000212691 001__ 212691
000212691 005__ 20181231212911.0
000212691 037__ $$aCONF
000212691 245__ $$aHang With Your Buddies to Resist Intersection Attacks
000212691 269__ $$a2013
000212691 260__ $$c2013
000212691 336__ $$aConference Papers
000212691 520__ $$aSome anonymity schemes, such as DC-nets and MIX cascades, can guarantee anonymity even against traffic analysis – provided messages are independent and unlinkable. Users in practice often desire pseudonymity – sending messages intentionally linkable to each other but not to the sender – but pseudonymity in dynamic networks exposes users to intersection attacks. We present Buddies, the first systematic attempt to offer intersection attack resistant pseudonyms in practical anonymity systems. Buddies groups users dynamically into buddy sets, controlling message transmission to make buddies within a set behaviorally indistinguishable to a traffic-monitoring adversary. Intersection attack resistance does not come “for free,” of course, and Buddies offers users control over the inevitable tradeoffs between anonymity, latency, and the useful lifetime of a pseudonym. Using trace-based simulations and a working prototype, we find that Buddies can guarantee non-trivial anonymity set sizes in realistic chat/microblogging scenarios, for both short-lived and long-lived pseudonyms.
000212691 700__ $$aWolinsky, David Isaac
000212691 700__ $$aSyta, Ewa
000212691 700__ $$aFord, Bryan
000212691 7112_ $$dNovember 4-8, 2013$$cBerlin, Germany$$a20th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
000212691 8564_ $$uhttp://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/papers/buddies-abs$$zURL
000212691 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/212691/files/ccs13-final.pdf$$zPublisher's version$$s765619$$yPublisher's version
000212691 909C0 $$xU13061$$0252572$$pDEDIS
000212691 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:212691$$pconf$$pIC$$pGLOBAL_SET
000212691 917Z8 $$x257875
000212691 917Z8 $$x148230
000212691 937__ $$aEPFL-CONF-212691
000212691 973__ $$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000212691 980__ $$aCONF