

Chapter 8

Conclusions: Development Consumers

Babbitt's spectacles had huge, circular, frameless lenses of the very best glass;
the earpieces were thin bars of gold.
In them he was the modern businessman;
one who gave orders to clerks and drove a car and played occasional golf and was
scholarly in regard to Salesmanship.
His head suddenly appeared not babyish but weighty...;
with respect you beheld him put on the rest of his uniform as a Solid Citizen.

Sinclair Lewis
Babbitt

The preceding chapters have looked closely at many specific aspects of the relationship between Malangali residents and agents of the development programs at work there. This chapter and the next one conclude the discussion of this development encounter by drawing together themes that arise from the situation in Malangali. The next chapter, *Poverty and Morality*, is a commentary on the politics of African development at the turn of the millennium. The present chapter draws more specific conclusions about the ways that Malangali residents interact with development programs. Only by understanding the place that development programs have within contemporary local African political economies can we form a more global analysis of the modern processes called development.

In this chapter I argue that Malangali residents are sophisticated consumers of development who make choices based on their opportunities and constraints as they understand them. This contention stands in contrast to established writings, discussed in Chapter 1, that posit in development a processual fulfillment of a set of goals through the

actions of a set of institutions. Rather than seeing development as a bundle of goods to which people can aspire, and that they can attain as they adjust to the logic of modern forms, I argue that Malangali residents are already firmly embedded within the modern order. Their peripheral relationship to the artifacts commonly associated with modernity, including prosperity, must be understood in the context of their political and economic relationships to the larger structures of which development programs form a part. As detailed in Chapter 1, discussions of why rural Africans do or do not accept particular development initiatives often obscure the contexts in which African development subjects interact with the programs. By seeing Malangali residents as consumers of development, we can examine the factors that go into their consumption decisions. I do not depart from economic development theorists as much as anthropologists might expect: I propose that Malangali residents *do* approach development programs as rational actors. Where I diverge from economistic analysis is by proposing much different bases for the rationality behind people's decisions, rationalities based on the interplay of economic, historical, political, and social constructions of Malangali modernity. This chapter brings these factors together to understand how Malangali residents act as development consumers, and what the implications of their consumption decisions are on them and on the outcome of locally active development programs.

I start by placing this discussion within wider debates that attempt to theorize "consumption." I propose expanding consumption theory beyond material products, asserting that people's actions in circumstances related to economy are based on ideas of economy and culture that are in themselves objects of consumption with social and

economic consequences. I then look at the many different development messages brought to Malangali, the legitimacy of which the previous chapter showed area residents to be generally receptive, as a set of consumption alternatives. Finally, I summarize and review each chapter from the perspective of development consumption.

Consumption

Although consumption is a necessary corollary to the production function that is intensely studied by economists, the factors that underlie purchasing decisions remain, uncomfortably, the domain of speculation (econometricians try to provide formulae for demand, but many of their variables are fudge factors for social unknowns) and anthropology. Mary Douglas, pivotal in delineating the concerns of contemporary anthropology with consumption, only published the seminal work on the topic, *The World of Goods*, with co-author Baron Isherwood, in 1979 (second edition 1996). Douglas and Isherwood point out that, “Demand theory is at the very center, even at the origin of economics as a discipline... But economists carefully shun the question of why people want goods” (1996: 3). They proceed to elaborate “the social conditions for rational behavior” (63) that “put social interaction first” (xxv) in determining the factors that underlie demand. Almost any example of consumption choice immediately extends beyond considerations of economic value (loosely, the costs of production) and into the realm of social calculation.

The housewife with her shopping basket arrives home: some things in it she reserves for her household, some for the father, some for the children; others ... for guests. Whom she invites into her house, what parts of the house she makes available to outsiders, how often, what she offers them for music, food, drink, and conversation, those choices express and generate culture in its general sense (1996:

37).

Although, for reasons elaborated below, I take issue with their definition of “consumption as a use of material possessions that is beyond commerce and free within the law,” their larger point is central to my interpretations: “Consumption is the very arena in which culture is fought over and locked into shape” (1996: 37).

More recent theorists of consumption have attempted to expand upon the challenge offered by Douglas and Isherwood to reconcile the apparent juggernaut of global consumerism with the social factors that contribute to demand for goods. In an important review article, Miller (1995) suggests that “consumption, like kinship, is simply a domain through which diverse projects of value are objectified” (156). In other words, goods acquire value through their social significance. Carrier and Heyman go on to put forward a model that “locates consumption in the efforts by household members to maintain and improve their location in a world of unequal social groupings..., a process that we take to be creative and problematic rather than repetitive and foreordained.” (1997: 362). The task these authors assign to anthropology is “to be sensitive to complex intersections of local strategy and big capitalism” while being “cautious about locating the meaning of objects in terms of society-wide hegemonies, resistances, and structures” (368).

This recent theorizing helps establish how we may investigate consumption, but it provides little more than a framework for further explorations of Douglas and Isherwood’s central question, why people want what they want. Other contemporary writing places consumption at the crux of capitalism in the affluent world, looking especially at the ways people use their purchasing decisions to form meaning in their lives, to the de facto

exclusion of societies in which consuming may take different forms and meanings (Lury 1996, Firat and Dholakia 1998). A focus on the particular curiosity of contemporary super-abundance can steer us away from theorizing underlying universal aspects of why people want what they want. I suggest that Arjun Appadurai is especially vague, shifting from calls for case-by-case examination of the histories and genealogies of consumption decisions to sweeping statements about late capitalism. How are we to utilize, for example, his conclusion that “the aesthetic of ephemerality becomes the civilizing counterpart of flexible accumulation, and the work of the imagination is to link the ephemerality of goods with the pleasures of the senses” (1996: 85) in our understanding of consumption in Malangali?

What the authors discussed above hint at, but fall short of stating, is that consumption is not simply about goods at all. I propose that we conceive of consumption as being mostly about ideas, with goods being the usual vehicles through which these ideas are manifest. Put another way, consumption stands at the intersection of symbol and economy. We cannot understand the economics of demand without examining the meanings that underlie people’s consumption decisions.

This approach to consumption makes explicit a semantic shift away from the Latin root *consumere*, to take up or to take. When speaking of consumption, social scientists no longer imply a literal using up of resources, in the way that people consume food or fire consumes wood. Rather, we imply a transfer of resources from one state to another, from a sphere of public availability to one of private or domestic use. A book of poems, for example, may sit on the shelf of a bookstore unread, unconsumed. Consumption in the

economist's sense occurs when someone pays for the book and brings it home, even if it then merely sits on a bookshelf unread. The book is no longer an economic object, unless it re-emerges at a used bookstore or an estate sale – once it is purchased, it has crossed into a private, non-economic sphere.

Must consumption involve fiscal transactions? What is the difference, for example, between purchasing a collection of poems and downloading the same poems off the Internet? From the publisher's perspective there is a world of difference, but for the (unpaid) poet there is no difference at all; for the poet, consumption occurs when her words are read and appreciated. Instead of point-of-sale, poetry is consumed at point-of-use, just as food is consumed at the dinner table instead of the market. By conceiving of consumption in terms of ideas, we can seek a definition that encompasses both economic and intellectual aspects of both point-of-sale and point-of-use. Such a definition is central to understanding development as consumption for Africans and Europeans.

To see how ideas are central to the economic aspects of consumption, let us return to Douglas and Isherwood's (not necessarily dated) example of the housewife with her shopping basket. The things in her basket will be there because of the social meanings they hold, not because they alone will satisfy a survival need. Which breakfast cereals does she bring home? While we might assume the answer is merely a question of flavor preference, the actual decision is much more intricate. Her children may have an avowed preference for one box of sugar and starch over another because of its cartoon representatives, or because of the enclosed plastic toy. She herself may choose a cereal because of its associations with slimming or athletics. Why, though, does she wish to be

slender? No Malangali woman would buy a product that promised to reduce inches from her waist! Similarly, the very notion that cereal in a box is appropriate breakfast food is a cultural idea with little basis in physiology. Yet how revolting would an American family find a breakfast of spaghetti or meatloaf or turkey soup, much less a meal of good Tanzanian *ugali*? Any of these foods would satisfy the family's nutritional needs and three of them might accompany the breakfast cereal home from the market. What causes the decision to buy them is a combination of ideas: what constitutes food (not *ugali*), what constitutes breakfast (cereal), what constitutes health (slimness), what constitutes fun (a plastic car in the box or a puzzle on the back), what constitutes fashion (a cereal that all the kids are eating), what constitutes nostalgia (a sugar cereal that "adults have grown to love").¹ Not least, but only part of the decision, are economic decisions about price and relative value.

We can extend the analysis of the ideas that determine consumption to almost any good. Comparative anthropology provides the material to disinter the cultural construction of seemingly normative ideas, simply by juxtaposing contrasting practices of two societies that nevertheless accomplish similar results. For example, Malangali residents bathe without indoor plumbing, play soccer but not baseball, and may purchase a rickety wooden chair so a guest can sit in style. These are at odds with predominant American ideas about how to get clean, how to enjoy sports, and how to welcome guests.

¹ Economists attempt to model the demand for "characteristics", which are features of a product such as, for cereal, crunchiness, sweetness, and even popularity. Modeling of such behaviors, though, retains the axiom that consumption of one or another version of the product is normative. What I am suggesting is that such characteristics are only a subset of the ideas that are consumed in the process of purchasing decisions, ideas that go to the heart of what may or may not be purchased or acted upon.


Aesthetics, concepts of fun, even concepts of the correct way to wash a body with soap and water become elements of purchasing decisions. The Malangali residents may decide the rickety chair *looks* better than a squat stool because of its associations with settings in which people of honor are seated on chairs. An American, conversely, may decide the African stool looks better than a wooden chair in a living room because of its shape or patina or association with some image of exotic Africa.

When Douglas and Isherwood define consumption “as a use of material possessions,” then, I must propose an alternative. Consumption is the use of ideas, often through the medium of material possessions, as they pass from a public to a private sphere. The book of poems is consumed when a purchaser decides the volume would make a nice gift, or might bring future reading enjoyment, or might support a deserving author, or will impress a visitor perusing a bookshelf. Whatever the ideas that cause him to take the book to the bookstore’s cash register, it is these ideas of “book” rather than cold economic calculation (for example, an increased personal utility function of the \$14.95 purchase price) that lead to the purchase. The poems may *also* be consumed when, one autumn evening, the message that the poet made available to all finally strikes a chord with someone who has taken the collection off the shelf in the den, or downloaded it off the Internet, or stood reading it in the bookstore.

Expanding the notion of consumption beyond that of goods could, one might argue, dilute the concept until it is too thin to be of use for economic analysis. I propose that expanding the consumption concept into the realm of ideas in fact enhances its

utility for economics. A fundamental problem for econometricians is calculating how much of a good people will buy at various prices, and making production decisions according to consequent projections of profit at these prices. Tacit in these calculations is that the economic “value” of a good, what people will pay, is often far above its production costs – that value is a negotiable assessment of social worth. In other words, on a graph of supply and demand, the entire space between the cost of production and actual sale price is purely notional (Figure 8.1). This notional space is also the focus of intense, continuous efforts to formulate mathematically, with the premise that with the right incentives (low enough prices or stimulation of desire) demand can be made to stretch toward infinity. I argue that the search for correct incentives, inherent in the

Figure 8.1: Notional Value of Consumption



actions of development agents to have their messages adopted, is a misconstrual; regardless of the normative assumptions of the producers of goods or ideas, people will only

consume in the name of progress – similar to what they will consume in the name of cleanliness or aesthetics or breakfast – from within the set of ideas within which they find value. It might be more useful to assess this notional value by combining economic with social analysis in the task of producing concrete numbers for the demand function.

Still, saying that consumption is about the cultural meanings of goods is not new, and has been well explored by McCracken (1988) and others in addition to those cited above. The more controversial thrust of where I propose consumption theory ought to expand is into ideas beyond those associated with material products. Particularly, I suggest that how people act in circumstances related to economy is based on ideas of economy and culture that are in themselves objects of consumption with social and economic consequences. Thus, when I speak of “development consumers,” I speak of people who incorporate *ideas* and *goods associated with ideas* into their apparatus of social and economic determinations. For example, how Malangali residents value “tradition” or “modernity” or aesthetics contributes to their decisions about what kind of houses to build, above and beyond the economic costs of their various options. Ideas about the attractiveness of metal roofs and the health benefits of well-ventilated homes are never bought and sold, but they are consumed. The ideas are made available in public fora such as village meetings, posters, and radio programs, and consumed when they are adopted into the private sphere of a family’s decisions about housing. Ideas about farming practices, ecology, and hydrology similarly move from public to private spheres by mechanisms of consumption. Even abstract concepts like gender relations and charity can be objects for consumption – ideas that are made available but remain plastic in their transition to

becoming normative. That these ideas are often non-normative means they are subject to the same processes of persuasion and marketing as are many goods, but even ideas that are taken for granted are consumed, as are ideas about food, in the process of enculturation. In previous chapters I have demonstrated conceptual bases for how Europeans and Africans perceive the ideas and artifacts associated with development activities. In this chapter I explore these ideological tensions as arenas of consumption. By doing so, I hope to enhance the way we understand the interactions in Malangali that combine into the ideas called development.

Messages

I first began to appreciate the consumer aspects of Malangali development programs when working with Concern's Simon Levin on their Wider Impact Study, the WIS (see page 53). In everything I had read and heard, Concern's personnel and donors conceived of their efforts as a relatively coherent package that might together lead toward whatever they understood to be development. Simon wanted to know which extension messages within this package people had responded to, and why. I thought the first part would be a relatively easy task, so sat down to list the messages to which people were exposed. I was able to list more than 100 items from memory, including many that are discussed in the chapter summaries below. When I delved into the project proposals and annual reports, I saw hundreds more, messages that often changed over the years. Some lasted just a year or two, such as growing grapes, while some like composting continued throughout Concern's time in Malangali. Concern promoted different sets of messages through their agriculture staff, their forestry staff, the horticulture program, the community

development staff, the water program, their programs in the schools, and special programs they sponsored over the years. People received additional messages from non-Concern authorities, including other government extension agents such as the livestock officers and health officers, from politicians, from the schools, and from radio programs. The list was far from complete when I got diverted to other tasks.² What the exercise demonstrated was the sheer quantity of development messages imparted on Malangali residents in the past decade. Older residents confirm that their experience with receiving myriad messages extends well back into the colonial era.

What begins in the planner's imagination as a package called "development" becomes, by the time it is enacted in Malangali, a loose compendium of hundreds of different, often conflicting dictats about how residents should conduct their lives. Far from coherent, these aid messages and material offerings are fragmented and dispersed over time. People may be instructed to do things in ways divorced from any rationale, or that are entirely inappropriate for their circumstances, or that require resources that they cannot acquire. Conversely, they may be excluded from activities in which their involvement is not deemed appropriate, for example if they do not qualify as "the poorest of the poor." Messages therefore appear before Malangali residents in a far from systematic manner, and are responded to in a similarly ad hoc way. This section discusses how people react to this constant barrage of official directives regarding every aspect of their

² The idea of generating these lists came very late in the research period. Had I had the time, I would have asked Malangali residents to recall the various messages they received, and then discuss their opinions. Simon and I talked about experimenting with "message ranking," which we both thought could be a useful Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) technique, but were unable to schedule it given the immediate need to conclude the WIS reports.

lives.

In November 1996 our local MP, Mr. Malangalila, made a two day whistle-stop tour of Malangali division.³ When he came to Mwilavila I stood in the small crowd who gathered to hear him speak. By this time I was familiar with the ritual of the public meeting, in many ways similar to the Kenyan *baraza* that Haugerud (1995) unfolds as a diagnostic event. This time I was far enough away from the speaker that I could kibitz with my companions under the shade tree as Malangalila spoke. The MP began talking about the troubles households had making money. He himself understood the difficulty, he said, but he had used various strategies to help himself. Chickens, if cared for, would reproduce many more chickens, and after a short while a household could profit from regular 2000/= (\$3.30) sales of the offspring. Goat husbandry was more work, but also more profit.

“This man knows nothing about goats,” Baba Shangaa whispered to me. “When he was headmaster of Itengule Secondary School, all the animals disappeared. He knows how to eat meat, but not from his own work.”

Another man joined in. “Why is he telling us to raise chickens? We all raise chickens. If you have too many chickens, you have to feed them good grain. Wouldn’t we eat chicken every day if we could?”

The MP, unaware of the grumbles from the rear, was just warming to his subject. “What we really need are good ways that people can earn money. We have to ask, what

³ The similarity in names between the division and its MP is only coincidental. *Malangali* is a Hehe word for a tree indigenous to the area. This scene is translated from synchronic notes written in Swahili.

crop is there a market for?" After listing crops for which the market had declined, he turned to tobacco. "These days people can sell tobacco for a fair price."

As he extolled the advantages of tobacco as a cash crop, the men near me started a hushed conversation. "Tobacco!" Baba Shangaa hissed. "Doesn't he remember what happened the last time we had to plant tobacco? Where are we supposed to get the wood to cure it? We're not allowed to cut wood in the forest anymore. We know the trucks won't take the leaves when they're fresh!"

Other men joined in. "So this year the price is good. What if we all plant tobacco and the price falls?"

"I grow a little for myself, near the house, but I don't sell it because there isn't any market."

"He doesn't know what he's saying."

"Where are the seeds?"

I asked Baba Shangaa, "Does he really believe everyone should plant tobacco? Or is he just saying something so he can sound smart?"

"They always want to sound smart," he replied. "Last month the District Commissioner was telling us something else. You remember, how we could make fire from the gas from cow manure? They always have to tell us something, so he tells us 'grow tobacco.'"

"Will you plant it?" I ask.

"Hmpph. Where?"

Soon the MP's speech drew to a close. After a few half-hearted cheers for the

President, the division, and the ruling party, he invited questions from the assembly. I urged Baba Shangaa to ask his questions about tobacco. “What’s the point?” he responded. “It’s better if I just continue as though he never said anything. If we don’t say anything, it’ll just die.”

Few people followed up on the new drive to plant tobacco, subsequently endorsed by the District Commissioner. Some people planted a little bit to see if the promised market would materialize, but production increased little during the next two cropping cycles. In reaction, the government (I am not clear whether at district or regional level) mandated farmers in the division produce higher quantities of tobacco in 1998-99. This mandate was almost immediately followed, however, with a complete shakeup in both district and regional administration. Malangali farmers continue to grumble about the idea of planting tobacco, and now are waiting to see not only whether the promised markets come into existence, but also whether the new administrators will pursue the policy many residents say is misguided. (Baba Shangaa never planted tobacco – he lost his cattle herd to disease, after which he found employment outside of Malangali.) What this scene represents is the moment at which a development message is presented to and first evaluated by the rural population. The little klatch under the tree came to the speech to hear what Malangalila had to say. If they were not interested, they would have found other things to do with their afternoon. Part of the attraction of these public meetings is undoubtedly the entertainment value of listening to live oratory, but the men all knew the portly MP well enough to not plan on hanging on his every word. Perhaps they thought he might pass on useful news from the Parliament, such as pricing changes for maize or

fertilizer. When they instead got chickens, goats, and tobacco, they put the ideas through their database of experience and returned a silent negative evaluation.

Importantly, the men under the tree did not reject Malangalila's suggestions out of hand. They did not insinuate that he had malevolent intentions, that he represented interests other than theirs, or that he had no right to tell them what to grow. Nor did they hint at active resistance to following his directives, though I gathered Baba Shangaa's reticence was so as not to attract official attention to his non-compliance. In fact, had the MP handed out tobacco seeds, most people would probably have taken them and stuck them in the ground. They did not go to the meeting expecting to hear of something new that would transform their lives, but they thought it possible that one or two useful things might emerge. I suggest that this meeting encapsulates a step in the consumption process by which most development messages are received and evaluated by Malangali residents, the point at which development ideas are made available in the public sphere.

Messengers As we have seen throughout this dissertation, most development activities are designed by people at some remove from daily rural life. The process whereby their ideas are transmitted to rural residents is, in essence, marketing activity. The ideas must be pitched to the intended beneficiaries, often with demonstrations, product or seed samples, and a spiel touting the reasons people should accept them. Sometimes, as with villagization and tree planting, the ideas are legislated and enforced by police. Whether through persuasion or coercion, planners know these efforts are necessary because people might otherwise ignore the ideas. I suggest that development agents do not conceive of their extension activities as "marketing" because planners have

consumed and naturalized the idea of their authority as experts. If the expertise flows from them to the rural residents, then experts assume their ideas, based in science and logic, ought to be accepted by rational peasants, Q.E.D.. My inference is based on pieces of actual testimony, such as assertions of why village residents “should” perpetuate the water scheme or use compost in their fields. The many strands of development analysis based on assumptions of expertise in practice heap hundreds of development messages on rural Tanzanians. The assumption of planners’ expertise is so pervasive, as discussed in the last two chapters, that it usually goes without question by all involved.

For Malangali residents, though, expertise does not necessarily imply knowledge. The expertise that extension workers are conferred by dint of their educational accomplishments ascribes to them a position of respect. This respect is enacted in many ways, from subtle indicators such as seating the extension worker in the best chair in the house to overt linguistic markers such as rural elders greeting younger extension workers with the honorific *shikamoo*. People pay attention to what the extension workers have to say, rarely arguing with message or messenger. However, when the extension worker leaves, or the village meeting is over, individuals follow up on the extension message in various ways, not out of their respect for the expert but through their own assessment of the validity and utility of what they were told based on their own experiences. To elaborate the point, let us re-examine as episodes of development consumption people’s experiences discussed in the preceding ethnographic chapters.

Summary

Farm Chapter 2 looked at agriculture, which has been the focus of the bulk of

development activity for most of the past century. Development agents have two challenges in agricultural extension, first communicating with farmers in isolated areas and then persuading them to try the extension messages. Concern was effective at reaching farmers in most parts of Malangali division, itself no mean organizational feat. I discussed several of the messages Concern delivered to farmers, some of which were continuations of practices long preached by agriculturalists and some of which were new or even in contradiction to earlier orthodoxies. The central agrarian premise of Chapter 2 is that farmers adopted or rejected extension messages based on their perceptions of how the techniques fit into their overall agricultural production goals. This stands in contrast to the premise on which most local development activities are based, that each family strives for a goal of agricultural subsistence that they have difficulty achieving – which is exclusively true for only a small subset of households in any year. The premise that most families have difficulty making ends meet is depressingly consistent with conditions throughout the division, but in fact pure subsistence agriculture as a survival strategy is rarely employed – and when it is, it is a goal that most area farmers know how to achieve. Most farmers express their ideal goal to be selling significant surplus grain, though market conditions have made this ideal impractical in recent years.

For most households, agricultural production strategies seek to balance domestic needs, including food and money, through a mixture of wage labor and work on the family farm plot. For example, one woman's almost bare grain bin testified to her reliance on brewing maize beer with which she buys enough grain to feed her family and make the next batch of maize beer. For her, such agricultural development messages as careful seed

spacing and composting are currently irrelevant; during the planting season she busies herself as a day laborer for cash on other people's farms, paying scant attention to her own feeble fields. Farmers hoping for a substantial surplus pay attention to extension messages and try various suggested techniques on experimental portions of their farms. Most have adopted some variation on recommended composting, spacing, and intercropping combinations, which they say improve their yields somewhat. Their main concern, though, is not the incremental yield increases they might get from following extension messages. Their main concern is explicitly the relative price of maize and fertilizer. Most families make farming decisions on the basis of relative expected financial return, which they calculate by factoring expected yields against the expected sale price of maize and the known price of fertilizer – and comparing these returns against the opportunity costs of alternative uses of their labor. An older man typical of many I spoke with had tried many agricultural extension techniques and could articulate them in detail, but had stopped farming “the expert way” because the few extra bags of grain he could harvest were simply not worth the extra effort to him and his wives. I submit that Malangali residents pass most of the hundreds of messages associated with “agricultural development” through subjective filters of experience and expectation by which they decide whether to incorporate, reject, or modify the suggestions of the “experts.” The messages Malangali residents choose to adopt, far from being those that development planners expect due to having consumed the idea that most rural Africans lack the knowledge to attain even basic subsistence, are those that fit with their personal understandings of their farms as centers from which they seek to eke out a monetary profit.

Forest Variations in access to land, demarcated especially by gender and age, are crucial determinants in how people interact with the tree component of environmental development programs. In Chapter 3 I discussed the Malangali Forestry Program, in which Concern planners took as normative, based on a patterned European consumption of misread ideas of African land and wilderness (Adams and McShane 1992, Fairhead and Leach 1996), the uncertain view that the district suffered from a crisis of deforestation arising from untamed local use, and that this assumed deforestation could be reversed by teaching area residents to plant trees. We met Hector Mtindo, a local man with a primary school education who adopted Concern's ideas about tree planting wholesale, seeing many different ways to profit from planting the trees he was paid as an extension worker to promote. Mtindo's enthusiasm and his example helped inspire Martin Lugas to plant a few acres of trees on his own plot. Lugas also raised a few hundred seedlings a year in his compound. Unlike Mtindo, though, Lugas stopped raising seedlings in 1996 because he spent the dry season building a beer club that he thought might be more lucrative. Lugas fully understood how to plant trees, and he understood the benefits from them, which we discussed at length when he agreed to sell me some building poles from his private woodlot. His decision to take several years off from raising seedlings, like that of his friend and neighbor Elli Mwenda to establish a tree nursery in the large town of Makambako, was based on a personal calculus that weighed expert advice against concrete experience. The young man who planted seventy trees on a very small patch of land his father gave him was constrained from planting a larger woodlot by his inaccessibility to land, a condition he hoped to remedy soon by marrying and being granted part of his father's

estate. He saw the profit potential in trees, but recognized that his priority was building a house and saving the cash he needed to get married. More trees, he reasoned, he could plant a little later so they could provide him income for the needs of his anticipated family, including money for his own sons to marry. Similarly, some older men who had built their houses and whose sons were already married and earning cash as migrant laborers were not enthusiastic tree planters because they did not foresee extensive benefits accruing to themselves or their offspring. Malangali men interacted with the forest program in ways similar to the economic projections of Concern planners, making their decisions on the basis of expected returns – though rarely, I argue, engaging the forestry program as a result of the ecological consciencization message that Concern sought to instill.

Most women, on the other hand, felt they had little or nothing to gain from planting trees. Plant they did, under the watchful gaze of the extension staff, but with the enthusiasm of patients opening wide for the dentist's drill. A few women, such as the young mother who planted fruit trees on land her father gave to her and her husband, did extol the benefits of at least some limited tree planting. Most women I met, though, were apt to let the trees they were forced to plant wither in the ground. Malangali women saw trees as a male domain, the provenance of fathers, husbands, and sons. Neither the ecological, nor the economic, nor the gender equity ideas that the Concern forestry staff found so compelling were in the least bit relevant for most Malangali women.

In all but a few cases people understood exactly what was involved in planting trees, not only the technical "how to" but also the factors that limited them and the potential benefits they stood to realize. Technical knowledge was an important tool

transmitted by Concern and other development agents, but was only one factor that went into people's decisions about how to interact with their forestry resources. Nor was the "cost/ benefit analysis" that the World Bank's Donald Sunguvia suggests is necessary (see page 365), and that many residents enumerated to me in detail, sufficient to determine whether people would become avid tree planters. In *addition* to these factors, people made decisions about whether tree planting was right for them based on their cultural knowledge, similar to the decisions beneath whether and which cereal Americans choose to eat for breakfast. By evaluating the decision to plant trees on the basis not only of potential profit, but also of the connection that most Malangali residents understand to exist between tree roots, land tenure, and lineage roots, we can see the clearest case in which the consumption of development ideas stands at the intersection of symbol and economy.

Water The Malangali Water Supply Scheme (MWSS) that is the focus of Chapter 4 was successful insofar as it fulfilled its technical goal of bringing relatively clean piped water to many residents of the lower and drier part of the division. Even the water scheme, though, got mired in conflicting messages best understood by the elaboration of a development consumption model. Area residents were quick to agree that a water system was something they wanted, and they repeatedly demonstrated their desires with volunteer labor. As they came to believe in the reliability of the water pipes, people began making major plans around the system, including where to build homes and the possibility of scheduling weddings late in the dry season. As Juliet Dickey's 1995 research pointed out and my findings and the WIS support, people who lived near reliable taps were willing

to pay substantial annual water taxes. Even were those taxes enough to maintain the system after the withdrawal of European funding support, however, area residents were not in a position to perpetuate the scheme on their own. Part of the reason for this inability is purely technical, that people along the water lines cannot count on enough equipment or trained personnel to administer a highly complicated engineering endeavor. Many people also expressed the opinion that water supply is a government-inspired goal that, while highly desirable, requires continued government attention. Their assumptions were thus in unarticulated disagreement with the development agency premise that people should want and be able to control such a system. Concern recognized belatedly that people did not feel personally invested in the system's continued maintenance, so undertook a last-ditch effort to convince area residents that they were "stakeholders" with "ownership." It is entirely possible that a more comprehensive, better planned approach would have convinced many Malangali residents that indeed they should and could assume responsibility for the system. My point is not that such a goal is impossible, nor even that it is undesirable. I simply assert that, from a consumption perspective, the sale was never made: residents never bought the idea.

Concern considers the MWSS to be a failure because it drank money without achieving their larger development objectives of "empowerment" or "community development" or "sustainability." I suggest that their real failure was that they never recognized that the premise of local sustainability was based on an unexamined logical fallacy, that people would behave in ways desired by development planners simply because those behaviors made sense in the planners' imaginations. As consumers of the MWSS,

Malangali residents never interacted with the higher-order premises of the development planners – these ideas were never made publically available in ways that could engage most people. What in Europe is a development “package” of water and sustainability is in Malangali a fragmented series of calls over many years to dig trenches, lay pipes, pay taxes, and conserve water. What was sold to Malangali residents was the idea that if they gave labor they would get water, an idea that was convincing to the vast majority of people along the pipeline. The other objectives were sold only to the project’s European donors, to whom they sounded persuasive enough to give Concern the funds.

The water program also illustrates the consumption aspects of development projects in the ways it interacts with other development messages received by the people of Malangali. Development planners conceive of distinct “sectors” to which funds and personnel are devoted. From the perspective of rural residents, these sectors are often a loosely amalgamated collection of government and expert representatives, acting as individuals on behalf of the larger authority structure. Consequently, planners operate within discrete spheres such as health, horticulture, and community development, whereas area residents interact with a reaggregated set of mandates. Health planners in Malangali have promoted the objective of clean water, which can be achieved by either treatment in the tanks or boiling before drinking; old posters hanging in some homes use drawings and words to promote boiled water, pit latrines, and hand washing as preventive measures against diarrhea. Health and horticulture personnel have also promoted private vegetable gardens, the former as a means of improving nutrition and the latter also as a means of generating household income.

Community development planners, apparently for the aesthetic benefits of progress and stability outlined well by Scott (1998), advocate *nyumba bora*, better housing, which entails construction of kiln-fired bricks made with a lot of water, as well as metal roofs. Meanwhile, forestry personnel advocate reductions in wood burning, including strict laws that, when enforced, impose large fines on transgressors. Each of these messages has bases in logical rationales, the writing about which has inspired funders to direct sums of money their way. When the various messages intersect in the lives of people, though, the outcome is a cacophony of mandates among which Malangali residents must choose to follow or ignore. Table 8.1 demonstrates the divergent professional attitudes that personnel of five sectors project to Malangali residents for three development messages related to the water supply scheme:

Table 8.1: Attitudes of Sectoral Personnel Toward 3 Development Messages.

		SECTOR				
		Health	Water	Horticulture	Forestry	Community Development
M E S S A G E	Boil Drinking Water!	Yes	Yes (because program stopped treating water in tanks)		Ambivalent (uses too much wood)	Yes (but also advocates reducing women's labor)
	Plant Vegetable Gardens!	Yes (for nutrition)	Family use only (gardens for profit use too much water)	Yes (for nutrition and profit)		Yes (for profit)
	Build Brick Houses!	Yes (for ventilation and sanitation)	Opposed but resigned (uses too much water)		No (do not use too much wood to burn bricks)	Yes (for aesthetics, modern look)

Now that many forest areas are proscribed, it is difficult for women to gather enough firewood to boil drinking water in addition to all their other domestic wood needs. Meanwhile, the water program stopped treating the water at the main tank for cost reasons, although the initial health considerations never disappeared and users of the system were not informed that the water was no longer treated. I asked many people about these contradictory mandates. Their answers revealed many considerations. For example, having close access to wood did not necessarily incline people to boil water; the propensity to boil seems in all cases the result of a family member falling ill in some way demonstrably correlated to the water. In several families where they did believe someone had fallen sick from drinking the water, or that the water worsened a bad condition, the women would make extra trips to distant woodlands to get the needed extra firewood,

whereas many people who live near abundant firewood do not boil because they do not believe it is necessary. People who expressed strong opinions about boiling are sometimes opposed on the basis that they have been drinking the water all their lives without apparent ill effects. Why should we boil it, they ask, just because now the government has decided to tell us we should? They have listened to the idea and made their determination through their experiences both of health and of shifting government programs.

Improved housing, on the other hand, is something about which most Malangali residents express positive sentiments. Men aspire to build houses of brick, and women hope their husbands will be able to do so. Young men who are unable to make the first section of their house out of brick will make a temporary structure of earth, and then build their brides additional structures of brick as they get older and the family grows. Brick not only looks better in the local aesthetic, it keeps out termites, does not require annual replastering, and lasts for as long as a hundred years. I did not meet a single person who expressed a preference for earthen walls, and although people would grant my point that metal roofs are hot and noisy, most still preferred them to thatch despite (because of?) their expense. What started as a development message, *nyumba bora*, has now been incorporated as a local symbol of progress. As discussed in Chapter 3, many people are in substantial agreement with the policies against cutting wood in certain forest areas. Because they also desire *nyumba bora*, they are often willing to haul wood long distances, or risk being caught breaking the law, in order to build brick houses. Apparently they are not willing to pass up brick houses because of sanctions against using water. Bricks are too

heavy to carry from valley bottoms, where water is always available, to the homesteads where men build. People who live near taps instead carry water to their building sites (often one young man is paid to keep water available, or several women *or* men will each make a few trips). They make bricks from clay on the premises, even though they know their use of water is technically illegal. As far as I know, nobody has ever been fined exclusively for using water for brick-making. Men are fully prepared to argue precedent if they are called to account for their activity, as I have witnessed in many various cases argued before village government. Meanwhile, however, personnel from both the water and forestry programs decried brick-making to me several times, and at least twice I heard them discourage it in public meetings.

Personnel from the water program were also in strong opposition to the private gardens promoted by the horticulturists. If each family grows a private garden for profit with water from the MWSS, they argue, then the system will be stretched beyond capacity. Individual gardeners, however, have a different outlook: the water is there.⁴ Because it is currently available, they choose to use it – often with the enthusiastic endorsement of the horticulturists who encouraged them in their endeavor. They are conversant in all the arguments against private water use for gardens, which are the

⁴ Economist Rupa Athreya notes in conversation that this is a classic problem in game theory that economists call (inaccurately, she asserts) the “tragedy of the commons,” where each individual takes as given the restraints on public goods that everybody is currently following, and exploits available common resources in ways that are individually optimal. The end result is a “Nash equilibrium,” best demonstrated in the case of fish stocks in the North Atlantic greatly reduced by over-fishing, when the resource becomes depleted and all individuals end up with less. In Chapter 4 I discuss the political circumstances in which the capacity of the MWSS was determined through a bureaucratic debate about the “science” of projecting daily water consumption by rural residents, and the long time horizon before the system reaches its projected maximum flow in most months.

subject of lengthy debates at village meetings. They make the choice to garden because, as long as the water is available, they have a chance at making some dry season income. If the water were cut off, for example if fines were imposed for gardening, people would voice their objections, but they would probably not substitute by gardening at the valley bottoms, unless they already owned land near creek beds. For now, though, they have made their consumption choices among the many, and often conflicting, development messages available to them.

Gardens Vegetable gardens are one area about which I have spoken only in passing, but which illustrate how development performs as a consumption activity governed by perceived opportunities and constraints. It seems that people in some parts of Malangali division were growing vegetables for profit long before Concern began its horticulture program. These gardens were along valley bottoms and in the swamps of the higher elevations, where abundant tiny gardens are today visible from the air. WIS researchers in Lwingulo village interviewed many people who had long grown limited numbers of green leafy vegetables and carried them to sell along the highway. As a result of Concern activities, though, many more Lwingulo residents began growing gardens, and the variety of vegetables increased. People elsewhere throughout Malangali division also began gardening to an extent never seen before, most notably among people who could plant near taps of the MWSS. Adoption of gardening was not, however, a straightforward incorporation of all the messages brought by the horticulturists. The horticulture program attempted to have people grow dozens of different items. Many of these species did indeed grow well, were easy to raise, and were popular to local tastes. Yet in garden after garden

people ended up planting a fairly standard menu of about half a dozen vegetables: a type of spinach, Chinese cabbage, tomatoes, onions, cabbage, and one or two others.⁵ Most of these vegetables were eaten within the home or given as small gifts, but many ended up being sold. People usually either sold the vegetables themselves, setting up a little table outside their home or in a central place like the market or near a church, or they sold them to the owner of the “Kariakoo Shimoni” vegetable stand in Mwilavila village. A few people grew tomatoes for sale to long-distance traders who would truck the crop to Dar es Salaam, but this contributed to a national tomato glut in 1996 so the trucks never arrived in Malangali that year.

Gardeners take the advice of extension agents, often trying seeds the horticulturists sell or give away, and then subject the advice to a range of private calculations. Will the crop grow well? Will it taste good? Will it require a lot of work? Will it need pesticide, fertilizer, or manure?⁶ Will there be a market? If I grow it after the

⁵ Despite the omniscient authorial voice, many things still puzzle me. One is the question of carrots. The extension staff promoted carrots, which have been a favorite of health programs for many years as a result of international campaigns of the Helen Keller Institute. Despite the availability of seeds and extension advice, people did not choose to grow carrots, and none were available in the markets. However, I tried growing carrots in my own garden, and after one failure was able to produce a fairly abundant crop. What puzzles me is that I hardly got to eat my own carrots. Once the crop started coming in, I found myself giving away almost every carrot in my garden. Sometimes children would knock on my door and ask if they could have some, but often adult visitors would hint that they would welcome a gift of carrots. If they were so popular, why did people not grow them? Perhaps the seeds were too expensive compared to other vegetables? Maybe the variety of seeds I brought back from Wal-Mart for my second attempt was by chance better suited to Malangali than the seeds available locally from Tanzania Farmers’ Association (TFA) and the extension staff? In 1998 I gave packets of American carrot seeds to about a dozen friends. The gifts were well received, and I am eager to learn whether any of these farmers are inspired to continue planting carrots in the future. For now, I leave this example floating, in part to demonstrate that things are messier than the veneer of polished writing may make them appear.

⁶ Pesticide use was advocated by horticulture staff in the 1980s. After expatriate Concern employees became attuned to the organic farming movement in the North, local staff were sent to seminars promoting organic agriculture in the 1990s. Chemical pesticides dropped out of the horticulture extension messages. Malangali

rains stop, when the market will be better, will it survive if piped water is unavailable for a few days? What if I want to go away after the grain harvest, to visit relatives or look for work? Is there a chance the entire crop will fail, for instance from some disease or birds? Can I make enough money to cover the cost of the seeds and my labor time? These and other considerations go into people's decisions about whether to grow gardens – decisions they are in a better position to make because of the activity of development agents bearing extension messages. One useful function of development agencies, then, is to expand the options among which people may pursue their strategies to secure a livelihood. That the options thus opened are usually relatively minor efforts that address the symptoms of rural poverty, rather than concerted actions directed at the root causes of poverty, will be the subject of the final chapter.

In this dissertation I have discussed the many different categories of actors who together shape the ways development is experienced in Malangali. Within these categories are, of course, many important differences. Especially important for this analysis are the many ways that Malangali residents bring different backgrounds, goals, and understandings to their encounters with development agents. Differences of gender, age, relative wealth, education, family composition, and religion, among others, all contribute to a heterogeneous population that is nonetheless acted upon by development agents with programs that assume a great degree of homogeneity. Also important are the perspectives of the educated African staff who share sometimes contradictory assumptions about

farmers, however, continue to use pesticides as they can afford them and see necessary, often engaging each other in long conversations about which chemical regimes have the best results for specific crops.

development both with their employers and with the people among whom they work. Tanzanian government personnel have similarly complicated approaches to Malangali residents, with the additional mandates that they produce such items as tax receipts and votes for the government. Expatriate development personnel are differentiated by their educational and political perspectives (for example, Concern brought to Malangali both engineers from conservative Catholic families and more liberal staff with feminist bent trained in the social sciences), their physical placement either in the village or in offices in urban centers far away – some even in Dublin – and their various institutional roles and responsibilities. Similar variations exist among the staffs of the large funding agencies, and among the millions of private donors. Despite these variations among the myriad individuals and categories that interact in the creation and enactment of aid efforts in Malangali, the uniformity of the term “development” serves to obscure the effects of how such programs attempt to be all things to all people.

With so many actors holding so many expectations, we must rephrase the frequent questions about whether development can meet its objectives. We must first specify, among the myriad possibilities, which objectives might be met, then ask for whom and by what criteria we determine the results. For example, in the Malangali horticulture program we can distill a host of objectives that differ by actor, and an attendant variety of ways to interpret the results. For many private Irish donors, for example, the very existence of the gardening program is enough to placate their need to feel they are doing their small part, while others appreciate the reassurance of agency literature that describes their contributions making a difference. Bureaucrats in London and Brussels are more

concerned that the NGO spend their money in an orderly and accountable manner; while the E.C. fully expects 70% of its co-funded projects in Tanzania to fail, they hope the funds are not siphoned off through corruption and that among the programs they fund will be some of which they can be proud.⁷ Concern's expatriate administrators were much more focused on achieving verifiable results, such as an increase in number of gardens and improved child health. (Despite this desire, the organization never instituted even a rudimentary monitoring system to keep track of results in any systematic way.) Concern water engineers – also expatriates – on the other hand saw the gardens as a threat to the water system, and so sought to limit both their size and number. Some horticulture extension officers were passionate devotees of gardens as sources of income and nutrition, while others who saw their jobs as sinecures with a good salary put little energy into their work. Regional government administrators appreciated the program for the resources it brought to the division, including vehicles and salaries, but had little interest in specific project activities. Some tension existed for government officials who were appreciative that Concern activities made it unnecessary to expend resources they did not have on programs they could not support, but on the other hand felt they had little control over areas under their nominal authority. Malangali residents meanwhile had horticultural objectives that ranged from complete avoidance of the program to extensive gardens that would sell produce to traders from afar. This long paragraph does not begin to touch on all the hopes for the horticultural component, which was just one small part of the many

⁷ Much of my information about E.C. objectives comes from an interview in Dar es Salaam with the E.C.'s Tanzania representative, after he visited Concern's Iringa projects in 1993. I have not had the opportunity to visit Brussels for this research project.

development activities underway in Malangali. When we extend our gaze to all the numerous other sectors that together comprise the development endeavor experienced by Malangali residents, we find that evaluations of “success” or “failure,” words that we vest with a symbolic significance that guides how we direct our aid money, often lose their relevance.

Women The programs aimed at changing the lives of women, the subject of Chapter 5, demonstrate the disjuncture between development agents’ assumptions of Africans’ general underdevelopment, and the perspectives of Malangali residents as autonomous consumers of development messages. By positing rural Africans as needy *and* backward, international development thought has created a conceptual ensemble that tries to address material deprivation through explicitly ideological attempts at social reconstruction. As discussed in Chapter 6, the assumption that African problems stem from ignorance and can best be addressed by education pervades the thought of donors and, I submit, that of many development agencies as well. Women’s programs have as their premise that oppression by males is a root cause of female poverty. The proposed solutions therefore aim at consciousness-raising among women about their subjugated position, as well as programs that specifically seek to alter the economic position of women vis a vis men. While this feminist-based approach has much to offer, the fact that it is now seen as normative within development thought rather than as political makes problematic most academic analyses of women’s programs that approach their subject from within the feminist tradition. I argue that Malangali women are not feminists, and treat women’s development initiatives as they do most other development messages, as

increasing the range of options among which they may choose. Some women, for example, choose to remain within women's groups that bring economic benefits through such income-generating activities as sewing. Many more women appreciated being "contact farmers" for the agricultural extension agents – without necessarily even realizing that their selection as direct beneficiaries was due to an agency decision to direct more agricultural outreach toward women. On the other hand, few women see the point in all the agency efforts to have them plant trees because they are in steadfast agreement that the social linkage between trees, land, and male lineage precludes direct female tree ownership in favor of ownership by the lineage of which they are part – and for which they say men should shoulder arboreal responsibility. At an even greater level of disjuncture, the development analysis that African women are oppressed by their heavy burden of bearing many children, and thus need birth control services, stands in stark contrast to Malangali women's desires for fertility services that would better enable them to bear the healthy children that for many confirm their identity as women. What to Europeans seems backward and oppressive – many surviving children – to many Malangali women seems progressive (in an area with poor health care and an attendant high infant mortality rate) and empowering (because successful mothers often become highly respected women with substantial influence). The ideological biases of programs aimed at women prevent the desires of the women from being heard. However, because the range of options for change available to women only extends to those offered by development agents or those they can pursue as individuals, the shared analysis that life is hard for Malangali women meets with few common solutions. Malangali women are left griping

about ineffective women's groups and their continued inability to find economic strategies with which they can thrive, while development agents are led by their framework of analysis to see the women as victims of their own oppression. I suggest that the failure of so many aid programs directed at African women is the result of disparate ideas of "woman," ideas that shape how people conceive of the economic problems facing women and which of the publically available solutions to those problems they will embrace.

Charity

My analysis of women's development programs helps reveal a further crucial aspect of international aid that is detailed in Chapter 6: aid programs are designed first to meet the needs of their funders. Women's programs are just one example of efforts that appeal to the large funding institutions, including governmental agencies like the British ODA and multilateral agencies like the European Community, that are immersed in discussions of contemporary development thought. Such agencies accept the current academic analysis that certain types of programs aimed at women are necessary, so look for such components in the funding proposals they consider. In the case of women's programs there is substantial overlap between the approach of Malangali program planners, who were Europeans educated in the feminist tradition, and the objectives of major funders. In such cases, projects are designed in some measure for the consumption of bureaucrats in London or Brussels. In the case of the water scheme, the crucial components of community involvement were designed explicitly for officials in Copenhagen who ended up passing the plans off to Concern. We saw in Chapter 4 that the residents of Malangali were left having to interpret and accommodate these plans. The options available to Malangali residents as development consumers were limited by

the consumption decisions made previously in European capitals about what aspects of what types of programs they would fund.

We are intellectually prepared to accept that development programs emerge out of debates current among academics and development planners, yet Escobar's corollary (1995) that such programs are social rather than scientific products has not become an accepted precept of development thought. Escobar's analysis looks at the production of development models in the institutional setting, but does not follow the implementation of these models among people living in actual material poverty. When this link is made, I find that residents of areas such as Malangali are mostly unaware of the discussions among funders about them, but are acutely aware of many potential benefits and inadequacies of the programs that the funders come up with.

Following the chain of money and ideas back even further, I find that the programs implemented in places like Malangali exist to meet the needs of the individual members of the development agency constituency. The large institutional funders must satisfy the demands of their taxpayer-electories, while charitable organizations must answer the needs of their private donors. In the case of Concern, the private donors are mostly citizens of Ireland while the taxpayers who offer more diffuse support through the ODA and E.C. are residents of the UK and, to a lesser degree, all other E.C. member states. I suggest these constituencies have similar understandings of problems facing Africa, and are amenable to similar aid efforts. My focus on Irish citizens looked at the core donor group at whom Concern pitched their fund-raising efforts for Malangali and their other development sites in the non-wealthy world. This group donates to African

aid programs, I argue, out of guilt that they wish to partly absolve, or alternately to purchase a sense of hope. Both guilt and hope arise from images of African misery and starvation that have circulated for decades and been ubiquitous since the Ethiopian famine of 1984. These have been accompanied by church and aid agency encomiums espousing small individual contributions as a way to make a personal difference. The aid programs remain constantly aware of the desires of these private donors. Projects that pique public interest, such as environmental programs around 1990, are accorded institutional priority and occupy the foreground of agency self-representation. Programs that are of little public interest, such as environmental programs in 1997, receive little public attention and quietly lose their institutional urgency. The shifts that aid programs undergo because of changes among private donors are imperceptible within development agencies that are constantly juggling dozens of priorities at all times, but affect residents of Malangali as they interact with European aid over the course of years. Projects designed to catch the prevailing winds of European popular understanding are often perceived quite differently by people at the recipient end of development aid. The environmental programs of the late 1980s, for example, sought to address an Africa of deforestation and soil erosion that existed in the imaginations of planners and donors, but was hardly representative of the ecological problems Malangali residents felt they faced. By framing their programs in terms that resonate with the charitable consumption interests of the donor public, the ways that development plans can address the problems of Malangali residents become severely limited.

Power In the final ethnographic chapter, Chapter 7, I discuss the relations of

power and authority that enable outsiders to see Malangali residents as inadequate and needing their aid and expertise, and that enable Malangali residents to accept this view of their inadequacy with relative equanimity. Individual donors, governments, aid agency employees, and even residents of places like Malangali all agree at some level with the authority of the aid agency to define what problems exist and what activities will be sanctioned to combat those problems. I propose that, along with the obvious issue of control over resources, structural relations among development actors vest the power to act authoritatively. Relations of power give non-residents the presumed authoritative knowledge to define the problems facing Malangali, as well as the confidence to pursue the solutions they devise.

I suggest that three ideas in particular combine to naturalize beliefs in the powerlessness of Malangali residents, and the powerfulness of those who propose plans to develop them. Education, which most development personnel but few local residents have attained, marks who has ideas that are held to be worthy of respect. Ethnicity, specifically the rural ethnic identity of those who communicate in natal tongues other than Swahili, is held by development personnel and rural residents alike as a mark of inferior integration with modernity; because of its associations with progress, modernity, and development, Tanzanians place value upon the adoption by all of a cosmopolitan, Swahili-speaking, pan-Tanzanian identity. Finally, I argue that race is a crucial coded component of the aid interaction. Many Tanzanians and Europeans alike share tacit assumptions that white people are inherently smarter and more capable, and therefore that their development ideas ought to be listened to even when they are too foolhardy to

actually carry through. Consumers at various positions of the development interaction incorporate power-laden notional values of education, identity, and race into their private spheres of understanding, framing how they approach the specific development messages discussed above.

Notions and effects of power affected decisions actors at all levels made regarding the resources that would be available in Malangali. Each player evaluates the resources associated with development initiatives in the light of their current objectives, including their own evaluation of their opportunities and constraints. Most Irish residents feel their only opportunity to help solve problems they know of in Africa is through the aid agency collection basket, while working abroad or even doing detailed research about the problems would be a personal impossibility for many. Aid agency personnel are constrained by financial limits, but perhaps more importantly by their intellectual understandings of what problems exist in Africa and what means they can use to address them. Malangali residents too are bounded by the knowledge set in which they live – which includes many development analyses of their problems – and also by severe restrictions on the income opportunities available to them both on and off their farms. The next chapter discusses the significance of the resources that are *not* included in the options available to Malangali residents.

I conclude that aid agencies like Concern in areas like Malangali do important things, but their results may not be those hoped for by development planners. Concern brought resources to Malangali, a few million dollars that would never have been at the service of some of the world's poorest people. These resources, both financial and

intellectual, expanded the options available to Malangali residents. The resources in themselves were not enough to address significantly the material poverty in which Malangali residents must secure their livelihoods, nor were the options adequate to achieve what might be called development. The social reality of the activities and expenditures of the aid agency did not bring prosperity, but it did cause changes that were important within the lives of the people of Malangali division. The people of Malangali, though suspecting that they would hardly end up more prosperous as a result, knew enough from their experiences with development efforts that they could select ideas and resources among these expanded options that they felt would best aid them in their daily struggles. Perhaps, given the way international aid is currently conceived, that is as much as could be hoped.