## The behavioral dimension of optimization

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## Outline

- Introduction
- Demand
- Supply
- 4 Integrated framework
- A simple example

- A linear formulation
- Example: one theater
- Example: two theaters
- Summary
- Appendix: dealing with capacities
  - Example: two theaters







# Transportation systems



#### Two dimensions

- Supply = infrastructure
- Demand = behavior, choices
- Congestion = mismatch







# Transportation systems

### Objectives





### Maximize satisfaction







# Transportation systems

#### Maximize revenues

Revenues = Benefits - Costs

### Costs: examples

- Building infrastructure
- Operating the system
- Environmental externalities

### Benefits: examples

- Income from ticket sales
- Social welfare



# Demand-supply interactions


### Operations Research

- Given the demand...
- configure the system



#### Behavioral models

- Given the configuration of the system...
- predict the demand



# Research objectives

### Framework for demand-supply interactions

- General: not designed for a specific application or context.
- Flexible: wide variety of demand and supply models.
- Scalable: the level of complexity can be adjusted.
- Integrated: not sequential.
- Operational: can be solved efficiently.







## Outline

- Demand
- Integrated framework

- A linear formulation
- Example: one theater
- Example: two theaters
- - Example: two theaters








## Aggregate demand

Price





Quantity





## Aggregate demand



- Homogeneous population
- Identical behavior
- Price (P) and quantity (Q)
- Demand function: Q = f(P)
- Demand curve:  $P = f^{-1}(Q)$





# Disaggregate demand




- Heterogeneous population
- Different behaviors
- Many variables:
  - Attributes: price, travel time, reliability, frequency, etc.
  - Characteristics: age, income, education, etc.
- Complex demand/inverse demand functions.







# Disaggregate demand



#### Behavioral models

- Demand = combination of individual choices.
- Modeling demand = modeling choice.
- Behavioral models: choice models.







### Choice models

#### Daniel McFadden

- UC Berkeley 1963, MIT 1977, UC Berkeley 1991
- Laureate of The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2000
- Owns a farm and vineyard in Napa Valley
- "Farm work clears the mind, and the vineyard is a great place to prove theorems"





2000

## Decision rules

### Neoclassical economic theory

Preference-indifference operator  $\gtrsim$ 

reflexivity

$$a\gtrsim a \quad \forall a\in \mathcal{C}_n$$

transitivity

$$a \gtrsim b$$
 and  $b \gtrsim c \Rightarrow a \gtrsim c \quad \forall a, b, c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ 

comparability

$$a \gtrsim b$$
 or  $b \gtrsim a \quad \forall a, b \in C_n$ 





## Decision rules

### Utility

$$\exists~U_n:\mathcal{C}_n\longrightarrow\mathbb{R}:a\leadsto U_n(a)$$
 such that

$$a\gtrsim b\Leftrightarrow U_n(a)\geq U_n(b) \ \ \forall a,b\in \mathcal{C}_n$$

Behavioral dimension of optimization

#### Remarks

- Utility is a latent concept
- It cannot be directly observed







## Decision rules

#### Choice

- Individual n
- Choice set  $C_n = \{1, \ldots, J_n\}$
- Utilities  $U_{in}$ ,  $\forall i \in C_n$
- ullet i is chosen iff  $U_{in} = \max_{j \in \mathcal{C}_n} U_{jn}$
- Underlying assumption: no tie.







### Two transportation modes

$$U_1 = -\beta t_1 - \gamma c_1$$
  
$$U_2 = -\beta t_2 - \gamma c_2$$

with  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma > 0$ 

#### Mode 1 is chosen if

$$U_1 \geq U_2$$
 iff  $-\beta t_1 - \gamma c_1 \geq -\beta t_2 - \gamma c_2$ 

that is

$$-rac{eta}{\gamma}t_1-c_1\geq -rac{eta}{\gamma}t_2-c_2$$

or

$$c_1-c_2 \leq -\frac{\beta}{\gamma}(t_1-t_2)$$



#### Trade-off

$$c_1-c_2 \leq -\frac{\beta}{\gamma}(t_1-t_2)$$

- $c_1 c_2$  in currency unity (CHF)
- $t_1 t_2$  in time units (hours)
- $\beta/\gamma$ : CHF/hours


#### Value of time

Willingness to pay to save travel time.




















# Assumptions

#### Decision-maker

- perfect discriminating capability
- full rationality
- permanent consistency

#### Analyst

- knowledge of all attributes
- ullet perfect knowledge of  $\gtrsim$  (or  $U_n(\cdot)$ )
- no measurement error

### Must deal with uncertainty

- Random utility models
- For each individual *n* and alternative *i*

$$U_{in} = V_{in} + \varepsilon_{in}$$

and

$$P(i|\mathcal{C}_n) = P[U_{in} = \max_{j \in \mathcal{C}_n} U_{jn}] = P(U_{in} \ge U_{jn} \ \forall j \in \mathcal{C}_n)$$

# Logit model

### Utility

$$U_{in} = V_{in} + \varepsilon_{in}$$

### Availability

$$y_{in} \in \{0, 1\}$$

- Decision-maker n
- Alternative  $i \in C_n$

# Choice probability: logit model

$$P_n(i|\mathcal{C}_n) = \frac{y_{in}e^{V_{in}}}{\sum_{j\in\mathcal{C}}y_{jn}e^{V_{jn}}}.$$







# Variables: $x_{in} = (z_{in}, s_n)$

### Attributes of alternative i: zin

- Cost / price
- Travel time
- Waiting time
- Level of comfort
- Number of transfers
- Late/early arrival
- etc.




### Characteristics of decision-maker *n*:

Sn

- Income
- Age
- Sex
- Trip purpose
- Car ownership
- Education
- Profession
- etc.







Disaggregate model

$$P_n(i|p_{in},z_{in},s_n)$$

Total demand

$$D(i) = \sum_{n} P_n(i|p_{in}, z_{in}, s_n)$$

### Difficulty

Non linear and non convex in  $p_{in}$  (and  $z_{in}$ )





## Outline

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- Example: two theaters

Behavioral dimension of optimization

- - Example: two theaters







# Optimization problem

Given...

the demand

Find...

the best configuration of the transportation system.







#### Context

- An airline considers to propose various destinations  $i = \{1, ..., J\}$  to its customers.
- Each potential destination i is served by an aircraft, with capacity  $c_i$ .
- The price of the ticket for destination i is  $p_i$ .
- The demand is known:  $W_i$  passengers want to travel to i.
- The fixed cost of operating a flight to destination i is  $F_i$ .
- The airline cannot invest more than a budget B.

### Question

What destinations should the airline serve to maximize its revenues?





#### Decisions variables

 $y_i \in \{0,1\}$ : 1 if destination *i* is served, 0 otherwise.

#### Maximize revenues

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{J} \min(W_i, c_i) p_i y_i$$

#### Constraints

$$\sum_{i=1}^{J} F_i y_i \leq B$$





### Integer linear optimization problem

- Decision variables are integers.
- Objective function and constraints are linear.
- Here: knapsack problem.

### Solving the problem

- Branch and bound
- Cutting planes







### **Pricing**

• What price  $p_i$  should the airline propose?

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{J} \min(W_i, c_i) p_i y_i$$

#### Issues

- Non linear objective
- Unbounded problem





### Unbounded problem


- As demand is constant, the airline can make money with very high prices.
- We need to take into account the impact of price on demand.

### Logit model

$$W_i = \sum_n P_n(i|p_i, z_{in}, s_n)$$

$$P_n(i|p_i, z_{in}, s_n) = \frac{y_i e^{V_{in}(p_i, z_{in}, s_n)}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} y_j e^{V_{jn}(p_j, z_{jn}, s_n)}}.$$

The problem becomes highly non linear.



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## The main idea









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### The main idea

#### Linearization

Hopeless to linearize the logit formula (we tried...)

### First principles

Each customer solves an optimization problem

### Solution

Use the utility and not the probability





### A linear formulation

### Utility function

$$U_{in} = V_{in} + \varepsilon_{in} = \sum_{k} \beta_k x_{ink} + f(z_{in}) + \varepsilon_{in}.$$

#### Simulation

- Assume a distribution for  $\varepsilon_{in}$
- E.g. logit: i.i.d. extreme value
- Draw R realizations  $\xi_{inr}$ ,  $r = 1, \ldots, R$
- The choice problem becomes deterministic



### **Scenarios**

#### **Draws**

- Draw R realizations  $\xi_{inr}$ ,  $r = 1, \dots, R$
- We obtain R scenarios

$$U_{inr} = \sum_{k} \beta_{k} x_{ink} + f(z_{in}) + \xi_{inr}.$$

- For each scenario r, we can identify the largest utility.
- It corresponds to the chosen alternative.







# Comparing utilities

### Variables

$$\mu_{ijnr} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } U_{inr} \ge U_{jnr}, \\ 0 & \text{if } U_{inr} < U_{jnr}. \end{cases}$$

#### Constraints

$$(\mu_{\mathit{ijnr}} - 1)M_{\mathit{nr}} \leq U_{\mathit{inr}} - U_{\mathit{jnr}} \leq \mu_{\mathit{ijnr}} M_{\mathit{nr}}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

where

$$|U_{inr} - U_{inr}| \leq M_{nr}, \forall i, j,$$







# Comparing utilities

$$(\mu_{ijnr}-1)M_{nr} \leq U_{inr}-U_{jnr} \leq \mu_{ijnr}M_{nr}, \forall i,j,n,r.$$

Constraints: 
$$\mu_{ijnr}=1$$
 
$$0\leq U_{inr}-U_{jnr}\leq M_{nr}, \forall i,j,n,r.$$
  $U_{jnr}\leq U_{inr}, \forall i,j,n,r.$ 

Constraints: 
$$\mu_{ijnr}=0$$
 
$$-M_{nr}\leq U_{inr}-U_{jnr}\leq 0, \forall i,j,n,r.$$
 
$$U_{inr}\leq U_{jnr}, \forall i,j,n,r.$$



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# Comparing utilities

$$(\mu_{ijnr}-1)M_{nr} \leq U_{inr}-U_{jnr} \leq \mu_{ijnr}M_{nr}, \forall i,j,n,r.$$

## Equivalence if no tie

$$\mu_{ijnr} = 1 \Longrightarrow U_{inr} \ge U_{jnr}$$
 $\mu_{ijnr} = 0 \Longrightarrow U_{inr} \le U_{jnr}$ 
 $U_{inr} > U_{jnr} \Longrightarrow \mu_{ijnr} = 1$ 
 $U_{inr} < U_{inr} \Longrightarrow \mu_{iinr} = 0$ 



Michel Bierlaire (EPFL)





# Accounting for availabilities

### Motivation

- If  $y_i = 0$ , alternative *i* is not available.
- Its utility should not be involved in any constraint.

## New variables: two alternatives are both available

$$\eta_{ij}=y_iy_j$$

Linearization:

$$y_i + y_j \le 1 + \eta_{ij},$$
  

$$\eta_{ij} \le y_i,$$
  

$$\eta_{ii} \le y_i.$$





# Comparing utilities of available alternatives

$$M_{nr}\eta_{ij}-2M_{nr}\leq U_{inr}-U_{jnr}-M_{nr}\mu_{ijnr}\leq (1-\eta_{ij})M_{nr}, \forall i,j,n,r.$$

$$\eta_{ij}=1$$
 and  $\mu_{ijnr}=1$ 

$$0 \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq M_{nr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

$$\eta_{ij}=1$$
 and  $\mu_{ijnr}=0$ 

$$-M_{nr} \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq 0, \forall i, j, n, r.$$





# Comparing utilities of available alternatives

$$M_{nr}\eta_{ij}-2M_{nr}\leq U_{inr}-U_{jnr}-M_{nr}\mu_{ijnr}\leq (1-\eta_{ij})M_{nr}, \forall i,j,n,r.$$

$$\eta_{ij}=0$$
 and  $\mu_{ijnr}=1$  
$$-M_{nr}\leq U_{inr}-U_{inr}\leq 2M_{nr}, \forall i,j,n,r,$$

$$\eta_{ij}=0$$
 and  $\mu_{ijnr}=0$  
$$-2M_{nr}\leq U_{inr}-U_{inr}\leq M_{nr}, \forall i,j,n,r,$$







# Comparing utilities of available alternatives

## Valid inequalities

$$\mu_{ijnr} \leq y_i,$$

$$\mu_{ijnr} + \mu_{jinr} \leq 1,$$

$$\forall i, j, n, r,$$

$$\forall i, j, n, r$$
.





## The choice

### **Variables**

$$w_{inr} = \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 1 & ext{if } n ext{ chooses } i ext{ in scenario } r, \\ 0 & ext{otherwise} \end{array} 
ight.$$

## Maximum utility

$$w_{inr} \leq \mu_{ijnr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

## Availability

$$w_{inr} < y_i, \forall i, n, r.$$





## The choice

### One choice

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{C}} w_{inr} = 1, \forall n, r.$$



## Demand and revenues

### **Demand**

$$W_i = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{n=1}^{n} \sum_{r=1}^{R} w_{inr}.$$

### Revenues

$$R_i = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{n=1}^{N} p_i \sum_{r=1}^{R} w_{inr}.$$







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## A simple example



### Data

- $\bullet$   $\mathcal{C}$ : set of movies
- Population of N individuals
- Utility function:

$$U_{in} = \beta_{in}p_{in} + f(z_{in}) + \varepsilon_{in}$$

### Decision variables

- What movies to propose?  $y_i$
- What price? pin







## Demand model

## Logit model

Probability that *n* chooses movie *i*:

$$P(i|y, p_n, z_n) = \frac{y_i e^{\beta_{in} p_{in} + f(z_{in})}}{\sum_j y_j e^{\beta_{jn} p_{jn} + f(z_{jn})}}$$

Total revenue:

$$\sum_{i \in C} y_i \sum_{n=1}^{N} p_{in} P(i|y, p_n, z_n)$$

Non linear and non convex in the decision variables





# Example: programming movie theaters



### Data

- Two alternatives: my theater (m) and the competition (c)
- We assume an homogeneous population of N individuals

$$U_c = 0 + \varepsilon_c$$
$$U_m = \beta_c p_m + \varepsilon_m$$


- $\beta_c < 0$
- Logit model:  $\varepsilon_m$  i.i.d. EV







## Demand and revenues





# Optimization (with GLPK)

### Data

- N = 1
- R = 100
- $U_m = -10p_m + 3$
- Prices: 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50

## Results

- Optimum price: 0.3
- Demand: 56%
- Revenues: 0.168







## Heterogeneous population



## Two groups in the population

$$U_{in} = \beta_n p_i + c_n$$

Young fans: 2/3

$$\beta_1 = -10, c_1 = 3$$

Others: 1/3


$$\beta_1 = -0.9$$
,  $c_1 = 0$ 







## Demand and revenues



# Optimization

### Data

- N = 3
- R = 100
- $U_{m1} = -10p_m + 3$
- $U_{m2} = -0.9p_m$
- Prices: 0.3, 0.7, 1.1, 1.5, 1.9

### Results

- Optimum price: 0.3
- Customer 1 (fan): 60% [theory: 50 %]
- Customer 2 (fan): 49% [theory: 50 %]
- Customer 3 (other) : 45% [theory: 43 %]
- Demand: 1.54 (51%)
- Revenues: 0.48





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#### Theater m

- Expensive
- Star Wars Episode VII

### Theater *k*

- Cheap
- Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy

## Heterogeneous demand

- Two third of the population is young (price sensitive)
- One third of the population is old (less price sensitive)

#### Data

- $\bullet$  Theaters m and k
- N = 6
- R = 10
- $U_{mn} = -10\rho_m + 4$ , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
- $U_{mn} = -0.9p_m$ , n = 3, 6
- $U_{kn} = -10p_k + (0)$ , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
- $U_{kn} = -0.9p_k$ , n = 3, 6
- Prices m: 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
- Prices k: half price

#### Theater m

- Optimum price m: 1.6
- 4 young customers: 0
- 2 old customers: 0.5
- Demand: 0.5 (8.3%)
- Revenues: 0.8

#### Theater k

- Optimum price *m*: 0.5
- Young customers: 0.8
- Old customers: 1.5
- Demand: 2.3 (38%)
- Revenues: 1.15



# Two theaters, same type of films

#### Theater m

- Expensive
- Star Wars Episode VII

### Theater *k*

- Cheap
- Star Wars Episode VIII

### Heterogeneous demand

- Two third of the population is young (price sensitive)
- One third of the population is old (less price sensitive)



# Two theaters, same type of films

## Data

- Theaters *m* and *k*
- N = 6
- R = 10
- $U_{mn} = -10p_m + 4$ , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
- $U_{mn} = -0.9p_m$ , n = 3, 6
- $U_{kn} = -10p_k + 4$ , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
- $U_{kn} = -0.9p_k$ , n = 3, 6
- Prices m: 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
- Prices k: half price

### Theater m

- Optimum price *m*: 1.8
- Young customers: 0
- Old customers: 1.9
- Demand: 1.9 (31.7%)
- Revenues: 3.42

### Theater k

Closed

# Extension: dealing with capacities

- Demand may exceed supply
- Not every choice can be accommodated
- Difficulty: who has access?
- Assumption: priority list is exogenous









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# Summary

## Demand and supply

- Supply: prices and capacity
- Demand: choice of customers
- Interaction between the two

#### Discrete choice models

- Rich family of behavioral models
- Strong theoretical foundations
- Great deal of concrete applications
- Capture the heterogeneity of behavior
- Probabilistic models







# Optimization

### Discrete choice models

- Non linear and non convex
- Idea: use utility instead of probability
- Rely on simulation to capture stochasticity

## Proposed formulation

- General: not designed for a specific application or context.
- Flexible: wide variety of demand and supply models.
- Scalable: the level of complexity can be adjusted.
- Integrated: not sequential.
- Operational: can be solved efficiently.







# Ongoing research

### Revenue management

Airlines, train operators, etc.

### Decomposition methods

- Scenarios are (almost) independent from each other (except objective function)
- Individuals are also loosely coupled (except for capacity constraints)







# Thank you!

Questions?







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# Dealing with capacities

- Demand may exceed supply
- Not every choice can be accommodated
- Difficulty: who has access?
- Assumption: priority list is exogenous









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# Priority list

## Application dependent

- First in, first out
- Frequent travelers
- Subscribers
- ...

### In this framework

The list of customers must be sorted







# Dealing with capacities

### Variables

- y<sub>in</sub>: decision of the operator
- y<sub>inr</sub>: availability

$$\sum_{n=1}^{N} w_{inr} \le c_i$$

$$y_{inr} \le y_{in}$$

$$y_{i(n+1)r} \le y_{inr}$$

$$c_i(1-y_{inr}) \leq \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} + (1-y_{in})c_{\max}$$

$$y_{in} = 1, \ y_{inr} = 1$$

$$0 \le \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr}$$

$$y_{in} = 1, y_{inr} = 0$$

$$c_i \le \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr}$$

$$y_{in} = 0, y_{inr} = 0$$

$$c_i \leq \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} + c_{\max}$$

$$\sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} + (1-y_{in})c_{\mathsf{max}} \leq (c_i-1)y_{inr} + \mathsf{max}(n,c_{\mathsf{max}})(1-y_{inr})$$

$$y_{in} = 1, \ y_{inr} = 1$$

$$1 + \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} \le c_i$$

$$y_{in} = 1, y_{inr} = 0$$

$$\sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} \le \max(n, c_{\max})$$

$$y_{in}=0,\ y_{inr}=0$$

$$\sum^{n-1} w_{imr} + c_{\mathsf{max}} \leq \mathsf{max}(n, c_{\mathsf{max}})$$

### Data

- $\bullet$  Theaters m and k
- Capacity: 2
- N = 6
- R = 5
- $U_{mn} = -10p_m + 4$ , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
- $U_{mn} = -0.9p_m$ , n = 3,6
- $U_{kn} = -10p_k + 0$ , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
- $U_{kn} = -0.9p_k$ , n = 3, 6
- Prices m: 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
- Prices k: half price

#### Theater m

- Optimum price *m*: 1.8
- Demand: 0.2 (3.3%)
- Revenues: 0.36

#### Theater k

- Optimum price *m*: 0.5
- Demand: 2 (33.3%)
- Revenues: 1.15

# Example of two scenarios

Custom	ier	Choice	Capacity <i>m</i>	Capacity $k$
	1	0	2	2
	2	0	2	2
	3	k	2	1
	4	0	2	1
	5	0	2	1
	6	k	2	0
Custom	ier	Choice	Capacity m	Capacity k
Custom	ner 1	Choice 0	Capacity <i>m</i> 2	Capacity <i>k</i> 2
Custom	ner 1 2	Choice 0 k		
Custom	1 2 3	0	2	
Custom	1 2	0	2 2	
Custom	1 2	0 k 0	2 2 2	







# Two theaters: all prices divided by 2

### Data

- $\bullet$  Theaters m and k
- Capacity: 2
- N = 6
- R = 5
- $U_{mn} = -10p_m + 4$ , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
- $U_{mn} = -0.9p_m$ , n = 3,6
- $U_{kn} = -10p_k + 0$ , n = 1, 2, 4, 5
- $U_{kn} = -0.9p_k$ , n = 3, 6
- Prices m: 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
- Prices k: half price

#### Theater m

- Optimum price *m*: 0.5
- Demand: 1.4
- Revenues: 0.7

#### Theater k

- Optimum price *m*: 0.45
- Demand: 1.6
- Revenues: 0.72

# Example of two scenarios

Custom	ıer	Choice	Capacity <i>m</i>	Capacity $k$
	1	0	2	2
	2	0	2	2
	3	0	2	2
	4	k	2	1
	5	k	2	0
	6	0	2	0
Custom	er	Choice	Capacity m	Capacity k
Custom	er 1	Choice k	Capacity <i>m</i> 2	Capacity <i>k</i> 1
Custom	ner 1 2			Capacity <i>k</i> 1 0
Custom	1 2 3	k	2	Capacity <i>k</i> 1 0 0
Custom	1 2	k	2 2	Capacity <i>k</i> 1 0 0 0 0
Custom	1 2	k k 0	2 2	Capacity <i>k</i> 1 0 0 0 0 0





