Incentivizing Truthful Responses with the Logarithmic Peer Truth Serum

We consider a participatory sensing scenario where a group of private sensors observes the same phenomenon, such as air pollution. We design a novel payment mechanism that incentivizes participation and honest behavior using the peer prediction approach, i.e. by comparing sensors reports. As it is the case with other peer prediction methods, the mechanism admits uninformed reporting equilibria. However, in the novel mechanism these equilibria result in worse payoff than truthful reporting.


Published in:
Proceedings of the 2015 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing and Proceedings of the 2015 ACM International Symposium on Wearable Computers, 1349-1354
Presented at:
Workshop on Mobile and Situated Crowdsourcing (WMSC'15)
Year:
2015
Laboratories:




 Record created 2016-02-10, last modified 2018-03-17

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