that production. Coherently, they do not give weight to political deliberation. What strikes is the flattening of the complexity of the others’ experience of the society and space. They convert difficulties into opportunities, regardless of how these are lived by others. This position is articulated from positions of high economic

⁹⁸⁵ This coordinate results from the refinements of the interpretation of type 9 (for original description see section 7.1 and 7.2 of the current chapter).

⁹⁸⁶ E55 frequents the north of Portugal, but finds no topics of spatial justice to discuss about such extension, confirming the municipality of Porto as the pertinent scale.

⁹⁸⁷ Here we can mention solidarity without a political dimension as it is merged into a sphere of interpersonal relations.

capital, not necessarily paralleled by superior educational capital. In their biography (or that of their relatives), there has been a social ascension in global capitals or important spatial challenges (for example, relocation in Porto from Egypt). Despite ambiguity regarding participation of the social in the construction of individual advantage (and the moral evaluation of worth that they can perform), the interviewees are open to some measures of solidarity, based on procedural equality.

7.3.1.4.1 A-spatial (excessive economic heteronomy of solidarity recipients)

This type critiques the present day solidarity, which is seen to neglect merit on the basis of the citizens' contribution to society. This discourse is very sensitive to productivity (a form of acknowledgement of aggregative goods), but has a hesitant view of the interrelatedness of the part and the whole. The explication of present injustice reads some influence of place in determining the current economic and spatial position of individuals. There is sensitivity to the environment as englobing setting with influence on actors. However, individuals are assumed to have equal rights and equal obligation to dispose of their potential, in order to overcome difficulties by their own means. As the approach to injustice de-contextualises the standards with which to assess the performance of the actors, it merges down social complexity into a judgement of worth.⁹⁸⁸ We find awareness of social construction in the capability of kinship, but the extension of the conditions of such co-production to all members of society is none of their concern.⁹⁸⁹

7.3.1.4.2 A-spatial (space as projection of social disparities)

The city of Porto is a place born out of work of the *bourgeoisie* (read as historically prone to the differentiation of individuals into classes). The city reflects how different people engage in the economic sphere. Different places have different opportunities, and the state should intervene with compensation in least protected areas. Public intervention guarantees similar spatial objects between worse and better-off parts of the city.⁹⁹⁰ The sociological composition of places and their urbanity level are not a part of the instruments of justice. The stakes do not seem to be the societal global improvement, but rather, the formal provision of a minimum threshold of spatial objects and education. We can interpret this statement as a spatial translation of the difference principle with minimum social complexity.⁹⁹¹ We can note the insufficiencies of Rawls's appeal to basic goods, as this discourse neglects the ongoing complex dynamics of the society. We do not observe, however, the force of equality that animates the Rawlsian discourses found in Porto. We also do not find the first principle of equal opportunity of access to space that is typical of the "urban Rawls".⁹⁹² The interviewees are aware of the social experience of certain places to be a part of individual opportunity, but do not consider it within the means of a horizon of justice. Despite the ambiguities, "classes" are immobilised, and changing them is seen as a utopia. Further equality is dependent upon people's willingness to work. Virtuous people will work to leave their current places (which they partially consider as a cause of injustice), while the others will remain.

7.3.1.4.3 Copresence (conflictual spatialities)

Space affects these inhabitants when networks of the city collide with their territory of everydayness. For example, private mobility detracts safety and children's spatial autonomy. This problem of spatial injustice is described to be of co-presence (without the awareness of the implication of the models of urbanity for mobility solutions). These individuals see themselves as actors and engage in solving spatial problems. Their action focuses on the spaces of

⁹⁸⁸ For example, we do not find an argument of poverty trap as we see with Van Parijs (2004), but rather, it is a moral judgment that prevails.

⁹⁸⁹ Part of the type narrates a massive investment of social advantages on the members of the family.

⁹⁹⁰ Some of these objects are mentioned without exploration of how they increase justice (public transports, health centres, schools) so we cannot deduce the model of society underpinning such advances.

⁹⁹¹ The difference principles is defined within Rawls's principles of justice as fairness (see points 4.3.1, "A deontological response to the plurality of valuable ends" and 4.3.3, "The role of actors and institutions in the conception of the just").

⁹⁹² Indeed, the city coming together in public space is not part of the horizon of justice. Some forms of co-presence are seen as problematic, for instance, social groups with loud and expansive presence in public space (without qualifying it unjust). One inhabitant compares Porto with Zurich to underline the existence of *pimbas* as a characteristic from Porto. *Pimbas* is jargon for the popular classes associated with some cultural productions (*música pimba*) and a mode of co-presence described, by some, as inelegant.

small scale.⁹⁹³ When problems are beyond the sphere of direct influence (exposure to burglary and sense of insecurity), the actor has the choice of keeping a positive attitude and relies on good fortune.

7.3.1.4.4 Co-presence (incivilities)

Another trait of this type is the focus on the disappearance of values. Like in the texts of Durkheim and Simmel, some passages note that the constraints of traditional values have been lifted, giving way to reduced social obligation. The type welcomes the relativity of values, and also perceives reduced heteronomy. Some changes in civility are, however, considered to be unacceptable.⁹⁹⁴ In this type, the definition of society’s shared ethical foundations is not demanded.

7.3.2 ...and their pre-ethical counterparts

7.3.2.1 Walzer *citadin*

	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Walzer													
Inhabitant													

Table 26 Erudite theories of justice and discourses of the inhabitants: “Walzer *citadin*”.

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	I	Municipality	–	High, low	Ambiguous	Central

Table 27 “Walzer *citadin*”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E30. Hesitant members of the type: E12, E28, E31, E32, E34, E59.

The discourse is delivered from the point of view of the *citadin*.⁹⁹⁵ The city is reduced to a hyper-central geotype. Injustice regarding the surrounding territory is acknowledged but suspended in the project of justice. The city has both a material sphere and a *sphère idéal*, and the social world covers plural dimensions (including the political). The object of justice is the city and its people, but the horizon of justice is mainly delivered through negativity. We can read Walzer’s notion of tyranny, that is, the use of superior standing in one of the spheres to gain advantage in a different field (subordinating the members possessing fewer goods). The just is identified with the removal of abuses found in the present monopolies of city governance, and the main idea of justice is liberation from subordination (components of freedom). As in Walzer’s theory, justice implies reducing the weight of political power. The similitude with Walzer is also found in the proposition of teleological good (here it is a response to a deficit of auscultation of

⁹⁹³ This approach results in reduced scope of transformation, for example, the implementation of a new traffic light on the path frequented by one’s children.

⁹⁹⁴ One inhabitant treats the relativity of values a-spatially, openly criticising families choosing different values than hers (in particular with regards to work/family balances).

⁹⁹⁵ This coordinates is constructed with the contribution of the discourse of E30, as in type 8, “Telos of the City” (see in section 7.1 and 7.2). Part of the discourse is endorsed by individuals with low global capitals. In such endorsements, the political versant of the type is omitted.

society). The immobilisation of teleological substances is more vehement than in other discourses, orienting the interpretation to the misrecognition that values are socially constructed.⁹⁹⁶ The open evolution of society and its space is not conceived of. Many incompatibilities of spatiality stem from this point of view, that is, the non-discussible purposes of the city. Spatial actions conflict with each other and with the englobing setting, making the environment the central locus of injustice. The conception sees a mistaken or ill-informed intentionality “behind” the fabrication of the unjust city, and attributes such misconduct only to big actors. Being an actor with a minimum set of competences and responsibility is not extensible to all persons. If the *prise* over the environment is asymmetric, this type quotes a classic affiliation with Aristotle in the appeal to the firm will of giving the other what is due to them.⁹⁹⁷ The city (at infra-urban scale) should give its permanent residents what these can consensually agree upon (at the cost of the remaining urbanites). Unlike Walzer’s motive for tight-proofing the political vis-à-vis other spheres, we do not find the possibility of achievements of equality. The concern for the least-well off is present, but it is accompanied with a dismissal of the poor and low-middle class from the demands of responsibility and contribution to a just space. The asymmetries of *actorisation* are not a part of the horizon of transformation of justice, pointing to an inevitably fractured social world.

7.3.2.1.1 Copresence/interspatiality (conflicting spatialities and unsustainable cospatiality with the world)

The city *telos* regards the living, the working, and the meeting of its inhabitants. The spatialities accompanying increments in density and in diversity are problematic, for they enter in conflict with the *a priori* substantiation of the city’s purposefulness. For example, tourism and nightlife corrupt the city virtue, transforming it into a playground.⁹⁹⁸ The reversal of the unjust gives priority to the *citadins* over the *suburbanites* and foreigner visitors. The city should remain of high quality, rather than accommodate mass urban consumption. This assessment of injustice is also consequential: the city is not imagined with sufficient scale and urbanity to support the cospatiality with the world market.⁹⁹⁹ Such flawed developmental model is seen to result of incompetence of political and technical spatial actors. The just reversal should be based on a comprehensive long-term economic project, integrating the potential of Douro and high-end tourism (without further details being provided).

7.3.2.1.2 Copresence/urbanity (unconstrained spatiality)

This perspective recognises the dynamics between centre and periphery in the production of Porto metropolitan space.¹⁰⁰⁰ It correlates the desertification of Porto and the densification of the suburbs, and links the lack of attractiveness of the city centre with affordable property cost in the suburbs (the rental market is not commented upon). Despite touching the spatiality of actors, spatial capital of individuals is not recognised, and the discourse “absolves” the erroneous choice of a suburban lifestyle.¹⁰⁰¹ The responsibility is attributed to a complot of politicians and big economic groups who, for the sake of furthering their self-interest, intentionally remove information and persuade the semi-actors to leave the city centre. The lack of agency-freedom is foregrounded: suburbanisation is

⁹⁹⁶ The proposition of substantive goods is reasonable in the context of the interview guide, but in this discourse, they are presented as virtues. The tonality of immutability is also distinct from the rest of the corpus. The interpretation of an epoch of morality can be discussed. We found it coherent with the ambiguous view of the political function and the unequal value attributed to each citizen. In the architecture of the ensemble, the critique of other spatialities is momentous, and we can raise the question about whether the conception allows entering into an ethical dialogue without a significant transformation of the core of the discourse.

⁹⁹⁷ The rehabilitation of this Aristotelian view by Aquinas is reviewed in point 4.11.2.1, “Natural law and the virtue of justice”.

⁹⁹⁸ Many spaces and spatiality represent a deviation from the city’s virtuous purposes: the adaptation of historic buildings to hotels are pastiche; the noise level of new leisure users disrespect ancient habitants; tourism distorts local prices; cycling detracts cars, that is, the mobility of those who work and contribute to the true end of the city. While some of these arguments treat important detracts to the qualities of the city and are thus infringements on the rights of all inhabitants, this conception presents the problem from a view which is not fully inclusive of others.

⁹⁹⁹ The model of internationalisation based on low-cost flight companies, is seen as fragile; the lack of critical mass is considered insufficient to sustain cultural production which is capable of maintaining Porto interesting in the long-term.

¹⁰⁰⁰ This problem is partially a conflict of urbanity levels, but it is presented as a problem of co-presence, reflecting a bordered territorial reading of the city, without networks. For this reason we have termed it “Copresence and urbanity (the injustice of unconstrained spatiality)”.

¹⁰⁰¹ According to E30, the “error” consists of underestimating costs with daily mobility, impact in quality of life and the economic risk of devaluation of the patrimony bought in the periphery.

read as expulsion in a complex process of incentives to leave centrality and prohibitive housing costs in this geotype. This explicative model further assumes that poor people are vulnerable to making bad decisions and that the conditions should have been set by those capable of a global perspective, in order to prevent the desertification of the city centre. This critique nears that of an insufficiently constraining spatial planning system (see spatial justice conception affiliated with Rawls).

7.3.2.1.3 Procedural (representative democracy, ignorant of the inhabitants’ spatial needs and wants)

We have seen that the type makes tyranny correspond to the pursuit of unfair advantage using superior capitals (beyond the limits set in society’s ethical code). The promiscuous relationship (between economic and political spheres) qualifies the actors as “evil”, “wrong”, and “corrupted”.¹⁰⁰² When advancing a reversal of the unjust, this discourse opts out from the right/left parties in existing representative democracy, proposing what the interviewee calls a “hyper-conservative” model. A “Council of the Wise” is proposed, inspired in the governance of small villages and towns before the centralisation of Portugal. Corporate interest, based on commonality of groups, ought to debate what the interests of the city are. This appeal for more transparent procedural practices of space-making nears the exit from the epoch of morality. However, the call for listening to the voice of people is non-representational and “anti-democratic”. At a high reconstructive level, we can read a demand for a strengthened function of the political in intersection with a project of habitat, but the observation of procedural equality in the suggested practices is ambiguous.

7.3.2.1.4 Political space (European federation of political spaces)

For supra-urban scales, this types reads Portugal’s share of sovereignty with Europe as unjust and sees globalisation as a conspiracy (The “New World Order” is evoked). The interest of foreigner people to invest in Porto is considered to be a part of a detrimental plan (even if the beneficial effect of cultural renewal is recognised).

7.3.2.2 Hyper-central Taylor

	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Taylor													
Inhabitant													

Table 28 Erudite theories of justice and the discourses of the inhabitants: “Hyper-central Taylor”.

¹⁰⁰² The linguistic mark of this discourse is the despicable treatment of political sovereign power while uttering the necessity to block the use of superior political capital. This conception joins Walzer in the association of justice with restricting the role of institutional politics (where political capital is accumulated).

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	In transition from we- to I-identity	Infra-municipal	Varies	Discrepancies between dimensions ¹⁰⁰³	Positive (with ambiguity)	Central

Table 29 “Hyper-central Taylor”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E14, E48. Hesitant members of the type: E13, E17, E33, E49.

This coordinate¹⁰⁰⁴ forwards the importance of space in human existence, through the stability of the spatial identity of persons and groups. It is located in the line of transition between the ethical and pre-ethical fields of the ethos (in Porto society). These interviewees see spatial belonging – the affective attachment to one’s place of birth or of long time residence – crucial for individual well-being. The interpretation of humans as territorialised beings appeals to the protection of spatial identity from exposure to continuous challenges and movements. Locational changes or transformation of places are seen as necessarily negative experiences. Injustice issues from the conception of place as a delimited territory of permanent features. We find Taylor’s call for making allowances towards untransformed perpetuation of identity and culture. As in Taylor’s conception of justice, culture appears as a product generated inside bordered territories of human association, rather than a transmissible and transformable product of ideality in humanity’s activities. We have seen that Taylor’s collective claims of infra-societal groups naturalise a divided social world. In the spatial declination of this idea, the inhabitants appear to be divided between the “true residents” and the others, while the uniqueness of the former is asserted. In particular, solidarity of proximity (Durkheim’s “mechanical solidarity”) is positively valued as a cultural trait that should survive.¹⁰⁰⁵ Spatial injustice is associated with the absence of well-being freedom (the affective disturbance with place transformation) and agency-freedom (not being able to choose to remain in a place). We can see the priority Taylor gives to these facets of liberty, interpreted as community experiences vis-à-vis the social whole.¹⁰⁰⁶ As in Taylor, we find the sacrifice of personal liberties: the right to reside in the area is not extensible to all interested parties. Increases in equality of outcome are also doubted (the problems of the area are thought to be “very complex” for a structural transformation). There are no aggregative goods. The collective spatial experience is valued, but the individual is also present and individual freedom is recognised.¹⁰⁰⁷

7.3.2.2.1 Copresence (conflictual spatialities and civilities)

The endorsers of this type comment on their experience and extend their concern to some other people (exposed to similar phenomena and/or with same spatial affiliation). This discourse sees many spatialities of other city users as incompatible. They elect ancestry as the criteria for prioritising different modes of inhabiting. The access of new inhabitants to these interviewees’ zone of residence is conditioned to the newcomers’ acceptance of local group specificities, including civilities. The reversal of injustice is a partial enclave. The incompatibility between spatialities of different actors, and the supporting spaces they imply, are attributed to social causes (it is not just a result of evil actors). This spatial justice conception argues for a different course of reality, where spatial attachment (and often a history of personal dedication to the making of space)¹⁰⁰⁸ is not procedurally overlooked. The horizon is thin, but it

¹⁰⁰³ E14 (medium/high economic and educational capitals); E48 (medium/high economic capital and low educational homologue).

¹⁰⁰⁴ This coordinate is based on type 4, “Longing for the space of belonging”, described in sections 7.1 and 7.2.

¹⁰⁰⁵ There is no questioning on whether such trait reflects the fragility of social group.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Taylor focuses on the possibility of bringing these claims to a process of increased equality, while the reduced political function of these inhabitants’ discourse lacks this component.

¹⁰⁰⁷ We do not find the subordination of kinship to one’s cultural model as in the second versant of the circulation of Taylor’s theory (The peri-urban Taylor).

¹⁰⁰⁸ The interviewees mobilise their own capitals to increase justice.

exists, and space is at the heart of the imagination of justice. Urbanity is not fully embraced, as social divisiveness is partially naturalised (maximum sociological diversity is not desirable or not possible).

7.3.2.2 Urbanity (loss of collective spatialities with more urbanity)

References to urbanity emerge in the critique to lost collective spatial practises in central geotypes (in particular in cases of relocation in the suburbs). However, these inhabitants do not demand the resourcefulness of urbanity, as evoked by the inhabitants resonating with Sen, Rawls or Mill. Increased complexity of the multi-dimensional substances of space accompanies the argumentative register, but it is limited by a communitarian stance. The reversal of spatial injustice does not accommodate compatibility between spatialities of different actors.

7.3.2.3 Peri-urban Taylor

	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Taylor													
Inhabitant													

Table 30 Erudite theories of justice and the discourses of the inhabitants: “Peri-urban Taylor”.

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	We	Infra-municipal	Varies	Discrepancies between dimensions ¹⁰⁰⁹	Negative	Peri-urban

Table 31 “Peri-urban Taylor”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E19, E40, E41, E42, E47, E54. Hesitant members of the type: E11, E23, E27, E29, E43, E44.

A second type of discourse¹⁰¹⁰ diverges from the same ideality of the ethos but is applicable to a smaller space, the *freguesia*.¹⁰¹¹ The experience of habitat is located here in the peri-urban and problems of ubiquity emerge (which were not present in the “hyper-central Taylor”). The reversal of injustice passes by a combination of mobility solutions (better infrastructure for private and/or public mobility) and the ubiquity of some services (and accessible networks for others). It also includes the protection of the enclave. The members of this type has not punctured the community basis of their relationship with the world. For example, we find explicit actions directed at removing freedom of spatial choice for younger members of the group. Spatial-ethical values are undiscussable. The “political” is mainly seen as a distributive actor. Justice is produced by top-down actors, denoting a conception of space as a simplified social object, rather than environments. This discourse is identified with a lesser societal interpretation of Taylor. It

¹⁰⁰⁹ E42 has medium/high economic, low educational, high spatial capitals.

¹⁰¹⁰ This type results from the refinement of type 5.1 “Desirability of “development”, communitarian”, presented in sections 7.1 and 7.2 of chapter 7.

¹⁰¹¹ As defined in point 6.1.2 of chapter 6, “Empirical referent, the urban area of Porto” the *freguesia* (parish) is the smaller unit of Portugal’s political space.

also resonates with an incomplete circulation of liberal Harvey's territorial equality. This conception of spatial justice appeals to the difference principle among territories, without considering the centrality of individual freedom or convergence of values.

7.3.2.3.1 Distance (non-ubiquity, insufficient enclave)

Harvey's "territorial merit" comprises of unequal distribution of resources necessary to surpass natural or social difficulty posed by space on human activity. These inhabitants seek territorial layouts on similar grounds, that is, maximising the prospects of the least fortunate regions (the speakers evoke the history of adversity, struggle, and achievements through which the territory arrives at present state of justice and injustice). The least developed territories should have priority in the distribution of resources over places that have been overinvested in the past (including the city centre versus the periphery; old municipalities versus young municipalities).¹⁰¹² They extend the claim to other areas of Portugal that are experiencing similar difficulties. Equality is assessed among places, not between persons. In this spatial imaginary there is a form of evolution, which the inhabitants see accessible without changing diversity or density (they name it "development")¹⁰¹³. Spatial injustice is read as a problem of unequal resources between territories (and consequently, their development level), rather than the outcome of systemic functioning with differentiated productivity. The absent spatial freedoms are attributed to the intentionality of economic actors (greedy investors), or to political incompetence or corruption (Walser's promiscuity); but not to feasibility constraints. These voices demand support of dense networks of facilities, mobile services, and heavy infrastructure which may support private mobility (in lower economic capitals there is a demand of public mobility as well). This type claims different types of investments, reflecting different thresholds of legitimate expectations.¹⁰¹⁴ Compensation for increased developmental difficulty sees the institutional political function of society as a matter of negotiation between territories and the political authorities governing the region. The idea of procedural equality is decoupled from that of spatial responsibility in the co-production of habitat. The rationale of these actors require is better understood if we note that they have invested personal resources in trying to make these places thrive. Indeed, while these inhabitants talk of their achievements (and failures) as actors which are capable of spatial change, they do not recognise the universal competences of other actors, or accommodate their intentionality. This type emerges in some passages of interviews predominantly located in other coordinates (including the "city Sen"). Being affectively bound to an original space of belonging in the peri-urban seems to be at the basis of such hybridity of discourses with contrasting degrees of *sociétalité*.

7.3.2.3.2 Political space (unequal treatment and project of union with other political spaces)

Coherently with the core of this conception, the merging of the *freguesias* into bigger political spaces is seen as an injustice.¹⁰¹⁵

¹⁰¹² There are discourses of fight against the perceived past and present forgetfulness devoted to their *freguesia*.

¹⁰¹³ As this discourse does not mobilise systemic goods, the inhabitants are not using the term with the definition we attribute to the concept. See presentation of the concept in point section 5.1 of chapter 5. See in particular point 5.1.3.1, "Veracity and the political requirements of the city".

¹⁰¹⁴ Some of the demands are leisure-oriented and could well-integrate a project of habitat as areas with a non-residential vocation.

¹⁰¹⁵ The redefinition of the local administrative territory was a part of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Portugal and Troika, as noted in point 6.4.1.6, "Europe as an actor".

7.3.2.4 Young from the ghetto

	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Young													
Inhabitant													

Table 32 Erudite theories of justice and the discourses of the inhabitants: “Young from the ghetto”.

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	In transition from we- to I-identity	Infra-municipal	Other urban places, municipality	Very low	Ambiguous	Central, suburban and peri-urban

Table 33 “Young from the ghetto”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E17, E33. Hesitant members of the type: E12, E15, E20, E21.

The tonality of this type¹⁰¹⁶ approximates Iris Marion Young resource from the ethos. Here, the inhabitants’ feel oppressed by the places where they live and the spatialities of others in these territories.¹⁰¹⁷ The claims are delivered on behalf of individuals or small groups. Like Young, we find the voicing of structures of personality in transit from a relationship with the world based on the community to one based on the individual/society. We can also see that the discourse have varying degrees of reasonableness, including the intentionality of infringement on other individuals’ personal liberties. This is accommodated within the place made by Iris Marion Young to the affective-subjective identification of injustice (we have seen that the author legitimises the absence of positive deontological guidance).¹⁰¹⁸ In relation to Young’s conception, we do not find the political dimension or the actual coming together, motivated by struggle.¹⁰¹⁹ When this discourses perforate the sphere of the individual, empathy towards the other is subject to the representation of similitude in the experience of oppression.¹⁰²⁰ The conception is marked by a lack of *marge de manoeuvre* of the actors and Young’s idea of struggle is not (or no longer) imagined. The conception is characterised for the dominance of a negative horizon of justice.

Some social objects (law, policies) are interpreted as impositions. The political is only present through the experienced contact with distributed resources (of which most of the speakers in this type are beneficiaries), without

¹⁰¹⁶ This discourse results from the re-arrangement of types 1 and 2, as described in section 7.1 and 7.2.

¹⁰¹⁷ In the construction of this type, we have privileged the tonality over the actual presence of all the ideas of justice present in Marion Young’s *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990/2011). Indeed, Marion Young conceives of procedural equality (co-varying with the importance of the political dimension of the society), a feeble presence of facets of equality and aggregate goods. These elements are not emergent in this spatial justice conception.

¹⁰¹⁸ As we have seen in section 7.2 of this chapter, this reduced deontological strength is reflected in the dominance of the narrative/interpretative register of the discourse (absence of an argumentative register and of procedural rationality).

¹⁰¹⁹ In Porto society, the basis of aggregation are very different from the ethnic, gender and sexual orientation based struggles that Young seeks out to formalise. The type does not claim any actual coming together in struggle which is a central aspect of Young’s conception.

¹⁰²⁰ The interviewee talks on the behalf of the persons sharing fragility (the poor, the disabled, and children), who are not strictly restricted to family bounds.

further comment on collective implications. We find Young's demands of well-being and agency freedom, combined with absence of egalitarian outcomes.

7.3.2.4.1 Co-presence (invasion of individual space, civilities)

The individuals do not recognise themselves as actors and narrate many instances in which their *marge de manoeuvre* is little, in materiality and in ideality. They are assigned to places by public actors, coerced by neighbours, and feel subject to the loss of spatial autonomy due to economic deprivation¹⁰²¹. The approach to injustice in co-presence narrates the predatory spatial practices of other inhabitants, an attack on individual freedom and on the body itself (the smallest space of society).¹⁰²² These imposing actors negatively impact the englobing settings where these inhabitants interact with their small social world. Environments are the locus of injustice. Perceived as rigid, there is little to no hope in this conception of spatial justice. We can see that space is narrated as relative (it depends on the realities found in space) and relational (even if the logic relating the actors is of poor *sociétalité* and not explored as a social construction).

7.3.2.4.2 Distance (ghetto)

The activation of distance is not spontaneous. There is a positive valuation of concertation (suburban notes in peri-urban areas) where objects are more accessible. The conception is not sufficiently systemic to be considered for a claim of higher urbanity. Distance is a problem in the absence of networked metrics with which one may suppress it. There is some acceptance of this inevitable difficulty (there is an adaptation neglect).¹⁰²³ In reconstruction, we can, however, identify spatial injustice as *ghetto* (that is, the impossibility to leave a place). These interviewees also narrate how non-spatial solidarity policies restrains their spatial strategy. For example, rules of subsidies distribution and social services regulation of material housing conditions. Even in the positions of very low global capital, individuals want to be free to choose with whom they should live, in which level of urbanity they should reside, and which trade-off for surface and physical conditions of the house to realise. They evoke not only the unfreedoms of low income, but also the normative removal of freedom attached to the reception of social income.¹⁰²⁴ The substantiation of solidarity transfers by the state, blindly to capability and individual valuation, has important effects (in particular when programs are discontinued)¹⁰²⁵. The inhabitants do not have the possibility to choose their own priorities and readjust to change of circumstance.

7.3.2.4.3 Copresence (ostracism and disappearance of civility in public space)

Part of the type described difficulties in the experience of public space. They perceive ostracism and misread if their choices by the judgements of the others, contacted with in public space. The endorsers of this spatial justice conception also regret the disappearance of some civilities (for example, assistance to people in public space).

7.3.2.4.4 Body (multi-dimensional deprivation)

The multi-dimensional deprivation lived by these inhabitants translates into injustices at the very small scale of the space of their body (in particular, hunger and loss of teeth).

¹⁰²¹ We can reconstruct some choices as self-limiting, but we understand that they are "structural" to the person experiencing them.

¹⁰²² Physical violence is portrayed among neighbours, but emotional pressure resulting in oppressive spatial practices can occur inside the family (though the sufferer does not attribute injustice to the members of the family).

¹⁰²³ The concept of neglect has been noted in Sen's critique of happiness and desire fulfilment as basis for assessing individual advantage and disadvantage. See point 4.2.3.1, "The individual as an actor of justice: capabilities", in chapter 4.

¹⁰²⁴ To prevent what the state reads as subsidy abuse, rules have been set up to limit the accumulation of economic support on the basis of residential address. Inhabitants cannot explore the full range of spatial possibilities open to them, as they cannot afford (or do not want to risk) losing their source of income. A spatial trap is attached to the social income trap.

¹⁰²⁵ E17 narrates the discontinuation of a program supporting teeth removal for the installation of prosthesis, leaving him without teeth.

7.3.2.5 Aquinas at the confine of the city

	Increase in equality of outcome	Procedural equality	Agency-freedom	Well-being freedom	Personal liberties	Aggregative goods	Capability	Open horizon of justice	Political function	Deontological elements	Actors	Social objects	Environments
Morality centred on													
Inhabitant													

Table 34 Erudite theories of justice and the discourses of the inhabitants: “Aquinas...”.

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	In transition from we- to I-identity	Infra-municipal and municipal	Other municipalities	Medium-low	Negative	Suburban, peri-urban, central outside the pole

Table 35 “Aquinas at the confine of the city”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: E26, E31, E38, E56. Hesitant members of the type: E36, E53.

This coordinate¹⁰²⁶ does not configure a horizon of justice. The reading of injustice is supported by a normative moral matrix. This type renounces the open consideration of the intentionality and choices of other actors, in particular, when they do not match their own orientations. We detect an ethos based on virtue and Aquinas’ supreme moral principle: the commandment of love for our neighbour as oneself. The good is considered self-evident, dissolving the political character of the problems. Injustice is defined as the lack of virtue in social environments. Space can be the plane in which a social relation takes place or be the object of social interaction. The conception of space is restricted to sociality or to a collection of objects. This discourse is also marked by the absence of actors. The competences of actors as capable of powerful effects through their action is restricted to only some members of the society. The desire to act is not recognised for those holding different views. In evaluating transformations in habitat, these interviewees mobilise the lack of moral virtue of other persons. The political and the economic substances of social objects are not present in their descriptions of the space where they exist. Distance is not a difficulty for these individuals, as they reside in central and suburban geotypes and have sufficient overall capital to be as mobile as they see necessary.

As the assessment of injustice is restricted to the actors’ susceptibility to moral flaws, the margins for justice are very small. The universals of justice declined in this conception are restricted to improvements in well-being freedom and some agency-freedom.¹⁰²⁷ Increases in equality, procedural equality, personal liberties and aggregative goods are all absent. Space is not imagined as a resource for lesser injustice. When space is visibly an entity under transformation, this conception judges unjust the conflict of different spatialities, as well as the tension between some spatialities

¹⁰²⁶ This discourse results from the refinement of type 3 and redistribution of its members (see original description of type 3 in sections 7.1 and 7.2 of the present chapter).

¹⁰²⁷ The crisis period in which the interviewees take place is prone to the virtue of charity, given the radical impoverishment the inhabitants could observe and the withdrawals of society’s support that took place during the research terrain.

and such instable space.¹⁰²⁸ According to this type, the spatialities of the least-privileged should prevail over that of the other subjects. The inhabitants seem to be transiting from a communitarian to a society of individuals.¹⁰²⁹ The predisposition for social interaction is influenced by the discretionary evaluation of the moral worth of others. We can see that this conception cannot recognise public space, which is funded upon attitudinal equality towards others. As seen in the review of contemporary revivals of Aquinas, self-reference remains the content, and the measure, of the other.¹⁰³⁰ Obligation to others is discretionary, as help or attention in the social contact of the actors depends on the latter sharing some basis of identity. Some of the individuals holding arguments in this coordinate also show some Walzerian components.¹⁰³¹

7.3.2.5.1 Copresence (alterity)

From the core description of the conception follows that the confrontation with alterity is, by default, a potential source of injustice.

7.3.2.5.2 A-spatial (lack of virtue in relationships)

Evil behaviour concerns the lack of decency in social relations where space is the object of transactions. When urbanity is evaluated through this angle, the unjust city configures an arena of transformation through the actions of some individuals moved by greed (for example, the rental market with increased rents, due to the greed of proprietors). These speakers talk from central and suburban geotypes which saw increases of urbanity, but the phenomena is not seen as systemic. The disappearance of the “rural” is accessed through the narrative of the involved characters: real-estate construction happens because the land owner is too old to farm the land, and factories close because young generations are not interested in taking over the family business.

7.3.2.5.3 Copresence (incompatible spatialities and their virtue)

Incompatibility of spatial uses emerging with the increase of urbanity is evaluated according to the criteria of wealth (the uses of the poor should prevail) and ancientness (the uses of more ancient dwellers should prevail).¹⁰³² The visibility of space provokes a conflation between criticisable behaviour of individuals and spatial qualities (for example, the shameful house without maintenance).

7.3.2.6 Anomie

Spatial identity	I/We identity	Scale of inhabiting	Scale of evoked spatialities	Global capitals	Valuation of high urbanity	Geotype of residence
Inhabitant	I	Infra-municipal	Municipal	Medium/high or very low	Positive	Central

Table 36 “Anomie”: spatial identity of the individuals who most contribute to this spatial justice conception. Interviewees who embody the coherence of the type: 50. Hesitant members of the type: 49.

¹⁰²⁸ There is also one case of positive valuation of the *freguesia*'s transformation. The *freguesia* is located in the peri-urban rather than the central and suburban level of urbanity that characterises this type (E36).

¹⁰²⁹ See discursive marks of type 3 in section 7.2 of this chapter.

¹⁰³⁰ We have seen that the interpretation of the other necessary for practical conduct is, in the moral doctrine, deprived from external resources to oneself, curtailing the need to discover and understand that different other.

¹⁰³¹ When an inhabitant is located between these two types, the ideas of justice at stake also imply a form of capability. E31 denounces the effect of political/economic monopoly in removing, from ordinary citizens, the opportunity to start a life plane from scratch.

¹⁰³² This argument is common to the “Walzer *citadin*”.

This conception of spatial justice¹⁰³³ presents zero resonance with the matters of spatial justice. This approach is held from a comfortable social capital and positions of acute disadvantage. In part of the type, there is a very brief mention of communism, with equality of salaries and jobs.¹⁰³⁴ We can note this contemporary view of the society – with very low *sociétalité* – appeals to a communist tag. If we expand our erudite concepts to include the sociological imagination explored in chapter 1, we can identify Durkheim’s anomie. When this approach to the social is enounced from privilege, there is no topic that evokes an ethical or moral disturbance with regards to others.¹⁰³⁵ This contrasts with the rest of the interviewees’ reading of Porto space and the diagnosis of difficulties which they provide us with. There is no sense of public or collective spatial project, although there is acknowledgment of minimal public provision (reference to street light). In the positions of social disadvantage, the inhabitants describe their choice to remove themselves from problems by not interfering with others in co-presence. Hints at this position are also present in the discourses which are dominantly located in other types.

¹⁰³³ This discourse results from the re-arrangement of type 10 and 1. For the preliminary characterisation of these types see sections 7.1 and 7.2 (chapter 7).

¹⁰³⁴ The passage on Marxism is too brief to allow the reconstruction of an affiliation with this coordinate from the universe of the ethos. The remaining language of the interview does not evoke this coordinate.

¹⁰³⁵ Speaking from a privileged point of view, the interviewee states to not have anything affecting her negatively. Enjoying the beach, the bars, and other pleasant attributes of her place are the spatial contents of most of the discourse. In the least spontaneous sections, there is a reference to spatial *unfreedom* when E50 was younger (as a dependent child being forced to move residence from central to suburban areas with her parents).

7.3.3 What matters for justice in space

The focus of this englobing portrait of the society of Porto responds to the motivation of this research, which takes an urbanistic perspective. Having departed from the concern with the need for a basis of substantive values on which one can co-construct legitimate decisions, we conclude that, in Porto, the dominant spatial values do not exist. In this society, urbanists need to work with the inhabitants/citizens to develop their capacity to define the same problematics of spatial justice. The synthesis table below provides an overview of the different ways to compose problems from the same city. The contrast between the themes of chorotypes of injustice and of justice – urbanity models, distance, co-presence, procedural injustice, or a-spatial difficulties – reflects the different conceptions of spatial justice used in the inhabitants' interpretation of the urban area of Porto.

Reference	Injustice	Contrary of injustice (or justice)
Sen		
7.3.1.1.1	Urbanity (<i>conflictual urbanity models, lack of capability</i>)	High urbanity (<i>public space, mixity, public mobility</i>) Political project (<i>spatial planning, participation</i>)
7.3.1.1.2	Distance/Urbanity (<i>ghetto, lack of urbanity</i>)	Co-presence in high urbanity (<i>contact between social layers</i>)
7.3.1.1.3	Distance (<i>enclave in ideality</i>)	Interspatiality (<i>co-spatiality with Northern Europe</i>)
7.3.1.1.4	Political space (<i>transcendence of Lisbon/Portugal, lack of participation</i>)	Political space (<i>increased political autonomy</i>)
Rawls		
7.3.1.2.1	∅ Copresence (<i>insufficient public space</i>)	Copresence/high urbanity (<i>public space and public mobility</i>)
7.3.1.2.2	Copresence/urbanity (<i>conflictual civilities</i>)	∅
7.3.1.2.3	Distance/urbanity (<i>ghetto, no urban quality</i>)	Copresence/high urbanity (<i>social housing in central geotype</i>)
7.3.1.2.4	Urbanity, procedural (<i>conflictual urbanity models</i>)	∅ (<i>private mobility</i>) Procedural (<i>spatial planning, no corruption</i>)
7.3.1.2.5	Distance (<i>cost of ubiquity and social isolation</i>)	Mobility (<i>mobile services and information to lower urbanity levels</i>)
	Copresence (<i>inequality in public space, inequality in treatment based on origin</i>)	Copresence/high urbanity (<i>public space</i>)
	Urbanity (<i>destruction of epoch diversity of the built fabric</i>)	∅ (<i>acceptance for some losses</i>) Urbanity (<i>refurbishment</i>)
	Procedural	Procedural (<i>transparency, ethical capital</i>)

CONNECTING SPACE AND JUSTICE IN METROPOLITAN PORTO

	<i>(consequential inequality resulting from distributive practices)</i>	
	A-spatial <i>(space as projection of social disparities)</i>	A-spatial <i>(educational resources)</i>
Mill		
7.3.1.3.1	Urbanity <i>(insufficient urbanity and impact on competence)</i>	Urbanity/distance <i>(support to spatialities and effort of ubiquity)</i>
7.3.1.3.1	Urbanity ∅	Urbanity <i>(contentment with urbanity level)</i>
7.3.1.3.1	Distance <i>(desertification of "rural" areas)</i>	Distance <i>(ubiquity of opportunity)</i>
7.3.1.3.1	Urbanity <i>(removal from high urbanity in the past, demanded on individual terms)</i>	∅
7.3.1.3.2	Political space <i>(transcending municipality over freguesia)</i>	Political space <i>(municipalisation of some freguesias)</i>
7.3.1.3.3	A-spatial <i>(causality of poverty, lack of economic capital to choose spatial identity)</i>	∅
7.3.1.3.4	Procedural <i>(lack of transparency in processes of ubiquitous efforts and a-spatial distributions of solidarity)</i>	∅
Desert-based		
7.3.1.4.1	A-spatial <i>(excessive heteronomy of solidarity recipients)</i>	A-spatial <i>(revision of solidarity, responsibility)</i>
7.3.1.4.2	A-spatial <i>(space as projection of social disparities)</i>	Distance <i>(ubiquitous spatial objects in the city as minimal compensation)</i> A-spatial <i>(education)</i>
7.3.1.4.3	Copresence <i>(conflictual spatialities)</i>	Political <i>(public pressure on minimal spatial transformation)</i>
7.3.1.4.4	Copresence <i>(incivilities)</i>	∅

Table 37 Injustices at the urban scale and their contraries, perceived from ethics.

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Reference	Injustice	Contrary of injustice (or justice)
Walzer		
7.3.2.1.1	Copresence/interspatiality (<i>conflicting spatialities, unsustainable cospatiality with the world</i>)	Copresence (<i>citadel</i>)
7.3.2.1.2	Copresence/urbanity (<i>unconstrained spatiality</i>)	Procedural (<i>local project of habitat</i> Reconstruction doubt on democratic inclusiveness of the proposed solution)
7.3.2.1.3	Procedural (<i>representative democracy, ignorant of the inhabitants' spatial needs and wants</i>) (<i>promiscuity of spheres</i>)	Procedural (<i>local project of habitat</i>) Reconstruction doubt on democratic inclusiveness of the proposed solution (<i>transparency, competence, control</i>)
7.3.2.1.4	Political space (<i>European federation of political spaces as unjust</i>)	∅
Taylor		
7.3.2.2.1	Copresence (<i>conflictual spatialities and civilities</i>)	Copresence/distance (<i>partial enclave</i>)
7.3.2.2.2	Urbanity (<i>loss of collective spatialities with more urbanity</i>)	∅
7.3.2.3.1	Distance (<i>non-ubiquity, insufficient enclave</i>)	Distance (<i>networks, ubiquity, mobility sustaining enclave</i>)
7.3.2.3.2	Political space (<i>unequal treatment and project of union with other political spaces</i>)	Political space (<i>infra-societal scale</i>)
Young		
7.3.2.4.1	Copresence, body (<i>invasion of individual space, civilities</i>)	∅
7.3.2.4.2	Distance (<i>ghetto</i>)	∅
7.3.2.4.3	Copresence (<i>ostracism and disappearance of civility in public space</i>)	∅
7.3.2.4.4	Body (<i>multi-dimensional deprivation</i>)	A-spatial (<i>heteronomy from state</i>)
Aquinas		
7.3.2.5.1	Copresence (<i>alterity</i>)	∅
7.3.2.5.2	A-spatial (<i>lack of virtue in relationships</i>)	∅
7.3.2.5.3	Copresence (<i>incompatible spatialities and their virtue</i>)	Copresence/Distance (<i>partial enclave</i>)
7.3.2.5	∅	Low urbanity (<i>satisfied with peri-urbanisation</i>)
Durkheim (anomie)		
7.3.2.6	∅	∅

Table 38 Injustices at the urban scale and their contraries, perceived from morality. When figuring in the column “injustice”, ∅ indicates that the theme is only treated as an existing justice; when appearing on the right, ∅ signifies absence of proposed reversal of a diagnosed injustice.

7.4 A portrait of the ideality of Porto

We have seen that textometry allows for the interpretation of the parts and the whole to interact in the construction of the interpretation. It does so by calling attention to contrast. Given such contrastive method, it is likely that the views we have identified exaggerate the cleavage in the ideality of Porto. If the objective is to present clear theoretical objects, helping others to think their own positioning, this exaggeration is not detrimental. However, to read the inclination of the society as a whole and to allow a prospective horizon, it is useful to draw attention to the commonalities that are observable in our object. This text tries to propose a synthetic view of both the continuity and discontinuity of the corpus.

Before we delve into that synthesis, it is worth noting some simple observations that characterise the corpus as a whole. Despite the internal divergence of the corpus, the general conception of space is relative, that is, space depends on the realities found in space. Space is also relational, that is, the spatial concerns of the inhabitants show well that space regards the relationships that spatial operators entertain with each other (this is so, even if the logic of the operators are not known or closed to enquiry). Even when spatial dynamics are not recognised at a societal level, space is always relational, due to the difficulties of co-presence experienced by many of the actors. Given the context of economic crisis and budgetary cuts, there is a central economic concern with unemployment. However, we can sustain the way in which problem configuration depends on the concept of spatial justice, similarly to the construction of urbanistic problems (treated in section 7.3).¹⁰³⁶ We can also note that the period of economic depression and the concerns with material deprivation do not convert the discourse into a-spatial interpretations of the social. Abundant problems and solutions are proposed with an urban scope for political action. Paradoxically, the impoverishment of Portugal during the period of the *terrain* makes spatial dimension an important plane to read injustices. The experience of the reduction of spatial capital, including removal of mobility – some describe not affording travels to the hyper centre – confronts the inhabitants with a lack of public goods of Porto (in particular, deficits of urbanity and public transports). As a part of the society is less capable to compensate the lacunae of their residential position through spatiality, the awareness of “lost” spatial capabilities rise. In this context, the *terrain* is actually favourable to detect what matters for justice in space.

If we resume the observations presented so far, the city presents some significant cleavages in its relation to space and ethos. Abundant complaints at incivilities denote the fact that the city does not share the codes of co-presence. We have seen that representations involved in the idea of progress can either be a part of a society’s dominance (that is, common to the entirety of its members), or be located at a more conflicting level of production.¹⁰³⁷ Spatial-ethical values in Porto at the level of production in the explanation of this society. There is not one dominant mode of regulating distance corresponding to a spatial ideology.¹⁰³⁸ The fact that there is not one spatial justice conception for the society of Porto denotes that the city is not experienced as one space. It seems that, up to the present, there is not a minimum threshold of common social experience, or a minimum level of democratic practices, foundational of a shared basis of spatial-ethical values. This points to the unavoidable question of defining the political scale of the urban/city via a political debate.

With these cleavages in ideality, the society members cannot easily cooperate in the production of the goods of their coexistence. If we call ethical capital to the capacity to form a collective will with others in any sphere of productivity, it should be noted that Porto has divergent levels but an overall low capital. Though we have advanced the notion of ethical capital thinking of individuals, we can also talk of a global ethical capital of a society. The ethical capital of Porto is visible in the materiality of its space and in its economic productivity. It also emerges in the episodes where

¹⁰³⁶The construction of problematic of economic crisis in alignment with the conception of spatial justice can be seen in section 8.2 of chapter 8, “Individual geotypes, the interspatiality of spatial justice”.

¹⁰³⁷ These ideas are covered in section 1.1 in chapter 1, “The social and the spatial in a dimensional paradigm”.

¹⁰³⁸ We have seen in section 6.4 of chapter 4, “Porto”, that this is utterly visible in the materiality of Porto metropolitan space.

Porto inhabitants feel misunderstood, misjudged, and maltreated in their experience of the social. As we have commented throughout, there is a general lack of trust in politics and a pervasive denunciation of corruption. Another common trait to this society, which is still emerging from a communitarian to a society of individuals, is the appeal to greater individual freedom, in particular, from positions of social disadvantage.

7.4.1 Resourcefulness of space for justice, comprehensiveness of universals of justice




Figure 19 Resourcefulness of space for justice, comprehensiveness of universals of justice.

In the intellectual journey described in this thesis, we have tried to understand how space and justice are connected in the ideality of the inhabitants of Porto society. We have observed that the theories that support our thoughts on space and justice are systemic and interrelated. It would have been easier to state the circularity of their concepts, articulated in such a way that they continuously merge into each other. We find that it is worth trying to construct a set of distinct contributions from the two planes of observation. Keeping in mind the use that others can make of this thought, it is necessary to stabilise some of the interrelations.

We have observed that there is a strong correlation between, on the one hand, the capacity to imagine space as a resource for the society and, on the other hand, the comprehensiveness of the universals implied in the reversal of injustice (in the horizon of progress). Several thresholds can be used to trace the main anchors where individual conceptions of spatial justice are localised.¹⁰³⁹ We can read these stages in two axis (fig. 19). The vertical axis represents the comprehensiveness of universals mobilised in the discourse. It can be seen as a dominantly affective-objective domain, implying the objectives of justice that the inhabitants feel ethically relevant or compelling when discussing justice and space. The horizontal axis translates the complexity through which space is mobilised as a resource which societies have at the disposal of their common existence and development. It can be seen as a cognitive-objective domain, where we can argue on the basis of veracity and feasibility. The relation between the two axes provide an information on the strength of the deontology, that is, the movement between the affective-objective and the cognitive-objective implied in the reasoning of justice.

In this organisation, the two fields of the ethos appear, each with a curve in relation to which the coordinates of the ideal types (the ten conceptions of spatial justice), are positioned. Though the coherence of each curve impedes them to intersect, we will see that individuals can hesitate between two moments.¹⁰⁴⁰ Fig. 19 presents the portrait of Porto conceptions of spatial justice. The diagram is also a synthetic reading of the ways to connect space and justice (the letters and symbols used in the description below refer to the elements of the diagram).

In abscise *a*, space is the plane of projection of social differentiation, as seen in the “desert-based a-spatial” conception. Space is also the object of disputes where conflicting social exchanges are incited, as described by the “Aquinas at the confine of the city”. In these two coordinates (*a*, $-\infty$; *a*, *ii*), space does not participate in any sort of improvement, either personal or societal.¹⁰⁴¹ In the second stage, *b*, space is assumedly at the core of injustice, and when the reversal of injustice is imagined, space is involved in the amelioration of the course of things. Space is here an object of assistance, whereby the idea of exchanges between parts of society emerges. This assistance does not take the sense of co-production of justice through solidarity. Distribution is motivated through compensation, and even if the actors mobilise a vocabulary of “progress” (evolution, development), it does not comprehend society in its ensemble. In the coordinates of the morality curve (*b*, *i*), this spatial view does not include open substantiation of individual projects. In case *b*, there are several degrees of possibility of reversing injustice. The degree can be zero and conceive of the violent annihilation of current obstacles to well-being and agency-freedom in space (as exposed by the “Young from the ghetto” (*b*,*i*-)). The reversal can regard the transfer of resources to the least urbanised territories that refuse being a part of society, a view endorsed by the “peri-urban Taylor” (*b*,*i*). In the “Mill of plural geotypes” (*b*,*ii*), the just demands increases of diversity in one’s area of residence. In a position of transition between these two coordinates, we find the protection of semi-enclaves in the city (as claimed by the “hyper-central Taylor”

¹⁰³⁹ For simplicity of the communication, we refer to the conceptions by the name of the political-philosophical affiliation only, dropping the information on the geotype associated with the production of the discourse (and its participation in the solution).

¹⁰⁴⁰ If we have defined an infra-societal space of morality and an urbano-phil space of ethics, there are punctures between these two camps. The movements between these fields are defined in the text “The horizons of Porto”, in the conclusions of part II.

¹⁰⁴¹ We have seen that there are suggestions of minimal improvements (a traffic light position), but, in the spectrum of the corpus, this can be interpreted as tending to be zero.

(*b, i+*). In these conceptions, space is not only a material position, but it is believed fundamental for the quality of life of the inhabitants. Many arguments support this view and approximate a language of capability.¹⁰⁴²

Such arguing for the transfer of resources when discussing justice in habitat can recognise the resourcefulness of space to enable the competences of individuals (*b, ii*). The experience of parenting is the anchor from which some inhabitants attempt to generalise the importance of urbanity for individual development and fulfilment. These competences are still fractured between the benefits for individuals located in certain territories and the collective outcomes beyond the municipality. These demands in plural (without being properly collective) or in individual terms, omit the implication of the desired competence to the capacity of the society as a whole. The third stage (*c*) conceives of public space and public mobility as public good (a trait of the “urban Rawls” (*c, iii*)). This is the first position in which the social whole is possible and valued. Irrespective of other inequalities, these two public goods enable all inhabitants to experience the normalcy of being a part of the society. This conception does not go all the way in making these spatial goods a condition for the development of society and the individual. Stage *d* acknowledges the instrumental resourcefulness of space. The city is here a tool for justice. These case originates two conceptions which depend on whether the mutualisation of resources through space goes in pair with the conception of all actors as such (*d, iv; d, i*). In this conception, the political dimension is key, and urbanism emerges as a part of the dispositive of justice, although the political solutions are symmetric between the “city Sen” and the “Walzer *citadin*”.

In this description of degrees of resourcefulness of space for the society, we were brought to comment upon the comprehensiveness of justice universals. There is, however, some distinctiveness in the materials that compose these two axis, as we have tried to argue throughout this chapter. The main divisive line along the vertical axis is the conception of a spatial justice in an epoch of morality or ethics. Morality has been defined as the absence of a dynamic opening to the other while ethics implies a relation through which both parts are potentially destabilised. In the epoch of ethics, norms, inclinations and values are questioned through social contact, rather than acquiesced in deference or defended in deaf antagonism. Ethics punctures the borders of separate systems of values towards convergence, and can imagine the new commonality of a societal collective experience, material and *idée*. From this resources of ideality, we can understand that a lack of positive relationship with otherness entangles defence of one’s goods vis-à-vis the collective; a by-product of the anachronism of morality in contemporaneity is found. The key universal of justice in this bascule is procedural equality. In the vast sense that we have retained for this concern with equality, it signifies the preoccupation with non-discriminatory treatment, that is, the predisposition to consider human beings universally as fundamentally equal beings. The absence of this predisposition is not only translated into the lower deontological strength of the conception, but also in the pessimistic outlook of justice, blind to its political construction with regards to others. This negative horizon minimally remediates the sufferance emerging from *unfreedoms* (well-being and agency).

The prospects of the actual removal of injustice are associated with some form of immutability. The Walzerian conception is eloquent in this regard (*d, i*). These inhabitants can value the city, but they do not see it open to the contributions of all members of the society. It is the consistency of the political function, and the possibility of outing the fragmented whole, that distances this position from its ethical counterpart (*d, iv*). In the remaining coordinates of the pre-ethical curve (*a, -∞; b, i*) the city is valued negatively. The antagonistic attitude towards otherness naturalises co-presence as a source of injustice. This attitude also translates into the unwillingness to include the views of others. In turn, reduced deontological strength results in the omissions of many objectives of justice: equality, personal liberty, capability, aggregate goods at urban scale, are all absent from the horizon of improvements. The communitarian stance held by some proponents of this conception also reduces the scope for demanded freedoms. The positions floating between the two curves (“Anomie” and the “hyper-central Taylor”) are not opposed to urbanity, but they are, respectively, insensitive to justice or ambiguous in their deontological reasoning.


¹⁰⁴² We have seen that the concept of capability involves an individual valuation exercise, part of a social experience. In this sense, the conceptions delivered in pre-ethical discourses are better apprehended through the concept of agency or wellbeing, that is, freedom rather than capability.

The positions that have punctured the morality threshold of procedural equality (ethical curve) are also graduated in function of the comprehensiveness of justice universals. The ordinate *b.* cumulates demands of well-being and agency-freedoms with procedural equality, but equality is not an objective of justice (a characteristic of utilitarianism). Equality and personal liberties (special kinds of freedoms extensive to all) only emerge in *iii.*, while the conception of systemic goods is specific to *iv.* The possibility to imagine the full resourcefulness of the city depends on the conception of this quality of good (that is, systemism), expressing the dynamic interrelatedness of the parts of the society and the whole.


If we have defined four ways in which space can be mobilised in the identification of injustice, it is clear that such imagination is tainted by the comprehensiveness of justice universals which participates in the conception. Between $-\infty$ to *iii.*, the more capable one is to include others in the concept of justice, the less conflict between space/spatiality and among the spatial actions afflicts the inhabitants. In the projection of development, there is a progression of the connection of individual strategy and the future of society. This relationship is at the core of the possibility to refer to a synthetic indicator, that is, “*sociétalité* of the spatial justice conception”. To wit, the degree of *sociétalité* with which individuals project an idea of coexistence in space. This indicator a different way to define the deontological strength mobilised in the actors’ articulation of individual and collective objectives with regards to the desirable and realisable future of the social world they inhabit. The distinction between the “urban Rawls” and the “city Sen” (*c.iii* and *d.iv*) also reflects this interpretation. Here, the force of spatial deontological constraints differs: the minimally restrained individual liberty of the “urban Rawls” confronts a project of habitat in the “city Sen”. The ethical demands of the former are satisfied with spatial goods which embed equality while respecting plurality of liberal ends. Equality has an end facet but not an instrumental one, affecting the comprehensiveness of egalitarian outcomes. The Senian approach extends the concept of public goods to the more demanding good of urbanity, which requires hierarchizing conflicting spatialities. It is the “systemic” beyond the “dialogic” of the couples individual/society and spatiality/space, which distinguishes the conceptions and intensifies the deontological exigencies towards each actor in the latter (that is, the “city Sen”). The inhabitants affiliated with Rawls see conflicting urbanity models but they do not imagine the possibility of their retroaction, which is affirmative in the “city Sen”.

The spatial axis translates the dynamic convergence of society in a totality, a habitat. While positions along this axis tell us about the complexity of the social world (which we have hypothesized to co-vary with the diversity of the actual experience of space, affected by both ideality and materiality), the vertical axis is determined by the predisposition in the ethos (ideality) that is re-actualised or transformed in that experience.


In the following figures (20 and 21), we can see the geographical distribution of the interviewees per conception of spatial justice. We can see the residential location of the interviewees per dominant affiliation of their discourse. We also represent the location of secondary discursive affiliations (for discourses which are hybrid or hesitant). The identification of the interviewees appearing in each map, together with their socio-economic-spatial indicators is readable in table 38 (annex E.6).




The city Sen



The urban Rawls




The Mill of plural geotypes




The desert-based a-spatial

● Dominant ○ Secondary


Figure 20 Geographical distribution of spatial justice conceptions: ethical field. Dominant conception regards the main spatial justice conception in the discourse. In cases of hybridity, a secondary conception is annotated.




The Walzer *citadin*




The hyper-central Taylor




The peri-urban Taylor



The Young from the ghetto



The Aquinas at the confine of the city



Anomie

Figure 21 Geographical distribution of spatial justice conceptions: pre-ethical field..

8 Unjust spaces and their contraries

Chapter 7 allows to identify the core of our thesis: spatial justice exists in the ideality of the inhabitants, where several conceptions are imaginable, bearing the mark of different degrees of *sociétalité* characterising the view and experience of the society that animates such conceptions. The present chapter is dedicated not only to further the robustness of our thesis, but also to initiate a transition of these observations to the domain of operational consequences. If we have identified different capacities to tell the just spatially, how exactly can we distinguish between the just and the unjust in singular problematics? The study of the identification of injustice and the proposition of justice for the theme of social housing provides some answers to this question (section 8.1). We have already hinted at how the conception of spatial justice stems from the spatial biography of individuals. In the second text of this chapter (8.2), we further explore this idea, which is of pertinence to how policies of spatial justice might be experienced in fragmented societies. In the light of our empirical conclusions, we can imagine that some citizens perceive, or feel, societal policies as hegemonic or alienating. It is also clear that many of the necessary responses to the stakes of urbanity cannot be defined by institutional decree. This opens a vast chantier, beyond the scope of our thesis, on the malleability of ideality as a spatial environment. We can, for the time being, advance that taking on board the complexity of the *sphère idéal* of space as a social construction complicates politics, but it also enhances the universe of the possible.

8.1 Social housing geotype

Almost all interviewees who brought up the theme of social housing consider it to be an unjust space. The extended consensus on this spatial injustice does not imply that the reasons supporting this judgment are concurrent, nor do they point towards the same policies.¹⁰⁴³ This theme is a good vantage point to verify the ten different ways of intersecting justice and space.¹⁰⁴⁴ This thematic geotype is also pertinent because social housing policy is considered by Porto politicians and planning officials to be forwarding spatial justice. Recently, the municipality of Porto has invested in the physical rehabilitation of some *bairros sociais*¹⁰⁴⁵ and demolished the “problematic” ones, reshuffling its inhabitants. This denotes that their conception of space is absolute, that is, independent from the realities found in space. The concept of space mobilised in this re-distribution of the recipients of social housing beneficiaries is also positional, that is to say, produced by central actors as if the relationships that inhabitants entertain with each other, and with the environment, did not exist or count for justice. The pertinence of this theme also resides in the fact that social housing is found in all urbanity levels of metropolitan Porto.¹⁰⁴⁶ The *bairros* vary in the scale and spatial layout. Some of the estates we have visited are located in low-density areas, with reduced access to the networks of mobility.¹⁰⁴⁷ Their position is prone to zero contact with the enviroing society of the municipality, let alone the

¹⁰⁴³ As seen in chapter 6, the method of data gathering was not a co-presence dialogue between the parties (see point 6.1.3, “The method of individual interviews”). Each of the interviewees is not confronted with other views. We do not know each interviewee’s comment regarding the full set of perspectives and, consequently, we cannot infer the resistance of the portrayed dissensus in the face of a democratic debate.

¹⁰⁴⁴ This study has been introduced in point 6.3.1.6, “Study 6: Transversal theme, social housing geotype” (section 6.3, “Corpus) and point 6.5.6.3, “Social housing geotype” (section 6.4, “Narrative”). Further information is provided in annex E.6.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Bairros sociais* can be translated as “social housing estates”, in English, of as *grands ensembles* or HLM (*Habitation à Loyer Modéré*), in the French context.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Here we are referring only to the municipalities where we have conducted the interviews, either with the inhabitants or with planning officials.

¹⁰⁴⁷ For example, the *bairros* in São Pedro da Cova and Baguim do Monte.

metropolitan society. In the context of our definition of spatial justice as creation of resourceful systems which all inhabitants can co-produce and enjoy, the perceived effects of policies of social housing are relevant. They help us question the role of *bairros sociais* in the convergence of plural relationships with space and their potentiation of the living together with others.

The dominant judgement, by the participants of our study, of social housing as unjust space, then merits a longitudinal analysis, producing a thematic geotype.¹⁰⁴⁸ We were interested in the universal ideas composing the horizon of justice, as deployed via this singular theme. The study is supported by interpretative *croquis* of the spaces described by the interviewees, as problematic (unjust chorotype), and as desirable (proposed chorotype).¹⁰⁴⁹ As in the previous section, these discourses are ideal types, anchored in the coherence of some individuals (without distorting the singular endorsement of the discourse by other individuals). The comparison between the unjust chorotypes and the proposed chorotypes, through the geotype, attempts to further understand the interrelationship between the denunciation of the unjust and the proposition towards the spatially just. The separation between the two chorotypes per discourse, one of spatial injustice and the other on the reversal or the unjust, shows that not all interviewees can enunciate the just.¹⁰⁵⁰ Against common sense, the appeal to a reversal of injustice is not the same as enunciating justice. The philosophical presumption of equal capacity to think about justice is not empirically attested. It is a socially constructed capacity, rather than a constant essence of human beings.

The ten thematic declinations of spatial justice conceptions through the prism of social housing as justice are presented in detail in section 8.1.1, and summarised in 8.1.2). They reflect the coherence of the ten the ways to intersect space and justice developed in the previous chapter.¹⁰⁵¹ The titles attributed to each declination make reference to the conceptions already presented, and, whenever applicable, allude to the proposition of justice included in the discourse. We seek to start each description with a quote focusing on the denunciation of injustice, and ending with a citation regarding the “reversal of injustice”.¹⁰⁵² Four of these descriptions are synthesized in figure 22.

We observe the progression from very incomplete notions of justice to those conceiving of the compatibility of equality and liberty. This geotype brings to light what demands of wellbeing and of agency freedom mean spatially.¹⁰⁵³ Those who actually inhabit social housing estates describe the substances of injustice missed by many other citizens, including those located in the ethics curve (table 17). The geotype shows that information from all angles of society (even when discursively less legitimate) is crucial in obtaining the full assessment of an injustice. The unjust and the just are not symmetric, and the stakes of their differentiation are not strictly cognitive. Each point of view bears veracity and is a contribution to the understanding of a spatial justice problem. This reinforces the idea that spatial justice is necessarily pragmatic, supported by reconstructive ethics.

¹⁰⁴⁸ We have defined chorotypes as simple spaces showing a value for scale, metrics and substance). The geotype is an ensemble of chorotypes that studies their relation, that is, their interspatiality (Lévy, 1994, pp. 81, 85). For the relationship of these two concepts within the theory of space supporting this thesis see point 2.2.1, “Space is a dimension of society and a multidimensional object”.

¹⁰⁴⁹ These drawings use my own spatial imagination (Collignon, 2013, pp. 489–491), as we did not ask the interviewees to produce images of their spatial conceptions. Given the results of the research, that is a promising direction for future enquiries.

¹⁰⁵⁰ We call “proposed chorotype” rather than “just chorotypes” to the desired spaces that inflict upon spatial liberties, that is, demands that cannot be extended to others (they are excludable and rivalrous) or which breach procedural equality.

¹⁰⁵¹ See, in particular, sections 7.3, “Ten encounters between space and justice”, and 7.4, “Continuity and discontinuity in the ideality of Porto” (chapter 7).

¹⁰⁵² These applies only to the conceptions where these two materials exist. See exceptions in points 8.1.1.5, “Desert-based theories (no injustice)”; 8.1.1.6, “The Walzer *citadin* (no spatial proposition for a recognised unjust policy)”; 8.1.1.9, “Aquinas, a-spatial distribution based on moral worth”; and 8.1.1.10, “Anomie: the force of reality”.

¹⁰⁵³ As an attack on well-being, *unfreedom* takes the form of subjection to violence and incivility. In the agency versant, it designates the impossibility to choose one’s place of residence, or to freely move in public space. These inhabitants also approach the idea of capability through the concern of the influence of places in child development. Despite being delivered from positions of incomplete horizons of spatial justice, these spatial translations are fundamental to the comprehensive understanding of the stakes of social housing for spatial justice.

8.1.1 The thematic declination of ten conceptions of spatial justice

8.1.1.1 City Sen, a horizon without the space/spatiality of social housing

The conception of space as resource of co-production of justice between the individual and society does not lead to one single spatial proposition of the just. This can be seen in the three chorotypes described below (8.1.1.1.1–8.1.1.1.3). In the first case, the existing urban space with social housing is put into question; while in the second, increases of justice focus on the support of spatialities of urban contact without questioning the stabilised layout. The third appeals to development of responsibility in environments.

8.1.1.1.1 Dismantling places of injustice

“... no Porto há algumas distorções na ocupação do ... espaço urbano..” E37.

For E37, social housing is a network of problematic places, co-spatial with the urban space of Porto. Social housing is a “distortion in the occupation of urban space” where social “layers” cannot contact with each other. The existence of “tense zones” is seen to result from the social housing policy followed in Europe since the end of 1960s.¹⁰⁵⁴ The division between a sufferer and an evaluating speaker does not emerge. There is an explicit statement that the interlocutor is distressed by this injustice, even if he does not reside in these places or in their neighbouring areas.¹⁰⁵⁵ The differentiation between impartiality and personal disinterest disappears. Unjust substance regards the removal of contact between social layers, impacting capability. Part of the population being insufficiently stimulated is seen to reiterate the lag effect¹⁰⁵⁶ in part of the society.¹⁰⁵⁷

Space should be the support of experiencing society, where individuals contact models of “social improvement” necessary for individual engagement (that is, out of a *laisser-aller* status).¹⁰⁵⁸ Coherently, the just space profoundly challenges existing social housing policy. The just chorotype inverts that model towards individual/family units in the space of the city. The just space implies sociological mixity in high urbanity.¹⁰⁵⁹ The just is an urban space where the inhabitants of lower global social capital can co-produce society and themselves, through the experience of the city. The outcomes are societal and individual, in the form of capacity of autonomy. This position is ambiguous in relation to agency-freedom. Given the territorial attachment to place of some inhabitants, the proposed policy orientation is likely to be controversial.

“...de forma a que as diferentes camadas sociais possam interagir mais umas com, umas com as outras em vez de se manterem... isoladas, o que só contribui para o agravamento do... dos problemas!” E37.

¹⁰⁵⁴ “E no Porto há algumas **distorções na ocupação do ... espaço urbano, com zonas bastante deprimidas e outras zonas**, enfim, **não com tanta tensão**. Hum... isto é só uma, uma política, quanto a mim errada, seguida desde o fim, desde os anos sessenta, que foi **a criação de bairros sociais que acabam por se tornar uma espécie de guetos de pessoas mais pobres!**” E37.

¹⁰⁵⁵ “Quer dizer, hum... com isto quero dizer que qualquer pessoa minimamente bem formada, eu sei que nem todas as pessoas o são, com o mínimo de sensibilidade se sente mal ao, ao verificar que, que há outras pessoas que não têm possibilidade de... de se bastar por si próprias, de... de... de conseguir meios de, de sustento, de ter uma vida social minimamente satisfatória, normal, portanto, é uma situação, é uma situação indigna e essa indignidade acaba por... por causar algum sofrimento.” E37.

¹⁰⁵⁶ For the notion of lag effect see chapter 1, point 1.2.3, “The individual/society dialogic (Elias)”.

¹⁰⁵⁷ “Isolar as diferentes camadas sociais é uma, é uma injustiça, é um, para mim é uma... é um prolongamento da situação, uma vez que as pessoas não são estimuladas hum a quererem mudar a sua situação e acabam por se... por se deixar ficar e de até agravar os problemas. Bolsas de pobreza, bolsas de criminalidade, bolsas de... de atraso social, pessoal, em todos os campos...” E37.

¹⁰⁵⁸ “Porque nós... na falta de interação as pessoas tendem a... a, a, a persistir, a hum... a persistirem em comportamentos negativos, a não procurar sair da situação em que estão. Portanto, como não têm modelos de... de... modelos de... de melho ... , de melhoria social portanto deixam-se ficar e, eventualmente até estimulará alguns comportamentos negativos.” E37.

¹⁰⁵⁹ We have seen that high urbanity is important for the spatial justice conception of the “city Sen”. E37 advances easy public mobility, green spaces, and pleasantly ordered physical environments in a critique of the effects of the sprawl and chaos in the quality of life. In the context of social housing, space also has this role of supporting quality of life (the latter is defined from what E37 sees as reasonable assumptions of what others may hold as expectations).

This construction of an unjust and just chorotypes from the theme of social housing informs the *croquis* IV. in figure 22.

8.1.1.1.2 Networks of urban virtuality perforate places of injustice

“Considero injusto essencialmente para as crianças que lá vivem. Eu dei aulas no Lagarteiro já há muitos anos atrás e aquilo para mim parecia-me uma pequena cidade dentro da cidade do Porto, porque é ali em cima, só havia um autocarro para lá, era o bairro à volta da escola primária.” E45.

Social housing estates constitute infra-societal places with internal metrics of homogeneity, interlocked with urban space (rather than co-spatial). The *bairros* of reference are not only located in the hyper-centre. E45 privileges the procedural aspect of both equality and freedom with the objective of increasing capability. We are in the domain where the individual and society are compatible. The unjust substance regards the reduced diversity in societal experience (spatial and social) of social housing inhabitants (the focus is on children, as E45 draws on her experience as school teacher). That underexposure limits the competences (later necessary to adulthood)¹⁰⁶⁰ and produces a profound inequality in children’s development.¹⁰⁶¹ This critique addresses the peripheral location of social housing and the realised project of building schools inside social neighbourhoods. Such choice of school location is argued to further restrict the experience of other streets, places, and people.

The just chorotype contributes to the development of individual capability. This objective activates the spatialities of social housing children, through a right to a parallel education¹⁰⁶² taking place in the city which includes equality of opportunities, access to things.¹⁰⁶³ The continued existence of some model of social neighbourhoods is not questioned, but they should integrate zones next to “all persons”, a reference to the sociological mixity.¹⁰⁶⁴ Spatial justice is scrutinised from a Lefebvrian point of view, breathing a sense of festive potentiality of urban space. The fairness of public space, accessible independent of global capital, is coupled with catalysers of spatial animation. The focus is on the opportunities created by spatial experience, rather than their outcome. This proposal of a just space addresses only part of the agency-freedom and well-being demands that emerge from the inhabitants who currently inhabit social housing.

“... há ali o bairro, mas então a escola, não tem que haver uma escola dentro do bairro, a escola é fora e eles têm que ir à escola fora, que assim ao menos passam por outras ruas, vão a outros sítios, conhecem outras pessoas...” E45.

8.1.1.1.3 Responsibility and the role of environments

“O próprio bairro piorou muito, em termos de comportamento os miúdos pioraram bastante porque sentem-se dentro do seu mundo, não é? E ali quem manda são eles e ali quem domina são eles...” E29.

¹⁰⁶⁰ “E, e, quer dizer, eles vivem ali a vida deles e depois quando crescem têm que ir para outro sítio e, quer dizer, vão entrar num sítio em que se calhar nunca foram, muitos miúdos nem saem de lá! Eles saem da escola para ca... de casa para a escola, da escola para casa e vivem ali a vidinha deles! Eu acho isso extremamente injusto para essas crianças que depois não vêem mais nada para além disso e conforme, eu digo o bairro do Lagarteiro, mas há muitos bairros também assim, que, que estão postos à parte.” E45.

¹⁰⁶¹ “Há miúdos que não têm referências nenhuma porque os pais não têm oportunidade financeira e eles acabam por não fazer muitas coisas fora e há outros que têm e acabam por ser mais desenvolvidos.” E45.

¹⁰⁶² “...igualdade de oportunidade de educação também não só a educação convencional da escola, mas também aquela educação, hum... paralela” E45.

¹⁰⁶³ These are the expressions of E45, supporting the interpretation of her discourse, in particular the sense of access to virtual resources (opportunities) rather than distribution of actualized resources:

“outra oportunidade”, “referências”, “igualdade de oportunidades”, “aceder às coisas”, “alguém proporcionaria isso aos miúdos”.

¹⁰⁶⁴ “Deveria tentar-se integrar os bairros numa zona **mais perto de todas as pessoas** e não pô-los à margem” E45.

Social housing constitutes of infra-urban places with internal metrics of homogeneity disconnected from urban space.¹⁰⁶⁵ The bases of homogeneity include low economic and educational capitals and associated “lifestyle” (social dimension of space).¹⁰⁶⁶ The pivot of the argument is the fact that schools have been recently built inside social neighbourhoods. The new school location reinforces the external metric of a frontier. It intensifies the practices of territorial ownership and further limits the inhabitants’ spatial experience.¹⁰⁶⁷ The unjust substance of the *bairros* is capability, both as competence and capacity. Reduced diversity in societal experience of the inhabitants restricts the opportunity of self-engagement towards the productive participation in the society. There is a clear horizon of increased equality in capability, which moves the conception of justice from charity to an epoch of responsibility and autonomy.

This particular argument privileges the realisation aspects of freedom over the procedural experience of its production. The objective is to “include” the population. E29 does not observe adult individuals voluntarily entering in co-production, animated by an individual project. Consequently, responsibility appears as a demand, an exigence which is expected to produce more autonomous actors.¹⁰⁶⁸ Though the role of experience in shaping opportunity is acknowledged (thus, breaching morality), the participation of the least-well off actors in the process is ambiguous.¹⁰⁶⁹ E29 marks the departure from charity, but the many-sided project of a joint horizon is hesitant. It is informed by the experience of a society of radical asymmetric competences of *actorisation*.

In the proposed chorotype, the model of the social estate is not challenged. The catalyser to increase justice would be to place the school outside the neighbourhood as the means to increase alterity.¹⁰⁷⁰ There is no reference of the fact that a considerable part of the spatial referent E29 has in mind is peri-urban.¹⁰⁷¹ This spatial solution is accompanied by pedagogical programs for adults addressing the sense of responsibility and contractual measures of solidarity, enforcing autonomy.

“...dar-lhes condições para que eles pudessem depois sozinhos andar para a frente” E29.

8.1.1.2 Urban Rawls, equal accessibility to all urban places

“... um gueto que não se pode entrar ... eu como cidadão do Porto, não poder passar numa zona do Porto!” E18.

¹⁰⁶⁵ “As pessoas tendem a agrupar-se e... e... e fazerem uma vida quase que aparte, não é? Principalmente nos bairros.” E29.

¹⁰⁶⁶ The residents of the estates are empirically contacted through her personal experience as a high school teacher.

¹⁰⁶⁷ This evaluation of school location is accompanied by a critique on the lack of decision makers’ auscultation of the public:

“Acho que isso... acho que é mau, porque ninguém foi consultado nesse aspecto, ninguém foi consultado sobre a localização do centro e etc....” E29.

¹⁰⁶⁸ In Sen’s theoretical framework, responsibility is a part of an increased agency-freedom. E29 notes this association as the end result (more autonomous adults will be able to resolve their problems freely), but some agency-freedom in that path needs to be traded off for such consequential end. This semantic field emerges with the expressions:

“incluir essa população”, “ser-lhes exigido algum tipo de responsabilidade quando lhe entregam uma casa ou seja o que for”.

On the enabling process of autonomy construction we can read:

“Portanto, dar-lhes... **dar-lhes condições** para que eles pudessem depois **sozinhos** andar para a frente” E29.

¹⁰⁶⁹ When referring to the new *actants* of responsibility, the speaker employs passive verb form and does not interrogate what might interest these recipients of solidarity:

“E porque eles é sempre no “depois vê-se” e não... isso vê-se através da escola – portanto, eles põem os miúdos na escola, almoçam, lancham, portanto, esse problema já está resolvido à partida e depois os outros, alguém há-de resolver! Quer dizer, eu acho que eles deveriam **ser educados** no sentido de aprenderem a resolver os seus próprios problemas, porque senão os problemas não diminuem, aumentam, pelo contrário.” E29.

¹⁰⁷⁰ “Eles deviam **ser tirados** desse, desse ambiente para que **pudessem perceber** que há outra realidades e **pudessem integrar-se** noutras realidades diferentes das deles.” E29.

¹⁰⁷¹ The empirical referent where the interviewee draws to elaborate her case is the *freguesia* of São Pedro da Cova, in the municipality of Gondomar.

E18 considers that a judgment of justice depends on the concrete *bairro social* one might have in mind.¹⁰⁷² Some are indeed just, others are not. One basis for judgement is the liberty of Porto citizens to enjoy the contiguity of public space in the city, without feeling impeded by the ghetto. In some cases (*Bairro do Aleixo*), social housing hinders the urban network of accessible spaces. The public good of mobility is evoked.¹⁰⁷³ The unjust space is limited by a topological border, at the scale of the municipality of Porto. Contrastingly, the configuration of chorotypes within the central geotype leads the interviewee to consider the social estates to be just, as located in zones with some urbanity and sociological mixity. Social housing is a just solution when constituting of networks of points in central geotypes, irrespective of land value (neighbouring places with good quality of life). Porto observes this model, social housing is “integrated”.¹⁰⁷⁴ This positive valuation relies on the material quality of space, and recent investment in the maintenance and improvement of existing social housing is considered an advantage. It is perceived as increasing affect for the object, leading to its material preservation.¹⁰⁷⁵ Despite the sensitivity to location and to the inhabitants’ relationship with place, solidarity is justified on material needs and it passes through distributive practices. In this sense, this discourse also explores the procedural injustice of (a-spatial) distribution of social housing among recipients. There is awareness of consequential inequality after distribution, as different global capitals result from the accumulation of solidarity distribution and individual agency (for example, small jobs in the black market).

The redress of unjust cases does not question the present model of social housing. Justice passes through the demolition and relocation within social estates at a reasonable distance from the hyper-centre.¹⁰⁷⁶ This redress, E18 argues, can never be totally just. Even when it constitutes of an external frontier, the internal metric of social housing remains heterogeneous (there is the idea that part of residents bears the consequences of a minority’s disruptive actions). One single solution for the place necessarily violates some of the inhabitants’ relationship with the habitat (we find Rawls preoccupation for liberal goods).¹⁰⁷⁷ The preferred procedure mobilises agency-freedom, making room for negotiation of new residential location when *bairros* are demolished. Once that possibility is exhausted, eviction is due. Correcting injustice demands, in the last instance, that one forgets “certain sensitivities”.¹⁰⁷⁸ There is a reference to the construction of new social estates at a smaller scale in central positions (project PER).¹⁰⁷⁹ Feasibility problems (availability of plots and pressure of demand) dilute the potentials of this solution and realism is evoked in the continuity of the current scale of social housing policy.

This discourse fixates the necessity of social housing which is seen as forever a part of the resources of justice of society.¹⁰⁸⁰ If there is an egalitarian view, it does not go as far as subtracting this type of need. Here, solidarity is a source of justice, but it immobilises social housing estates (ideally smaller) as an unavoidable distributive practice (with sensitivity to location). The reversal of injustice is produced by political actors only, and doing justice and being

¹⁰⁷² In the construction of argument, E18 uses personal and professional experience as an architect. Different empirical cases are compared and they give way to different evaluations (not all social housing estates are unjust, just those that form ghettos).

¹⁰⁷³ The problem is constructed as one of a network of mobility, rather than public space, as the interviewee refers to the permeability of the *bairro* through private metric only.

¹⁰⁷⁴ “...a cidade com mais **bairros sociais enquadrados**, quer dizer, **integrados na cidade**, não é? **Menos periféricos** ... sinto alguma simpatia por este facto da cidade do Porto ser uma cidade em que se **misturam os bairros**, os ditos bairros sociais e as, e as... e ao lado ... é onde se vive melhor!” E18.

¹⁰⁷⁵ “Ao **fazer obras** a gente vê que eles pelo menos aparentemente vão mantendo, **ficam com mais orgulho** nas coisas e acabam por... hum... por hum... pá, por **preservar mais**, e os bairros da cidade ... estão bestiais!” E18.

¹⁰⁷⁶ The lack of architectonic quality is an important part of the argument in favour of demolition:

“Acho bem... quer dizer, claro que acho bem [a demolição]... aquilo é degradante! ...**não tem qualidade arquitectónica** ...” E18.

¹⁰⁷⁷ “Há sempre lá 3 ou 4 pessoas que vão ser injustiçadas, porque estavam ali, viviam ali e mesmo com más condições, **gostavam de viver ali** ...” E18.

¹⁰⁷⁸ “... tenho de **esquecer** um bocado algumas... algumas **moralidades** e algumas **sensibilidades**”. E18.

¹⁰⁷⁹ The interviewee makes reference to the *Programa Especial de Realojamento* (PER) (Portal da habitação, 2016).

¹⁰⁸⁰ “... porque existe **habitação social**, tem de se fazer, **tem de existir sempre** – eu fiz montes de projectos de habitação social” E18.

ethical are not fully compatible. Given the information gathered about social housing in the rest of the corpus, the just assessment represents a significant distortion of how these places are experienced and perceived by others.

“Mas hoje em dia as pessoas até, se calhar pode-se é fazer pequenos núcleos em que as pessoas não fujam também muito dali e para não estarem a ser atiradas para o concelho de não sei quê ...” E18.

The construction of an unjust and just chorotypes by E18 informs the drawings III. in figure 22.

8.1.1.3 Mill, the increase of urbanity in one’s social housing

“...ambiente muito pesado para meninos...” E20.

This interview does not configure the problem of social housing as a societal one, but does not explicitly exclude others from demands of justice. The affiliation with utilitarianism, thus, emerges by default. The spontaneous treatment of the theme presents a topographic space of small scale, which is part of a network at municipality level. The unjust substance is the place’s negative impact on competence and lack of capability to access the city.¹⁰⁸¹ Concretely, E20 is revolted with the exposition of children to drug-dealing.¹⁰⁸² While children are referred to in general, the speaker specifies to speak only for herself, presenting the liberal dissociation between her good and the just.¹⁰⁸³ The discourse sees co-presence with negative role models as a potential limitations of child development. Moved by the concern for the competence of their children, these inhabitants enter into a universe of proto-capability through space. Their personal discontentment with spatial experience pushes them to more comprehensive universes than what we could expect (through their educational capital and argumentation in other themes). Justice demands removal of the drug dealers, and a toddler’s park to function as a distraction.¹⁰⁸⁴

This discourse activates the distance between the social estate and “the city”, making the *bairro* part of an area.¹⁰⁸⁵ The inhabitant describes the lack of capability to access higher urbanity: lack of economic capital (for transport tickets and consumables) restricts both mobility and accessibility to public space (park) and certain spatialities (stroll, play). It is not only a material deprivation that curtails this accessibility. Lack of purchasing power vis-à-vis diversity of retail implies permanent refusal of her children’s desires, tainting the experience.¹⁰⁸⁶ This inhabitant voluntarily abstains from the emotional cost of this experience of diversity. The reversal of injustice does not point towards the improvement of accessibility to the highest urbanity level. Instead, this discourse demands an increase of some offer (park, retail) inside the neighbourhood, for the local population. Though the impact of the place on children’s competence is recognised, the appeal is to suspend the necessity to move.

¹⁰⁸¹ The last argument required an advanced level of reconstructive interpretation. The information is provided by the interviewer in the section dedicated to spatial biography. The levels of spontaneity of the interview are described in point 6.2.1, “Interview guide” (chapter 6).

¹⁰⁸² The neighbourhood is a mixed tenure neighbourhood in Vila Nova de Gaia, known as *Vila d’Este*. Part of the neighbourhood has been invested with public space, sports facilities, and housing refurbishment by the municipality (with European funds). There is also another project of extending the metro light rail line (supported by the proximity of the *Hospital Santos Silva*).

¹⁰⁸³ “Sei lá, isto agora da droga, aquilo que há em todo o lado - isso é que não havia mesmo de ser! Que aqui agora é mesmo à frente dos miúdos que andam aí a brincar. Assim um parque para eles brincarem, ao menos distraírem-se daquilo que vêm, não é? Aqui... Como eu tenho duas, falo por mim Ai, revoltada! Que eu não gosto. Eu não fumo, não bebo nem nada, não gosto. Eu não quero fazer os meus mais do que ninguém, mas se a gente os tirar desses caminhos, melhor, não é? A gente, claro, fica chateada, não é? Quem é que não fica?” E20.

¹⁰⁸⁴ In the words of E20, the role of distraction seems to concern failure of the first measure, but also as general distraction from multi-faceted deprivation.

¹⁰⁸⁵ This chorotype emerges after the spontaneous part of the interview. It explores a relaunch at the end of the interview, communicated with lesser animosity than the exposition of children to a negative role model.

¹⁰⁸⁶ “... tenho pouca, poucas **possibilidades**, que eles [filhos] começam a pedir” Começam a crescer, começam a aprender, querem isto e querem aquilo e a gente já quando sai de casa tem que dizer para não estar a pedir isto nem aquilo que não têm, prontos, temos de começar a... que eu não gosto de sair e eles estarem a pedir a dizer assim “Ó... dá-me isto ou dá-me aquilo” e a gente não ter para dar é um bocado chato (...) E a gente custa estar sempre a dizer “não, não, não”, não é?” E20.

“... faz falta, sim senhora, mas outras coisas de roupas, calçados, coisas, sei lá, de... de brinquedos, parques, essas coisas todas...” E20.

In lesser societal versions of this argument, the appeal is not to remove the drug dealers from public space, but rather, from the *bairro*. A horizon of equality is not conceived. The proposed space discriminates against a part of the society (drug dealers) and depends on the central action of the municipality. The reversal of injustice is conditionally extended to others upon some basis of moral worth.

Individuals qualified as utilitarian, and who do not reside inside social housing, focus on the procedural inequality involved in (a-spatial) social housing benefits. In particular, economically fragile individuals consider it unjust to have least purchasing power, and low overall quality of life, than the ones resulting from the social housing beneficiaries' accumulation of several solidarity measures (housing support, social revenue) and, at times, illegal sources of income. We observe the evaluation of justice through the focus on consequences. We see the susceptibility of utilitarian lack of deontological constraints to the declinations of spatial injustice in dependency with the social capitals of the speaker. We also observe the trade-off with egalitarian preoccupations while endorsing a concern with procedural equality. This appeal could be reconstructed as the movement of a part of the Porto society to an epoch of solidarity based on responsibility. We also see the transition from distributional to realisation-based approaches to justice.

8.1.1.4 Mill, fragmenting the city's confines of incivility

“A política dele dos bairros sociais, acho que está, está muito errada, porque ele está, está a tirar os problemas de um sítio concentrado para espalhá-los por toda a cidade. Eu entendo a ideia, mas se calhar está a ser mal aplicada, porque havia sítios que eram relativamente mais sossegados, que hoje em dia ficaram complicados.” E35.

This point of view sees social housing as a negative externality. This critique is pronounced on the behalf of inhabitants inside and in the neighbouring areas, who should be able to continue to reside undisturbed within, or in the proximity of, social housing. The discourse is also concerned with abuses of the system and proposes increased scrutiny of candidates to housing assistance. The basis of scrutiny is, in some types, expressed as moral worth. We find this perspective voiced by the conception of the “Mill of plural geotypes”, in particular those from the suburbs and from central areas. The version described below is not articulated in a collective voice, and is the most societal of the many variants of this approach.¹⁰⁸⁷

E35, visitor of various social housing neighbourhoods (as friend of his residents) approaches social housing as a potential nuisance.¹⁰⁸⁸ This discourse underlines the susceptibility of both the insiders and outsiders to the instabilities of the demographics of these places, under the jurisdiction of the mayor of Porto¹⁰⁸⁹. Social housing is conceived as a negative externality affecting a broader “zone”. The focus resides on the confine between social housing and the city (topographic limit of a territory). The scale of the just chorotype comprises of the entire city and several neighbourhoods are evoked. The substance of the injustice is a lack of well-being freedom and of procedural fairness in the distribution of goods. The argument of civility emerges in only some versions of the conception. There is a perceived menace of reliance on quiet co-presence as a guarantee of security of one's fragile environments (the

¹⁰⁸⁷ This discourse is also endorsed by some communitarian of the “peri-urban Taylor”. As we will see, individuals located in that type tend to hybridise with utilitarian arguments. As such, we can consider that they transit to the “Mill of plural geotypes” when treating social housing in this fashion.

¹⁰⁸⁸ This point of view is marked by the recent changes in the sociological composition of the social housing fabric of the municipality of Porto. This context of argument is also present in E13, treated under the conception 8.1.1.7, “The hyper-central Taylor, well-being freedom from disruptive other/agency-freedom of a return to place of origin”.

¹⁰⁸⁹ “Acho que neste momento é o principal problema da cidade do Porto, realmente... principalmente a nível social, acho que isso... havia sítios que eram muito calminhos, muito sossegados e desde que veio essa política, transformou muito.” E35.

body, the habitat). Despite being a virtual negative externality of parts of the city, social housing is not called into question by most of the endorsers of this critique. It is an available solution for people in need.¹⁰⁹⁰

With regard to the non-spatial procedural approach, this discourse proposes control of effective need vis-à-vis abuse in the distribution of the good.¹⁰⁹¹ Ancestry is evoked as well as protection of elderly populations. Established calm residents should be protected from disruptive new residents.¹⁰⁹² There is also a “small injustice” towards the residents of border zones, who may be obliged to making a new residential choice in order to escape nuisance.¹⁰⁹³

The space of redress is hybrid. In the face of procedural difficulties, these inhabitants call for heightened scrutiny of application procedures.¹⁰⁹⁴ There are no references to the establishment of transparent criteria for such verification. The horizon does not include the potential disappearance of need. With regards to incivilities, E35 suggests an inversion of the model of concentration, breaking down social housing into small units. The embedment in urban space – the dissolution of homogeneous environments – is expected to discourage problematic behaviour.

“Se as pessoas não estão rodeadas de ambiente semelhante ao delas, por muito que queiram, não vão conseguir ter os mesmos comportamentos e vão acabar por ceder ... porque sabem que quem está ao lado não vai aceitar, não é? Não se vai calar...” E35.

8.1.1.5 Desert-based theories (no injustice)

Desert-based theories treat social neighbourhoods as a projection of social differentiation on space and they develop an argument that reduces solidarity towards some of the residents of these places. Though hinting at the need for policies which involve responsibility, the argument focuses on actors rather than on the dialogue between actors and society. The role of environments in responsibility is underplayed.

8.1.1.6 The Walzer *citadin* (no spatial proposition for a recognised unjust policy)

E30 briefly criticises the refurbishment of social housing as an insufficient measure to transform the scope of problems. Social housing is not constituted as a specific theme. The more just proceduralism, proposed for the city, applies.

“AP: E... e o que era necessário mudar para que fosse possível essa tal, essa cidade?”

E30: Era preciso mudar tudo! Era preciso mudar tudo. Tudo! Acabar com esta... acabar com esta gente, acabar com estes partidos, acabar com isto e deixar que as pessoas de facto percebessem quais são os problemas da cidade, informassem, haver uma pedagogia de facto do que é a vida na cidade e haver mais, mais participação directa das pessoas na sua própria... nos seus micro-círculos, não é? E as decisões serem decisões por um lado criadas ao nível sistémico, mas por outro lado também deixando que a microanálise funcione, não é? E é esse, essa tensão que não existe, porque aqui quem decide tudo são sempre os tipos que estão lá em cima que estão completamente afastados, nem querem saber da vida das pessoas, não querem saber disso para nada! Querem lá saber disso para alguma coisa? “Vamos pintar o bairro!” “Vamos lá pintar o bairro”, mas tudo mantem-se na mesma, não é? O bairro

¹⁰⁹⁰ “Acho que toda a gente tem o direito de viver onde quiser e, e já que há as casas de habitação social que sejam distribuídas realmente por quem precisa que às vezes não é o que acontece nos bairros.” E35.

¹⁰⁹¹ “Hum... e essa realmente é a grande injustiça, é que pessoas que até precisam, e que merecem de certa maneira, estão a conviver com pessoas que se calhar não precisam ou não merecem, não é?” E35.

¹⁰⁹² E35 is mainly concerned with elderly people:

“Zonas que eu acho que têm bastante terceira idade deviam ser relativamente um bocado poupadas.” E35.

¹⁰⁹³ “Mas é... aí sim, vai haver um bocadinho de injustiça se realmente começar a haver problemas em zonas que não existiam e se calhar as pessoas vão ter que optar outra vez por... quem quer estar num sítio sossegado tem que se deslocar.” E35.

¹⁰⁹⁴ “As pessoas deviam ser minimamente investigadas antes de, de se terem direito a uma, a uma habitação.” E35.

fica limpo e gastaram lá 5 milhões "Eu gastei 5 milhões de euros a pintar o bairro não sei de quê!" Olha, grande coisa!" E30/AP.

8.1.1.7 The hyper-central Taylor, agency freedom for a return to place of origin (and well-being freedom from disruptive others)

"O exemplo do bairro do Tarrafa [João de Deus], não sei se ouviu falar? ... Era um... era um dos piores bairros da cidade do Porto, a nível de tráfico, mas é ... principalmente a droga. Esse bairro ao ir abaixo, eles tiveram que realojar essas pessoas noutros bairros. O que é que eles fizeram? Foi minar outros bairros que estavam praticamente limpos!" E13.

This chorotype of injustice is delivered by E13, inhabitant of Bairro da Pasteleira, in the central geotype of Porto (but outside the hyper-centre). The attributes of the injustice are a topographic metric juxtaposed on the urban network, where the scale of the problem includes Porto and Matosinhos. The unjust substance consists in a lack of agency-freedom and wellbeing-freedom. The interview takes place after the demolition of two estates in the municipality of Porto (*Bairro de São João de Deus* and part of *Bairro do Aleixo*).¹⁰⁹⁵ The inhabitant perceives that "clean bairros have become tainted". In this context, social housing is a place of dual social composition: the regular inhabitants (working class and retired people) and troublesome inhabitants (incoming drug dealers). The central injustice is the disruption of habitat by the spatialities of some of the inhabitants. Personal freedom, capability, and agency-freedom are the central ideas to identify the substance of injustice. The limiting effect of the *bairro* includes stigma (affecting the inhabitants' integration in the society) as well as fear and dissuasion of visitors from using nearby public parks (an insinuation of public space emerges). The uncivil spatialities also impair free mobility (through fear, but also through police orders of avoiding certain areas which are subject to raids).¹⁰⁹⁶ This hinders children and young people's development of competence (a notion of capability emerges).¹⁰⁹⁷ The critique is anchored on the inhabitant's personal incapacity to escape the situation, and, consequentially, his exposure to the discretionary redistribution of the inhabitants by the social housing central agency.¹⁰⁹⁸ "If I could...", "option", "I am subject to this" are the main semantic markers of the reported lack of agency-spatial freedom.¹⁰⁹⁹ Agency freedom is coupled with the importance which is attributed to territory and the community of origin.¹¹⁰⁰ The requests of redress focus on the opportunity to live in communitarian space, like in the past, preferably through a return to the historic centre. In the absence of that possibility, E13 would like the segregation of the individuals who are involved in illicit activity. The question remains open to experimentation about whether, given the financial supports to relocate into a private market, inhabitants with this concept would choose to mingle in the city or would try to reconstruct an enclave.

"... havia de pegar neles e mandar os traficantes para outro lado! Não é? Faziam um bairro, sabem quem é que são os tralfulhas, espetava-os lá todos, até controlava, até os controlava melhor!" E13.

This conception of social housing injustice is represented in the sketch II. of figure 22.

8.1.1.8 Young, inhabitable places without individual freedoms

"Olhe, é a minha cama: deito-me e deixo estar ali, de noite tomo calmantes para ver se consigo dormir é a minha vida é a cama. E estou ali porque preciso, preciso, preciso de ir levar com o Dr. Pinto e vou

¹⁰⁹⁵ In wikipedia we can read that Bairro de São João de Deus was frequently reported in the media as "drug supermarket" (Bairro de São João de Deus, 2016). It was called Tarrafal (reference to the political prison based in Cape Verde, created by Estado Novo in 1936).

¹⁰⁹⁶ "Eu é que ainda **tenho** que fazer o percurso para **me desviar** do tráfico." E13.

¹⁰⁹⁷ We have seen that this trait defines the core of the conception "Mill, the increase of urbanity in one's social housing" (8.1.1.3). The discourse is actually better apprehended through E13's dual qualification as Taylor and as utilitarian.

¹⁰⁹⁸ There are also concerns with the lack of transparency in the distribution of social housing.

¹⁰⁹⁹ "... mas **tenho** que lá viver, mas **se eu pudesse** estar aqui na minha zona", "**Tenho uma opção** para lá, **se me dessem** para aqui eu vinha." E13.

¹¹⁰⁰ "... **ajeitar** isso [Miragaia] tudo e tentar fazer com que as pessoas que moraram... que nasceram cá continuassem cá. (...) 90 por cento das pessoas que saíram daqui, (...) **se lhes dessem a hipótese de vir**, 90 por cento ficava tudo." E13.

sair daqui porque preciso de estar com uma pessoa de família para tirar isto tudo que está dentro de mim. Eu ando aqui, sabe Deus, sufocado, estou... sou desamparado, sou sozinho, como deve compreender.” E17.

The unjust space of E17, inhabitant of *Bairro do Lagarteiro*, is marked by the utterances of hopelessness in *unfreedom*s.¹¹⁰¹ His chorotype can be described as a topologic space¹¹⁰² of small scale (environment)¹¹⁰³ with lack of wellbeing-freedom.¹¹⁰⁴ One of the many injustices taking place in the social housing, as experienced by E17, is the attack on his physical integrity, the body showing signs of violence exerted by one of his neighbours. The space of livelihood is reduced to the minimum, close to the limit of extinction, the bed inside the house. The interviewee places the oppressive residents, who employ a group’s law by force, at the centre of the critique.¹¹⁰⁵ He illustrates invasiveness of his “privacy” and of his body, namely in the incapacity to rest (a lack of hygiene, resulting from keeping a dog in the shared space of the building, the unconsented use of his window to dry clothes, the use of the common patio to store their “merchandise”, noise during the night-time). He describes a zero degree of civility and attributes it to a sub-human condition, based on the race of the neighbour. E17 also denotes the limitation of the gang with respect to what emerges as an ex-communitarian space, in the form of illegal market domination.¹¹⁰⁶ Distance is activated though not being attached to a judgement of injustice. He perceives his residence to be remote in relation to Porto,¹¹⁰⁷ but lack of accessibility to the city centre is not put forward with great animosity.

In E17, spatial justice is inconceivable. The just chorotype is inexistent. His personal strategy passes by consulting with the local social worker, reaching out for his daughter. He trusts a particular social worker, but has a general distrust towards the providence state professionals. He describes social workers as unreliable and untrustworthy (as they offer and remove support in the function of government policy). An exemplary case is the removal of all his teeth in the context of a dentistry program, which was interrupted before he was attributed with a dental prosthesis. This inhabitant mentions with nostalgia a time of community, but he expresses no expectation of establishing that environment. From his critique, we can deduce that justice should guarantee the entitlement to a space of existence, protecting one’s personal integrity. There should be a minimum degree of civility and space should be free from noise, hygiene and health hazards. Except for the physical condition of the house (where the municipality is expected to intervene), E17 does not state that injustice can be solved through societal resources and mentions the possibility of killing the aggressor.

¹¹⁰¹ It is likely that the interpretation of this interviewee bears my subjective contact with this person’s acute distress. He showed me the marks of physical abuse, cried, and shared his hesitation in killing his neighbour (while holding a gun in his hands).

¹¹⁰² Calling “networks” to these small-scale spaces calls for clarification. In the interviewees of this pole, the problem with space is its discontinuity, fragmented in sub-places with associated risks and interdictions. The fact that that this perception takes place in places of small scale, definitely infra-societal (and which appear to the external observer as rather homogeneous) is a revelation of the *idéal* made possible through the employment of the concept “topological”.

¹¹⁰³ The individual mentions Porto, but only in the past, when he was living in Miragaia or working in Baixa. At present, he cannot afford to take public transport to Porto centre. At times he walks (for an hour) to get there or to other places of the urban area where he might have a job or voluntary work (in exchange for a meal). He does not feel that these difficulties are a form of injustice. They are presented as a fact, in support of a different message (the incapacity to reply to the instruction):

“É assim eu não posso responder muito porque é assim eu mal vou para o centro da cidade, eu não saio daqui porque o dinheiro não dá. Ou vou a pé, mas para ir a pé tenho que ir tratar de assuntos ... tenho meses sem lá pôr os pés, sem sair daqui do bairro. Não dá”. E17.

¹¹⁰⁴ There is employment of the word “right” (*direito*), so, universal freedom is not only evoked through negativity:

“Ana: E acha isso uma injustiça?

Américo: Eu acho que sim, está-me a incomodar, senhora. Está-me a incomodar. Eu tenho direito à minha privacidade. Está a ver?” E17/Ana.

¹¹⁰⁵ “E essa gente veio empregar a força da lei: nós é que queremos, nós é que mandamos.” E17.

¹¹⁰⁶ “Há espaço para mais um para vender, que vá vender! Eu não vendo, nem quero saber dessas vidas, não tenho nada a ver, mas também incomoda-me ver um homem a exigir dinheiro aos outros, só porque estão a vender droga! Só porque ele é cigano, é? ... Aqui sempre se vendeu droga, nunca ninguém da nossa raça chegou ao pé de alguém “Olha, tens que me dar dinheiro porque estás aqui a vender droga!” E não é dizer isso, é ameaçar! E vai de fueiro lá sempre, são todos rapazes novos, você veja como é que eles vão ser!” E17.

¹¹⁰⁷ In a schematised *plan géotypique*, Campanhã, the *freguesia* of residence of E17, is part of the central geotype. In a more fine reading, the zone of the *bairro* is a suburban point, with reduced diversity.

“E... mas sinto-me um inútil para a sociedade, sinto-me uma... uma pessoa inválida! À espera da morte. É por isso que eu lhe digo, é por isso que eu peguei naquilo [reference to picking up a gun] e disse "Isto são mais 10 anos de vida, se eu tiver!" Eu tenho quase 60 anos... mas não é um garoto que vem brincar comigo, não. Não é, não.” E17.

This conception of social housing injustice is represented in the croquis I. of figure 22.

8.1.1.9 Aquinas, a-spatial distribution based on moral worth

The injustice of social housing seen from the lenses of Aquinas is similar to the procedural a-spatial critique found in “Mill, fragmenting the city’s confines of incivility” (8.1.1.4). In the Aquinas version, there is substitution of language of rights for language of moral worth. Social housing should be allocated to families indefinitely, closing the possibility of new residents and the associated risk of them being of no quality, or unworthy of dignity.

“Eu acho que isso é uma injustiça, acho que a Câmara devia dizer, havia de ter em atenção, dizer "A pessoa nasceu ali, nasceu ali e devia de habitar", mas as casas não são eternas, as casas têm que ser sempre internas, habitadas por o Manel, ou pelo António, ou pelo João, elas têm que ser internas, porque a Câmara não vai fechar a porta, "morreu os pais, agora vocês vão para a rua" e a casa fica fechada. Não fica! Se a casa precisa de obras vão fazer obras, no fim das obras vem outra pessoa que, que nunca viveu até, por exemplo, aqui no bairro, não é? Nem sabem a qualidade da pessoa, não sabem se é uma pessoa digna de aceitação dentro da sociedade, se é uma pessoa que já tem problemas e vem criar, vem arrastar os problemas para, para outros bairros. Isso pode às vezes acontecer. Ora se durante a vizinhança toda conhece aquela pessoa, nasceu ali, ora têm confiança na pessoa. Agora vem aquela pessoa a sair para outro lado, a ser posto na rua, que é o que acontece, e agora vem outro que nem sequer sabem quem é o vizinho que, que vem! Se é de boa qualidade, se é de má qualidade... Portanto, isso é uma das, é uma das injustiças que eu também acho que está mal.” E38.

The injustice also resides in the actions of some of the beneficiaries regarding the material object of the house. Here the argument is lack of respect vis-à-vis the actors who performed the distribution (that is, the municipality) and the tax payers behind such investments.¹¹⁰⁸ These two moral arguments are paired with the absence of space.

8.1.1.10 Anomie: the force of reality

In the anomie conception, leaving social housing when it faces demolition is a pity. The resident will move out as it ought to be.

“AP: E ter que sair daqui acha uma injustiça?”

E49: Claro, mas vai ter que ser, por isso... Se calhar há aí um projecto que eles vão cumpri-lo, não é? Vão ser..., mas sinceramente, vamos ter de sair, não é? Tenho muita pena, mas com certeza que vamos ter que sair.” AP/E49.

¹¹⁰⁸ “Sim, porque aquilo que eu ouço dizer, que eu não entro em casa de ninguém, mas por aquilo que ouço dizer ainda há pouco repararam dentro da casa das pessoas já estão as paredes riscadas, já está tudo deteriorado nalgumas já, já até faltam tacos no chão, já têm tijoleiras arrancadas, por isso é que eu digo, não é? Que isso também vai da menta-, da mentalidade das pessoas. Portanto, não aceitaram, porque senão se a Câmara, se a casa estava um bocadinho deteriorada a Câmara ao fazer a melhoria das obras automaticamente, haviam de aproveitar, haviam de conservar aquilo que estava e não deixar deteriorar... Deteriora! Isto aquilo que eu ouço falar porque, é como lhe digo, não entro dentro das casas para ver, mas ouço falar “Ó pá, as casas por dentro já estão uma miséria, as pessoas dão cabo de tudo! ... Sim, eu acho que, que é uma injustiça não perante a pessoa e perante quem, quem lhes conservou a casa. Acho que foi uma falta é uma falta de respeito perante a pessoa que lhes conservou a casa, não é? E depois não as, não as mantêm nem tal e qual, porque a casa, a Câmara quando gasta dinheiro a gente assim “Ah, é da Câmara.”, não é da Câmara, é de toda a gente! Os impostos que a Câmara... o patrão da Câmara é o presidente e ele não vai buscar de casa dele para lá investir! São dos nossos impostos, impostos de toda a gente que vai para servir, melhorar, não pode ser toda a gente, é verdade, mas vai-se melhorar o que está pior! Portanto, acho que aí devia de haver um, da parte das pessoas mas um bocado de consideração pelas obras e pelo investimento que se fez, que fizeram.” E38.

8.1.2 Telling the just from the unjust at the urban scale

Corresponding to the coordinates positioned in the ethical curve, we find five configurations of the problem of social housing (the utilitarian type is divided into two, depending on residence inside or outside social housing).

The most societal approach is defined through the existence of a horizon with comprehensive outcomes of justice, where justice requires a horizon without the space/spatiality of social housing (8.1.1.1). These inhabitants share the importance of space in the production of public goods (Sen calls them aggregative goods). Social contact of diversity and access to the city's resourcefulness is central to the outcomes which are beneficial for all members of the society, irrespective of their position in the exchange of solidarity. From this common basis, we observe different trade-offs between the components of freedom and equality in the suggested proto-policies: dismantling places of injustice, using networks of urban virtuality in order to perforate places of injustice, and policies based on responsibility. These chorotypes of justice are characterised by a scale bigger than the municipality (this approximation to the metropolitan area we can call proto-societal scale) and topographic and topological metrics, indicating a complex conception of habitat.

In the second coordinate, "Urban Rawls, equal accessibility to all urban places" (8.1.1.2), the horizon of justice is less ambitious, immobilising future necessity and adequacy of social housing solutions. The approach to solidarity is distributive and there is symmetry between recipients and contributors. The chorotype decouples the perspective of estate residents (imagined as variable) from that of the regular Porto inhabitant. From the point of view of the latter, public good of mobility is claimed to hierarchize conflicting spatialities. The intangible benefits of increased social contact are not evoked. The conception underlines the importance proximity to centrality. The scale of the just chorotype is smaller than that of the "city Sen" and it focuses on networks, indicating the lesser importance attributed to co-presence.

A chorotype based on utilitarianism, "Mill, the increase of urbanity in one's social housing" (8.1.1.3), has a lesser comprehensive horizon with corresponding smaller scale. It tends to understand the compatibility of spatialities and space by asserting the dissociation between goods of different inhabitants and the space that englobes them. The utilitarian who live outside social housing propose a chorotype of injustice which is focused on the topographic limit of the territories of social housing: "Mill, fragmenting the city's confines of incivility" (8.1.1.4). The confines of social housing with the remaining city are spaces of conflictual spatialities. Overall, this discourse is hesitant about the possibilities of achieving compatibility between the different actors' relationships with the space. These speakers are predisposed to include all members of society into the horizon of social transformation. However, this source of ethos does not recompose the fractured whole in a totality. As a result, they cannot resolve injustice through space. These inhabitants appeal to a-spatial fair processes which are capable of removing abuses from the recipients of solidarity.

Desert-based theories naturalise the social problems existing in these places (8.1.1.5). The substance is insufficient to identify the injustice and there is no information on metric or scale (space is a vague referent).

In the pre-ethical field, we observe five further chorotypes of injustice and respective reversals. The critique of the "Walzer *citadin*" is marked by the absence of a spatial proposition towards justice (8.1.1.6). Walzer's antinomy towards institutional policies is at stake.

The "hyper-central Taylor, well-being freedom from disruptive other/agency-freedom of a return to place of origin" (8.1.1.7) breaches procedural equality, that is, the predisposition to treat human beings universally as fundamentally equal beings. The same applies to the reversal of injustice advanced by the "Young from the ghetto" views on social housing ("Young, inhabitable places without individual freedoms", 8.1.1.8). In these cases, we cannot take suggestions of the inhabitants literally, but there is an information on the experience of momentous lack of well-being and agency freedom that cannot be ignored in a policy of the spatially just. These discourses do not conceive of the compatibility between spatiality and space and hierarchize spatialities on the basis of different worths. In the most societal versions of these two approaches, there are appeals to civility, public space, and social contact, accompanied by the exclusion of some members of the society from these entitlements. The persistency of the model

of social housing indicates that there is, nevertheless, sensitivity towards the need for distributive policies in relation to habitat.

Aquinas discusses virtue to reside in social housing where it is a material recourse distributed by a central actor (8.1.1.9). The injustice takes place against the distributor and other residents. There are no mentions to objectives of justice associated with beneficiaries of this type of solidarity transfer. There is no horizon of justice.

Anomie does not configure an injustice, accepting the impact of the social housing agency decision (past removal from historic centre, prospect of demolition and relocation) as a force of reality (8.1.1.10).

Figure 22 exposes a selection of these discourses, with *croquis* for four coordinates (I. and II. are located in morality; III. and IV. in ethics).¹¹⁰⁹ These four positions seek to communicate the essential observations that confirm the explicative comprehension of our empirical object. We observe, at once, a progression towards an increased coverage of universals of justice, and how scale, metric, and substance define the role of space in such realisations. From the predisposition to find compatibility between the part and the whole, the imagination of justice varies. The feasibility and the resourcefulness of society to bring about justice have varying degrees (reflected in the density of ideas of justice and their facets). They correspond to different objectives attributed to space: social contact, accessibility or virtuality of urbanity, and material shelter. We also see that the different declinations of the reversal of injustice have different scales and they correspond to the ideas of progress where the advancement of the self and of the whole are connected with different strengths. There are different degrees of deontology, that is, encompassment of the other in the ethical concerns of the person. This ensemble of combinations we call degrees of *sociétalité* of spatial justice.

Our method assumes from the outset that social positions might matter in different conceptions of spatial justice (without, however, presupposing the influence of each facet within individuals' multi-dimensional capitals). Our observations, across a spectrum of degrees of advantage and disadvantage, show us that it is not protection from self-interest that best defines deontological identifications of justice. Three observations change the distinction between self-interest and impartiality, which are unproductive in the treatment of the inhabitant conceptions of spatial justice: 1) Individuals who do not decentre their claims from their own singular persons can have good reasons to do so. Self-centred exposition of problems does not prevent these voices from communicating important problems of the society (though their way of communicating might need to be mediated). 2) Even when a citizen reports an injustice where he is not the main victim, the outrage felt may taint the discourse of an affective-subjective tone which is not impartial, but is not self-interested either. Inversely, treating problems decentred from the self is not a guarantee of the reasonableness of the justice claim. 3) Individuals who conceive of the imbrications between the individual and the society can objectively argue how an injustice is collective and implicate their person in the affective-subjective spatial sufferance, even if they are not in the traditional sense, the first victims of injustice. The test of reasonableness of the proposed or implicit "reversal of injustice" is an economic way to traverse these variations in discerning the just from the unjust.

¹¹⁰⁹ These chorotypes (of injustice and of the reversal of injustice) correspond to the descriptions in the following coordinates: I. "Young, inhabitable places without individual freedoms" (8.1.1.8); II. "The hyper-central Taylor, well-being freedom from disruptive other/agency-freedom of a return to place of origin" (8.1.1.7); III. "Urban Rawls, equal accessibility to all urban places" (8.1.1.2); and IV. "City Sen, a horizon without the space/spatiality of social housing" (8.1.1.1) (versant: "Dismantling places of injustice", 8.1.1.1.1).




Figure 22 Thematic transversal geotype: social housing unjust spaces and their contraries.

8.2 Individual geotypes, the interspatiality of spatial justice

This text presents the observations developed in study 7 – “Longitudinal individual geotypes” –¹¹¹⁰ synchronising them with remaining reconstructions of chapters 7 and 8, towards the maximum explicative comprehension of the empirical object. The study intends to test the preceding observations across a full set of scales, specifically their metrics and substances. The restricted scope of the analysis to two interviews enables the observation of the entire spectrum of spaces treated spontaneously by each of the interviewee. It also shows how these different spaces are related to each other when making propositions towards justice. We can better understand how the deontological reasoning relates to the individuals’ relationship with space and the role of cognitive and affective components in that process.

As described in chapter 6, this study composes the geotype of spatial justice for two contrasting discourses. A “city Sen” whom we call António and a “peri-urban Taylor” whom we can Luís.¹¹¹¹ Through the interaction between spaces mobilised in the identification of injustice, and in the proposition of just spatial arrangements, we can better understand how the imagination of justice treats a space as environments which can be transformed by other spaces. In other words, we observe the interspatiality of spaces as evoked by these two discourses. A representation of each geotype is presented in the tables 39 and 40. The head of each column presents a simple space. These spaces can be rather complex objects, that is, geotypes. However, to contrast them with the ensembles of spaces whose interactions we want to study, we consider each of the simpler spaces a chorotype.¹¹¹² The first rows of the tables indicate its scale and substance. Substance comprises the dimensions of society implied in the reversal of injustice on the singular achievement of justice at stake. The last row treats the relationship of that space with regards to the superior scales (the division in columns is an observation and expository need, and indeed, the text tries to present the results in a more interrelated fashion). The columns – the spaces participating in the geotype – are organised by increasing *sociétalité* of the smallest space described in an interspatial couple or ensemble: the individual and the smallest space of his everydayness (the house, the urban block) (A), the freguesia (B), the municipality (C), the region (D), Portugal (E), Europe (F), and “towards the (scale of the) world” (G). Spaces which can have similar Euclidean sizes are hierarchized according to the information on their degree of urbanity: a peri-urban *freguesia* is considered to be smaller than a hyper-central urban place.¹¹¹³

These tables are verbally expanded in section 8.2.1. A final text, “Interspatiality of justice imagination, a world-view” (8.2.3), wraps up the observations of the individual geotypes while elaborating on the comprehensive explanation that these two discourses bring to the ensemble of the corpus.

¹¹¹⁰ This study has been introduced in point 6.3.1.7, “Study 7: Longitudinal individual geotypes” (section 6.3, “Corpus) and point 6.5.6.4, “Individual geotypes” (section 6.4, “Narrative”). Further information is provided in annex E.7.

¹¹¹¹ We have seen that the objective of exercise 7 addresses data reductions operated in previous exercises: the focus on the scale of urban unjust chorotypes, the necessary generalisation in defining the types of spatial justice conceptions and the focus on social housing. The last two reductions, in particular, overlooked internal variation inside each discourse. The study of individual geotypes abandons an urbanistic focus, making room for superior scales, while studying the variation of arguments inside entire conversation.

¹¹¹² We see that there is reconstruction taking place. We do not reproduce the “cases” as they are presented by the interviewees, but recompose all substance and metric associated with a given scale.

¹¹¹³ The freguesia and the municipality are infra-societal spaces. They are too small to account for the spatialities of the urban system and to include all types of actors, environment, and objects pertinent for justice. As defined in chapter 3, the urban area is the societal scale with which a justice-minded urbanism can deal with. The region is here employed in the sense of the French classic geographical concept, that is, as a sub-ensemble of the national space, of a dominant territorial metric and assumed hybridity, corresponding to a relationship of autonomy between resources and identity. It constitutes of relevant potential political spaces (we are not extending the concept to regions of supranational spaces). (Lévy, Region, 2013, p. 852)). The geopolitical state is suitable – at the condition of not being the exclusive scale – to read features of history, culture, contemporary political scene, and economic life. These substances and size (introducing pertinent distance) guarantee that space is societal (Lévy, État, 2013, pp. 368–371). Europe can be conceived of as a region bigger than the geopolitical states whose substance is at least economic, political, and social. The region is a nod in the world network (of plural substances) that presses for a European project more than the sum of its societies. It is, then, a societal scale (Lévy, Region, 2013, p. 852). The world is the biggest of all human spaces, as a place which, beyond englobing smaller spaces, has its own substance (Retailé, 2013, pp. 686–688).

Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify the three modalities of interspatiality proposed by Jacques Lévy (Lévy, *Interspatialité*, 2013, pp. 569–570). The interaction might be absent, reflecting the option of self-sufficiency of the space (which theoretically presumes the societal scale of the space, but it is not necessarily employed as such by individuals).¹¹¹⁴ This modality – interface – chooses the frontier as the type of crossing which put the two spaces in a relation. The second modality – interlocking (*emboîtement*) – corresponds to the articulation of an englobing and an englobed space. The type of connection implies a “jump in scale”. The third family of relationship between spaces is co-spatiality, that is, the articulation of different spatial layers in the same extension, independently of their Euclidian distance or differences of scale. They are linked by a commutator (*commutateur*). The last family is the one that best illustrates the way in which interspatiality defies the interaction of space as a simple management of contact and distance (Lévy, *Interspatialité*, 2013, p. 570).¹¹¹⁵

¹¹¹⁴ « Dans le cas de l’interaction entre geotypes sociétaux, l’autosuffisance est une des options et, dans cette perspective, pour s’assurer de la libre disposition des ressources localisées sur son territoire, une société peut être tenté par le double mouvement d’expansion de ce territoire par la guerre et d’enfermement dans des frontières étanches. C’est la quête du *Lebensraum* (« espace vital ») justifiée par Friedrich Ratzel, et qui définit la frontière ligne de front comme l’interface interétatique classique de la géopolitique. » (Lévy, *Interspatialité*, 2013, p. 570).

¹¹¹⁵ « À la différence des opérateurs géographiques élémentaires, les espaces sont des situations impliquant et agençant plusieurs logiques d’action, plusieurs acteurs. Ils possèdent une stabilité minimale qui fait d’eux des localisations, et pas seulement des réalités localisées. On ne peut donc traiter de leurs interactions comme s’il s’agissait de gérer la contradiction géographique fondamentale entre contact et écart. » (Lévy, *Interspatialité*, 2013, p. 570).

CONNECTING SPACE AND JUSTICE IN METROPOLITAN PORTO

<p>Scale (and toponym)</p>	<p>A Individual (Casa)</p>	<p>B Freguesia (Covelo)</p>	<p>C C1 Municipality (municipality where Covelo is situated)</p>	<p>D Region (least dense regions of Portugal)</p>	<p>E Portugal</p>	<p>F Europa</p>	<p>G Towards the world (Países árabes, Países asiáticos, Angola, América)</p>
<p>Substance (social dimensions)</p>	<p>INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL/SOCIAL -cultural</p>	<p>POLITICAL/ SPATIAL/SOCIAL- cultural</p>	<p>POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Space of economic impact of "centralism"</p>	<p>INDIVIDUAL/ECONOMIC/SPA TIAL: Space of individual economic actors</p>	<p>SOCIETAL: space of political big actors+ cultural space (of illegitimate values)</p>	<p>POLITICAL/ ECONOMIC/SPATIAL: Pertinent economic and political space</p>	<p>ECONOMIC/INDIVIDUALS: menacing economic space + origin of illegitimate immigration</p>
<p>Interspatiality of spaces in the justice horizon</p>	<p>A1 >A interface between the individual and the small space of his everydayness with all societal scales. The house is the space of the family, a territory of common lifestyle, dominates the individual. Interface with big cities, where inferior lifestyles are located. Impossible interface with Portugal. Current societal contact via telecommunication (newspapers and television) is unjust dues to the common culture of mediocrity of the bigger scale. No just horizon for this relation. A-B Cospatiality with the freguesia. Both the house and the freguesia are territories with the values of conviviality and security.</p>	<p>B-E Interlock of freguesia and Portugal, with immanence of the freguesia. Currently interlocked (transcended) by the political space of the state, the just space would allow the freguesia to be immanent over segments several networks. This immanence is not paralleled by budget autonomy, least dense spaces should receive more resources under a principle of territorial equality. The different contributions to and implications of these objects to individuals and society are flattened under the principle of superior legitimacy of spatialities of proximity.</p>	<p>C1-E The just space would allow the municipality to be autonomous in terms of taxation of its companies, currently defined at national level. C2 Big cities are location of unhealthy lifestyles (see A).</p>	<p>C2-D Individual spatialities disjoints territories of origin (dense municipalities) with territory of destination (rural regions). These two territories are conceived more as an area where two places are at distance, rather than a network of mobility. The economic potential is in the (young) individual that moved (national heroes).</p>	<p>E-F In the past, the just space would have avoided the transcendence of Europe over Portugal, allowing a development project based on the specificity of the country (seen as a legitimate space with a fixed economic vocation (the climate, the sea)). E42 does not explicitly demand the closure/exit of Portugal to/from Europe. The problem of unemployment is transferred to the scale of Europe. E-F In a just space, Portugal as the origin of a network of individuals' mobility (emigration) should give way to a bordered territory where take place both the societal investment in education and the return of investment through the co-production of development of nationals.</p>	<p>F-G The just space would be an interface between Europe and the rest of the world. The territory is political: internal metrics of nationalism are a legitimate protection against excessive solidarity reflected in the current co-spatiality of migration networks and European States. It is economic and ideal (cultural): internal autonomy corrects excessive cospatiality with territories of corruption and dictatorships (China, Angola), reducing risk of importing mediocrity. It is spatial. There is also an interface with the networks of individuals (workers) which are different and potentially difficult to be with.</p>	<p><F – F An interspatiality with F corresponds to the absence of a horizon of justice. The unjust space that is likely to pervade is the interlocking of Europe (and via Europe, Portugal and all the inferior scales) in a bigger territory – towards the world – of common metrics – of decreased social rights and quality of life.</p>

Table 39 Interspatiality of spatial justice seen from "Peri-urban Taylor".

CHAPTER 8. UNJUST SPACES AND THEIR REVERSAL


Id	Scale (and toponym)	Substance (social dimensions)	A1 Individual (Quarteirão)	A2 Urban place (Beira)	B Municipality (Espinho)	C1 Urban area (Grande Porto)	D Portugal	E Europa	F1, F2 Towards the world (Sociedade Ocidental, Mundo)
		INDIVIDUAL/SOCIAL/ECONOMIC MIC Higher level of intimate inhabiting of space (in the sense of time-permanence)	 A1-(D,E,F) Cospatality of the individual with the societal space of his choice. This choice applies to mobility and immobility and requires the economic viability of societies. (The interspatiality above neutralises distance when the substance is freedom of mobility or immobility) (It is possible to interpret the superior legitimacy in the territory of origin vis-à-vis the enlargement of the network, thus an immanence of the proximity spatialities over distant ones.)	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
Interspatiality of spaces in the justice horizon			 A1-(D,E,F) Cospatality of the individual with the societal space of his choice. This choice applies to mobility and immobility and requires the economic viability of societies. (The interspatiality above neutralises distance when the substance is freedom of mobility or immobility) (It is possible to interpret the superior legitimacy in the territory of origin vis-à-vis the enlargement of the network, thus an immanence of the proximity spatialities over distant ones.)	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
			 A2-(E1) Cospatality of the territory, infra-societal, with a bigger network of places (European cities). Substance: urbanity (with focus on retail diversity). (The interspatiality above neutralises scale and time-distance. Cospatality has been used to designate the approximation of different places through the mobility of individuals.)	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
			 A2-(C1, C2) Interlocking of A2 in C, as zones with higher level of urbanity.	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
			 B-D Municipality co-spatial with Europe The current interspatiality of the political space of the municipality with the northern region and Portugal would, in a just space, be a cospatality of all these spaces with Europe (commutator: ethical capital). B-E There is no information on what the commutator between the local space and northern Europe could be.	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
			 B-C Some isolated municipalities are provided as examples of injustices of the metropolitan area. However, the political project remains explicit only at the scale of the municipality, as identified in B. There is a relationship of pregnance of the metropolitan area with its municipalities, without constituting a political interlocking.	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
			 C(ΔD) The absence of relation with bigger scales is an important information. Resolving injustice in space at the urban scale largely dispenses with the remission of the injustice to other spaces. Within the scale of the metropolitan area the relation is one of cospatality of territories and networks.	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
			 C(ΔE) Autonomy in a local spatial project. Within the scale of the country these is scope for transformation which does not pass (or passes only indirectly) by interspatiality with other spaces: mainly in the ideal space of mentality and in the immaterial space of political law.	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
			 D-E The interspatiality tries to express the liberation of Europe from domination of economic actors without implying the immanence of Europe over the world. It can be read as a co-spatiality of the actors rather than of the political spaces. Co-spatiality of the actors implies the compatibility of economic actors' spatialities with societal development objectives.)	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space
			 E-F2 The interspatiality of the just space is that of cospatality of the civic territory of Western Society and the economic networks of the world. (Similar to E, for the Western Society and with a feeblor political dimension).	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL Higher level of friction between multisensory perception of space and knowledge on space	POLITICAL/CULTURAL/SPATI AL Smaller pertinent political space+ social space of civic behaviour	INDIVIDUAL/SPATIAL: Space of the organisation of the urban : multisensory perception of space and space of the organisation of the urban	POLITICAL/SOCIAL Pertinent political + cultural space	POLITICAL/ECONOMIC Pertinent economic and political space	ECONOMIC/SOCIAL Pertinent economic and civic space

Table 40 Interspatiality of spatial justice seen from "City Sen".

8.2.1 The relationship with the world in the construction of interspatiality

António's conception of spatial justice mirrors a view of the world as a changeable place. It is this capacity of transformation that sustains a horizon of justice where different scales are in contact to produce a human habitat of one's everyday life. Luís helps us to understand what it means to evaluate injustice and its reversals when geographical mutation is seen as a multiscale menace to the unquestionable foundations of one's mode of existence. Each increment in scale reinforces the border that smaller spaces fail to secure. The world is there where justice is no longer imaginable. We note that these two inhabitants are clearly located in their respective types. They are the examples of non-ambiguous conceptions, which, as we have seen in section 7.4, are quite present in the corpus. In this text, we sustain the idea that spatial justice is generated at a fundamental level of relationship with the world.

8.2.1.1 The smallest space of individual everydayness

The first ensemble of interspatiality departs from the space of the individual. The relationship of this environment with the next smallest space of everyday existence (the house, the urban block) presents to us the position of the interviewee in relation to the individual-society vis-à-vis the *Gemeinschaft*. From this position we can derive the "theme" which will resonate across the geotype.

8.2.1.1.1 Individual immobility from place of birth (immutability of values in commonality)

Luís is not located in an epoch of compatibility of the individual and the *Gesellschaft*. The commonality of the group is antithetical both to the individual and to society. The space of the house is assessed as just. It is *cospatial* with the *freguesia*¹¹¹⁶ and configures a bordered territory of cultural substance, based on the primacy of the family as a unit of survival against a society of moral degradation (abundance and superficiality are criticised). In the reversal of injustice, the space of the house assures the permanent *cospatiality* for women and children.¹¹¹⁷ Maximum socialisation with the family assures uniform values among its members. There is an intentional removal of younger individuals from the capability of reasoned arbitrage in the face of societal influence.¹¹¹⁸ The desired space is an interface between the house and the world.

8.2.1.1.2 Individual spatial choice of society of habitat ... including not to move from familiarity

For António, the unjust space is that of an individual without the capability to choose to live in the society of his preference (allusion to the economic migration of young Portuguese to foreign places). Society's mode of production is evoked as a constraint to individual's spatial choice. Lack of employment opportunities in Portugal and contemporary requirements of job flexibility are seen to impose mobility (national and international), a lack of agency-freedom. Self-driven mobility is positively valued. The space on which the capability of spatial choice can be enabled is that of the municipality, the region, Portugal, Europe and the world. Each of these spaces presents a particular *marge the manoeuvre* for economic/political retroaction with effects on the possibility to choose a society as one's habitat.

António combines this universal valuation of spatial choice with the assumption that, for those who wish not to change the spaces of their biography, the likely preference is to live at a distance from the city-block, with respect to the other generations of the same family. The possibility for family members to entertain frequent interactions based on co-presence is slightly more than a valued capability.¹¹¹⁹ The family as the basis of intergenerational copresence is an important environment. Given the role of choice and freedom in the overall discourse, it is the substance of

¹¹¹⁶ Given the number of occurrences of the term *freguesia*, we do not use italics in the rest of this passage, to indicate foreign word.

¹¹¹⁷ Women would be paid for their household work, and were, in this conditions, excepted to universally choose not to have a professional career.

¹¹¹⁸ Luís describes numerous injunctions addressed to his children and describes the practices that confirm the success of his influence over their spatial choices.

¹¹¹⁹ The observation of different behaviour is read an override of value, constrained – perhaps unconsciously – by the demands of economic integration. He does not conceive of the possibility that intergenerational contact might be entertained independently from family affiliation, or that intermittent copresence might be a preferred spatial model to permanent co-presence.

agency-freedom deployed at societal scales that we retain. This contrasts with the intentional removal of substances of justice in the geotype of Luís.

8.2.1.2 The local political scale: *freguesia* vis-à-vis the municipality (no urban area)

If we look at the scale that each individual considers to be legitimate for the smaller political space, we observe a peri-urban *freguesia* (Luís) and one central municipality (António). We have defined these two scales as infra-societal (chapter 3).

8.2.1.2.1 *Freguesia*, the spatial bastion of politics of virtue

For Luís, the *freguesia* of Covelo is the relevant political unit where one's "land" can be "invested" with one's private and "collective" strategies. The *freguesia* is seen to better address the requirements of "knowing" the constituency, and of being able to make decisions on a virtuous manner. The "fusion of *freguesias*", joining two political units at this scale, is considered "centralisation". Societal political scales are seen to menace the treatment of citizens as persons rather than numbers.¹¹²⁰ Portugal is a transcending political space, exercising excessive power over local places. This judgement is anchored in the politicians' ignorance of the implications of principled law in the lives of people in local spaces. For these reasons, most political decisions applied to the entire territory, including Covelo, are source of injustice. The co-spatiality of space of problems, of political decision and of resources, is not addressed.¹¹²¹

The *freguesias* are also territories of higher quality of life, as confirmed by his observation of the peri-urbanisation of Porto and the visits to the "marina".¹¹²² In defining spatial injustice at this scale, the *freguesia* is part of an area. The administrative contour of the *freguesia* is the topologic border which allows treating it as a point in the evaluation of networks of public services and other facilities. This measurement is then used to evaluate the justness of distance between the population of Covelo and public services, on the basis of an isotropic relationship with distance.¹¹²³ The contrast between past achievements (where Luís played an active role) and the current dismantling of the density of such networks (see section 6.4) is the source of many injustice chorotypes.¹¹²⁴ Luís delivers an explicit argument for territorial equality, allowing fixation of population throughout the territory, where minimum conditions suppress the necessity of mobility. The desired space is sustained through an interlock of the *freguesia* and national space, though with the immanence of the *freguesia* over the networks that trespass.¹¹²⁵ Health centres, social housing, schools, Junta de *Freguesia*, post office, cultural and sports facilities, public spaces and road network, etc., are the objects treated through the same model. The *freguesia* would like to be able to decide (with local knowledge, competence and virtue) on transcending networks. The logic of private market is accepted for public transports, which are then excluded from the demands of ubiquity (coherent with the model of immobility).¹¹²⁶

¹¹²⁰ "Aliás, todas as estruturas nacionais e europeias tratam as pessoas por números e eu detesto isso, acho que as pessoas devem ser tratadas com atendimento personalizado, as pessoas devem-se conhecer e devem ser tratadas assim. Nas escolas acontece a mesma coisa, se puder falar das escolas." Luís.

¹¹²¹ A similar argument is constructed for the current interlocking of the *freguesia* in the municipality.

¹¹²² The public space of the Marina is the sole place welcoming "foreigners" into the *freguesia*. It is a pleasant beautiful space, open to fruition by the inhabitants from (at least partially) the metropolitan area, sustaining growth (delivered in an abstract manner). There is the rejection of a group of public as well (the wealthy owners of boats).

¹¹²³ Distance between places is activated only in the terms of individual spatialities, measured in Euclidian distance of road path between their homes and the services location.

¹¹²⁴ The fact that such networks existed in the past is evoked as an argument of feasibility. This transformation takes place just after his retirement from public office, which might increase the affective tonality of the discourse: "nós tivemos aqui um dispensário na *freguesia* e que eu nunca permiti que tirassem daqui." Luís.

¹¹²⁵ « Immanence/Transcendance : Relation de domination entre deux espaces emboîtés. Dans le cas de l'immanence, le petit espace domine le grand ; dans le cas de la transcendance, c'est le grand qui s'impose au petit. » (Lévy, *Immanence/Transcendance (spatiales)*, 2013, pp. 536-537).

¹¹²⁶ "Não temos os transportes públicos que queríamos, mas também isso, isso entendemos que não é possível, são empresas privadas. De resto, fez-se tudo e criou-se tudo para que as pessoas tivessem aqui onde vivem, fez-se tudo para que as pessoas tivessem aqui onde vivem um mínimo de condições para viver e não precisar de sair daqui." E42.

The term “de-centralisation” is used to describe the correspondence of a spatial solution of ubiquity and the scale of political space. He treats interchangeably the aggregation of political spaces which should be as small as possible and the distribution of public facilities, which should be as large as possible. The argument is transcendental, evoking the principle of equality between freguesias; and substantial, through his perception of the impact of political spatial decisions on people’s lives.¹¹²⁷ As we have seen in the discourses which circulate the communitarian ideality of Taylor and the non-egalitarian matrix of Mills, the argument does not consider the interrelation of spatialities in a whole. Some parts of the argument could be interpreted in the light of a Rawlsian lenses. There is a concern for the least well-off who are located in these territories. However, the sacrifice of personal liberties implied in the appeal to the protection of group values is not compatible with liberalism. Also, the evoked basis of fragility are restricted (age), resonating more with moral concern for the poor than an egalitarian project.¹¹²⁸ If we remove the information from the argumentative framework where it is anchored, important information is provided. For example, the relative cost of travelling in public transports in relation to income of a part of the population (cost includes not only the ones tickets but also expenses of *séjour*) or the fear experimented by some elderly in withdrawing retirement pension in *banckomat* (once post offices are removed). This points show that there is no substitute to public debate and research in gathering information on the citizen’s experience of spatial transformation. Less reasonable voices need to be heard not only for the purpose of democratic formal inclusivity, but for insight.

From this mixed conception derives a number of demands of justice, to which we could attribute different reasonableness. Capability demanded on collective grounds, not extensible to others (that is, that do not constitute personal liberties) involves demands of security and conviviality in the places of low density; negating the location of housing for the least well-off,¹¹²⁹ and the protection of natural environment from facilities for private mobility (the road should move elsewhere rather than be suppressed altogether).¹¹³⁰ Capabilities demanded on collective grounds, which are blind or infringe individual capability translate into the possibility of immobility in the frequency of school (associated with the maintenance of the family model presented above); liveness conferred to the locality through the presence of school.¹¹³¹ There are also arguments that we can reconstruct under capability, but they are erroneously made dependent of the low urbanity model: lower ratio students/teachers in primary schools.¹¹³² Beyond this direct demand, the model is blind to societal egalitarian outcomes which are measured in individuals (rather than in-between places). Due to the cost of certain services in the least dense areas, the mode of territorial equality means, potentially, that wealthy individuals in the least dense areas receive more solidarity resources than poorer individuals in denser areas. Public debates should be able to call attention to the competitive priorities between ubiquity and other societal investments affecting equality.

The discourse breathes capability throughout. Space makes it accessible for inhabitants to link claims of justice to the lives of people. This observation has a theoretical importance. It is an argument for not making capability the single

¹¹²⁷ The isotopy of services also has an economic substance, beyond their service to the population: teachers, administrative personal, doctors and nurses are needed to sustain jobs in the territory (which, we can add, would not survive in a non-public job market).

¹¹²⁸ Access to healthcare for the elderly, in particular, in isolated locations, accessibility to municipal and postal services irrespective of income and other capabilities (age, fearfulness).

¹¹²⁹ The obligation of this territory to contribute to a national/municipal policy of housing of the least well-off is not perceived as such. The value of security and conviviality is advanced as a legitimate argument against that contribution. This argument for rejecting foreigners does not survive the test of reasonableness.

¹¹³⁰ There are three further arguments against the construction of more highways: not necessary; not feasible given the current deficit; the missed opportunity networked mobility is for the discovery and economic benefit of bypassed territories.

¹¹³¹ The argument of animation of the village is less legitimate as the good of education – for its individual and societal relevance in development – should be treated as an end, and not as the means which are subordinate to local priorities.

¹¹³² Location of school in the least-dense areas is supported by the observed inferior ratio students-adults/teachers in these spaces. There is a point in enticing public debate on the adequate ratios.

unit of assessment of justice, and to keep under specific scrutiny the relationship between with capability and public goods.¹¹³³

8.2.1.2.2 Municipality, the horizon of local civic engagement

Four types of space can be described with regards to this scale. The municipality is a territory in which one can see and feel – in city's visibility – societal phenomena. In what concerns justice, the city allows for the observation of loss of urbanity (loss of retail, density of inhabitants, diversity of the inhabitants, and the physical quality of urban space). Part of this problem is resolved at the urban area. The municipality's visibility is not sufficient, and the interviewee articulates it with bigger scales, including the metropolitan area, Portugal, Europe and the world. The space of the municipality is (one of) the contour(s), enabling the measurement of indexes that complement and converge with what is observed in the city (loss industry and employment, aging population, consequences of poverty for families, lesser available homes to a poor segment of the population). We observe mainly a territorial metric of injustice, and the cospatiality with the region and the country. The commonality (commutator) between these spaces is a cultural feature: incapacity of civic organisation for the common good. The consequence of the feature is the lack of a local developmental project which is capable of dealing with the effects of dynamics happening at superior scales (Europe and world). The municipality of Espinho is also the smallest pertinent scale used to discuss habitat and mobilise civic society. The substances involved in the pursuit of justice at this scale comprise of a-spatial material and immaterial objects that are accessible to all (private family housing units in good material conditions, comfort, and employment) and the society's capability of conceiving a developmental project (with relatively spatial autonomy).

Such justice outcomes require the co-spatiality of Espinho and Portugal, seen to increase the alterity of individuals, through the practice of multiple belonging to different (civic) groups and the transformation of cultural feature towards a model of ethical engagement available in Northern Europe.¹¹³⁴ This triple co-spatiality (Espinho, Portugal, Northern Europe) would result in the actors' long-term capacity for co-producing space with society, surpassing their individual sphere and projecting themselves into the societal.¹¹³⁵ Justice would also require the cospatiality between Espinho and Europe on an economic dimension. In a just space, Europe would be a structured society, with sustainable social systems (social security, health system) seen as the necessary means for co-living together in harmony. Such sustainability is dependent on the availability of taxes from jobs and from the company's profit (both of which are connected with the world level). A stronger economy would result and enable individuals to entertain solidarity relationship among employees, practising a model of organised collective interest (in Espinho). Important resulting capabilities would be freedom from the need of economic migration and contribute to the development of Portugal and the overall reduction of a part of the society afflicted by poverty and the magnitude of inequality. Finally, the municipality is a part of a general conception of the just urban space as an extension where distance is surpassed.

We can contrast this treatment of the municipality with Luís' consideration of the same scale. For the latter, Gondomar does not raise specific matters of spatial justice. The municipality (of Porto, of Gondomar) is a point considered in the evaluation of mobility, leading to the judgement of insufficient accessibility to public facilities by the entire population (as seen in the freguesia)¹¹³⁶. The municipality is also a fragment of the space of country, reflecting problems which are seen uniformly across that scale: aging of population, necessity of mobility due to unemployment, excessive concentration of decision-making in Lisbon, and failing to acknowledge the "local" reality.

¹¹³³ Between the municipality and country, there are brief references to the region. If we look for further spatial references distinct from municipalities/freguesias/country described with uniform features, we find: litoral, interior, zonas rurais. Given the overall refusal of networks in the spatial conception of the interviewee, these spaces also disregard the integration of transcendent networks. The discourse is unclear with regards to a relative autonomy of resources, which is important to the constitution of a political space.

¹¹³⁴ The *soci t alit * of the capability is inexplicit. What is explicit is the lack of belonging to civic society groups, and how that hinders people frequenting each other in multiple locations. The statement of impoverishment of peoples' lives and social organisation can be interpreted as a missed wealth of experience and debilitating space.

¹¹³⁵ The required capacity can be reconstructed to be generalizable to all citizens. That is not explicitly stated, but the logic of the interviewer is to conceive of the other as a similar being. It is extended to big political actors.

¹¹³⁶ Gondomar is the destination in function of which distance is measured, in mobility originated in the remaining freguesias of the municipality (and in particular Covelo).

The current role of the municipality is that of a distributive centre towards its components (the freguesias), according to the principles of equality of access to public utilities.

8.2.1.3 The urban scale, absence vis-à-vis contact and societal development

8.2.1.3.1 Absent

Big cities are evoked as places of unhealthy lifestyle. The urban scale, as such, is absent.

8.2.1.3.2 Marge de manoeuvre for a just space

Despite not being treated as a political scale, Grande Porto is constructed by António as a series of thematic networks and of territories which pose problems of justice. Five illustrations follow. 1) The social housing constitutes places with internal metrics of socio-economic-cultural homogeneity; the network has reduced connectivity with other urban networks. The inversion of the model points towards a network of individual/family units distributed through the entire urban space. The space (mixture) and the type of spatiality (contact with models of upward social mobility) supports, at once, the societal outcomes and individual capabilities (capacity of autonomy).¹¹³⁷ 2) Suburbanisation results in part of the urban fabric with little access to a mobility network (and access to centrality), implying long time-distance arches. This network is connected with that of individuals and the material and ideal spaces of the territory. This dispersion describes the results in the loss of density in central areas and loss of diversity throughout the urban space (in terms of socio-economic and age groups). The just would “compress” the network with transport efficiency.¹¹³⁸ It would also reshuffle individual positions, with increased density in central areas (partial retroaction of suburbanisation towards a high urbanity model).¹¹³⁹ In the hyper-centre, it would imply refurbishing the housing fabric. 3) The metropolitan Porto is also a material space, offered to the senses. For this sphere of space António demands continuous aesthetic standards across its extension (“harmony”). The material contiguity is related to the self-visibility of space, to which are attached ideal attributes of identity, history, and memory. The just space would intensify this identity through the refurbishment of the historic urban fabric.¹¹⁴⁰ Prevention of further construction in inadequate densities and with inadequate aesthetic standards is also a part of the just urban space. 4) As for the space of Espinho, the metropolitan area is also a space of representation of societal problems, a territory of readability of economic dynamism and its impact on physical infrastructure (industry, retail). The intensity of unemployment of this territory co-varies with other societal problems, but this scale is not determinant of specificity. The ideas furthered for Espinho are not evoked for the Grande Porto, potentially reflecting the poor visibility of this space as a political one. The argument of civic society is also not present, potentially reflecting the way in which that argument is articulated with the cultural plane (in the sense of participating in identity). 5) António also treats urban as smaller territories inside the city, emphasising the importance of co-presence and public metrics. The unjust space is a territory whose level of urbanity has been reduced. Loss of diversity is observed in the markers of retail, café life, bookshops, time of spatial uses; loss of density is conveyed in the disappearance of animated ambiances.¹¹⁴¹ The unjust space is also a network of shopping experiences. The scale of economic actors has had an impact on the homogeneity of retail, implying the disappearance of a European cities’ specific offer.¹¹⁴² The just space is a territory of copresence within the city, restored with adequate level of diversity across the identified markers (retail, cultural

¹¹³⁷ Lack of mixture in space is a factor aggravating societal problems. Inadequate arrangement of the social dimension of space removes a factor for development (of individual and of society).

¹¹³⁸ The extension of network to the entire metropolitan area is perhaps an excessive interpretation.

¹¹³⁹ The problems of social housing and of suburbs are, initially, presented in parallel. The solution for the suburbs passes by changing the people to the centre.

¹¹⁴⁰ This demand is connected with the economic spaces already mentioned as the capacity to renew and adapt urban fabric to contemporary lifestyle is expensive.

¹¹⁴¹ The publicity of the retail spaces is evoked when describing lost spaces. In the reversal of injustice, what is at stake is the scale of the operators (that scale is measured in capacity to act in space and in economic capital).

¹¹⁴² His preference is perhaps not generalizable to the entire population who value lower prices and styles of the mass offer. However, arguing for diversity does not imply the elimination of the entire offer of retail chains.

activities, night and day, and users). These places are nodes in a network of European urban spatialities. The substances involved are agency-freedom (choice in urban experience through diversity) and the capabilities of enjoyment of high urbanity in each place and alterity with regards to other cities. We can see that the experience of urban diversity is connected with the transformation of economic monopoly of big actors in the international market, which implies the capability of small urban actors to compete with big actors, an argument that crosscuts several scales.¹¹⁴³

The justice achievements of this urban space would be the capability of enjoyment of adequate level of urbanity, with individual capacity of societal engagement (autonomy and participation in society), through mixity in copresence; the removal of difficulty and sufferance in people's lives¹¹⁴⁴ through a well-planned and agreeable urban space (pleasant and ordered urban fabric, green spaces, adequate infrastructure for circulation);¹¹⁴⁵ mixity of socioeconomic-age groups, induced by the affordability in the rental market of denser areas; continuous aesthetic urban standards reflect historic time of their construction and identity of place. Conditions in the rental market and in the physical materiality of housing needs to be produced for individuals to change their spatiality. Aesthetic standards are argued, in terms of history, identity, as well as common practice in other European cities. The legitimacy of generalising the capability from his experience and preferences can be discussed¹¹⁴⁶. However, António justifies his point of view, based on attitudinal equality: the *other* would value similar things should he be able to conceive of the same spatiality and should space allow him to choose what he values. The remaining capabilities are delivered at once as individual and societal, coherent with the idea of equality between the individuals based on the extension towards others of what the self has reasons to value as a spatial human being.

8.2.1.4 Portugal's transcendence on local habitat

The insufficiency of public services does not result from spatial impossibility to sustain those services, but, as the incompetence of Portuguese political actors (the context of European relations is ignored).

8.2.1.4.1 Dominating yet protecting from further alterity

For Luís, the national scale also plays a role in the interfaces of protection from injustice.¹¹⁴⁷ In Luís' conception of spatial justice, local spaces are morally superior as well as more competent. The country is seen as a territory of common low moral quality (corruption) and incompetence of the political class who holds centralised power. Most of the territory, with exception of the smaller environments of the house and of the freguesia, corresponds to a society of consumption that spends unwisely and sustains mediocre values. This judgement is extended to the national space of telecommunication (television, press). With regards to political competence, this ideality is

¹¹⁴³ His experience of past spaces is the foundation for the enunciation. However, the economic explanation focusing on the economic actors and the generalisation on grounds of diversity, is able to transcend the self.

¹¹⁴⁴ Among the impediments to freedom there is an explicit reference to free time and time to play. At a higher level of reconstruction we can also detect a social and political substance: impediment of further possibility of development due to the magnitude of conflict of interest created by spatial disorder. It is difficult to interpret the use of the word harmony/disharmony. We can either read it as it is metaphorical import from aesthetics of an idea of agreeable coexistence which implies increased openness to the social construction of space than the first alternative. If we choose the most progressive interpretation, then urban planning disorder also has an impact in the social dimension of space, i.e. how people relate to each other. This hesitation reflects well the ethical upgrade which is taking place in Porto.

¹¹⁴⁵ The reading of the reduction of time-distance of the branches of urban network might be over-interpreted from a reference to appropriate "vias" to circulation.

¹¹⁴⁶ In the light of the rest of the corpus, I can see a tendency of consensus on the value of historic urban fabric and a model of conservation, in particular in type 6. The design of Praça dos Aliados is considered unjust by almost all interviewees. As a public space, the transformation is often mingled with its reflex of the lost spatiality of Porto as a "city of work". However, it is undeniable that the transformation of the materiality and its aesthetic quality is a part of the argument. The civic quality of the most symbolic space of society does not correspond with the level of extremity in the public space of this society.

¹¹⁴⁷ Between the municipality and country, there are brief references to the region. If we look for further spatial references which are distinct from municipalities/freguesias/country, described with uniform features, we find litoral, interior, zonas rurais. Given the overall refusal of networks in the spatial conception of the interviewee, these spaces also disregard the integration of transcendent networks. The discourse is unclear with regards to a relative autonomy of resources, which is important to the constitution of a political space. The dislocation of urbanites from the city to rural areas is considered heroic.

addressed at Lisbon which then extends the results to Portugal, through its immanence over the bigger national scale. The results of this unjust interspatiality are mainly seen in unemployment.¹¹⁴⁸ In the just space, Portugal would develop a project enabling the country to catch up its difference in relation to other European countries, depending on the recognition of the specificity of the country, based on a positional reading of space. In that project, there is an interface between the space of society's investing on individual competence through education and the space of the outcome, that is, the society's capacity.¹¹⁴⁹

Economic injustice in Portugal is also described through the territory's common history, narrated in terms of a big political actor' decision to integrate Europe, a vaster political and economic space.¹¹⁵⁰ The subjection to Europe is seen to have hindered the definition of common interest which is based on Portugal's (positional space) fixed economic vocation (the climate and the sea). The transnational networks of economic fluxes evoked by António are not considered. There is a rejection of economic aid and of European political federation.¹¹⁵¹ There is a component of time in the "ought to" of the narrative. In the past, the just space would have avoided European integration.¹¹⁵² Luís does not demand the exit of Portugal from Europe. We can see that the political model is of interlock for economic dimension and of interface for political. This incongruence is not treated. We can see that it is implied in the European funding of the model of territorial development that he endorses, and, to an extent, benefits from.

Portugal is also a bordered territory, menaced by networked spaces which do not respect the topologic metrics of its limit. While the internal political metric is seen as unjust (in relation to smaller spaces that get uniform in that way), the border with the menacing external spaces justify national political unity. This change of modality of interspatiality also happens when Portugal, Europe, and the World are brought together. Here, Europe appears as the economic partner, allowing an interface with China (which represents more demands of alterity, and, once again, perceived mediocrity). Economic difficulties should be resolved at the scale of Europe – and only at the scale of Europe – to suppress the need for mobility outside the country and to foster residence in a bordered territory of habitat. Economic difficulties resolved at European and national levels should allow, via decentralisation, the creation of jobs in the least dense territories. That, combined with the ubiquity of public services and facilities, would suppress the necessity of contact with rejected cultural values. There is no solution for television or press.

8.2.1.4.2 National social traits responsible for injustice

For António, the next space anchoring a specific interspatiality for justice is Portugal.¹¹⁵³ It is a territory with a political scene characterised by the lack of ethical capital of its actors. Common law governing the setup of political institutions is seen to be accountable for low quality of actors attracted by this function (internal functioning of parties). The country is also a territory, interlocked with that of the municipality and region, characterised by culture, and result in a common mentality, deprived of civic dimension, which, in turn, is determinant of the future development of

¹¹⁴⁸ There is no differentiation between the experience of a national problem by the members of his family and by others.

¹¹⁴⁹ The individual mobility required to face unemployment is unjust as it transgresses the topologic limit of Portugal.

¹¹⁵⁰ The diagnosis of present economy is attributed to the decision of Prof. Cavaco Silva to integrate Europe. Incompetence associated with low moral worth are localised in a person and in a historic moment, with no reference to policy or eventual societal consensus around that moment. It should be noticed that there was no referendum in Portugal before the adhesion.

¹¹⁵¹ Illustratively, we can read federation as subjection to Common European Policy in the sectors of fishery and agriculture, in exchange for loans. Other members (Spain) are seen as unlawful competitors.

¹¹⁵² The historical move is solely the responsibility of political actors.

¹¹⁵³ Between the urban scale and the country, the region does not raise specific issues. The region – the interior of Portugal – is not an injustice, but a consequence of an injustice: the incapacity of civic society and economic actors to, through collective organisation, increase the scale of the space and, in that way, guarantee the economic viability of territories. The presumption that individual would have stayed in such regions, had they created the economic conditions to do so, is an assumption about their behaviour, not a demand of solidarity. In that sense, this space does not introduce new justice requirements, and can be seen as a variation of municipal and national spaces. The exodus towards the littoral is seen as an unjust consequence, through the increase of population density and associated (unspecified) difficulties. We can read that, despite the spatial model favourable to the city, there is a maximum level of density considered acceptable.

Portugal.¹¹⁵⁴ This territory is a part of an area, where two ensembles of spaces are interfacing. In the just space they should be co-spatial.

The national space is also a part of a transcending network of individual spatiality – mobility for economic purposes – conflicting with the legitimate scale for the participation in a societal development project.

8.2.1.5 Europe

8.2.1.5.1 Europe, transcending protection from further alterity

For Luís, Portugal and Europe are co-spatial with regards to the metrics of economic difficulties, loss of social rights, and incompetence of political actors. They form a new territory that needs to be protected from superior scales at its borders. The looseness of the border of this territory, transcended by a space of networks of people and economic objects, is a source of injustice rather than of advantage. The partial acceptance of the territorial unit of Europe is justified as a strategy against the menace of unfair competition due to cheap labour from Asia (not clear if it is referring to dislocation of industry or immigration) and from Arabic countries (immigration). We have seen that the impact of Europe on inferior scales – the idea of federation itself – is considered unjust. Luís explicitly prescribes nationalism; he approves of the closure of Europe to the world in terms of the labour market. Luís also endorses reducing the obligations of solidarity towards refugees to episodic support (access to hospitals).

8.2.1.5.2 The interface of Europe with the world as an environment

For António, Europe is a societal space, interlocked with a vaster space of networks (of mainly economic substance). Its internal metrics of injustice are characterised by two main dialogical attributes: unemployment and society's incapacity to sustain the viability of systems of security and solidarity. The internal metrics have some discontinuity as the periphery of Europe has less employment than central Europe. This space is transcended by the dynamics at the world level, but it is a space of consequence in its own right: the "fall of Europe". The just space is a territory with political control over economic and financial networks at the world level. The just networks have smaller but denser nodes, reflecting the disappearance of the actors with disproportionate capital (which are currently able to make space in spite of society).

8.2.1.6 Towards the world

Luís' interspatiality between non-European places (Angola, China) and "Mundo" identifies injustice as the existence of non-democratic, corrupt societies, with unacceptable economic inequality.¹¹⁵⁵ These countries are of uniform attributes irrespective of their location, forming a co-spatiality of low wages, absence of social rights and democratic functioning. The problems introduced by this space in Europe demand "the world" to come forward as an actor, pressing other countries to increase equality and democracy. The world is a synecdoche (taking the whole for the part) of Europe and America. The appeal is to legitimize international trade bound to the existence of democracies in both parties. Though the synecdoche World-Portugal, the world also emerges as a territory with the same properties of rejected societal spaces.¹¹⁵⁶ The reference to the world does not comprise of specificities of this scale. Expressions such as "Living in the world... living in abundance" point to the world as a space of existence where moral corruption of virtuous values is manifest.

With increases in the scale towards the world, Luís introduces new injustices: the absence of freedom from war, from famine, and from unemployment. However, he is concerned only with the scales to which he considers himself

¹¹⁵⁴ That common mentality is explained through common history (dictatorship), religion, and economic attributes. It is also defined as a spatial relation of the individual with his private space, without considering the immediate environmental disorder.

¹¹⁵⁵ Synecdoche Angola-World: the individual behaviour of wealthy big actors originally from Angola (Isabel dos Santos) is used to characterise the behaviours responsible for unacceptable inequality in the world. Inequality is described, as in smaller spaces, through the behaviour of the rich and the political body (though in the Angolan society, there is perhaps more veracity in this judgment).

¹¹⁵⁶ The world is used in comparison with Portugal, with regards to the physical (climate) or "moral" attributes of its people ("melhores pessoas").

spatiality affiliated with. Not only the world does not appear as a specific resource for justice, it represents the loss of justice achieved at some of its places. The prospect of an open labour market beyond Europe is expected to lower social rights and quality of life.

António reads the world as a network of fluxes of material objects (industry), displaced from the Western Society (USA and Europe) to the nodes of inner metrics of cheaper labour.¹¹⁵⁷ The world is also an immaterial network of capital fluxes connecting the places of the Western Society with nodes towards tax havens (Caiman Islands and Luxembourg). The unjust substance of this interspatiality is the capital unavailable to the western society for its political project. The engagement of individuals in the civic society (explored in details for the spaces of Espinho and Portugal) is briefly mentioned as the scale of the world. At a higher level of reconstruction, we can read the necessary action of the world-civic-society on the world space of finance. We interpret the beginning of an idea of the world-society. This society is not referred to with a corresponding political institution.

8.2.2 Interspatiality of justice imagination, a worldview

"E é isto, esta sociedade que para mim eu detesto, detesto esta sociedade, por isso é que me isolo aqui, no meu cantinho, o mais possível e, e deixa lá!" Luís.

"... se fôssemos um bocadinho mais generosos para, uns para os outros, podia o país ganhar imensamente, se fôssemos um bocadinho mais generosos uns para os outros. No sentido de... generosidade, de nos darmos a uma causa comum.... o país era com toda a certeza muito mais rico e vivíamos todos muito melhor. E não é que os portugueses não sejam, digamos, pessoas que se ajudam umas às outras, mas ajudam-se... uma ajudinha aqui ou acolá, mas não uma coisa constante e planificada e projectada para o futuro, quer dizer, são capaz de dar se calhar muitas esmolas aos pobres, mas isso é uma coisa... é um comprimido, é como tomar um comprimido, não é uma... não é um esforço constante, é "O pá", descarregar a consciência "Pá, vamos ajudar os pobrezinhos!", não chega. Temos que nos ajudar a nós primeiro e ajudar-nos a nós implica uma visão colectiva!" António.

We observe that the scale of the freguesia, central for the proposition of justice in Luís' geotype, is absent in the one of António. Inversely, the role of urban space in the pursuit of justice, characteristic of António, is absent in Luís. These scales correspond to their respective response to the pre-instruction: Which place do you feel you are an inhabitant of? They are also the scales that these two individuals consider to be the smallest pertinent political space. We have seen that the scale of the identification of the latter is determinant for reasonableness in identifying spatial justice in urbanistic terms. António and Luís share Portugal and Europe as political spaces, but they diverge on the world. The political space of António at the scale of the World is non-institutional. There is no world-society in the view of Luís.

The two interviewees conceive of contrasting metrics at the limits of each chorotype, which reflects the modality of interspatiality with spaces of superior scales. We observe that Luís chorotypes are mostly of territorial metric.¹¹⁵⁸ Removal of injustice proposes a bordered space between currently interlocked spaces, for all types of spaces. At the scales of house, freguesia and municipality, the desired interspatiality is the interface vis-à-vis big cities and Portugal (the injustices is described as interlock or co-spatiality with societal scales). In Luís's view, reversing spatial injustice can have a counterfactual register. Portugal should have avoided interlocking with Europe, but the current interspatiality Portugal/Europe is seen as beyond reversal. The inversion of injustice should then further close Europe from the world. Co-occurring with non-European toponym, we find the rejection of alterity and reduced solidarity. The geotype of Luís is aware of the direction of the world towards increased contact between its regions and considers such prospect without a positive possible outcome. The existence of spaces where the control of the border

¹¹⁵⁷ There are no elements of Toponym/location in the destination. In the origin, Espinho, Grande Porto, Portugal, periphery of Europe are all named places.

¹¹⁵⁸ Territorial inner metrics seems to reflect a general relationship with distance. Luís rejects networked metrics even when travelling in Portugal. He prefers "national roads" to highways as means to know, exhaustively, the places on the way between origin and destination.

is seen as less plausible further motivates the withdrawal of the inhabitant into the peri-urban. The latter is a stronghold, a space one perceives to command. We can call this set of spatial relationships a territorial geotype.

In António, the just space activates the cospatiality between different spaces and across different societal dimensions. This conception considers unjust the insufficiency of co-spatiality at world level. He proposes an interspatiality with auto-organisation at local scales, without neutralising interaction with bigger spaces and in respect of freedom of individual spatialities. This is reflected in the combination of territories and networks as inner spatial metrics. Ideality plays an important role in the objective of justice. António hints at the existence of an ethical capital that ought to be raised through the contact of the local society of Espinho/Portugal with European regions of superior capital, impacting the political, economic and spatial dimensions of these local spaces. António mobilises his spatial identity constructed through the experience (in extended periods) of several places (Grande Porto, Funchal, Lisbon, Brussels and Latin America). This seems relevant in understanding his capacity to imagine the positive development of space and of co-existence with others, on the basis that human beings are not that different from each other.

We observe that the multi-dimensional substances present in these conceptions are formally equivalent. They diverge less on the type of actors involved but rather on the complexity of the intentionality attributed to spatial operators. We also know that the density of information mobilised in such substance is not the result of asymmetric possibilities to discuss one's views with others.¹¹⁵⁹ From the available biographic information on political and civic engagement of these inhabitants we can expect that these two individuals had (at least formally) similar opportunities debate.¹¹⁶⁰ The difference between the spatial capital of António and Luís is nuanced.¹¹⁶¹ It has to do less with the types of experienced spatial objects (mainly cities) and more with the intentionality underpinning such spatialities. The time modality of *séjour* vis-à-vis passage seems to count. We have reasons to think that the capacity to form and coordinate different spatial identities is involved in the differentiation of the discourses.

8.2.2.1 Interrelated reasons for the variation of spatial justice conceptions

Below we present interrelated interpretations of the reasons for the diversity of conceptions of spatial justice found in the corpus. They stem from the detailed study of the coherence of Luís and António, but the advanced statements are in line with all the memorised empirical information. We have departed from the contemporary existence of actors producing their environment, through which they create a space that affects their subsequent making of society (and of themselves). We have seen that actors as the smallest unit of society. Coherently, we look for explicative factors of empirical variations, both in the actors, environments and the space they make.

8.2.2.1.1 Morality, *allophobie* and interface

We have observed that territorial inner metrics and the topologic metrics of the limit characterise the chorotypes of injustice of the pre-ethical curve.¹¹⁶² These geographical attributes reflect the person's relationship with alterity.¹¹⁶³ Symmetrically, the attributes of the chorotypes of the post-moral just spaces – networks, confines, cospatiality – express the necessity for social contact to allow for the transformation of space and spatiality (involving modes of

¹¹⁵⁹ In annex E.7 we provide further information on biography and capitals participating in the spatial identity of these two individuals (table 41). Luís has been involved in the political scene of the freguesia. He was also part of the syndicate of his professional group. He narrates a number of encounters where he discussed his views with other politicians, in the local and national political scenes. António is a journalist and also had several representative roles in collectives, including syndicate of journalists.

¹¹⁶⁰ Given these interviewees' different educational capitals, the information contacted (and then mobilised in these debates) may be of varying consistency. Both interviewees have, however, some choice in such informational access (literacy, access to newspapers and free time).

¹¹⁶¹ Luís describes extensive opportunities to travel for work, though without permanent residence. In this singular case, travelling for work is not enough to change one's relationship with otherness. *Séjour* and/or voluntary departure might be necessary for spatiality to transform ideality.

¹¹⁶² In the explanation of different constructions of unjust chorotypes, we focus on the understanding of metrics and scale. With regards to substance, the planes covered by the multi-dimensionality of space are similar in the geotypes of Luís and António. See tables 30 and 31.

¹¹⁶³ We have seen the definition of alterity in chapter 3, point 3.3.2, "*Urbanité/s*, modes of living together".

contact experienced elsewhere or yet to invent). We find the couple *allophilie/allophobie*, that is, the acceptability or non-acceptability of exposition to alterity.¹¹⁶⁴ We can see this relationship as a psychic (changeable) trait describing how strangeness and difference affect the individual. We can understand that when that relationship with others operates from spatial ideality located in an epoch of morality, the odds of *allophilie* are low. The use of an immobile toolbox of values apprehends heterogeneity as failure to respect one's values, and sets the individual in a route of conflict with the non-familiarity of the social. The misalignment between one's spatial expectations and what one observes in the world intensifies the choice of a frontier between the space of individual everydayness and society. The rejection of the city is the vivid expression of this phenomena of ideality. If we read the bordering of space (and time) as remedy to the perceived incompatibility between oneself and the society, the frontier is the minimum safeguard in the face of the unimagined possibility of a collective future which is more just. We can advance, with caution, that the interface model of interspatiality is common to other "peri-urban Taylor" and, eventually, to the remaining types of the morality curve of spatial justice conceptions (fig. 19).

8.2.2.1.2 Utilitarian space, absent deliberative pragmatics, disassembled social

We have seen that the invention of the individual implies that his strategies are in tension with (some of) those of other actors (Lévy, 1994, p. 18; 2013b, p. 68). If alterity is a condition of urban societies, for some of the actors it is not part of established facts, confirming the existence of contradictory temporalities in the relationship with space. From the subjective (positive or negative) inclination towards alterity, the individual encounters social objects which might support, or challenge, his ideality from the ethos. The support of that encounter by inadequate political spaces, and the resulting infra-societal policies, further reinforces the expectations (seen as legitimate expectations by the actor) with which the individual consubstantiates his model of spatial justice. The space produced in that dynamic might subtract the actor from the stimuli that could inflect the degree of *sociétalité* of his spatial imaginary. We can propose reading Porto environment in this line of reasoning. Recent developments on the basis of a utilitarian model, consolidating undebated spatial rights through local, national, and European resources, are unfavourable to the transition from an epoch of morality to ethics.¹¹⁶⁵ So far, Porto inhabitants with different urbanity models did not have sufficient opportunities to discuss at metropolitan level, prevailing the naturalness of a disassembled space.¹¹⁶⁶ Contrasting relationships with distance are reflected and fed by the mosaic of geotypes that support the daily inhabiting of inhabitants. Furthermore, our terrain shows that though metropolitan Porto has important connectivity, there are many enclaves and ghettos. All of these preclude the society to form – and foresee the possibility of – an inclusive totality.

8.2.2.1.3 Socially constructed ethical capital

We have seen that justice demands rationality, that is, internal coherence in the reasoning that identifies injustice.¹¹⁶⁷ If telling the just demands the practice of justifying our reasons to ourselves, different educational capitals, and the intellectual gymnastics involved in the professions they give access to, may account for different degrees of reflexivity in this exercise. This might explain varying levels of accuracy, in the geotypes of António and Luís.¹¹⁶⁸ However, we are inclined to argue that despite being linked to competence, rationality is a resource of individual autonomy and responsibility. Even if one operates from the naturalness of an ethos, the act of taking arbitrary and discretionary

¹¹⁶⁴ This observation aligns with a theorem stating *allophilie/allophobie* as a major differentiating axis of the spatial practices of the actors (residential choice, in particular) (Ourednik, 2009, p. 9).

¹¹⁶⁵ For more details on urban development in Porto metropolitan area see the text *Porto* (section 6.4), in particular point 6.4.1.6, "Europe as an actor".

¹¹⁶⁶ The lack of extensive public debate is argued in section 6.4, in particular points 6.4.1.5, "The object of institutional planning" and 6.4.1.6, "Europe as an actor".

¹¹⁶⁷ Rationality is understood as "a matter of basing our choices – explicitly or by implication – on reasoning that we can reflectively sustain if we subject them to critical scrutiny" (Sen, 2010, p. 180). The concept is put in relation with other deontological elements in point 4.2.2, "Deontological demands of public reasoning".

¹¹⁶⁸ Accuracy translates the relation of truth that a theory establishes with observable empirical facts. See definition in relation to other attributes of theoretical conceptions in point 4.1.3, "The *sociétalité* of erudite discourses on justice".

choices – an act involved in some practical application of a pre-ethical disposition – can be noticed by a doubting thinker.

As defined by Sen, reasonableness is a more exacting demand than rationality. It requires that our arguments are such that they cannot easily be rejected by others. That is, our reasonable conceptions need an effective and/or hypothetical incorporation of points of views that are different from our own.¹¹⁶⁹ This is the main objective of public debate that we have presented in the reviews of Sen and Lévy. Such listening exercise for other voices needs to exist and be performed with the “willingness to modify our private demands” (Sen, 2010, p. 197). When Luís demands heteronomy of smaller spaces in the economic dimension, and immanence on political substance, it is a problem of reasonableness that we witness. In the interspatiality *freguesia*/urban area/Portugal/Europe, citizens have reasons to reject his demands on the basis of different scales of autonomy, depending on the direction of the society’s transfers of resources.

In Luís, the substance of justice is mainly thought of in terms of places (rather than individuals). This approach to the claims of justice implies important trade-offs with overall aggregative goods, personal liberties, and procedural equality. Luís claims infringement on personal liberties, argued in the name of “collective capability” in the space of everydayness. Freedom has been defined as an opportunity that can only be assessed at individual level, though the means of its realisation (and even the form of its enjoyment) might be collective.¹¹⁷⁰ However, capability demanded in collective terms would risk being protected from being enjoyed by others. It would not guarantee that all members of the group are given the possibility to choose the full set of spatial actions which they may have reasons to value. The absence of attitudinal equality (we have called it procedural equality) is also an important motor in reducing the reasonableness of Luís’ discourse. Appealing to the moral superiority of certain places condemns other inhabitants, who decide for other spatial locations and practices, to a judgment of unworthiness. We have seen that procedural equality is the kernel of ethics where the intention to treat others as equal human beings is asserted.¹¹⁷¹ The absence of this attitude is what mostly differentiates the discourses located in an epoch of ethics from the ones articulated from morality.¹¹⁷²

In António, the substance of the ethos refers to individuals. It tends to assure the respect of personal liberties and protection from group bias. However, some passages of António do not reach the maximum potential of reasonableness. For example, António translates the objective of superior harmony, solidarity, and lesser individualism into the possibility of family members (of several generations) to have nearby residences.¹¹⁷³ This

¹¹⁶⁹ The concept is further explored in point 4.2.2, “Deontological demands of public reasoning”.

¹¹⁷⁰ We have seen that Sen restricts the concept of capability to the individual precisely to prevent assigning legitimacy to this argument. For more details in this argument see point 4.2.3.1, “The individual as an actor of justice: capabilities”.

¹¹⁷¹ See synthesis of the tens modes of connecting space and justice in section 7.1.1, “A portrait of Porto society: resourcefulness of space for justice, comprehensiveness of universals of justice”.

¹¹⁷² As clarified in the conclusion of Part II, to treat different deontological predispositions are worth or as capacity is not the same. See point “Ethical capital”.

¹¹⁷³ Ana: E como é que explica esse viver das famílias atomizadas?

António: Eu penso que é uma... é uma... é uma consequência da... da forma como a sociedade está organizada, portanto... Antigamente, portanto... normalmente havia uma pessoa que trabalhava e... o homem da família e as, e as mulheres estavam em casa. É um enriquecimento as mulheres trabalharem, é um enriquecimento em todos os aspectos, não é? Hum... mas isso levou a que as... a que se perdesse... claro em todas as mudanças algo se ganha e algo se perde, ganhou-se umas coisas... ganhou-se em capacidade aquisitiva, em capacidade de, de consumo e tudo isso, mas perdeu-se aquela... aquela harmonia da vida antiga em que tínhamos os avós, quando não era em casa era na casa ao lado ou no quart- , ou no mesmo quarteirão e agora já não temos. Portanto, muitas vezes estão numa cidade e outros noutra e isso, portanto, é uma, uma consequência da... da própria... organização, organização da sociedade que faz com que... há até muitos casos que... de famílias nucleares que estão separadas porque o pai trabalha acolá e a mãe trabalha ali; a mãe é professora e foi colocada acolá e tal... Portanto... a vida não é o mais fácil, compra-se mais coisas mas não é mais fácil! É mais difícil!

Ana: E essa organização... considera isso uma injustiça?

António: Não é propriamente uma injustiça, quer dizer, é uma, é o resultado das pessoas... fazem escolhas, portanto, é o resultado de alguma pressão, uma pressão externa da própria economia para que as pessoas se organizem desta forma mais... menos solidária e mais individualista, não é? As pessoas organizam-se em fun- , em função não de viverem melhor ou de forma mais harmónica, mas em, em adquirir maior capacidade económica, como tal, é uma, é uma escolha que as pessoas fazem, que não é necessariamente individual, não é livremente assumida, é... é uma

passage contrasts with the rest of the interview. We observe susceptibility of extending to others one's subjective preference. There is perhaps some veracity in his assessment. Valuing family proximity might have only recently abandoned the "dominance level" of the Porto society. More globally, it may also be that at some point reflexivity stops verifying if one's inclinations are universal.¹¹⁷⁴ This bascule from objectivity to subjectivity comes earlier in some conceptions than others, but it eventually takes place. This line of argument leads us to the conclusion that reflexivity, spatial and educational capitals, and how they translate into inclination to reasonableness, cannot guarantee the inclusiveness of all relevant points of views which may exist in the society. The construction of spatial-ethical values cannot be restricted to the secluded pragmatics of individuals, even when the latter show significant ethical capital (or the attributes expected to produce such capital). Integrating both the cognitive and the affective, spatial justice pleads for debate rather than isolated philosophising. Public debate is not only due to the sake of "including the poor" or out of democratic obligation, it is instrumental in the potentiation of the ethical capital of each member and the increase of the ethical capacity of the society in its ensemble.

If we can attribute the variation of individual ethical capital to choice, there are also elements pointing to the social construction of one's willingness to modify personal views, and enlarge the universe of perspectives which are relevant to justice. The two interviewees whom we are trying to understand have not only contrasting spatial experiences and educational capitals, but also different biographical tonalities. António describes a happy upbringing in a house where three generations co-inhabit peacefully. Luís mentions being raised in an orphanage and his decision to counteract social disparity. His life plan includes showing by example the possibility of social ascension inside the *freguesia*.¹¹⁷⁵ We can imagine that the resoluteness involved in this spatial plan gets on the way of his revising the centrality of the *freguesia* for justice. We do not have further information to develop this explanatory route, but we can raise a research question on the role of early environments (for which the individual is not responsible) in the development of their personal spatial objectives (and their rigidity or openness to transformation).

If we reinject these observations into the transversal reading of the corpus, we can raise the hypothesis that different global capitals metabolise the interaction with society differently, with an import for the formation of ethical capital. Positions of deprivation ex-centre to the city, are likely to be of poor *sociétalité*: they have lesser opportunities to experience society and are more likely to narrate negative experiences (as they have less *marge de manoeuvre* in their interaction with environments).¹¹⁷⁶ Intermediate capitals who need to interact with society in their going about with their lives have the possibility of densifying their view of the social. In these positions, the role of ideality is crucial, predisposing the inhabitant to comfortable or negative perceptions of the interaction with others (and the resulting degree of *sociétalité* of spatial justice conception). Well-off individuals capable of segregating themselves from society are also susceptible to conceptions of poor *sociétalité*. These cases of global high capitals, having the

escolha que a sociedade, que é organizada, que não é o .. da sociedade, obriga que as pessoas vão fazendo crescente, de forma crescente. As pessoas organizam-se em função da capacidade de conseguir mais dinheiro, e não da capacid- , e não em função da capacidade de viver melhor, da... da... da necessidade de viver melhor. Portanto, isso, portanto, mas é uma..." António/Ana.

¹¹⁷⁴ This may be a mark of the societies we live in, where the setup of conditions for philosophising is not a priority.

¹¹⁷⁵ "Luís: O rico é sempre o poderoso, não é? E agora em termos mundiais é... até nos países, a América é poderosa, porque tem o que tem, não é? Há países poderosos, nós somos, infelizmente, somos pequeninos, mas, mas somos bons e correctos, mas os nossos governantes é que, infelizmente, não acertam. Porque nós somos um país maravilhoso. Temos, temos um clima dos melhores do mundo, compreende? Não é?"

Ana: E e...?

Luís: Pessoas das melhores do mundo.

Ana: E essa questão ... rico e pobre, isso sente-se aqui no Covelo?

Luís: Não, agora não se sente, já se sentiu. Agora não se sente. Aliás se quer que lhe diga, uma, uma das minhas, das minhas entradas na política a Presidente da Junta foi precisamente dentro disso. Eu quis sempre combater os ricos, os chamados ricos - coitados, eles agora são mais pobres que eu, porque os terrenos não valem nada e essas coisas não valem nada, infelizmente, para todos nós -, mas eu quis sempre, como sou um indivíduo de origem humilde e prezo ser, não é? Basta ter ficado sem pai aos três anos, naquele tempo da guerra, mas sempre quis combater os ricos da terra, percebe? E por isso é que alinhei, não é para me vingar de ninguém, que eu dou-me bem com todos, mas para, para, para fazer um contraste, não é só os ricos que chegam a determinados lugares!" Luís/Ana.

¹¹⁷⁶ These experiences of society has been annotated in section 7.2, "The words of justice". The early formulation of this explanation can be read in annex E.4, in the passage "Hypothesis of comprehensive explanation: the role of spatialities".

possibility of a complex experience of society, solidify the explicative route that gives significance to ideality. The influence of a moral conception of impossibility of equality and fallibility of others stops the bascule from objectivity to subjectivity earlier than what the rationality of the actors would allow. We can see with some confidence that while spatial experience and overall social advantage and disadvantage play a role, ideality of ethos is a powerful motor. The ethical capital of individuals (and that of the society) is hindered by the circulation of discourses legitimising the termination of a reflexivity process before what the intellectual capital of the inhabitants could allow. Porto society has, at its hand, the choice to intervene in the production and circulation of a product of ideality located in a period of ethics.

We can imagine the inversion of the destructive systemic currently at place in some parts of Porto society: the more the experience of society is negative and individuals feel unethically treated by others, the more they distance themselves from procedural equality. They are comforted in their judgement where different others are unfriendly. Actions towards the enhancement of ethical capital in any position of Porto society are therefore likely to be a *levier* in the increase of ethical capacity of the ensemble.

Conclusions of Part II

I. The horizons of Porto

Given the construction of our empirical terrain, our conclusions cannot deduce how the idea of justice in space would change in an observed real debate, a focus group, or even in a second interview, of a more confrontational quality.¹¹⁷⁷ We can, however, use the hybridity shown by some interviewees to detect their hesitations and propose the likely directions of evolution of the conceptions. The observation of the number of connections between dominant and secondary coordinates (in cases of hybrid discourses) indicates that the “Mill of plural geotypes” (Mill)¹¹⁷⁸ gives the corpus a predominant tonality.¹¹⁷⁹ Indeed the interpretation of Porto space (material layout, spatialities, institutional planning, and role of Europe) points in this direction (section 6.4). It expresses the prevailing of spatiality at the cost of space through loose interrelatedness between individual spatial action and the resulting ensemble. We have seen that the conception based on Mill is expounded by suburban educated individuals with low economic capitals, ascending profiles who want to cut loose communitarian bounds, and parents who are sensitive to the importance of urbanity in enabling the competences of their children. All these inhabitants demand higher urbanity. We can interpret the main direction of these discourses through the scrutiny of the problems where the inhabitants hesitate to shift their coordinate (to higher or lower levels of *sociétalité*).

Based on the ideas on the role of the actors, environments and objects in the formation of spatial justice conceptions (advanced in point 8.2.2)¹¹⁸⁰, we can make propositions for political intervention. We argue how they could enable the inhabitants to inflect their conceptions towards the position of a higher *sociétalité*, or, in other words, participate in the co-construction of higher ethical capital. Actions towards the enhancement of such capital are likely to be a *levier* in the increase of ethical capacity of the ensemble.

“The horizons of Porto” answer two objectives of this research. Through the different conceptions of spatial justice of a society, we offer the portrait of ideality of Porto, through the proposed lenses. Through the study of hybridity of some discourses, and its indication of a society in movement, we detect potential evolutions of the space *idéal* and identify some *marge de manoeuvre* for inflections towards a more societal space. We thus coordinate the output of fundamental research with operational indications.

¹¹⁷⁷ This limitation of our research is treated in section 6.1.3, “The method of individual interviews”.

¹¹⁷⁸ For simplicity of the communication, we refer in the rest of this section to “Mill”, that is, the political-philosophical affiliation only, dropping the information on the geotype associated with the production of the discourse (and its participation in the solution). This is so for the ten names of the spatial justice conceptions.

¹¹⁷⁹ The final distribution of the interviewees per conception (including dominant and secondary is readable in table 38 (annex E.6).

¹¹⁸⁰ See, in particular, passage 8.2.2.1, “Interrelated reasons for the variation of spatial justice conceptions”.




Figure 23 The horizons of Porto. Movements from dominant to secondary spatial justice conceptions, in the cases of hybrid discourses. The ten conceptions of spatial justice (7.3) have been simplified to their affiliation with the ethos. The stages (letters) in the vertical and horizontal axis refer to the figure 19.

The entry in ethics through Mill

The gains in *sociétalité* of spatial justice in direction to Mill are related with the importance of space (co-presence and high urbanity) for competence in children development. We can hypothesise that the more these utilitarian conceptions are supported in their desire to access higher urbanity (for example through their relocation in centrality via a functional rental market), the more they will co-produce the space/spatialities favourable to the higher *sociétalité* of their conceptions (Rawls or Sen).

The movement from the peri-urban Taylor to Mill is a-spatial, motivated by the desire for autonomy from obligations of direct solidarity (E11).

The downward hesitation of the utilitarian to the positions of lesser *sociétalité* (Young and hyper-central Taylor) is based on the negative experience of social contact (E21, E20, and E47). Lesser communitarian practices, and debate on civilities, are likely to consolidate the predisposition to non-antagonistic attitude of these inhabitants. A specific case of this tendency is the inclination towards Taylor (from discourses anchored in Mill) by an inhabitants who considers to have an ethnic component in their identity but

positively value diversity and urbanity (E47). This interviewee shows the wish to develop *actorisation* (and an I-identity), but the experience of inequality in public space makes him hesitant in abandoning communitarian protection.¹¹⁸¹ A debate on civilities, inclusive of representatives of individuals who consider to have “ethnic” identities, is fundamental to reinforce this direction of individuation and *allogophilie*. The experience of more urbanity and positive contacts with society might open a Rawlsian or Senian horizon.

Some discourses anchored in Mill are also attracted by Walzer (E28, E32). This reflects the overall low ethical capacity of the society (where indeed promiscuity of spheres is practised) but also the necessity of justifying results of differentiated spatial development without resorting to systemic logics. More transparent and democratic practices of spatial planning might dissolve this ambiguity and press on towards the development of a more complex explicative model of injustice. In turn, this might lead to the imagination of justice on the basis of a stronger interrelatedness between the city and its components, space and spatialities (Sen).

The prospects of Rawls

The connection between desert-based conceptions and Rawls is a-spatial, based on the good of education. Public debate might be an effective way to circulate information on the role of space for the good that moves these inhabitants’ concern for justice (E16, E55).

The ambiguity between affiliations with Mill and Rawls translates the mismatch between concerns for a-spatial egalitarian outcomes and an approach to spatial justice with loose deontological concerns (E25). Ambiguity between Mill and Rawls also resides on the upholding of equality both between of individuals and places (E32, E23). Though these discourses have egalitarian concerns, they are affectively susceptible to favour the degree of urbanity of their “origin” (in the peri-urban), leading to demands of dispersal (seen as a translation of equality in space). This is to say, these appeals to ubiquity are not motivated by a distaste for alterity. Awareness raising on the resourcefulness of urban space for equality might shift these positions towards more assumed Rawlsian or Senian stances. We can observe a movement from discourses of strong Mill tonality to the Rawlsian importance of equal access to public space. The latter emerges as a proto-public good, defended from central positions (E35).

Some discourses which are favourable to urbanity are anchored in Mill because they infringe, in practice, egalitarian concerns. Part of these discourses endorse utilitarianism as the necessary trade-off to resolve abuses of solidarity, not out of unequal solicitude towards other or profound *allogophilie* (E35, E39). These discourses are delivered by profiles of middle-low global capitals who, in comprehensive assessments, do less well than those who are sufficiently poor to receive solidarity transfers. We can hypothesise that the implementation of fairer solidarity procedures, as well as a universal solidarity measure (a universal minimum revenue) would remove such current sacrifice of egalitarian objectives (and to Rawlsian objectives).

The hesitation between Aquinas and Rawls (articulated from an anchored in Mill (E53)) is eloquent with the force of the existing spatial/ethical objects in blocking the horizon of justice. In other words, these inhabitants are sensitive to objectives of equality and to public space, but not to the actual feasibility of justice. Their idea of the future thus focuses on the hopeful safeguard of oneself (rather than the entire society) from falling into collective misery. The role of ideality of ethos in the closure of the possibilities of justice points to the importance of discussing the removal of public support towards the transmission of

¹¹⁸¹ The interpretation of E47 of unfair treatment in public space sounds plausible, given the views on ethnic civilities that run in the corpus.

resources of morality.¹¹⁸² The creation of solutions for civic engagement outside a tradition of almsgiving might also provide a new imagination of the possible.

Sen at the horizon

The movement towards Sen, from positions with a dominant anchor on Rawls, is justified through the joint valuing of public space and capability through spatiality, without associating the latter to the choice of a model of high urbanity (E45). There is ambiguity when discourses do not particularly value the city but are capable of recognising the role of social contact in capability (E52). The Rawlsian matrix directs these discourses to the efforts of ubiquitous outreaching. Information (and debate) on the impact of high urbanity in capability is likely to shift these conceptions towards the city as resourcefulness of justice. These interviewees also join Sen in the recognition that political spaces are environments that can be changed.

There are also cases of hesitation between Sen and Walzer (E30, with dominance in Walzer, E29 with dominance in Sen)). The injustice of transcendence of Porto by Lisbon/Portugal is hinted at in Walzerian arguments of the corpus, without being included in the horizon of possible transformation. Future signs of this possibility, namely through the increase in the political and financial autonomy of local societies, are likely to gather more adherence to this aspect of the Senian discourse.

Affective attachment to land of origin explains positions located in Sen and sharing some arguments of the “peri-urban Taylor” (E29). In this discourse, which has heightened sensitivity to the role of space in individual development, public debate and geographical enlightenment might strengthen the anchor on Sen.

Other ambiguities

The connection between Mill/Walzer can also express the positive valuation of increases in urbanity, while condemning some spatialities which divert from those of the past (E59).

The connection between a dominant Walzer and Young (as secondary affiliation) expresses at once the assertion that some uses of the city are superior, and the severe experience of conflicting spatialities, which is translated into a sense of oppression by the environment and self-imprisonment into one’s apartment and (E12). The move from Aquinas to Walzer is procedural, not spatial. It represents the acknowledgement where spatial objects matter in the pursuit of a life-plan, and, as such, demand procedural transparency (E31).

The link Anomie/Taylor is a reference to the past and not a present demand of justice (E49). The move from Aquinas to Mill also happens through contentment with continued peri-urbanisation (E36), without representing a major transforming in the ethos. Anomie and Mill could have been merged (if we consider that the satisfaction of the spatial preferences of the self does not require, in the utilitarian criteria, extending such spatial mobilisation to others). However, the utilitarian conceptions are concerned with procedural equality, and, in such way, are more sensitive to social contact and the social bound than the anomic views. Stating the existence of Anomie in Porto intentionally raises the alarm to the malaise of this society. Thus the researcher’s appeal that spatial justice be taken into serious consideration by the political.

¹¹⁸² The offer of catholic education – “Educação Moral e Religiosa Católica” - in public school curricula is obligatory (the offer, not the frequenting), determined by an agreement between the Vatican and Portugal dating back from 1940.

II. A debate on habitat

The consensual positive valuation of public spatial goods is counterfactual in present day Porto, where different relationships with urbanity models compete. Our study shows that plural relationship with distance, different reflexivity levels and varying opportunities (or choice) to experience society, sustain different conceptions of spatial justice. If one endorses a reconstructive ethic, it is difficult to evoke truth as the means to change the conceptions towards convergence. However, taking into consideration the different relationships with space does not mean naturalising spatial divisiveness in the *sphère idéal* of space. The fact that society is, at present, composed of contradictory sub-systems – including strategies which refuse the social requirements of space (Lévy, 1994, p. 66) – opens a vast *chantier*. The results of our work show that a single model of “territorial cohesion”, based on efforts of ubiquity, does not correspond to the full spectrum of spatial justice conceptions circulating in the society. There is an important segment of the consulted Porto population that claims higher urbanity. However, the disinvestment in the lower levels of urbanity in favour of the centre and suburbs is far from the consensus.

We can propose that, given the density of problems they meet, the inhabitants have reasons to agree on the necessity to synchronise their conceptions, bringing spatial justice from a *production* to a common layer of *dominance*. For its political implications, this *chantier* is synonymous with engaging in the acceleration of an ethical turn. From the assumption of this minimal agreement (subject to empirical test), we can imagine a multi-sphere (ideality/materiality) scenario of policies, but also the opening of a manoeuvring margin for the actors. Though the kernel of our operational conclusion is the argument for a public debate on habitat (and the expected resulting transformation of spatial layouts and spatiality), we can imagine complementary policies. Geographical and civic pedagogical objects;¹¹⁸³ opportunities for civic engagement outside almsgiving; removal of constraining social assistance (targeting the individual rather than the family, policies supporting agency rather than substantial immobility); a model of solidarity based on procedural equality and responsibility; measures of universal solidarity irrespective of one’s capital. Through singular policies embedding these ideas, it is likely that inhabitants would choose to position themselves in the more societal coordinate of the alternative poles in their present hybridity.

As stated in the premises of our work, defining a political space to publicly deliberate at the scale of certain problems is a pressing requirement. A common statement of many inhabitants is the demand for Porto increased autonomy vis-à-vis Lisbon. The discourses are less clear about the correspondence between the legitimate scale of such political space and the functional urban metropolitan area. Erudite voices can try to accelerate the cognitive model of the inhabitants which have difficulties in seeing more than one municipality as “the city”. Our study shows that the idea of a metropolitan political space does not emerge spontaneously. Spatial justice is dominantly attached to the municipality, *freguesia* or *bairro* (this might be a limitation of our interview guide). We can imagine that the debate of a project of habitat can be a motor in the society’s realisation of a pertinent political space. The shift from the practice of public consultation of the PDM (Plano Director Municipal) at municipal level can be based on the (currently weak) political entity of the Metropolitan Area of Porto.¹¹⁸⁴ Future densification and expansion of the metro light rail system is an evident case for such discussion, but topographic projects of high affective charge can also be productive of societal coming together.¹¹⁸⁵

¹¹⁸³ It seems particularly relevant to raise the intelligibility of the interconnection of: 1) spaces of resources, 2) spaces recipients of solidarity transfers, 3) political spaces, and 4) the location of multi-dimensional deprivation.

¹¹⁸⁴ For example, through the public debate of the territorial models of the metropolitan arc (Sá, Portas, & Domingues, 2009).

¹¹⁸⁵ For example, there is a momentous convergence on the judgement of the refurbishment of the Praça da Liberdade, with design by Architect Álvaro Siza, as unjust (or problematic). In light of the conclusions of our research, we can say that the new design does not correspond to the spatial imaginary of the inhabitants, in particular, its relation to *extimacy* in public space. The meaningfulness

We observe that the corpus is divided in three relationships between urbanism and the political function. Part of the inhabitants thinks that politicians should decide and distribute; other considers that the people needs to be listened to; and a third group demands more technical spatial planning (restricting individual freedom). Overall, there is scope for working towards the political *actorisation* of Porto citizens.

III. Connecting space and justice in Porto: responses to the research questions

From the contact with empirics we wanted to know how individuals problematize injustice through space. We also wanted to raise the pertinence of our research through the construction of an empirical object: the city of Porto seen through the angle of the inhabitants' discourses on spatial justice. These conclusions provide an overlook of Porto according to it, and are aligned with the theorems of spatial justice proposed in the conclusion of Part I.

Does space matter for justice in the perspective of the inhabitants of the Porto metropolitan area?

We want to know whether space matters for justice from the perspective of the inhabitants of the Porto metropolitan area. We raised the hypothesis that it does, given the function of regulators of co-existence with others shared by both space and justice. Empirics have soundly confirmed this hypothesis. Space matters for justice and it does so as relative (depending from the realities found in space) and relational (minding the relationships that actors entertain with each and with social objects and environments). The inhabitants are sensitive to social contact and their lived experience of such contact makes space a fecund object to detect what is not going well in the society. We have noticed that though economic injustice is present, the inhabitants are capable of seeing deprivation or impoverishment through a specific spatial angle.

We had also hypothesised that the planes of ethos and space are somehow connected in judging injustice in space, and eventually, in the imagination of increases in justice in this social dimension. Our central thesis is that there is a strong correlation between the capacity to imagine space as a resource for the society, on one hand, and the comprehensiveness of the universals implied in the reversal of injustice, in the horizon of progress (fig. 19). The justice axis can be defined as a dominantly affective-objective domain, translating the ethical sensitivity of the inhabitants. It recalls the "sense of injustice", defined by Sen as the disturbance that human beings experience in the face of avoidable injustice. The spatial axis translates the complexity through which space is mobilised as a resource which societies have at their disposal for their common existence and development. It can be seen as tending to the cognitive-objective domain, arguable on the basis of veracity and feasibility. The relation between the two axes gives information about the deontological strength of conceptions of spatial justice. That is, the movement between the affective-objective and the cognitive-objective implied in the reasoning and valuation choice which synthesises these two instances in the identification of action towards more justice. This strength reflects the capacity of inhabitants to articulate individual and collective objectives in their expectations with regards to the desirable and realisable future of the social world they inhabit. In this sense, we can talk of an ethical-spatial capacity (constructed between the individual and the society). Spatial justice is not inescapably associated with the individual dimension of space or the affective-subjective relationship with habitat. We observe that many individuals can detach themselves from their personal affects when thinking about space and justice. The subjective experience of space is mobilised to detect the unjust and the mobilisation of lived space guarantees that there is veracity and important information in all views of injustice. However, we

of this space for the metropolitan area would have been an occasion to mobilise the voices of inhabitants, beyond the residents of the hyper-centre.

have seen that sole mobilisation of narrative and/or interpretative registers (and associated rationalities) is a global indicator of low resistance to the tests of reasonableness. The variation of this capacity of reasonableness leads to the concept of ethical capital.

How do individuals problematize injustice through space?

We have concluded that problematizing injustice through space depends on the model or conception of spatial justice of the individual. The combination of modalities of each of the axes produces ten ways of connecting space and justice. They can be organised into two fields, an epoch of morality and one of ethics. The universal of justice implied in the bascule between the two temporalities is procedural equality, that is, the preoccupation with non-discriminatory treatment, the predisposition to consider human beings universally as fundamentally equal beings. The absence of this predisposition is translated into the lower deontological strength of the conception and in the pessimistic outlook of spatial justice. In the morality epoch, the substance of justice is less dense and space seems to remain an inextinguishable source of conflict. The ethic field presents symmetric attributes: a relationship with the other through which both parts are potentially destabilised, a richer imagination of the prospects of justice, and, in its most societal version, the resourcefulness of spatial justice tending to the compatibility between spatialities and space. The moral conception is closed to the open determination of society, the ethical one is divided between a relativistic versant, valuing individual freedom, and the imagination of strong interrelatedness between parts and the whole. Despite the identification of these two fields, the full corpus can be seen as a progression of the capacity to connect the individual strategy and the future of the society in the projection of development. From the identified co-variation we can refer to the synthetic indicator *sociétalité of the spatial justice conception*, that is, the degree of *sociétalité* with which individuals project an idea of coexistence of social realities in space. There is also a parallel progression in sensitivity to the role of political construction of solutions to the difficulties of coexistence with others.

From each coordinate in this progression, the inhabitants construct different chorotypes of injustice and different propositions towards justice. It is not only the empirical referent that the individual meets or knows about that determines the problem. The problem is a construction. The inhabitants define different scales (societal/non-societal), internal and external metrics (of continuity or of separateness) as well as varying degrees of complexity of substance (spatial, non-spatial, and ethical). It results that the confrontation of the inhabitants with the object "Porto" produces different diagnosis of injustices and their contraries. In the least societal conceptions, the reversals of injustice can be inexistent, a-spatial, or procedural (which is not synonym to democratic solutions). When space is present, solutions consider *spacement* a positive value (associated with demands of ubiquity, enclave, and private mobility) (tables 37 and 38). Though these positions identify many problems of co-presence, the propositions for justice do not address them. In coordinates of higher *sociétalité*, it is urbanity which is positively evaluated. The just propositions pass through the increases in urbanity (public space, public metrics, and intangible spatial resources) and resolution of difficulties in co-presence (civilities, conflicting models spatialities). The theme of political spaces is also present. Intermediate levels of *sociétalité* combine the absence of solutions, procedural emphasis, distance-based propositions (though mobility rather than ubiquity) and claims of urbanity (diversity decoupled from density).

Is there one spatial justice conception for the society of Porto?

The city presents significant cleavages in its relation to space and ethos. Spatial-ethical values in Porto are at the level of production where there is not one dominant mode of regulating distance corresponding to a spatial ideology. We have identified a tonality, the "Mill of plural geotypes", but the "peri-urban Taylor" is also significant. Porto society is still emerging from a communitarian form of social organisation to a society of individuals. However, the appeal towards greater individual freedom, in particular from positions of social disadvantage, is sound. The association between the conceptions of spatial justice and the geotypes of residence (fig. 20 and fig. 21) shows that more societal conceptions tend to be located in

central and suburban areas, and in the arc of metropolitan Porto, where the strength of connectivity of daily mobility is higher. This indicates that there might not be a minimum threshold of common social experience in all (and across) geotypes. The distribution of spatial justice conceptions in Porto also shows that a positive relationship with alterity is associated with central and suburban geotypes. Here, the ethical turn is more advanced. This points in the direction of reading the city as a proper ethical influence on the ideality of the actors.

With these cleavages in ideality, it is likely that society members cannot easily cooperate in the production of the goods of their coexistence. If we designate the capacity to form a collective will with others, in any sphere of productivity, as an ethical capacity, it can be said that Porto has divergent levels but an overall low capital. This is visible in the materiality of its space and in its economic productivity. It also breathes in the importance of problems of co-presence identified by a significant part of the participants.

For the smallest unit of society, do we find convergence between the ethical principles mobilised in different substantive declinations of spatial justice?

We have seen that there are individuals who are very coherent in their singular declinations of spatial justice, resorting to a main political-philosophical orientation. We have also observed that some others share traits of two or more affiliations. In the second category, there tends to be a dominant affiliation and a secondary facet. The explicative comprehension of our corpus has underlined that inhabitants mobilise their view of the social world, their relationship with alterity and the corresponding relationship with *espacement/co-presence*. In the light of these observations, we can say with some confidence that inhabitants are coherent in their reading of spatial justice. They tend to use the same conception in all singular-universal problems of spatial justice that they evoke. Apparent ambiguity or hybridity can be read as an indication of a movement in the ideality of the individuals, who seem to be synchronising their conceptions, currently at different levels of the spectrum of *sociétalité*. This allows a prospective exercise where the political-philosophical conceptions of Mill, Rawls and Sen are prone to receive more adhesion. We have sustained that the conceptions (and the hesitations) translate the imprint of the experience of space. It is likely that political action on space, as materiality and ideality, can support the inhabitants who hesitate between two or more conceptions in their choice of the more societal coordinate. If the city is interested in augmenting its ethical capital, urbanism can be an active environment for this sort of pragmatics.

How can we comprehensively explain our empirical object?

The inhabitants' spatial justice conceptions (and the associated construction of spatial justice problems) can be accounted for through the dynamic interaction between actors, environments and social objects experienced in their life trajectory within a society.

If we start with the actor, we can say that through his biography as part of a society or societies, the individual constructs an ensemble of capitals, which synthetize different degrees of easiness in defining and enacting his projects in society. From this set, educational capital is important for its implication in reflexivity. We have seen that reflexivity has a role to play in being rational and reasonable, when assessing justice. Spatial biography is also influential of the spatial affiliation of the individual, part of his identity. It participates in the connection of justice and space whenever affect is activated in the denunciation of injustice. The actor is also the component where individual autonomy and will (*volonté*) participate in the construction of the conception. The individual is also the scale where the development of responsibility takes place.

The environments are the realm of the contact between the individual, other actors and social objects. We have observed that the diversity of spatialities is an important explicative factor of varying conceptions. The wealth of information and the stock of social experiences that individuals gather in environments are

CONCLUSIONS OF PART II

used to produce an explicative model of society, which underpins the diagnosis of injustice. We have seen that the absence of this cognitive model flattens the assessment of injustice into the realm of the moral fallibility of others. The opaqueness of an object of society also leads to the perception of social constraint as an intentional oppression of others upon the self. Positive or negative evaluations of the experience of society, by the individual, bear links with the complexity of this model of society.

Different global capitals are likely to metabolise this contact with society (in the environments) differently and lead to judgments of such contact as positive or negative (that is, they participate in the formation of a relationship with alterity). Positions of deprivation ex-centre to the city, have lesser opportunities to experience society and are more likely to narrate negative experiences (as they have less *marge de manoeuvre* in their interaction with environments). Poverty and economic dependency on welfare render these individuals more susceptible to breaches on their quality of actors. Intermediate capitals who need to interact with society in their going about with their lives have the possibility of densifying their view of the social and portrait less negative contact with others. Well-off individuals capable of segregating themselves from society are also susceptible to conceptions of poor *sociétalité*. We can see with some confidence that the contact with society counts and that it is influenced by overall social advantage or disadvantage of the actor.

The predisposition that comes from the ideality of the ethos also plays a role in the construction of conceptions of spatial justice. Resources from the ethos can be seen as social objects. We can understand that when the relationship with society operates from an epoch of morality, individuals tend to be *allophobe*. The immobilisation of norms apprehends heterogeneity as disrespect, and predisposes the individuals to fence out otherness. The rejection of the city is the vivid expression of this phenomena of ideality and how it marks spatiality.

In the social objects also figures space. As the support of the spatiality, a space that does not put different parts of society in contact contributes to the poor *societality* of conceptions of spatial justice. For example, isolation and heteronomy in some social housing estates, but also enclaves where communitarian ideals are active. Porto experience of extensive heteronomy in space-making (interspatiality *freguesia/region/Portugal/Europe*) is also an explicative factor of spatial justice conceptions of loose interrelatedness between spatiality and space.

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


Figure 24 Dynamic representation of the construction of the conceptions of spatial justice.

Final conclusion

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I. Ethical capital

"I will not make a big distinction between those whom Rawls categorises as "reasonable persons" and other human beings (...). I have tried to argue elsewhere that, by and large, all of us are capable of being reasonable through being open-minded about welcoming information and through reflecting on arguments coming from different quarters, along with undertaking interactive deliberation and debates on how the underlying issues should be seen." (Sen, 2010, 43).

This work can be seen as an auscultation of what valued spatial capabilities are, in the view of Porto inhabitants. Capability is the substantive definition of the freedoms a person "has reasons to value" (Sen, 2010, p. 231), a form of individual ethical valuation taking place under social influence. What individuals actually value reflects the spaces that are contacted (as ideality and as materiality). These appraisals talk about the spatial capacity of the city as a whole – the easiness or difficulty which is created for the inhabitants – and the spatial competence of each individual. While attributing a central role to being a part of the social construction of values, the spatial identification of capabilities does not dispense with deontological requirements. The concept of reasonableness, referring to the potential of non-refutability from a variety of points of view which are detached from the positions of the interlocutor (as long as there is willingness to follow an argument), emerges as the indicator of the ethical capital of the inhabitants. Our empirical work shows that though everyone can denounce injustice, there are varying degrees of the capacity to propose inclusive redresses towards justice. A robust covariation between the conceptions of space and justice suggest that spatial experience plays an important role in the inhabitants' construction of an ethical capital. The ethical capital tells us about the inclusiveness of the other in one's reflexivity on habitat. It denotes the size of a social whole with which the individual sees himself concerned, with importance on the level of *sociétalité* and complexity with which space is conceived. It also reflects the relationship with alterity, and, most visibly, whether each social part is seen as a fellow human being, to which one owes equal solicitude. These facets of an ethical capital can help investigate the socially constructed ability of actors to align their spatiality with space (spatial responsibility). A research opening of this result is the study of spatial biography of individuals in articulation with their conceptions of spatial justice, as well as comparative studies of different societies (entering via the spatially just, rather the unjust).

The observation of an ethical capital defies the assumption of "equal moral worth" at the basis of Rawls's equivalence between his point of view and that of the educated reader (Rawls, *A theory of justice*. Revised edition, 1971/1999, pp. 28, 41–44). The commentary of Sen in this regards is helpful in clarifying our proposition. Sen states that not all individuals are willing to engage in the kind of reasoning demanded by justice. He argues that the kind of theory he is seeking does not need the absence of counter-factual cases. The theoretical postulate of the equal capacity of being reasonable is necessary, the author argues, if a theory of justice is to work out the qualities of reasoning which, should they be practiced in public debate, would make perspectives evolve and eventually contribute to equality of moral worth. It is, thus, not surprising that Sen's presupposition is not empirically observed. But Sen might be right in assuming the self-fulfilling prophecy of such presumption. In the inhabitants' sensitivity to social contact that we have been exploring, the experience of being distrusted is an important blockage to the development of ethics. And so the idea of ethical capital demands careful appropriation. It should propel us into more enquiry of the other and his reasons, rather than being used as an *a priori* label.

We have stated that the deontology of individuals admits varying levels. We have approached the problem via the procedural angle, which seemed the most promising for the debate on habitat that we seek to cultivate. We have seen that such project of habitat cannot be an external imposition of centralised political actors, but constructed by all actors as inhabitants and citizens. We should now clarify that the idea of justice-minded political urbanism we are trying to advance does not imply value-neutrality from all the involved actors. There is room in this conclusion to dissociate the procedural recommendations from the silence on the researcher's spatial values.

Through the idea of habitat, that is, the pursuit of public good through space, we came to postulate that the spatial acting of the components of society and that of the society as a whole are imbricated through systemic logics. This postulate does not issue one single model of urbanity. Indeed, a society is free to choose a model of dispersion, shall its members agree to such modality of the living together and if they have considered the implications of that choice in the inevitable interlock of the city in the world-society of urban productivity.

We have, however, argued in favour of a model of high urbanity as more promising for objectives of spatial justice. The city is the solution which, through its efficiency, is in the position to offer the most extensive access to spatial goods to all members of society, and, in particular, the least well-off. In a just urban space, the virtuality of spatial concentration can work towards egalitarian outcomes. The object of the city offers all inhabitants a considerable level of interaction with social realities, from which they can construct and pursue their strategies (spatial and non-spatial). We have also endorsed that such dynamics contributes to the productivity of the society, which, in turn, generates resources that can be retroacted in projects of solidarity. Our empirical work adds to these theoretical postulates¹¹⁸⁶ that urban spatialities are a special kind of freedom, a foundational capability that can enable the positive experience of being a part of a society. To all these reasons, we can add the voices of inhabitants who demand the intangible qualities of urbanity. We can state that spatial practices of dispersion are less compatible with objectives of justice than those which construct a system of dense and diverse polarities, connected by public metrics, favouring public space and ongoing negotiation of civilities.

Independent from this personal voice, the thesis of an ethical capital cannot be accused of breaching "common humanity".¹¹⁸⁷ What is at stake is not the assessment of the intrinsic worth of persons in function of their spatial inclinations, but the need to substitute the dead angle of an anthropological postulate, an immutable human essence, by the constructed lenses of competence/capacity developed in the dialogic individual-society. The actors are responsible for the development of their ability, but they are not solely accountable for the mastering of ethical reasoning. All social interactions between actors, environments, and objects factor in this co-production: the actors we meet and with whom we learn how to relate with others; the *marge de manoeuvre* experienced in our productions with environments, the experience of an object of society as an enabling constraint or as an oppression, opaque in its motives. Our proposition emerges in a view of justice co-produced between individuals and society. In this view, the easiness with which individuals formulate legitimate demands (or align their voluntary spatialities with the model of habitat we find prone to justice) can be seen as a social construction. There is a *terrain* worth exploring on the interrelation of capitals and the societal configurations of each social dimension in the potentiation of – and productive benefit from – the *ethicization* of society.

¹¹⁸⁶ Though theoretical, these postulates inherit the theorems of previous empirical research. We avow however, that the systemic quality of the goods evoked is difficult to prove.

¹¹⁸⁷ Here we make reference to the concept as employed by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991/2006, pp. 11, 75, 145–156). For the articulation of the notion with the theoretical proposition of these authors see point 1.2.5 in chapter 1, "Plural justifications in social environments (Boltanski and Thévenot)".

The centrality of alterity in the comprehensive explanation of the discourses (section 8.2) and the distribution of the spatial justice conceptions across geotypes (section 7.4) point in the direction of seeing the city as an environment favourable to the development of ethical capital. This is at the level of hypothesis, and more research is necessary to determine the ways in which the experience of a city might influence the development of such capacity. The city, as an environment where the maximal inclusiveness and interactivity of social realities can be experienced, is a plausible explanation for the higher ethical capital in the residents of central and suburban geotypes. The spatial modalities of social contact seem to influence the imagination of the possibilities of change and the feasibility of urban space as a resource for the individual/society.

Ethical capital does not structure society between rich and poor, as the interrelation of some of other capitals does. We understand that reflexivity is involved in telling the just. However, it is not only influenced by educational capital and linguistic easiness. Through reconstruction, we observed that such competences are factors but not sufficient conditions for the deontological strength of spatial justice discourses.

II. Justice-minded political urbanism

In its globality, this thesis attempts to contribute to the theory of spatial justice, placing it in the heritage of Lefebvre's urban revolution. It interprets the most productive facets of this author's scientific and political programs, detaching them from the original Marxist matrix. Spatial justice, thus, foregrounds the urban problematic as one of coexistence, in heterogeneous societies, of inhabitants with potentially divergent spatial conceptions, values and practices. This divergence renders the political dimension of society unavoidable and underlies the importance of inclusive construction of a collective project where space is a resource and justice the horizon. We have also seen that our research ethics considered the plural rationalities of actors pertinent. Beyond procedural and argumentative rationality, we have made room for reconstructive ethics (and, in this way, to all rationalities of the actors).¹¹⁸⁸ We discover that the diversity of conceptions of spatial justice stems from the lived singularity that intimately links narrative and argumentation. Beyond the recognition of the political, ethical capacity depends on the possibility to think that the world can change and the individual can change with it. It also requires a very simple realisation: the individual one is, is not that different from others. If the psyches of the inhabitants is profoundly involved in their relationship with space, it is likely that policies derived from the best arguments will not be experienced as just, potentially resulting in further refusal of societal demands. We recover Rawls's intuition present in the coupling of a thin and thick theories of justice. The dominant layer (thin), includes what, in a society-time, is considered as stable (and consensual). The production layer (thick) includes the objects of instable valuations. This double-layered horizon of spatial justice demands the invention of politics operating the synchronicity of spatial models. The stake of public deliberation and political co-presence is to transpose spatial public goods from dissension in the productive layer into the dominant (universally experienced) layer of a society's horizon of spatial justice. Even in societies where the conceptions of spatial justice are at the level of dominance (if such societies exist), such pragmatics can address new *enjeux* and assure that convergence is not synonymous to immobility. The spatial-ethical needs to accompany the development of the society and an epoch of ethics implies keeping an open chantier. Political processes of inclusiveness of all voices of society require inventiveness and

¹¹⁸⁸ The interrelation of rationalities and discursive registers is explored in point b. of the Introduction, "Ethics of reconstruction and the plural rationalities of actors".

experimentation. Conditions that might bring the participants to their maximum potential of procedural rationality, at a given moment, need to be given thought.¹¹⁸⁹

Our results point to the necessity of a highly deliberative urbanism with transversal participation of citizens across geotypes. This transversal strategy is paramount if the conceptions that are potentially conflictual are to get into contact. We also have to consider that such processes may require intensive mediation and an enabling reconstructive ethic. Such mediation does not imply the silence or neutrality of some actors (architects, urbanists, artists, etc.), as frequently interpreted in discourses and practices of “participation”. In our construction, these mediating actors should work out the ethical implications of their own spatial preferences. Practices that seek to listen to the voices of citizens would gain from requiring explicit enunciation of the points of departure of all participants, including experts. This procedural equality demands willingness to change perspective (also applied to all participants, irrespective of their cultural or intellectual affordances). Such exposition of lay and erudite views rehabilitates open impartiality in a society of actors, that is, the importance of listening to many voices and information in the formation of progressive values. All actors are susceptible to parochialism, when we define it as the immobilisation of what is moving in the complexity of the social. Given asymmetry in discursive capacities, fair processes with which to advance these objectives are open to experimentation.

III. The encounter of space and justice

In the *réalisme dialogique* that supports our work we recognise the permanent liaison between ideality and materiality of space. Independent from the form of manifestation (in a concrete object or in an immaterial discourse), ideality refers to the thought of a man deployed for and through his productivity. We have seen that the activation of space by actors, in order for its configuration to become perceivable, implies ideas and discourses. Through this lenses, resources from the ethos are also components of ideality, in play in a spatial action, actualised and materialized in spatial arrangements or layouts. We can consider that part of spatial ideality is fed by the circulation in society of a social product called ethics. Presently, we do not have a substantive historical theory of how such resources from the ethos might have entered in the society of Porto. For the sake of our study, we consider that the *idéal* informing spatial justice circulates in society, horizontally across dimensions, vertically in time, and it includes a relationship with otherness. The latter is declined both ethically, in the inclusiveness of the concerns for different others, and spatially, through the relationship with distance. If the ethos is part of the spatiality of the actors – its mode of inhabiting – we can presume that the spatial identity (and residential location) reflects a part of such ideality, as englobing unintended influence or as intentional pursuit.

We wanted to be alive to individual variations inside one society. As such, we have hypothesized that the actors, as the smallest unit of society, are moving spaces, accumulating the ideality and materiality of arrangements of their spatial existence. While we did not study their spatial biography in details, we could observe that the actors have different possibilities to choose to experience places. The extensiveness and the diversity of social realities they have contacted in such experience is also variable. We advance that such global spatial experience (which includes literacy) is a major differentiating factor to imagine a collective progress and the role of space in that pursuit. The spatial imagination mobilised in the horizon of spatial justice has a facet of abstract resources of ideality (in which the ethos figures), and it extracts matter (beyond static images) from the stock of the previous interactions with space and their positive/negative affective signal. The idea of *sociétalité* has been mobilised to describe the complexity of the social, as it is

¹¹⁸⁹ From our observations, we have reasons to suppose that agreeing on the scale and metrics of a problem may bring the participants closer to convergence on the socio-ethical values being mobilised in the identification of the problem. We can hypothesise that drawing spaces can be a tool in that process.

FINAL CONCLUSION

conceived of in and through these experiences. Despite the constructivist outlook of spatial justice pursued in this research, thinking justice also regards the activation of the utopian charge of the actors, counting on their assertiveness as a dreamer and a thinker. For this reason, defining the unjust is likely to evolve with the sensitivity of future times. Spatial justice conceptions, then, cannot be immobilised in theory, but portrayed for a given time, for a given society.

In the different approaches to the empirical object presented in this work, we have tried to denote the interrelatedness of space and justice through different strategies. We have projected the meaning of the words of spatial justice into planes of erudite conceptual definitions from the disciplinary traditions of space and justice. We have explored the *sociétalité* of the conceptions, moving between the universals of justice and components of societal or infra-societal views of the social world. We have accounted for the embeddedness of the ethos as a part of the spaces perceived and desired by the individuals and imagined a specific substance of space dedicated to ethics (a plane among others in the multi-layered conception of society). Throughout these differentiated treatments of the two planes of ethics and space we have sought to favour the intelligibility of the contributions of deontology and universals of justice vis-à-vis the proper spatial imagination of the actors in the configuration of problematics of spatial justice. Our prospect is that this effort might support the actors in detecting the reasons behind their disagreement and in their reconstructive work towards convergence.

Annexes

Annex A Definition of the area of study

Different representations of the Metropolitan Area of Porto (AMP) configure different territories (table 41).¹¹⁹⁰ The morphological map proposed by Ferrão and Vala (2001) does not suit well the dispersion of the urban settlement observed in the North of Portugal. As noted by the authors of that study, it is not possible to apply of the UN criteria in defining urban continuity (p. 34).¹¹⁹¹ The authors start by limiting the area of study to the tiles of the chosen *fond de carte* (segments of Carta Militar of 1999). This results in the artificial interruption of identified zones of continuity (p. 24). The authors also opt to limit the continuous built fabric in association with high speed road axis (p. 34). They exclude the northern and southern extremities of the current official definition of the AMP (Póvoa de Varzim and Vila do Conde to the north, Vale de Cambra and Arouca to the south) and include Ovar (which belongs to the Centre Region).

The contribution of Deus, Tenedório, & Bergadà (2012) is closer to a systemic representation of the AMP. These authors have initiated the mapping of Portuguese space based on the concept of urban systems. Rejecting the administrative boundaries of local spaces, they propose a reading urban systems in the bases of matrixes of origin-destination flows showing the “interactions produced by daily mobility – mainly required for work” (p. 132).¹¹⁹² In a study based on census data from 2001 the authors consider the commuting fluxes of the Portuguese an indicator of “functionally autonomous systems, enabling us to identify authentic pieces of urban organization: urban systems” (p. 132). The methodology proposed by these authors is based on the “interaction value” (p. 132).¹¹⁹³ The map of Porto urban system produced by Deus, Tenedório, & Bergadà (for 2001) includes only part of the municipalities currently belonging to the administrative definition of the AMP and adds three others belonging to the sub-region of Tâmega (district of Porto) (p. 137). It also shows that the interdependence of Porto urban system does not cross regional boundaries.¹¹⁹⁴ In this exercise the authors detect important limitation of data. The information at the desegregation level of the freguesia is only available for the origin of the movement, not the destination, enabling the constitution of a matrix of flows only at municipal scale (p. 135). The commuting movements involve work and study purposes only.¹¹⁹⁵ These limitation have also been present in our attempt to read the spatial interdependence based on the origin-destination matrix provided of 2011 census data.¹¹⁹⁶

¹¹⁹⁰ According to Patrícia Abrantes (2007) Portugal does not have an official definition of functional or morphological urban areas.

¹¹⁹¹ João Ferrão and Francisco Vala inspire their study in the definition of morphological continuity proposed by the United Nations in 1978: “a population group that, without taking into account the administrative boundaries, forms a built-up area where no construction is at more than 200 meters from the nearest one.” (Ferrão & Vala, 2001, pp. 9, 34).

¹¹⁹² “Commonly, administrative boundaries at a local level, which are country specific, do not follow the true urban structure that articulates the territory, given the interdependencies that arise from commuting reasons, shopping, errands, and leisure, among others.” (Deus, Tenedório, & Bergadà, Urban Sprawl In Portugal Based On Urban Systems Spatial Boundaries, 2012, p. 132).

¹¹⁹³ The interaction value puts in relationship, for two municipalities, the number of job commuting travels, employed population and number of jobs available locally. The urban system of Porto for 2001 presents 604,240 locally based jobs, 591,761 employed population and a tax of self-containment of 93,4% (Deus, Tenedório, & Bergadà, 2012, p. 139). In the definition of the indicator the authors point to the work of Roca and Moix (2005, 2009, 2011, 2012), following the work of Coombes and Openshaw (1982).

¹¹⁹⁴ All the municipalities included in the urban system are all part of the Northern Region of Porto.

¹¹⁹⁵ Data do not discriminate the metrics of the movements.

¹¹⁹⁶ As of January 2013, the authors had not produced an actualised version of that map for these data (personal correspondence with Professor Jose Antonio Tenedório).

To study the mobility articulating residence, study and work seemed a useful approximation in identifying the territories and networks effectively used as one resource by the ensemble of the inhabitants of our area of study.

Representation	Administrative area	Morphologic	Urban system (iteration value)	Mobility
Year of map (year of data sources)	2013 (NA) ¹¹⁹⁷	2001 (census 1991)	2012 (census 2001)	Area of study (census 2011)
Author	Assembleia da República	Ferrão & Vala	Deus, Tenedório, Bergadà	
Porto				
Maia				
Matosinhos				
Valongo				
Gondomar				
Vila Nova de Gaia				
Paredes				
Penafiel				
Marco de Canavezes				
Santa Maria da Feira				
São João da Madeira				
Oliveira de Azeméis				
Póvoa de Varzim				
Vila do Conde				
Trofa ¹¹⁹⁸				
Espinho				
Vale de Cambra				
Arouca				
Santo Tirso				
Ovar (Centre Region)				

Table 41 Lists of municipalities part of the metropolitan area of Porto in different representations.

Our mapping of the metropolitan area is based on census origin-destination mobility matrix from 2011.¹¹⁹⁹ Our study uses an iterative process, inspired by the INSEE definition of urban area.¹²⁰⁰ According to the French official definition, an urban area comprehends the array of municipalities (without enclave) consisting of an urban centre (« *pôle urbaine* ») of more than 10,000 jobs, and rural towns or urban units (forming the « *couronne périurbaine* ») sending at least 40% of the resident employed population to work in the centre or in the municipalities attracted by it.¹²⁰¹ The first iteration gathers the communes sending at least 40% of their active population to the pole. The second iteration adds to this zone the communes sending at least 40% to the space identified in the previous iteration as

¹¹⁹⁷ The institution of the Metropolitan Area of Porto (AMP) was created in 1991 as “a collective personal of public right”, constituting “a specific form of association of the municipalities of the territorial units defined on the basis of the NUTS III (...)” (Lei n.º 46/2008, de 27 de Agosto). The initial nucleus included Gondomar, Maia, Matosinhos, Porto, Póvoa de Varzim, Valongo, Vila do Conde e Vila Nova de Gaia (lei n.º 44/91). The last two alterations to the legal status of the AMP are from 2008 (Lei n.º 46/2008, de 27 de Agosto) and 2013 (Lei n.º 75/2013, de 12 de Setembro).

¹¹⁹⁸ Trofa became an independent municipality from Santo Tirso in 1998.

¹¹⁹⁹ We can recall that at that time, mobility was already supported by the *Metro do Porto* light rail system, serving part of the municipalities of Vila do Conde, Maia, Matosinhos, Gondomar, Porto and Vila Nova de Gaia.

¹²⁰⁰ INSEE stands for the French “Institut National de la statistique et des études économiques”.

¹²⁰¹ See definition in <http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/aire-urbaine.htm>.

destination. Only five municipalities from the northern region send more than 40% of their population to work or study outside the municipality,¹²⁰² none of which reaches the threshold of 40% of commuters traveling to Porto.¹²⁰³

The INSEE definition foregrounds the importance of a central pole. Given the disperse pattern of urbanisation of Porto we have hypothesised that the interdependence of the urban area could be better apprehended through considering a network of multiple destinations (rather than a central pole).¹²⁰⁴ As a point of departure to the identification of the territory containing the destinations and origins of this interrelated ensemble, we represented the commuting fluxes within the geographical extension of the Northern region (fig. 10, section 6.4.2).¹²⁰⁵ Each arrow represents the number of travels for an origin/destination pair in relation to the total population of the municipality of origin.¹²⁰⁶ We can observe five magnitudes for the part of commuting population of each municipality.¹²⁰⁷ Though the stronger magnitudes we can identify three discontinued networks involving a more significant part of commuters.¹²⁰⁸ To the west, an area including a linear segment attached to the coast line, a denser nucleus around Porto, and the poles of Braga, Guimarães and Felgueiras. Our area of study is located in this “arc” (1). An area limited by Chaves (in the north) and Moimenta da Beira (in the south) and including the pole of Vila Real (2). An area with the pole of Bragança (3).

Zooming in the area of the metropolitan arc, we have identified: the ensemble of municipalities sending commuters to Porto (i); the ensemble of municipalities sending commuters to the municipalities attracted by Porto (ii); the municipalities sending commuters to elements of the territory already identified (iii); and so forth until reaching the border of the network (iv).¹²⁰⁹ The municipalities enclaved in the ensemble have also been considered.¹²¹⁰ A set of thirty nine municipalities has been identified. At this point we did not define any threshold for the part of the commuting population considered part of the urban area.

From this point we have measured the part of commuters that travel from each municipality of the northern region (and Ovar) to these thirty nine municipalities. We observe that no new municipality emerges as significantly connected to this territory. From within the pre-identified municipalities, twenty have less than 12% of their population commuting within the network.¹²¹¹ In contrast, the remaining nineteen communes send more than 40%

¹²⁰² Valongo (48,15%), Gondomar (48,01%), Maia (45,94%), Espinho (41,08%) and Matosinhos (40,40%).

¹²⁰³ Valongo (19,24%), Gondomar (27,07%), Maia (20,80%), Espinho (8,48%) and Matosinhos (23,64%).

¹²⁰⁴ The sum of movements with multiple origins to a municipality could justify its inclusion in the area of study.

¹²⁰⁵ We assume that the regional containment observed by Deus, Tenedório and Bergadà did not change in a decade, and is supported by the description of Aveiro as a place of high urbanity (Portas, Domingues, & Cabral, 2003, p. 47). This choice is discussable and open to revision in future work.

¹²⁰⁶ We have chosen to represent total population rather than total of working and study population.

¹²⁰⁷ The ratio of number of commuting movements per total population can be organised into five magnitudes (according to five natural break points of the data set): [0,00-0,39], [0,39-1,47], [1,47-3,64], [3,64-7,14], [7,14-15,81]. Natural Jenks breaks are optimization method that seeks to reduce the variance within subsets and maximize the variance between classes. It produces subsets with minimum values of standard variation (within each subset) and maximum difference between the values of standard variation of different classes. For readability, we play down fluxes of the lower magnitude (less than 1,5% of commuting population)

¹²⁰⁸ Part of the network is not bidirectional, for example we can see that the area polarised by Porto is discontinued from the northern costal fluxes in Esposende. As a separate forth element we also see the couple of Arcos de Valdevez/Ponte da Barca. The following list of excluded municipalities helps us locate the limits of the bidirectional commuting network: the border with Esposende, Barcelos and Vila Nova de Famalicão to the north, with Santo Tirso and Paços de Ferreira to the northeast, with Amarante, Marco de Canaveses and Castelo de Paiva to the east, with Ovar to the south.

¹²⁰⁹ This exercise has been developed by observing the map. Municipalities in i: Esposende, Póvoa de Varzim, Vila do Conde, Matosinhos, Maia, Valongo, Porto, Gondomar, Vila Nova de Gaia, Espinho, Santa Maria da Feira, São João da Madeira, Lousada, Trofa, Paredes, Penafiel, Castelo de Paiva, Marco de Canaveses, Baião, Amarante, Vila Nova de Famalicão, Santo Tirso; municipalities in ii: Oliveira de Azeméis, Arouca, Paços de Ferreira, Barcelos Guimarães, Vizela; municipalities in iii: Vila Verde, Póvoa de Lanhoso, Fafe, Vale de Cambra; municipalities in iv: Terras de Bouro, Vieira do Minho, Celorico de Basto, Mondim de Basto, Amares; enclaved municipalities: Braga, Felgueiras.

¹²¹⁰ This inclusion is not fully coherent with the networked logic which is being studied.

¹²¹¹ Nearer this natural break we have Ovar (11,24%), Castelo de Paiva (9,51%) and Santo Tirso (7,99%).

of their population to work or study in the area.¹²¹² This was the area we have considered for our study. It is the *fond de cart* used to develop our sampling, which is necessarily more restricted in the territorial coverage. This point of arrival left unchecked whether this ratio is still expressive when the destination of the movements is restricted to the nineteen municipalities.¹²¹³ Subsequent examination shows that half of the travels are indeed directed to the twenty excluded municipalities, indicating that the retained area for our sampling is not as connected as expected. It reflects the dispersion of the built fabric and the filigrane of streets, roads and pathways that characterises the materiality of this territory.

Reconsidering the set of thirty-nine municipalities initially identified, we observe that Valongo, Gondomar and Maia are the municipalities with a more mobile population, sending approximately 26% of their residents to work and study to other communes of the area. They are followed by Matosinhos and Vila Nova de Gaia (with respectively 22% and 17% of commuters). Porto is the main pole, receiving 42% of the movements within the area. Maia and Matosinhos are the destinations of approximately 10% of the commuters, followed by Vila Nova de Gaia (7,2%). These four municipalities (Porto, Maia, Matosinhos, Vila Nova de Gaia) show signs of bidirectional interdependence, a space effectively experienced as one city. Our study also includes inhabitants from centralities outside this “pole”.¹²¹⁴ As shown in the maps of population density and land cost (fig. 11, section 6.4.2), these places (which have a sector of “consolidated city”) distinguish themselves from the periurban area surrounding the pole.¹²¹⁵ We also see that not the entire territory of the four municipalities shows high density and high land cost.

¹²¹² Maia, São João da Madeira, Valongo, Paços de Ferreira, Paredes, Gondomar, Matosinhos, Santa Maria da Feira, Oliveira de Azeméis, Vila Nova de Gaia, Vila do Conde, Lousada, Penafiel, Póvoa de Varzim, Arouca, Vale de Cambra, Trofa, Porto, Espinho.

¹²¹³ These maps are my first attempts to use data to represent cities. Despite the support of Luc Guillemot and preliminary comments of Jacques Lévy, these exercises are to an extent “bricolée” with my beginner’s cartographical competence. The movements between the observation of maps and quantitative datasets is inelegant.

¹²¹⁴ Here we do not claim the INSEE definition of pole presented above as we did not study the employment basin.

¹²¹⁵ For example Espinho, Trofa, Penafiel.

Annex B Socio-economic-spatial indicators of the interviewees

Id	Zone	Density of residence	Land cost/m ² of zone of residence	Gender	Age	Education	Source of income	Monthly income in euros
11	10	Low density	Low: $c < 785$	female	63	Level 1	Work	$450 \leq i \leq 514$
12	3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	82	Level 1	Unkown	Unknown
13	1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	45	Level 1	Work	Unknown
14	3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	43	Level 5	Work	$992 \leq i \leq 1330$
15	3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	65	Level 5	Retirement / Pension	$992 \leq i \leq 1330$
16	1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	female	42	Level 5	Husband's work	$i \geq 1499$
17	3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	58	Level 1	Retirement / Pension	$i \leq 449$
18	1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	51	Level 5	Work	$992 \leq i \leq 1330$
19	7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	66	Level 2	Retirement / Pension	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
20	9	Medium density	Low: $c < 785$	female	34	Level 1	Husband's work	$i \leq 449$
21	3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	64	Level 2	Retirement / Pension	$992 \leq i \leq 1330$
22	6	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	66	Level 4	Retirement / Pension	$1331 \leq i \leq 1498$
23	4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	66	Level 4	Retirement / Pension	$i \geq 1499$
24	6	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	33	Level 5	Work	$i \geq 1499$
25	10	Low density	unknown	female	24	Level 5	Work	$i \leq 449$
26	10	Low density	unknown	female	54	Level 3	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
27	7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	48	Level 5	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
28	4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	58	Level 1	Retirement / Pension	$i \leq 449$
29	7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	53	Level 5	Work	$i \geq 1499$
30	1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	42	Level 5	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
31	7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	55	Level 3	Work	$889 \leq i \leq 991$
32	7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	33	Level 5	Work	$992 \leq i \leq 1330$
33	8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	57	Level 1	Work	$i \leq 449$
34	8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	41	Level 5	Other	$515 \leq i \leq 888$

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35	3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	Unkown	Unkown	Unkown	Unknown
36	5	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	70	Level 4	Retirement / Pension	$1331 \leq i \leq 1498$
37	3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	63	Level 5	Work	$i \geq 1499$
38	1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	63	Level 1	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
39	6	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	32	Level 5	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
40	10	Low density	Low: $c < 785$	female	31	Level 5	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
41	4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	60	Level 4	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
42	8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	71	Level 2	Retirement / Pension	$992 \leq i \leq 1330$
43	5	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	28	Level 5	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
44	5	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	38	Level 4	Work	$450 \leq i \leq 514$
45	7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	33	Level 5	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
46	3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	44	Level 2	RSI	$i \leq 449$
47	7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	32	Level 4	Work	$i \leq 449$
48	2	Medium density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	57	Level 1	Work	$889 \leq i \leq 991$
49	1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	70	Level 1	Retirement / Pension	$i \leq 449$
50	4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	35	Level 5	Work	Unknown
51	8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	60	Level 1	Work	$450 \leq i \leq 514$
52	8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	48	Level 5	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
53	4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	37	Level 5	Work	$889 \leq i \leq 991$
54	8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	69	Level 4	Retirement / Pension	$992 \leq i \leq 1330$
55	2	Medium density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	51	Level 4	Work	$i \geq 1499$
56	4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	85	Level 0	Retirement / Pension	$i \leq 449$ Euros
57	4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	49	Level 4	Work	$515 \leq i \leq 888$
58	4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	35	Level 5	Work	$1331 \leq i \leq 1498$
59	1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	female	88	Level 0	Retirement / Pension	$450 \leq i \leq 514$

Table 42 Spatial-socio-economic indicators of the interviewees.

Educational levels:

Level 0: No formal education or incomplete first cycle of Basic Education

Level 1: First cycle of Basic Education (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th year)

Level 2: Second cycle of Basic Education (5th and 6th year)

Level 3: Third cycle of Basic Education (7th, 8th and 9th year)

Level 4: Secondary Education / Technical Education (10th, 11th and 12th year)

Level 5: Higher education I (Academic License)

Level 6: Higher education II (Master's degree or Doctorate)

Source of income:

RSI: Rendimento social de inserção (Minimum social revenue)

Annex C Interview guide I (February 2013)

Entry to justice	Authors of inspiration	
Capabilities – valued qualities in the city	Sen	
Urban qualities – the other and the self	Sen and Ricœur	
Pluralism	Walzer and Boltanski + Thévenot	
Jacques Levy’s ideas of spatial justice + Ana’s attempts at translating justice into space	Sen and Lévy	
Other	Literature on the Just City	

	Short title	Question					
§ 1.1	Identification of qualities	Which are the most important qualities in your daily life in the city?					
§ 1.3	Non-available/accessed urban qualities	Beyond these qualities, are there others that you would find important to enjoy, but that are currently not part of your daily life? Which ones?					
§ 1.4	Reasons for non-availability/access to urban qualities	What is the reason for not enjoying, at present, these desirable qualities?					
§ 2.1	Urban qualities accessibility	From all these qualities that you have mentioned - the ones that you enjoy and the ones you would like to enjoy - which ones do you think should be accessible to everyone that also gives them value, importance?					
§ 2.2	Criteria of accessibility to urban qualities	On which factors does the access to these qualities depend (by those who value them)?					
§ 2.3	Threshold of universal accessibility	For the different uses of the city, which are the characteristics that “is up to” the public authority (state or local government) to ensure a universal access to?					

§ 2.4	Reasons for universal accessibility	What are the reasons for which these characteristics should be accessible to everyone?					
§ 2.5	Urban qualities and project of society	Which benefits do these qualities bring to society?					
§ 2.6	Verification of universal accessibility Public provision and project of society	If we consider that to render these qualities of universal access entails the use of public money, for which we contribute with our taxes, do you maintain/ do you agree with the list of qualities of universal access or would like to make any changes? Which changes?					
§ 2.8	Funding and project of society	Are there any services that you think ought not to be funding with public money?					
§ 3.1	Distribution in space	For rendering these qualities accessible to everyone (for whom they are important), which should be the criteria for their location in the territory? + or ... I have here some arguments/examples that I would like you to comment on.					
§ 3.2	Spatial scale of public funding	This public funding, should it be national or at the scale of the territory which is being benefited? Why?					
§ 3.3	Territorial cohesion. Solidarity vs. Autonomy of territories	In this case [using an example mentioned so far] taxpayers of a territory would pay for equipment and services that they do not use. This solution can be seen as a strategy of territorial cohesion. Is this expression used in planning familiar to you? What does territorial cohesion mean to you?					
§ 3.5	Management of the territory and social cohesion	In your opinion, does the management of territories have the obligation to prevent or reduce social fractures or social divisions? In what way?					
§ 3.6	Scale of territorial cohesion	At which scale should we assess whether the territory is cohesive?					
§ 4.1	Public interest and private property	Law provides for the possibility to expropriate private property - that is, to force the owners to sell it - when the constructions have public interest. Do you think this is just, this power of public authority over private property rights? [why/example]					
§ 4.2	Justice between generations	From the qualities that we share in the city, which ones do you think we have the responsibility to preserve or improve for the next generations?					
4.3		Are there projects in the metropolitan area of Porto that went against this responsibility?					
4.4		And if the current public interest opposes public interest of future generations, which one do you think has priority? Can you think of an example?					

<p>§ 4.6</p> <p>4.7</p> <p>4.8</p>	<p>Justice and freedom</p>	<p>Going back a little bit, in which other themes of urban life do you think there should be restrictions imposed by the public authority?</p> <p>Do you think those limits increase or reduce the justice of the territory?</p> <p>And that increase of justice would increase or reduce our freedom?</p>				
<p>§ 3.8</p>	<p>Provision of qualities of universal access</p>	<p>Nowadays, there are many urban services that are provided by private or public-private partnerships, from building roads to hospital facilities. Of urban uses deemed essential, which ones do you think is acceptable to be provided by the private sector?</p>				
<p>§ 1.5</p>	<p>Enjoyment of qualities</p>	<p>Returning to the urban qualities that are important to you in your daily life. On what does the full enjoyment of these qualities depend?</p> <p>Is it a matter of them just being available or are other conditions necessary?</p>				
<p>§ 1.6</p>	<p>Individual or societal production of urban qualities</p>	<p>To allow the full enjoyment of these qualities, what is of the responsibility of each and what can only be achieved by sharing a city?</p> <p>Are there qualities that also involve others and are not just a matter of our own choice?</p> <p>Are there urban qualities that can only be achieved with other people, which cannot be done case by case, every individual for him?</p>				
<p>§ 5.1</p>	<p>Collective cost of housing</p>	<p>Different models of urbanisation have different social costs, both environmentally and in terms of state investment. For example, more dispersed urban settlements are more costly in terms of installation of water and sanitation networks.</p> <p>These images represent the main types of urbanization found in the metropolitan area of the Porto, with approximate values for the cost of networks and facilities, public space, urban waste management and local public facilities. (read values of concentrated (17.000) and disperse (73.000))</p> <p>Given these values who do you think you should pay the difference between the different urbanisation costs?</p> <p>And do you find it legitimate the state intervening to prohibit certain types of urbanization?</p>				

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§ 5.3	Identification of inequality in the city (negative formulation)	In your image of the city X / AMP, is there a place that concentrates negative qualities? What is this place? What are the negative qualities?				
§ 5.4	Inequality in urban quality and inhabitants opportunities (capabilities)	Do you think that living or working in these places adversely affects the opportunities of the inhabitants? What are the affected opportunities? Do you think this is an injustice? (Are there other cases of concentration of negative qualities that you consider to be an injustice?)				
§ 5.6	Identification of inequality in the city (negative formulation)	What about the positive qualities? Is there a place that concentrates positive qualities? What is this place? What are the positive qualities? Do you think the difference between these two places is an injustice?				
§ 5.8	<i>Pergunta vassoura</i>	In these cases and in the examples we have discussed so far, what do you think should be done to correct this injustice? What other problems in the area of XX / AMP raise issues of justice and injustice?				
§ 5.10	Social Housing and justice arguments	What do you think of the housing solution for disadvantaged families in social neighbourhoods? Do you think this is a just solution to the housing problem?				
§ 5.12	Social housing and centrality	What do you think about social housing located in privileged sites? For example the towers of Aleixo, facing the river? Are you aware that one of the Aleixo Towers has been demolished and that demolition of the four remaining ones are planned? What do you think about it?				
§ 6.2 § 6.4	Participation	Who do you think should have been “listened to” during the process of decision of the cases we have seen? Is there any case where you think the decision-making should not listen to people? In which form would it be fair to be consulted? (if in silence suggestions given: Referendum on major public projects with binding vote, Referendum on large public projects just as public pressure, Public Protest, Public Debate).				

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§ 6.6	Participatory budget	Are you familiar with the idea of participatory budgeting? What do you think about it?					
§ 6.9	Vote in between municipality and country	Do you think that there should be elections at the level of the metropolitan area?					

Annex D Specificity model

The hypergeometric model¹²¹⁶ has been proposed by Pierre Lafon as a way to compare the variability of frequency of forms across several parts of a corpus (Lafon, 1980, p.128)¹²¹⁷ with the scope of identifying forms marked by their generality or specificity (p. 134). The model evaluates whether the frequency (k) of a form F in a certain part of the corpus (t) is proportionate to the size of that part, considering the frequency of the form (f) in the full corpus (T) (p. 136). If, for a certain part t we calculate all possible combinations of the words of a corpus T into parts with the size of t,¹²¹⁸ we have the universe of possibilities, each of which having the same probability (the model does not use any language determinations, such as syntactic sequences, to affect probability). The probability of a form F to occur k times in a part of size t (given its total occurrences in the corpus f) is given by the number of combinations which contain that occurrence at stake (which results from all combinations of the element F, k times, multiplied by all possible combinations of the remaining elements of t), divided by the total universe of possibilities. If we calculate the modal value, that is, the integer which is the closest to $f \times (t/T)$, we have the most probable value for k. When the effective occurrence is higher than the modal value, we can talk of an overemployment or positive specificity of the form in that part, while a smaller occurrence than probability, alerts us to an underemployment of the form in the part.

To render probability more expressive, the model calculates the cumulative probabilities of all events equal and greater than k (if it has concluded that there is overemployment) or equal and smaller than k (if it has concluded that there is underemployment). Finally, the probability is expressed in logatims of base 10. The lower the probability that the frequency is at least k (for positive specificities) or that the frequency is at most k (for negative specificities), the more significant that occurrence is (and the higher the logarithm of base 10, that is, the higher the specificity score).

Implications for the analysis

The magnitude of specificity grows as t grows (with $t < T/2$), that is, the probability of a given word F to have k frequency decreases as there are more events which are equally possible. This means that the specificity model underlines with more confidence variations in big parts than variations in small parts. But it can detect significant variations in small parts too. Scores should always be superior to 3 to be indicative. In a corpus whose parts have discrepant sizes, the use of specificity scores is sounder when comparing forms inside a given interview (rather than across interviews).

Inversely, the magnitude of specificity grows as f grows. The more occurrences of a word in a given corpus, the more the variation of an occurrence in relation to the modal value is significant, that is, there is, the least it is expected by chance.

¹²¹⁶ "Hypergeometric" refers to the law describing the results of a series of "tirages Bernoulli dependants". The model is that of a "ballot box" from which we draw the black and white "balls" without putting them in the ballot box. (from Wikipedia.fr)

¹²¹⁷ This model is claimed as an alternative to the Khí2 (« loi normale avec calcul d'écart réduit ») and the « loi de Poisson », whose adequacy to the analysis depends on the magnitude of frequencies and part sizes (Lafon, 1980, 128, 142–145).

¹²¹⁸ In these combinations, repeated words are not interchangeable, meaning that each word has a unique id independent of its repetition. Permutation of the order of occurrence of the same elements does not produce different combinations.


Annex E Diachronic empirical observations

E.1 Study 1: Qualitative reading

Interviewee	Space	Subject	Core of the problem	Justice	Comments
E33	Almost none	Self. Family damaged situation	1Debt of family member due to charges for defamation	1Evil (confirm) of the other, who is a member of the family in law	Violation, imposition. The subject and the imposer
E33			2Lascivious look by man in public space	2Inequality in public space	Insufficiency of primary goods (spatial and non-spatial)
E33			3Absence of things to do in proximity	3Lack of possibility in space (trace of capability)	
E49				No society, just individuals	3. good in interaction
E49				Interaction between people	The trait which is bizarre is the unwillingness to talk in the name of others.
E49				Shares with E50 not wanting to talk in the name of others; Isolation, personal problems	observe in text whether there is, beyond interaction some spatiality
E49				Not unjust to demolish the neighborhood; force of law, of reality	
E49			Leaving Barredo	Not unfair as couldn't pay increase in rent after the works (alerts to that problem of fake opportunity in regeneration + the less poor are the ones with effective chances. If we reduce densities and increase mixity, there is always a part which won't have place. Which fair process?	
E49				There is conception of advantage for the city; and good behavior fueled by public park	
E49				Justice equivalent to more assistance, aid (moral sense of giving)	

Table 43 Illustration of data reduction during qualitative reading. This segment concerns type 1, "Little place, mainly family".

E.2 Study 2: Corpus bipartion with lexical motive “just”



Graph 1 Relative frequency of lexeme “just”.

Group A: low presence of words of the lexeme “.*just.*” in relative frequency

E11, E12, E13, E17, E20, E44, E51, E56, E57, E59, E33, E37, E50, E15, E14, E24.

Observation: Typical profile seems to be low educational capital, while density and cost of land are variable.

Group B: high presence of words of the lexeme “.*just.*” in relative frequency

E18, E25, E28, E31, E35, E39, E42, E45, E52, E53, E55, E22, E26, E34, E43, E32, E30, E58, E41, E16, E49.

Observation: Typical profile seems to be high educational capital, while density and cost of land are variable.

E.3 Study 3: Typology of ways to connect space and justice

		Categories of space			
		A. Objects without society	B. Territory of a group	C. Towards a society's space	D. Society's space
Name on behalf of whom injustice is being denounced	Individual (without society)	T1, T2	T5.2, T5.3 (B2)	T9,T10 (C2)	
	Group/community	T3	T4, T5.1 (B1)	T8 (C1)	
	Individual-society				T6, T7

Table 44 Synthetic table aggregating types (August 2015).

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Spaces of injustice	A	B	C	D
	Infinite small space of a person's habitat	Small space of a group	Big municipality of some groups	Metropolitan area of the individual/society
Complexity of the social	Lack of good behaviour of other actors, in particular those with superior capital (political, economic, and social).	Lack of reasonable intentionally or competence of political actors external to the group of spatial belonging.	Lack of responsibility of individuals in advancing its economic integration (small actors) + lack of competent political and economic big actors.	History of urbanisation, resulting from insufficient planning and lack of civic engagement; Insufficient autonomy of the city due to state centralised decisions.
Reversal of spatial injustice, negative and positive horizons of justice	No horizon of achieved equality between Individuals. Distribution by state (politicians is the main actor responsible for improving misery) violence.	No horizon of equality between individuals. Parity of places through decentralisation of decisional power to infra-societal spaces.	No horizon of equality between individuals. Protectorate of the poor by the well-off groups of society, or acceptance of inequality. A spatial/economic project compatible with the closed purpose of the city for its permanent residents.	Horizon of equality among individuals, read in their overall capital, quality of life and societal integration. This equality can be achieved in and through space ¹²¹⁹ . Urban experience as resource of justice.
Compatibility self/other	Values of the other are not coincident with those of the self. The self belongs to the group of the least-well off, together with others that share a position of fragility. The other is the oppressor, which is	Values of the other are not coincident with those of the self. The others are corrupt politicians and individuals who entertain different values (the specification of social class or function for that other is irregular).	Values of the other are not coincident with those of the self. The other is the group of the least-well off. The views of responsibility and power are irregular within the grand-type, from obligation to protect the poor to	Coincidence self-other: goods that benefit everyone are also advantageous for the self (public goods); concern for the least-well off, in which the disadvantage of the other is a problem of society, not just

¹²¹⁹ "In space" refers to the removal of impediments to people's lives, while "through space" is with regards to the increase of spatial and societal competence through a social contact.

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not necessarily conceived in terms of class. withdrawal from of those experiencing the spatial sufferance. This coincidence is not generalised to all spatialities.

Table 2 Four grand-groups associating complexity of space and observation of deontological concerns (August 2015, edited).

id	Freguesia	Municipality		Density	Land cost euros/sqm	Gender	Age	Education	Typology 1
21	Santo Ildefonso	Porto	Z.3.1	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	64	3	Ambiguous
49	Lordelo do Ouro	Porto	Z.1.2	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	70	2	1. Little place, mainly family
33	Pedroso	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.8.1	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	57	2	1. Little place, mainly family
20	Vilar de Andorinho	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.9.1	Medium density	Low: $c < 785$	female	34	2	2. Invaded in the immediate environment
15	Campanhã	Porto	Z.3.3.1	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	65	6	2. Invaded in the immediate environment
17	Campanhã	Porto	Z.3.3.1	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	58	2	2. Invaded in the immediate environment
26	Milhundos	Penafiel	Z.10.1	Low density	unknown	female	54	4	3. Goodness and charity in relationships
31	Penafiel	Penafiel	Z.7.1	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	55	4	3. Goodness and charity in relationships
56	Leça da Palmeira	Matosinhos	Z.4.1	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	85	1	3. Goodness and charity in relationships
53	Silvalde	Espinho	Z.4.2	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	37	6	3. Goodness and charity in relationships
13	Lordelo do Ouro	Porto	Z.1.2	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	45	2	4. Longing for place of belonging
14	São Nicolau	Porto	Z.3.3.2	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	43	6	4. Longing for place of belonging
48	Nevegilde	Porto	Z.2.1	Medium density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	57	2	4. Longing for place of belonging
11	Sobreira	Paredes	Z.10.1	Low density	Low: $c < 785$	female	63	2	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
47	Baguim do Monte	Gondomar	Z.7.1	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	32	5	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
19	São Pedro da Cova	Gondomar	Z.7.4	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	66	3	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
40	Sobreira	Paredes	Z.10.1	Low density	Low: $c < 785$	female	31	6	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
41	Canidelo	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.4.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	60	5	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
42	Covelo	Gondomar	Z.8.1	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	71	3	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
43	Ferreiró	Vila do Conde	Z.5.2	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	28	6	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
44	Ferreiró	Vila do Conde	Z.5.2	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	38	5	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
54	Covelo	Gondomar	Z.8.1	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	69	5	5.1 Desirability of development: communitarian
27	São Romão do Coronado	Trofa	Z.7.2	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	48	6	5.2 Desirability of development: unsatisfied local resident

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28	Silvalde	Espinho	Z.4.2	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	58	2	5.2 Desirability of development: unsatisfied local resident
39	Ermesinde	Valongo	Z.6.2	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	32	6	5.2 Desirability of development: unsatisfied local resident
36	Labruge	Vila do Conde	Z.5.1	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	70	5	5.3 Desirability of development: satisfied
25	Milhundos	Penafiel	Z.10.1	Low density	unknown	female	24	6	5.3 Desirability of development: satisfied
51	Santa Maria de Avioso	Maia	Z.8.6	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	60	2	5.3 Desirability of development: satisfied
58	Maia	Maia	Z.4.3	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	35	6	5.3 Desirability of development: satisfied
57	Maia	Maia	Z.4.3	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	49	5	5.3 Desirability of development: satisfied
22	Ermesinde	Valongo	Z.6.1	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	66	5	5.3 Desirability of development: satisfied
38	Aldoar	Porto	Z.1.2	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	63	2	6. Urbanity as good
23	Canidelo	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.4.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	66	5	6. Urbanity as good
35	Bonfim	Porto	Z.3.1	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	unknown	unknown	6. Urbanity as good
18	Aldoar	Porto	Z.1.2	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	51	6	6. Urbanity as good
24	Ermesinde	Valongo	Z.6.1	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	33	6	6. Urbanity as good
45	Baguim do Monte	Gondomar	Z.7.1	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	33	6	6. Urbanity as good
37	Espinho	Espinho	Z.3.1	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	63	6	6. Urbanity as good
32	Penafiel	Penafiel	Z.7.1	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	33	6	7. Space participates in capability
46	Espinho	Espinho	Z.3.1	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	44	3	7. Space participates in capability
52	Santa Maria de Avioso	Maia	Z.8.6	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	48	6	7. Space participates in capability
29	São Pedro da Cova	Gondomar	Z.7.4	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	53	6	7. Space participates in capability
34	Pedroso	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.8.1	Low	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	41	6	7. Space participates in capability
12	São Nicolau	Porto	Z.3.3.2	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	82	2	8. Telos of the city
30	Foz do Douro	Porto	Z.1.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	42	6	8. Telos of the city
59	Foz do Douro	Porto	Z.1.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	female	88	1	8. Telos of the city
16	Lordelo do Ouro	Porto	Z.1.2	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	female	42	6	9. Meritocracy
55	Nevegilde	Porto	Z.2.1	Medium density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	51	5	9. Meritocracy
50	Leça da Palmeira	Matosinhos	Z.4.1	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	35	6	91. Not speaking in the name of others

Table 45 Socio-economic indicators of the interviewees and spatial justice conceptions (first typology) "First qualitative definition of the types". This grouping of the interviewees is used in studies 2 to 5.

E.4 Study 4: Lexical specificities of types

E.4.1 Original observations of specific isotopies (February 2015).

With the exception of type 7, there are isotopies that support the hypothesis. They were either grammar marks (like the use of *us*); references to space (toponym, *freguesia*, etc.); a lot of the words were used to convey the problem (in a type with a lot of different empirical cases, they will be idiosyncrasies); and then we also have word which are more clearly a critique or judgement vocabulary. It is important to underline that the spatial and societal referents (“*sociedade*”, “*cidade*”, *espaço*, etc.) used by the interviewees can be at odds with these conceptions. For example, an interviewee might use the word “*sociedade*” without being able to conceive of the existence of a plurality of social groups, which is inconsistent with the idea of society. The semantic field of the spatial and societal referents can be pitfalls, disorienting the interpretation to directions inconsistent with the conception of space-society that truly survives the reading of the entire interview. Here there is an important argument limiting the reliability of textometric methods.

Little place, mainly family and 2. Invaded in the immediate environment

Types 1 and 2 share the position of the speaker narrating their own problems, as revealed by the first person forms of verbs and pronouns. They are marked by the absence of direct references to: injustice, place entities and abstract designation of others (*peçoas*). Type 1 is marked by references to kinship. References to environmental elements are of very small scale, from the body up to the unit of the neighbourhood. This seems to sustain the classification of these two types as “no place”.

Goodness and charity in relationships

Type 3 is characterised by the abundance of religious and moral vocabulary paralleled by the juridical field and the absence of direct references to justice or injustice. References to the environment are dense of rural elements (*poço*, *campo*, *terreno*, *aldeias*) (this might be due to over influence of E56). Urban elements (*autocarros*) start to emerge. The environment of the house is still a positive specificity as well as cars. Names of places refer both to *freguesias* and municipalities. Abstract references to *freguesias* and *cidade* are absent. Property rental contracts emerge as the problematic relationships which are being described in moral terms.

Longing for place of belonging

Type 4 is perhaps over marked by the length of E48, as revealed by the references to the beach. I think the type should be decomposed into planes which are shared with other types as the language of the three interviewees does not merge well. Confirm in qualitative reading.

The places are those in proximity of residence and there are no abstract references to space. There are marks of collective identification in the pronouns, verbs and potentially in “*orgulho*”. City elements appear as diverse shops, there are no urban elements such as transports. Problems of violence in co-presence are given away by security vocabulary. There is no direct reference to justice. “Complicated problems” seem to be the framing within our topic. Some words could refer to capability: capacity and opportunity. There are some mentions of participatory processes (*democraticamente*, *ouviu-nos*).

Desirability of development. Communitarian

There are abundant references to places at the local scale of the *freguesia*, as revealed by the use of that word and the respective toponym. References to the environment are mainly rural. Public transports is the only referred “urban object”. Pronouns and verb forms in first person plural reveal a collective speaker. This is underlined by the word “*comunidade*”. Pronouns are mainly possessive. “*Desenvolver*”, “*serviço*” and the list of required territorial infrastructure seem to express the idea of desirability of development. The group is marked by the absence of the

city, municipalities, first person pronouns and urban objects. E47 is in the group of collective voice due to his concern for the ethic integration of gipsies.

Unsatisfied local residents

5.1 and 5.2 seem to deserve further distinction. High demand of infrastructure of 5.1 gives way to requirement of programs and activities. The unit of reference is that of the municipality (or urban freguesia such as Ermesinde), though Porto is still absent. The environments of the house and of the freguesia are no longer present. Explicit justice arguments “igualdade” and “injustiça” are present. Perhaps excessive presence of features of E39.

Satisfied: the integrated metropolis or other centralities (Penafiel, Ermesinde)

Type 5.3 overlaps the requirement of urban facilities, comments on infrastructure and some references to rural environment. It clearly demarcates itself from 5.1: the individual point of view in 5.3 vis-à-vis the collective enunciations in 5.1. Two specific individuals seem to emerge from the group through the specificity of their discourse: E36 and his moral stance (shared with type 3) and E22 and his concern with excessive development. “Desenvolvimento” rather than verb forms is a potential mark of this group. They use explicit justice words.

Urbanity as good

More qualitative vocabulary resulting in a clear enunciation of what is valued (adjectives, nouns, verbs): order, harmony, solidarity are some examples. Those specific enunciations might be substituting the use of “justice” words to perform judgements. They oppose type 5 in the lack of use of first person pronouns and verbs, either in singular or plural forms. The reference to other “they” is also absent. We find use of concepts to refer to society elements such as individual, citizen, society. They oppose to 1, 3 and 5 in the absence of kinship. Spatial referents are abstract (city) and there are no references to rural elements. The juridical field is also under present. “bem” is under employed, in opposition to 1 and 5.3.

Space participates in capability

Capability words do not emerge with the expected visibility. There is emphasis on the role of education, but insertion in society is still conceived as an action without co-production (inserir-se). There are indirect references to the idea of responsibility. The predominant point of view is that of mother (thus the presence of kinship) and teacher. There are some references to activities and programs (as in 5.3) and absence of reference to infrastructure (opposing 5.1). There are concerns with mobility as in 6. Potential focus on economy depression. Judgement words emphasise basic need.

The type does not seem to survive this exercise. Capability might just be a plane that some interviewees share without dominating the full discourse, not consubstantiating a type.

Telos of the city

Reaction against change is communicated through verbs expressing transformation, removal and closure. This contrasts with words expressing value of history (also present in other types). Vocabulary of tourism and entertainment reflects the critique on those functions of the city (co-product of their inhabitants). Judgement words clearly posit what is “right” and “wrong” and pronouns and verbs do not suggest personal opinion as in other types (eu + acho). Society elements are enunciated in words defining groups rather than in general terms (burguesia, povo, corporações). There is a strong presence of words communicating promiscuity between spheres (this element is not exclusive from this type, but extremely visible in E30). What brings together this group is their “reactionary” tone against the course of development of the city and urban life. This type is also an extreme expression of the critique against corruption and the value of heritage and history.

Meritocracy

“Empreendedor”, “trabalho”, “escolhemos”, “preguiça”, “vondate” are words that seem to legitimise “diferença”. Education, luck and opportunity are also mentioned.

Not speaking in the name of others

Hypothesis of comprehensive explanation: the role of spatialities

We have seen that the discourses of types 1, 2 and 3 have marks of low *sociétalité*. For 1 and 2 we perceive that present contact with other actors of society is restricted to residence and the surrounding area. When “social objects” are referred to – the state, social workers – they appear as an oppressor, not a collective identity distinct from the parts that represent it. While the absence of a concept of society influences their interpretation of contact with these a social objects, the interpretation of experience has plausible elements. These interviewees of low global capitals portray important limitations of social services upon their freedom. The ethical confusion of existing social policies – mixing social control and solidarity – can be part of the detachment of individuals from a conception of compatibility between the individual and society.

For the other to be contacted as a differentiated individual outside the family and the neighbourhood, an increase in the minimum global capital is necessary (type 3). When individuals can afford to rent a house in the private market or attend to more central public schools, the substance of society densifies. The interviewees here describe economic, legal, and cultural relationships. These experiences are judged negatively and seem to correspond to a difficult movement from territorial and communitarian models into individuation. As for the previous two types, it is possible that the spatial context of experience gives these inhabitants some reason. As we come to conclude that the epoch of the ethos is less societal in lower urbanity levels, we can also expect that discriminating actions do take place in these environments. Our reconstructive predisposition makes place to the veracity of perceptions of a lascivious look in public space, or a teacher’s “favouring students from the city”. Individuals mobilise the same interpretative key in economic and political dimension: when a complex explicative model of the functioning of society is not available all phenomena are flattened into the plane of the ethos. As we will see this narrows the *marge de manoeuvre* of justice as there is little hope in reverting corruption of human character (the refinement of this type can be read Aquinas at the confines of the city).

Speakers in a collective voice from predominantly peri-urban positions bring this non-systemic society view to a political institutional dimension. They see society as an interaction of political actors and organise their community to dialogue with such actors. This unidimensional dynamic bypasses the exam of an economic project at infra-societal scale. These spatial actors are very efficient and have managed to accomplish part of their group spatial project. It articulates a partial enclave of they perceive to be higher quality of life with demands of “development” translated into a tendency to ubiquity. Their success naturalises the asymmetry of exchanges between the group and society and further stabilises their conception of spatial justice at a lower degree of *sociétalité*. Recipients of support, owners of their land, they claim a model heteronomy in economic distributive claims and autonomy in the remaining dimensions (the refinement of this type can be read in Peri-urban Taylor). In the most societal cases, the discourse interprets the actors’ choice to leave place of birth to the city as having reasons, but it is still considered unjust.

The distinction between type 4 and 5.1 shows that the degree of urbanity experienced in everydayness counts in the conception of spatial justice. While speaking from the same conception of society with actors, a spatial model of bordered territoriality (and an argumentative register), these two types arrive at different conceptions of spatial justice.

We have seen that 5.1 claims a model of ubiquity in the support of the enclave. Type 4 discusses issues of co-presence together with the experience of spatial change towards higher urbanity. Collective voice from intra-city positions refer to experiences of contact with societal actors in more dimensions (local authorities, schools, clients) while recognising the validity of the intentionality animating this third parties. This contact seems to support the fabrication of a dynamic explication of the course of injustice and result in a less antagonistic predisposition towards different

others. Affective-subjectively these individuals would like the survival of the group to be possible and put their individual capitals in action to serve that purpose (spatial, educational). However, the experience of higher urbanity minimally synchronises their desire with the development of society. Their spatial model reversing injustice is a negotiated enclave, where locals should be protected but be open to some newcomers while benefiting from urban dynamics.

The inhabitants of 5.2 have positively contacted urbanity – including in foreign cities – and consider it a desirable spatial model for their place of birth (suburban municipalities seen as “a city”). They consider their position fixed due to perceived lack of economic choice and the evaluation of mobility (to foreign cities) as disproportionality costly. They claim increases of urbanity but their experience of economic tightness prevents self-perception as producers of that desired space. This makes space a product of political actors.

5.1 and 5.2 shows that the force of a single scale of spatial identity (freguesia or municipality) is determinant in the conception of spatial justice (vis-à-vis individuals concerned with several places and scales). Spatial affiliation matters, the more inclusive of other, the more the overall conception approximates coordinates of complete *sociétalité*.

Speakers in type 9 are individualised. The desert-based ideality values the effort to the individual and its contribution to society’s production. Though valuing the role of education in producing the individual and his values, they do not universalise that observation to others. These individuals have witnessed or experienced social ascendance through work and thus value choice and individual will above opportunity. This a-spatial interpretation of their biography is reflected in their conception of spatial justice. They have a reduced direct contact with the society of Porto (importantly through the opinion of housemaids).

8 Telos is the exemplary case of the “blockage of ideality” in the reading of space. The ideal type of the Telos of the city is very informed and has extensive contact with the city (he is a layer). Yet, he reads it through the strict responsibility of an elite of technocratic and politicians. The lack of a horizon of compatibility and the absence of small actors is reflected in a spatial model of conflict in co-presence. The impossibility of a harmonious living together is accompanied by the explicative emphasis attributed to big actors in a “conspiracy model”. Spatial conservation, absolute spiritual values and pre-democratic political models appear like a sound basis in the search of reversals of justice.

Types 6 and 7 experience society from positions of relative comfort. They interact with society through their professional activities and frequent multiple municipalities of the AMP.

E.5 Study 5

E.5.1 Study 5.1 : Histograms of relative frequency of specific words

Despite the quantitative basis of this data display, we use it as a guide to the moments where further qualitative reading is necessary to the refinement of the typology. Textometry is then being used as assisting reading of the corpus, calling the attention for cases of potential cognitive bias.

This exercise was developed after the study of the lexical specificities (section 7.2). It intended to verify the widespread use of specific words across interviews of each type. We can observe different degrees of discrepancy in the employment of the specific words by the members of the type and the remaining corpus. Types 2, 3, 5.1, 5.2, 7 and 9 regular distributions of the stock of work within and outside the type. This can be interpreted as indicative of sets of words which are overall more present in the corpus, as it was defined in this exercise.


CONNECTING SPACE AND JUSTICE IN METROPOLITAN PORTO

Types	1	2	3	4	5.1	5.2	6	7	8	9	10
Max. relative frequency	25,7 %	16,0 %	23,8 %	16,1 %	18,1 %	25,3 %	20,0 %	26,8 %	31,6 %	18,4 %	19,4 %
Min. relative frequency	25,4 %	12,2 %	19,2 %	9,6% %	13,9 %	19,5 %	12,4 %	18,1 %	25,1 %	14,8 %	17,4 %
Average relative frequency in corpus	11,6 %	6,9% %	12,2 %	6,2% %	11,1 %	16,0 %	10,3 %	15,7 %	21,8 %	9,1% %	10,3 %
Standard deviation of type	0,2%	1,6%	1,7%	2,7%	1,5%	2,7%	2,3%	2,6%	2,3%	1,6%	1,0%
Standard deviation of remaining corpus	2,6%	1,9%	2,2%	0,9%	1,9%	2,9%	3,1%	2,7%	3,7%	2,2%	2,6%

Table 46 Relative frequencies of specific lexicon inside and outside each of the types.

[T1] In Little place, mainly family

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 133 words




Graph 2 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 1.

The interviewees of this group emerge quite clearly on the top of the list of all interviewees, when ordered in decreasing order of the relative frequency of the specific words. The average use in the type is 2, 3 times the average use in the remaining corpus. The relative frequency of the two interviews that belong to the type is approximately the same. Specific words represent approximately 25% of the overall stock of words used by this discourse. We can note the proximity of E20 and E12. The former has also been located in a utilitarian approach, but E12 shares the same sense of oppression of place to the level of touching the basis of feeling alive and free. These interviewees are brought together with part of type 2 (E15) to detain the dominant isotopy of oppression in places, resonating with Iris Marion Young.

[T2] Invaded in the immediate environment

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 210 words



Graph 3 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 2.


From the interviews used to compose this group, E17 shows the higher relative frequency of the specific words of the type (in the order of 16%), followed by E20 and E15. The average use within the type is 2,2 times the average use in the remaining corpus. The relative frequency of the three interviews that belong to the type is rather variable. The maximum frequency (E17) is 1.3 times the minimum frequency (E15) (within the type). E13, who had this group as complementary classification, shows an average relative frequency of the typical words of the group, while E37 (type 6) is at the bottom of the users of those words. We can read the proximity with the interviewees located in type 1, sharing material deprivation with the inhabitants located in type 1 (E49 and E33). E49 will be moved to a new type, bringing together the inhabitants that do not evoke injustice or accept the spatial sufferance.

Other interviewees using part of this specific stock are: E28¹²²⁰ (Mill), E50 (Anomie), E26 (Aquinas). The focus on the self is potentially what brings them to use some of the specific stock of words.

[T3] Goodness and charity in relationships

Interviewees in this type: E56, E53, E31, E26

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 230 words



Graph 4 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 3.

The four interviewees of this group emerge at the top of use of the typical words, in the following order: E26, E53, E31, E56. E26 slightly dominates the group. There is a timid natural breakpoint separating these speakers from the


¹²²⁰ Impure interview with focus both on family, community and city issues, with an explicit view that not everything is possible and partial rationality.

rest of the corpus. The average use in the type is 1,7 times the average use in the remaining corpus. The relative frequency of the four interviews that belong to the type is variable (between 20 and 25% of the stick of the words of these discourses) but inferior to variation found the remaining (standard variation of remaining corpus is 2,25%). This confirms a solid type, affiliated with Aquinas.

[T4] Longing for place of belonging

Interviewees in this type: E48, E13, E14, (E12, E17).

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 243 words



Graph 5 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 4.


E48 emerges at the head of the type, followed by E14 and E13. The average use in the type is 2, 2 times the average use in the remaining corpus. The relative frequency of the three interviews that belong to the type is variable (between 16% and just under 10%) while the rest of the corpus is quite invariable (standard variation 0,89%). This is a case where an interview seems to dominate the type (E48). E13 is close to the use of this lexicon by the rest of the corpus. This observation does not affect our trust in the type, which we will maintain with the anchor of “Urban Taylor”. Given the narrative discourse used by these interviewees, part of the specific vocabulary is not common to all persons due to the singularity of the episodes in question. This would explain why the stock of specific words is smaller in relation to that of other types.

We have also seen that part of the corpus shares the importance of attachment to place (this could explain the proximity of E40, located in the “peri-urban Taylor”) and the affective reaction over spatial transformation (which could explain the proximity of E30, “central Walzer”).

[T5.1] Desirability of “development”, communitarian

Interviewees in this type: E11, E19, E40, E41, E42, E43, E44, E54, E47

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 296 words



Graph 6 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 5.1.

The interviewees which have been initially qualified as part of the type are on top of the users¹²²¹. The head of the graph is not very pronounced but there is still a breakpoint in relation to the last 3 interviewees of the type (E54, E11, E43). E47 does not strictly appeal to the preservation of the community as it justifies injustice through infringements of others on their entitlement to attitudinal equality in co-presence (which can be reconstructed as public space). This type makes many distinctions between different ethnic lineages and traditions and are ambiguous on their willingness to revise some “cultural traits”. Disambiguation would require a situation of procedural rationality. In any case the argument of equality is not extended beyond their personal experience of lack of well-being and agency-freedom. Given the focus on the self from which the appeal at procedural equality is delivered, this discourse is also positioned in Mill (sharing the trait of positive valuation of urbanity).

E54 and E43 are with no doubt part of the core of the type. E11 shows clear signs of valuing procedural equality in particular in relation to “church” demands of monetary contributions and lack of transparency of affairs (an utilitarian seme). She has punctured the communitarian logic, even she defends the role of the man of the land as “puxar pela terra” (We find a double location between Taylor and Mill).

We can also interpret high frequencies for some discourses which had not been affiliated with type (E27 and E29). These interviewees have an overall argument of superior *soci tality* but their affective bound to place of residence makes them value the development of these territories. E29 talks about the fusion of freguesias, the accumulation of garbage in the least “valued” freguesia, efforts of levelling the freguesia with others despite a past of poverty associated with the mining industry. We can consider that her valuing of S o Pedro da Cova (a freguesia) as a political space and certain divisiveness from the rest of the municipality does affiliate E29 with the type.

E27 is concerned with inequality of structural investment in his city (roads dealing with industry). The fact that it is a poor municipality resulting from the independence from Santo Tirso would merit some of the efforts of ubiquity¹²²². The conception is based on a developmental project and the fact that Trofa is indeed an important contributor to the economy of the metropolitan gives this approach a degree of reasonableness that we cannot find in the peri-urban type. Furthermore, E27 welcomes cospatiality with other spaces through networks which is antithetical with the conception of the peri-urban Taylor.


[T5.2] Desirability of “development”, unsatisfied inhabitants

Interviewees in this type: E27, E28, E39, (E46, E52). Doubts with regard to E28.

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 201 words

¹²²¹ The proximity between the four first positions is interesting as they are from different places and different educational levels.

¹²²² Trofa is a municipality upgraded from a freguesia of Santo Tirso in 1984.



Graph 7 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 5.2.

The average use within the type is 1,5 times the average use in the remaining corpus. The relative frequency of the three interviews that belong to the type is more variable than the rest of the corpus (standard variations are, respectively, 2,57% and 2,13%), indicating that the type needs to be revisited. E39 and E27 distinguish themselves with more use of the specific words. A set of interviews which had not been included in the type appear with high frequencies of the specific lexicon. E24, E25 and E32 need to be scrutinised and the core of the type reinterpreted.


We propose to retain the utilitarian criteria to describe this discourses where there is no breach of equal solicitude, an important concern for procedural equality. This type may identify the role of space in the achievement of individual competence without making that achievement societal. This interviewed focus on the infra-societal scale of their municipality, some of which outside the urban pole.

E24 resists attachment to this type. Though she shares some relativity of spatial values, these can be sufficiently accommodated in the dominant Rawlsian affiliation. E25 shares the sense of contentment with the level of urbanity of her municipality. She also appears in proximity with the discourses concerned with public space and equality in material city quality (Rawls). E32 fits in the new definition of the type. He desires the extension of urbanity to medium density areas (he does not extend this assessment to the rest of national territory). This interviewee also considers the investment in the city centre public space less necessary than that of the periphery and judges unfair that lesser populated spaces have lesser political pressure. It is clear that E32 has clear concerns with equality that are best expressed through the application of Rawls to the territory than with the low deontological demands of Mill. Though he is sensitive to the role of city in children education, he does not move from competence to capacity (this is a demand of Sen, not of Rawls). In the new interpretation, E28 is well situated for her procedural concerns but lack of systemic imagination of the city and no egalitarian concerns. E31 appears in the type is likely due to the shared toponym. E23 has egalitarian concerns that de-centre the distributional claims from the position of the speaker (he is Rawlsian).

[T5.3] Desirability of “development”, satisfied inhabitants with increased urbanity

Interviewees in this type: E58, E51, E36, E25, E22 + E57 (E32).

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 191 words



Graph 8 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 5.3.

The top positions are shared among members from the type and interviews from the remaining corpus. The variation among the top is superior to the dispersion in the remaining corpus (2,48% and 2,05%, respectively). These observations with regard to type 5.3 show that this type is not sufficiently strong. This is perhaps due to the fact that it is not structured around an idea of justice but in relation to the absence of strong justice claims.

Among the confirmed top users of the specific words of type 5.3 we have E51, E25 (which, as we have observed, is also top position in the histogram of 5.1). E50, despite the resistance to our instruction, describes her satisfaction with the degree of urbanity. E58 has a liberal affiliation: she pinpoints the difficulty of defining what is good for the self and for society when there are so many people involved in a city. She appeals to the possibility of actors to stay in least urban areas and criticises the closure of schools, which also nears the ubiquity demands of the rest of the type. She does so motivated by self. Interest, but pity for spatial transformation. She has only a feeble concern for equality to be considered Rawlsian. She does not value a minimum interrelatedness between the self and the other in space nor does she value public space positively). We have also qualitatively confirmed that E20 integrates this type.


E57 is also satisfied with Maia. She has concerns for the well-being of others and for equality of access to the *minimum* (the minimum is mainly services and objects). She is more Rawlsian than utilitarian. E22 tonality of satisfaction communicates the systemic development with the integration of the metropolis, the arrival of the metro and has a positive spatial horizon where spatial happiness co-varies with productivity (he is at the highest of the *sociétalité* of spatial justice). We understand that he has a foot in the newly defined Mill for the importance he attributes to the political scale of the municipality. E36 also leaves the type to integrate the ethos recourse of morality. He considers justice to be about the fixation of a regime that does not change, so that people know what to count on it, he evokes the role of God in in the future. However, he does value urbanity positively and does not raise the incompatibility issues that characterise the Aquinas of the corpus.

We interpret the presence of Cristina in the third group of higher users. As she has little things to complain about due to her habituation to poverty, the language of acceptance can be similar to a language of satisfaction.

[T6] Urbanity as good

Interviewees in this type: E18, E23, E24, E35, E37, E38, E45

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 231 words



Graph 9 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 6.

This group shows a smooth decreasing presence of the lexicon of specific words. The top users of the specific words confirm the manual affiliation of the individuals to type (E24, E37, E18, E23 and 45). This sequence is interrupted by E53 who has initially been placed in type 3. E53 reports lack of experience of equal treatment in social environments, which is a negative version of the value attributed to equality in co-presence (the episode is presented narratively but she extends it to other cases¹²²³). Diversity is valued and the inhabitant would like to see it increase in the centre of Espinho. She would also like her current place of residence (suburban) to increase density. She has equality concerns with accessibility to spatial objects at municipal scale, in particular to the least mobile (hospital emergency, shopping). She appeals to increased participation in urbanistic decisions. She is indeed Rawlsian. E35 had been initially placed in the type as he values public space and public mobility. He is critical of a city divided in poor and wealthy areas. In this aspects, he fits the profile of Rawlsian justice applied to space. However, he is concerned with procedural liberty, in particular excesses of heteronomy of part of the population. He also demands even distribution of public green spaces and cultural facilities within the hyper-centre. He values public space as well. Simultaneously, he considers the development of Gaia exemplary as it is less concentrated. If possible, he would leave the centre for the suburbs, following his well-being and increasing demands of dispersal (which we have identified with the proposed solutions of the suburban Mill) however this could also be the result of the non-systemic view of Rawls. The type reflects this ambiguity of his resources of the ethos but in the panorama of Porto spatial ethos his concern for the least-well off is distinctive.

E38 is located in a moral universe. He criticises lack of respect, critiques people's lack of will in living a decent life. He has the stack view of space that characterises Aquinas, as well as the disambiguation of procedural hierarchical treatment based on ancestry in place. The concern for procedural equality does not reach a language of rights. The people should be selected based on their moral worth, by the people of the neighbourhood. The misplacement of the interviewee in type 6 was biased by his positively valuing Porto urban park (of which he is a neighbour¹²²⁴).

The continuation of the curve shows values in the magnitude of 20%. We have confirmed the solid positions of the continuous interviewees (E27, E25, E43, E58, E32, E44 and E29.) We can attribute the proximity of language to higher educational capital as well as some concern for equality that is present in some of these positions. We can also advance that higher reflexivity associated to higher educational capital produced less radical representatives of other types.


¹²²³ The place of origin - she was raised in "the village" by her grandmother - is seen to have affected her social relationships when she moved into the city. She narrates different grading by a teacher during her studies, based on spatial origin. This episode which absorbs a significant part of the interviewee was initially interpreted as the focus of space on co-presence unvirtuous relationship, which is inaccurate.

¹²²⁴ The park is a good of the freguesia: "António Calobra: Hum, é assim, em dia normal, durante a semana, é o meu trabalho, não é? Que trabalho em Aldoar também, tirando isso, venho até ao Parque da Cidade, mais um bem que Aldoar tem, tem um Parque da Cidade em que a pessoa pode fugir da poluição dos carros e meter-se nos, nos arvoredos, costuma-se a dizer, passear à vontade, não tem incómodos [sic. incomodações] sobre isso, até ver ainda não paga imposto para ir ao Parque da Cidade, que a Câmara ainda não se lembrou de meter umas barreiras e dizer assim "Para vir para aqui tem que pagar". Ainda bem que ainda não se lembraram disso, não é? Um dia que se lembrem, se calhar têm o Parque da Cidade a criar mato! Portanto, não tenho razão nenhuma para dizer mal de Aldoar. Tem tudo." E38.

[T7] Space participates in capability

Interviewees in this type: E34, E32, E29, E46, E52.

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 193 words



Graph 10 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 7.

As we have annotated in the study of the specific words, this type is not congruous. We have already relocated a number of its members.

The revision of E32 and of E52, affiliated with Mill/Rawls, have already been exposed. E29 has capability concerns and dispersal model (she is located between Sen and Mill). E46 is less concerned with equality, shares the dominance of political actors in the making of space, the procedural critiques, the request for more urbanity as well as equal treatment of other freguesias outside centrality (she has been located in the urban Mill). She expresses the rejection of the communitarian life, with which she is still in contact. The critique on lack of responsibility that comes with the seme of capability might be what justifies the presence of E16. We have also noted how the interview recognises the role of environments in children upbringing but is hesitant in extending it to all members of society (spatiality). This hesitation merits note in our portrait of the society. E24 is in a universe of capacity.

E34 are stronger (interestingly, the later talk from the point of view of their personal involvement).

E34 talks about inequality in public space (incivility in a queue or with parking spaces for the disabled). The discourse is dominated by the promiscuity between political/economic spheres. In space, this results in inequality in urban space quality: sunlight, accessibility, mobility, order, functionality¹²²⁵. However, he resists calling these things injustices – injustice is a dispute between two actors, towards the natural balance of things. The interviewee attributes responsibility for justice to politicians¹²²⁶. There is not an extensive positive horizon. We interpret this position as *Walzerian*.

¹²²⁵ "Miguel Martins: É injusto porque depois não tem acesso ao que as outras cidades têm quando são devidamente ordenadas, não é? E funcionais, não é? Agora aqui... agora quando não é... não é? É injusto não conseguirem chegar ao mesmo local com os mesmos meios que outros chegam, é injusto não ter se calhar uma via de circulação para bicicletas quando gosta de andar de bicicleta, é injusto ter uma casa se calhar muito próxima da sua e que nem sequer apanha sol, é... é... não é? É injusto não ter saneamento básico, por exemplo, eu estou-te a dizer assim tipo exemplos que podem, podem acontecer, não é? É injusto e é injusto porquê? É uma injustiça porque foi uma consequência, uma consequência da não aplicação correcta do dinheiro para situações primárias e bens essenciais e condições essenciais, não é, de, de habitabilidade. Hum... é isso, é, não é? Portanto, a política tem os seus intervenientes, não é? Depois dependendo das cores. Agora cada um dos intervenientes é incompetente ou não é competente! O problema é que isto é quase como um cancro que se alastra: um incompetente aproxima-se de um incompetente, depois temos uma série, um grupo de, de senhores que depois acabam por não... por gerir um bocado... o seu município +[pron=lapsus] ... hum... o seu concelho conforme as suas hum... suas... não é as suas necessidades... o seu proveito próprio, se calhar, não? É um bocado isso." E34.

¹²²⁶ "enq1: E o caso do saneamento básico?"


Miguel Martins: Hum.

enq1: Também referiste. O que é que pensas em relação a isso?

[T8] Telos of the city

Interviewees in this type: E12, E30, E59, (E56).

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 162 words



Graph 11 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 8.

E30, E12, E59 appear on the head of the histogram, confirming the widespread presence of the typical words of type 8 across the interviewees of that type. E30 dominates the group, but given the discrepancy in eloquence (E30 is a lawyer and E12 and E59 have, respectively, complete primary school and incomplete primary school) the proximity is still quite revealing. We confirm the proximity of E34 to the type. E12 is also affiliated with a hyper-central version of Young.

[T9] Meritocracy

Interviewees in this type: E16, E55.

Miguel Martins: Hum, penso que... agora já está muito melhor, mas há uns anos nem sequer havia saneamento básico, não é? As pessoas tinham... poço sumidouro ou a fossa séptica em casa e depois iam lá ou aquilo ia pela terra, não é? Depois aí tinham um problema de... não é? de infiltração nas... nos rios de água, não é? Mas penso que agora já deve estar mais resolvido. Não tenho agora uma... uma noção do município geral, não é? lá por aqueles confins, lá para...

enq1: E essas coisas que melhoraram, achas que trazem mais justiça à cidade? Ou não aplica esta forma de pensar?

Miguel Martins: Hum... a justiça, não, não sei, acho que não se aplica!

enq1: Não se aplica?

Miguel Martins: A justiça já é um termo que já se afasta muito desse ponto, não é?

enq1: Das coisas positivas?

Miguel Martins: A justiça é quando se reclama, não é? Há justiça ou não há justiça, foi determinada ou não? Regulou-se ou não se regulou? As coisas hum... voltaram ao seu equilíbrio natural ou não? A justiça só acontece quando se, quando há uma reclamação! Não é? não podemos dizer a justiça é quê?... Tem que haver um caso concreto, não é? Tem que haver um problema, tem que haver duas pessoas e que não estão de acordo, não é? O ponto... o ponto de situação é levantado por, por uma das partes que se sente injustiçada, não é? É.

enq1: E... e quando se fala de uma sociedade mais justa, o que é que isso te faz pensar?

Miguel Martins: Mais justa, mais equilibrada, não é?


enq1: Mais equilibrada como?

Miguel Martins: Depende. Nós se regularmos todos em função de outros e depois depende de quem é que... e depois depende de quem é que ocupa quase como a pirâmide...hum... das competências, de... de... das obrigações, das vontades, sei lá! Não... não é?

enq1: Não estou a perceber. A pirâmide de competências?

Miguel Martins: Por exemplo, temos os políticos lá em cima são os que gerem o país, se eles gerem mal o país, as coisas começam a funcionar mal, portanto começa a haver uma desarticulação entre... entre áreas, não é? Se há uma área que falha, uma não paga à outra, a outra não paga àquela, portanto, há aqui uma desregulação, um desequilíbrio, se há um desequilíbrio, pronto, tudo cracha +[estrangeirismo] ! Em termos genéricos é mesmo assim." E34

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 103 words



Graph 12 Histogram of relative frequencies of positive specificities of type 9.

The type is broadly confirmed with E16 and E55 on top and dispersion inside the type much smaller than in the remaining corpus. Close to the top, and forming a natural breakpoint in relation to remaining corpus we have E34. We have seen that this interview shares a concern for equality based on spatial experience, which is more Rawlsian than the projection of difference in space than the one present in this type. We can nevertheless highlight that E34, E49 and E50 all resist the instruction... which approximates the lack of an encompassing horizon of justice in all these discourses and the respective types.

[T10] Not speaking...

Interviewees in this type: E50.

Bulk test using list of words specific of this type (specificity score >3): 19 words

We have observed that E50 is close to the language used in type 5.3 and can integrate the reconstruction of that group (as well).

Ambiguous

There are many references to problems of co-presence, delivered on behalf of the speaker and other people. E21 is against the Xenophobic regard dedicated to Brazilian immigrants and their culture of "getting by" (procedural equality in co-presence). It is wellbeing-freedom which dominates the interview (desertification of historic centre, lack of freedom to enjoy the streets due to fear, the disturbance with immigrant population who occupies the apartments voided by the flight of the middle class to the suburbs. This concerns do not raise issues of equality in access to space, nor competence or capability (a central Mill). There are also chorotypes involving moral judgements of others people's activities and an appeal to the control of the environment of the body of prostitutes and people infected with HIV (Aquinas section of the ethos). This explains the difficulty in locating the interviewee in our initial studies. The suburban Mill are closer to the compatibility of spatialities advanced in the liberal stance. Once treated from a central chorotype, space shows that the problem of compatibility with others cannot be avoided. It brings the discourse to civilities. We cannot locate this interviewee in a Rawlsian framework as there... there are some prospects and there is a non-spatial concern for redistribution.

E.5.2 Study 5.2: Factorial analysis per type

TXM provides a tool of factorial analysis of correspondence, based on the “tableau croisé” or “table de contingence” (Lebart & Salem, 1994, pp. 78-79). We will not elaborate here on the definition of the method. It suffices to annotate the interpretation of the profile-line close to the average or “horizontal margin” and of Profile-column close to the average or “vertical margin”. With regard to the latter we know that the relative use of a given word by an interviewee in relation to the total use of that word by all interviewees is close to the total frequency of that word among all words of the corpus. In other words: the part of the word stock used by the interviewee is close to the part of the corpus dedicated to that word. Profile-column close to the average or “vertical margin” indicate that the relative use of a given word by an interviewee in relation to the total number of words of that interview is close to the total words of the interview among all words of the corpus. In other words, the part of interview used by that word is similar to the part of the corpus taken by the interview.

We have realised AFC for the list of specific words from a type and have particularly focused our attention on the words that are simultaneously far from the axes and from the origin. They are the most commonly used words by the interviewees represented by the two axes. We have done some verifications of the strength of the projection of a point whenever it was particularly informative. The AFC study has not been realised for all types. The decision has a discretionary component, based on doubt in relation to the internal uniformity of the type. Types 5.3 and 7 had not passed the previous test so they were not further examined. Types 5.1, 8 and 9 were considered solid in their basic traits. Type 5.2 was only briefly observed.


At the end of this section, the table with the final allocation of the interviewees within the typology is presented (table 47).

AFC on specific words of type 1


Proper values:

1	0,0188	27,59	27,59
2	0,0112	16,45	44,03
3	0,0062	9,14	53,17

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Graph 13 Distribution of interviewees based on specific words of type 1, axes 1-2.



Graph 14 Distribution of specific words of type 1, axes 1-2.

E33 takes a peripheral position in axis 1 and a negative coordinate in axis 2. E49 takes a peripheral position in axis 1 and is closer to E49 along axis 2 than the remaining interviews.


In the common quadrant between these two positions we find some commonalities. A certain passivity is expressed in the reflexive forms of the verbs, themselves bearing a passive seme: someone “found” and “took” E33 a job; someone “found” E49 a house; someone “removed” E49 from the place of origin (parents). In this examination there is a spatial seme. It emerges in the comparison between the present and the past and the changed conviviality and animation. The word “convívio” expresses the longing for a different model of co-presence that they had in previous places of habitat from where they were removed. These interviewees also share some of the “longing for place of belonging” isotopy (Hyper-central Taylor). In the specific words of each individual we have the family problems, economic in E33, health related in diseases in E49.

AFC on specific words of type 2

Proper values:

1	0,0228	28,56	28,56
2	0,0167	20,83	49,38
3	0,0075	9,41	58,8

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
Graph 15 Distribution of interviewees based on specific words of type 2, axes 1-2.

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AFC on specific words of type 3


Proper values:

1	0,022	20,63	20,63
2	0,0179	16,77	37,41
3	0,0145	13,59	50,99



Graph 17 Distribution of interviewees based on specific words of type 3, axes 1-2.

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Graph 18 Distribution of specific words of type 3, axes 1-3.

Axis 1 (with a proper value of 20,63%) is dominated by E26 (point-column contributes with 60,47%) followed by E56 (on the same axis, a contribution of 22,83%). Axis 2 (with a proper value is dominated by E53 (point-column contributes with of 93,09%). The other interviewees are not well represented in these axes. Axis 3 represents E56 and E26 (64,84% and 28,12%, respectively). Remaining interviewee of type (E31) is not well represented in any of the three main axes. Indeed we have found a sense of desire for political transparency that brings this discourse closer to the Walzer conception, without abandoning the moral affiliation. We see that the common quadrant is densely populated. We find the words with the “rural” seme (*erva, batata, couves*) and of religious connotation (*esmola, Deus, humildes, correctas*). We observe depreciatory words towards people (*gentinha, senhoras*). This type has persisted in our final portrait of Porto society, with a spatial justice conception circulating Aquinas as recourses of the ethos.


AFC on specific words of type 4

Proper values:

1	0,0299	36,61	36,61
2	0,0110	13,53	50,14
3	0,0072	8,86	59


ANNEX E

Plans factoriels de l'analyse des correspondances
sur la partition CORPUSAFTERPYTHON du corpus null



Graph 19 Distribution of interviewees based on specific words of type 4, axes 1-2.

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


Graph 20 Distribution of specific words of type 4, axes 1-2.


The common words between the interviewees, distancing them from the rest of the corpus confirm the interpretation of the type. For example we find the word “reality”. In E14 this refers to the physical reality of the historic centre and its building fabric, unsuitable for handicapped access; the lack of confrontation of children with reality; and market reality explaining division of poor and rich in the city. In E48 this word is associated with the knowledge of the “local reality” by politicians; the past reality of deprivation (in his family and in general); reality of the bar business. We see that the hypothesis of increased complexity of the social is well present and common to these two interviewees. These interviewees also claim a specific knowledge of their environment. E14, for example, uses the word “complex” to comment the difficulties of the historic centre on which she focuses her account of spatial injustice. “piorar” is associated by both interviewees with a certain cataclysmic view of the course of events. The word “pride” is also common to this type. In E14 it refers to the pride of people in living in “their” area (while pride is not attached to her specifically) and in E48 it is experienced by the speaker in relation to national scale. The words that contribute to the axis 2, associated to E14, define her perception of the central area of Porto as degenerated, empty of life. E48 has abundant vocabulary associated with the beach and the freguesia. This variation is not significant for the conception, it only expresses contact with different areas of Porto. We can however notice that some of words employed by E14 have higher order of generality, reflecting her superior educational capital.

AFC on specific word of type 5.2

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Graph 21 Distribution of interviewees based on specific words of type 5.2, axes 1-2.



Graph 22 Distribution of specific words of type 5.2, axes 1-2.


In the common quadrant we see the word “concelho” (synonym of municipality) and equality (that we know to be used to compare different political spaces). We also find “crescimento”, “jogos”, “parques”, “cultura” that we have interpreted as ambiguous position between competence and capacity, growth and development.

AFC on specific words of type 6

Proper values:


1	0,0202	17,22	17,22
2	0,0152	13,02	30,24
3	0,0133	11,39	41,63

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Graph 23 Distribution of interviewees based on specific words of type 6, axes 1-3.

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Graph 24 Distribution of specific words of type 6, axes 1-3.

The biggest contribution to axis 1 is of E37 (60,30) followed by E24 (6,85). Suggests proximity between E37 and E24 in opposition to rest of corpus. This observation is at the origin of the division of this type into two, accompanied by the revision of type 7. Axis 3: biggest contribution of E37 (27,13) followed by E24 (20,44), E45 (19,10) and E35 (10,28). Suggests proximity between E24, E45 and suggests distance of E35. This set of members of the group is followed by E53 (4,31 of contribution, \cos^2 0,2). E18 and E23 are closer to origin but not well represented in this axis.

E38 and E23, considered member of the type, are not well represented in any of the axis. E23 shares the core meaning retained for type 6, affiliated to Rawls. He criticises the lack of encouragement to public and soft mobility, disorganised densification, and exaggeration in public facilities in lower densities and has a central preoccupation for the least-well off. He supports some development in rural land but he does so for egalitarian concerns (and some affection for land). E38 has been misplaced in type 6.

E.5.3 Socio-spatial profiles of the interviewees and conceptions of spatial justice (final typology)

<i>id</i>	<i>freguesia-residence</i>	<i>municipality-residence</i>	<i>sub zone</i>	<i>density</i>	<i>land-cost-m2</i>	<i>sex</i>	<i>age</i>	<i>education-level</i>	<i>Dominant coordinate</i>	<i>Secondary coordinate</i>
29	São Pedro da Cova	Gondomar	Z.7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	53	7	Sen	7 Taylor
22	Ermesinde	Valongo	Z.6	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	66	5	1 Sen	2 Rawls
37	Espinho	Espinho	Z.3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	63	7	1 Sen	
24	Ermesinde	Valongo	Z.6	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	33	7	2 Rawls	1 Sen
45	Baguim do Monte	Gondomar	Z.7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	33	7	2 Rawls	1 Sen
52	Santa Maria de Avioso	Maia	Z.8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	48	7	2 Rawls	1 Sen
15	Campanhã	Porto	Z.3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	65	7	2 Rawls	8 Young
57	Maia	Maia	Z.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	49	5	2 Rawls	
18	Aldoar	Porto	Z.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	51	7	2 Rawls	
25	Milhundos	Penafiel	Z.10	Low density	unknown	female	24	7	3 Mill	2 Rawls
35	Bonfim	Porto	Z.3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	unk own	-	3 Mill	2 Rawls
23	Canidelo	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	66	5	3 Mill	2 Rawls/ 6 Taylor
32	Penafiel	Penafiel	Z.7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	33	7	3 Mill	2 Rawls/ 5 Walzer
28	Silvalde	Espinho	Z.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	58	2	3 Mill	5 Walzer
59	Foz do Douro	Porto	Z.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	female	88	1	3 Mill	5 Walzer
21	Santo Ildefonso	Porto	Z.3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	64	3	3 Mill	8 Young
20	Vilar de Andorinho	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.9	Medium density	Low: $c < 785$	female	34	2	3 Mill	8 Young

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53	Silvalde	Espinho	Z.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	37	7	3 Mill	9 Aquinas/2 Rawls
47	Baguim do Monte	Gondomar	Z.7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	32	5	3 Mill	Taylor +
27	São Romão do Coronado	Trofa	Z.7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	48	7	3 Mill	
39	Ermesinde	Valongo	Z.6	High density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	32	6	3 Mill	
51	Santa Maria de Avioso	Maia	Z.8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	60	2	3 Mill	
58	Maia	Maia	Z.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	35	7	3 Mill	
46	Espinho	Espinho	Z.3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	44	3	3 Mill	
16	Lordelo do Ouro	Porto	Z.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	female	42	7	4 Desert	2 Rawls
55	Nevogilde	Porto	Z.2	Medium density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	51	5	4 Desert	2 Rawls
30	Foz do Douro	Porto	Z.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	42	7	5 Walzer	1 Sen
34	Pedroso	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.8	Low	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	41	7	5 Walzer	2 Rawls
12	São Nicolau	Porto	Z.3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	82	2	5 Walzer	8 Young
13	Lordelo do Ouro	Porto	Z.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	45	2	6 Taylor +	3 Mill
14	São Nicolau	Porto	Z.3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	43	7	6 Taylor +	
48	Nevogilde	Porto	Z.2	Medium density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	57	2	6 Taylor +	
11	Sobreira	Paredes	Z.10	Low density	Low: $c < 785$	female	63	2	7 Taylor -	3 Mill
19	São Pedro da Cova	Gondomar	Z.7.4	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	66	3	7 Taylor -	
40	Sobreira	Paredes	Z.10	Low density	Low: $c < 785$	female	31	7	7 Taylor -	
41	Canidelo	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	60	5	7 Taylor -	

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42	Covelo	Gondomar	Z.8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	71	3	7	Taylor -
43	Ferreiró	Vila do Conde	Z.5	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	28	7	7	Taylor -
44	Ferreiró	Vila do Conde	Z.5	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	38	5	7	Taylor -
54	Covelo	Gondomar	z.8	Low density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	male	69	5	7	Taylor -
33	Pedroso	Vila Nova de Gaia	Z.8	Low	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	57	2	8	Young Taylor +
17	Campanhã	Porto	Z.3	High density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	58	2	8	Young Taylor +
36	Labruge	Vila do Conde	Z.5	Low density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	male	70	5	9	Aquinas 3 Mill
31	Penafiel	Penafiel	Z.7	Medium density	Medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$	female	55	4	9	Aquinas 3 Mill/5 Walzer
26	Milhundos	Penafiel	Z.10	Low density	unknown	female	54	4	9	Aquinas
56	Leça da Palmeira	Matosinhos	Z.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	85	1	9	Aquinas
38	Aldoar	Porto	Z.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	63	2	9	Aquinas
50	Leça da Palmeira	Matosinhos	Z.4	Medium density	Medium high: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$	female	35	7	9a	Anomie 3 Mill
49	Lordelo do Ouro	Porto	Z.1	High density	Upper extreme: $c > 1736$	male	70	2	9a	Anomie Taylor +/ 3 Mill

Table 47 Socio-spatial profiles of the interviewees and conceptions of spatial justice. The column “dominant conception” indicates the main spatial justice conception in the discourse. In cases of hybridity, a “secondary conception” is annotated. We observe that the “hesitant” facet can represent an increase or a decrease of *sociétalité* in relation to the dominant conception.

E.6 Transversal theme, social housing geotype

Categories of space / categories of justice	W	X	U	Y, Z
Unjust metric	Topological inner metric	Topographic limit	Spatial object without metric	Topographic space and topological borders
Unjust substance	Absence of comprehensive equality ¹²²⁷ + inexplicit freedom or explicit freedom (focus on agency-freedom of some)	Absence of comprehensive equality ¹²²⁸ + inexplicit freedom	Procedural equality and equality of outcome for the taxpayer.	Equality (F1)/ Equality of capability (F2,F3,F4)+ irregular views on liberty (focus on realisation-freedom or on agency-freedom)
Focus of substance	Individual (Beneficiary)	Group (Neighbouring residents)	Individual (Taxpayer)	Individual-Society
Interviewees	E20, E17, E49, E13, E14	E41, E15, E35	E34, E30 ¹²²⁹ E41, E46, E18, E39, E21, E16, E35, E38 ¹²³⁰	E18, E29, E45, E37
Types	T2, T10*, T4	T2, T5.1, T6*	T7*, T8 T9, T10, T5.2, T5.3, T3, T6*	T6, T7
Correspondence Grand-groups in Types	A/B	A/B	A/B2/C	D

Table 48 Observations on the social housing geotype (August 2015).

¹²²⁷ No presence of any idea of equality (A1, A2, B, and D) or presence restricted to equality of realisation, excluding procedural equality (E).

¹²²⁸ Idea of equality restricted to procedural equality, without equality of realisation.

¹²²⁹ The focus is then on an object to be distributed among individuals in need, similarly to other a-spatial resources, in particular the distribution of social subsidies.

¹²³⁰ This set of positions is grouped around the conception of the house as a right, an entitlement requiring public solutions whenever individuals cannot autonomously guarantee their access to a decent shelter. The focus is then on an object to be distributed among individuals in need, similarly to other a-spatial resources, in particular the distribution of social subsidies.

E.7 Study 7: Longitudinal individual geotypes

The toponym present in each of the discourses merit being observed. We have arranged them by simple categories. While this aggregation intends to compare the extension of the lists for a given scale of sociétalité, this is but an approximate ordering. We can nevertheless observe the dominance of the freguesia and small cities in Luís repertory, contrasting with the list of urban places located in hyper-centralities in the lexicon of António. We can see that for supra-national spaces the lists have similar number of elements (there is not a pattern distinguishing the content of this section of the two lists).

	Luís	António
Infra-freguesia	Leverinho, Midões (lixreira de Midões, serra de Midões), ¹²³¹ Boialvo, Picoto. ¹²³²	∅
Freguesia	Fânzeres, Valbom, Foz do Sousa, Medas, Melres, Covelo.	∅
Municipalities within AMP ¹²³³	Gondomar, Gaia, Porto, Valongo.	Espinho, Porto, Paredes, Gondomar, Gaia, Vila da Feira, Vila do Conde, Matosinhos, Paredes, Gondomar, Gaia.
Urban places	Marina de Gondomar, Antas, Baixa, Foz, Freixo. ¹²³⁴	Santa Catarina, Rua da Alegria, Baixa, Clérigos; ¹²³⁵ Baixa, Rossio, Campo Pequeno, Avenidas Novas. ¹²³⁶
Urban area	∅	Grande Porto.
Portuguese municipalities outside the AMP	Lisboa, Alcobça, Aveiro, Braga, Bragança, Coimbra, Coruche, Évora, Fátima, Foz do Côa, Leiria, Macedo de Cavaleiros, Mealhada, Monção, Moncorvo, Óbidos, Odemira, Portimão, Sines.	Lisboa.
Regions	Algarve, Minho, Norte; Sicília.	Norte.
Portugal	Portugal.	Portugal.
European Cities	Darmstadt, Düsseldorf, Londres, Paris, Santiago de Compostela, Auxerre.	Varsóvia, Paris, Bruxelas, Amesterdão.

¹²³¹ Inside outside municipality of residence.

¹²³² Outside municipality of residence.

¹²³³ AMP stands for metropolitan Area of Porto.

¹²³⁴ Located in Gondomar and Porto.

¹²³⁵ Located in hyper-centre of Porto.

¹²³⁶ Located in hyper-centre Lisbon.

CONNECTING SPACE AND JUSTICE IN METROPOLITAN PORTO

European countries	Checoslováquia, Alemanha, Espanha, França, Inglaterra, Itália.	Suíça, Polónia, Luxemburgo, Espanha, Dinamarca, Bélgica, Alemanha.
Europa	Europa.	Norte da Europa, mapa europeu.
Non-European	Brasil, China, Egipto, Malvinas, Texas, Angola, América, Luanda.	Venezuela, Brasil, Estados Unidos, Ilhas Caimão, América do Sul, Miami.
World	Mundo.	Mundo.

Table 49 Comparison of toponym occurring in the discourses of António and Luís.

ANNEX E

Indicators	E37 (António)	E42 (Luís)
Place of birth	Funchal	Covelo
Past residence (toponym)	Funchal, Espinho, Lisbon, Brussels and Latin America	Covelo (was raised in an orphanage)
Considers himself to be a inhabitant of:	Grande Porto	Covelo
Present residence (geotype)	Central (outside pole of the urban area) ¹²³⁷	Periurban ¹²³⁸
Other stated spatial affiliation	Funchal, Lisbon.	Covelo, Portuguese, and European.
Spatial capital	Travelled extensively, for work and private life. Lived abroad.	Travelled extensively, following jobs opportunities without intentional choice
Travelling references	European capitals and countries, other continents.	Portuguese small and medium cities; European cities, capitals and countries.
Formal Education	Higher education (17 years)	Second cycle of basic education (6 years)
Foreign languages	English, German, French, Spanish, Italian	∅
Age	63	71
Gender	Male	Male
Profession	Journalist	Commercial representative (retired)
Revenue	Superior to 1499 euros	Between 992 and 1330 euros
Political and associative activity	He was a part of the direction of the <i>Sindicato de Jornalistas</i> and is now a member of a civic association in Espinho.	He directed <i>Sindicatos dos Técnicos de Vendas</i> and had a political role in the Junta de Freguesia for 19 years.
Proximity of political party	Partido Socialista (PS)	Partido Social Democrata (PSD)
Legislative elections 2011	Coligação Democrática Unitária (CDU)	Prefers not to answer
Municipal elections 2009	Centro Democrático Social - Partido Popular (CDS-PP)	Prefers not to answer

Table 50 Information on biography and capitals towards the spatial identity of the interviewees.

¹²³⁷ High density and medium high cost of land: $1067 \leq c \leq 1736$.¹²³⁸ Low density and medium low: $785 \leq c \leq 1066$.

CONNECTING SPACE AND JUSTICE IN METROPOLITAN PORTO

Attributes of the just space		E37	E42
METRIC		The just spaces can be either territories or networks or the interspatiality of both	The just spaces can only be territories
	Scales	Block, city zone, municipality Grande Porto, Region, Portugal, Europe, Western Society, (towards the) world.	Freguesia, municipality Region, Portugal, Europe, (towards the) world.
SCALE	Absent scales, when compared	Freguesia	Metropolitan Area
	Substance ¹²³⁹	Economic, political, aesthetics, cultural/civic (?), space, social, individual	Economic, political, cultural, space, social, individual
SUBSTANCE	Most contrasting substantive attribute	Society produced by a plurality of actors including civic society, political and economic actors. This society is read from the municipality to (almost) the World, opening up manoeuvring spaces for improvements of justice at those scales.	Society produced mainly by political actors. This society is read from the municipality level (almost) the World, closing the possibility for improvements of justice at all scales except that of the freguesia.
	Equality	Equality of individuals. The other as a similar being. He would act similarly and value similar things, should he be able to conceive of the same spatiality and should space allow him to choose what he values.	Equality of spaces. The other might be a different being. He might be mediocre, adhering to values of consumption, unhealthy lifestyle, appearance, negligence or idleness. Space needs to be differentiated and bordered to protect the virtuous form the corrupt. Furthermore, small density allows knowing and influencing individuals towards the good values. Once space is defined at the scale of low density freguesias, he is able to generalise claims to the entire

¹²³⁹ It is not the type of plane that differentiates them, but how the substances are attached to scales and metrics and how diverse are their consubstantiation. In other words, how they contribute to the complexity or simplicity of the spatial model.

ANNEX E

			population of the country living in that category of places.
	Freedom	<p>The conception of equality makes for an increased legitimacy of the capabilities he requires (of space and of spatiality).</p> <p>However, it seems that talking about justice from spatial perspective is not only a cognitive operation. As it mobilises personal experience of space it is subject to affect as well. As such, not all capabilities will be societal. Some will be individual our group capabilities.</p>	<p>The conception of equality is incompatible with that of individual freedom and it is responsible for the decreased legitimacy of the capabilities he requires (of space and of spatiality).</p> <p>His values are superior to those of the other and thus claiming for capabilities that might be generalizable to everyone is subject to the living of those people in the spatial model of his preference. They are mostly group capabilities.</p>
INTERSPATIALITY	Interspatiality	The just space implies relationship between spaces, in particular of co-spatiality and interlocking. Co-spatiality is a source of justice as it increases individual capital (in different substances) and thus the development potential of society.	<p>The just space would reduce the relationship between spaces. As that is often an impossibility, assuring the border of the interface is the closest to the just solution.</p> <p>Co-spatiality is a source of contagion of rejected values. Interlocking (<i>emboîtement</i>) opens up the opportunity for political actors to weaken individuals' capital by further exposing them to dynamics happening at superior scales.</p>
ACTOR	Personal strategy	<p>Actor of the civic society:</p> <p>Past: journalist</p> <p>Present: civic association</p>	<p>Past: actor of the political scene the scale of the freguesia</p> <p>Present: absent (refuge at home + revolt)</p>

Table 51 Observation of two individual geotypes of the just space (July 2015).

Annex F Interview extracts

F.1.1 City Sen

“E37: Ah, os problemas fundamentais são, são, para além do desemprego, é uma deficiente estruturação hum... urbana, portanto, por exemplo isso nota-se menos em Espinho, porque... do que noutros sítios, por exemplo em Gaia nota-se bastante porque é uma cidade que durante muitos anos não investiu, não... não teve... teve um, um crescimento anárquico por falta de planeamento, falta de previsão, falta de infra-estruturação a todos os níveis, de saneamento, essas coisas todas. Portanto, em, em Gaia isso foi um pouco corrigido nos últimos... na última década mas isso causou muita... portanto... uma situação muito desagradável a nível de... da paisagem urbana em Gaia. Em... em Espinho como teve este crescimento em... portanto, tem esta, tem esta estrutura moderna, é uma cidade moderna, das poucas que há em Portugal, hum... esta estrutura em quadrícula, portanto, isso não se, não se nota tanto. Noutras zonas do Grande Porto, Gondomar também tem o mesmo problema, portanto, um cancelho que era agrícola, tal, tal como Gaia que era muito agrícola e de repente foi urbanizado e as pessoas, as... as... a urbanização não obedeceu a uma, a uma planificação nem a um pensamento nem a nada! Fez-se de uma forma casuística sem... sem... à medida em que as pessoas iam conseguindo autorizações para construir; e tinham um terreno, construíram um prédio aqui outro acolá, sem qualquer planificação, portanto, e isso causa desconforto visual. Nem todas as pessoas têm essa sensi-, sensibilidade estética desenvolvida, mas... mas também não... com essa paisagem à sua volta também não a vão, a vão desenvolver com muita dificuldade, mas de qualquer maneira hum... isso é um factor de, de desconforto, mesmo que as pessoas não se apercebam disso. Não ter um... não ter um em torno agradável, aprazível, não ter espaços verdes, não ter... não ter hum... vias de comunicação com, enfim, com dimensões apropriadas para a, para a circulação é uma grande... é uma, é uma dificuldade, é uma dificuldade para as pessoas.

enq1: E considera essa dificuldade uma injustiça?

E37: Sim, tudo. Tudo o que for mal, mal planeamento, tudo o que não for planificado e tudo o que for anárquico gera... isso gera situações de... de... de conflitos de interesse, conflitos de... conflitos de... hum... conflitos de toda a espécie, portanto... Introduce desarmonia na, na cidade, no espaço das pessoas e acaba por... por... introduzir sofrimento na vida das pessoas, mesmo que não seja claramente percebido, mas é desconforto, é mau estar.”

“enq1: E... e que outras ou quais são as consequências deste domínio da economia financeira para as cidades, nomeadamente as do Grande Porto?

E37: As consequências são, portanto, a... a desestruturação da sociedade, a introdução, a pauperização de, de, de grande parte da, d população, que causa decadência a todos os níveis, mesmo até da própria... da própria... do urbanismo com... com... com as pessoas a viverem em péssimas, em más condições, os edifícios que ficam sem, pessoas sem, com dificuldades em pagar, em pagar rendas... hum... em, em pagar... As pessoas que se meteram na compra de casa, depois... como agora, todos sabemos, a entregar os, os apartamentos ao banco, porque não conseguem, não conseguem pagar, porque perderam empregos, porque perderam portanto... e isso... temos neste momento um parque habitacional, centenas de milhares de, de casas desocupadas e há montes de famílias que não, não, não têm hipótese de ter um espaço seu para... onde viver, portanto!”

“E37: Portanto, o Grande Porto o principal problema é ... o desemprego, que é um factor de geração de grande injustiça. Penso que é o distrito com pior situação a nível nacional em, em matéria de desemprego e... e isso acaba por ser... portanto, tornar todos os problemas bastante mais graves aqui no, no Grande Porto.

enq1: Quando diz todos os problemas...

E37: Hum... os problemas, portanto... problemas de... gera grande desarmonia social, hum... e, e sofrimento, no fim de contas, individual, mesmo para quem não é directamente afectado pelos problemas, portanto, fatalmente se terá alguma sensibilidade mínima, e eu julgo que todas as pessoas têm... isso causa preocupação e alarme.

enq1: E considera essa situação uma injustiça?

E37: Sim. Sim, claro.

enq1: E como é que essa situação a faz sentir?

E37: Vamos ver se eu consigo rebobinar. Hum... hum... portanto o... basicamente sente-se através de... maior... alguns factores de insegurança... a nível até criminal, não é? Pequenos roubos, pequenas hum... E isso afecta principalmente as zonas mais deprimidas da socie- ... da, da, da cidade, portanto, ou do Grande Porto, não é? Portanto, as periferias, os

bairros sociais, hum... E no Porto há algumas distorções na ocupação do espaço, do espaço urbano, com zonas bastante deprimidas e outras zonas, enfim, não com tanta tensão. Hum... isto é só uma, uma política, quanto a mim errada, seguida desde o fim, desde os anos 60, que foi a criação de bairros sociais que acabam por se tornar uma espécie de guetos de pessoas mais pobres! E... portanto, isso é um... um erro que eu penso ... que foi feito em, em toda a Europa, não só aqui, não só, e que seria uma, uma questão a evitar de forma a que as diferentes camadas sociais possam interagir mais umas com, umas com as outras em vez de se manterem... isoladas, o que só contribui para o agravamento do... dos problemas!

enq1: E... e essas...

E37: Falta ver, portanto, problemas a nível de, de, de instrução, da escolarização, da... portanto as pessoas quando estão sozinhas em grupos fechados tendem a estagnar e não a, a progredir, portanto... não há estímulo para as pessoas poderem progredir." E37/AP.

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"E29: É como quando eles estão no primeiro Ciclo, os pais vão à escola e são chamados e se não forem são chamados e a gente insiste e vão e vão e vão. Passam para o segundo Ciclo e para o terceiro, deixam de... de comparecer. Deixam de comparecer às reuniões, deixam... demitem-se completamente da... da... da função, a maioria, não é? Claro que são sempre dos mesmos lugares, embora a gente não queira rotular, mas é... é verdade e depois isso traz-nos outro problema agora grave na escola e, isso sim, vai criar aí algumas injustiças, porque os pais reclamam porque não querem os filhos nas turmas desses meninos que... que já andam aí há um ano e outro ano e outro ano e outro ano, e depois vai... acontece que se vão meter meninos de 10 anos junto com meninos de 14 e 15 e, portanto, os, os, os pais não... não querem, reclamam. Muitos... muitos eu conheço e essa realidade eu conheço bem, acabam por retirá-los para outros sítios, acabam por mudá-los de escola e, isso sim, é que eu acho que vai agravar essas diferenças sociais, mais do que... mais do que até outros problemas que eles possam ter, eu acho que vai ser por aí que as diferenças se vão acentuar! Porque eles, de facto, vão... vão... mas é, é quase... quer dizer, é quase inevitável, porque basta haver 3 ou 4 para que uma turma não possa funcionar, para que não trabalhe. Então alguns desses pais que ainda têm esse... essa expectativa em relação ao futuro dos filhos, põem-se a pensar, juntam dois mais dois e tiram-nos e a escola está a ficar aqui com... quer dizer, estão-se a perder os melhores, não é? E está a ficar... vai ficar com esses todos aí, depois não sei se vai... Quer dizer essa questão da inclusão é o que eu digo, quando queremos incluir, às vezes eu acho que estamos é a... a excluir, mas... pronto, isso é... é uma, é uma coisa que eu penso e que a maioria dos... dos... especialistas acha que não e, se calhar, eles é que têm razão e eu não, mas... eu acho que essa questão da inclusão está... está a trabalhar para a exclusão, não para a inclusão, mas pronto. Mas acho que será por aí que as diferenças se vão acentuar e muito!" E29/AP.

"enq1: E esses problemas entre eles considera-os uma injustiça?

E29: Eu, eu não sei se é uma injustiça, não sei... é termos... injustiça em termos de quê? Hum... é uma injustiça, pois claro, não é uma coisa que seja... que seja justa para eles próprios, não para... não para os outros. Agora eles também não, não tiveram... não tiveram ninguém que... ou melhor, eles têm muita gente... é essa, é a tal coisa, eles têm uma parafernália de técnicos que giram à volta deles, mas que no fundo não são capazes de, de fazer nada deles! Hum... não... não conseguem e depois eu acho que se criou um vício, eles estão de tal modo dependentes de subsídios e de ajudas e de não sei quê, que não percebem, ou não querem perceber - eu já às vezes, também já não sei muito bem o que é -, não querem mudar de vida, aquilo está bem assim, portanto, está bem assim, não, não, não há... não há vontade, não há outra expectativa, não têm outra expectativa, é, é assim e é assim. Portanto, se, se... acho que o único, parece que o único objectivo é casar ou juntar-se ou qualquer coisa e ter filhos, e ter filhos, porque esses, porque normalmente têm sempre três ou mais, e portanto é, é, é o único objectivo parece que é esse, é terem filhos uns atrás dos outros e, sabendo que não têm capacidade para lidar com eles - porque não têm -, para tratar deles. Têm no Centro de Saúde acesso aos meios contraceptivos, se quiserem; estão informados porque a escola informa-os, as assistentes sociais informam-nos, toda a gente os informa e eu pergunto o que é que os leva a não... hum... o que é que os leva a não, a não fazer nada disso? Quer dizer, se eles têm os meios, se são gratuitos, se não têm que pagar por eles, o que é, o que é que os leva a isso? Quer dizer, o que é que... o que é que... por que é que eles fazem ou elas, digamos assim, por que é que têm umas crianças atrás das outras? Se não são capazes de cuidar delas, se não são capazes de lhes fazer uma alimentação correcta, se não são capazes de os lavar, de os vestir, de os chamar de manhã, de lhes dar o pequeno-almoço para os pôr na escola? E eu... isso a mim faz-me um bocado de impressão, porque... se não são capazes de tratar dum, por que é que têm dois, têm três e têm e acham aquilo... andam com eles aí atrás, para trás e para a frente, para a frente e para trás e vão com eles todos para a Segurança Social, porque se os levarem todos aquilo depois parece que estão mesmo ainda pior do que o que são, e portanto... mas eu não sei... eu gostava de perceber de facto o que é que leva as pessoas... se calhar é isso que anda a tentar perceber, o que é que leva, que é que leva as pessoas a agirem assim, essa falta de... de motivação, essa falta de... de expectativa, essa falta de... de horizontes, não... não... não percebo o que é que leva as pessoas a isso, de facto. E mais, e como já lhe disse, porque sou do tempo em que quanto mais as pessoas estivessem pior, melhor queriam que... que os filhos estivessem. Portanto, havia sempre essa... esse sentimento de querer mais e ir mais além, ter sempre... os filhos tivessem sempre uma vida melhor do que aquela que eles tinham tido e aqui não, e aqui parece-me que... parece-me não, não encontro esse sentimento nas, nas pessoas, pelo contrário." E29/AP.

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“E22: Não, não faz sentido, mas sabe que quem decide aqui não são os de cá, são os de Lisboa, e Lisboa é que manda. Muitas vezes não sabem o que é que as pessoas passam no interior e estão-se marimbando para o interior também. O centralismo de Lisboa não... não é bom!

enq1: Mas considera Ermesinde interior?

E22: Em relação a Lisboa acho que Ermesinde está, está, está no interior do país, no interior, quer dizer está à beira mar, mas não falo, não falo propriamente na interioridade terrestre com a marítima, falo do interior... tudo o que está para além de Lisboa.

E22: É injusto por isto: nós temos aqui uma obra feita no norte, que eu considero que foi das obras que o governo pagou e das obras melhores feitas aqui a Norte, que é o metro do Porto, não sei se já andou se conhece.

enq1: Sim, sim, sim.

E22: Gastou-se aí muito dinheiro e acho que é um problema aí complicado! Mas se há obra bem-feita, no sítio certo e que devia ser feita foi o metro do Porto. Mas foi Lisboa que teve de decidir para o fazer! Houve aqui um presidente da Câmara do Porto que lutou muito, andou sempre a falar nisto ao longo dos anos, até que lá como ele era do partido dele convenceu alguém do partido para adjudicar esta obra aqui para o Porto e lá pronto. Na altura ele conseguiu, ainda bem! Mas o Porto, se esta zona estivesse independente e tivesse recursos provavelmente faria isso, não estava dependente de uma, do pagamento de, de Lisboa e da autorização de Lisboa, não é? Fazia com recursos próprios. Se a região norte não estivesse dependente de Lisboa, as pessoas daqui provavelmente discutiriam o que é que seria melhor para a, para nós, para as populações daqui. E digo-lhe, essa obra do metro do Porto é das obras mais necessárias e arrojadas que se fez no, enfim, aqui no Norte.”E22

“enq1: E como é que acha que seria a cidade se a sociedade fosse ainda mais justa?

E22: Se fosse mais justa em que sentido?

enq1: Se a sociedade fosse mais justa.

E22: Eu acho que a tendência, e são os tempos modernos, é para as pessoas, enfim, pá... para haver maior desenvolvimento, as pessoas sentirem-se mais felizes, acho eu. Tudo, umas coisas arrastam as outras. O bem-estar das pessoas, físico, psicológico, até contribui para, para o aumento de, da produtividade, enfim, do trabalho. Uma pessoa satisfeita com a vida produz mais, acho eu. E tudo o que há de bom e de desenvolvimento, tudo o que proporcione melhores condições de vida reflecte-se no desenvolvimento das terras, quer no desenvolvimento humano das pessoas, quer no desenvolvimento depois físico no, do que nos rodeia, não é? todas as outras actividades, enfim.

enq1: E qual é que é o papel da cidade nisso?

E22: O papel? É sempre um motor de, de impulsão, não é? A própria cidade desenvolve-se, cria novas, novas oportunidades, enfim, cria novos, como é que eu hei-de dizer, novos produtos, há sempre a inovação que vai trazendo alguma coisa, criam-se fábricas, cria-se isto... tudo isto vai em prol do desenvolvimento não sei até quando, porque eu acho que o desenvolvimento há-de ter que parar em algum lado, mas não atingiremos, não se atingirá a perfeição em tudo, mas isto tem, tem que parar em algum lado ou não sei, não sei quantos milhões de anos a Terra vai, se vai aguentar, não é? Não sei até que este, este, este espaço onde a gente vive aqui no meio das estrelas e no meio, não sei... não sei o que é que será disto! O sol terá a tendência a não mandar raios de calor e luz aqui para a Terra, acho eu, terá tendência a apagar-se. Nós estamos dependentes do sistema solar, não é?

enq1: Mas acha que o desenvolvimento vai ter que parar antes disso ou é relacionado com isso?

E22: Vai ter que ter cautelas, para que isto não, enfim, não se atinja um, vá lá, um, uma palavra o fim do mundo, acabar com isto tudo! Sabe que o planeta em si também não tem sido muito bem tratado, não digo cá em Portugal mas a nível mundial e alguns efeitos no planeta, se não houver preservação, não sei, alguns efeitos há-de ter, penso eu que mais...

enq1: Estou, acho que estou a perceber. E então...

E22: As pessoas não, não estão a... eu penso que a nível mundial já há aí algumas, algumas movimentações, mas a nível mundial as pessoas não estão a pensar pôr um bocadinho um travão nisto, porque o desenvolvimento não se faz só para termos outras coisas melhores, etc., o desenvolvimento também se faz no bem-estar da pessoa em termos, em termos interiores, em termos de... não é agora por se construir mais uma piscina que a pessoa fica mais feliz ou mais ou ter mais um sítio... não, isso já temos, já, já chega! Agora o desenvolvimento, para mim, tem uma componente importante que é desenvolver nas, nas partes que faz felicidade às pessoas, Aonde? Na doença, por exemplo, no cancro, arranjar maneira de combater o mal físico das pessoas, eu aí acho que o desenvolvimento para a frente!E E22

F.1.2 Urban Rawls

E24: Se formos a falar de cidades, mas estás a... da cidade em si? Hum... hoje... o que eu sinto muita falta - há mais, nota-se mais - mas é espaços verdes, de genericamente as pessoas terem sítios onde... onde passarem tempo com qualidade e de preferência de acesso gratuito e democrático, não é? Acho que aqui, a nível desta zona do Porto, mas acho que é em Portugal, de uma forma geral, que se investiu muito em sítios para onde as

peças vão, mas onde não têm qualidade de vida nenhuma, isso acaba por ser... por exemplo, os shoppings para mim é uma coisa que me mete imensa confusão, mas... mas pronto, se calhar a maioria das pessoas quer, não é?, e a procura desse tipo de espaços é que determinou que eles aparecessem! Mas... mas acho que não... não me atrai minimamente, para mim, se pudesse erradicava uma série deles, porque, pronto, também determinou muito... olha, por exemplo, isso estamos a falar de injustiças, determinou que muito comércio tradicional, de rua, que dá vida às cidades, que acabasse por... por ir ao charco cá no Porto, literalmente! E os espaços ficaram completamente vazios e muito mortos. Pronto, isso acabou por determinar a forma como nós se calhar vivemos a cidade. Hoje em dia ali... ir ali para Cedofeita, por acaso já houve outras zonas do Porto que, pronto, por outros efeitos acabaram por renascer um bocado, também não acho que é da forma mais adequada, mas... agora ir, por exemplo, a Cedofeita, que é aquela rua em que eu me lembro de ir com a minha mãe fazer compras quando era miúda, aquilo era uma vida imensa, ir para lá agora é... mesmo desanimador - é as lojas todas grafitadas, muito... pronto, alguma decadência, acho eu. Hum... pronto, isso aí... e acho que isso tem muito a ver com o comércio à grande... das grandes cadeias genericamente.(...)

“enq1: E podias-me explicar um bocado melhor?”

E24: É uma coisa que aqui eu acho que não se privilegia... não se privilegia, não existem muitos... Que acho que as cidades no geral não têm aquelas áreas hum... democráticas e em que tu possas ter qualidade de vida, que toda a pessoa tenha, possa ter acesso para relaxar, para estar e... e noto mais agora que existe, porque existem, mas poucos e que é o caso, por exemplo, dos que eu acho mais piada no Porto, que é o Palácio de Cristal e aquele jardim e a própria biblioteca. Hum... porque é um sítio que é... o acesso é gratuito e tu vais lá e vês toda uma mistura de pessoas que é incrível e é ótimo ver! É... por exemplo, vês sem-abrigo lá dentro, que alugam filmes e estão cá em baixo a ver o DVD, porque o acesso é de todos, não é? Vês estudantes, as pessoas mais velhas, vês hum... pessoas que estão, só a ler o jornal, vês pessoas que estão ali porque precisam mesmo de cumprir um objectivo - fazer trabalhos, não é?, estudar - pronto, tens essa parte a biblioteca e o próprio jardim que é um espaço super tranquilo, muito relaxante, em que se quiseres consegues-te completamente isolar do frenesim da cidade e da semana. Pronto, e como eu estive seis meses a viver em Madrid, quando estudei, e então ali naquele Retiro que é o que é, pronto, aqueles jardins as pessoas realmente para correr, para... para... no final do dia, ao fim de semana, é um sítio fantástico e realmente aqui não... tirando esse, pronto, há... agora já há alguns, mas não acho que... as cidades deviam ter mais um equilíbrio maior entre os espaços que a pessoa pode estar descontraidamente a relaxar e, lá está, porque a mim mete-me confusão, por exemplo, ir a um shopping e ver aqueles parques, sei que às vezes é à noite, também não tem uns horários assim muito fáceis, mas para... os miúdos com os pais naqueles parques que há dentro do shoppings, uma barulheira incrível, um ar completamente viciado e, por exemplo, não ver esses parques cheios de crianças, não é? É um bocado aquela cultura espanhola que foi isso que eu apreciei que é toda a gente na rua, a arejar, a apanhar ar, a... pronto, uma coisa mais saudável, que não sei se tem também... pode ter a ver com a cultura, não é? A nossa cultura de se estar mais em sítios fechados...

enq1: E... e a existência desses espaços como o Palácio ou a biblioteca, achas que é uma questão de justiça?

E24: Existirem?

enq1: Sim.

E24: Acho. Aí sim, porque eu gosto da biblioteca porque é um sítio democrático e é esta... a possibilidade de qualquer pessoa lá ir e de tu entras lá e sentes que... que a... que a... a ninguém é barrado o acesso e portanto, para mim, a democracia e esta mescla de pessoas, para mim é uma forma de justiça, não é? É quase o acesso... o acesso genérico, generalizado, é uma forma de igualdade de oportunidades, lá está, por isso tem tudo a ver com justiça social, para mim sim.” E24/AP.

“enq1: E a falta de mais espaços verdes, achas que é uma injustiça?”

E24: Acho que é o fruto de... de alguma inconsciência política ou de... lá está, aquela falta de regras que eu acho que existe em Portugal, nunca quer dizer que não as haja, também confesso que não as conheço... mas acho que existem proporções que seria necessário cumprir - por cada x de área de construção ter x área verde - não é? Não sei qual é a percentagem. Mas a verdade é que aqui em Portugal as coisas não se cumprem e portanto hum... tu consegues aprovar um projecto sem se calhar cumprires uma regra básica que está definida para prever esses espaços verdes nas cidades é um injustiça, porque também em si acaba por ser o... a vontade de uns... de algumas pessoas com poder para deturpar as regras do jogo, não é? ... aí é que vem a minha capacidade de apreciar países em que teoricamente algumas podem não funcionar bem, e acho que isso até é um dos casos da Suíça, que é eles puseram uma regra e... que tem aquela área verde e a área de construção não pode aumentar e venha quem vier - é assim. Porque o bem público é mais importante e porque

há regras instituídas e... e nós estamos a pensar não no bem só desta geração que cá está, mas das gerações que virão para a frente, não é? Para terem qualidade de vida e tudo mais. Aqui, acho que hoje em dia se privilegia o imediatismo, os objectivos muito curto prazo, ninguém planeia, não se faz... não se faz planeamento a esse nível, portanto aquilo que for para... para conseguir uma rentabilidade ou um objectivo de uma empresa... de muito curto prazo, isso é que está... é que está... é o que é o mais importante, pronto..." E24/AP.

E24: ... acho que já passei aquela fase de sentir triste ou... que às vezes sinto, não é? Sou um bocado sensível a esse tipo de coisas, mas acho que me sinto mais mobilizada agora para fazer alguma coisa. Por muito pequena que seja, porque às vezes pode ser uma gotinha no meio de... de um oceano, mas sinto que hoje em dia e eu que estou num papel ou numa situação privilegiada face a muitas pessoas, não é?, que estão excluídas... Um desemprego, um divórcio, uma situação de... social qualquer, depois a própria sociedade ainda te exclui ainda mais, portanto, aquilo acaba por ser um poço... às vezes, a sociedade ainda vai e dá o empurrão final para ela ficar lá mesmo no buraco! Pronto, e acho que... pelo menos a mim, acho que já passei a fase de... não gosto de sentir pena, acho que não é por aí, mas sinto-me mobilizada a fazer um bocadinho, a minha parte, se calhar." E24/AP.

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"E18: a injustiça vai-me sempre, o raciocínio vai-me sempre para a questão social, não é? Não é? Injustiça, não é? Associao sempre a uma questão social, a questão de... das pessoas menos... com menos possibilidades, que têm... a injustiça dos transportes públicos não serem tão eficazes como deveriam ser, embora tenham melhorado muito, não é? (...) Como utente normal, eu não uso, por exemplo, os transportes públicos, não é? Mas é tipo 0, não é? Andei 3 vezes no metro, porque não... porque a minha vida profissional me obriga a andar de carro, não é? Eu entendo os benefícios todos do... do... dos transportes públicos, principalmente o metro que eu percebo que, que é uma coisa é... é um... foi algo que mudou radicalmente a cidade, que tornou-a menos injusta, talvez, não é? Portanto, as pessoas começarem a ter... a ter possibilidade de se mover, que implicou até as pessoas escolherem zonas da cidade que não eram tão procuradas, não é? porque têm meios de transporte." E18/AP.

"E18: ... portanto eu estava a dizer que aquilo que me sugere essa questão das injustiças na cidade... pronto, está sempre associado a esse, a esse tipo de, de... quase luta de classes, não é? Quer dizer, pronto, eu vivo numa zona que é... hum... que fica ali entre a zona rica e a zona pobre, não é? Portanto eu estou em Aldoar. Portanto estou... do meu lado esquerdo... quer dizer tenho ali a zona da Foz e Boavista e não sei quê e Marechal Gomes da Costa, do outro lado da Boavista, do meu lado tenho Ramalde, os bairros de Ramalde e Aldoar, e onde moro é próximo até dos bairros sociais ali de... que é aquela cooperativa ali da... da SACHE e tal, pronto. E portanto, apercebo-me das... quer dizer as injustiças são diárias, quer dizer as injustiças não é só da cidade é da sociedade, não é? Portanto a gente vê que, de facto, as pessoas, pá, têm dificuldades económicas, não é?"

"E18: A cidade, vamos lá a ver, para não fugir do assunto... também podia falar, quer dizer... a questão do acesso... porque o Porto é uma cidade com alguma graça porque a parte mais degradada ou pelo menos que nunca foi resolvido que é o problema das ribeiras e não sei quê também é a zona mais... mais turística, o que penso que é normal numa data de cidades europeias, não é? E portanto também há aí às vezes esse conflito das pessoas que vivem ali... sem acesso às... quer dizer, e agora com este, com este incremento do comércio de algum, com algum, comércio gourmet, não é? E das coisas boas e não sei quê junto exactamente das populações que têm menos acesso a elas, portanto, há essa injustiça da oferta das coisas que há para o comer... para fazer dinheiro, para vender aos turistas, para ganhar dinheiro e ao mesmo tempo a população que vive ali que não tem acesso a essas coisas, não é? Pronto, mas isso lá está, está-me a ir tudo para o marxismo-leninismo, não é? Percebes? Não... a cidade em si... quer dizer, para quem seja assim mais... para a malta nova e para quem gosta de praia e que gosta de ferra e não sei quê também... lá está, a cidade é é a cidade é injusta porque a cidade para se ter algum tipo de, para se fazer esse tipo de, para se ter esse lazer, não é? tem de se pagar e o problema económico é sempre o problema que está em... É evidente que há mistura de classes - toda a malta que vai para a noite, há sempre... na noite as classes não são... as pessoas vestem-se da mesma maneira, não há, não há, não há, não há uma imagem, não há uma imagem de quem é que é de Gondomar... de quem é que é empregada de supermercado de Gondomar e quem é que é filha do doutor não sei quantos - mistura-se, não é? portanto essa imagem. Mas depois há o problema económico, não é? Quer dizer, uns têm de beber uns copos antes e depois só bebem uma cervejinha e outros, quer dizer... eu não sei se isso é injustiça se não é injustiça, a cidade é assim, não é?" AP/E18.

E18: Eu acho que sim, quer dizer, quer dizer, é... é... tudo... eu, eu, eu na minha cabeça está... a justiça está sempre um bocadinho no... lá está, é o que eu digo, se calhar é um bocado, um bocado... marxista-leninista, pá. É tentar aproximar as pessoas das, das... do usar... portanto a cidade, a cidade tem coisas que são pagas, não é? Mas há outras coisas que são... quer dizer, um exemplo extraordinário de, de, de... de... de... hum... pá, de justiça, pronto, lá está, já que estamos neste tema, é o Parque da Cidade, pá. O Parque da Cidade é uma coisa maravilhosa, é uma coisa... quer dizer, foi à custa de algum... foi muito polémico e tal, não sei quê, mas o, o... aquele, aquele... aquilo que toda a gente sente como seu, porque é, de facto. A gente vê lá desde a malta mais humilde até aos tipos mais betinhos da Foz e tal, aquilo... a correr, uns não sei quê, outros com os cães, outros nos piqueniques, outros a jogar à bola, mas aquilo é muito participado e as pessoas sentem aquilo como, como... como deles e sinto até que há algum respeito, porque hum... aquilo está bem mantido... quer dizer, a Câmara faz algum esforço de manutenção, mas penso que as pessoas também respeitam aquilo. Não há... não se vê aos Domingos uma barafunda de coisas deitadas para o lixo, as pessoas, mesmo as pessoas mais...

com menos educação, às vezes, e civismo, já começam, quer dizer, há ali algum respeito e acho que é, lá está, é onde se juntam as várias classes sociais e as pessoas todas das várias... e é gratuito. Portanto as pessoas vão ali, levam... agora houve as corridas de automóveis, por exemplo, as pessoas vão para ali, metem a mantazinha como quem está no pinhal e tal, mas usam aquilo. Usam e aquilo faz bem e é bom, é saudável e os cães e não sei quê, a família e os miúdos a correr... Acho que é um elemento de justiça... - é engraçado, agora lembrei-me disso! Porque acho que é... porque todos os equipamentos que são comuns, não é? e que sejam tendencialmente gratuitos ou gratuitos, não é?, que sejam da cidade, as pessoas podem usá-las, não é? As fontes, as praças, os passeios públicos, aquelas..., não é? São coisas que tendem a... que, que... pronto, que são de acesso a toda a gente, já ir ao São Carlos [theatre in Lisbon] é preciso pagar bilhete, não é? Pronto, é um bocado isso. Esses equipamentos da cidade são importantes, de lazer, digamos e de... e culturais."E18/AP

"E18: ... mas hoje em dia já há muita ... quer dizer, já há boas instalações, houve aí um período em que se fez... hum... exagerou-se até, juntas de freguesia e pavilhões gimnodesportivos e... edifícios multiusos, houve aí uma tonelada ... tudo o que é equipamentos, acho que até estão... há um exagero, não é? Qualquer junta de freguesia queria ter o seu pavilhão multiusos e o... e o... e a junta de freguesia com auditório não sei quê para não sei quantas pessoas e portanto, neste momento, temos equipamentos a mais do que aquilo que temos necessidade até da tradição que temos de... de, de... de actividades públicas e de conjunto e de, de... não é? Não somos, não somos como outros países que são mais, hum, colectivistas, não é? Nós, pronto, temos as nossas agremiações e tal mas, quer dizer, claramente que há aí pavilhões multiusos que não se faz nada! Faz-se o baile dos bombeiros e faz-se não sei quê mais nada, quer dizer, é... houve aí um... ainda hoje estamos a pagar um bocadinho isso, não é? Porque houve uma altura que se? que o dinheiro... havia dinheiro fazia-se tudo, pronto. Ah, pronto! ...

enq1: E, e essa questão do exagero dos equipamentos públicos, isso parece-lhe uma injustiça?

E18: Quer dizer, só é injusto, quer dizer, é injusto... eles estão disseminados, não é? Se fosse uma coisa, quer dizer... se fosse... eu acho que isso foi, foi generalizado no país todo, não é? Quer dizer, porque eu vejo de Norte a Sul. Quer dizer, os autarcas, não é? os autarcas sempre que... o autarca é um, quer dizer, é um tipo muito ligado, quer dizer, quanto mais pequena é a... hum... o Presidente de Junta é o Presidente de Junta, não é? Depois tem... mas são pessoas ligadas muito ao, ao... à população, não é? Com contactos muito directos, portanto, também facilmente... e depois sempre com aquela... quer dizer, há sempre uma vaidade no poder, não é? E há sempre aquela coisa de poder fazer, ó pá, uma estrada para aqui para ajudar os meus amigos dos columbófilos não sei quê e ta ta ta. Há muito esse jogo de interesses e tal, e portanto, está disseminado no país todo. De facto podia ser injusto se houvesse só num certo, num sítio, agora, o que é verdade é que se fez... é injusto para a... é injusto, digamos, é só injusto é o reflexo que isso tem, não é? Que é a quantidade de dinheiro que se gastou... hum... e isto falando de muitos arquitectos... ó pá, eu também fiz juntas de freguesia, não é? Portanto, nós usufruímos - nós, os construtores, os... tudo o que é ligado à construção civil e não sei quê usufrui de haver essa... essa, pá, loucura de fazer tudo e mais alguma coisa, não é? Que foi bom - foi bom para o desenvolvimento, foi bom para, para manter empregos, foi bom para uma data de coisas - mas sinto claramente que houve... que houve exageros, quer dizer, em zonas, freguesias com meia dúzia de pessoas, pá, de 350 ou 450 pessoas, hum... havia um pavilhão gimnodesportivo, uma coisa que não faz sentido, quer dizer, não é... não estou a falar do caso ali de... aqui, mas... ainda agora, no outro dia, fui também ali acima ao pé de Resende ou lá o que é... Resende ou Caldas de Aregos ou não sei quê, também umas piscinas municipais e mais um edifício e não sei quê, depois mais dois pavilhões, quer dizer, claramente equipamento que na Suécia não se faz, quer dizer, na Suécia um tipo tem... se calhar devem fazer um pavilhão gimnodesportivo mediante a população que há ali, depois deve haver transportes e tal. Ah! Ninguém anda a fazer para cada capelinha faz a sua, a sua, a sua coisa... portanto, eu acho que isso é, é injusto do ponto de vista, quer dizer, de nós agora estarmos todos, estamos todos obviamente a pagar isso e é... e é disparatado, não é? Principalmente um país que tem... que é pobre, que sempre foi e que houve uma altura que foi novo-rico, não é? Portanto, houve aí esse período de novo-riquismo e que... ó pá, é injusto, pronto, nesse sentido, não é? Claro que as pessoas... é bom, é bom ter, quer dizer, é sempre... quer dizer, é melhor, não sei o que é melhor, não é? quer dizer, um miúdo quer fazer desporto, hum... ter, ter a possibilidade de fazer desporto é bom e é aquela coisa "Ai, até pode fazer aqui no pavilhão dos bombeiros, novo, que tem ali, agora tem um professor brasileiro que vem aqui dar não sei quê, pa pa pa", pronto. E a pessoa tem acesso a isso é bestial, pronto, é bom, mas se calhar nós não podemos ter isso à porta, à porta de toda a gente, se calhar temos de ter... devia ser mais racional, mas isso é normal, não sei se isso até não é só português, não é? Isto é um fenómeno - esse fenómeno de... das... pá, do pequeno poder, não é? Daquela coisa de ganhar as eleições, tem de fazer um... tem de fazer um pátio... o átrio da igreja, não é? Em participar não sei quê, isso é daqueles truques... injustiça só no sentido que temos de pagar, mais nada, de resto, não é? É um problema, é um problema, é um problema. Para manter as coisas, não é? Tem ares condicionados, tem não sei quê, tem..." E18/AP.

"E18: ... Quer dizer, mas é... que era aquela coisa do utilizador-pagador, que é mais justo, pronto, eu... não sei. Quer dizer, eu acho que... isto é muito difícil, já é economia demais para mim, isto já não... eu não sei, sei que... sinto que é uma injustiça, sinto que... porque eu tenho de ter um meio de poder ir para o meu trabalho e não posso ir obviamente, quer dizer, "Ah, então vai pela..." como uns tipos defendiam a Estrada Nacional 109, quem vai para Espinho ou não sei quê ou para Ovar "Ó pá, não queres usar a não sei quê vais..." ó pá, ninguém pode ir por uma estrada que pára a toda a hora cheia de lombas e de passeios, ó pá, são zonas de peões e de não sei quê, quer dizer, as pessoas já... já se habituaram, já organizaram a vida de maneira a saber que têm x tempo para chegar a um local, não é? E com os... e perigo de atropelar pessoas e, quer dizer, também temos de... tem a ver com isso, não é? Antigamente havia mortes por todo o lado, não é? A Estrada Nacional número 1 atravessava aldeias onde as pessoas... não havia passadeiras não há nada, aquilo era cada...

de vez em quando era uma matança, não é? Portanto, essa é a questão de segurança também é importante. Mas pronto, portanto acho uma injustiça, portanto em rigor acho uma injustiça." E18/AP.

"ó pá, hoje em dia está muito diluída a questão da... do desenvolvimento, as pessoas são iguais, não é? têm acesso a tudo, informação, não é? Escolas pá, não é? Portanto, a universidade, pronto, é evidente que não há, mas já agora, também já há universidade na Maia, há uni +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida] ... há aqueles... tudo isso está disseminado, não é? Não me parece que haja uma grande diferença entre os problemas da cidade do Porto e a grande ci... e o Grande Porto, não é?" E18/AP.

"E18: Há um problema geral, mas isso é um problema geral no país, quer dizer, é o problema de educação, não é? Eu sou muito sensível, eu acho que nós todos sofremos e temos um problema de educação, de civismo, isso é, quer dizer, faz-me muita impressão eu ir numa rua em que está um buraco bestial no coiso, pá, e a sinalização, as sinalizações de obras nas cidades e nas estradas em Portugal é um absurdo completo! Quer dizer, só por um milagre é que não há mortes por todo o lado, quer dizer, eu vejo, já vi situações em vias rápidas, que se eu fosse um alemão, que era a primeira... que vinha, que vinha, alemão ou espanhol ou qualquer coisa, que entrou no país e chega ali ao meio da tarde e vai passar por ali esse tipo, eu tenho a certeza, que esse tipo vai cair no buraco de... porque aquilo é mal sinalizado... não há responsabilidade nisso, nisso eu fico passado, eu passo-me com a... e isso é um problema português, um problema português, porque isso é a todos os níveis, é um tipo que não faz o pisca quando vira para a esquerda, quer dizer, está-se a borrifar para fazer o pisca que é preciso tirar a mão do cigarro ou do micro... ou do telemóvel, eu fico doido com isso, mas isso já é um problema nacional, agora já estou... isso, mas que isso é um problema, quer dizer, da cidade do Porto, da cidade de Lisboa, de todo o lado, não é? A falta de civismo é terrível, a falta de educação, aquela base, aquela base, porque simpáticos somos, somos um país maravilhoso, de malta simpatiquíssima, gosta de receber, pá, beber uns copos, isso é... agora, falta-lhe é depois um mínimo, aquele mínimo de... como é que um país, como é que um cidadão ou um povo tão simpático não tem a preocupação de quando vira para a esquerda fazer o pisca a dizer que vai virar para a esquerda? Porque o pisca não é preciso... as pessoas têm a mania, ou acham que vão gastar pilhas, que estão a gastar qualquer coisa, então "vou poupar", ou então é pura e simplesmente porque está-se a borrifar para os outros do lado!

enq1: E... e isso acha que é uma questão de... de injustiça?

E18: Isso é, claro que é! Quer dizer, acho que sim. Pelo menos é injusto relativamente aos... relativamente aos, aos, ó pá, aos gajos mais civilizados, não é? É chato um tipo viver num país que, que... eu todos os dias... sou muito sensível a isso, por isso é que até agora disse meio a brincar. Não sei se é uma injustiça, quer dizer, eu só acho, sinto que... que isso é um problema, não é tanto a injustiça, é um problema, é um problema! O problema da falta de civismo é um problema. Agora se é... se é um... ó pá, se é uma injustiça, ó pá, é injustiça? Eu acho que é uma injustiça, pá, bolas, sou português, tenho um país tão bonito e tenho uma data de malta às vezes tão bronca, não é? e que não... não é? Mas por outro lado é gente boa, não é por mal, aquilo não tem maldade nenhuma, é pura e simplesmente falta de civismo, não é? Falta de hábito dessas coisas e isso eu tinha exemplos, ui às toneladas! ... Portanto, eu estou sempre na estrada, estou sempre... e eu sei quantas coisas se fazem por uma questão de um tipo... se o tipo vai ao volante e tiver a preocupação de quem vem atrás e vai à frente, e estar preocupado com os outros também, evitavam-se milhões de desastres! Porque um tipo via qualquer coisa, metia os 4 piscas, quantas vezes um tipo... e eu vejo lá ao fundo que há confusão - tem de se estar com os olhos a olhar para a frente, não é para ali - vejo não sei quê meto 4 piscas. Quantas vezes vou eu na coisa e de repente há uns gajos "guiiiiiii", porquê? Porque há um tipo há mais de 10 minutos que estava a ver ou a... estou a exagerar, há um minuto que estava a ver ou que ia ali haver coisa, e a preocupação dele, foi resolver o problema dele, não foi meter 4 piscas para avisar o tipo do lado! Nisso, passo-me da cabeça, acho que isso é um problema, é um problema da cidade, da, da... da sociedade. Pronto, mas agora assim já disse." AP/E18.

"E18: E era o que eu estava a dizer, desde o início, quer dizer, quando... pá, vou sempre à justiça social, não é? No meu ponto de vista de cidade, não é? Não vou pôr a questão da justiça entre sexos, não é? De ser uma cidade muito boa para os homens e má para as mulheres, porque, sei lá, não é? Não é? Ou crianças e velhos. Ó pá, que normalmente crianças e velhos normalmente são os mais desfavorecidos, não é? Em termos de... de... talvez não, até estou a ser injusto, se calhar, porque hoje em dia já há muito equipamento para crianças, as crianças de facto já têm, os velhos se calhar têm sempre o... têm sempre os jardins e as pombas e jogar às cartas, que é um bocado uma ideia macaca que se dá dos velhos e tal. Mas, hum, não, quer dizer, a questão da justiça, portanto, eu vou sempre ao, para as questões sociais, quer dizer, é de ser uma cidade que, ó pá, a gente se for a... a Las Vegas, não é? Las Vegas é a cidade do jogo, quer dizer, aquilo só faz sentido para quem vai jogar porque... agora, uma cidade que seja uma cidade normal, que tem zonas industriais, tem zonas comerciais, tem não sei quê e tal tem de ser, pá, tem de ser equilibrada, não é? Quer dizer tem de haver tudo, não é? Ó pá, a justiça é o acesso às coisas, pá, que lá está, eu bato sempre no ceguinho que tem a ver com a parte económica, quer dizer, os pobres têm sempre menos acesso quando as coisas são pagas. Tudo o que seja gratuito, não é? Uma cidade que possibilite, quer dizer, qualquer cidade que possibilite ter... actividades de lazer, culturais e não sei quê que sejam gratuitas é mais equilibrada e mais justa, pronto, quer dizer, tudo o que seja para pagar, quer dizer, ninguém vai querer que as pessoas andem a distribuir Rolaxes pelas pessoas, não é? Quer dizer, é ridículo, não é? Agora tudo o que é ambiental, cultural, ó pá, aquela coisa, aquelas coisas, às vezes, que parecem coisas patetas, mas pronto, aquela coisa das bicicletinhas que se põem de um lado para o outro e tal, que no fundo, é para... é para possibilitar] ... é puxar as pessoas a não levar o carro e andar não sei quê, mas, por outro lado, também é uma maneira de... para a malta que tem mais, até de andar a brincar um bocado, a divertir-se com aquilo e não tem bicicleta, embora eu ache que toda a gente... hoje também as dificuldades também já não são assim, não é? Não há ninguém, mesmo as pessoas do... com o rendimento

mínimo que não tem, que não possa comprar uma bicicleta, porque uma bicicleta, se for ao Continente custa, ó pá, custa 15 euros ou 20 euros ou não sei quê, há bicicletas de todos os preços. Quer dizer, hoje em dia também já não é aquela coisa de as pessoas não terem dinheiro para comprar sapatos e andam descalças, não existe isso já, não é? Mas pronto, uma cidade mais justa, portanto, do meu ponto de vista, resumindo, era isso, é uma cidade, tem de ser uma cidade que não obriga, quer dizer, para ser justa - portanto, a justiça para mim é sempre económica e social - portanto, uma cidade que possibilite as pessoas viverem sem gastar dinheiro, que possam, quer dizer, não lhes vai dar o lanche, não é? Não vem um empregado da Câmara dar um lanche a toda a gente, estás a perceber? Mas quer dizer, o máximo de coisas possível, que seja... que seja... que fuja um bocado a este espírito do capitalismo selvagem, não é? Quer dizer, é... as pessoas podem ir para o Parque da Cidade fazer o que bem lhes apetece: jogar à bola, juntar uma data de amigos, levar o farnel. Pá, acho bestial! Acho que isso é... acho que isso é fundamental numa cidade. Uma cidade que é muito fechada e não tem isso obriga as pessoas a se quererem ir têm de apanhar o autocarro para ir para o, para o, para o... para a mata, que é a 30 quilómetros, lá terão que andar de camioneta e não sei quê, outra coisa é a cidade proporcionar isso é mais... portanto, porquê? Por causa de o meu raciocínio sempre de justiça social e não de outro género, não é?" E18/AP.

"E18... o que eu acho é que quando se depara com uma situação de injustiça deve-se fazer qualquer coisa, porque o pior que há... ou denunciar, não é? Ou escrever um artigo para o jornal ou não sei quê, desde que... quer dizer, uma pessoa tem de ser activa, mas isso depende... nós também não somos, o português não tem muita tendência... tem tendência de dizer mal, mas não, não ser uma coisa construtiva, não é? Não ir ao sítio certo, não é? É andar a dizer... ó pá, é ir ao sítio... o departamento de lixos "Está ali um contentor do lixo que há 3 dias sem não sei quê. Ó pá, venha cá se faz favor, tal tal tal tal." Pronto. Sem estar a... as pessoas às vezes não têm aquela coisa de exigir, não é? A gente tem de exigir a um polícia, ó pá, "Ó senhor guarda, está ali o coiso... Estão aqui estes tipos, estão aqui a roubar não sei quê. Venha cá prendê-los!" não pode ser uma coisa só de dizer no outro dia "Ó pá, porra, isto é uma injustiça, coiso, os polícias não fazem nada!" Não, tem de se, tem de se actuar e as pessoas devem ser mais actuaentes e em Portugal... eu também tenho de falar, que eu às vezes sou um bocado retilão, mas muitas vezes também sou relaxado, não é? E isso é um problema se calhar nacional, tenho de... deveria ser mais activo, mais participativo." E18/AP.

F.1.3 Mill of plural geotypes

"AP: E depois também referiste a falta de actividades de iniciativa escolar.

E39: Claro. É...

AP: É uma injustiça isso para ti?

E39: Acho que sim, porque há, há concelhos que têm uma, uma visão em que a escola não é uma obrigação daquelas obrigações que as crianças têm que ir para lá tristes. Fazem, fazem de ir à escola algo mais que isso! Algo onde as pessoas além de ir estudar, vão confraternizar, vão, vão fazer desporto, vão fazer actividades não só ligadas ao desporto - fazer bonecada, pinturas, sei lá, várias coisas e não... neste momento não, não há nada disso em Ermesinde, portanto, eu tenho muita pena em pôr a minha filha a estudar em Ermesinde, porque sinto que se se vai para a escola só para se ir para a escola. Não devia ser assim! A pessoa devia ter, como eu vejo na América e noutros sítios, outros interesses. Em Ermesinde há, há, há computadores, computadores e fórum cultural, é. Mas não, não é, não há uma orientação, tentar orientar as crianças de Ermesinde para ficarem em Ermesinde. Só não ficam, só não vão embora porque não têm dinheiro, porque se tivessem acho que já estava uma cidade quase morta! E está ficando, não é? Como está a ficar o país.

AP: E como é que essa situação te faz sentir? A das escolas?

E39: Faz-me sentir que, que aqui em Ermesinde é só mesmo por não ter alternativa, por eu não ter possibilidades financeiras de a colocar num colégio que pod +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida] ... onde ela possa ter ballet, aulas de dança e escolher por ela própria. Em Ermesinde ou faz o que há ou não faz! Não pode escolher, não, não há música, não há... nem escola de música deve de haver quase em Ermesinde já e portanto as crianças fazem o que há na escola ou não fazem e, e até são penalizadas por isso, porque se não gostarem do desporto que é tão limitado em Ermesinde até recebem notas negativas, não é? O desporto é sempre o mesmo e é sempre tão básico que não dá, que, que é pena. Eu vejo nos colégios têm natação, andebol, ballet, dança... as pessoas, as crianças deviam ter o livre direito de escolher aquilo que mais têm gosto e prazer em fazer, para fazê-lo com gosto. Porque a pessoa quando faz com gosto tem mais prazer.

AP: E referiste que há outros concelhos com outra visão.

E39: Ah, claro! É notório isso, é notório que há concelhos... Vila Nova de Gaia... também pode ser por serem maiores e terem mais poder financeiro, não é? podem investir mais. Concelhos no Sul que têm visões maiores e criam inter-escolas, intercâmbios, hum... os melhores alunos de, de Desporto vão competir com os outros, os melhores alunos de Matemática vão competir com os outros e isso não se torna uma competição dolorosa ou uma, uma competição a doer, é uma competição saudável, porque as crianças no fundo vão confraternizar e vão fazer algumas amizades, ao mesmo tempo aprende, aprendendo a competir desde jovens para entrar no mercado de trabalho sem darem fé. Fazendo daquilo uma alegria, vão-se habituando e as pessoas em Ermesinde, quando saem para o mercado de trabalho aos 20 anos é tudo uma novidade, porque nunca foram enfrentados com "Tenho que ganhar àquele, vou tentar ganhar ou...". É muito... não há. Chegou a haver há uns anos atrás, há... para aí há uns 12, 13 anos, havia cinema uma vez por semana ao ar livre, havia

umas bandas ali no Parque Urbano a actuarem, criar condições... um palco camarário para quem quisesse fazer uns concertos. Por exemplo, aqui, eu quero formar uma banda musical ou tenho dinheiro ou não formo, porque não há um sítio que a Câmara disponibilize para nós testarmos, pelo menos para ligar os instrumentos e não incomodar vizinhos! Basicamente isso, que outras Câmaras têm. Por exemplo, grafitar em Ermesinde não há um sítio, fazer escalada, não há um sítio. Eu sei que há Câmaras que têm, têm sítios. Eu vejo que quase todos os meus amigos e vizinhos têm, todos têm filhos nunca ninguém, ao fim de semana, fica em Ermesinde. Nós temos que sair para mostrar aos nossos filhos coisas diferentes, porque aqui em Ermesinde pouco há para mostrar! Há no Parque da Cidade do Porto..." E39/AP.

enq1: E referiu que não havia igualdade no investimento de concelhos.

E27: Eu acho que não, eu acho que não, por exemplo, eu acho que neste momento, por exemplo, já falando de regiões, a região sul essencialmente, Lisboa tem uma fatia muito maior de nível de investimento do que propriamente, por exemplo, o Porto, hum... só para dar um exemplo, e o Porto devia ser mais apoiado a nível de crescimento e até porque a maior parte do desemprego, embora Lisboa também é uma cidade que está, que está a ser muito afectada, mas o Norte foi mais afectado a nível de, de, de desemprego. No entanto, é o Norte que está-se a centrar mais na exportação, está, está a criar mais riqueza, mas é para exportar, portanto... mas a nível, a nível de comércio, porque a maior parte das, das médias e pequenas empresas que se encontravam no Norte, verificou-se mais esse, esse tipo de problema.

enq1: E considera isso uma injustiça?

E27: Hum... é injustiça no sentido, por exemplo, quando há, ou há dinheiros do, da União Europeia para investimento, para empreendimentos, eles... a fatia que é cingida de dinheiros para, para as regiões todas é diferente e, portanto, quando se quer que uma região seja, está mais prejudicada e que tenha que crescer, tem de ter um, uma, um investimento maior. Não, não digo igual, porque a população por per capita +[estrangerismo] a população é diferente, mas, pelo menos, tenham o mínimo, que tenham o mínimo de, de investimento ou de dádiva de dinheiro, e isso não acontece. Acontece sempre nas grandes cidades que já são ricas e continuam a investir mais nessas cidades e as outras são esquecidas, não é?

enq1: Portanto então isso aplica-se mais a que situações? Em que concelhos é que estava a pensar?

E27: É assim, distrito do Po +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida] ... pronto, neste caso concelhos, o concelho da Trofa já por si já é prejudicado, pronto, eu estou a falar também depois entre regiões, não é? Depois tem os seus, cada concelho tem uma fatia de dinheiro que é distribuído, pronto, hum... nesse sentido acho que, que é pior, porque é, é um concelho recente, um concelho novo, costuma-se dizer, porque a pessoa hum... precisa de mais apoio, não é? Num concelho novo e isso não aconteceu, foi um concelho que foi fraccionado, hum... depois teve muita dificuldades porque a nível de, de dividendos de freguesias também onde tem que ir buscar os impostos também não deve ser muito grande. Pronto, e precisa de muito apoio.

enq1: E essas diferenças de apoio e investimento estrutural considera isso uma injustiça?

E27: Quando ele não é feito de forma equitativa sim.

enq1: E como é que essa situação o faz sentir?

E27: Hum... desagradado, não é? Porque, porque eu faço parte do concelho e, pronto, eu acho que o concelho não cresce devido, pronto, e cria-se uma, uma injustiça social também maior, mais desempregados, portanto, se não há empresas, não há investimentos, portanto, não há empresas, não há emprego e isso traz sempre injustiça social."E27/AP.

enq1: E mas então aqui na Trofa, se percebei bem, a maior dificuldade é ser um concelho novo, é isso?

E27: Hum... não teve tempo ainda. Não, não, não teve tempo ainda para se estruturar, para se, para ter projectos de, de longo prazo de investimento. O projecto do metro, que ficou a meio, mas isso também foi genérico, não foi só, não foi só a questão da... foi a questão da crise, que isso também ficou bloqueado, não é? O próprio, o próprio projecto em si do metro é muito complicado a nível de, de, de rentabilidade e talvez por isso, por essa questão da rentabilidade, se é rentável ou não, ir até à Trofa, se calhar até nem vai para lá por causa disso, porque a questão da metropolitana do metro e, neste caso, não deu lucro também. Portanto, e muitas vezes passa por, por, por ver até onde é que se pode ir, se é rentável ter o metro em determinadas zonas, não é? Que isso é importante, é bom para o crescimento do, do, do concelho, mas se calhar não, não, muitas vezes não vai a determinados sítios por uma questão de poupança, porque se não tiver pessoas suficientes para que o faça, porque, inclusive, houve um decréscimo este ano de pessoas que andam de metro na ordem dos 30 por cento, o que foi bastante! Por possibilidades... de dificuldades talvez económicas, houve um decréscimo muito grande, portanto isso... Mas, não haja dúvidas, a existência do metro, a existência de tudo o que tenha a ver com a parte rodoviária e estradas, as autoestradas, plataformas, tudo o que entra num concelho isso contribui sempre para o seu desenvolvimento. Bom numa parte, má noutra, não é? Na parte do ambiente talvez não seja tão bom, mas na parte de desenvolvimento e de emprego acaba por trazer também alguns benefícios.

enq1: São exemplos dos tais projectos que ainda não tiveram tempo...

E27: Hum... os projectos são alterações de fundo que tem que haver, hum... primeiro a estrutura da, do ordenamento do território, depois fazer um projecto a longo prazo de construção e dar benesses aos, às pessoas desse concelho, ou menos impostos, ou dar possibilidades a empresas implementarem-se nesse concelho talvez com menos impostos ou pessoas que pagam menos IMI, por exemplo, para poder singrar nesse, nesse concelho e, portanto, trazendo empresas para o concelho

também se traz emprego e... mas isso parte do projecto muito comum, que é na parte do ambiente, que é na parte da construção civil, na parte de ordenamento de território, de da parte industrial, hum... isso não se faz, não é assim tão simples, isso precisa de uma conexão de várias, de vários ramos no concelho, hum... Também não é fácil, mas isso são projectos a longo prazo, isso não se faz de um momento para o outro, esses projectos demoram tempo, no mínimo 4, 6 anos. É claro que, por exemplo, em projectos, porque há um dinheiro que é, que é dos fundos estruturais, há outro dinheiro que é da própria... por empréstimos que pedem ao banco, a verdade é que neste momento, um concelho que não tem dinheiro não consegue pedir dinheiro também, não emprestam, não é? Neste momento está muito difícil pedir dinheiro, pronto, e daí ser muito difícil, ser muito difícil crescer. É como uma empresa, uma empresa pequena neste momento é muito difícil crescer, os grandes ainda conseguem mexer mais e desenvolver, as pequenas e médias empresas, não, por terem dificuldades de investimento e de empréstimo bancário, também não crescem, estagnam, ficam paradas, pronto. Costuma-se dizer que o dinheiro semeia dinheiro, o que não tem dinheiro estagna, para, e neste momento, está muito, está mais difícil, ainda mais difícil se torna." E27/AP.

enq1: Mas referiu a diferença entre as grandes cidades e as... e outros meios.

E27: Portanto, a Trofa é uma cidade, não passa, deixa, é uma cidade aqui já é uma vila... mas a diferença que existe a nível de sociedade já se põe também, se for uma grande cidade ou uma pequena cidade ou uma vila, que é a relação entre as comunidades que fazem parte dela. As pessoas coabitam, falam muito umas com as outras, se for nas cidades as pessoas nem no mesmo prédio se falam quase. Portanto, isto tem a ver com, com o relacionamento social dependendo se é um meio pequeno ou grande ou uma vila, grande cidade ou vila, não é?

enq1: E acha que essa questão levanta essa situação levanta uma questão de justiça ou de injustiça?

E27: Hum... neste caso não vejo relação com a justiça ou a injustiça, hum... isso faz parte da evolução. Portanto, quem, quem faz parte desse processo evolutivo acaba por, pronto, e social, hum... isso passa, passa muitas vezes por nós, ou seja, essas alterações que depois acontecem a nível da, das cidades, é porque as pessoas não têm tempo, essencialmente é isso, hum... não têm tempo para comunicar umas com as outras, só se for no emprego. Andam sempre a correr, não é? Porque depois a questão que se põe nas cidades é que as pessoas têm de se deslocar muito, enquanto que nas pequenas cidades, as pessoas estão ali perto ou estão... nas grandes cidades as pessoas têm que sistematicamente e a vida que se põe hoje, não é? Trabalha a mulher, o marido, depois o filho tem que ir para a escola ou tem que ir para a... portanto, é um processo muito... muito, muito complicado. Há pouco tempo para estar... a própria família já tem pouco tempo para estar junta, por isso, muito menos tempo tem para falar com os outros.

enq1: E quando diz que faz parte da evolução... acha isso desejável?

E27: Hum... não é fácil alterar, não é fácil. Para alterar, para alterar isso tinha de se alterar o sistema todo. Não estou a ver...

enq1: É só porque eu não percebi se acha isso positivo ou negativo.

E27: Hum... É positivo nalguns aspectos e negativo noutros. Hum... é assim... o, o problema é que as populações crescem, não é? Há um aumento populacional grande. Hum... a qualidade de vida aumenta, isso é bom, aumenta a tecnologia, aumenta a qualidade de vida, as pessoas duram mais tempo, a parte negativa é o relacionamento entre elas, começa a desligar. Essa é a parte negativa, mas isso é como em tudo, há partes boas e partes más. Agora se não há equilíbrio, depois... é, é que é mau, não é?" E27/AP.

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E51: Injustiças? Prontos, eu acho que injustiças que não, não há assim grande... Aqui na Maia, como vivi aqui e participo aqui em muita coisa, prontos, a minha irmã é natural daqui, também mora aqui, venho aqui com eles, agora para Domingo, venho cá à inauguração do Lar da Nazaré, que é ali na igreja nova, na igreja velha da Maia. Vai ser inaugurado um lar, vem o bispo e tal... e gosto de conviver, pronto. Assim como o Jardim Zoológico, o Presidente da, da Junta da Maia, um grande amigo meu também, prontos... e Santa Maria acho que também... está, para agora está tudo, agora quando vier as novas eleições não sei, porque agora o Presidente vai ser um para 5 freguesias! Lá no Castelo. Porque eles é assim, agora... havia um presidente em cada freguesia, agora vai ser um para as 5! Agora é que pode modificar um bocadinho, não é? É muito trabalho para um! Agora, como estava, estava bem, mas o governo mudou tudo... Agora é um concorrente para as 5! E a Junta não sei onde é que vai ser, se há-de ser no Castelo ou onde é que vai ser, não sei... enq1: Hum, hum. E há assim mais algum problema na Maia ou em Avioso?

Sr. Aníbal: Aqui na Maia não e em Avioso acho que também não há assim grandes problemas. Eles têm feito as estradas, têm feito tudo! Prontos, eu acho que está tudo... aqui na Maia também agora aí os... este ano fizeram a feirita agrícola ali no Bom Despacho... estão a melhorar algumas coisas, não é?

enq1: O que é que tem melhorado mais?

E51: Santa Maria, prontos, agora vão fazer o BTT no Domingo, tem as festas que foi agora estas últimas duas semanas, lá a Senhora da Agonia e a Santa Ovídeo, vão fazer lá a corrida das bicicletas, prontos, e acho que está tudo... tem a universidade, o ISMAI, aqui em São Pedro, ao lado, divide... não, aqui São Pedro e Santa Maria acho que está mais ou menos evoluído, está. A nível de... agora vão... também vão alargar o cemitério de Santa Maria... Sr. Aníbal: Alargar o cemitério de Santa Maria, pronto, já está a ficar pequeno. Acho que... não estou assim a ver coisas... Agora, o que é eles prometem às vezes coisas para fazer só que não fazem, não é? Está ali o Ecocentro à beira da minha porta, tem o terreno

para fazer um ringue, um, um coiso desportivo só, sabe como é agora a dificuldade dos dinheiros é que é o pior. O dinheiro agora não chega para as coisas, não é?" E51

“enq1: Hum, hum. E... e diga-me uma coisa, estas obras todas que foram feitas, falou-me já de muita coisa, e não só também das actividades, acha que trouxeram justiça para a Maia e para a Santa Maria?”

E51: ... Veio, veio pronto favorecer muito....Favoreceu muito porque as pessoas, pronto, o seu passatempo... passatempo, vai até ao quintalito e faz ali... acho que são coisas que... são necessárias, não é? Acho que são coisas necessárias, pronto. Agora também fazer coisas para... só para a gente ver, não vai! Também tem lá um museu, não é? E agora esteve lá uma boa exposição que era do Sport Clube do Castelo da Maia, o Museu municipal lá no Castelo... estou a dizer se fosse coisas assim feitas só para, para a gente olhar para as paredes, pronto, não é? Há coisas que a gente não tem... não, não passa tempo, assim como o museu, é uma parte quando há exposições, não é? A pessoa vai e ainda agora foi a Festa de Santa Ovídeo, esteve lá muita gente também, esteve lá a exposição do Sport Clube do Castelo da Maia, não sei, 2 mesitos, parece que acabou agora no dia 31. Pronto, são coisas que chama +[pron=lapsus] as pessoas. Agora, se for agora às piscinas desde Junho, salvo erro, até agora, não falta lá gente! Movimenta muita gente as piscinas! Aquilo é gente, até mete medo! E não, não cabe lá toda a gente nas piscinas.

enq1: E isso favorece?

E51: Favorece. Então? Acho que favorece, os moradores e não-moradores, não é? São coisas que tem interesse para a freguesia. Assim como São Pedro também, o São Pedro é só o... o Parque de Avioso e tem lá um ringue e tal, hum... para desportivo, pronto, esse é que está mais um bocadito... fraco, a freguesia.

enq1: Mas porquê?

E51: Pronto, não tem capela mortuária, é uma coisinha pegada à igreja, tem... Gemunde já tem uma capela grande, Barca já tem uma capela, Santa Maria também já tem, pronto, são obras feitas pela autarquia, não é?... Gondim também já tem uma, uma, uma boa capela, foi feita agora há pouco e tem desenvolvido muito, a nível de moradores e... tudo, aquilo por acaso agora está a desenvolver muito!... Em todas, é. Santa Maria está e o São Pedro; Gemunde, Gondim também... também tem... tem... e tem as colectividades, o futebol, prontos, e está bem, aqui também mais não pode haver...

enq1: Então e diga-me lá, hum... destas obras todas de que me falou, explique-me lá como é que elas favorecem aqui a Maia, por exemplo, a Feira Agrícola.

E51: A Feira Agrícola, prontos, tinha o gado, tinha lá um cavalito, um cavalo bonito que era a atracção do povo, pronto foi o primeiro ano e depois no Domingo também tiraram o leite à vaca e deram de beber a quem quisesse. Foi o primeiro ano, foi engraçada a Feira... Acho que sim, ainda tinha ali umas pessoazinhas +[palavra corrigida por ap a partir de pessoítas] a vender... Tinha coisas... produtos. Produtos como no caso dos presuntos, tinha lá... as pessoas compram; coisas artesanais, pronto, feitas à mão, prontos, como a gente diz, aquelas compotas e tudo... pronto. Acho que devia continuar... Aqui na Maia, não é? Foi a primeira vez que fizeram, mas... uma feira é sempre feira... Coisas modernas. Agora a gente está habituada a comer manteiga e tudo, agora essas compotas que vêm são muito boas. E tinha muita coisa ali!... Portanto, foi o primeiro ano, agora não quer dizer, tinha o... aqui um senhor que tem produção de vinho, também tinha lá a vender. Não quer dizer que é o primeiro ano, para o ano que vá melhorar, não é? Mas...

enq1: E depois também referiu a BTT...

E51: É, é o... corrida de bicicletas. Que fazem muito lá no Castelo isso. É agora... agora Sexta e Sábado, hum Sábado e Domingo.

enq1: E isso também é positivo?

E51: É, porque eles juntam... então já estão 800 e tal inscritos, ciclistas! Sabe que traz muita gente ali a Santa Maria, e depois não é só os corredores, também vêm os familiares - faz negócio! Ali o comércio faz ali o negócio no... É sempre bom, porque senão os cafés e aquilo está tudo ali com aquilo do costume e vem muita gente de fora aquilo... é como o Castelo quando joga o voleibol, vem ali o Benfica, vem o, o Leixões, vem o Esmoriz, junta-se sempre muita gente! Porquê? Vêm os clubes, são grandes e trazem muita gente para ver também." E51/AP

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“E25: E estão aqui a mudar a cidade, do Sameiro e... penso que é uma coisa positiva. Vai chamar pessoas de fora para aqui para a cidade. É bom! Evoluir... Hum... ali o Sameiro, o jardim do Sameiro, hum.... em toda a minha vida conheci como um jardim, e eles agora estão a mudar e vão pôr lá uma fonte, hum... aqui no centro da cidade vão reconstruir um café que fica num jardim, hum... estão a mudar a rua, estão a pôr a cidade mais clara, digamos assim, os passeios claros e limpos, uma cidade limpa. Hum... é por aí a reconstrução da cidade - estão a fazer bem.

enq1: E achas que isso é uma justiça?

E25: É, porque trabalhamos para isso, somos cidadãos daqui e acho que deve ser aproveitado para nós, não é? O dinheiro que nós damos, que pagamos, acho eu, as contribuições, não é? Acho que... não sei se todo o dinheiro vem daí, acho que não, mas é bom que saibamos que o nosso dinheiro está a ser usado para uma coisa boa aqui na cidade.

enq1: Sim. E como é que isso te faz sentir?

E25: Bem! Eu gosto de dizer que... às vezes lá no trabalho [in Porto] "Vocês têm que ir a Penafiel, que é uma cidade, onde está... onde está-se bem, não se passa lá nada e o Sameiro está a ser reconstruído...". É bonito! Tenho orgulho na cidade." E25.

"E25: Hum... Não. Dos pontos que eu queria dizer é que Penafiel é uma cidade de elite, é... Hum... que já me aconteceu isso lá do café. Hum... até como nós tratamos as pessoas, como as pessoas nos tratam a nós também é diferente. É diferente. Hum... nota-se bastante em espaços comerciais. Hum... hum... o falar, dependendo da profissão que nós temos - mas eu não sei se é aqui ou se é porque nos conhecem ou se é assim em todo o... em todo o mundo, provavelmente é - conforme o nível de vida que nós temos, e digo cultura, profissão, educação, hum... as pessoas tratam-nos de maneira diferente. Hum... Eu sinto isso aqui porque eu moro aqui e também porque não vou a outras cidades, infelizmente, hum... mas acho que é assim, aqui em Penafiel. É.

enq1: E... e podias explorar isso um bocadinho mais? O que é que queres dizer com o tratamento das pessoas?

E25: Hum... o que, o que... o tratamento das pessoas, por exemplo, hum... - fogo! - a pensar... hum... vamos a uma loja qualquer, daqui Penafiel, hum... se nós tivermos, se, se essas pessoas souberem que nós temos um tipo de profissão, um tipo... não sei, temos dinheiro, é mesmo assim, tratam-nos de maneira diferente, já somos atendidos de maneira diferente, já são mais prestáveis, mais simpáticos, mais acolhedores, hum... É diferente, é totalmente diferente.

enq1: Hum, hum. Estou a perceber. E tu achas isso uma injustiça?

E25: É. Devemos ser todos tratados de maneira igual, desde que não fiquemos a dever nada a ninguém, devemos ser todos tratados da mesma forma! E é injusto." E2/AP.

F.1.4 Desert-based a-spatial

"E55: As injustiças no Porto... não sei. Talvez a diferença das... das zonas... dos diferentes... Hum... não sei. É complicado, nunca... nunca... nunca pensei sobre isso. Temos algumas diferenças de umas áreas para as outras, mas... o Porto basicamente é uma... é uma cidade de, de trabalho, não é? E... uma cidade que foi construída ou que cresceu à custa de um... de uma burguesia... empreendedora e que, pronto, inerente à classe sempre fez uma certa distinção entre quem faz alguma coisa ou quem não quer fazer, não é? Isso depois nota-se pelas zonas da cidade. Está melhor, mas ainda, ainda há muito para fazer. Nós temos zonas que estão bem, temos zonas que estão menos bem. Estamos sempre a falar numa... numa... numa área habitacional, não é? Por aí que estamos a, que se dirige. Eu creio que talvez Paranhos e Campanhã tenham alguns problemas em relação ao resto, porque... por motivos geográficos, não faço ideia, ficaram sempre mais... mais para o interior e como isto é um país dessa... em que existem essas diferenças, é normal que numa cidade se note, não é? Penso só mesmo aquela parte mais... mais popular ali da Foz, a Cantareira e por aí fora, estão... estão bastante melhores do que algumas zonas de... principalmente de Campanhã, não é? Embora isto tenha vindo a melhorar, têm tentado resolver o problema lá dos bairros. Foram feitas algumas coisas a nível dos bairros sociais em toda a cidade, mas é sempre relativo. E se bem percebi era isto, não é?

enq1: Sim, à volta disto. Não sei se percebi bem a questão da... da relação do Porto com origem na burguesia e depois disse há outros que fazem, há os que não fazem e eu não percebi.

E55: Não, é assim: a classe burguesa... os burgueses têm um princípio - premeiam quem trabalha, certo? E, e, e em qualquer sociedade, escolha a que quiser e no sítio do mundo que quiser, há os que trabalham e os que não trabalham, mas é natural às pessoas, não tem nada a ver com... independentemente de ser empreendedor ou não ser empreendedor, se uma pessoa for trabalhadora, não é?, é premiada em relação a quem trabalha menos. E... como a cidade nunca foi uma cidade aristocrática, embora tenha, mas foi principalmente a partir do século XVII, ou XVIII, não, foi mais XVIII, a burguesia é que a puxou para cima. Hum... as pessoas premiadas por isso, pelo esforço do trabalho, tiveram mais regalias que os outros, entende? É.

enq1: Que tipo de regalias é que...?

E55: Não... são, são, são regalias normais, quer dizer, é assim, você trabalha, se trabalhar bem vai progredindo, não é? Há hipóteses de promoções, há outras... esse género, não é? E quem trabalha mal ou não quer trabalhar, fica por ali, não é? Isso reflecte-se em tudo!

enq1: Na cidade também?

E55: A cidade é uma organização de pessoas, não é? Se falarmos numa aldeia, o princípio é o mesmo numa escala muito pequena. Quanto maior é a escala, maior é as disparidades, não é? Como a cidade é grande, ou é média... para Portugal é grande, mas é a cidade pequena ou média, porque basicamente a cidade são quê? 300 e tal mil, 400 pessoas não chega, não é? essas diferenças notam-se. Se formos falar das periferias é pior, não é?

enq1: E essas diferença entre áreas do Porto considera isso uma injustiça?

E55: Não, não considero uma injustiça. Considero uma selecção natural. A única coisa que eu acho que deve ser feita pela cidade, por todos os, os cidadãos, é tentar compensar as zonas mais desprotegidas com serviços básicos e coisas do género. Faça-me entender?

enq1: O que é que inclui nesses serviços básicos?

E55: Transportes decentes, não é? Escolas iguais às outras, não piores, ao mesmo nível. Hum... centros de saúde que se chamam agora, esse género de, de, de... com qualidade sempre, não haver distinções entre uma coisa e outra.

E55: Ei, pá! Os bairros... não, é assim você sabe 10 vezes mais do que eu, vocês que estão a estudar aí... Os bairros sabem por que é que foram criados, certo? Pronto, e na altura esses bairros foi uma solução achada para resolver o problema de habitação, crescimentos rápidos... e os bairros criados nas freguesias mais limítrofes, ou mais periféricas do mar, falo em relação ao Porto apanharam esse género de pessoas com menos interesse nas... na parte... empreendedora ou responsável de trabalho. Isso reflecte-se em tudo e se der uma volta pela cidade, embora agora nestes últimos tempos tenha sido feita uma... uma recondici ... um recondicionamento dos bairros e dotaram-se as casas de melhores condições pelo que eu sei, os problemas sociais são mais, são mais complicados nuns lados do que noutros, devido à base, à génese da coisa, não é? Porque eles continuam lá todos naqueles sítios e quem... e há... e uma coisa que é notória é que quem está nesses sítios e consegue e trabalha e não sei quê, a primeira coisa que quer fazer é sair de lá! Os bairros é um problema das sociedades, o nosso é pequenino, eles em França têm 10 vezes piores que os nossos, portanto... estes últimos anos foi... tentou-se resolver esse problema, está mais ou menos dentro do que é possível, não é? E pronto.

enq1: E acha que essa questão dos bairros sociais levanta alguma... alguma questão de injustiça?

E55: Não. Não é, não é, não é questão de injustiça, cria... cria é uma... uma diferença de oportunidades dentro... é cá do Porto? (...)

“enq1: Estava a comentar a diferença de oportunidades nos bairros.

E55: Não é na diferença de oportunidades, é evidente que as pessoas que... e aqui a cidade nesse aspecto, eu não tenho... também não tenho muita vivência social disso, por isso... mas, mas as... aqui a nível do ensino, até há uns anos atrás, agora mudou muito, qualquer um tinha hipótese de chegar a um liceu, não é? E quem se aplicava seguia em frente, tinha era que ser aplicado, ser trabalhador, não é? Pronto. Se a base, não é? se a génese da coisa já sai com defeito, tarde ou nunca se endireita! Entende? Ou porque os pais obrigavam a estudar em casa, ou porque... ou porque, sei lá, a vida social em casa permitia e as conversas que havia eram em si... não é?

enq1: Então é nesse sentido que dizia que... associava os bairros à diferença... diferente oportunidade?

E55: Os bairros foram... sim, mas os bairros foram criados para umas classes sociais mais baixas, certo? E independentemente de ser alta ou baixa, há pessoas independentemente da classe social em que estão, que são mais interessadas em vários motivos do que outras, isso reflecte-se em tudo. É evidente, voltando ao início, que qualquer pessoas que more lá no fundo em Campanhã prefere mil vezes estar a morar cá em baixo no... no... em Ramalde ou Aldoar ou não sei quê do que estar lá em cima, porque as condições são melhores, sei lá, o tempo é melhor, não faço ideia, há vários motivos... a vivência social é melhor, por aí... Mas as injustiças são criadas naturalmente, não é? Isso é uma história de classes antiga, portanto não vale a pena perdermos muito tempo por aí. Não existe, é utopia.”

“E55: Hum... o que é que quer que eu lhe diga? Há... há um problema na, na... que não é do Porto, no resto... transferi isso directamente para o Porto, mas acho que o problema que nós temos cá e é uma questão de evolução da sociedade, isso também cria injustiças, não é? Nós muito rapidamente passámos de... alterámos os valores que tínhamos das coisas e portanto isso fez com que... com que houvesse mais... maior disparidade entre quem tem e quem não tem e maior distinção entre quem pode e quem não pode, faça-me entender? E... isso foi talvez muito rápido e a sociedade não teve, mas aqui já não é o Porto, é a sociedade portuguesa não teve tempo suficiente para se adaptar a essa... essa... a essa alteração de valores, foi muito rápida! Não estou a dizer que estes são melhores ou piores que os anteriores ou vice-versa. Ou se os que gostava mais eram aqueles com que fui educado que agora são ligeiramente diferentes, mas isso...”

enq1: E podia-me explorar um bocadinho mais essa questão como é que a alteração dos valores afecta...?

E55: Afecta da maneira simples, não é? Sei lá. Hoje acho, eu acho que se dá mais valor, dá-se mais interesse àquele fulano que tem dinheiro em relação ao fulano que faz alguma coisa, não é? Dá-se valor àquele tipo que foi um chico-esperto em relação àquele que sempre correu, sempre teve um, um perfil íntegro. São essas pequenas coisas, não é? E esse valores mudaram muito nos últimos 20 anos, 30 talvez e isso ... a sociedade tem evoluído, está cada vez mais liberal e portanto as, as diferenças sociais são mais... não é? São mais acentuadas. Quando se perdem alguns princípios de... de... de, de obrigação social que as pessoas têm, não é?

enq1: E acha que essa alteração levanta alguma questão de injustiça, essa alteração de valores?

E55: É assim, eu considero que o aumento da diferença entre as classes causa injustiças e como a sociedade alterou os valores, essas injustiças, no meu ponto de vista, estão mais pronunciadas agora, não é?

enq1: E... e o que é que sente em relação a essa situação?

E55: Qual situação?

enq1: Do aumento do... do aumento das injustiças.

E55: Ah, isso... tenho de pensar, nunca pensei nisso, não...

enq1: Não tem assim nenhum sentimento que lhe venha associado?

E55: Há uma certa tristeza da, da evolução da sociedade, mas não quero ser melancólico, mas acho que há uma... perdeu, perderam-se valores, percebe? E isso fez com que se acentuasse essas, essas injustiças vamos-lhe chamar assim. Pronto. Entenda-se... embora seja apologista que... tem de premiar quem trabalha, não é? Independentemente de ser um, um físico nuclear XPTO que inventou não sei o quê ou um técnico de limpeza de rua que tenha a rua sempre impecável, façome entender? Isso para mim é... são igualmente importantes, mas... mas... nessa... passaram a ser vistas de maneira diferente." E55/AP

The hesitating presence of equality.

“enq1: E... e ainda em relação ao Porto, há alguma coisa que comece agora a mudar?

E55: A cidade do Porto, política à parte, certo? Ou com política incluída?

enq1: Depende o que é que entende por política.

E55: Estamos numa época política, ainda por cima com as eleições autárquicas! Não, tem... é assim, o Port +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida], o Porto tem nos últimos talvez 20 anos, deu um passo muito grande em qualidade a nível de... de... de... de afirmação de cidade, de... de... de...de carac +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida], de, de valores próprios, de... pronto isso tem vindo a aumentar, isso nota-se. Temos cá muitos low cost que vêm cá fazer aqueles programas de fins-de-semana ou curtos, a cidade tem vindo a crescer, a nível de... de... de...de cultura está... está melhor, eventos culturais. O metro foi uma, uma grande... uma grande... mais-valia, mas está... está uma grande diferença da cidade, isso...

enq1: E alguma dessas diferenças acha que levantam questões de justiça ou de injustiça?

E55: Não, eu isso acho que não. Não, porque o metro é igual para todos, 80 por cento ou 90 por cento dos eventos culturais que há são acessíveis a quase toda a gente, não é? Porque se as pessoas têm dinheiro para gastar... a carregar telemóveis e fazer chamadas disparatadas a mandar, não é? Também só não têm para comprar um bilhete para, para uma exposição ou para um concerto ou isso porque não querem, não é? Portanto, eu isso aí acho que o... o acesso, as oportunidades estão abertas a todos e tem sido conseguido... tem-se conseguido fazer aqui algumas coisas interessantes!

enq1: E... e há alguma preocupação que tenha em relação ao Porto sobre a qual ainda não tenha as ideias totalmente claras, ainda não saiba se vai levantar questões de justiça ou de injustiça?" AP/E55.

“E... se calhar eu posso considerar que é injusto estar a dar um rendimento de...de... mínimo a alguém que anda na droga e a roubar e que... acho isso injusto, não é? E ter uma pessoa que trabalhou durante 40 e tal ou 50 anos, teve um, um problema qualquer e que vive com um... uma reforma miserável! Percebe? Acho mais injusto isso em relação ao tipo que nunca fez nada e que anda na droga e que recebe dinheiro. Isso são parâmetros diferentes. Isso aí não tem nada a ver com uma coisa ou com outra, não é? Tem a ver com a evolução da sociedade neste pseudo liberalismo-socialista, não é? E que dá estas... estas injustiças, vamos falar assim, chamar-lhes isso.” AP/E55.

“E55: ... aqui o que se nota é uma cultura pimba que está acentuada e que tem vindo a crescer muito, principalmente nos mais... que, por exemplo, em Zurique não se nota, embora haja vários níveis sociais, eu não vejo muitos pimbas. Sabe o que é pimba, não sabe?

enq1: Hum... mas não sei se estou a perceber neste contexto.

E55: Sabe o que é aquelas... estas... pronto... aquelas pessoas assim um bocadinhos mais mal-educadas, menos... menos... mais boçais, quenão se vê... pronto mas isso é cultura nossa, não sei talvez, também temos esse problema, somos... somos ibéricos ou latinos, portanto, às vezes um bocadinho mais exuberantes, mas... mas isso é uma questão de educação e cultura do povo, e isso demora mais tempo. Mas acho que tirando isso, também é uma particularidade da cidade, mas, por exemplo, se você chegar ali à zona da Ribeira, as pessoas são como são, mas têm aquele... esta nova geração é um bocadinho mais diferente e é isso que, que eu noto em relação a essas pessoas. A dúvida é assim, é complicado mas...

enq1: Esta nova geração é diferente em que sentido?

E55: Ah... voltando atrás, no centro dos valores das coisas, da educação, deste género, não é? Eu não ando, eu normalmente não uso transportes públicos, isso é muito raro, mas sei que há cenas nos autocarros que no meu tempo era completamente inconcebível, não é? Eles mantêm-se sentados, porque os outros se quiser que façam o que quiserem, não é? Portanto, há valores que se perderam e isso nota-se.

enq1: Mas quando diz a nova geração está a referir-se a essa parte da população...?

E55: Não, a toda.

enq1: Toda, em geral?

E55: Em geral, não é? É evidente que quanto... como é que hei-de explicar? Quanto menos têm, menos aprendem, não é?

enq1: E... e... e essa... e essa presença... que disse, presença... de cultura pimba acentuada considera que isso levanta uma questão de injustiça? Ou não se aplica neste caso?

E55: Não, isso... não, não, não levanta injustiça, é... é... a gente... é resultado da... da... da... da fraca base com que arrancam, não é? Não tem nada a ver. A injustiça já... a injustiça não... também é um bocado difícil de achar bem o que é que é injustiça, não é?"E55/AP.

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"E16: Não é? Pois, nós fizemos... eu fiz aí um... um barulhito e... o Facebook dá imenso jeito nestas coisas, não é? Porque... coincidência ou não, passado poucos meses puseram aqui uns semáforos.

enq1: E, e foi por parte de quem o...

E16: Foi a Câmara depois, foi a Câmara que pôs. Eu sei que já havia um movimento há uns, há uns, pelo menos há mais de um ano ou dois para porem semáforos e... e não punham. A verdade é que desde que começou-se a fazer um bocado de barulho no Facebook e coincidência ou não, não sei, funcionou, não é? Hum... Que mais assim? As coisas que estão mal... sei lá! Várias coisas, não é?

...

enq1: E essa questão do... do cruzamento, como é que essa situação a fazia sentir? Antes de estar resolvida?

E16: Ah, muito, muito insegura. Então, eu tenho filhos com idades muito diferentes e um deles tem 12 e eu queria que ele fosse autónomo, quero que ele seja autónomo, é para isso que o educamos, não é?, para ser autónomo e saber que ele vai à rua e não ter a certeza se ele vai ser atropelado ali é assim um bocadinho... e foi num desses dias que eu o deixei ir ao supermercado em que, ele por acaso já tinha chegado a casa, e eu estava ali na janela e vi uma menina a ser atropelada... podia ter sido ele, não é? Porque tinha acabado de chegar. E eu acho que isso é, é... para isso que eu também ajo, como mãe faço algum barulho, para haver segurança para os miúdos crescerem, para poderem andar como nós andávamos na rua, cá fora, não é? Porque eu vejo pais agora de lá da escola que dizem "Ai, não deixo o meu filho sozinho, porque... porque, porque", mas temos que deixar! É a minha opinião, temos que deixar, mas também temos que fazer alguma coisa para que seja seguro andarem na rua ou de transportes ou o que for, não é?"E16/AP.

"E16: Eu aqui... por acaso aqui não vejo assim... Aqui, eu acho que aqui o Porto é uma... aqui é a Foz, não é?

enq1: Hum, hum.

E16: É um bocadinho à parte do... resto da... da cidade, talvez.

enq1: Em que sentido?

E16: Pois, é... as pessoas aqui escondem um bocado, não é? Tudo o que lhes acontece e tal e estamos todos muito bem e parece quase férias, não é? Uma pessoa trabalha, mas depois tem aqui tudo à frente, tudo ao lado e por isso eu acho que é... é um sítio bom de viver. Se já começarmos a ir mais para ali já vemos outras condições, não é? Hum... Vemos aqui ao pé mesmo, não é? Bairros ótimos e mesmo a 5 minutos bairros com muitas dificuldades. Não deve ser fácil... não deve ser fácil esta... vivência para eles, digo eu, não é? Hum... não é? Quem está mais à vontade não... liga tanto ao que se passa... Eu digo para ali porque ali já há um, não é? Eu vivi muitos anos perto de um bairro e sei os problemas que podem existir, não é?

enq1: E podia... podia-me explorar isso um bocadinho mais? Essas... essa experiência que teve?

E16: A experiência que eu tive... Eu vivi ali perto do bairro da Rainha D. Leonor. Hum... toda a minha infância vivi nesse, perto desse bairro e durante a minha juventude nós estávamos cá fora, brincávamos e jogávamos e, depois mais tarde, estávamos com os amigos e notava-se, não é? Assim alguma... tensão, por vezes, sobretudo, não é?, com 15, 16 anos os rapazes são mais..., não é?, intensos e havia assim umas lutazitas e umas confusões, mas não passavam disso, não é? E uns assaltos, não é? Havia uns assaltos, nisso às vezes a justiça aí... Nós queríamos fazer justiça e eles entravam com mais força, mas... era isso era um... nunca houve assim nada de muito... grave. Lá, é engraçado, enquanto vivi lá nunca houve assaltos e agora que vivo aqui começa a haver também, se calhar por causa da... não é?, do que vivemos agora, desta... falta de estabilidade, não é? Mas...

enq1: E lembra-se como é que se... isso a fazia sentir na altura? Quando vivia ali perto...

E16: Eu, eu não tinha... grande consciência, uma pessoa com 15 anos não tem assim grande... medo não tinha, andei sempre na rua sozinha, continuo a andar e também não... como sempre me dei bem com as pessoas. Eu não incitava a confusão, não é? Não me metia lá dentro, portanto, nunca tive problemas. Não gostava de ver era alguns miúdos, não é?, que vinham e que andavam por aí a pedir... dinheiro. Sempre me fez um bocado de confusão, mas fora isso...

enq1: E... considerava a situação uma justiça, uma injustiça ou essa questão não se colocava?

E16: Na altura?

enq1: Sim, na altura e depois agora.

E16: Na altura não... nem me passava pela cabeça, não é? Hoje em dia... justiça e injustiça, não sei. Há muita coisa, não é? Hum... Não, eu vejo a falar aqui com a minha empregada, que ela vive num bairro também e ela... há algumas coisas que temos a mesma opinião, a mesma opinião, uma pessoa tem que... há justíças e injustiças e há coisas que uma pessoa trabalha para ter, se não trabalha também depois não pode pedir, não pode dizer que é injustiça, não é? Não sei. Eu acho

que há coisas que, que... é preciso trabalhar para se, para se ganhar a vida, não é? Portanto, não fazer nada e ainda ser injusto, não... não concordo, não.(...)

E16: Se formos falar se calhar só do rendimento mínimo, não é?, que habituou as pessoas a não trabalhar. Isso sim, acho injusto. Acho injusto para quem trabalha, por exemplo, como a minha empregada que vem trabalhar de manhã à noite, trabalha e ganha um salário, ganha o dela, não é? E muita gente no bairro dela que ganha rendimento mínimo e não faz, não faz rigorosamente nada! Isso acho injusto. Acho, acho até uma vergonha, não é?, para quem trabalha, para quem trabalha, quem faz alguma coisa... dar não é, não são produtivos, não é? E é uma pena porque está-se a educar... hum... estamos a educar jovens, não é?, futuros adultos para... para dependerem, serem sempre dependentes do Estado e não fazerem nada, o que eu acho uma pena. Essa é a grande... uma das grandes coisas que eu vejo que... acho que se devia educar as pessoas a trabalharem, não é?, a não dependerem de ninguém. É mais fácil, não é? É sempre mais fácil depender, não ter que fazer nada, mas...

enq1: E como é que acha que isso poderia ser resolvido ou melhorado?

E16: É difícil hoje em dia, não é? Sem empregos para ninguém... mas não sei, formação, educação. Educação, educação. Eu continuo a achar que a educação é fundamental! Hum... Educação. Trabalho, algum... Nem digo educação não é preciso, eu acho que não é preciso sermos todos, irmos todos para a universidade ou assim, mas ensinar, dar bases para os... para as crianças estudarem ou terem uma profissão, fazerem alguma coisa para poderem vencer na vida. E há muita coisa aí a fazer, não é? Um trabalho técnico que podia ser feito, que há muitas crianças que podiam fazer. Não fazem! Não sei se investir aí daria algum... daria no futuro alguns adultos mais produtivos, não é?"AP/E16.

"E16: Eu... hum, toda a gente fala da falta de... do desemprego. Eu aqui... Se calhar, felizmente, ainda não tenho essa... essa percepção assim num grande... num grande plano, mas acredito que a falta de emprego não é?... começando a não existir mesmo emprego, acredito que vá afectar toda a cidade, não é? Porque... não há emprego, não há dinheiro a entrar, tem que afectar, seja... hum... indo para fora, como alguns amigos meus já foram, e que não vejo directamente, porque eles mudaram-se daqui para... para outros continentes, não é?, para trabalhar, porque já não há... não há... não chegava aqui. Essa é assim a... o problema que eu vejo, não é? Voltar a... emigrar em grande massa. Mas...

enq1: E essa questão de... sair, acha que isso é uma questão de justiça ou de injustiça?

E16: Eu não vejo as coisas como... eu vejo como outra oportunidade, vejo como oportunidade. Não é?" AP/E16.

"eu digo sempre que acho que se a crise veio por alguma coisa, se calhar veio para... hum... para as pessoas pensarem um pouquinho nos valores e no que gastavam - todos nós gastamos sempre, por norma, mais do que o que devemos, não é? E se calhar às vezes a crise faz bem para... acalmar, pensar e pôr... pôr as... o consumo um bocadinho em... hum... em... acalmar o consumo.

enq1: E, e mencionou valores... o que é que estava a pensar?

E16: Não.

"enq1: Disse qualquer coisa como "faz-nos pensar nos valores", uma coisa assim.

E16: Faz-nos pensar... sim nos valores. Nos valores, no que, valores no... não é? No que é mais importante, não é? Se é, hum... Acho que é engraçado vê-se aí... uma pessoa deixa de... de... hum... se calhar faz mais coisas com a família, deixa de, não é?, como não está tão à vontade para gastar noutras coisas... começa a fazer mais passeios com a família, mais... hum... mais coisas ao nível pessoal, eu acho que é... também pode ser interessante. Mas...

enq1: Então acha que há aqui... hoje em dia há uma... alguma coisa em relação aos valores que não está bem?

E16: Hum... eu acho que está péssimo! Não, não é? "Está péssimo!", hum... acho que às vezes as pessoas têm prioridades... prioridades que não estão correctas, na minha opinião. Não é sempre fácil manter essas prioridades, porque quando é preciso dinheiro é preciso dinheiro e é preciso pôr comida na mesa, não é? Portanto... Infelizmente, posso... posso compreender alguma acções de desespero, mas... mas... eu só posso falar, eu só falo em comparação com os amigos dos meus filhos, não é?, que... não sei, parece que... é trabalho, trabalho, trabalho, trabalho, acho que os filhos ficam para trás e é uma pena ver os miúdos todos aí assim... com falta de... hum... não digo bens materiais, porque não lhe, não lhes faltará isso, se calhar, mas falta-lhes o resto... que considero bem mais importante e bem mais... que aguenta muito mais no tempo, não é? Muito mais importante para o futuro!" E16/AP.

"E16: Não, eu vou sempre é via... via a Fátima, que ela tem vários casos na família, e que às vezes me fala e está indignada e com razão, não é? Porque... com razão, não é?, e com razão. Indignada porque as pessoas não querem fazer nada! Mas, felizmente, nem toda a gente tem a mesma ideia dessa sobrinha, não é?, que não quer, que quer ser... uma... que quer ter sempre uma muleta atrás dela.

enq1: Portanto, pessoas novas também?

E16: Sim. E... é pena, é pena... mas pronto. Não se consegue mudar o mundo! Mas se calhar devagarinho, fazendo estas coisas pode... devagarinho. Este fim-de-semana estávamos a falar sobre isso mesmo, não é? Como... como mudar... ou o que fazer, não é?, para as pessoas deixarem de estar... na preguiça, na sombra. Mas quando se vê também... eu compreendo, é difícil, dá trabalho, é preciso... tira tempo, não é?, para as outras coisas, mas..."(E16).

F.1.5 Walzer *citadin*

enq1: E... e voltando à primeira questão que me falou do centro do Porto transformado

E30: Num grande hotel!

enq1: em bar e restaurante. E, pronto, isso considera uma injustiça?

E30: Considero, claramente. Claramente.

enq1: E... como é que isso o faz sentir?

E30: Olhe, isso é... é um... é assim, o que me faz sentir? Quer dizer... isto há sempre um sentimento de... de desagrado, não é? E de alguma revolta, porque as pessoas, nós temos que verba, que verbalizar aquilo que nos vai na alma e... e, e não é correcto, quer dizer, a Câmara do Porto não fez coisíssima nenhuma a não ser dizer "Venham, venham, venham, venham. Ai que bom! Ai que bom! Ai que bom!", quando nós não temos a certeza, aliás há muitas cidades lá fora que já não querem seguir este caminho, portanto vão à nossa frente, portanto, os sinais já vão em sentido contrário, mas nós, claro, parolos como sempre, não é? Pequeninos como sempre, de vistas muito curtas estamos a copiar modelos que deram os seus... os seus... não sei se estou a falar a verdade, mas aquilo que eu sei da minha experiência pessoal, foram modelos muito desenvolvidos em Espanha nos anos 80 e 90! E agora estão a ser em 2000 e tal desenvolvidos em... 2013, 2010/2013, desenvolvidos no Porto, quer dizer, isto não faz sentido nenhum! Quando já há muita gente que coloca em questão até, aliás até noutra dia vi um técnico não sei de quê, de Urbanismo, que colocava também em questão esta... esta própria estratégia da Câmara, que é uma estratégia de curtíssimo prazo, não é? Porquê? Porque está assente numa operadora de voos, porque está assente numa, numa visão de cons +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida], consumista e rápida das viagens e do estar em vez de ser numa coisa mais sustentada, com o Douro aqui tão perto, etc., etc., numa visão mais... mais global. E depois injusta, respondendo directamente, porque o que interessa na cidade e nas cidades é captar pessoas e pessoas com qualidade de vida e pessoas que vivam bem a cidade e que recebam bem aqueles que a visitam, mas que também aqueles que a visitam saibam comportar-se, não é? E adequem-se ao seu, aos seus estrato, ao seu estatuto cultural, digamos assim, ao modo de ser cultural das cidades. Portanto, isso é incorrecto, incorrectíssimo. O não ser correcto, o incorrecto é não ser recto. Não ser recto é não ter direito, não ter direito é ser injusto. Percebeu?"E30/AP.

"E30: Coisas que não... Olhe, há uma coisa muito má e que eu acho uma injustiça para com as pessoas que lá vivem, foi a transformação do Porto, nomeadamente o centro histórico do Porto, num centro de bares e cafés e restaurantes e... ou seja, o centro histórico, aquilo ficou transformado nos últimos talvez 2 ou 3 ou 4 anos - já não sei muito bem, mas foi mais ou menos isso, com mais força nestes últimos 4 ou 5 anos, não sei - ficou transformado num grande... num grande playground, numa grande zona de diversão de todas as pessoas à volta do Porto que se deslocam para ali à noite e isso não me parece correcto, nem justo para com as pessoas que lá moram, nem adequado para a protecção do património do Porto. Portanto, é uma coisa muito bonita ter bons restaurantes, bons cafés, bons bares, mas bons, não massificados como tem sido actualmente a cidade do Porto. Massificado à custa do turismo externo também e um bocado de pé de chinelo e que eu acho que não é a via correcta para uma cidade se impor pela qualidade e não pela quantidade. Portanto, para os moradores isto só traz problemas de saúde, de segurança, de sossego, do direito ao sono, etc., etc., etc. Portanto, é uma desgraça para as pessoas que lá vivem... Portanto, há muitas queixas e muita injustiça na, na forma como a Câmara Municipal do Porto tem tratado esse assunto, que foi imposta aliás por ela! Tanto é que isso parece-me uma injustiça clamorosa para com os habitantes do Porto, para com o respeito pela História, percebe? Pelos edifícios históricos, etc., etc. Aquilo é tudo transformado nuns pastiches, numas coisas, num pronto-a-vestir nocturno, é incorrecto. Depois toda, toda a sujidade, toda a porcaria, toda a... o desrespeito que está associado. Não sou contra a noite, mas num centro histórico não me parece claramente o sítio indicado para haver um centro de diversões nocturnas. Transformar o centro de uma cidade histórica como é o Porto num centro de diversões nocturno, nocturno não me parece correcto! É injusto.(...) As cidades servem para as pessoas viverem e trabalharem e portanto têm de certa forma haver aqui um equilíbrio entre essas comodidades, estacionamento e custo dos mesmos, uma coisa que não existe, não é?, nas cidades não existe. E acho que o Porto nisto tem perdido muita gente à conta desta, desta brincadeira, não é? Estão a transformar isto numa montra muito interessante por fora, mas completamente degradada por dentro. Portanto, o que interessa nas cidades, as cidades são locais de pessoas, não é? É o sítio onde as pessoas se encontram. Não é um sítio para beber copos nem para passear e dizer "Que bonito que era no século XVI ou no século XIV"! Isso deve ser mantido, porque são preciosidades mas não é, não é esse o sentido da cidade, portanto, há aqui uma corrupção que tem a ver com a corrupção dos tempos em que vivemos! Há aqui uma corrupção absoluta do sentido e do viver de uma cidade, que depois leva a que as pessoas a abandonem! Não é? E as Câmaras, no fundo, preocupam-se com coisas que são bagatelas do ponto de vista da gestão em vez de se preo +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida] ... de terem planos estratégicos de longo prazo e que façam a revitalização da cidade e da sua... porque uma cidade só vive com a economia, não é? Sem economia não existe e eles querem transformar estas cidades portuguesas, as que podem, em economias turísticas, quer dizer, mas as pessoas não vivem todas disso, não é? Portanto, partem. Está errado. Isto acaba por se transformar num grande, num Hollywood, uma grande fachada! Isto é uma corrupção que os nossos políticos estão a fazer, é uma maldade que estão a fazer às nossas cidades e, nomeadamente, ao Porto, claramente! Aliás, eles ficam todos contentes quando, quando vêem as estatísticas do centro histórico e vêem que aquilo está um completo degredo. Por outro lado, as freguesias ribeirinhas e a

frente marítima do Porto é muito utilizada, é cada vez mais utilizada, isso parece-me correcto. Mas também se nota muito envelhecimento, mas isso tem a ver com as questões da, da, da especulação imobiliária."E30/AP.

"E30: Câmara está ligada a tudo o que é terrenos e tem um olho muito gordo sobre os terrenos que valem muito dinheiro e portanto faz ali maroscas, enfim, tenta meter o dedo na gestão dos terrenos privados, faz pressão com - isto sei profissionalmente até - faz pressão com... inventa coisas da limpeza dos terrenos e coimas atrás de coimas e por cima de coimas, tudo no sentido de evitar que os... os senhorios, portanto, os donos, perdão, os proprietários dos terrenos façam alguma coisa com eles! Quer dizer, é inacreditável, portanto, tanto do lado - isto no fundo é a transformação de... - quer dizer, tanto de um lado como do outro é transformação num pastiche e, por outro lado, pressão sobre os proprietários para venda a grupos económicos muito poderosos, alguns até da própria cidade do Porto, dos terrenos que ainda restam nas zonas nobres, consideradas zonas nobres, como sejam a Foz, por aí fora, não é? Portanto, há aqui muita corrupção, muita... que se eu disser assim "Ah, mas quem é que é corrupto?" Não é nesse sentido do corrupto, é no sentido da corrupção relacionada com hum... a ,a ,a apreensão administrativa de terrenos, percebe? Encapotada, à má fila, a dizer que vamos fazer e vamos acontecer e vamos ter e depois não temos dinheiro, mas agora são vocês, que os proprietários têm que avançar "Vocês têm que, têm que fazer os loteamentos, têm que fazer", quer dizer, estamos a brincar, não é? Portanto, há aqui muita... o jogo político é um jogo absolutamente porco, deturpado, numa lógica... como é que hei-de dizer? Numa lógica muito... muito interna, muito... de autoconsumo, percebe? Não é virado para as pessoas, não é virado para os problemas das pessoas, não é nada disso, é sempre virado numa perspectiva económica e numa perspectiva de... de ver que lucros, que rendimentos é que podemos obter com algum negócio que se possa fazer nalgum lado da cidade do Porto. E eu falo isto quer em termos de taxaço, portanto, é um lucro do Estado, quer em termos até da própria corrupção, mas como digo não tenho nenhuma... é, é o sentido que temos das coisas, dados objectivos e concretos, não temos... vemos as pessoas muito metidas nestes assuntos, não é? Digamos assim, os decisores da cidade do Porto estão todos relacionados umas coisas com outras, não é?"E30/AP.

"E30: Hum, a grande injustiça é sempre, nós quando estamos a falar de questões de justiça, estamos sempre a falar das pessoas, não é? Portanto, quando estamos a atribuir, no conceito clássico da justiça o "Suum cuique tribuere, alterum non laedere", não é? Como é que é? "Nemo plus iuris quam ipse habet". Este é o conceito tradicional de justiça que eu disse em latim e portanto basicamente a justiça o que é? Basicamente, é atribuir a cada um o que é seu, não é? E a cidade, de quem é a cidade? É daqueles que a visitam e é daqueles que lá habitam e trabalham. De facto é. E qual é a justiça disto? Para que é que serve uma cidade? Não é para a Câmara Municipal não sei de quê sobreviver e ter tachos e não sei quê e gabinetes artísticos e praias e... isso não serve para nada! Não é? Essas coisas são instrumentais das pessoas e... mas isso não, não, não existe, não é? Nós na nossa vida e na minha vida actualmente, percebo perfeitamente que nós vivemos numa grande injustiça, não é? Uma grande injustiça. Este conceito que lhe acabei de transmitir, que é um conceito clássico, é um conceito que está completamente distante do, do, dos dias de hoje! Em que as pessoas só pensam no seu umbigo, só querem saber como é que vão ganhar dinheiro sobre aquilo, é uma cultura absolutamente burguesa, pronto, em que há o domínio do económico sobre o valor, sobre o conceito ético-moral que lhe está subjacente, não é? E... e é o mundo que temos! É o tal, a nossa - como é que, como é que se diz? - "novus ordo seclorum", a Nova Ordem Mundial. É que é uma maçada isto! Porque... porque depois a, as pessoas que pensam de forma diferente são considerados revolucionários, não é? E, e com... é anti-sistema. Se quiser eu associo-me completamente a, a esse anti-sistema, não é aqueles que vão fumar drogas para a praça não sei de quê e dizer que está tudo muito mal, temos que mudar e viram-se ao sol e tal e continuam a fumá-las. Isso não é propriamente aquilo que eu acho, pronto divertem-se, está bem. Mas voltando ao raciocínio e se quiser para ter... para, para terminar este ponto, há um distanciamento cada vez maior entre os artifícios institucionalizados, ou seja, aquilo que é criado como institu..., instituição representativa e aquilo que é verdadeiramente o interesse, o justo, o que deve ser feito dentro da, da... das cidades, não é? Depois há guetos, há drogas, há, há prostituições, há este cenário todo que é, claro que nós sabemos que não se consegue acabar, mas não se consegue... mas também não se consegue explicar por que é que subsiste desta maneira, não é?"E30/AP.

"E30: Sim, completamente! É uma estratégia assumida para acabar com a cidade do Porto! O que leva a ainda maior... o resultado disso não é a riqueza, porque não há riqueza, o que... há uma aparência de riqueza, só que não é assente em nada de produtivo - é assente num serviço. Ora se hoje estamos numa economia global, não é? Nós competimos baseados numa única coisa, que é no... no... naquilo que a Ryanair e os outros voos estão aqui plantados, porque quando descobrirem um sítio que lhes dá, que der mais lucro, eles vão levantar voo daqui! E portanto, tudo aquilo que as pessoas fizeram, investiram e gastaram dinheiro e que não tem retorno num ano ou 5, nem 10, não é? A maior parte das vezes não é pensões a 30 euros que vai recuperar os 100 mil ou 200 mil que lá meteu! Num ano ou dois, não consegue, é impossível! Portanto, o que nós assistimos é a uma moda que vai dar mau resultado e que vai levar ainda mais ao empobrecimento das pessoas! Percebe? Porque não é sustentado em nada! Isto não está assente em nada sério! Está assente nalguma coisa séria? Não está! O que é que há para fazer no Porto? O que é que eles têm programado para fazer no Porto? Não têm nada! "Ah, ande aí a pé, vá ver o mar, vá ver a Ribeira e as..." Está bem, pronto, ok, a zona histórica é a única coisa de jeito. Mas depois assim em termos de... de vida cultural, temos assim alguma vida cultural assim tão famosa? Que traga para cá milhares de pessoas? A vida cultural pelos vistos é os copos! E os gays e os copos e os não sei quê e estas porcarias todas que vêm associadas, e as drogas e as lojas do... daquelas tralhas que os miúdos agora consomem! Eu não sou nenhum velho cabotino, mas não gosto, não é? Não gosto, não acho que isto seja bom para a minha cidade! Acho que é preciso justiça, é preciso conta, peso e medida e controlar isto tudo, percebe? Com clareza! E não andar aqui a enganar os pacóvios dos habitantes, que "Isto agora é que vai ser, que o turismo que vem aí que vai ser uma delícia, isto é só ganhar dinheiro a rodos!" É mentira! Até porque de Inverno há muito menos turistas, mas muito menos! Portanto, eles passam 9 meses sem

turistas e 3 meses com turistas - ganham em 3 meses para 9. Portanto, basta haver uma variação num voo ou dois dos que, dos que aí andam para acabar a brincadeira e nunca mais pagam as dívidas que têm! Percebe o meu ponto? Portanto, não é correcto isto, não é correcto. Isto não é uma cidade como Paris, não é? Ou como Lisboa. Não é. Não tem massa crítica suficiente! Nem tem monumentos suficientes! Por aí se vê, isto é uma cidade, uma segunda cidade dum país, pequenino, pobre, etc., etc., etc., que tem, de facto, coisas bonitas e que tem à volta muita coisa para ser explorada numa forma integrada, coisa que não acontece!"E30/AP.

"E30: ... a cidade é gerida de uma forma muito pouco clara, muito distante dos munícipes, não há nenhuma cultura de consenso, nem de busca de... nem, nem vou dizer democrática, porque eu não sou democrata, mas não há uma busca de, de diálogo sobre seja o que for. Que isto da democracia é uma, é uma grande fraude! Mas, quer dizer, não vejo salvação para estas cidades, não é? Quer dizer, o dictato +[palavra desconhecida] que veio lá de fora foi que Portugal e os portugueses, neste caso, teríamos, teríamos que nos adaptar ao turismo e é aquilo que eles estão a fazer! E que depois isto é extremamente injusto porque para nós hoje em dia é tudo caro, para um estrangeiro é tudo barato, o que se torna... o que gera uma escravização do ,do ,do, do povo, do povo português, não é? Do povo, verdadeiro povo, não consegue sair da cepa torta, não tem meios de sair, o valo +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida] ,os valores que tem, que as coisas que tem são valores que para nós ou são excessivos ou estão completamente descompassados da realidade, mas para o estrangeiro é tudo sempre mais barato, muito barato! Portanto, há... também se sente aqui alguma pressão imobiliária aquisitiva por parte de estrangeiros de imóveis com muita qualidade, nomeadamente relacionados com a História, com, com, imóveis históricos, ou, não sendo históricos, em bom rigor, são imóveis com aquela chamada traça, não é? Portanto, também há essa busca destes imóveis. Por outro lado, também se pode dizer que isso é bom, é um fenómeno de substituição da... cultural. Há aqui... que vai no sentido daquela nova ordem mundial que eles tanto pregam, não é? Faz sentido, portanto, está tudo muito bem estruturado, bem pensado, mas isto... as cidades são feitas não são para os munícipes, são para, no caso concreto, parecem-me serem feitas para terceiros!

"enq1: Pois, se for preciso alguma precisão. Gostava só se me pudesse repetir a... porque não estávamos na altura a gravar e eu preciso de usar as suas palavras, a parte de... quando me começou a dizer que isto era um modelo...

E30: Ah, isto é um modelo

enq1: conservador.

E30: hiperconservador, é um modelo tradicional português. É um modelo de organização concelhia do estado Português, antes da centralização, percebe? E antes do Estado moderno. E as cidades eram assim governadas e as aldeias eram assim governadas! Tem um exemplo de até de uma arquitectura muito própria deste tipo de governo que era o... em Mirando do Douro tem lá um... como é que se chama aquilo, bom, vá ver à... tem um monumento que é o sítio onde se reuniam os cidadãos na... na, na gestão do, dos problemas lá do... concelhios, digamos assim. Hoje em dia dizem camarários, mas a Câmara só serve é uma organização de malfeitores, porque só serve para abrigar os meninos dos partidos políticos que não sabem fazer mais nada na vida, senão ganhar dinheiro e distribuir dinheiro! E isto não é governo! Percebe? Por isso é que eu lhe disse que o revolucionário hoje em dia é ser conservador, é ser tradicionalista assente nos valores espirituais, se quiser, se não quiser, vá para a parte agnóstica, tudo muito bem. Mas com... que são valores universais, não é globais, globais só serve para vender garrafas aqui e na China - são todas universais. E fazem que parte da nossa matriz greco-romana e cristã, não é? Portanto, atenção a isso.

enq1: Eu não sei se estou a perceber bem isto, a questão dos valores. Podia-me dar um exemplo?

E30: Posso. Hum... Eu dei-lhe... há bocado dei-lhe um exemplo, a questão dos valores significa que eu tenho que dar mais atenção àquilo que são as pessoas e a vida das pessoas do que aquilo que são os interesses do, do comércio, do governo do comércio, entende? A prevalência é sempre para as pessoas não é para o comércio nem para os interesses económicos das coisas, embora a economia seja instrumental das pessoas e é assim que tem que estar, mais nada! Não é escravizar as pessoas.

enq1: Hum, hum. E... e quando falou do... do tal "sistema corporativo", corporativo entre aspas, que representaria os interesses dos diferentes grupos

E30: Claro.

enq1: Nesse caso que tipo de interesses é que está a considerar?

E30: Então, nós numa cidade temos imensos interesses, não é? Eu dei-lhe exemplos. Vamos imaginar. Antigamente até estavam organizados por ruas.

enq1: Hum, hum.

E30: Não é? Hoje em dia não se organizam por ruas, organizam-se por sindicatos ou por corporações ou por, ou por associações ou nem se organizam! Aliás, hoje em dia nem se organizam, a maior parte dos interesses não estão organizados - uns chamam-lhe lobbies, outros chamam não sei o quê, mas pronto. Então, se houvesse um modelo de organização comunitária destes... destes interesses e esses... e esses, atenção, e esses interesses corporativos fossem representados depois na gestão da cidade, o consenso, não é um consenso de direita ou de esquerda, é o consenso do que

é bom para a cidade e para todos! Percebe? Não há consenso de jogo de partidos, é um consenso no interesse real das pessoas, porque tem que ceder, percebe?

enq1: Hum, hum.

E30: A tomada da decisão não é uma tomada de decisão partidária, é uma tomada de decisão com certeza consensualmente política, porque isto é política sempre, mas correlacionada com debates efectivos, não é tretas! Não é conversa da treta, percebe? Sobre aquilo que interessa verdadeiramente às corporações, porque não é o partido que está na... que é triado por não sei quantos... quantas... directórios dos partidos, que sabe qual é o interesse das pessoas. Não sabem! Estão longe disso nem querem saber! Nem são daqui a maior parte deles! Querem lá saber! Depois vão-se embora, deixam os mandatos, vão para fora do país e não sei quê e vão para... começam a ver as eleições a vir saltam todos para, para os organismos do Estado para, para receberem o dinheiro, quer dizer... Oh, é uma brincadeira! Andamos a brincar!"E30/AP.

"E30: ... porque hoje em dia quer comprar qualquer coisa, apesar da crise, é caro, percebe? Quer comprar um "edifício qualquer no centro histórico até compra - mas ou compra arruinado e mais barato ou então compra caro porque as pessoas, mesmo com aquela pancada dos 40 por cento, ainda é muito caro. Ou eles têm, como têm procura não... não adequam o preço à realidade, ou seja, levam as pessoas mais daqui para fora, porque o que nós tínhamos que ter aqui era pessoas a viver, não é artistas, percebe? A fazer criações, nem instalações nem nada disso, isso é a brincadeira de artista, tudo muito bem, arranjam para aí uns espaços para eles brincarem, enfim, e fazerem umas obras de arte, se calhar um ou outro até vão ser famosos, muito bem. Mas não, a cidade do Porto não serve para essa gente, serve para as pessoas viverem, são casas de habitação, são... é o modelo de uma cidade que é todo, está todo posto em causa e o resultado é evidente, é a transferência das populações para as periferias! Porquê? Porque o Porto deixou de ser atractivo para viver, as, as instituições que deviam velar pela atractividade do Porto, Porto cidade de vida, repare, ou viva se quiser - até é um termo engraçado! -, o Porto cidade viva precisa de pessoas que lá vivam! Não é que lá bebam nem comam! Não - vivam! Que é uma coisa muito diferente, portanto, a não ser que a ideia destes cavalheiros seja pôr as pessoas todas a viver fora do Porto e fazer ali do centro histórico e daquelas zonas mais ou menos envolventes um, uma grande palhaçada! Um canal Hollywood ou qualquer coisa assim! Não sei muito bem, não sei muito bem."

"enq1: Portanto, esta transformação dos edifícios considera isso uma injustiça?

E30: Considero claramente! Ouça, porque desvirtua do fim da cidade - o fim da cidade é vida, não é, não é os copos, nem o dormir num hostel, não é nada disso, isso é para ganhar dinheiro! Está tudo muito bem, mas a cidade em si precisa de vida e a vida não pode vir só dos outskirts, Quinta, Sexta e Sábado, percebe? E depois de jovens também sem poder de compra, empobrecidos e que vêm para lá beber como em Lisboa, não é? Não dá, embebedarem-se e acharem que estão ali a fazer um grande serviço no meio da rua! Porque não têm dinheiro para ir para outros sítios! Quer dizer, isto não é modelo para ninguém, isto não faz sentido nenhum! É uma grande diversão estarmos todos na rua a falar, que grande diversão! Não, é o sinal dos tempos - é uma grande pobreza, é o que é! Percebe? "Ai, estamos ao ar livre". Tretas! Para o ar livre vai para a beira do rio ou para a beira do mar, não fica no meio da cidade, porque durante a noite até irradia o calor, fica mais quente! É errado, portanto isto... olhe, é o sinal dos tempos! É o sinal dos tempos! Portanto, a economia de facto manda nisto. Ter ou não ter dinheiro modifica - nunca tinha pensado nisto, se calhar estou a dizer uma grande anormalidade - modifica o sítio onde as pessoas se divertem ou não."E30/AP.

"enq1: E a seguir também referiu a falta de planos estratégicos a longo prazo.

E30: Claro, de sustentação da vida da cidade ou de que é que uma cidade vive, não é? Ok, vive toda do turismo, pronto, vamos então viver todos do turismo, mas não é assente na Ryanair! Não é? Isso não é estratégico, isso é tática, isso é do 5 anos, 2 anos, 3 anos, eu estou a falar de longo curso, ciclos longos! Uma geração, duas gerações, três gerações, 100 anos, 200 anos. De que é que as cidades vivem? Não é? Senão, senão desertificam-se, vão-se embora, desaparecem do mapa, fica uma aldeia piscatória? Meia dúzia de malucos a olhar para as ruínas!

enq1: Também se aplica a...

E30: A tudo. Aplica-se a tudo!

enq1: Também se aplica neste caso o... percepção de injustiça?

E30: Claro! Então se eles não têm capacidade intelectual para perceber e para discutir isto numa base de longo prazo, é claramente uma injustiça para com as gerações vindouras e com, para com os presentes. Estão a ser enganados, não é? Claramente. Então para que é que serve uma cidade? Para beber copos? Então a cidade é um grande copo? Até pode ser se der muito dinheiro! Mas o que é que faz dar muito dinheiro? Não é a qualidade intrínseca da vida na cidade? Hum... parece-me que é mais isso! Não é as pessoas que lá vivem, é um modo de ser especial que gerou... perdão, que gerou aquela interligação, aquela intervivência +[palavra desconhecida] ? Acho que é mais isso!" E30/AP.

"enq1: E... e a questão que tem mencionado de diversas formas da... da... da separação entre as instituições representativas e depois os interesses...

E30: Não, não é os interesses.

enq1: Habitar da cidade.

E30: *Ah, da cidade! Claramente, mas isso é claramente uma injustiça e, pior, isso não é, isso não é bem uma injustiça, isso é bem para além disso, isso é uma premeditação, isso é má-fé! É a forma como eles encontraram de manter o povo ignorante e calado! Isso vai para além da injustiça, da percepção da injustiça, porque o povo não tem a percepção da injustiça, só vai ter a percepção da injustiça quando houver aqui a pedagogia dessa justiça, quando lhes explicarem que isto não pode ser assim, não é? E, e, os primeiros a saber são as pessoas exactamente que vivem no centro da cidade, foram os primeiros a sofrer, porque sofreram, não é? Acabou-se-lhes o pão e só viram o circo. São os que... porque sofrem, portanto, acabaram por levar, são os primeiros a perceber o grau da injustiça de que está a falar e a revolta que sentem! Mas, pronto, as instituições, pumba, tapam-nas.*

enq1: *Mas quando diz as pessoas do centro está a falar...?*

E30: *Estou a falar dos habitantes*

enq1: *Dos habitantes?*

E30: *do centro, sim. Os poucos que ainda lá restam.*

enq1: *E então este caso que vai para além da injustiça como é que o faz sentir?*

E30: *Hum... quer dizer, hum... faz-me... faz-me... como é que lhe vou explicar isto? Hum... A sensação que nós temos é sempre uma sensação de grande, por um lado, de grande asco em relação a esta gente, é uma gente que não merece nenhum tipo de consideração, nenhum tipo de consideração e de facto há alguma revolta em relação ao sistema que está... que está aqui a viver, não é? Que está todo apodrecido. Está aqui a viver os últimos dias de Roma, não é? Esperemos que o circo arda!*

enq1: *E como é que acha que seria a cidade se a sociedade fosse mais justa?*

E30: *Olhe, era mais vivida! Era mais dinâmica. Era mais correcta, não é? A grande questão aqui é que não há instrumentos de controle. Não há instrumentos de controle, quando grande parte da população é absolutamente inculta ou não tem interesse nisto e, por outro lado, temos os institucionais que tentam tapar a todo o custo... a todo o custo qualquer... qualquer género de informação que possa, que os possa beliscar no seu status quo, percebe? Portanto, se juntarmos isto tudo dá um caldinho de uma coisa perfeitamente... de um cãozinho perfeitamente governável! E... ou de um porquinho, não é? Que no final do coiso vai... todos os anos vai ao matadouro tirar umas lascas da gordura! É isto que... mas depois vai ficando mais pobre, mais pobre, mais pobre, vai definhando, mas eles vão sacando, não é?, o leite, a gordura, não sei quê... vão tirando. Mas não matam!*

enq1: *E... e o que era necessário mudar para que fosse possível essa tal, essa cidade?*

E30: *Era preciso mudar tudo! Era preciso mudar tudo. Tudo! Acabar com esta... acabar com esta gente, acabar com estes partidos, acabar com isto e deixar que as pessoas de facto percebessem quais são os problemas da cidade, informassem, haver uma pedagogia de facto do que é a vida na cidade e haver mais, mais participação directa das pessoas na sua própria... nos seus micro-círculos, não é? E as decisões serem decisões por um lado criadas ao nível sistémico, mas por outro lado também deixando que a microanálise funcione, não é? E é esse, essa tensão que não existe, porque aqui quem decide tudo são sempre os tipos que estão lá em cima que estão completamente afastados, nem querem saber da vida das pessoas, não querem saber disso para nada! Querem lá saber disso para alguma coisa? "Vamos pintar o bairro!" "Vamos lá pintar o bairro", mas tudo mantém-se na mesma, não é? O bairro fica limpo e gastaram lá 5 milhões "Eu gastei 5 milhões de euros a pintar o bairro não sei de quê!" Olha, grande coisa!"E30/AP.*

“enq1: *E a questão da transferência para as periferias considera isso uma injustiça?*

E30: *Considero, claramente! Porque mais uma vez, mais uma vez as pessoas transferem-se para a periferia porque lhes é dito que é mais barato e, de facto, o preço dos imóveis aparenta ser mais barato, mas tem um custo de vida, nomeadamente para quem depois tem que voltar para trabalhar, enorme! Portanto, e se nós multiplicarmos o dinheiro, o investimento feito nesta, nesta nossa burguesia, pequena burguesia e média burguesia, que comprou estes apartamentos todos aqui à volta, Valongos, Ermesinde, por aí fora, Maias, não é? São valores muito caros que foram depreciados agora pela crise que esta gente nunca mais em dias da vida consegue pagar, ou seja, vai pagando, mas nunca mais consegue reaver o dinheiro que lá meteu! E isto foi tudo orquestrado, lá está! É tudo sempre orquestrado por esta malta do, do, do... dos governos e das políticas e das Câmaras, que são sempre os mesmos, sempre os mesmos, sempre os mesmos, sempre os mesmos! Quer dizer, isto é uma, é uma sensação... uma grande amargura e um grande desrespeito pelo povo que há, percebe? Esta, esta democracia em fim de vida, quer dizer, isto é um desrespeito total, portanto uma injustiça total por estas pessoas - são enganados, são levados, tudo à conta do, do tal capital, não é? É uma, uma tristeza, é um modelo... este modelo burguês saído da Revolução de 1700 e... como é que é? 89? 98? A Francesa... 1700 e...*

enq1: *Não sei ao certo.*

E30: *798 acho que é.*

enq1: *E esta questão da transferência para as periferias como é que o faz sentir?*

E30: *Tem que me ligar a um polígrafo! Faz-me... faz-me sentir... lá está, é injusto, isto é incorrecto, é incorrecto. Isto é injusto, é incorrecto, isto não devia ter sido assim! As pessoas deviam ter sido informadas do, do real, do verdadeiro custo de vida e o custo económico e financeiro para as suas famílias, porque isto é insustentável! Percebe? Nunca deviam ter saído do centro das cidades, nunca deviam ter sido expulsos do centro das cidades pela, pela desorganização e caos provocado pelos próprios organismos que gerem as cidades, percebe? E não deviam ter sido incentivados a sair da cidade para depois se construir ali hostéis +[palavra corrigida por ap a partir de hostais] e a venda ser mais fácil para esta gente, não pode ser, quer dizer, isto é errado. É errado, é errado, é errado.*"E30/AP.

"enq1: *E em relação à avenida, como é que explica a mudança da avenida?*

Amélia Conceição: *A avenida? Era a entrada da cidade do Porto. Era a estação, era a Igreja dos Clérigos ... do... de São... ali na, na... dos Congregados e era a Avenida. Quando se saía daquela estação, o que se tinha logo era aquele olhar lindo, lindo, lindo! Mas claro, tinha que ser feito o metro. Há pessoas que são contra, por exemplo, pessoas da minha geração. Chorou-se muito naquela avenida! Pessoas idosas que choraram muito ali e eu fui uma delas, mas andei sempre, não parei a chorar, mas as lágrimas vieram-me aos olhos quando vi aquilo tudo assim! Há outros que foi uma beleza porque foi o metro! Lá está também. Beneficia quem gasta... quem se serve do metro, porque vai e chega muito mais rápido, é muito mais tudo. Para aqueles saudosos como nós, como eu... Lá está, a gente, a gente fica no meio-termo, não é? Nem posso dizer que... tenho de dizer que tenho muitas saudades, porque tenho. Mas "Ai, mas vem o metro e isto é muito mais rápido!", é sim senhora, pronto, é, sim senhora, pronto foi muito cómodo para muitos milhares de pessoas, não é? Porque metem-se ali, vão para os seus empregos, em 5 minutos estão lá. Agora nós como já não vamos para o nosso emprego, infelizmente, temos saudades de quando iam para ali com as crianças, à noite. Aquilo era cheio de criançada, de casais ali até às tantas que o calor era muito! E a gente agora não tem. A menina vê aqui em volta alguma coisa onde se ir? Não vê! De maneira que...*

enq1: *E então acha essa situação uma injustiça?*

E12: *Não, eu não acho uma injustiça. Não posso achar injustiça, porque não é por eu ter saudades que os outros não hão-de beneficiar! Isto é, isto é... acho que ser... dizer que era injustiça, não é. Foi pena! Foi muita pena, agora injusto não é, porque se tanta gente se serve do metro para ir para suas casas, para os seus trabalhos, para tudo, não pode ser injustiça! Foi foi muita pena!*

enq1: *E aqui a Praça do Infante?*

E12: *Também. Era um jardim lindíssimo! Também puseram ali aquela pouca vergonha, que aquilo... nem sei. Eu acho injusto porque nos tiraram um sítio que a gente tinha ali: tinha o chafariz para a água, para a gente beber água; era um jardim muito florido, tinha um jardineiro que era um sonho de, um senhor de idade, que tinha um amor àquelas flores, trazia aquilo... eu acho que era mais asseado do que a casa dele ainda! A gente passava ali, vinha cheia de calor, passava ali... repousava um bocado. Apesar de que com os anos que moro aqui, nunca ali me sentei! Mas gostava de passar por ali. E... E agora a gente passa e... e aquilo foi feito por causa do parque. Mas mesmo assim, mesmo com o parque por baixo eu acho que podiam pôr aquilo mais... mais apresentável, mais... mais risonho! Está tudo, está tudo muito cinzento, tudo triste! O Porto é triste agora. É triste! Mas, quem manda ainda não tem 80 e tal anos, não é? Quando tiver é capaz de ter saudades disto ou daquilo que mandou desmanchar. Não posso dizer mais nada!"E12/AP.*

"enq1: *E o comportamento dos automobilistas? Acha... o que é que a faz sentir?*

E12: *Já lhe disse há bocado! Poucos param para a gente atravessar de um lado para o outro. E a gente, quando pára, até fica assim a meio "Será ou não será? Será ou vai andar à frente?" Mas isso... Isso vai tudo da educação, minha menina! Isso já não tem a ver com o governo, nem com Câmaras, nem com nada, isso já vai da educação de cada um!*

enq1: *E acha que isso pode avaliar como justo ou injusto, ou não se aplica?*

E12: *Olhe, a questão da justiça? A justiça... não é justo eles não deixarem passar quem não pode andar depressa! Podiam parar um bocadinho, porque eles vão de rodas e nós vamos a pé, a passinho, a passinho, a passinho, não é? Acho injusta é a má educação que eles têm! O resto... As estradas são para andar, não é? Mas não era para andar assim! Deviam ter mais respeito por aqueles que não podem, porque parece que não mas eu para ir daqui à Junta, para mim é uma grande caminhada. E para atravessar acolá é sempre a medo! Sempre a medo. Nunca sei se hei-de ir se hei-de ficar. Porque eles vêm longe, mas quando a gente dá dois passos eles já estão perto, não é? Porque uma pessoa não pode andar, as rodas andam muito depressa! A gente fica ali entre as 10 e as 11... Aí a parte injusta é deles. Porque muitos hão-de ter avós, hão-de ter mães já idosas, hão-de ter isso tudo, mas aí... não importa, isso não importa... não importa. Eu tive uma irmã que atravessou ali, acima da polícia um bocadinho, naquele sítio e veio um carro atirou com ela e ela durou... durou pouco de um mês. Está a ver? Se ele visse que a pessoa que ia a atravessar que não podia andar, que ia devagarinho, não custava nada parar. Mas... eles dizem que o carro é para andar e a estrada é para andar. Portanto, aí a injustiça é deles! Não é de mais ninguém. Porque há... tantas campanhas, a polícia vai para a rua, agora a Republicana vai para a rua fazer... para dar as informações, mas mais informação do que a que há? Não pode! Só se for um polícia para cada um. Estar ali na estrada. Não pode. Mas... é assim. E a gente não espera, aí a gente não... eu, por exemplo, não espero por melhor. Não espero por melhor, não. Porque a gente cada vez vai tendo... mais e mais e mais e mais motivos para não esperar por*

melhor. Tenho pena da freguesia, que era uma freguesia cheia de vida, linda e está morta! Está morta. A cidade toda está morta!"E12/AP.

enq1: E já é muita coisa. E diga-me para esse da... Como é que explica esses problemas? Como é que explica, por exemplo, das ruas... ? Falou-me das ruas, das casas fechadas, de insegurança... como é que explica esses problemas?

E12: Ah, como é que se explica? Os senhores que dão na televisão é que devem explicar, não é? Porque... há desemprego, não há dinheiro, as casas fecharam. Aquela Rua das Flores e a do Mouzinho, aquilo era uma vida tremenda, agora é tudo sozinho. E quando tirarem os carros vai ser pior ainda! Porque eles agora querem tirar os carros. Acham que fazem muito bem, mas eu acho que fazem muito mal! Porque os carros dão vida e são companhia, porque enquanto vêm pôr o carro e vêm tirar o carro, há gente na rua. E tirando os carros, as meninas vão ver na televisão aquelas praças, aquelas praticas de... de como dizem? De... ai! Pronto, de antigas, como é que se diz agora? Eu custa-me muito falar! O centro histórico! Os centros históricos estão muito lindos, muito asseados, muita planta, mas não há ninguém! Portanto, os comerciantes ali fecham, as pessoas não saem porque têm medo. Portanto, eu se vier pela Rua das Flores e chegar a meio e não vir ninguém, eu volto para trás! Para a frente já não vou! Agora, tirando os carros... não há nada! Eles... porque eles tanto poluem estar na rua, como poluem estar no parque. A razão é que estando no parque, dá dinheiro e na rua não dá. A gente a franqueza é assim. Agora, também não sei como é que eles vão fazer... Para a quantidade de carros que há, a maior parte das pessoas que o têm é para trabalhar, não têm dinheiro para pagar um parque! E o que é que eles vão fazer a essa gente? Multá-los? Tirar-lhes o carro? Como é que se vai trabalhar? A pé? É um dos grandes problemas que está aqui: porque a maior parte das pessoas daqui tem o carro só só só para ir trabalhar, porque não há transportes para aqueles sítios. E tirando os carros, põem os parques... A cidade já está morta, tirando os carros da rua fica completamente morta, que não há ninguém, não há ninguém, não há ninguém! Uma pessoa não pode ir a um teatro, não pode ir a um cinema, não pode vir... por exemplo, agora já é Verão, mas mesmo assim a certa hora que as casas começam a fechar, as pessoas já não querem sair! E isso o que é que faz? Encerra a gente dentro de casa, tira-nos a vida, tira-nos o andar, tira-nos tudo! E a gente fica muito mais tempo... quer dizer, ficamos... o tempo que ainda podíamos andar lá fora, é-nos tirado porque ficamos fechados em casa! E nisso ninguém pensa. Essa é a minha opinião.

enq1: E acha que isso é uma injustiça?

E12: Eu acho que sim! Olhe, primeira injustiça: para aqueles que não têm dinheiro para pagar os parques, que são caríssimos. A segunda: é para os idosos que podiam sair mais vezes à rua, vir mais tarde e não podem. Portanto, encerramos dentro de casa, fecham-nos, prendem-nos mesmo dentro de casa, porque a gente tem medo de sair! O que é que a gente há-de fazer? Se eu pudesse... eu poderia andar muito mais tempo! Mas eu tenho medo de sair, não saio, fico em casa. Fico com dificuldades em andar muito mais cedo do que aquilo que devia ser! Porque a menina sabe que a gente estando metida em casa, os músculos deixam de funcionar como devia ser, não é? Mas, mas... para aí ninguém... isso não importa. Não importa porque, olhe, os velhos já não fazem falta! Nós só cá estamos, segundo eles, para a gente dar despesa (que damos uma despesa muito grande, não é?). O velho hoje quase que não come. Ou tem medicação. Opta por uma coisa ou pela outra, não é? E depois é muito triste, porque a gente... antigamente, antes destas coisas, a gente via as pessoas idosas iam, sentavam-se no jardim... Não há um jardim! O jardim tiraram e puseram ali aquela... pouca-vergonha! A gente não tem para onde ir! A freguesia aqui não tem nada, para onde se ir. Não tem um parque para as crianças brincarem, não tem um parque com arvoredos onde os idosos possam ir, como se vê nas outras terras, sentar-se ali à fresquinha e estar. Não há nada! Fizeram do Porto... mataram-no.

enq1: Quando diz eles... está...

E12: Eu digo eles... todos os que lá estiveram e os que lá estão, sei lá quem é! Eles é que mandam, não somos nós, não é?

enq1: Quando diz "eles" está a falar dos políticos, é isso?

E12: Claro! Nós... O povo por mais que grite, não adianta! A gente acaba... Eu nunca fui de andar em... em... nessas coisas lá das políticas, nem nada. Mas ele é que mandam, não somos nós. Agora nós realmente é que sofremos, porque sentimo-nos... a gente sente-se aprisionada. À noite, a gente antigamente ia daqui dava uma voltinha até lá em baixo. Onde é que eu me atrevia agora a sair à noite e ir dar uma voltinha, que está tanto calor, até ali à Alfândega? Não me atrevia. Não. As coisas do lixo, é tudo uma porcaria... é tudo, menina. Olhe, ...

enq1: O lixo é o quê?

E12: O lixo... o lixo... essas coisinhas pequenas que põem agora... essas coisas de lixo... o lixo é que está todo por fora. O pessoal também não tem, não tem... não tem... consciência. Eu nem a consciência aqui, nem a consciência... já é assim tudo à balda. Chegam ali não, tem que se levantar aquilo para meter o lixo! Está no chão que é mais prático! Nós também temos muita culpa. Mas quem não foi... quem não educou, agora já é muito tarde! Já é muito tarde, porque a geração já vai... não é com os valores antigos, é com os valores agora de não respeitarem nada nem ninguém: ?Anda lá velha que já devias ter andado!? Uma pessoa não pode andar, não há ninguém que se... os próprios automobilistas é raro, aqueles que a gente vai a atravessar a estrada e pare! Não é? ?Andou!? Se morrer, morremos, já não faz falta a ninguém! A nossa freguesia aqui era uma grande freguesia! Era uma freguesia de... de gente muito... muito aconchegante uns com os outros. Agora não. Agora, esta malta nova que veio já é tudo muito... Acho que já não tem remédio. Não vejo... nada à frente que... que diga "Isto vai ficar direito, vai fazer assim?... não vejo nada.

enq1: Mas quando diz "a malta nova que veio", veio de onde?

E12: *Olhe, muita gente que não era daqui e vieram para aqui e outros já nasceram aqui, mas... vêm outros e juntam-se. É às vezes aí umas poucas-vergonhas, a menina sabe como é. Não sei se são daqui nem se não. Como eu digo eu não conheço ninguém. Conheço algumas caras antigas que ainda estão, mas conheço só de passagem. Agora, a malta nova já não conheço ninguém.*

enq1: *Mas poucas-vergonhas como?*

E12: *Ó menina! Nas ruas atiram com tudo... atiram com pedras às portas, queimam os latões do lixo. Aqueles bidões do lixo, várias vezes, já foram queimados. Essas coisas... essas barbaridades, que não sei agora como é que se educam os filhos ou os netos, não sei, olhe, não sei, menina. Eu sou de uma geração em que tudo era respeitado. Havia também as suas coisas, não é? Mas a maior parte tinha respeito, agora não... não vejo... não vejo saída! Não vejo não. Pelo menos para o meu tempo, não sei. As meninas andam por lá, andam na rua e vêem muita coisa. Eu já não vejo que estou aqui, mas vê-se muita coisa, mas já se vê, não é?*

enq1: *E como é que esse problema a faz sentir?*

E12: *Faz-me sentir triste e presa!*

enq1: *Presa, também?*

E12: *Como?*

enq1: *Presa, também?*

E12: *Quantas vezes agora nestas noites de calor, uma pessoa... por exemplo, há 30 anos atrás ou mais tinha a vizinha aqui do lado e íamos para ali com as crianças aqui no nosso sítio, estávamos ali e passávamos ali um pedaço da noite bem, à fresquinha. Hoje nem me atrevo a abrir a porta! Nem me atrevo a ter a campainha ligada de noite! Ao fim da tarde é sempre desligada, porque vem essa gente por aí abaixo, vêm dos bares e toca e tal... eu não, não... Não auguro nada de bom! É triste, porque a gente vivíamos numa outra vida... que eu acho era difícil numas coisas, mas noutras não. Tínhamos segurança, tínhamos a polícia. Se a gente telefonasse, eu nunca telefonei, que nunca foi preciso, mas tínhamos sempre polícias aqui à porta, sempre sempre... por exemplo, aqui por baixo era um barzito, mas era uma gente que respeitava muito e, à meia-noite em ponto, a polícia estava aí para fechar. Hoje são 4, 5 horas da manhã passa por aí tudo... pirralhos ainda assim destas idades e menos ainda... e quem é que vai pôr mão nisso? Ninguém!*

enq1: *E acha isso uma injustiça?*

E12: *Sabe, eu isso já nem acho injustiça, eu acho isso um problema de educação; e um problema dos pais que conseguem estar descansados nas suas casas e trazer os filhos assim! Miudagem, miúdas e rapazes pequenos... não sei, mas isto... a geração agora é assim, não vale a pena. Porque nós, na boca dessa criança, somos velhos, somos antigos, não sabemos viver, não sabemos... a gente é que não sabe viver! Porque andar alcoolizado, drogado, a roubar, isso é que é saber viver, não é? Agora nós não... Nós somos uma... uma geração que estamos empurrados, assim, bem para o canto. É. Se alguém desta idade disser o contrário... isto é a minha maneira de ver, não é? Há quem, por exemplo, se sinta à vontade! Pessoas idosas podem se sentir à vontade nesse meio, não é? Mas eu não. Acho que não... A gente sente-se cada vez mais empurrada, mais empurrada para o canto - "O teu lugar já não é aqui" - e é quase como "Este país não é para velhos!?" E a gente já foi nova, não é? Mas... é assim."E12/AP.*

"enq1: *Tem assim mais algum problema, uma coisa que acha que não deva ser assim, que devia mesmo de... de mudar? Que não aceitava...*

E12: *Eles, eles para mudar tinham de mudar tudo! E agora o mudar, é ao contrário. Não é para a frente, é para trás. Agora o mudar é ao contrário. Não... Não vejo, não vejo nada... Por exemplo, a gente vai, vai para ali, à Casa da Música, vai para o Jardim de Serralves e até "Por que é que tiram tudo?" Onde vive tanta gente e a maior parte com grandes dificuldades como são, por que é que tiram só para fora daqui as partes bonitas? Não é? Depois aquelas partes para nós estão quase inacessíveis! Porque nós não podemos ir para lá! Não temos carro para nos levar. Nem que... mas também se tivesse eu também não ia! Já lhe sou franca... porque a beleza que está lá... que a guardem para eles. A gente fica com a nossa saudade! Mas também... também para fora daqui não vejo muita beleza. Esses bocadinhos ainda... ainda há sítios que ainda estão mais ou menos. Mas é tudo fora do alcance daqueles que não podem. Porque?ou não se pode andar de carro, ou não se pode andar de autocarro, que é o meu caso, ou não se tem dinheiro para os passes, ou assim. Portanto, é tudo dificuldade! E não vale a pena.*

enq1: *E quando diz que fica para eles, quem é que entende por eles?*

E12: *Ué, para aqueles que gozam aquilo, quem vai lá, do povo, deles, quem pode. Todas as pessoas que podem. Que fique para quem pode! Agora quem não pode, tem que se contentar com o... com o cimento e mais nada! Não é? Fui o mais sincera possível. E aquilo que eu podia dizer."E12/AP.*

F.1.6 Hyper-central Taylor

"E14: (...) Porque não podemos falar [in response to a question of spatial injustice] ... hum... daquelas situações mais complexas quando é um idoso fica envelhecido, é isolado em sua casa, tem muitas barreiras arquitectónicas, mas isso é a realidade do... deste aqui contexto, não é? Mas lá está: se isto fosse contrariado por termos cá os verdadeiros residentes -

as redes de solidariedade são muito fortes! Aqui é impensável um idoso falecer em casa e estar semanas sem se dar conta. Não! As rotinas aqui são muito... Há o vizinho que sabe que vai à mercearia tal, se não vem à janela... hum... muitos têm a chave da casa uns dos outros para ver como é que está, como é que não está, quer dizer... agora quando um idoso fica sozinho num prédio, não é? Num terceiro andar, isto é uma missão muito difícil, não é? E portanto é complexo, muito complexo! De se ultrapassar.” AP/E14.

E14: [commenting on her decision not to move out after having considered the possibility in order to solve the problem of her elderly mother immobility due to lack of elevator] Mas é uma opção. Quando isto não é uma opção, é uma obrigação, deve ser uma violência... emocional... Quem viveu uma vida inteira em que a relação rio, a relação vizinhos, a relação zona é tão importante... ver-se desprovida disso tudo... sem opção. A única opção é que vai viver para uma casa melhor. Sim, e depois? A casa não é tudo, não é? Para nós que vivemos aqui esta relação é muito... é muito importante! Acho uma profunda injustiça. Tirar as pessoas, que toda a vida pagaram a sua renda, cumpriram os seus... as suas obrigações, não faltaram com as suas obrigações, porque é que de um momento para o outro... porque a casa degradou, porque ninguém fiscalizou, porque ninguém quis saber... hum... tem um contrato de arrendamento, sempre respeitou esse contrato de arrendamento, portanto não é o inquilino que está a falhar... por que é que de um momento para o outro?... Não lhe encontram uma solução... recuperam o edifício e vêm para o mesmo sítio, com uma renda mais cara - evidentemente, sem, sem... a casa passa a ter outras condições - e tem que ir desterrado para outro sítio qualquer... Não entendo! Não compreendo.” AP/E14.

“E14: Prontos. entretanto, o metro quadrado de determinada cidade foi valorizando, foram-se construindo, foram... criando os condomínios fechados, quer dizer, há possibilidades das pessoas acederem? Isto não é uma questão de injustiça, é questão das pessoas não conviverem em conjunto, não é? E portanto isto é complicado. Porque até pode haver de certeza absoluta na zona da Pasteleira - eu dou o exemplo da Pasteleira, como pode ser Lagarteiro, como pode ser outro qualquer - um bairro camarário e um.. e um prédio mas aquele prédio tem condomínio fechado, entra o carro, fecha o portão, acabou. Sabes o que é que eles dizem? ? É o céu dos ricos!?” AP/E14.

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“E14: (...) Então tantas pessoas aqui, nesta zona aqui que é património, estamos a falar de São Nicolau, Sé, Miragaia, mais nesta parte, que é a que eu conheço mais, tanta casa recuperada, boa e tantas pessoas a precisarem de casa e porque é que, qual é a necessidade de irem para um bairro camarário? Para uma Pasteleira? Completamente longe da sua... da sua zona. Não entendo, não é? Não entendo e portanto faz-nos aqui pensar... com o surgimento dum boom turístico, o que é que isto... esta relação... se se vai hum... aproximar... o que é que isto vai acontecer no futuro? Acho que é preocupante. (...)

AP: E como é que esta situação a faz sentir?

E14: Muito angustiada! É assim, eu sou... eu sou nascida e criada aqui nesta freguesia de São Nicolau e recordo-me na minha infância - eu sou da parte de cima, na Rua das Taipas - a Rua das Taipas, Belmonte eram locais muito habitados, com muitas crianças na rua - nós agora não temos crianças na rua! Conseguimos contar quem é que mora no prédio A, B ou C. Chegamos ao cúmulo de conseguirmos contar quantas pessoas moram naquela... na rua, uma rua comprida! Quer dizer, acho que perde a vida. Completamente! Não tem a mesma... a mesma vida, a mesma alegria, hum... É, é... é completamente diferente, não é? As casas são muito degradadas, muitas delas... hum... e portanto tem muito... é um... não estamos a falar de 50, 60 nem 70 anos! Estamos a falar de 20 ou 30 anos em que se notam diferenças abismais, não é? Em que os convívios que as pessoas tinham e que se encontravam não... não há renovação, não há gente nova! Hum... Se não há gente nova, não há gente para estudar - os níveis de escolaridade das pessoas já são muito baixas. Portanto isto é... a renovação, não urbana, mas... das pessoas e das zonas é muito difícil, não é? Eu tenho vários vizinhos... relativamente... porque tenho prédios recuperados... e quando uns têm de facilidade de integração, outros não têm tanta facilidade de integração - isto é... isto é uma vivência muito específica; isto é... é um merceiro... hum... que toma conta das chaves dos carros, se houver a polícia... ele controla a situação; hum... quer dizer, há aqui uma relação de confiança - nós conhecemo-nos há muitos anos, não é? - e quem vem tem dificuldade de perceber esta..” AP/ E14.

“E14: Os miúdos têm muitas negativas, por isso é que nós temos aqui um centro de apoio ao estudo, os pais não têm capacidade de os ajudar, não é? Portanto, isto aqui é uma relação muito... é duro, é muito duro de se... de se contrariar, de se contrariar. Quando eu vim para cá, nós criamos um centro de apoio ao estudo porque os miúdos dificilmente chegavam ao nono ano de escolaridade. Agora conseguem.” AP/E14.

“E48: Eu fiz tudo para que ele continuasse na escola, não deixei que o expulsassem. Hum... mas eu uma ocasião trouxe-o aqui a almoçar comigo, uma ocasião, eu tinha um Porsche, fui buscá-lo de Porsche à porta da escola para os outros verem, mesmo à porta da escola, eu a entrar fiz assim uma festa muito grande para eles verem que ele tinha um amigo e tal para não se sentir tão desprotegido. Esteve a almoçar. O putito era uma doçura, pá, a única coisa que ele tinha era um

desadaptado e o que os professores tinham era nine to five, é das 9 às 5. As professoras todas tinham os maridos em casa, tinham os filhos em casa e não estavam para perder tempo com um gajo que mandava mensagem aos pais e não apareceu lá ninguém! (...) Fiquei tão triste com aquela injustiça. Mas o garoto era de fibra. Antes do final do ano foi-se embora, foi trabalhar para um drogaria lá junto aos Bombeiros de São Pedro da Cova. Ainda fui lá duas ou três vezes. Depois a meio do ano a minha filha mudou e eu desliguei-me. Mas está a ver a fera terrível que me pintaram, que eu fui para lá preparado para levar com um daqueles pintas de bairro... ó pá, era uma doçura, era um desadaptado, pá. Por isso está a ver. São Pedro da Cova, mas uma escola muito problemática! Bem, faltarem ao respeito às professoras era pão com queijo! Uma ocasião chegou uma à minha beira que tinha uma mão marcada na cara, ó pá, uma garotita nova e grávida. Bem, eu dei uma trepa no gajo, pá, nele e no pai, mas teve que ser fora da escola!" AP/E48.

"E48: As pessoas que viviam aqui na Avenida gostam muito de festas e tudo, mas é como se costuma dizer, pimenta no rabiote dos outros é fresco. Quando vão de férias acham todos muita graça Palma de Maiorca, Saint Tropez, uma, uma esplanada com música, é tudo muito bonito, mas aqui não. Aqui é horrível, não os deixa dormir, não sei quê. Quando tivemos sempre o mínimo de cuidado: nunca fazíamos coisas para além da meia-noite e eu estou a falar aulas à hora de almoço e vir a polícia impedi-las! Pois há muito novo-rico aqui que julga para além do andar, comprou a avenida e comprou o lugar onde mora. Foi sempre um dos meus lamentos. São alguns... é como tudo. Por isso é que eu digo, é bom, é uma lufada de ar fresco vir pessoal de fora, mas às vezes não é tão bom! No meio desse pessoal de fora vem gente muito empertigada, que ao comprarem um andar de meio milhão, julgam que compraram tudo em redor!

AP: E... e esse... esse aspecto acha injusto?

E48: Acho muito injusto, pá. Nós estamos aqui há tantos anos e às vezes queremos fazer com que isto ande para a frente. A menina não sabe, mas quando eu tomei conta disto há 34 anos, aqui vendia-se droga e os ditos comprimidos como eu vendo garrafas de águas aqui nas mesas das esplanadas. Não podia vir aqui com o seu marido. Podia ser desfeiteada, não podia vir com crianças para aqui e isto deu muito trabalho a limpar e não foram as autoridades, fomos nós que cá estávamos." AP/E48.

F.1.7 Peri-urban Taylor

"E41: Aqui também temos, acho que é muito injusto não termos em Canidelo - o que não acontece com todas as freguesias deste concelho, mas em Canidelo isso não existe - que é um... um lar de acção social. A acção social... estamos muito muito deficientes em acção social. Hum... há um projecto, há um projecto que vem, remonta já de há muito tempo a esta parte, mas nunca... nunca se conseguiu... hum... levar por diante, porque politicamente não... não foi possível. Há... há realmente projecto, há local... hum... mas a única coisa que não existe é dinheiro para poder fazer avançar isso que é muito premente mesmo! Nós temos muita carência nessa... nessa acção social. Não é? Portanto, estes são os principais... os principais problemas daqui de... de... de injustiça, que temos aqui talvez em Canidelo, não é? Quer dizer, não vale a pena a gente pegar e falar em ruas, não é? porque as ruas... isso acontece em tudo o que é lado. Também temos aqui a rede viária, alguma dela, um pouco... um pouco deficiente. Posso-lhe dizer que ainda agora... ainda agora ao fazer esta distribuição deste trabalho que estou a fazer e que se apercebeu, não é? Hum... eu perdi bastante tempo com alguns moradores desta freguesia que realmente nos culpam de não fazermos, daqui da autarquia não fazer nada, o que não é verdade, porque a autarquia não tem a culpa total! Porque em cima +[pron=lapsus] de nós temos a autarquia principal que é a Câmara Municipal, que essa é a que realmente deve gerir e tratar, mas a Câmara não tem possibilidades e é lógico que... hum... nós somos penalizados, não é? Mas há aí também na rede viária muita coisa realmente desagradável, não é?" AP/E41.

"E40: Temos também perda, muita perda de população jovem neste momento. Temos muita gente licenciada, mas pouca gente a ficar na terra e a investir aqui, ou seja, o que nos tem acontecido nos últimos anos é: os miúdos saem daqui, nós já tentámos abrir o décimo segundo ano aqui nesta escola que entretanto nunca teve matrículas já... eu penso que já há dois anos que... que se tem persistido nessa tentativa e nunca houve matrículas suficientes para abrir o décimo ano! Ou seja, o décimo ano depois que depois iria formar o décimo segundo e iria dar continuidade a essa... a essa situação, mas o que tem acontecido é que os miúdos chegam aqui ao nono ano, vão para Valongo ou para Paredes ou para Baltar - Baltar agora já é muito pouco comum, porque em termos de transportes é mais fácil eles deslocarem-se para Valongo ou para o Porto ou para Paredes - e depois daí partem para a universidade e muito raramente voltam! Quando voltam, voltam porque estão desempregados e voltam para casa dos pais, mas não, não... envolvem-se muito mais em, em actividades no sítio onde estudaram do que aqui! E o que nós temos assistido aqui é a isso mesmo - são jovens que temos aqui, matéria-prima que não aproveitamos, muitas das vezes, porque eles não se sentem filhos, acabam por sair e não se sentem filhos da terra. Eu acho que é uma coisa também que tem que ser mudada que é a mentalidade das pessoas, não é? (...) E depois também vemos muita gente nova a fixar-se mais nas cidades, por exemplo, quem vier estudar para o Porto, depois já fica no Porto e não vem para aqui. Hum... isso custa-me ver, porque as pessoas hum... ó pá, é porque, é porque não se sentem bem aqui, falta fazer alguma coisa aqui para fixar essa gente aqui, não é? Nomeadamente, nós, nós temos um problema aqui também que é hum... a falta de, de, de iniciativa cultural e de, de... e isso acho que isso, isso abalaria aqui as coisas e obrigaria as pessoas a, principalmente a população jovem, a fixar-se aqui.

AP: E este último caso dessa não fixação consideras isso uma injustiça?

E40: Considero.

AP: E como é que isso te faz sentir?

E40: *Faz-me sentir também triste, não é? Ver, ver essa gente a não ter amor à terra, não é? Eu sei... eu sei que nem toda a gente... ó pá, não sei, é, é, é complicado ver pessoas que... nós crescemos aqui e acho que as, as terras só crescem, estes locais pequenos só crescem se as pessoas realmente gostarem e tentarem fazer alguma coisa por, por aqui, por, por toda esta gente. Aqui há um bocadinho a mentalidade, que já nas gerações mais antigas, antigamente não, porque, por exemplo, essa gente que construiu os... as redes de água, as... essa gente tinha que gostar desta terra e sentiu necessidade e muita gente deve ter gasto muito dinheiro do próprio bolso, como é óbvio, e muito tempo que tirou à família e tudo mais. E esse sentimento, desse sentimento que pôs a Sobreira a certa altura se... que a pôs... não a pôs no mapa, não é? não vou dizer isso, mas que fez dela o que ela é nesses tempos, falta esse espírito nas pessoas, as pessoas andam adormecidas! E esta gente nova também! É preciso isso, é preciso avivar as pessoas e dizer "Meus meninos, estamos aqui. Nós somos nós!", não é? E, e isso beneficia-nos a nós próprios enquanto pessoas." AP/E40.*

"E54: *Devia-se ter uns acessos melhores, devia ter um, uma coisa que lutámos muito e não conseguimos, por falta de dinheiro da autarquia, era fazer os estradões que agora fizeram falta. Agora fizeram falta com estes incêndios. Se estivessem feitos provavelmente não, não acontecia o que aconteceu, que não foi muito para o que podia ser, mas arder ardeu, mas pronto, hum... na parte da Lixa, na minha Lixa, lá em baixo, eu digo na minha porque é a minha aldeia, hum, aquilo desenvolveu um bocado realmente porque o rio aí já tem uma, já tem uma componente muito grande que é o rio, com a navegabilidade do rio, aquilo melhorou, para quem conhece, conhecia aquilo há 30 ou 40 anos, melhorou muito, muito e isso, isso não haja dúvidas que aquilo até, eu considero aquilo a sala de visitas do concelho de Gondomar. Se vier ali à noite fica encantada com aquela zona daquele fundo, da marina e depois para o lado do rio Douro tem ali um barzinho com esplanada e tal, aquilo é, é, é um luxo para, para as aldeias que temos por aqui fora." AP/E54.*

"E54: *Eu vejo aqui porque há coisas na autarquia que a gente tem que fazer e a gente, por exemplo no tempo que era eu e o Luís, você tinha uma casa por exemplo, uma casa aqui abaixo da Junta ou perto do Luís ou aqui à minha porta e por falta de, uma das coisas, falta de saneamentos deixavam, que isso é mal feito, isso é, isso é mal feito, mas deixavam ir águas chocas, águas sujas para a rua. E que é que a gente fazia? Negociava com eles uma coisa, dizíamos-lhe "Ó pá, isso não podes fazer, mas não vamos estar a chamar a, a entidade que trata disso, que era, era", pronto agora não me recordo o nome daquilo, "mas, olha, vamos fazer o seguinte: tu, como a gente não tem dinheiro para tudo, dás por exemplo o material e a gente dá-te a mão-de-obra, ou se vires que te é mais favorável a mão-de-obra", porque havia alguns que eram trolhas e pedreiros e tal, "fazes tu a mão-de-obra e a gente dá-te o material, fazes um passeio, metes tubos por baixo e vai sair a uma sarjeta qualquer, pronto". Melhorávamos as coisas para benefício das famílias, das crianças e tudo mais porque isso era cheiros, era brincadeiras de criança, sujavam-se nisso. Hum... eu tenho aqui, infelizmente, eu tenho aqui a passar à minha porta e a sair dentro do meu terreno, sair dentro do meu portão ali onde você entrou. Já chamei a atenção de, diversas vezes do presidente, mas bem, não sei se repara a minha casa, pelo tamanho da casa, e aquela ali. Está claro que a carteira não deve ser igual!"*

"AP: *Portanto, esse pouco desenvolvimento não acha [that is it unjust]...?*

E54: *Não, não acho que seja por, por falta de apoio de ninguém, é as pessoas aqui é que está claro, a autarquia é que pode ir fazendo alguma coisa, mas o que pode fazer também com o dinheiro que lhe dão, que agora já é, já é a nossa autarquia agora já é quase uma, uma empresa, não é? Já tem uma série de funcionários, já tem carros, já tem casa própria, quando a gente começou não, andava aí de casa em casa onde houvesse uma sala disponível e o carago, mas já foi tudo feito também, aquilo já foi feito no nosso tempo, mas de qualquer maneira, prontos, isso... a autarquia agora pode é ir melhorando alguma coisa, fazer certas coisinhas, que, que eu acho que os presidentes devem ter vaidade até em mostrar, pelo menos fazer uma coisinha ou duas, durante o mandato para não parecer muito mal. De resto, não, não pode ser, não pode, eles não pode vir aqui instalar nada, porque isto aqui não tem, não tem, também agora não há nada para se fazer. Quem é que agora quer montar uma oficina ou uma fábrica? Assim com medo que isto dê para o torto, não querem. De qualquer maneira não temos espaço para isso nem temos condições para isso aqui. Essa parte daqui eu acho que isso que tinha que ser o povo daqui, o pessoal daqui. O pessoal daqui não tendo possibilidades, os que tinham são esses que estão instalados fora, não são também parvinhos para, para agora dizer "Vamos defender a nossa terra, vamos para lá levar isto" e vão prejudicar-se? Vão mandar depois os trabalhadores embora? Eles lá, isto parece uma família. Por acaso há umas há umas empresas que são, salvo erro, três sociedades, mas é tudo a mesma família, mas fizeram sociedades separadas que parece tudo uma família com os trabalhadores deles e tudo mais. Eu, eu adoro os gajos, um dos patrões é Manuel Alves também, mas é Manuel Alves Júnior e não é o meu nome pronto, é mais novo do que eu, tem o meu nome já lhe foi dado depois. Já o pai também era Manuel Alves. Portanto, esses não vêm agora melhorar nada para aqui porque, não vêm melhorar, a presença deles melhora, não é? Já dá um bocado de coisa, mas, mas no, no aspecto de desenvolver não. Mas também não considero, não considero injustiças isso não andar mais para a frente do que o que está." AP/E54.*

"AP: *Porque é que acha que esses problemas... se acha que estes problemas levantam questões de justiça e de injustiça.*

E19: *Hum... de injustiça? Mas a a... os problemas... são injustiças... é injusto, é injusto porque é injusto, por exemplo, é quando diz quando diz de injustiça não sei se está a a a falar por isso, na questão, por exemplo, do do lá de cima do... do sanatório, não é? Então, um edifício enorme... um edifício que tinha ali a gente a a a, não é? morreram lá de facto muitos, não é? Vieram por aí abaixo, não é? Para o cemitério, mas alguma gente ainda conseguiu resistir alguns anos, e o edifício depois que deixa de funcionar e ter aquilo ali ao alto, não aproveitar de facto para nada, acho que é, é injusto, isto não é, não é.. e é botar dinheiro público ao lixo! Porque hoje se formos lá se calhar aquilo é capaz de ser uma montoreira de lixo ou já foi, porque não é qualquer pessoa, e neste caso uma autarquia como a nossa, que vai ter se calhar capacidade de além da freguesia tem e tentar limpar o melhor possível sempre, de ir lá se calhar limpar as montoreiras que passam ter.*

Eu já lá cheguei a passar há uns anos largos e aquilo de facto só tinha lá montoneiras de lixo, portanto, as pessoas depois aproveitam os locais abandonados, digamos, que estão abandonados, que estão desprezados, para despejar lá tudo! Eu quando entrei para a autarquia em 82, 83, e estive lá até 97, já, isto já como membro da Assembleia, mas mesmo como membro do Executivo, em 87, hum, de facto, nós antes mesmo de sermos, de sermos eleitos e depois de sermos eleitos nós limpámos aí montes de montoneiras aqui pela freguesia, porque as pessoas ou não tendo, ou não tendo nada de proximidade de onde eles possam despejar, não sendo educados a fazê-lo, não é? Depois despejam o lixo em qualquer canto! ... Pronto, é ver que não é, não é, não é fácil, não é fácil às vezes estar, estar-se satisfeito e por isso ser uma injustiça o não preservar o não preservar a a por parte de algumas entidades, nomeadamente a Câmara Municipal de Gondomar, não preservar tanto as coisas... enfim, não posso dizer que a Câmara, neste caso que estou a falar não tenha feito alguma coisa no concelho, sim, mas houve muita coisa que podia ter feito e não fez, e enfim, e depois tivemos outras coisas que foi "Ó pá, fizemos isto aqui", mas não não nos parece, pelo menos aos meus olhos não me parece que foi aquilo que devia ter sido feito, pronto, acho que devia haver devia haver mais uma uma uma atenção redobrada das coisas e as 12 Freguesia que compõem e agora vão ser menos, porque vão haver uniões, não é? Mas as Juntas de Freguesia que compõem actualmente o concelho não não foram não foram vistas com com olhos de ver." AP/E19.

"E19: Hum... hoje nós em questão de arruamentos, de arruamentos eu-se um salto qualificativo muito bom, pronto, foi de facto um salto qualificativo muito bom, hum... há um ou outro problema de facto ainda por resolver, mas que à vista daquilo que nós vimos aqui há anos, hum, a freguesia neste aspecto está já a quase, quase, quase a a atingir aquilo que, que era desejável e necessário. Hoje, a Junta de Freguesia, a Junta de Freguesia hum ainda, ainda pode ir lutando com alguns problemas, hum... de facto da, da, do apoio, do apoio que, que tem dado. Houve um que exactamente foi agora resolvido a, em Dezembro, em 8 de Dezembro, foi as instalações da Junta. Portanto a Junta de Freguesia tinha uma edifício próprio, entretanto, com as negociações que eu sinceramente não compreendi hum... veio, veio para um edifício alugado, esteve lá vários anos, hum... hoje, e a partir de 8 de Dezembro, tem umas instalações próprias. Que hoje não sabemos até que ponto é que... são de facto umas instalações não sei se conhece, se já lá passou, já lá esteve com certeza já viu a grandeza das instalações, porque não é qualquer terra tem uma Junta, um edifício de Junta como aquele, agora com esta, com esta nova lei, digamos assim, a nova lei macabra deste governo, nós hum... e com a união das freguesias Fânzeres, São Pedro da Cova, podemos não saber em que sítio é que fica a funcionar a Junta! Se no edifício que não é muito bom em termos de espaço, em termos pronto, de dimensão em Fânzeres, se será após as eleições aqui e naturalmente tendo Fânzeres com apoio. Ainda não se sabe o revés naquilo que foi a luta pela pela pela instalação de uma Junta de Freguesia digna de uma terra destas, hum... e de facto os milhares de, de euros empregues, postos lá na construção, hum... e de facto o o que é que pensam estas pessoas de facto, o que é gastar dinheiro público e depois a gente ficar assim um bocado na dúvida. Naturalmente, espero bem que tenha um fim um fim um fim um fim feliz, como normalmente se diz, que é a Junta de Freguesia seja e continue a ser de facto em São Pedro da Cova, de facto a sede, a sede de Junta, muito embora com a união, com a dita união que eu há bocado falei, Fânzeres/São Pedro da Cova, ... é uma coisa que que efectivamente preocupa muito as pessoas em São Pedro da Cova. Muito embora as pessoas estejam estejam quase quase certas que será São Pedro da Cova a sede de Junta. Para nós, fosse São Pedro fosse Fânzeres se tivesse ela condições nós com certeza... mas mas como nós verificamos que de facto o o o retirar após uma, uma longa caminhada que foi a a a Junta a Junta a Junta hum... ser, ter um edifício próprio, porque já tinha tido, mas que entretanto hum... lá construíram, houve uma reconstrução que hoje está, está praticamente abandonada, que é um centro lúdico que a Câmara mandou construir, onde gastou cá também também um bom dinheiro e aquilo hoje, aliás eu digo hoje porque foi lá dentro já depois daquilo construído andaram, pronto, uma pequena aprendizagem no computador e o professor, o professor João Santos, estava na altura a, a administrar as aulas, hoje, segundo me disseram, já emigrou, porque entretanto deixou de ter o serviço na Câmara Municipal e aquilo tem lá uma funcionária ou outra, mas outras que estavam lá e diariamente que atendiam o público, que atendiam pessoas com carências, pessoas que até iam lá levar a roupa para lavar, porque não tinham condições em casa, ou não tinham condições monetárias, não sei, eu não sei bem porquê, mas iam lá levar e até buscar roupa para casa que é entregue para entretanto ser distribuída, que aquilo foi o o o o o o... a ser que afinal não servirá para nada, não servirá para nada de momento, mais tarde não sei, não se sabe, nunca se sabe o que pode acontecer. É de facto uma uma questão que que eu penso que as autoridades, nomeadamente a Câmara Municipal, já deviam ter, ter visto, não é?" AP/E19.

"E19: Uma pista de manutenção, é uma coisa de que também se fala há uns anos bons e que tem entrado até no plano de actividades da Junta, mas que, dada a falta de apoio nomeadamente da da Câmara Municipal e até do próprio do próprio governo, ainda não ainda não, não se concretizou. Penso que era uma, uma coisa que +[pron=pi] ter e e não acontece, mas... (...) já constou em vários programas em vários planos de, de actividades, hum... que foram postos à Câmara Municipal de Gondomar, um deles, pronto, é aquele que já lhe falei um bocadinho, mas que volto a falar que é a pista de manutenção. Achamos que era uma utilidade boa para a manutenção, não é? Uma pista de manutenção que nunca foi, que nunca foi de facto concretizada, nunca foi feito nada por ela, apesar do esforço que a Junta tem tido sobre, sobre esta questão..

AP acha que é uma injustiça?

Joaquim Barbosa: Eu acho que, eu acho que de facto é injusto no que... nós nós verificamos e hoje, hoje mais do que nunca, verificamos que as pessoas procuram locais, aliás até aqui junto às piscinas para... como outras vão ali para a zona de aqui de Fânzeres na na... eu chamo-lhe a Avenida da Conduta, fazer manutenção, portanto, dar umas caminhadas, dar umas corridas e tal, pronto, porque hoje os serviços médicos, e se calhar já há muito tempo o faziam, mas hoje com mais força

que as pessoas devem caminhar, as pessoas devem fazer exercício, as pessoas devem, depois de jantar, ou principalmente ao final do dia ir dar uma volta, porque fará bem e há várias há várias há várias situações nomeadamente à digestão e à própria à própria baixar de peso, às pessoas não andarem assim depois a ficar obesas, como se vê muita gente por aí e esta pista de manutenção foi uma coisa que sempre se lutou e nunca se viu de facto interesse nenhum em que isso fosse feito cá em São Pedro da Cova. A Junta sempre sempre sempre se bateu por isso, mas foi injusto, porque, de facto, nunca se fez” AP/E19.

“E41: nós temos aqui uma estação de tratamento, por exemplo, a ETAR, do, do Douro litoral, que é aqui em Canidelo, mas que, portanto, deveria chamar-se ETAR de Canidelo e não é - é ETAR Douro litoral porque realmente houve alguém que lá fora em Bruxelas e aqui na Câmara de Gaia não quis que isso acontecesse! Temos aqui um... um parque de campismo da Madalena, que deveria ser Canidelo, mas porque houve alguns interesses realmente chamou-se da Madalena e não de Canidelo, e há uma marina... uma marina que foi uma coisa muito, que é importante para Canidelo, não é? São as coisas mais assim, mais problemáticas, que se chama Douro Marina, quando se devia chamar Marina de Canidelo, hum? Mas só porque o Senhor Douro Luís Filipe Menezes queria chamar àquilo Marina da Afurada, porque está quase no território da Afurada hum... mas hum... mas não, aquilo é território de Canidelo e, portanto, e estas são algumas, não são preocupações porque agora não é possível fazer mais nada, mas foi realmente as preocupações que nós mais tivemos, que andámos para aqui, lutámos um bocado desesperadamente para realmente defender isto, mas mesmo assim não conseguimos fazer com que isto tivesse o nome de Canidelo conforme gostaríamos que fosse!” AP/E41.

E44: Não, isto com a junção das freguesias será sempre um problema, nunca é favorável para a própria freguesia, porque se é só uma a defender uma causa, se são 4 a defender a mesma causa o consenso por vezes não é... não é favorável a isso e principalmente o orçamento vai ser mais reduzido e a dividir por 4 freguesias e por vezes as freguesias mais pequenas não serão tão favoráveis... não será tão favorável para essas freguesias em termos económicos e... acho que, que aí as freguesias vêm a perder um bocadinho a sua identidade, quando não se perder tanto de imediato, mas pouco a pouco as coisas começam a ser feitas em conjunto, é um bocadinho tudo o que aconteceu com a escola - a escola de [pron=pi] foi extinta, foi feita a união das escolas de, de Bagunte e notou-se aí um bocadinho essa parte das crianças: o aproximar das crianças, as crianças ora andavam de autocarro ora andavam de carrinhas, as crianças a levantar-se muito mais cedo, riscos de acidentes, essa, essa complicação toda, as pessoas... as crianças a apanhar chuva e não sei quê, quando havia condições para elas estarem muito mais favoráveis e muito mais próximas das famílias. Acho que aí já se perdeu um bocadinho e com o futuro as coisas vão-se... criando uniões para ser economicamente mais vantajoso mas depois há... há o nível de... de... de assistência às populações acho que depois diminui. A proximidade é sempre muito mais vantajoso, desde que haja condições...

AP: E... e essa questão da escola considera uma injustiça?

E44: Eu acho que sim. Acho que se tínhamos condições não é por... por vezes por ter a... por vezes as turmas seriam mais pequenas mas era mais fácil talvez juntar duas freguesias mais pequenas do que fazer um núcleo mais... mais denso, maior. Acho que tudo ficava a ganhar, as turmas eram mais, mais pequenas mas que acho que as crianças tiravam muito melhores resultados e acho que não... e com o problema que há dos professores com falta de colocação ainda seria mais favorável, havia uma despesa para o Estado, não sei... é mais uma escola a manter em vez de fazer tudo em conjunto... são opções. Agora isso é muito discutível.”AP/E44

E44: ... Mas foi das freguesias que mais desenvolveu nessa parte... as próprias pessoas da freguesia quase sempre ficavam na terra, moviam, faziam uma casa no terreno dos pais ou qualquer coisa assim para ficar na, na, na terra. Isso foi uma coisa que desenvolveu em termos de casas novas por... por habitante deve ter sido das freguesias que mais se desenvolveu nessa área.

AP: E isso acha positivo ou negativo?

E44: Eu acho positivo, porque se as pessoas gostaram de ficar na própria terra, porque trazia-lhes vantagens para eles e decidiram ficar.

AP: E acha que trouxe mais justiça para a freguesia?

E44 Eu acho que sim. Nessa parte acho que sim, porque é sempre, sempre bom ficar os filhos da terra ficaram na terra, se, se se desenvolvem e se criam riqueza e criam um bocadinho... se gostam de ficar é porque têm condições para isso.

AP: E o que é que o faz sentir essa justiça?

E44: Não, faz-me sentir bem e acho que a gente vendo as outras pessoas também a desenvolverem e a criarem condições e nível de vida e a criarem habitações dignas e com... com gosto e com, com os seus gostos das suas habitações acho que é... que é importante.

AP: Hum. Há bocado disse que parecia bem haver menos betão.

E44: Sim. Mas isso é um betão digamos desorganizado, digamos que se se neste momento em Ferreiró não há nenhum edifício digamos aquelas casas germinadas, aqueles apartamentos com... com... só com 3, com 3 andares e não sei quê, isso é que acho que não é muito vantajoso porque criaram-se aqueles núcleos habitacionais, agora criar uma casa para um filho ao lado da outra casa que já existe ou criar num terreno que tenha condições para isso, acho que isso é vantajoso, agora criar um bocadinho uma coisa desenfreada digamos assim sair assim um bocadinho da área que existe, por exemplo, não há nenhum... nenhum caso desses, não temos nenhum apartamento na freguesia, não temos nada sem ser casas

mesmo. E acho que aí era evitar essas coisas... Acho negativo. Concentra demasiadas pessoas e acho que... que isso não trazem vantagens para todos. Acho que é manter um bocadinho a parte rústica e rural que temos neste momento." AP/E44.

"E19: ... mas as terras que eu já percorri desde Monção até, até ao Alentejo, eu vejo tantas populações, populações, pequenas, pequenas aldeias que aquilo lembra se calhar ao século ao século quase princípios do século 20, fins do século 19. eu vejo situações que aquilo são degradantes. Não sei como é que as pessoas vivem ali! Com pouca, com pouca gente, é certo, mas que que vivem ali num sufoco! Acho que aquilo que não não não é não é nada de desenvolvimento não parece um país da Europa, desta Europa onde nós vivemos e e, como diziam há muitos anos já, um jardim à beira-mar plantado, que não é nada, isso para mim não é, não é nada disso, é de facto um... as pessoas estarem na, estarem naquela naquela situação e não terem meios, quase meios para se deslocarem a lado nenhum, ou então não estarem numa terra, onde eu eu também já estive, onde as pessoas não trabalham lá, que era Zagalho de Vale de Conde, ali para para os lados de, de Penacova, a vida deles era durante a semana em Coimbra ou perto de Coimbra ali a trabalhar e só ao fim de semana é que vão a casa." AP/E19.

"E19: Joaquim Barbosa: Hum. É de facto é de facto é de facto uma pessoa ver que efectivamente não há justiça e a justiça tem que ser reposta, e o trabalho... vamos lá a ver. Como digo uns pequeninos focos que há uma outra uma outra rua que ainda não esteja tal como devia, como mereciam as pessoas, mas já está está e puxaram... há tempos atrás, há muitos anos atrás, de facto isto aqui não tinha esta rua aqui assim, era era... nem estrada, se calhar pouco mais, pouco mais de metade era era a rua que passava aqui, não é? Os bairros mineiros que existiam que não conheceu, mas que eram de facto bairros muito degradados e as pessoas que viviam aqui assim numa situação bastante má. Aliás, tanto aqui como no Passal, basta dizer que hoje e eu e eu na minha idade de... +[pron=pi] e haver pessoas a viver em casas de madeira aqui e já tinha aqui assim para aí uns 30 e poucos e ainda havia pessoas a viver em casas de madeira ali, não é? É, era de facto porque era, porque era São Pedro de Cova. Hoje o desenvolvimento está está está por aí, mas enfim, quer dizer, como eu disse há bocado, que se melhor um pouco mais, não será não será nada demais também!" E19/AP.

"Aliás, eu vou a essas zonas, como disse sou de lá, e não noto diferença nenhuma em relação à minha infância, praticamente! Quer dizer, o que eu noto, noto que há automóveis que não havia, mas o resto para mim é tudo muito semelhante, muito parecido com aquilo que... aliás, aqui em Gaia, a 15 quilómetros do centro de Gaia, que é o caso, eu... dá-me a id, dá-me a sensação que estou em Trás-os-Montes! Trás-os-Montes, Bragança. Bragança ou lá para os... para as zonas mais recônditas da... da... do país. Por isso essas pessoas têm de se sentir injustiçadas e não me sinto muito bem, por causa disso. Até porque tenho lá as minhas raízes." E23/A.

F.1.8 Young from the ghetto

"E33: Olhe, os meu, os meus melhoramentos, era ver tudo melhor era na minha família, entende? E... e eu não andar a pagar uma dívida que o meu filho não teve, não teve preocupações nenhuma, não foi nada com ele, hum... a ex-mulher é que... é que foi dizer que ele chamou muitos palavrões, infelizmente... olhe isso é que eu estou pior! (...)ela estragou-lhe o trabalho, ela estragou-lhe tudo (...)Foi... ela diz que foi... por lhe tratar mal, está a ver? Por tratar mal a ela, prontos se lhe chamou uns palavrões é porque na hora ela realmente fez, pronto, ela na hora ela fez, está a entender? (...)Pronto, isto é falando português, era "puta, vaca" e, e ela é muito forte, muito espaçosa, e como ele chamou-lhe esses nomes todos, na hora chamou, teve razão, não é? Estava desesperado como a gente estava. Não era coisa que se fizesse, que a gente merecesse, mas pronto... teve que ser, aconteceu, olhe..." E33.

"Quando a mulher o deixou ficar, nós... ele foi para minha... para casa de onde está este meu filho agora, na Praceta... no Perosinho. Foi para lá, mas depois nós não tínhamos condições, só 2 quartos, não é? Eles dormiam na sala, outros dormiam no chão, e depois os miúdos iam dizer para, para a Segurança Social, como foram apertados, não é? para ver como é que estavam e... começaram a dizer... eles começaram a dizer que os meninos estavam a dormir no chão, que estavam a dormir no ar e a gente antigamente dormíamos no chão, dormiam uns para cima, dormiam outros para baixo, estamos aqui não morremos, agora... agora não é assim! Tem que ser tudo... cada um no seu quarto. E... e isso é que nos levou a ir para casa da minha mãe, foi isso, porque a minha mãe tem muitos quartos." E33.

Urbanity: "eu gosto porque gosto aqui do ponto. Tem tudo e é muito movimentado, a gente sempre tem mais ruas para caminhar para aqui, caminhar para acolá e para trabalhar bem e é mais pertinho para tudo, para agora como eu agora trabalho." E33.

E33: Eu já não saio há tanto tempo, menina!

enq1: Nesses passeiozinhos que faz até à...

E33: Não, porque aquilo é tudo muito morto... É assim, na Quinta da Paradela, prontos, é a bola que está, a gente não vê assim nada de especial. Não é? A não ser as pessoas a, a estacionar e a entrar e a comprar um bilhete para entrar, se houver bola, não é? E se não houver, as pessoas vão passear, vão, vão caminhar lá para dentro. Tem bar, vão beber, não é? O que, o que podem, não é? O que querem beber e estão assim a passar um bocadinho, como eu às vezes vou. Estou lá um bocadinho, depois venho embora, pronto. Mas não vou beber nada, só vou ver e... dou assim duas voltas, gostava... não me sinto muito bem sozinha, não é? A gente vê muita gente acompanhada e a gente está ali sozinha. A gente começa... vê as pessoas a olhar, que... há sempre pessoas que olham para a gente, os homens principalmente, que olham assim para a gente, se nos virem sozinhas, não é? Pensam... a pensar em coisas piores e a gente está li um bocadito e eu, prontos,

venho logo embora. Assim coisas de, diferentes... de barulhos... é, que diz a menina? Assim não vejo assim nada disso, não. Não vejo. Nada de especial.

enq1: Barulhos como? Quando diz barulhos...

E33: Assim com as pessoas. Não?

enq1: Mas o que é que quer dizer com barulhos?

E33: Por exemplo, pessoa que trate mal uns aos outros... sim às vezes há assim essas zara +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida], essas zaragatas, não é?

enq1: Mas aqui não se vê?

E33: Não. Não vejo.

enq1: E... e isso de haver assim gente que olha e assim...

E33: Há, aqueles hom +[palavra truncada no final no original e não corrigida], aqueles homens mais, mais atrevidos, há sempre, então não há?

enq1: Acha isso uma injustiça?

E33: Acho que... É injustiça que é mesmo... ?

enq1: Sente... sente-se... sente que é uma injustiça para consigo? Estarem a olhar assim?

E33: Sim, eu acho que não tinham necessidade de estar a olhar, não é? Mas pronto... As pessoas olham é porque têm de... a minha mãe diz assim "Olha, eles se olham é porque olhos na cara para olhar!". A minha mãe não pode caminhar, não pode andar assim e ela não vai comigo porque fica em casa, não é? E às vezes chego a casa e conto isso e ela "Então, eles olham porque têm que olhar. Tu andas e não tens nada que estar a..."; Então, eu também não respondo, não é? Eu... quem vai, vai, quem está, está. Eu não sou pessoa de... nem de barulhos nem de zaragatas, eu não gosto nada disso.

enq1: E como é que essa situação a faz sentir? Lá no parque.

E33: Como é que faz sentir? Um bocadinho mal, não é? A gente não está bem! Não está bem, retira-se, vem embora." E33/AP.

F.1.9 Aquinas at the confine of the city

"AP: E como é que acha que seria a cidade de Penafiel se a sociedade fosse mais justa?

E31: Acho que viveriam todos melhor. Pelo menos não... acho que não havia tanta revolta na... toda a gente se pudesse... ter outra... outra ligação.(...) É assim, que as pessoas fossem mais sinceras umas com as outras, por exemplo. Não houvesse essas coisas de... se uma pessoa não der isto, não, não vai conseguir aquela licença, por exemplo. É assim, eu falo daqui porque é o conhecimento mais... mas sei que há noutras... que noutras cidades também é assim que funciona. Aqui sei.(...) acho que é assim, isto é uma cidade pequena acho que as pessoas podiam viver quase que como família, entre aspas. Família longa! Basicamente isso. As pessoas não deviam ser tão... não é raivosas, tão... muitas vezes parece que estão a espezinhar as pessoas, não... parece que vivem com o mal dos outros!" E31

"Que eu não gosto de injustiças, não gosto que se faça mal a ninguém. Aquela pessoa não pratica o Bem, mas chama-se a atenção e ela amanhã pode estar melhor! Acho que é assim! Quanto a mim. Não sei." E56

"Hoje, a gente vai na rua, ou dizem que vão na rua de dia e já estão a fazer maldades! Portanto, já vê tenho mais medo de andar agora de dia do que antigamente de noite! Ah, isto!" E56

"AP: E diga-me uma coisa senhora Dona Maria Helena, na... aquela questão da Petrogal e das casas que foram feitas depois, acha uma injustiça?

E56: Contra a Petrogal? Acho. A favor das senhoras não. As senhoras se vieram comprar a casa ali, desculpe lá, se eu tenho aqui a Petrogal, mas "Eu agora vejo esta casa aqui, gostei dela, vou comprá-la", a Petrogal já lá está e não tenho o direito... vou reclamar depois? Para que é que a comprei? Para que é que eu a aluguei? Para que é eu vim para ali? (...) Muita gente vive ali e ainda não há muito tempo que estava o Narciso Miranda ainda estava no poder da Câmara e elas queriam que ele retirasse dali a Petrogal. Ele ainda andou a tentar mas não conseguiu. Não foi as barbas dele que conseguiu ter força para tirar daí a Petrogal. Para onde é que ia esta gentinha toda que está lá a ganhar o pão para comer? Ia mais gente para a rua? Ia mais miséria? Já há pouca!" E56.

"[a pessao é] capaz de estar ali a fumar, é capaz de... é assim, para mim isso acho que já não faz hum... não estão a ser sinceras, então se não podem, também não podem fumar, não é? Eu acho que é assim, embora nem toda a gente consegue controlar esses vícios, tudo bem, mas há coisas que... não faz sentido." E31

"Ter o mínimo acho que o mínimo é as pessoas ter trabalho, hum... não roubarem, por exemplo, acho que as pessoas sendo... quando as pessoas têm trabalho e são honestas, é assim, basta levar a vida, o dia-a-dia, que as pessoas hum... muitas vezes... quanto mais são... quanto mais humildes são mais hum... eu pelo menos é assim que eu penso e eu é assim que eu estou a agir. Hum... as pessoas sendo sinceras comigo, eu sou capaz de dar tudo, quando começam a fazer o

contrário, tanto dou como tiro tudo também! Acho que as pessoas para ter aquilo... para ter uma vida merecedora acho que... a simplicidade e a honestidade é... é tudo." E31

"E53: Hum... se melhorava? Melhorava, acho que... se as pessoas fossem no seu âmbito todas mais justas, acho que só tínhamos todos... tínhamos benefícios, toda a gente tinha benefícios em... com isso. Acho que ganhávamos mais e todos e também se calhar tínhamos mais para dar a outros!

AP: E concretamente o que é que acha que ia ser diferente na... na localidade?

E53: Se ia mudar as estruturas locais?

AP: Sim ou quais eram os benefícios?

E53: Não sei se ia mudar as estruturas, não é? Mas se as pessoas trabalhassem todas mais alegres, toda a população, isso, isso aí... Acho que... eu também não consigo visualizar isso. Hum... toda a gente a ser justa e toda a sociedade... eu acho que é algo que eu não consigo visualizar." AP, E53.

"Hum... considero porque, imaginemos que qualquer... uma pessoa, uma pessoa minimamente... com poder económico baixo se quiser a nível de Câmara pedir uma licença não consegue e se for, por exemplo, se as pessoas subornarem já conseguem. Acho uma injustiça, porque muitas vezes as pessoas fazem muitos sacrifícios, não é?, para poder fazer uma casa - às vezes não quer dizer que seja correcto, mas a mentalidade de cada um é que sabe, não é? - e muitas vezes põem esse entrave e eu acho que... (...) mas acho, acho uma injustiça, porque a sociedade não é... as leis que fazem para uns não é igual para os outros! E acho que, para mim, acho que é uma injustiça na mesma.

AP: E como é que isso a faz sentir?

E31: Revoltada! É isso. Às vezes, sei lá, qualquer... por exemplo, (...) tive conhecimento que várias pessoas quiseram concorrer a essa mesma esplanada e que não conseguiam, ninguém sabia como haviam de conseguir concorrer e agora, de um momento para o outro, já se sabe quem vai, porque é filha de, de Senhor Doutor que está na Câmara e de outro senhor fulano que faz parte... pronto, por aí acho que é uma injustiça, porque as pessoas querem muitas vezes trabalhar, começar do zero e não conseguem, porque a parte que está na Câmara, o complô é sempre o mesmo! Isso, isso é uma revolta, porque quem quer começar do zero não consegue! Sinto, sinto que é."

The example is on procedural inequality: "Quando faz... quando há uma acção de despejo - a quem é que faz a acção de despejo? São pessoas pobres, humildes, pobres de espírito. Se for uma pessoa que tenha uns bens, que tenha um... ninguém faz uma acção de despejo nessas pessoas! Não é? (...)Hum... quando são grandes ninguém se quer meter com eles!" E31 [sequence of Walzer]

"AP: E a questão da recolha de alimentos, a situação que está por trás, considera uma injustiça?

E53: Considero, porque... é assim, há muitos problemas, há pessoas que não têm actualmente emprego e que não conseguem... nós temos às vezes situações de... de pais que não conseguem alimentar os filhos e... eu pergunto-me "Carambas! O que é que se passa aqui? E como é que a gente vai resolver estas situações?" e nem sempre conseguimos. Isso para mim é uma injustiça grande, mesmo, porque não há emprego e... professores, eu tenho constantemente aqui currículos, chegam-me constantemente currículos de todas as áreas de professores, há muito desemprego. E eu questiono-me, eu não consigo abranger toda a gente! E sei de situações gravíssimas de, de professores que... ou que estão casados ou que têm um filho e o que é que a gente faz e como é que eu vou agora resolver a situação? E... e eu digo-me a mim mesma "Eu espero não chegar a este ponto". E isso eu considero uma injustiça mesmo!" AP/ E53.

"AP: Mas não acha isso injusto então?

E56: Não, quero lá saber! Nem acho justo nem injusto, cada qual se governe da melhor maneira, que eu cá me vou governando com a feição da minha." E56/AP.

E56: ... Que há muita gente aí proprietária que tem casas e tem à frente um jardim que é um nojo! É preciso a Câmara incentivá-los ou ir comunicar, por exemplo, fazer a comunicação para que eles mandem limpar a porcaria! Que é uma vergonha à frente da rua!" E56/AP.

F.1.10 Anomie

"enq1: O senhor Joaquim diga-me lá, antes de começarmos, de onde é que se sente habitante?

E49: Eu já estou aqui há 28 anos. Eu já estou aqui no bairro há 28 anos. Agora eu sou de Paços de Ferreira, não é? É uma vida aqui já!

enq1: Então é daqui do bairro que se sente habitante?

E49: Claro! Eu, a base é viver aqui, os meus filhos nasceram aqui.

enq1: Então o que eu gostava era que me falasse dos principais problemas do bairro, assim de injustiças.

E49: *Sei lá, ó menina, isto agora... sabe porquê? Sou uma pessoa que não me meto com a vida de ninguém. E às vezes ouço assim a fugir por um lado, mas os principais problemas devem ser... há pessoas umas com as outras de qualquer maneira discutem, pá, e parecem que são capaz de pegar à pancada e no fim fica tudo bem.*

enq1: *Hum, hum.*

E49: *Males daqui pelos vistos, por aquilo que eu analiso, não é, não são, não é má gente, não é aquilo que dizem, percebe? Por mim... não me meto. Eu já trabalhei para a Câmara, já... conheço, conheço aqui muita malta, conhecia, ... de agora e... sinceramente, não tenho nada que... que dizer. É que não tenho mesmo. Para mim está tudo bem, às vezes pedem ajuda, a gente ajuda, que dava, não é? Agora já não posso, já estou reformado, já não trabalho. E isto... objectivamente é isto. Não tenho mais nada de mal, se houve desordens, nunca me meti nas desordens. Às vezes vou a passar, estão a discutir "Ó pá, então como é pá? Tu não tens ..." "Está bem." e outro, "Ah, senhor Joaquim, desculpe e tal." e lá se viram.*

enq1: *E essa discussão, essa desordem considera isso uma injustiça?*

Sr. Joaquim: *Não.*

enq1: *Não?*

Sr. Joaquim: *Não, não. Não, eu não considero isso nada injustiça. Depois de passado algum tempo está tudo bem. Portanto, para mim não é injustiça, não é? Porque senão levo a mal.*

enq1: *Então como é que lhe chamaria?*

Sr. Joaquim: *Arrelias, talvez, entre os outros, não é?*

enq1: *Hum, hum. Hum, hum. E disse-me que aqui não é má gente, não é o que dizem.*

Sr. Joaquim: *Ó pá, os outros dizem... mas o que os outros dizem a mim não me interessa, não é? Eu para mim, tenho, ó pá, eu aqui estou bem visto. Não estou... nem posso abrir aquilo, aquilo, além, não posso dizer nada que não tenho nada que dissesse. Eu também quando andei a trabalhar, ia a casa deles e etc.*

enq1: *Bom dia!*

Sr. Joaquim: *Pode entrar, D. Lurdes. Ó Renato.*

enq1: *Dá para continuar acho eu.*

Sr. Joaquim: *Vai ser.*

enq1: *Estava a dizer que o que os outros lhe dizem não lhe interessa.*

Sr. Joaquim: *Não me interessa nada. Veio aí há dias pedi-lhe ajuda, umas coisas e eu sempre que posso, eu ajudo. Sinceramente, eu, até tenho pena é de sair daqui.*

enq1: *Tem pena? E vai ter que sair daqui?*

Sr. Joaquim: *Vou ter que sair daqui, porque isto vai abaixo, não é? Já foram duas torres. Agora dizem que vai a primeira e a segunda e a terceira, não sei. Dizem, que eu não sei.*

enq1: *E ter que sair daqui acha uma injustiça?*

Sr. Joaquim: *Claro, mas vai ter que ser, por isso... Se calhar há aí um projecto que eles vão cumpri-lo, não é? Vão ser... [pron=pi], mas sinceramente, vamos ter de sair, não é? Tenho muita pena, mas com certeza que vamos ter que sair.*

enq1: *E qual é o projecto?*

Sr. Joaquim: *Não sei. Não sei. Só sei que não há projecto, não sei.*

enq1: *E o que é que é injusto em ter que sair?*

E49: *É injusto ter que sair, foi criado aqui os meus filhos, estão aqui habituado a viver, percebe menina? Eu tenho pena do local que é isto, é, é a minha vida. Esta zona aqui é fora de série, para mim não há zona boa no Porto como esta! Não há! É só isso, eu não tenho mais nada a dizer, não é? Mas deixe ver se o Bernardo sabe o projecto que vai dar aqui.*

enq1: *Depois eu pergunto no fim, é melhor.*

E49: *O projecto.*

enq1: *E isso de ter que sair como é que o faz sentir?*

E49: *Triste. Muito triste. Até que eu fui agora pedir à Câmara para me arranjar uma casa, um rés-do-chão, porque a minha mulher é muito doente, foi agora operada a um... a um... a um cancro nos intestinos, teve este problema no coração e eu pedi e eles "Sim, senhor." Aceitaram "Vamos fazer o possível por me arranjar a casa". Portanto, mais +[pron=pi] eu não posso dizer nada...*

enq1: *E sabe para onde é que vai?*

E49: Não. Eles agora vão [pron=pi] as casas, vão-nos chamar, nós vamos ver as casas, parece que são 3 casas, e entre elas temos que escolher uma. É o que dizem, a mim não me disseram nada disso, isso é o que dizem. Eu a partir daí tenho que aguardar.

enq1: A partir daí?

enq1: Estou a perceber. E aqui no Porto há assim algum problema que ache que é uma injustiça?

E49: ... Aqui no Porto não sei. Sabe que eu era trabalhar, casa, trabalhar, casa. Não tenho [pron=pi]. Injustiças deve haver muitas, não é? Que eu saiba, não.

...

enq1: E gosta de viver aqui?

E49: Gosto. Já lhe disse que tinha pena de sair daqui.

enq1: E na altura porque é que veio para aqui?

E49: Olhe, porque estava uma casa da Câmara no Barredo e transferiram-me para aqui. Eu lá não podia pagar a renda que eles queriam, depois mandaram-me para aqui. E aqui estou há 28 anos, salvo erro.

enq1: Quando saiu do Barredo como é que foi?

E49: Quando saí do Barredo, foi...

enq1: Gostou?

E49: Eu gostava de estar no Barredo, que eu não podia, as minhas posses não davam para pagar a renda, não é? Depois arranjaram-me uma casa aqui que é onde eu estou. E eu vim viver para aqui e aqui estou, mais nada.

enq1: Mas na altura a renda aumentou foi?

E49: Não, a renda era barata. Agora... se eu quisesse lá ficar arranjavam uma casa mas tinha que pagar muito mais e eu não tinha posses para isso.

enq1: Era outra casa então?

E49: Era outra casa então. Depois tiraram-me daquela a arranjaram-me esta que foi muito mais barata.

enq1: E porque é que tinha que mudar de casa no Barredo?

E49: Ah, talvez por causa de obras, parece.

enq1: Foi por causa das obras?

E49: Acho que sim, que foi por causa de obras.

enq1: E na altura achou mal ter que sair para aqui?

E49: Que remédio!

enq1: Não achou injusto?

E49: Eu achei injusto? Eu tinha que ter casa, menina, não é? Eu não podia pagar, achei bem! Quando uma pessoa não pode pagar tem de se sujeitar àquilo que tem, não é? Foi isso. Agora não foi por mais nada! Continuei lá com amigos também, até amigos de lá vieram para aqui e a gente continua todos amigos.

enq1: E como é que se sentiu na altura, lembra-se?

E49: Ora bem, eu sentia-me um bocado triste, mas teve que ser, não é? Senti-me um bocado triste, mas teve que ser.

enq1: E na altura pode escolher para que bairro é que ia?

E49: Não, por acaso não escolhi muito. Ainda eu acho que foi uma troca até que fizeram. Acho que foi uma troca da minha casa com esta. Acho que foi troca só. Embora a renda fosse mais baixa. Eu gostei... vim aqui, gostei do local e tudo o mais e fiquei.

enq1: E agora vai poder escolher entre as casas?

E49: Vamos ver, eu vou escolher entre 3 casas, que eu não sei aonde ainda. Eu é que vou escolher.

enq1: E acha bem poder escolher?

E49: Pois, acho que é melhor se chegar lá e "Tem que ir para esta casa!" eu acho mal. Agora se me derem 3, 3 hipóteses, eu acho que é melhor, não é? Seja o que Deus quiser, vamos ver.

(...)

E49: Aliás, eu tenho muito pouco que dizer, porque realmente não tenho, percebe? Foi uma vida assim muito... a minha vida foi sempre assim guiadinha, pá.

enq1: Assim?

E49: Guiadinha. Orientada. E pronto. Não quer dizer que precise às vezes de ajuda... mas normalmente os familiares ajudam. Quando é preciso algum coisa.

enq1: Pronto, então eu vou terminar.

E49: Mais coisas, não é? Agora com as modificações pode ser que um tipo até... que veja alguma coisa e depois... e depois entramos em contacto.

enq1: Porque assim de momento não tem assim nenhuma emoções?

E49: Não, não, não tenho nada. É tudo triste o que eu tenho agora neste momento." E49/AP.

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"AP: E... e esta pergunta é assim um bocadinho mais abstracta, mas como é que acha que seria Leça ou as cidades em geral se a sociedade fosse mais justa?

Patrícia Machado: Muito melhor.

AP: Muito melhor, mas muito melhor em que sentido?

Patrícia Machado: Se as coisas fossem mais equilibradas, acho que as pessoas viviam todas muito melhor.

AP: E quando diz equilibradas...?

E50: Tipo... um bocado... uma cena comunista. Todos terem mais ou menos a mesma coisa, os mesmo salários, toda a gente ter emprego. Acho que era muito mais justo para todos.

AP: E acha que isso ia ter consequências na cidade? Que se ia ver na cidade?

Patrícia Machado: Provavelmente sim.

AP: E o que é que seria diferente nessa cidade?

E50: Não faço a mínima ideia." E50/AP.

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Curriculum Vitae



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RESEARCH INTERESTS

Theory of spatial justice, theories of justice, urbanism and (urban) spatial planning, metropolitan democratic governance, social science epistemology (realist constructivism and erudite and non-erudite regimes of truth, inter- and post-disciplinarity).

RESEARCH SKILLS

Qualitative research design, including interview protocol, sampling criteria and analytical method choices. Conduction of interviews and analysis of extensive corpus, including quantitative (textometry) and qualitative (discourse analysis) techniques. Capacity of synthesis. Mapping, semiology and visual representations (computer assisted and hand-drawn). Interdisciplinary experience and collaborative skills, developed in international milieu. Communication in five languages, including proficiency in English and French (oral and written). Team spirit and capacity to work autonomously for long periods. Experience in the organisation of international seminar.

LANGUAGES

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RESEARCH AND TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Scientific advisor

June 2015 to June 2016. Project *Justice Spatiale*, commissioned by the *Commissariat général à l'égalité des territoires* (France) to the laboratory Chôros (Switzerland). Participation in discussions between the research parties (Commissariat, research team, invited panel of experts of plural disciplines), co-construction of interview protocol with research team, orally and written communication to the research parties of individual contribution to findings.

Doctoral candidate

December 2011 to October 2016. Development of doctoral research on the topic of spatial justice, under the supervision of Professor Jacques Lévy at the laboratory Chôros, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL, Switzerland). Interdisciplinary research on Urbanism, Geography, Urban Sociology and Political Philosophy.

December 2011 to December 2013. Participation in the research activities of the laboratory Chôros through regular debates on ongoing projects. Contribution to dissemination of laboratory research (Wikipedia, website, research poster).

February 2013 to July 2014. Co-organisation of a bi-annual international seminar on Spatial Justice, involving EPFL laboratories LaSur and Chôros, the doctoral program *Architecture and Sciences of the City* (EDAR, part of the Doctoral School of EPFL) and the Geography doctoral program of the Conférence universitaire de Suisse occidentale (Cuso). Contact with key international scholars in the subject of Spatial Justice such as Mustafa Dikeç, Philippe Gervais-Lambony, Susan Fainstein and Bernard Bret. Animation of discussion workshop. [URL](#) (2013).

September 2012 to July 2013. Teaching assistant of the bachelor course "City intervals: the urban challenge", with Prof. Dr. Monique Ruzicka-Rossier and Architect-urbanist Dominique Von Der Mühl; and of the master's course "Urbanism and Territories" with Prof. Dr. Monique Ruzicka-Rossier (EPFL, Switzerland).

RECOGNITION OF MERIT

December 2011. Four year individual scholarship granted by the *Fundação Ciência e Tecnologia* based on merit of candidate, of the doctoral research plan and of the hosting institution.

July 2009. Honourable mention in international competition *Europas 09* on the theme European urbanity, sustainable city and new public spaces.

EDUCATION

Propaedeutic year of doctoral studies

September 2010 to December 2011. Essays and presentations in the context of the doctoral program *Architecture and Sciences of the City* of the EDAR (EPFL, Switzerland): «Architecture et sciences sociales, rencontres théoriques et méthodologiques»; «Dynamiques sociales et espaces urbains»; «Théorie et

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histoire de l'architecture ». Academic writing for doctoral students. Ateliers on Social science research methods from the complementary (Cuso, Switzerland).¹²⁴⁰

Master in Architecture

September 2004 to May 2006. The thesis – “Architecture Studies. The Journey and the Houses” – constitutes the first englobing reflectivity exercise on the role of space, questioning the aesthetic and ethical responsibility of architects. This work produces an inflection from architecture into urbanism, as a more pertinent resource for societal development. It has been supervised by Prof. Dr. Manuel Mendes at the Faculty of Architecture of the University of Porto (Portugal).

Erasmus mobility

September 2002 to September 2003. Laboratorio di Sintesi Finale in Progettazione Urbanistica (Laboratory for Final Synthesis in Urban Design), under the direction of Professor Daniele Pini, at the Faculty of Architecture of the University of Ferrara (Italy).

Bachelor degree in Architecture

September 1998 to January 2006. Subjects: History, theory of Architecture and Urban Studies. Project design, construction. Spatial Anthropology. Visual Representation. Faculty of Architecture of the University of Porto (Portugal).

PUBLICATIONS

Book

Collective book with Jacques Lévy and Jean-Nicolas Fauchille publishing the empirical research and the theoretical work of the “Spatial justice” pole of laboratory Chôros. In progress.

Doctoral Thesis

Connecting space and justice in metropolitan Porto. The discourses of the inhabitants on the spatial dimension of justice. Membres of the jury: Prof. Philippe Thalmann, Prof. Jacques Lévy, Prof. Luca Pattaroni, Prof. Álvaro Domingues, Prof. Erik Schokkaert. Lausanne: Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, October 2016.

Article

A process of disagreement on Spatial Justice. Article accepted by *espacetemps.net* in December 2013 (submission withdrawn by the author due to superseded content before actual publication). [URL](#).

Documentary film

Ana Póvas and José Roseira. Miragaia. Porto: Manobras no Porto, 2012.

Book Chapter

Carter, Richard; Delacruz, Romeo; Garrido, Cristina; Póvas, Ana; Ryser, Judith; Slavin, Martin. *Resistance, then what? Reflections of the Spirit of '68 Group* in Critical Cities. Ideas, knowledge and agitation from emerging urbanists (Vol 3). London: Myrdle Court Press, 2012.

¹²⁴⁰ “Qualitative methods: towards or beyond orthodoxy?” Fribourg; « Atelier de fabrication de concepts » Genève; « Atelier sur l’analyse de discours » Fribourg; « Les Terrains Non Canoniques. Les articulations délicates entre terrain de recherche, méthodologies et approches conceptuelles choisies », Neuchâtel; « Penser l’espace des humains ensemble », La Tour de Peilz.

Master Thesis

Architecture studies. The journey and the houses. Porto: Faculty of Architecture of the University of Porto, 2006.

PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS

With supporting paper

15.06.2016. *Spatial Justice. Connecting justice and space in Porto.* Conference paper for *Géopoint 16* presenting doctoral research conclusions (Lausanne, Switzerland). [URL](#).

23.03.2015. *Space and Justice. Experiences and discourses of Porto inhabitants.* Presentation of experiment findings to laboratory Chôros (Lausanne, Switzerland). [URL](#).

13.04.2013. *Spatial justice: towards a legitimate space.* Conference paper presenting empirical results of exploratory interviews in the Metropolitan Area of Porto, delivered at the Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting (Los Angeles, USA). [URL](#) (abstract), [URL](#) (full text).

20.02.2013. *Exploratory interview guide on the topic of Spatial Justice.* Method paper discussing movements between theory and empirical data in the process of interview design and analysis, presented at the seminar « Justice Spatial » (Lausanne, Switzerland). [URL](#).

22.01.2013. *Spatial justice as societal development and desirability. Beyond the procedural approach.* Presentation of an argument from negativity in the context of the EDAR Winter School on the topic « Avec quoi n'êtes-vous pas d'accord? » (Rôle, Switzerland). [URL](#).

15.01.2013. *Critical review. Jacques Lévy's working papers on spatial justice.* Presentation and paper delivered in Doctoral Workshop "Territórios (In)justos", in the Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa (Lisbon, Portugal). [URL](#) (full text).

15.06.2012. *Spatial Justice. Two projects, one interest: individual spatial values.* Research poster with Jean-Nicolas Fauchille presenting ongoing research of the pole of "Spatial Justice" of laboratory Chôros (Lausanne, EPFL). [URL](#).

15.12.2011. *Which ideas of spatial justice do individuals conceive of as they construct their urban practice?* Presentation of research proposal to laboratory Chôros (Lausanne, Switzerland). [URL](#).

Informal exchanges

14-15.10.2015. EU Open Days. European Week of Regions and Cities, Brussels (Belgium).

26-27.05.2014. Rencontres à la croisée de l'architecture & des sciences humaines. Université Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium).

28-30.06.2012. Cities are Us. Rethinking Urban Inclusion: Spaces, Mobilisations, Interventions. Centro de Estudos Sociais of University of Coimbra (Portugal).

5-7.06.2012. Penser et Produire la Ville au XXI^e siècle. Modernisation écologique, qualité urbaine et justice spatiale, organised by Association pour la promotion de l'enseignement et de la recherche en aménagement et urbanisme, Université de Lausanne (Switzerland).

14-15.04.2011 Mapping Ethics. New trends in Cartography and Social Responsibility, organised by Eidolon, Laboratorio Diathesis, Chôros-EPFL, Université Laval (Switzerland).

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Other written material

June 2016. Final report of individual doctoral grant to *Fundação Ciência e Tecnologia*.

2011-2016. Annual reports to the doctoral school EDAR.

2012-2013. Annual reports of project *Miragaia* to Porto Lazer.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE IN ARCHITECTURE AND URBANISM

Urban designer and masterplanner

February 2008 to December 2010. Collaboration in several multidisciplinary teams delivering urban regeneration masterplans for the towns and cities of Bexleyheath, Welwyn Garden City, Hereford and London, including the London Olympic Transformation masterplan. Collaboration in design competitions of complex programs (hospital, cancer centre) and requalification of suburban neighbourhoods in Greater London (Barking, Stratford). Employer: Allies and Morrison, Architects, London (United Kingdom).

Architect and research Assistance

March 2006 to February 2008. Research supporting design in the context of projects and competitions of educational and cultural building programs. Assistance to doctoral research on the topic "Portuguese Piazzas and Contemporary Public Space". Editorial work on the company's projects. Employer: Francisco Barata Fernandes & Madalena Pinto da Silva, Arquitectos, Lda, Porto (Portugal).

Internship in Architecture

February 2004 to February 2005. Development of single house projects from inception through to construction packages. Employer: aab Arquitectura Lda, Porto (Portugal).

EXPERIMENTATIONS WITH IMMATERIAL URBANISM

Documentary film *Miragaia*

2009 to 2013. With José Roseira, project of visual ethnography counting with the participation of the population who has residence, work, business investment or leisure in a parish of the historic centre of Porto. [URL](#).

Festival *Manobras no Porto*

2008 to 2009. With Ana Pedrosa, contribution to the concept of "Manobras no Porto", an urban festival which seeks to bring to public enjoyment erudite and non-erudite cultural productions of Porto inhabitants. The project was co-financed by the Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER), through the Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional (QREN) 2007-2013, in the framework of ON.2 – O Novo Norte (Programa Operacional Regional do Norte 2007-2013). [URL](#).

Participatory practice *Building Communities*

April 2009. With *Architectes Sans Frontières UK*, observation and enquiry into two favelas in the suburban area of São Salvador da Bahia (Brazil) targeted by the government-led development programme funded by the World Bank (Novos Alagados II and Ribeira Azul) and the grassroots development practice with the support of Homeless Social Movement of Bahia (Escada). Comparative assessment of the two case studies using the theoretical framework of Amartya Sen's Capability Approach and Nabeel Hamdi's concepts of enablement and community empowerment.

Urbanism competition EUROPAN 09 *Bounding Spaces*

2009. With Ana Pedrosa, competition entry for the town Santo Tirso (part of metropolitan Porto) in response to the theme “European urbanity, sustainable city and new public spaces”. *Bounding Spaces* proposes a combination of design and activities, sensitive to the co-inhabitation between new leisure and productive uses and the existent diverse environment of high and low urbanity, agricultural and forestry landscapes. The project received an honourable mention. [URL](#).

Public space installation *Suspended Trees*

2006. The creation of the installation project *Suspended Trees*, part of Porto International Marionettes Festival. At the initiative of artistic director Isabel Alves Costa (Portugal), the project sprung from a workshop with Architect Jean-Philippe Vassal (France) treating the theme of spaces for encounter. The installation effected change upon the perception of an underused public space by proposing a transformed environment and a dance event, performed by audience and the dance company Rosas (Belgium).

COMPUTER SKILLS

ArcGis (basic level), TXM, Atlas.ti, Adobe creative suite (Illustrator, Indesign, Photoshop, Dreamweaver, Premiere), mysql, Office suite (Word, Excel, PowerPoint), Microstation and AutoCAD.

