000212690 001__ 212690
000212690 005__ 20190812205851.0
000212690 037__ $$aCONF
000212690 245__ $$aProactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict
000212690 269__ $$a2013
000212690 260__ $$c2013
000212690 336__ $$aConference Papers
000212690 520__ $$aAmong anonymity systems, DC-nets have long held attraction for their resistance to traffic analysis attacks, but practical implementations remain vulnerable to internal disruption or “jamming” attacks, which require time-consuming detection procedures to resolve. We present Verdict, the first practical anonymous group communication system built using proactively verifiable DC-nets: participants use public-key cryptography to construct DC-net ciphertexts, and use zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to detect and exclude misbehavior before disruption. We compare three alternative constructions for verifiable DC-nets: one using bilinear maps and two based on simpler ElGamal encryption. While verifiable DC-nets incur higher computational overheads due to the public-key cryptography involved, our experiments suggest that Verdict is practical for anonymous group messaging or microblogging applications, supporting groups of 100 clients at 1 second per round or 1000 clients at 10 seconds per round. Furthermore, we show how existing symmetric-key DC-nets can “fall back” to a verifiable DC-net to quickly identify misbehavior, speeding up previous detections schemes by two orders of magnitude.
000212690 700__ $$aCorrigan-Gibbs, Henry
000212690 700__ $$aWolinsky, David Isaac
000212690 700__ $$aFord, Bryan
000212690 7112_ $$dAugust 14-16, 2013$$cWashington, D.C., USA$$a22nd USENIX Security Symposium
000212690 8564_ $$zURL$$uhttp://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/papers/verdict-abs
000212690 8564_ $$zPublisher's version$$yPublisher's version$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/212690/files/sec13-final.pdf$$s575818
000212690 909C0 $$xU13061$$pDEDIS$$0252572
000212690 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:212690$$qGLOBAL_SET$$pconf$$pIC
000212690 917Z8 $$x257875
000212690 917Z8 $$x148230
000212690 937__ $$aEPFL-CONF-212690
000212690 973__ $$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000212690 980__ $$aCONF