000212693 001__ 212693
000212693 005__ 20190617200733.0
000212693 037__ $$aARTICLE
000212693 245__ $$aSecurity Analysis of Accountable Anonymity in Dissent
000212693 269__ $$a2014
000212693 260__ $$c2014
000212693 336__ $$aJournal Articles
000212693 520__ $$aUsers often wish to communicate anonymously on the Internet, for example in group discussion or instant messaging forums. Existing solutions are vulnerable to misbehaving users, however, who may abuse their anonymity to disrupt communication. Dining Cryptographers Networks (DC-nets) leave groups vulnerable to denial-of-service and Sybil attacks, mix networks are difficult to protect against traffic analysis, and accountable voting schemes are unsuited to general anonymous messaging. DISSENT is the first general protocol offering provable anonymity and accountability for moderate-size groups, while efficiently handling unbalanced communication demands among users. We present an improved and hardened DISSENT protocol, define its precise security properties, and offer rigorous proofs of these properties. The improved protocol systematically addresses the delicate balance between provably hiding the identities of well-behaved users, while provably revealing the identities of disruptive users, a challenging task because many forms of misbehavior are inherently undetectable. The new protocol also addresses several non-trivial attacks on the original DISSENT protocol stemming from subtle design flaws.
000212693 700__ $$aSyta, Ewa
000212693 700__ $$aJohnson, Aaron
000212693 700__ $$aCorrigan-Gibbs, Henry
000212693 700__ $$aWeng, Shu-Chun
000212693 700__ $$aWolinsky, David
000212693 700__ $$aFord, Bryan
000212693 773__ $$j17$$tACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)$$k1
000212693 8564_ $$uhttp://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/papers/analysis-abs$$zURL
000212693 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/212693/files/analysis.pdf$$zPostprint$$s513329$$yPostprint
000212693 909C0 $$xU13061$$0252572$$pDEDIS
000212693 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:212693$$qGLOBAL_SET$$pIC$$particle
000212693 917Z8 $$x257875
000212693 917Z8 $$x148230
000212693 937__ $$aEPFL-ARTICLE-212693
000212693 973__ $$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED$$aOTHER
000212693 980__ $$aARTICLE