000215902 001__ 215902
000215902 005__ 20190317000406.0
000215902 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1145/2856102
000215902 02470 $$2ISI$$a000380322200005
000215902 037__ $$aARTICLE
000215902 245__ $$aIncentives for Effort in Crowdsourcing using the Peer Truth Serum
000215902 269__ $$a2016
000215902 260__ $$aNew York$$bAssoc Computing Machinery$$c2016
000215902 300__ $$a28
000215902 336__ $$aJournal Articles
000215902 520__ $$aCrowdsourcing is widely proposed as a method to solve large variety of judgement tasks, such as classifying website content, peer grading in online courses, or collecting real-world data. As the data reported by workers cannot be verified, there is a tendency to report random data without actually solving the task. This can be countered by making the reward for an answer depend on its consistency with answers given by other workers, an approach called {\em peer consistency}. However, it is obvious that the best strategy in such schemes is for all workers to report the same answer without solving the task. Dasgupta and Ghosh (WWW 2013) show that in some cases exerting high effort can be encouraged in the highest-paying equilibrium. In this paper we present a general mechanism that implements this idea and is applicable to most crowdsourcing settings. Furthermore, we experimentally test the novel mechanism, and validate its theoretical properties.
000215902 6531_ $$aHuman Factors
000215902 6531_ $$aEconomics
000215902 6531_ $$aMeasurement
000215902 6531_ $$aCrowdsourcing
000215902 6531_ $$amechanism design
000215902 6531_ $$apeer prediction
000215902 700__ $$0246632$$aRadanovic, Goran$$g211310
000215902 700__ $$0240959$$aFaltings, Boi$$g105074
000215902 700__ $$0241251$$aJurca, Radu$$g146368
000215902 773__ $$j7$$k4$$q48$$tACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology
000215902 8564_ $$s542180$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/215902/files/a48-radanovic.pdf$$yn/a$$zn/a
000215902 909C0 $$0252184$$pLIA$$xU10406
000215902 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:215902$$pIC$$particle$$qGLOBAL_SET
000215902 917Z8 $$x211310
000215902 917Z8 $$x211310
000215902 917Z8 $$x148230
000215902 937__ $$aEPFL-ARTICLE-215902
000215902 973__ $$aEPFL$$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED
000215902 980__ $$aARTICLE