000221425 001__ 221425
000221425 005__ 20190619023710.0
000221425 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.5075/epfl-thesis-7079
000221425 02470 $$2urn$$aurn:nbn:ch:bel-epfl-thesis7079-1
000221425 02471 $$2nebis$$a10725942
000221425 037__ $$aTHESIS
000221425 041__ $$aeng
000221425 088__ $$a7079
000221425 245__ $$aBuilding Security Protocols Against Powerful Adversaries
000221425 269__ $$a2016
000221425 260__ $$bEPFL$$c2016$$aLausanne
000221425 300__ $$a122
000221425 336__ $$aTheses
000221425 502__ $$aDr Olivier Lévêque (président) ; Prof. Aikaterini Argyraki, professeure Christina Fragouli (directeurs) ; Prof. Bryan Ford, Prof. Panos Papadimitratos, Prof. Suhas Diggavi (rapporteurs)
000221425 520__ $$aAs our sensitive data is increasingly carried over the Internet and stored remotely, security in communications becomes a fundamental requirement. Yet, today's security practices are designed around assumptions the validity of which is being challenged. In this thesis we design new security mechanisms for certain scenarios where traditional security assumptions do not hold. First, we design secret-agreement protocols for wireless networks, where the security of the secrets does not depend on assumptions about the computational limitations of adversaries. Our protocols leverage intrinsic characteristics of the wireless to enable nodes to agree on common pairwise secrets that are secure against computationally unconstrained adversaries. Through testbed and simulation experimentation, we show that it is feasible in practice to create thousands of secret bits per second.  Second, we propose a traffic anonymization scheme for wireless networks. Our protocol aims in providing anonymity in a fashion similar to Tor - yet being resilient to computationally unbounded adversaries - by exploiting the security properties of our secret-agreement. Our analysis and simulation results indicate that our scheme can offer a level of anonymity comparable to the level of anonymity that Tor does.  Third, we design a lightweight data encryption protocol for protecting against computationally powerful adversaries in wireless sensor networks. Our protocol aims in increasing the inherent weak security that network coding naturally offers, at a low extra overhead. Our extensive simulation results demonstrate the additional security benefits of our approach.  Finally, we present a steganographic mechanism for secret message exchange over untrustworthy messaging service providers. Our scheme masks secret messages into innocuous texts, aiming in hiding the fact that secret message exchange is taking place. Our results indicate that our schemes succeeds in communicating hidden information at non-negligible rates.
000221425 6531_ $$asecurity
000221425 6531_ $$asecret key generation
000221425 6531_ $$aanonymizing networks
000221425 6531_ $$alinguistic steganography
000221425 700__ $$0245672$$g194221$$aSafaka, Iris
000221425 720_2 $$aArgyraki, Aikaterini$$edir.$$g176638$$0243542
000221425 720_2 $$aFragouli, Christina$$edir.$$g161832$$0240968
000221425 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/221425/files/EPFL_TH7079.pdf$$zn/a$$s1931746$$yn/a
000221425 909C0 $$xU12550$$0252412$$pNAL
000221425 909CO $$pthesis-public$$pDOI$$pIC$$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:221425$$qGLOBAL_SET$$pthesis$$pthesis-bn2018$$qDOI2
000221425 917Z8 $$x108898
000221425 917Z8 $$x108898
000221425 918__ $$dEDIC$$aIC
000221425 919__ $$aNAL
000221425 920__ $$b2016$$a2016-10-7
000221425 970__ $$a7079/THESES
000221425 973__ $$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000221425 980__ $$aTHESIS