000219524 001__ 219524
000219524 005__ 20181203024251.0
000219524 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1049/iet-ifs.2014.0616
000219524 022__ $$a1751-8709
000219524 02470 $$2ISI$$a000378417900004
000219524 037__ $$aARTICLE
000219524 245__ $$aPrivacy failure in the public-key distance-bounding protocols
000219524 260__ $$aHertford$$bInst Engineering Technology-Iet$$c2016
000219524 269__ $$a2016
000219524 300__ $$a6
000219524 336__ $$aJournal Articles
000219524 520__ $$aPublic-key distance bounding protocols are well suited to defeat relay attacks in proximity access control systems when the author assume no prior shared key. At AsiaCCS 2014, Gambs, Onete, and Robert designed such a protocol with privacy protection for the prover. That is, the protocol hides the identity of the prover to active adversaries and the prover remains anonymous. In this study the author contradicts the result on this protocol by proving that an active adversary can easily identify one prover out of two possible ones. At WISEC 2013, Hermans, Peeters, and Onete proposed another protocol which is proven to protect the privacy of the prover. In this study the author complete their results and show that the protocol does not protect it in a strong sense. That is, if the adversary can corrupt the provers, then privacy is not guaranteed any more.
000219524 6531_ $$apublic key cryptography
000219524 6531_ $$acryptographic protocols
000219524 6531_ $$adata protection
000219524 6531_ $$aauthorisation
000219524 6531_ $$aprivacy failure
000219524 6531_ $$apublic-key distance-bounding protocols
000219524 6531_ $$arelay attacks
000219524 6531_ $$aproximity access control systems
000219524 6531_ $$aAsiaCCS 2014
000219524 6531_ $$aprivacy protection
000219524 6531_ $$aWISEC 2013
000219524 700__ $$0241950$$aVaudenay, Serge$$g131602
000219524 773__ $$j10$$k4$$q188-193$$tIet Information Security
000219524 909C0 $$0252183$$pLASEC$$xU10433
000219524 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:219524$$pIC$$particle
000219524 917Z8 $$x200065
000219524 937__ $$aEPFL-ARTICLE-219524
000219524 973__ $$aEPFL$$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED
000219524 980__ $$aARTICLE