Tornado Attack on RC4 with Applications to WEP & WPA *

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Abstract. In this paper, we construct several tools for building and manipulating pools of biases in the analysis of RC4. We report extremely fast and optimized active and passive attacks against IEEE 802.11 wireless communication protocol WEP and a key recovery and a distinguishing attack against WP A. This was achieved through a huge amount of theoretical and experimental analysis (capturing WiFi packets), refinement and optimization of all the former known attacks and methodologies against RC4 stream cipher in WEP and WPA modes. We support all our claims on WEP by providing an implementation of this attack as a publicly available patch on Aircrack-ng. Our new attack improves its success probability drastically. Our active attack, based on ARP injection, requires 22,500 packets to gain success probability of 50% against a 104-bit WEP key, using Aircrack-ng in non-interactive mode. It runs in less than 5 seconds on an off-the-shelf PC. Using the same number of packets, Aircrack-ng yields around 3% success rate. Furthermore, we describe very fast passive only attacks by just eavesdropping TCP/IPv4 packets in a WiFi communication. Our passive attack requires 27,500 packets. This is much less than the number of packets Aircrack-ng requires in active mode (around 37,500), which is a huge improvement. Deploying a similar theory, we also describe several attacks on WPA. Firstly, we describe a distinguisher for WPA with complexity $2^{42}$ and advantage 0.5 which uses $2^{42}$ packets. Then, based on several partial temporary key recovery attacks, we recover the full 128-bit temporary key of WPA by using $2^{42}$ packets. It works with complexity $2^{96}$. So far, this is the best key recovery attack against WPA. We believe that our analysis brings on further insight to the security of RC4.

1 Introduction

RC4 was designed by Rivest in 1987. It used to be a trade secret until it was anonymously posted in 1994. Nowadays, RC4 is widely used in SSL/TLS, Microsoft Lotus, Oracle Secure SQL, Apple OCE, Microsoft Windows and WiFi 802.11 wireless communications. 802.11 [23] used to be protected by WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) which is now replaced by WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access), due to security weaknesses.

WEP uses RC4 with a pre-shared key. Each packet is encrypted by XORing it with the RC4 keystream. The RC4 key is a pre-shared key prepended with a 3-byte nonce IV. The IV is sent in clear for self-synchronization. Indeed, the adversary knows that the key is constant except the IV which is known. Nowadays, WEP is considered as being terribly weak, since passive attacks can recover the full key by assuming that the first bytes of every plaintext frame is known. This happens to be the case due to the protocol specifications.

In order to fix this problem, the Wi-Fi Alliance has replaced WEP by WPA [23]. The peer authentication is based on IEEE 802.1X which accommodates a simple authentication mode based on a pre-shared key (WPA-PSK). The authentication creates a Temporary Key (TK). The TK then goes through a temporary key integrity protocol (TKIP) to derive per-packet keys (PPK). The idea is that the TK is changed into a TKIP-mixed Transmit Address and Key (TTAK) key to be used for a number of frames, limited to $2^{10}$. Each frame applies a simple transformation to the TTAK and a counter TSC to derive the RC4 per-packet key PPK. Again, the 3 first bytes of the RC4 key are known (they depend on the counter). In addition to the key derivation, WPA provides a packet integrity protection scheme MIC [13]. Thus, only passive key recovery attacks can be considered.

⋆ This paper is the full version of our FSE 2013 [60] paper and the corrected version of our paper published at Eurocrypt 2011 [62].
Related Work. We recall three approaches for the cryptanalysis of RC4: attacks based on the weaknesses of the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA), attacks based on the weaknesses of the Pseudorandom Generator Algorithm (PRGA), and the blackbox analysis [61], which looks at RC4 as a blackbox and discovers weaknesses in RC4.

As for the KSA, one of the first weaknesses published on RC4 was discovered by Roos [56] in 1995. This correlation relates the secret key bytes to the initial state of PRGA. Recently, Maitra et al. [35] generalized Roos-type biases and introduced a related key distinguisher for RC4. Roos [56] and Wagner [75] identified classes of weak keys which reveal the secret key if the first bytes of the key are known. This property has been largely exploited to break WEP (see [6,14,20,33,32,61,4,68,73]). Another class of results concerns the inversion problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key [5,52].

Regarding the PRGA, the analysis has been largely motivated by distinguishing attacks [15,17,38,40] or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [18,30,41,72] with complexity $2^{241}$ for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream output bytes in [39,54]. Mironov recommends in [42] that the first 512 initial keystream bytes must be discarded to avoid these weaknesses. Recently, Ohigashi et al. [50] showed that even if these initial bytes are discarded, RC4 can still be broken in broadcast schemes.

In 1996, Jenkins published two biases in the PRGA of RC4 on his website [26], which were used in an attack by Klein later [29]. These biases were generalized by Mantin in his Master’s Thesis [37]. In 2008, Paul, Rathi and Maitra [53] discovered a bias in the index which generates the first keystream word of RC4. Another bias in the PRGA was discovered by Maitra and Paul in [34]. Finally, Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux [61] discovered 48 new correlations in the PRGA between state bytes, key bytes and the keystream and 9 new correlations between the key bytes and the keystream.

RC4 can also be used in broadcast schemes, when the same plaintext is encrypted with different keys. In this mode, the attacker often endeavours to find unconditional or conditional biases on the keystream (see [39,56,59,25,1,50] for the most relevant attacks.).

In practice, key recovery attacks on RC4 need to bind the KSA and the PRGA weaknesses to correlate secret key words to the keystream words. Some biases in the PRGA [29,53,34] have been successfully bound to the Roos correlation [56] to provide known plaintext attacks. Another approach is the blackbox analysis [61], which does not require any binding and can discover a correlation among the key bytes and the keystream directly. This was exploited in [61].

The WEP key recovery process is harder in practice than in theory. Indeed, some bytes of the keystream may be unknown (see Appendix 1 of [73] for a description of the known and unknown bytes in ARP and IP packets). Moreover, the theoretical success probability has often been miscalculated and conditions to recover the secret key are not the same depending on the paper. For example, [68,73,4,61] check the most $10^6$ probable keys instead of the first one as in [14,33,32,64,65]. Additionally, the IEEE 802.11 standard does not specify how the IVs should be chosen. Thus, some attacks consider randomly picked IVs or incremental IVs (both little-endian and big-endian encoded). Some implementations specifically avoid some class of IVs which are weak with respect to some attacks.

To unify the results, we consider recovering a random 128-bit long secret key with random IVs. This often corresponds to the default IV behavior of the 802.11 GNU/Linux stack. We compare the previous and the new results using both a theoretical and a practical approach.

– In [14], Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir’s (FMS) attack is only theoretically described. The authors postulate that 4 million packets would be sufficient to recover the secret key of WEP with the success probability of 50% with incremental IVs. A practical implementation of this attack was realized by Stubblefield, Ioannidis and Rubin [64,65]. They showed that between 5 million to 6 million packets are needed to recover the secret key using the FMS attack. Note that in 2001, almost all wireless cards was using incremental IVs in big-endian.

– There is no proper theoretical analysis of the Korek [32,33] key recovery attacks. Only practical implementations such as Aircrack-ng [10] are available. Additionally, Aircrack-ng classifies the most probable secret keys and performs a brute-force attack. The success probability of 50% is obtained when about 100000 packets are captured with random IVs. Note that the amount of the brute-forced keys depends on the value of the secret key and the “Fudge” factor (the number of trials on the key), a parameter chosen by the attacker. By default, around 1000 to 1000000 keys are brute-forced. In this paper, we improve the conditions of the Korek attacks and prove their success probability.
The ChopChop attack was introduced in [31,67], which allows an attacker to interactively decrypt the last \( m \) bytes of an encrypted packet by sending \( 128 \times m \) packets in average to the network. The attack does not reveal the main key and is not based on any special property of the RC4 stream cipher.

In [29], Klein showed theoretically that his new attack needs about 25,000 packets with random IVs to recover the WEP secret key with the probability of 50%. Note that there is no practical implementation of the Klein attack, but both the PTW [68] and the VV07 [73] attacks, which theoretically improve the WEP key recovery process, need more than 25,000 packets, which shows that the theoretical success probability of the Klein attack was over estimated. We implemented this attack and we obtained the success probability of 50% for approximately 60,000 packets (random IVs).

Tews, Weimann and Pyshkin showed in [68] that the WEP secret key can be recovered with only 40,000 packets for the same success probability (random IVs). However, this attack brute-forces the most \( 10^6 \) probable secret keys. Thus, a comparison with the previous attacks is less obvious. Moreover, there is no theoretical analysis of this attack, only practical results are provided by the authors. We confirm this practical result.

Vaudenay and Vuagnoux [73] presented an improvement to the previous attacks, where the same success probability can be reached with an average of 32,700 packets with random IVs. This attack also tests the \( 10^6 \) most probable secret keys. Moreover, only practical results are provided by the authors. We confirm this practical result.

According to [4], Beck and Tews re-implemented the [73] attack in 2009, obtaining the same success probability with only 24,200 packets using Aircrack-ng in the “interactive mode”. Using this strategy, much less number of packets is required (see Section 8.1 for more details). No other previous attack used this strategy, so a comparison between this result and other results in the literature is not straightforward. The \( 10^6 \) most probable secret keys are brute-forced. Note that we were not able to reproduce this result.

In 2010, Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux [61] described new key recovery attacks on RC4, which reduce the amount of packets to 9,800 packets for the same success probability. The most \( 10^6 \) probable keys are brute-forced as well. However, the IVs were not randomly chosen and some attacks such as the FMS were over represented.

In 2011, Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux [62] introduced an optimized key recovery attack on WEP, obtaining the same success probability as the previous attacks with only 4,000 packets, but they did not verify their theoretical results with experiments.

In this paper, we construct a precise theory behind the WEP attack. We show that the analysis in [62] concluding that it is feasible to derive 50% success rate with 4,000 packets should be revisited. We illustrate that the variance of some random variables in [62] are not as expected and the assumption of the independence and distribution of a few random events in [62] are not correct. All our analysis has been precisely checked through extensive amount of experiments. We show that we can recover a 128-bit long WEP key using 22,500 packets in less than 5 seconds using an ordinary PC. With less number of packets, a successful attack will run for a longer period, due to brute-forcing more keys.

WPA was proposed as a replacement for WEP in 2003 [23]. Almost all known and new key recovery attacks on WEP could be applied to WPA if there were several packets using the same RC4 key. Indeed, only the Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack [14] is filtered. However, WPA uses a different secret key for every encrypted packet. Since 2003, a few cryptanalysis results were published against WPA, but most such attacks work only in case some special features of WPA are enabled (for instance QoS). Currently, dictionary attacks [10] and recovering the PIN code of WPS [74] by brute-force (see below) are the main techniques that break WPA practically. In case the user chooses a safe password and WPS is disabled, we are not aware of any method that can perform a key recovery attack on WPA in a short period of time. Below, we list the most well-known attacks on WPA in the literature:

- **Dictionary Attack**: Eavesdropping the network, the goal of the attacker is to get a WPA handshake [24, 10]; the hash of the key is communicated between the client and the Access Point (AP) when the client begins the connection.
The attacker can wait or launch a deauthenticate-attack against the client. When he gets the hash, he can try to find the key with a dictionary attack, a rainbow attack [49] or one of the multiple attacks that exist on hashed keys in general.

- A flaw in WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) is known from the end of 2011 by Tactical Network Solutions (TNS) [74]. From this exploit, the WPA password can be recovered almost instantly in plaintext once the attack on the access point WPS is initiated, which normally takes 2-10 hours.

- In 2009, Beck and Tews released an attack on WPA [4]. This is not a key recovery attack, but still exploits weaknesses in TKIP to allow the attacker to decrypt ARP packets and to inject traffic into a network, even allowing him to perform a DoS (Denial of Service) or an ARP poisoning. In order to be practical, the attack requires some additional quality of services features (described by IEEE 802.11e) to be enabled.

- The Ohigashi-Morii Attack [51] is an improvement of the Beck-Tews attack on WPA-TKIP. Indeed, this attack is efficient for all modes of WPA and not just those with QoS features. The time to inject a fake packet is reduced to approximately 15 minutes to 1 minute at the best. For this attack, a man-in-the-middle attack is superposed to the Beck-Tews attack, with tips to reduce the execution time of the attack. In [71], the time complexity of Ohigashi-Morii attack was improved. This new attack focuses on a new vulnerability of QoS packet processing and this vulnerability can remove the condition that the Access Point (AP) needs to support IEEE 802.11e.

- The Hole196 vulnerability was found by Airtight Networks [46] in 2010. The name “Hole196” refers to the page number in the IEEE 802.11 Standard (Revision, 2007) where the vulnerability is buried. This attack is not a key recovering attack, the attacker has to be an authorized user of the network. All Wi-Fi networks using WPA or WPA2, regardless of the authentication (PSK or 802.1x) and encryption (AES) they use, are vulnerable.

- An attack against the Michael message integrity code of WPA was presented in [3], that allows an attacker to reset the internal Message Integrity Check (MIC) state and concatenates a known message with an unknown message which keeps the unknown MIC valid for the new entire packet.

- In 2004, Moen, Raddum and Hole [43] discovered that the recovery of at least two RC4 packet keys in WPA leads to a full recovery of the temporal key and the message integrity check key. Once from the same segment of $2^{16}$ consecutive packets two RC4 keys are successfully recovered, the Moen, Raddum and Hole attack can be applied. This leads to a TK key recovery attack on WPA with complexity $2^{104}$ using 2 packets.

We extend Moen, Raddum and Hole attack. We first recover several weak bytes of the key and then we apply Moen, Raddum and Hole attack. As a result, we propose a key recovery attack against WPA with complexity $2^{96}$ and by using $2^{42}$ packets.

**Our overall contribution.** In this paper, we construct tools for building and manipulating pools of biases. With our theory, we analyze several statistical strategies for a partial key recovery. We apply it to recover some weak bits of the WPA key TK by using $2^{42}$ packets. We apply our analysis to WEP and show experimentally that the best attacks so far can still be improved. We then transform our partial key recovery attack into a distinguisher for WPA. Our distinguisher was further improved recently [57] deploying another technique. Finally, we build a full session key recovery attack against WPA with complexity $2^{96}$ and using $2^{42}$ packets. We review some errors in our previous publications [61,62] and verify our results by experiment.

**Structure of the paper.** We first present RC4, WEP, WPA and Aircrack-ng in Section 2. Tools for manipulating the pool of biases in RC4 are presented in Section 3. Two significant statistical biases in RC4 are elaborated in Section 4 for the target key bytes. Then, we study key recovery attacks to be able to recover some “weak bits” of the temporary key of WPA in Section 5. Then, we present a full temporary key recovery attack for WPA in Section 5.4. We also introduce a distinguisher for WPA in Section 5.5. Finally, We present an optimized attack on WEP in Section 6 and then we compare our results with Aircrack-ng 1.1 in Section 7. Finally, we present some open problems and challenges in Section 8 and conclude.
2 Preliminaries

2.1 Description of RC4 and Notations

The stream cipher RC4 consists of two algorithms: the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and the Pseudo Random Generator Algorithm (PRGA). RC4 has a state defined by two registers (words) $i$ and $j$ and an array (of $N$ words) $S$ defining a permutation over $\mathbb{Z}_N$. The KSA generates an initial state for the PRGA from a random key $K$ of $L$ words as described in Fig. 1.

Note that in this paper, we define all the operators such as addition, and multiplication in the ring of integers modulo $N$ represented as $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, or $\mathbb{Z}_N$, where $N = 256$ (i.e. words are bytes). Thus, $x + y$ should be read as $(x + y) \mod N$.

Throughout this paper, we denote $K[i] := K[0] + \cdots + K[i]$. Note that in this paper, we recover $K[i]$’s, instead of $K[i]$’s, because this approach increases the success probability of key recovery (see [73] for more details). We let $z$ denote the keystream derived from the key $K$ using RC4. The first bytes of a plaintext frame are often known (see [73]), as well as the IV (the first 3 bytes of the key $K$). That is, we assume that the adversary can use $z$ and the IV in a known plaintext attack.

It starts with an array $\{0, 1, \ldots, N - 1\}$, where $N = 2^8$ and swaps $N$ pairs, depending on the value of the secret key $K$. At the end, we obtain the initial state $S_0 = S_{N-1}$.

![Fig. 1. The KSA and the PRGA Algorithms of RC4](image)

Once the initial state $S_0'$ is created, it is used by the second algorithm of RC4, the PRGA. Its role is to generate a keystream of words of $\log_2 N$ bits, which will be XORed with the plaintext to obtain the ciphertext. Thus, RC4 computes the loop of the PRGA each time a new keystream word $z_i$ is needed, according to the algorithm in Fig. 1. Note that each time a word of the keystream is generated, the internal state of RC4 is updated.

Sometimes, we consider an idealized version RC4*(t) of RC4 defined by a parameter $t$ as shown in Fig. 2. Namely, after the round $t$, $j$ is assigned randomly. This model has already been used in the literature, such as in [40,56,52].

Let $S_i[k]$ (resp. $S_i'[k]$) denote the value of the permutation defined by array $S$ at index $k$, after the round $i$ of the KSA (resp. the PRGA). We also denote $S_{N-1} = S_0'$. Let $j_i$ (resp. $j_i'$) be the value of $j$ after the round $i$ of the KSA (resp. PRGA) where the rounds are indexed with respect to $i$. Thus, the KSA has rounds 0, 1, $\ldots$, $N - 1$ and the PRGA has rounds 1, 2, $\ldots$. The KSA and the PRGA are defined by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KSA</th>
<th>PRGA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$j_0 = 0$</td>
<td>$j_0' = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$j_i = j_{i-1} + S_{i-1}[i] + K[i \mod L]$</td>
<td>$j_i' = j_{i-1} + S_{i-1}'[i]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_{i-1}[k] = k$</td>
<td>$S_0'[k] = S_{N-1}[k]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_i[k] = \begin{cases} S_{i-1}[j_i] &amp; \text{if } k = i \ S_{i-1}[i] &amp; \text{if } k = j_i \ S_{i-1}[k] &amp; \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$</td>
<td>$S_i'[k] = \begin{cases} S_{i-1}'[j_i'] &amp; \text{if } k = i \ S_{i-1}'[i] &amp; \text{if } k = j_i' \ S_{i-1}'[k] &amp; \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$$z_i = S_i'[j_i] + S_i'[j_i']$$
In WEP and WPA attacks, the base of the complexity measurement is the time it takes to compute the value that a bias proposes for a key byte.

### 2.2 Description of WEP

WEP [21] uses a 3-byte IV concatenated to a secret key of 40 or 104 bits (5 or 13 bytes) as an RC4 key. Thus, the RC4 key size is either 64 or 128 bits. In this paper, we do not consider the 40-bit key variant. So, \( L = 16 \). We have

\[
\]

where \( IV_i \) represents the \((i+1)\)-th byte of the IV and \( K[3]|\ldots|K[15] \) represents the fixed secret part of the key. In theory, the value of the IV should be random, but in practice it is a counter, mostly in little-endian and is incremented by one each time a new 802.11b frame is encrypted. Sometimes, some particular values of the IV are skipped to thwart specific attacks based on the “weak IVs”. Thus, each packet uses a slightly different key. RC4 then produces a keystream which is XORed with the plaintext to obtain the ciphertext.

It is well known [55,68,73] that a relevant portion of the plaintext is practically constant and that some other bytes can be predicted. They correspond to the LLC header and the SNAP header and some bytes of the TCP/IP encapsulated frame. For example, by XORing the first byte of the ciphertext with the constant value \( 0xAA \), we obtain the first byte of the keystream. Thus, even if these attacks are called known plaintext attacks, they are ciphertext only in practice.

### 2.3 Description of WPA

WPA includes a key hashing function [19] to defend against the Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack [14], a Message Integrity Code (MIC) [13] and a key management scheme based on 802.1X [22] to avoid the key reuse and to ease the key distribution.

The 128-bit Temporal Key (TK) is a per-session key. It is derived from the key management scheme during the authentication and is given as an input to the phase1 key hashing function (key mixing algorithm), together with a 48-bit Transmitter Address (TA) and a 48-bit TKIP Sequence Counter (TSC) which is sometimes called the IV. We will avoid this latter name to avoid any confusion with the first 3 bytes of the RC4 key (which indeed only depends on the TSC, but with a shorter length).

The TK can be used to encrypt up to \( 2^{48} \) packets. Every packet has a 48-bit index TSC which is split into IV32 and IV16. The IV32 counter is incremented every \( 2^{16} \) packets. The packet is encrypted using a 128-bit RC4KEY which is derived from the TK, TSC, and some other parameters (e.g. device addresses) which can be assumed as constants and known by the adversary for our purpose. As for WEP, the first three bytes of the RC4KEY only depend on the TSC,

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**Fig. 2.** The KSA\(^*\)\((t)\) and the PRGA\(^*\) Algorithms of RC4\(^*\)\((t)\)
so they are not secret. The derivation works in two phases. The first phase does not depend on IV16 and is done once every 2^{16} packets for efficiency reasons. It derives a 80-bit key TTAK, called TKIP-mixed Transmit Address and Key (TTAK) in the standard (but, is denoted P1K in the reference code).

\[ TTAK = \text{phase1}(TK, TA, IV32) \]

The second phase uses the TTAK, TK and the IV16 to derive a 96-bit key PPK which is then turned into the RC4KEY:

\[ RC4KEY = \text{phase2}(TK, TTAK, IV16) \]

The key derivation of WPA based on a pre-shared key is depicted in Fig. 3 (without protocol parameters such as the transmitter address TA).

In what follows, we denote \( K[i] = RC4KEY[i \mod 16] \) and \( IV = K[0] || K[1] || K[2] \) to use the same notations as in WEP. By convention, the TTAK and the PPK are considered as vectors of 16-bit words. The TK and the RC4KEY are considered as vectors of 8-bit words. Vectors are numbered starting from 0.

The RC4KEY is simply defined from the PPK, TK and the IV16 by

- \( RC4KEY[0] = \text{high8}(IV16) \)
- \( RC4KEY[1] = (\text{high8}(IV16) \text{ or } 0x20) \text{ and } 0x7f \)
- \( RC4KEY[2] = \text{low8}(IV16) \)
- \( RC4KEY[3] = \text{low8}(PPK[5] \oplus (TK[1] || TK[0])) \gg 1 \)
- \( RC4KEY[4] = \text{low8}(PPK[0]) \)
- \( RC4KEY[5] = \text{high8}(PPK[0]) \)
- \( RC4KEY[6] = \text{low8}(PPK[1]) \)
- \( RC4KEY[7] = \text{high8}(PPK[1]) \)

Note that a filter avoids the use of some weak IV classes. Actually, only the weak IV class discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir [14] are filtered.

### 2.4 Aircrack-ng

Aircrack-ng [10] is a WEP and WPA-PSK keys cracking program that can recover keys once enough data packets have been captured. It is the most widely downloaded software in the world. It implements the standard Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir’s (FMS) attack [14] along with some optimisations like the Korek attacks [32,33], as well as the Physkin, Tews and Weinmann (PTW) attack [68]. In fact, it currently has the implementation of state of the art attacks on WEP and WPA. We applied a patch on Aircrack-ng 1.1 in our implementation to improve its success probability.
3 Tools for Manipulation of Biases in RC4

In this section, we mathematically formulate the pool of biases in RC4 and describe the notations for manipulating these biases which will be used later in our attacks. Each individual bias is described in Appendix A.

There exists a big list of biases for RC4. In our attacks, we use this big list to statistically vote for $K[i]$'s. For the WEP attack, we first recover the value of $K[15]$ and then we recover the values of $K[3]$ to $K[14]$ sequentially. We first recover the value of $K[15]$, because in RC4, we have a fundamental relation as follows:

$$K[i + 16j] = K[i] + j \cdot K[15]$$

for $0 \leq i \leq 15$ and $j = 0, 1$ and 2. This means that if the value of $K[15]$ is known, the biases for $K[i + 16j]$ can be used to vote for $K[i]$. This helps us increase the probability of recovering $K[i]$ correctly. The values of $K[3]$ to $K[14]$ are recovered sequentially, because if the value of $K[3]$ is known, since $K[0], K[1], K[2]$ are also known (they make the IV), we can update the state to $S_3$. This will incline the success probability of recovering $K[4]$. Hence, we first recover $K[3]$ and then we update the state to $S_3$, then we recover $K[4]$ and update the state to $S_4$, and we continue this process until we recover $K[14]$. For WPA, we do not need to recover all key bytes to be able to discover the 8 weak temporary key bytes of WPA. It will be shown in Section 5, that we only need to recover $K[15], K[3], K[13]$ and $K[14]$, but in this case, we only use the state $S_3$ for key recovery.

Since the intuition is already presented above, we now mathematically represent how to manipulate the pool of biases for RC4:

Let $I_0$ be a set of integers, which represents the indices of those key bytes which are already known. We call $clue$ the value for all $K$ bytes whose indices are in $I_0$. To begin with RC4 in WEP and WPA, we have $I_0 = \{0, 1, 2\}$ and $clue = \text{IV}$, since $IV$ is the first 3 bytes of the key.

To recover $K[i]$, given a set of indices $I_0$ and an index $i$, we assume that we have a list $\text{row}_{I_0}^{\text{RC4}}$ of $d_{I_0}$ vectors $(\vec{f}_j, \vec{g}_j, p_j, q_j)$ for $j = 1, \ldots, d_{I_0}$ with functions $\vec{f}_j$ (see Table 3 in Appendix for all such biases) and the corresponding event $\vec{g}_j$ (see Table 3 in Appendix for all such biases conditions) such that

$$\Pr[K[i] = \vec{f}_j(z, \text{clue})|\vec{g}_j(z, \text{clue})] = p_j$$

for some probability $p_j \neq \frac{1}{N}$ and

$$\Pr[\vec{g}_j(z, \text{clue})] = q_j$$

where $q_j$ is called the density of the bias. We use the list of classes of biases from Table 3. The mysterious function $\sigma_{i,r}$ in Table 3 can be computed using the clue. The exact definition of this function is given in Lemma 6 later.

For simplicity, we assume that for some given $i, z$ and clue, all suggested $\vec{f}_j(z, \text{clue})$ for $j$'s such that $\vec{g}_j(z, \text{clue})$ are pairwise distinct. We further assume that the events $K[i] = \vec{f}_j(z, \text{clue})$ with different $i$'s are independent. We will also assume that $\vec{f}_j$ and $\vec{g}_j$ are of the form $f_j(z, \text{clue}) = f_j(h(z, \text{clue}))$ and $g_j(z, \text{clue}) = g_j(h(z, \text{clue}))$, where $\mu = h(z, \text{clue})$ lies in a domain of size $N_{\mu}$. In fact, $h$ is just a function which compresses $z_i$'s to the minimum necessary to compute $\vec{f}_j$ and $\vec{g}_j$. In fact, some of the $z_i$'s are unnecessary to compute $\vec{f}_j$ and $\vec{g}_j$.

To be able to merge the biases using Eq. (1), we define deduce($I$) to be the set of all key indices such that we can use them to compute all $K[i]$'s where $i \in I$. For instance, deduce(0, 1, 2, 5) = \{0, 1, 2, 5\} and deduce(0, 1, 2, 5, 15) = \{0, 1, 2, 5, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, \ldots\}

Next, we transform the above $\text{row}_{I_0}^{\text{RC4}}$ list by removing some rows for the key bytes which can be deduced and by merging the rows leading to the same key byte (using Eq. (1)). Namely, we define $\text{row}_{I_0}$ as follows: if $i \in \text{deduce}(I_0)$, the row has a single “bias” $\vec{f}_1(z, \text{clue}) = K[i]$ with probability $p_1 = 1$ since $K[i]$ can be computed from the clue. Otherwise, $\text{row}_{I_0}$ is the concatenation of all $\text{row}_{I_0}^{\text{RC4}}$ for $i$ such that $i \in \text{deduce}(I_0 \cup \{i\})$. For instance, $\text{row}_{2(0,1,2)}$ has a single bias, $\text{row}_{2(0,1,2)} = \text{row}_{2(0,1,2)}^{\text{RC4}}$, and

$$\text{row}_{5(0,1,2,15)} = \text{row}_{5(0,1,2,15)}^{\text{RC4}} || \text{row}_{2(0,1,2,15)}^{\text{RC4}} || \text{row}_{37(0,1,2,15)}^{\text{RC4}}$$

In the “concatenation” above, we only update $\vec{f}_j$ from the $\text{row}_{I_0}$'s so that it computes the $K[i]$ instead of the $K[i']$. To recover the key bytes sequentially, given two lists of byte indices $I_0$ and $I = (i_1, \ldots, i_{10})$, we construct a new table
\( \Pi(I|I_0) \) in which the list of rows is \( \text{row}_i|I_0, \text{row}_{i+1}|I_0, \ldots, \text{row}_{|I_0|}|I_0 \). For instance for WEP, \( I_0 = \{0, 1, 2\} \) and \( I \) is a list of the key byte indices which are sequentially obtained using the biases.

We define a tuple \( v = (\hat{K}[i])_{i \in I} \) which belongs to a set of size \( N_\nu(I) = N^{\#I} \), and corresponds to the key bytes to be recovered. For WEP, this tuple has dimension one, since we recover the key bytes sequentially, but for WPA, we recover a vector of key bytes at the same time (the dimension of this tuple for WPA is whether 4 or 5). Given \( i \in I \), we let \( d_i^{\Pi(I|I_0)} \) be the length of the row for \( \hat{K}[i] \) in \( \Pi(I|I_0) \), which corresponds to the number of biases which are useful for recovering \( \hat{K}[i] \). Given a tuple \( (j_i)_{i \in I} \) such that \( 1 \leq j_i \leq d_i^{\Pi(I|I_0)} \) for all \( i \in I \), by collecting the \( j_i \)-th bias of the row \( i \), we obtain an agglomerated bias to compute \( v \) from \( z \) and a clue. Note that for technical reasons, we may have to keep elements of \( I_0 \) in \( I \). This is why we may have rows for \( i \in I_0 \) in \( \Pi(I|I_0) \) with a single bias with probability 1. We let

\[
k(I|I_0) = \prod_{i \in I} d_i^{\Pi(I|I_0)}
\]

be the number of possible agglomerated biases. For convenience, we number the agglomerated biases with an index \( \ell \) from 1 to \( k(I|I_0) \), where each number defines a tuple \( (j_{i, \ell})_{i \in I} \). So, the \( \ell \)-th bias is defined by \( v = f_\ell(z, \text{clue}) \) with probability

\[
p_{ij, \ell}^{\Pi(I|I_0)} = \prod_{i \in I} p_{ij, \ell}^{\Pi(I|I_0)}
\]

where \( p_{ij, \ell}^{\Pi(I|I_0)} \) is the probability of the \( j \)-th bias in the row corresponding to \( \hat{K}[i] \) in \( \Pi(I|I_0) \).

We let \( N_\mu(\Pi(I)) \) be \( N \) raised to the power of the number of \( z_i \) bytes and \( I_0 \) bytes appearing in any of the biased equations from \( \Pi(I) \). For example, \( N_\mu(\Pi(3, 13, 14|0, 1, 2)) = 10^{10} \), since biases for \( \hat{K}[3] \) are based on \( z_1, z_2, z_3 \) and \( z_4 \) and biases for \( \hat{K}[13] \) and \( \hat{K}[14] \) are based on \( z_1, z_2, z_{13}, z_{14} \) and \( z_{15} \). We further need the IV to compute the state up to \( S_2 \). So, we have 10 bytes in total: \( z_i \) for \( i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 15\} \) and the IV. Given a keystream \( z \), we define \( \mu = h^{\Pi(I)}(z, \text{clue}) \) as the vector of all \( z_i \) and clue bytes which are useful. We define \( v = f_\ell^{\Pi(I)}(\mu) \).

For simplicity, we write \( \Pi, k, N_\nu, N_\mu, p_{ij, \ell}, h \) and \( f_\ell \) when \( I \) and \( I_0 \) are made clear from context. That is, the range of \( h \) has size \( N_\mu \), and \( f_\ell \) goes from a domain of \( N_\mu \) elements to a range of \( N_\nu \) elements.

### 3.1 More Definitions and Lemmas

- We denote

\[
\varphi(\lambda) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\lambda} e^{-\frac{x^2}{2}} dx = \frac{1}{2} \text{erfc}\left( -\frac{\lambda}{\sqrt{2}} \right)
\]

In particular, \( \varphi(-\lambda/\sqrt{2}) = \frac{1}{2} \text{erfc}(\frac{\lambda}{\sqrt{2}}) \).

- The gamma function over the field of complex numbers is an extension of the factorial function and is defined as:

\[
\Gamma(x) = \int_{0}^{\infty} t^{x-1} e^{-t} dt
\]

for \( \text{Re}(x) > 0 \).

- The beta function, also called the Euler integral of the first kind, over the field of complex numbers is defined as:

\[
B(a, b) = \int_{0}^{1} t^{a-1} (1-t)^{b-1} dt
\]

for \( \text{Re}(a) > 0 \) and \( \text{Re}(b) > 0 \).

- The incomplete beta function is a generalization of the beta function and is defined as:

\[
B(x; a, b) = \int_{0}^{x} t^{a-1} (1-t)^{b-1} dt
\]
– The regularized incomplete beta function is defined in terms of the incomplete beta function and the complete beta function as

\[ I_x(a, b) = \frac{B(x; a, b)}{B(a, b)} \]

– We say that \( X \) has a negative binomial distribution if it has a probability mass function:

\[ \Pr[X = x] = \binom{x + r - 1}{x} (1 - p)^r p^x \]

where \( r \) is a positive integer and \( p \) is real. \( r \) and \( p \) are both parameters of this distribution. Extending this definition by letting \( r \) to be real positive, the binomial coefficient can also be rewritten using the gamma function:

\[ \Pr[X = x] = \frac{\Gamma(x + r)}{x! \Gamma(r)} (1 - p)^r p^x \]

This generalized distribution is called the Pólya distribution. We also have

\[ E(X) = \frac{pr}{1 - p} \quad \text{and} \quad V(X) = \frac{pr}{(1 - p)^2} \]

The cdf of this distribution can be computed using the regularized incomplete beta function. In fact, we have

\[ F_X(x) = \Pr(X \leq x) = 1 - I_p(x + 1, r) \]

**Definition 1.** Let \( A, B \) and \( C \) be three random variables over \( \mathbb{Z}_N \). We say that \( A \) is biased towards \( B \) with bias \( p \) conditioned on an event \( E \) and we represent it as \( A \overset{p}{\rightarrow} E B \) if

\[ \Pr(A - B = x | E) = \begin{cases} p & \text{if } x = 0 \\ \frac{1 - p}{N - 1} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

When \( \Pr[E] = 1 \), it is denoted as \( A \overset{p}{\equiv} B \).

**Lemma 2.** Let \( A, B \) and \( C \) be random variables in \( \mathbb{Z}_N \) such that

\[ A \overset{p_1}{\equiv} B \quad B \overset{p_2}{\equiv} C \]

We assume that \( A - B \) and \( B - C \) are independent. We have \( A \overset{p}{\equiv} C \), where

\[ P = \frac{1}{N} + \left( \frac{N}{N - 1} \right) \left( p_1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \left( p_2 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \overset{\text{def}}{=} p_1 \otimes p_2 \]

The operator \( \otimes \) is commutative and associative over \([0, 1]\), where 1 is the neutral element.

**Proof.** For \( x \neq 0 \), we have

\[
\Pr[C - A = x] = \sum_{y \neq 0} \Pr[B - A = y] \cdot \Pr[C - B = x - y]
= \sum_{y \neq 0} \Pr[B - A = y] \cdot \Pr[C - B = x - y] + \Pr[A = B] \cdot \Pr[C - B = x] + \Pr[B - A = x] \cdot \Pr[B = C]
= (N - 2) \left( \frac{1 - p_1}{N - 1} \right) \left( \frac{1 - p_2}{N - 1} \right) + p_1 \left( \frac{1 - p_2}{N - 1} \right) + p_2 \left( \frac{1 - p_1}{N - 1} \right)
\]
which does not depend on \( x \). Then,

\[
\Pr[A = C] = 1 - \sum_{x \neq 0} \Pr[C = A = x] = \frac{1}{N} + \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right) \left( p_1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \left( p_2 - \frac{1}{N} \right)
\]

So, \( A \triangleq C \).

The \( \otimes \) operation is trivially commutative over \([0, 1]\) and 1 is the neutral element. Below, we show that it is also associative over \([0, 1]\). We simply show that \((p_1 \otimes p_2) \otimes p_3 = p_1 \otimes (p_2 \otimes p_3)\).

\[
(p_1 \otimes p_2) \otimes p_3 = \frac{1}{N} + \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{N} + \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right) \left( p_1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \left( p_2 - \frac{1}{N} \right) - \frac{1}{N} \right] \cdot \left( p_3 - \frac{1}{N} \right)
\]

and

\[
p_1 \otimes (p_2 \otimes p_3) = \frac{1}{N} + \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right) \left( p_1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{N} + \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right) \left( p_2 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \left( p_3 - \frac{1}{N} \right) - \frac{1}{N} \right]
\]

Hence, the \( \otimes \) operator is associative.

From the above lemma and the associativity of \( \otimes \), we deduce the corollary below:

**Corollary 3.** Let \( A, B, C, D \) and \( E \) be random variables in \( \mathbb{Z}_N \) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
A &\triangleq B \\
B &\triangleq C \\
C &\triangleq D \\
D &\triangleq E
\end{align*}
\]

We assume that \( A - B, B - C, C - D \) and \( D - E \) are independent. We have \( A \triangleq E \), where

\[
P = p_1 \otimes p_2 \otimes p_3 \otimes p_4 = \frac{1}{N} + \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right)^3 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{4} \left( p_i - \frac{1}{N} \right)
\]

For \( p_4 = 1 \), we obtain

\[
P = p_1 \otimes p_2 \otimes p_3 = \frac{1}{N} + \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right)^2 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{3} \left( p_i - \frac{1}{N} \right)
\]

We can extend the above corollary by adding new conditions. We use the lemma below in Section 4 and also in analyzing the rest of the biases in Appendix A.

**Lemma 4.** Let \( A, B, C, D \) and \( E \) be random variables in \( \mathbb{Z}_N \) and \( \text{Cond} \) and \( \text{Cond'} \) be two events such that

\[
\begin{align*}
A &\triangleq B \\
B &\triangleq C \\
C &\triangleq D \quad \text{Cond} \quad S[D] \\
D &\triangleq E
\end{align*}
\]

We assume that for all \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma \) and \( \delta \), the events \( A - B = \alpha, B - C = \beta, (C - S[D] = \gamma) \land \text{Cond'} \) and \( D - E = \delta \) are independent; furthermore, we assume

1. \((A = S[D]) \land \text{Cond}) \leftrightarrow ((A = S[D]) \land \text{Cond'})
2. \(\Pr[\text{Cond}] = \Pr[\text{Cond'}] \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[D = E|\text{Cond}] = \Pr[D = E|\text{Cond'}]
3. \(\Pr[A = S[E]|A \neq S[D], D \neq E, \text{Cond}] = \frac{1}{N-1}\)
We have

\[ \Pr[A = S[E] | \text{Cond}] = p_1 \otimes p_2 \otimes p_3 \otimes p_4 \]

Later, we make a heuristic assumption that the events 1, 2, 3 above occur.

**Proof.** We have

\[
\Pr[A = S[D] = S[E] | \text{Cond}] = \left( \frac{1}{\Pr[D]} \right) \cdot \Pr[(A = S[D]) \land \text{Cond}, D = E]
= \left( \frac{1}{\Pr[D]} \right) \cdot \Pr[(A = S[D]) \land \text{Cond}', D = E]
= \left( \frac{1}{\Pr[D]} \right) \sum_{\substack{\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \in \mathbb{B} \land \gamma \neq 0 \land \delta > 0}} \Pr[A - B = \alpha, B - C = \beta, (C - S[D] = \gamma) \land \text{Cond}', D - E = \delta]
= \sum_{\substack{\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \in \mathbb{B} \land \gamma \neq 0 \land \delta > 0}} \Pr[A - B = \alpha] \cdot \Pr[B - C = \beta] \cdot \Pr[C - S[D] = \gamma] \cdot \Pr[D - E = \delta]
= (p_1 \otimes p_2 \otimes p_3) \cdot p_4
\]

We also have,

\[
\Pr[A \neq S[D], D \neq E | \text{Cond}] = 1 - \Pr[A = S[D] | \text{Cond}] - \Pr[D = E | \text{Cond}] + \Pr[A = S[D], D = E | \text{Cond}]
= 1 - \Pr[A = S[D] | \text{Cond}'] - \Pr[D = E | \text{Cond}'] + \Pr[A = S[D], D = E | \text{Cond}']
= \Pr[A \neq S[D], D \neq E | \text{Cond}']
\]

Moreover,

\[
\Pr[A = S[E], A \neq S[D] | \text{Cond}] = \Pr[A = S[E], A \neq S[D], D \neq E | \text{Cond}]
= \Pr[A = S[E] | A \neq S[D], D \neq E, \text{Cond}] \cdot \Pr[A \neq S[D], D \neq E | \text{Cond}']
= \left( \frac{1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot \Pr[A \neq S[D], D \neq E | \text{Cond}']
= \left( \frac{1}{N - 1} \right) \sum_{\substack{\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \in \mathbb{B} \land \gamma \neq 0 \land \delta > 0}} \Pr[A - B = \alpha, B - C = \beta, (C - S[D] = \gamma) \land \text{Cond}' , D - E = \delta]
= \left( \frac{1}{N - 1} \right) \sum_{\substack{\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \in \mathbb{B} \land \gamma \neq 0 \land \delta > 0}} \Pr[A - B = \alpha] \cdot \Pr[B - C = \beta] \cdot \Pr[C - S[D] = \gamma] \cdot \Pr[D - E = \delta]
= \left( \frac{1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot (1 - p_1 \otimes p_2 \otimes p_3) \cdot (1 - p_4)
\]

Hence,

\[
\Pr[A = S[E] | \text{Cond}] = (p_1 \otimes p_2 \otimes p_3) \cdot p_4 + \left( \frac{1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot (1 - p_1 \otimes p_2 \otimes p_3) \cdot (1 - p_4)
= p_1 \otimes p_2 \otimes p_3 \otimes p_4
\]
In the following, we introduce some lemmas which are very useful in the consequent sections. The next lemma represents a relation between \( K[i] \) and the value of \( j_i \).

**Lemma 5.** In the KSA of RC4, we have

\[
K[i] = j_i - \sum_{x=1}^{t} S_{x-1}[x]
\]

**Proof.** We prove it by induction by using

\[
j_i = j_{i-1} + S_{i-1}[\hat{i}] + K[\hat{i}]
\]

\( \square \)

The following lemma represents the probability that some state bytes remain at their position during RC4 state updates. Intuitively, \( S_t \) is the last state the attacker can compute. For instance, for WEP and WPA, since the IV is known, the attacker can initially compute up to state \( S_2 \), therefore \( t = 2 \) in this case. Later, when he recovers more key bytes sequentially, \( t \) will increase. Hence, from now on, anytime we talk about the index \( t \), we mean the index of the last state which the attacker can compute.

**Lemma 6.** For any \( 0 < i < N \), and any \( -2 < t < i \), the following five relations hold on RC4* (t) for any set \( (m_1, \ldots, m_b) \) of distinct \( m_j \)’s such that \( m_j \leq t \) or \( m_j > i - 1 \):

\[
P^b_A(i, t) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Pr \left[ \bigcap_{j=1}^{b} (S_{i-1}[m_j] = \cdots = S_{t+1}[m_j] = S_t[m_j]) \right] = \left( \frac{N-b}{N} \right)^{i-t-1}
\]

\[
S_{i-1}[m_j] \overset{p_i}{=} S_t[m_j]
\]

\[
\sum_{x=1}^{i} S_{x-1}[x] \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sigma_i(t) \quad \text{with} \quad P_B(t, i, t) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \prod_{k=0}^{i-t-1} \left( \frac{N-k}{N} \right) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - \prod_{k=0}^{i-t-1} \left( \frac{N-k}{N} \right) \right)
\]

\[
P_0 \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[S_{i-1}[i] = \cdots = S_t[i] = S_{t+1}[i] = \cdots = S_i[i] = (N-1)^{N-2}
\]

\[
S_{i-1}[i] \overset{p_0}{=} S_t[i]
\]

where

\[
\sigma_i(t) = \sum_{j=0}^{i} S_{j-1}[j] + \sum_{j=t+1}^{i} S_i[j]
\]

**Proof.** Note that \( S_{i-1}[m_j] = S_t[m_j] \) is equivalent to \( S_{i-1}[m_j] = \cdots = S_{t+1}[m_j] = S_t[m_j] \), because if \( m_j \) is moved, it can not come back to the same place, due to the restrictions \( m_j \leq t \) or \( m_j > i - 1 \). Furthermore, \( P^b_A(i, t) \) is defined as the probability that a set of bytes corresponding to a set of indices \( (m_1, \ldots, m_b) \) are not swapped from \( S_t \) to \( S_{i-1} \). Since \( m_j \leq t \) or \( m_j > i - 1 \), they will not be elected by the index \( i \) from \( S_t \) to \( S_{i-1} \). Hence, they can only be picked by the index \( j \) which moves uniformly at random by the definition of RC4* (t). So, this is correct with probability \( \left( \frac{N-b}{N} \right)^{i-t-1} \). In fact, we have

\[
S_{i-1}[m_j] \overset{p_i}{=} S_t[m_j]
\]

That is because

\[
\Pr_{x \neq y}[S_{i-1}[m_j] = y | S_t[m_j] = x] = \frac{1}{N-1}
\]

Since we know up to state \( S_t \), we have to approximate \( \sum_{x=1}^{i} S_{x-1}[x] \) with the state bytes in \( S_t \). The first term in \( P_B(t, i, t) \) is the probability that \( S_{x-1}[x] \) can be approximated as \( S_t[x] \) for \( x > t + 1 \). The second term is the probability that
at least one of these approximations is wrong, but at the end the result holds with uniform probability. We can also assume that

\[ \Pr_{y \neq \sigma(i)} \left[ \sum_{x=1}^{i} S_{x-1}[x] = y \right] = \frac{1}{N - 1} \]

\( P_i \) is the probability that index \( i \) is not swapped from \( S_i \) to \( S'_i \). This probability depends only on the values of \( j \) and \( j' \), which change uniformly at random in RC4\(^*(t)\). There are \( N - 2 \) state updates in the way, so the overall probability is \( \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-2} \). We also have

\[ \Pr_{x \neq y} [S'_{i-1}[i] = y | S_i[i] = x] = \frac{1}{N - 1} \]

This leads to \( S'_{i-1}[i] \overset{P_i}{=} S_i[i] \).

\[ \square \]

4 Two Significant Biases in RC4

We classify RC4 biases into two categories: the conditional biases and the unconditional biases. We use these notions specifically in the WPA attack in Section 5. Although all the biases are conditional, we put the SVV\(_{10}\) and the Korek biases in the conditional category and the Klein-Improved and Maitra-Paul biases in the unconditional category. This is because the density of unconditional biases are very close to 1. This is not the case for conditional biases.

Next, we describe two significant biases in RC4 as an example of how we manipulate them, namely: the Klein-Improved bias (an unconditional bias) and the A\(_{u15}\) bias (a conditional bias). The complete list of all such biases are elaborated and proved in Appendix A. For each bias, the conditions which need to be satisfied for the bias to hold are described. Moreover, the probabilistic assumptions for the state bytes through the KSA and the PRGA state updates are also represented. These assumptions illustrate the path which the bias follows through the KSA and the PRGA. For simplicity, we use the word Cond and the event \( g(z, \text{clue}) \) (described in Section 3) interchangeably in this section. As we mentioned already, \( S_i \) represents the last state we can compute deploying the known key bytes. For instance, \( K[0], K[1] \) and \( K[2] \) are initially known, therefore for WEP, the state up to \( S_2 \) can be computed. we recover \( K[3] \) first using \( S_2 \) and then using \( K[3] \) we update the state to \( S_3 \) and recover \( K[4] \). We continue this process until we recover \( K[14] \). On the other hand, for WPA, we set \( t = 2 \) all the time, and we only use \( S_2 \), and recover \( K[15], K[3], K[13] \) and \( K[14] \).

4.1 The Klein-Improved Attack

Klein [29] combined Jenkins’ correlation for the PRGA and weaknesses of the KSA and derived a correlation between the RC4 key bytes and the keystream. This bias was further improved in [73] by recovering \( K[i] \) instead of \( K'\)[1] to reduce the secret key bytes dependency. We use the theorem by Jenkins and explain how it can be merged with the weaknesses of the KSA (see Fig. 4).

**Lemma 7. (Jenkins’ correlation [26]).** Assuming the internal state \( S_{N-1} \) is a random permutation, and \( j'_i \) is chosen randomly, then \( z_i + S'_i[j'_i] \overset{P_i}{=} i \), where \( P_i = \frac{2}{N} \).

**Proof:**

\[ \Pr[S'_i[j'_i] = i - z_i] = \Pr[S'_i[j'_i] = i - z_i | S'_i[i] + S'_i[j'_i] = i] \cdot \Pr[S'_i[i] + S'_i[j'_i] = i] + \Pr[S'_i[j'_i] = i - z_i | S'_i[i] + S'_i[j'_i] \neq i] \cdot \Pr[S'_i[i] + S'_i[j'_i] \neq i] \]

\[ = \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \approx \frac{2}{N} \]

\[ \square \]

The conditions, assumptions, the key recovery relation and the success probability of this attack are described below:
- **Conditions:** \((i - z_i) \not\in \{S_i[t + 1], \ldots, S_i[i - 1]\}\)  
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 4)
  - \(S_i[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = S_{i-1}[i] = S_i[j'_i] = i - z_i\)
- **Key recovery relation:** \(\bar{K}[i] = S_{i}[i - z_i] - \sigma_i(t)\)
- **Probability of success:** \(P_{\text{KI}}(i, t)\) (see below)

Exploiting the above correlation and the relations in the KSA and the PRGA, we obtain

1. \(S'_i[j'_i] \stackrel{P_j}{=} i - z_i\) (Lemma 7)
2. \(S'_i[j'_i] = S'_{i-1}[i]\)
3. \(S'_{i-1}[i] \stackrel{P_{\text{Cond}}}{=} S_i[i]\) (Lemma 6)
4. \(S_i[i] = S_{i-1}[j_i]\)
5. \(S_{i-1}[j_i] \stackrel{P_{\text{Cond}}}{=} S_i[j_i]\) (where \(\text{Cond}'\) is the event that \(j_i \leq t\) or \(j_i > i - 1\).)
6. \(j_i = \bar{K}[i] + \sum_{x=1}^{i} S_{x-1}[x]\) (Lemma 5)
7. \(\sum_{x=1}^{i} S_{x-1}[x] \stackrel{P_b}{=} \sigma_i\) (Lemma 6)

We make the same heuristic assumptions of independence as in Lemma 4 and Lemma 6. Then, we gain

\[P_{\text{KI}}(i, t) = P_j \otimes P_b \otimes P_{\text{KI}}(i, t) \otimes P_b(i, t)\]

conditioned to Cond. Hence, the key recovery relation becomes

\[\bar{K}[i] \stackrel{P_{\text{KI}}}{\text{Cond}} S_{i-1}[i - z_i] - \sigma_i(t)\]

### 4.2 The A_u15 Attack

Korek is the nickname of a hacker who described 20 key recovery attacks on RC4 [32,33]. A_u15 attack is the best Korek attack with the highest success probability. First, we introduce the conditions for this attack to succeed, the assumptions we make, the equation for the key recovery and the success probability. All other Korek attacks are described in Appendix A.

- **Conditions:** \(S_i[i] = 0\) and \(z_2 = 0\)
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 5)
  - \(S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[i]\)
  - \(S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2] = S_i[2] = 0\)
  - \(j_i = 2\)
- **Key recovery relation:** \(\bar{K}[i] = 2 - \sigma_i\)
- **Probability of success:** \(P_{\text{KI}}(i, t)\) (see below)

We classify the conditions as

\[C_1 : S_i[i] = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad C_2 : z_2 = 0\]

We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as
We introduce a lemma by Mantin, et al. [39] which is used later to prove the success probability of the attack.

**Lemma 8.** *(Theorem 1 in [39])* Assume that the initial permutation $S'_0 = S_{N-1}$ is randomly chosen from the set of all the possible permutations over $\{0, \ldots, N-1\}$. Then, the probability that the second output word of RC4 is 0 is approximately $\frac{2}{N}$. In fact, we have $z_2 \approx 0$.

**Proof.** First, we show that if $S_{N-1}[2] = 0$ and $S_{N-1}[1] \neq 2$, we obtain $z_2 = 0$. Assume $S'_0[1] = \alpha$ and $S'_0[\alpha] = \beta$, then $i = 1$ and $j'_i = S'_0[1] = \alpha$, so we swap $S'_0[1]$ and $S'_0[\alpha]$. In the next iteration, $i = 2$ and $j'_i = \alpha + S'_1[2] = \alpha$, that is because we assumed $S_{N-1}[1] \neq 2$ and $S_{N-1}[2] = 0$, so $S'_1[2] = 0$. Then, we swap $S'_1[2]$ and $S'_1[\alpha]$ and $z_2$ is computed as
\[ z_2 = S'_2[S'_2(2) + S'_2(\alpha)] = S'_2(\alpha) = 0. \]

Finally,

\[
\Pr[z_2 = 0] = \Pr[z_2 = 0 | S'_0[2] = 0, S'_0[1] \neq 2] \cdot \Pr[S'_0[2] = 0, S'_0[1] \neq 2] \\
+ \Pr[z_2 = 0 | S'_0[2] \neq 0 \vee S'_0[1] = 2] \cdot \Pr[S'_0[2] \neq 0 \vee S'_0[1] = 2]
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{N} \left( N-1 \right) + \frac{1}{N} \left[ \left( N-1 \right) - \frac{1}{N} \left( N-1 \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{N} \left( N-1 \right) \left( 2 - \frac{1}{N} \right) + \frac{1}{N^2}
\]

\[
\approx \frac{2}{N}
\]

If \( x \neq 0 \), we also have

\[
\Pr[z_2 = x] = \frac{1 - \Pr[z_2 = 0]}{N-1} = \frac{N-2}{N(N-1)}
\]

Now, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate \( \Pr[B|C_1, C_2] \). So, we compute

\[
\Pr[B|C_1, C_2] = \Pr[E_1 S_3|C] + \Pr[B \neg S_3|C]
\]

\[
= \Pr[E_1 S_3|C] \cdot \Pr[S_3|C] + \Pr[B \neg S_3|C] \cdot (1 - \Pr[S_3|C])
\]

Now,

\[
\Pr[B \neg S_3|C] = \Pr[B \neg E_1 \neg S_3|C]
\]

\[
= \Pr[B \neg E_1|C] \cdot \Pr[E_1|C]
\]

\[
\approx \frac{1}{N-1} \cdot (1 - \Pr[E_1|C])
\]

Overall,

\[
\Pr[B|C_1, C_2] = \Pr[E_1|C] \cdot \Pr[S_3|C] + \left( \frac{1 - \Pr[E_1|C]}{N-1} \right) \cdot (1 - \Pr[S_3|C])
\]

\[
= \Pr[E_1|C] \cdot \left( \frac{N \Pr[S_3|C] - 1}{N-1} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - \Pr[S_3|C]}{N-1} \right)
\]

We then approximate \( \Pr[S_3|C] \approx P_b(i, t) \) and we also have

\[
\Pr[E_1|C] = \Pr[C_1|E_1 C_2] \left( \frac{\Pr[E_1|C_2]}{\Pr[C_1|C_2]} \right)
\]

\[
\approx \Pr[C_1|E_1 C_2]
\]

\[
= \Pr[C_1 S_1 S_2|E_1 C_2] + \Pr[C_1 \neg (S_1 S_2)|E_1 C_2]
\]

\[
= \Pr[C_1 S_1 S_2|E_1 C_2] + \frac{1}{N} (1 - \Pr[S_1 S_2|E_1 C_2])
\]

\[
= \Pr[C_1 S_1 S_2|E_1 C_2] + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_b(i, t) \cdot \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{N-i} \right)
\]

\[
\Pr[C_1 S_1 S_2|E_1 C_2] = \left( \frac{\Pr[C_1 S_1 S_2 E_1|C_2]}{\Pr[E_1|C_2]} \right)
\]

\[
= \Pr[E_1|C_2] \cdot \Pr[C_1 S_1 S_2 E_1|C_2] \cdot \left( \frac{\Pr[C_1 S_1 S_2 E_1]}{\Pr[C_2] \cdot \Pr[E_1|C_2]} \right)
\]

17
Deploying Lemma 8, we obtain

$$\Pr[C_1S_1S_2|E_1C_2] = \frac{1}{2}P_A^1(i,t) \left(\frac{N-1}{N}\right)^{N-i}$$

Therefore, overall we have

$$P_a^1(i,t) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[B|C_1C_2] = \left(\frac{NP_B(i,t) - 1}{N-1}\right)$$

$$\cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2}P_A^1(i,t) \left(\frac{N-1}{N}\right)^{N-i} + \frac{1}{N} \left(1 - P_A^1(i,t) \left(\frac{N-1}{N}\right)^{N-i}\right) \right]$$

$$+ \left(\frac{1 - P_B(i,t)}{N-1}\right)$$

**Fig. 5.** RC4 state update in the A_{sl15} attack

We manipulate all the biases in RC4 similarly, (see Appendix A) to mount optimal key recovery attacks against WEP and WPA.

### 5 Attacks on the WPA Protocol

In this section, we use the two biases described in the previous section and all the biases described in Appendix A (except the Maitra-Paul attack\(^1\)) to mount a key recovery attack against WPA. We first recover 8 bits of WPA temporary

---

\(^1\) We do not use the Maitra-Paul attack in the WEP and WPA attacks; this is because we noticed that this bias is very much correlated with the Klein-Improved attack. In fact, using this attack together with the Klein-Improved attack does not yield any
key, and then use it to mount a key recovery attack against the full key. Recovering those 8 bits is performed in two steps: we first recover 7 of such bits (the first attack), and then the last bit (the second attack).

There are 8 bits of the TK that we call weak, because they have a simple relation with the bits of the PPK. These bits consist of the 7 most significant bits of the TK[0] and the least significant bit of the TK[1]. We define some statistical attacks using the following mappings:

\[ z^m, IV^m \xrightarrow{h} \mu \xrightarrow{f_\ell \text{ if } g_\ell(\mu)} v \xrightarrow{\pi} x \]

Here, \( z^m \) is the \( m \)-th keystream using the \( IV^m \) and \( \mu \) is some compressed information to compute \( v \). The \( v \) is some RC4 key bytes which are useful in computing \( x \). The \( x \) is some information about the TK which we want to recover using statistics. We define \( N_x \) as the number of possible values for \( x \).

### 5.1 The First Attack: Recovering 7 Weak Bits of the TK


\[
K[3] = \text{low}_8((PPK[5] \parallel TK[1] \parallel TK[0])) \gg 1
\]

So, given \( v = (K[2], K[3], K[13], K[14]) \), the adversary can compute \( x = \text{high}_7(TK[0]) \) by

\[
\pi(v) = \text{low}_7((K[3] - K[2]) \parallel ((K[14] - K[13]) \gg 1))
\]

\( N_v = 2^{32} \) is the total number of possible \( v \)'s and \( N_x = 2^7 \) is the total number of possible \( x \)'s. We have \( N_v = 2^{48} \), the total number of \( \mu = h(z, IV) \).

We can recover the 7 weak bits as follows: for each candidate value \( x \) (naturally distributed), each packet \( m \) and each \( \ell = 1, \ldots, k \) (corresponding to a tuple \( (w_2, w_3, w_{13}, w_{14}) \), if agglomerated condition \( g_\ell(h(z^m, IV^m)) \) holds, we define \( v = f_\ell(h(z^m, IV^m)) \) to be the value of the RC4 key bytes suggested by the bias \( \ell \) on packet \( m \), which is correct with probability \( p_\ell \). We let \( x = \pi(v) \) be the suggested value of \( x \) computed as explained. We let \( X_{s,m,\ell} \) be some magic coefficient \( a_\ell \) (to be optimized later) if \( \pi(f_\ell(h(z^m, IV^m))) = x \) and 0 otherwise. We let \( Y_s = \sum_{m=1}^n \sum_{\ell=1}^k X_{s,m,\ell} \), where \( n \) is the total number of packets to be used. Clearly, the correct value for \( v \) is suggested with probability \( p_\ell \) and others are obtained randomly. We assume incorrect ones are suggested with the same probability \( \frac{1-p_\ell}{N_v-1} \).

If \( x \) is not the correct value, it is not suggested for sure when \( v \) is correct. Since \( \pi \) is balanced, this incorrect \( x \) has \( \frac{N_v-N_x}{N_v} \) values \( v \) belonging to the set of \( N_v - 1 \) incorrect ones. So, \( x \) is suggested with probability \( \frac{N_x}{N_v} \times \frac{1-p_\ell}{N_v-1} \). Consequently, the \( X_{s,m,\ell} \) for incorrect \( x \)'s are random variables with the expected values

\[
a_\ell q_\ell N_v \frac{1-p_\ell}{N_v(N_v-1)} \]

if \( x \) is not the correct value.

If \( x \) is the correct value, it is suggested with probability \( p_\ell \) for the correct \( v \) and when \( v \) is one of the \( \frac{N_v-N_x}{N_v} \) (incorrect) preimages of \( x \) by \( \pi \). That is, with overall probability \( p_\ell + \frac{N_v-N_x}{N_v} \times \frac{1-p_\ell}{N_v-1} \). So, the \( X_{s,m,\ell} \) for the correct \( x \) are random variables with expected values

\[
a_\ell q_\ell N_v \frac{1-p_\ell}{N_v(N_v-1)} + a_\ell q_\ell \frac{N_v p_\ell - 1}{N_v - 1}
\]

The difference between these two expected values is important. This is also the case for the difference of variances. Since every \( x \) is suggested with the probability roughly \( \frac{q_\ell}{N_v} \), we assume that the variance of a bad \( X_{s,m,\ell} \) can be significant extra success probability for our overall WEP and WPA attacks. Finding the reason for such a correlation is still an open problem.
approximated by $\frac{q_{\ell}}{N_x} \left(1 - \frac{q_{\ell}}{N_x}\right) a_{\ell}^2$. Let $\Delta$ be the operator making the difference between the distributions for a good $x$ and a bad one. We have

$$E(Y_{x \text{ bad}}) = \frac{n}{N_x} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N_x}\right) \sum_{\ell} a_{\ell} q_{\ell} (1 - p_{\ell})$$

$$E(Y_{x \text{ good}}) = E(Y_{x \text{ bad}}) + \Delta E(Y)$$

$$\Delta E(Y) = \frac{n}{1 - \frac{1}{N_x}} \sum_{\ell} a_{\ell} q_{\ell} \left(p_{\ell} - \frac{1}{N_x}\right)$$

$$V(Y_{x \text{ bad}}) \approx n \sum_{\ell} a_{\ell}^2 q_{\ell} \left(1 - \frac{q_{\ell}}{N_x}\right)$$

$$V(Y_{x \text{ good}}) = V(Y_{x \text{ bad}}) + \Delta V(Y)$$

$$\Delta V(Y) \approx \frac{n}{1 - \frac{1}{N_x}} \sum_{\ell} a_{\ell}^2 q_{\ell} \left(p_{\ell} - \frac{1}{N_x}\right)$$

where $E(Y_{x \text{ bad}})$ and $V(Y_{x \text{ bad}})$ denote the expected value and the variance of a $Y_x$ variable for any bad $x$ respectively. Here, we remove the subscript $x$ of $Y_x$ in $\Delta E(Y)$, since this does not depend on a specific value for $x$. Let $\lambda$ be such that $\Delta E(Y) = \lambda \sqrt{V(Y_{x \text{ bad}}) + V(Y_{x \text{ good}})}$. The probability that the correct $Y_x$ is lower than an arbitrary wrong $Y_x$ is $\rho = \phi(-\lambda)$. That is, the expected number of wrong $x$’s with larger $Y_x$ is

$$r = (N_x - 1) \phi(-\lambda)$$

So,

$$n = \frac{\lambda^2 \sum_{\ell} a_{\ell}^2 \left[2 \left(\frac{q_{\ell}}{N_x}\right) \left(1 - \frac{q_{\ell}}{N_x}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{N_x}\right)^2 + q_{\ell} \left(p_{\ell} - \frac{1}{N_x}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{N_x}\right)\right]}{\left(\sum_{\ell} a_{\ell} q_{\ell} \left(p_{\ell} - \frac{1}{N_x}\right)\right)^2}$$

By computing the derivative of both terms of the fraction with respect to $a_{\ell}$ and set them as equal, we conclude that the optimal value of $n$ is reached for

$$a_{\ell} = a_{opt} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\left(p_{\ell} - \frac{1}{N_x}\right)}{\left(p_{\ell} - \frac{1}{N_x}\right) \left(1 - \frac{q_{\ell}}{N_x}\right) + \frac{2}{N_x} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N_x}\right) \left(1 - \frac{q_{\ell}}{N_x}\right)}$$

Hence, we obtain

$$n = n_{opt} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\lambda^2 \left(1 - \frac{1}{N_x}\right)}{\sum_{\ell} a_{\ell} q_{\ell} \left(p_{\ell} - \frac{1}{N_x}\right)}$$

In [62], it was assumed that $\Delta V(Y) = 0$ and the value for $n_{opt}$ and $a_{opt}$ were different. However, experiments have shown that this approximation was not appropriate. This is why we integrate $\Delta V(Y)$ here. The attack works as follows:

1. Set $I = (2, 3, 13, 14)$ and $I_0 = \{0, 1, 2\}$.
2. Initialize the $Y_\ell$ counters to 0.
3. for $m = 1$ to $n$
4.    for $\ell = 1$ to $k$
5.       if $g_\ell(h(z^m, IV^m))$ holds then
6.          Compute $v = f_\ell(h(z^m, IV^m))$, the suggested value for ($\bar{R}[2], \bar{R}[3], \bar{R}[13], \bar{R}[14]$).
7.          Compute $x = \pi(v)$.  

20
8: Increment \( Y_x \) by \( a_\ell \).
9: \textbf{end if}
10: \textbf{end for}
11: \textbf{end for}
12: Output \( x = \arg \max_x Y_x \).

Clearly, the time complexity is \( nk \). The complexity is measured in terms of the number of times the \textbf{if} structure is executed. This should have a complexity which is essentially equivalent to executing the phase2 of the key derivation. The memory complexity has the order of magnitude of \( N_x \). Here is another variant of the algorithm:

1: Set \( I = (2, 3, 13, 14) \) and \( I_0 = \{0, 1, 2\} \).
2: Initialize a table \( y_x^\ell \) to 0.
3: \textbf{for} \( \ell = 1 \) to \( k \) \textbf{do}
4: \textbf{for} all possible \( \mu \) such that \( g_\ell(\mu) \) holds \textbf{do}
5: Compute \( x = \pi(f_\ell(\mu)) \).
6: Increment \( y_x^\mu \) by \( a_\ell \).
7: \textbf{end for}
8: \textbf{end for}
9: Initialize the \( Y_x \) counters to 0.
10: \textbf{for} \( m = 1 \) to \( n \) \textbf{do}
11: \textbf{for} all \( x \) \textbf{do}
12: Compute \( \mu = h(z^m, IV^m) \).
13: Increment \( Y_x \) by \( y_x^\mu \).
14: \textbf{end for}
15: \textbf{end for}
16: Output \( x = \arg \max_x Y_x \).

Now, the time complexity is \( N_\mu k + N_x n \) and the memory complexity is \( N_\mu N_x \). So, the complexity is

\[
\text{c} = \min(nk, N_\mu k + N_x n)
\]  

(4)

The two complexity curves intersect for \( n = \frac{N_\mu k}{k - N_x} \approx N_\mu \) when \( N_x \ll k \).

For \( I = (2, 3, 13, 14) \), we have \( N_\nu = 2^{32}, N_\mu = 2^{48} \) and \( N_x = 2^7 \). The complexities with and without using conditional biases are summarized in Table 1. As we can see, when ignoring the conditional biases we need about 65\% more packets, but the complexity is much lower because \( k \) is smaller. So, the conditional biases do not seem to be useful in this case.

### 5.2 The Second Attack: Recovering One Weak Bit of the TK

Let \( I_0 = \{0, 1, 2\}, I = (15, 2, 3, 14) \) and \( x = \text{low1}(\text{TK}[1]) \) be the last weak bit. Given the IV and also

\[
\nu = \langle \overline{K}[2], \overline{K}[3], \overline{K}[14], \overline{K}[15] \rangle
\]

we deduce \( x = \pi(\nu) \) by

\[
\pi(\nu) = \text{high1}((\overline{K}[3] - \overline{K}[2]) \oplus (\overline{K}[15] - \overline{K}[14]))
\]

So, we apply the first attack with this \( I \) and \( N_x = 2 \). Since \( 15 \in I \), we have more biases. We have \( r, n \) and \( c \) from Eq. (2), Eq. (3) and Eq. (4).

For \( I = (15, 2, 3, 14) \), we have \( N_\nu = 2^{32}, N_\mu = 2^{120} \) and \( N_x = 2 \). The complexities are summarized in Table 1. Again, conditional biases are not very useful. We can also see that this choice of \( I \) leads to a much better attack than the one from Section 5.1 in terms of \( n \), but the complexity is slightly higher. This is due to a larger \( k \).
5.3 Merging the First and the Second Attacks

In this section, we merge the first and the second attack on WPA, to recover its 8 weak bits. Given two attacks with sets $I^1$ (resp. $I^2$) for recovering independent $x^1$ (resp. $x^2$) random variables leading to $Y_i$ (resp. $Y_j$), $c_1$ (resp. $c_2$), $n^1$ (resp. $n^2$) and $\lambda^1$ (resp. $\lambda^2$), one problem is to merge the sorted lists of $x^1$ and $x^2$. One can follow the approach by Junod-Vaudenay [28]. We sort pairs following their likelihood ratio, which is obtained by multiplying the likelihood ratio of both terms. We assume that all $Y_i$’s are independent, normally distributed with the variance either $V(Y_i)^{\text{good}}$ or $V(Y_i)^{\text{bad}}$ and the expected value either $E(Y_i)^{\text{good}}$ or $E(Y_i)^{\text{bad}}$. Given $x^1$, the ratio for $x^2$ being the correct value based on the observation $Y_i$ is

$$
\frac{\Pr[Y_i \mid x^1 \text{ good}]}{\Pr[Y_i \mid x^1 \text{ wrong}]} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi V(Y_i)^{\text{good}}}} e^{-\frac{(Y_i - E(Y_i)^{\text{good}})^2}{2V(Y_i)^{\text{good}}}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi V(Y_i)^{\text{bad}}}} e^{-\frac{(Y_i - E(Y_i)^{\text{bad}})^2}{2V(Y_i)^{\text{bad}}}} = \sqrt{\frac{V(Y_i)^{\text{bad}}}{V(Y_i)^{\text{good}}}} e^{\frac{(Y_i - E(Y_i)^{\text{bad}})^2 - (Y_i - E(Y_i)^{\text{good}})^2}{2V(Y_i)^{\text{good}}}}
$$

So, when multiplying some terms of this form for the pairs of values, sorting them by decreasing product is equivalent to sorting them by decreasing value of

$$
\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{V_{1g}} - \frac{1}{V_{1g}} \right) Y_i^1 + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{V_{2g}} - \frac{1}{V_{2g}} \right) Y_i^2 + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{V_{2b}} - \frac{1}{V_{2b}} \right) Y_i^2 = a (Y_i^1 - \beta_1)^2 + b (Y_i^2 - \beta_2)^2
$$

where

$$
V_{1g} = V(Y_i^1)^{\text{good}} \quad V_{2g} = V(Y_i^2)^{\text{good}} \quad V_{1b} = V(Y_i^1)^{\text{bad}} \quad V_{2b} = V(Y_i^2)^{\text{bad}} \quad \Delta V_1 = \Delta V(Y_i^1) \quad \Delta V_2 = \Delta V(Y_i^2) \quad E_{1g} = E(Y_i^1)^{\text{good}} \quad E_{2g} = E(Y_i^2)^{\text{good}} \quad E_{1b} = E(Y_i^1)^{\text{bad}} \quad E_{2b} = E(Y_i^2)^{\text{bad}}
$$

$$
a = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{V_{1g}} - \frac{1}{V_{1g}} \right) \quad b = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{V_{2b}} - \frac{1}{V_{2b}} \right) \quad \beta_1 = \frac{V_{1g} E_{1b} - V_{1b} E_{1g}}{\Delta V_1} \quad \beta_2 = \frac{V_{2b} E_{2b} - V_{2b} E_{2g}}{\Delta V_2}
$$

So we let $Y_i^{x_1,x_2} = a (Y_i^1 - \beta_1)^2 + b (Y_i^2 - \beta_2)^2$. With the same assumptions as in [28], we are back in the situation where $Y_i^{x_1,x_2}$ is distributed with the Generalized-$\chi^2$ distribution [8,9]. The average number of the wrong $(x^1,x^2)$ pairs with higher score than the good one is

$$
r = (N_x - 1) \cdot \Pr(Y_i^{x_1,x_2} \text{ good} - Y_i^{x_1,x_2} \text{ bad} < 0)
$$

Thus, we define a new random variable

$$
\Delta Y_i^{x_1,x_2} = \sum_{m=1}^{2} \sum_{j=b,g} d_{mj} \left[ \frac{(Y_{m,j} - \beta_m)^2}{V_{mj}} \right]
$$
of freedom and non-centrality parameters respectively. It was shown in [44] that when \( \chi_{\text{centralized}} \),

Our experiment revealed that their non-centrality parameters are large. Let

Using this approach, the above integral can be avoided. Hence,

The characteristic function of a quadratic form in independent normal random variables

where

\begin{align*}
  a_{1g} &= aV_{1g} & a_{1b} &= -aV_{1b} & Y_{x'g} &= Y_{x' \text{ good}} \\
  a_{2g} &= bV_{2g} & a_{2b} &= -bV_{2b} & Y_{x'b} &= Y_{x' \text{ bad}}
\end{align*}

\( \Delta Y_{x',x^2} \) is a quadratic form in independent normal random variables. It can be expressed as the linear combination

\[ \Delta Y_{x',x^2} = \sum_{m=1}^{2} \sum_{j=b,g} a_{mj} X_{mj}^2 \quad (5) \]

where \( X_{mj} \)'s are independent and normally distributed random variables with variance one. We write

\[ t_{mj}^2 = \frac{(E(Y_{mj}) - \beta_{mj})^2}{V(Y_{mj})} = t_{mj}^2, \quad n \]

The characteristic function of a quadratic form in independent normal random variables \( \Delta Y_{x',x^2} \) is given by Davies [8]:

\[ \varphi_{\Delta Y_{x',x^2}}(u) = E(e^{iu \Delta Y_{x',x^2}}) = e^{-\sum_{m=1}^{2} \sum_{j=b,g} a_{mj} t_{mj}^2} \prod_{m=1}^{2} \prod_{j=b,g} (1 - 2iua_{mj})^{-\frac{1}{2}} \]

If \( E(|\Delta Y_{x',x^2}|) \) is finite, it follows from Gil-Pelaez [16] that

\[ F_{\Delta Y_{x',x^2}}(w) = \Pr(\Delta Y_{x',x^2} < w) = \frac{1}{2} - \int_{-\infty}^{w} \text{Im} \left( \frac{\varphi_{\Delta Y_{x',x^2}}(u)e^{-iun}}{2\pi u} \right) du \]

Substituting what we have, one derives

\[ F_{\Delta Y_{x',x^2}}(0) = \Pr(\Delta Y_{x',x^2} < 0) = \frac{1}{2} - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \text{Im} \left( \frac{e^{-\sum_{m=1}^{2} \sum_{j=b,g} a_{mj} t_{mj}^2} \prod_{m=1}^{2} \prod_{j=b,g} (1 - 2iua_{mj})^{-\frac{1}{2}}}{2\pi u} \right) du \]

Finally, setting \( r \), the value of \( n \) can be numerically computed.

It might be of interest to evaluate \( n \) analytically. In Eq. (5), the \( X_i^2 \)'s follow the non-centralized \( \chi^2 \) distribution. Our experiment revealed that their non-centrality parameters are large. Let \( n_i \) and \( t_i^2 \) be their corresponding degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameters respectively. It was shown in [44] that when \( n_i \to \infty \) or \( t_i^2 \to \infty \), the non-centralized \( \chi^2 \) random variable can be approximated by normal distribution with the same expected value and variance. Using this approach, the above integral can be avoided. Hence,

\[ E(\Delta Y_{x',x^2}) \approx \sum_{m=1}^{2} \sum_{j=b,g} a_{mj} (1 + t_{mj}^2) \]

\[ V(\Delta Y_{x',x^2}) \approx \sum_{m=1}^{2} \sum_{j=b,g} 2a_{mj}^2 (1 + 2t_{mj}^2) \]

To find \( n \), we need to solve the following equation.
\[
\left( \frac{-E(\Delta Y_{x_1,x_2})}{\sqrt{V(\Delta Y_{x_1,x_2})}} \right) = \varphi^{-1} \left( \frac{r}{N_i N_k^2 - 1} \right)
\]

Thus, we derive

\[
n \approx \left[ \frac{1}{\mu} \varphi^{-1} \left( \frac{r}{N_i N_k^2 - 1} \right) \right]^2
\]

where

\[
\mu = \frac{\sum_{m=1}^{2} \sum_{j=b,g} a_{mj} f_{mj}}{\sqrt{\sum_{m=1}^{2} \sum_{j=b,g} 4a_{mj}^2 f_{mj}}}
\]

We can use these merging rules to merge the two previous attacks. \( c = c^1 + c^2 \) by using Eq. (4) for \( c^1 \) and \( c^2 \). We obtain the results in Table 1.

Table 1 represents the corresponding complexities when merging the previous attacks to recover the 8 weak bits of the TK. We also compare these attack using a merged set \( I \) directly. As we can see, merging the attacks with small \( I \)'s (reference 3) is much better than making a new attack with a merged \( I \) (reference 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>reference</th>
<th>( I )</th>
<th>( n )</th>
<th>( c )</th>
<th>( r )</th>
<th>( N_i )</th>
<th>( k )</th>
<th>( \lambda )</th>
<th>( N_v )</th>
<th>( N_y )</th>
<th>cond. biases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1u</td>
<td>(2, 3, 13, 14)</td>
<td>( 2^{41.10} )</td>
<td>( 2^{42.10} )</td>
<td>( 2 )</td>
<td>( 2^7 )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>( 2^{24} )</td>
<td>( N^6 )</td>
<td>without</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c</td>
<td>(2, 3, 13, 14)</td>
<td>( 2^{41.38} )</td>
<td>( 2^{43.38} )</td>
<td>( 2 )</td>
<td>( 2^{11.72} )</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>( 2^{24} )</td>
<td>( N^8 )</td>
<td>with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2u</td>
<td>(15, 2, 3, 14)</td>
<td>( 2^{40.38} )</td>
<td>( 2^{45.38} )</td>
<td>( 2 )</td>
<td>( 2^5 )</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>( 2^{24} )</td>
<td>( N^{15} )</td>
<td>without</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c</td>
<td>(15, 2, 3, 14)</td>
<td>( 2^{39.12} )</td>
<td>( 2^{55.85} )</td>
<td>( 2 )</td>
<td>( 2^{16.73} )</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>( 2^{24} )</td>
<td>( N^{17} )</td>
<td>with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3u merge 1u+2u</td>
<td>( 2^{41.83} )</td>
<td>( 2^{46.87} )</td>
<td>( 2 )</td>
<td>( 2^8 )</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>( 2^{40} )</td>
<td>( N^{17} )</td>
<td>without</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c merge 1c+2c</td>
<td>( 2^{41.22} )</td>
<td>( 2^{57.99} )</td>
<td>( 2 )</td>
<td>( 2^8 )</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>( 2^{40} )</td>
<td>( N^{19} )</td>
<td>with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4u</td>
<td>(15, 2, 3, 13, 14)</td>
<td>( 2^{51.72} )</td>
<td>( 2^{57.72} )</td>
<td>( 2 )</td>
<td>( 2^6 )</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>( 2^{40} )</td>
<td>( N^{17} )</td>
<td>without</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4c</td>
<td>(15, 2, 3, 13, 14)</td>
<td>( 2^{51.05} )</td>
<td>( 2^{72.69} )</td>
<td>( 2 )</td>
<td>( 2^{21.64} )</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>( 2^{40} )</td>
<td>( N^{19} )</td>
<td>with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Temporary Key Recovery Attack on WPA

The results from [43] lead to an “easy” attack on WPA: guess the 96-bit PPK and the 8 weak bits of the TK with an average complexity of \( 2^{103} \) until it generates the correct keystream. Then, guess the 96-bit PPK of another packet in the same segment (with the weak bits already known). Then, apply the method of [43] to recover the TK. We improve this attack by recovering the weak bits of the TK separately: we know from Table 1 that we can recover the weak bits of the TK by using \( 2^{42} \) packets. After having recovered the weak bits, we note that the 96-bit PPK is now enough to recalculate the RC4KEY. So, we can do an exhaustive search on the PPK for a given packet until we find the correct one. This works with average complexity of \( 2^{95} \). We do it twice to recover the PPK of two packets in the same segment. Given these two PPK sharing the same IV32, we recover the TK by using the method of [43]. Therefore, we can recover the temporary key TK and decrypt all packets with complexity \( 2^{96} \). The number of packets needed to recover the weak bits is \( 2^{42} \).
5.5 Distinguishing WPA

RC4 can be distinguished using $N$ packets [39] and since WPA’s output is already an output of RC4, it can be simply distinguished from random using a few packets. However, the distinguisher of [39], based on the bias of $z_2$, can not distinguish two protocols that are both using RC4. In this section, we are using all the biases on RC4 together with some weaknesses in the structure of WPA and mount a distinguishing attack on WPA. This distinguisher is also capable of distinguishing WPA from other protocols using RC4. The first attack can be turned into a distinguisher as follows. The expected value and the variance of the correct $Y_x$ are

$$E(Y_{x \text{ good}}) = E(Y_{x \text{ bad}}) + \lambda \sqrt{V(Y_{x \text{ bad}})} + V(Y_{x \text{ good}})$$
$$V(Y_{x \text{ good}}) = V(Y_{x \text{ bad}}) + \Delta V(Y)$$

Let extend our notations by defining

$$\gamma = \frac{V(Y_{x \text{ good}})}{V(Y_{x \text{ bad}})}$$

The random variable $Y_x$ of the good counter is larger than

$$T = E(Y_{x \text{ bad}}) + \lambda' \sqrt{V(Y_{x \text{ bad}})} + V(Y_{x \text{ good}})$$

with probability $\phi \left( \left( \lambda - \lambda' \right) \sqrt{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma}} \right)$. Now, if we replace the WPA packets by a sequence generated by RC4 fed with random keys, all the counters have the expected value $E(Y_{x \text{ bad}})$ and the variance approximately $V(Y_{x \text{ bad}})$. The probability that a given counter exceeds $T$ is $\phi \left( -\lambda' \sqrt{1 + \gamma} \right)$. The probability that any counter exceeds this is lower than $N_c \phi \left( -\lambda' \sqrt{1 + \gamma} \right)$. So, the condition max$_n Y_x > T$ makes a distinguisher of the same $n$ and $c$ as in the first attack and with $\text{Adv} \geq \beta$, where

$$\beta = \phi \left( \left( \lambda - \lambda' \right) \sqrt{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma}} \right) - N_c \phi \left( -\lambda' \sqrt{1 + \gamma} \right)$$

Finally, we find the optimal $\lambda'$ which maximizes the advantage.

$$\lambda' = \sqrt{\left( 1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \frac{\lambda^2 + \left( \gamma - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \lambda^2 + 2 \ln \left( N_c \sqrt{\gamma} \right)}{\left( \gamma - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \lambda}$$

We use the same values as before and target $\text{Adv} \geq \frac{1}{2}$. We use Eq. (3) for $n$, Eq. (4) for $c$ and Eq. (6) for a lower bound $\beta$ of the advantage. The performances of the distinguishers are summarized in Table 2. Again, the attack based on $I = (15, 2, 3, 14)$ is better in terms of the number of packets, but is not in terms of the complexity. It works using $2^{41.23}$ packets and complexity of $2^{46.23}$. The one based on $I = (2, 3, 13, 14)$ works with 50% more packets ($2^{41.83}$) with no conditional biases, but with a much better complexity of $2^{41.83}$.

Table 2. The complexities of several distinguishers for WPA. We compare them when including conditional biases and without. We provide the number of packets $n$, the running time complexity $c$, the bound on the advantage $\beta$, as well as the parameters $k$, $\lambda$, and $N_c$. We target $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$. We used $I_0 = \{0, 1, 2\}$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$I$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$c$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$N_c$</th>
<th>$k$</th>
<th>$\lambda$</th>
<th>$N_c$</th>
<th>$N_p$</th>
<th>cond. biases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1u $I = (2, 3, 13, 14)$</td>
<td>$2^{41.83}$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>$2^{29}$</td>
<td>$N^6$</td>
<td>without</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c $I = (2, 3, 13, 14)$</td>
<td>$2^{41.11}$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>$2^{33}$</td>
<td>$N^8$</td>
<td>with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2u $I = (15, 2, 3, 14)$</td>
<td>$2^{46.23}$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>$2^{33}$</td>
<td>$N^{15}$</td>
<td>without</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c $I = (15, 2, 3, 14)$</td>
<td>$2^{45.70}$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>$2^{33}$</td>
<td>$N^{17}$</td>
<td>with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above distinguisher has recently been improved by Sen Gupta et al. [57]. Their distinguisher requires $2^{19}$ packets to distinguish WPA from any other protocol based on RC4.

25
6 Tornado Attack on WEP

In this section, we present an attack on WEP using the theory we already introduced. We recover $\bar{K}[15], \bar{K}[3], \ldots, \bar{K}[14]$ sequentially. We initially set $t = 2$ and use $S_2$ and then update the state by recovery each key byte sequentially. When the full key is recovered, we test it, in case it is not correct, we test more keys by re-voting (see below for more details). We call this attack Tornado Attack, because we use a theory from tornado analysis to apply it to the WEP attack scenario.

We apply the first attack on WPA (see Section 5.1) with $x = \nu$: we only recover the key bytes which are the same for all packets. This attack produces a ranking of all the possible $x$'s in the form of a list $L$ by decreasing order of likelihood. The attack works as in Fig. 6.

Fig. 6. Tornado attack on WEP

In the following, we compute the values of the $\rho_i$'s, such that they yield 50% success probability for the WEP attack and minimize the attack complexity:

Let $\Pi_i = \Pi(i|0, \ldots, i - 1, 15)$ for $i = 3, \ldots, i_{\text{max}}$ and $\Pi_{15} = \Pi(15|0, 1, 2)$ be the table of biases used by the attack on $\bar{K}[i]$. Similarly, let $N_x = N_\nu = N$, $r_i$ and $c_i$ be their parameters following Eq. (2.4). Let $R_i$ be the rank of the correct $\bar{k}_i$ value in $L_i$. Let define a random variable $U_{ij} = 1(Y_{x'}^{\text{good}} < Y_{x'}^{\text{bad}})$, where $Y_{x'}^{\text{bad}}$ is the $j$-th bad counter in attacking $\bar{K}[i]$. Hence, we have

$$R_i = \sum_{j=1}^{N_x-1} U_{ij}$$

The expected value and the variance of this random variable can be computed as follows:

$$r_i = E(R_i) = (N_x - 1) \phi(-\lambda_i)$$

and

$$E(R_i^2) = E(R_i) + (N_x - 1)(N_x - 2) \cdot E(U_1 \cdot U_2)$$

where
\[ E(U_{11}, U_{12}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi V(Y_{i', \text{good}})}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^{-\frac{(y - E(Y_{i', \text{good}}))^2}{2V(Y_{i', \text{good}})}} \left(1 - \Phi \left( \frac{Y - E(Y_{i', \text{bad'}})}{\sqrt{V(Y_{i', \text{bad'}})}} \right) \right)^2 dY \]

This finally yields

\[ V(R_i) = (N_i - 1)\Phi(-\lambda_i) + (N_i - 1)(N_i - 2) \cdot E(U_{11}, U_{12}) - (N_i - 1)^2\Phi(-\lambda_i) \]

In [62], \( U_{11} \) and \( U_{12} \) were incorrectly assumed to be independent, leading to

\[ V(R_i) \approx (N_i - 1)\Phi(-\lambda_i)(1 - \Phi(\lambda_i)) \approx r_i \]

which did not match our experiments. Now, the fundamental question is: What is the distribution of \( R_i \)?

### 6.1 Analysis Based on Pólya Distribution

In [62], it was assumed that the distribution of \( R_i \) is normal. Running a few experiments, we noticed that in fact it is following a distribution very close to the Poisson distribution. A revealing observation was that the variance of the distribution was much higher than the expected value. A number of distributions have been devised for series in which the variance is significantly larger than the mean [2,12,47], frequently on the basis of more or less complex biological models [7]. The first of these was the negative binomial, which arose in deriving the Poisson series from the point binomial [66,76]. We use a generalized version of the negative binomial distribution called the Pólya distribution. The main application of the Pólya distribution is in Tornado Outbreaks [70] and Hail Frequency analysis [69].

In most climates, the probability of hail is small. If the mean hail frequency ranges on an interval \( f_1 < f < f_2 \) for all climates, it is observed that for values of \( f \) near \( f_1 \) the hail storms are quite scattered through each year. For this case, the hail storms might be considered independent of each other. In this instance, the series of annual frequencies of hail events are expected to follow the Poisson distribution of rare events. On the other hand, if the mean hail frequency is near \( f_2 \), then it seems reasonable to assume that the successive hail storms may no longer be independent, and if one storm had hail, the next storm would be more likely to have hail as well. The introduction of dependence between successive storms leads in a special fashion to the negative binomial distribution [69]. Similarly, tornadoes tend to cluster within years and follow a Pólya process rather than a Poisson process in areas where frequency of the occurrence is high [70].

This observation led us to find out that \( R_i \) is in fact following the Pólya distribution. To be more precise, if two events occur with Poisson distribution and their expected values are very low, then it can be assumed that those events are happening independently. On the other hand, for Poisson events with high expected values (approximated as normal), the occurrence of the former event may increase the probability of the latter. In such cases, the overall distribution would be the Pólya distribution. Regarding the current problem, the events \( (Y_{i', \text{good}} < Y_{i', \text{bad'}}) \) and \( (Y_{i', \text{good}} < Y_{i', \text{bad'}}) \) are not independent. Therefore, they tend to follow the Pólya distribution. Since \( E(R_i) \) and \( V(R_i) \) are known from Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), the values \( p_i \) and \( r_i \) for attacking \( K[i] \) can be simply computed by

\[ p_i = \left(1 - \frac{E(R_i)}{V(R_i)}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad r_i = \left(\frac{E(R_i)^2}{V(R_i) - E(R_i)}\right) \]

As a proof of concept, we have sketched the probability distribution of \( R_i \) for 5000 packets. The corresponding parameters for the Pólya distribution are \( p = 0.9839 \) and \( r = 0.356 \) (see Fig. 7). As can be observed, those two distributions are extremely close. Also,

\[ u_i \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[R_i \leq p_i - 1] = 1 - I_{p_i}(p_i, r_i) \]

where \( I \) is the regularized incomplete beta function. Overall, the success probability is

\[ u = u_{15} \prod_{i=3}^{i_{\text{max}}} u_i \]

27
and the complexity is

\[ c = c_{15} + \rho_{15} \left( c_3 + \rho_3 \left( c_4 + \rho_4 \left( \cdots c_{i_{\text{max}}} + \rho_{i_{\text{max}}} N^{14-i_{\text{max}}} \cdots \right) \right) \right) \]

To be able to compare our results with the state of the art, we set \( u = 50\% \). To approximate the optimal choice of \( \rho \)'s, let \( i_{\text{max}} = 14 \). We have to deal with the following optimization problem:

\[
\text{Minimize } c \text{ in terms of the } \rho_i \text{'s, with the constraint that } u = \prod_{i=3}^{15} (1 - I_p(\rho_i, r_i)) = \frac{1}{2}.
\]

To solve this optimization problem, we deploy three distinct approaches:

- To obtain the probability of 50\%, we let the probabilities \( u_i \)'s be equal for all \( i \in \{3, \ldots, 15\} \). Hence, we set

\[
(1 - I_p(\rho_i, r_i)) = 2^{\left( \frac{1}{i_{\text{max}}} - 1 \right)} = 0.9481
\]

and we find the corresponding \( \rho_i \)'s. This approach does not yield the optimal solution, but at least it gives a benchmark on what we should expect.

- Another approach is to use Lagrange multipliers to find the optimal solution. We used the \texttt{fmincon} function in Matlab with Sequential Quadratic Programming [48] (SQP) algorithm as the default algorithm to compute the local minimum. This algorithm was very fast and stable compared to the Genetic algorithm which is explained next. Since this algorithm needs a starting point \( x_0 \) for its computations, we used the \texttt{GlobalSearch} class which iterates \texttt{fmincon} function multiple times using random vectors for \( x_0 \). Simultaneously, it checks how the results merge towards the global minimum. The drawback of any Lagrange multiplier approach is that the algorithm should be fed with a continuous objective function. This is because it has to compute derivatives. Since we need integer values for \( \rho_i \)'s in practice, we had to relax the outputs by the \texttt{ceil} function to round up the \( \rho_i \)'s found by this approach. Therefore, it does not guarantee that the optimal solution is found, but it finds a complexity very close to the optimal. As our experiments revealed, this algorithm most often sets \( \rho_{14} = N \). So, using this approach, \( i_{\text{max}} = 13 \) and we do not often need to vote for \( R[14] \).
– The last approach is to find an algorithm which can handle discrete functions, i.e., it accepts integers as input. One option is to use the Genetic algorithms. We used the `ga` function in Matlab for this purpose. Since these algorithms are evolutionary, the drawback is that with the same parameters, each run outputs different results. So, we have to run the algorithm multiple times and pick the best solution. The other drawback is that it finds a local minimum and does not guarantee to find the global optima. As can be observed in Fig. 8, this method is not as stable as the other approaches, plus the experiment time is much longer than the other methods. To obtain a stable result, the parameters of the Genetic algorithm should be set carefully. This approach often yields a high value for $p_{15}$, but it is often less than $N$.

Moreover, using the empirical distribution of $R_i$’s and by deploying the Genetic algorithm approach, we computed the experimental curve for the complexity. We have depicted the result of all these three approaches in Fig. 8.

![Fig. 8. Theoretical and experimental logarithmic complexity in terms of the data complexity for breaking a WEP key with probability at least 50% with respect to three distinct optimization approaches: the Benchmark approach, the Global optimization technique and the Genetic algorithm technique.](image)

We call the optimized key ranking attack on RC4, “Tornado Attack”, since $R_i$’s follow exactly the same distribution as tornadoes occurrences.

Recovering $\bar{K}[15]$ is a crucial step in the WPA and WEP attacks. We compare the theoretical and experimental success probability of recovering $\bar{K}[15]$ as the first element in the sorted list. In [62], it is assumed that $Y_x^{\text{good}} - Y_i$ is independent for all bad $i$’s and was deduced that the good $x$ had a top $Y_x$ with probability $(1 - \varphi(-\lambda))^{N-1}$. Running some experiments, we observed different results which invalidate this model. Fig. 9 represents this success probability with respect to the number of packets, theoretically and experimentally. Since we already know that the distribution of the rank is the Pólya distribution, we obtain

\[
\Pr[R_{15} = 0] = (1 - p_{15})^{15}
\]

The difference between these two curves are coming from the dependency between the biases. In all our analysis, we assumed that the biases are independent, which may not be the case for some cases in practice. This difference can be observed in Fig. 9.
For the attack on WEP and WPA, we used the biases up to $\bar{K}[34]$. for any $i > 34$, the probabilities are getting very close to the uniform distribution. It can still improve the overall success rate of the attack, but this improvement is not significant and it further increases the computational cost of the attack. The IVs are picked pseudo-randomly using SNOW 2.0 stream cipher [11].

![Graph showing success probability vs. number of packets for Experiment and Theory]

**Fig. 9.** The success probability of recovering $\bar{K}[15]$ as the top element in the voted list in theory and practice.

### 7 Comparison with Aircrack-ng

Fig. 10 represents a comparison between Aircrack-ng and our new attack. We used an Intel Xeon Processor W5590 at 3.33Ghz with 8M Cache for the comparison. In the previous section, we computed the success probability and drew the curve for the case when $\bar{K}[15]$ is the top element in the sorted list. But for a comparison with Aircrack-ng, we let the attack run for maximum 5 seconds. If the key is not found in that time period, we assume that the attack fails. If we do not restrict the attack time frame, it runs for ever by going exhaustively over all elements in the sorted lists.

As can be observed, our passive attack outperforms Aircrack-ng running in active mode. This gives significant advantage to the attacker, since for some network cards, the driver has to be patched so that the network card can inject packets, and in some cases such patch is not available at all. Moreover, the active attacks are detectable by intrusion detection systems. Similarly, passive attacks can be performed from a large distance. Moreover, the TCP/IPv4 packets can be captured with much higher rate than ARP packets. As a rule of thumb, in a high traffic network, (for instance the user is downloading a movie), if we consider TCP/IPv4 packets with maximum size around 1500 bytes, in a 20 Mbit/sec wireless network, it takes almost 10 seconds to capture 22500 packets. This amount is already enough to find a key with our improved Aircrack-ng in less than 5 seconds.

### 8 Challenges and Open Problems

WEP key recovery process is harder in practice than in theory. This is because the biases in RC4 are not independent, and several bytes of the keystream are unknown in ARP and TCP/IP packets. Therefore, the theoretical analysis is
more complex if the dependencies are considered. Also, some bytes of the keystream have to be guessed, and the proportion of TCP/IP packets to ARP packets is distinct for every network and attack (passive vs. active). The a priori probability of guessing those bytes correctly can not be precisely determined, and we had to leverage some heuristics to deal with this problem; since this proportion also depends on the traffic itself, finding the $\rho$ which is optimized for every network is not feasible. We leveraged some heuristics to set the $\rho$ to obtain a high success rate in practice. Moreover, the Aircrack-ng is not an interactive software. The interaction with the user may allow to tweak the $\rho$ and/or wait for more packets to capture. This trade-off should also be considered in real life applications.

The Algorithm described in Section 6 is recursive. This recursion is very expensive in practice, since with a wrong guess on a key byte, all the subsequent key bytes with higher indices are recovered incorrectly (in theory), so we need to recompute the vote for each of them again. In practice, we observed that a wrong guess of a key byte does not influence the subsequent key bytes recovery significantly. For instance, even with a wrong guess on $\bar{K}[3]$, in many cases, we could still recover all the subsequent bytes correctly. This is because a wrong guess for $\bar{K}[3]$ mandates only 16 wrong swaps out of 256 iterations of the KSA. A further improvement to our work can be to adjust our theory to consider such cases. Hence, in our implementation, we perform a recursive attack to only find the best key candidate, and if it turns out to be a wrong key, we then use the pre-computed voted list to perform an exhaustive search, with no re-voting.

8.1 A Sequential Distinguisher Approach

Previously, we were always assuming that a fixed number of packets is given to the adversary and his goal was to maximize the success probability. Changing the perspective, one can look at the problem as fixing the success probability and searching for the minimum average number of packets to gain that probability. This idea was initially used by Davies and Murphy [45] to decrease the complexity of their attack against DES. With this type of model in mind, the notion of $n_{\text{max}}$-limited generic sequential non-adaptive distinguisher was defined by Junod in [27], where $n_{\text{max}}$ is an upper bound for the allowed number of packets in that context. We use the notion of sequential distinguishers for key recovery.

Mapping the definition of an $n_{\text{max}}$-limited generic sequential non-adaptive distinguisher in [27] to our attack, the new attack works as follows: The attacker eavesdrops a small number of packets from the channel and then runs an
attack similar to the one described in the previous section. If it fails, then he waits for more packets to come and runs the attack again. This procedure is iterated again and again. The attacker stops in case he finds the correct key or the threshold \( n_{\text{max}} \) number of packets is reached. If the former occurs, it outputs 1 (success), otherwise it outputs 0 (failure). This attack mode was already used in Aircrack-ng and also in [4]. It is referred to as the “interactive mode”. This approach turns out to be more efficient in terms of the average number of packets compared to the other types of distinguishers. In fact, Siegmund [63] has proved the following theorem (see [27] for details).

**Theorem 9.** For a simple hypothesis testing against a simple alternative with independent, identically distributed observations, a sequential probability ratio test is optimal in the sense of minimizing the expected number of samples among all tests having no larger error probabilities.

Using this technique, we can decrease the average number of packets to reach the success probability of 50%. For instance, we can drop the data complexity of our fastest attack (i.e., with all \( \rho_i = 1 \)) in Fig. 8 from 27 500 to 22 500 packets in average using this approach to gain the success probability of 50%. We also give another example next to illustrate how the number of packets can be dropped using this technique.

As an example, using 23 000 packets and the attack from the previous section, we computed the almost optimized \( \rho_i \)'s derived from the Genetic algorithm approach in practice to gain the success probability of 50%. We set

\[
\begin{align*}
\rho_3 &= 2 \\
\rho_4 &= 1 \\
\rho_5 &= 1 \\
\rho_6 &= 2 \\
\rho_7 &= 2 \\
\rho_8 &= 1 \\
\rho_9 &= 2 \\
\rho_{10} &= 1 \\
\rho_{11} &= 1 \\
\rho_{12} &= 4 \\
\rho_{13} &= 2 \\
\rho_{14} &= 86 \\
\rho_{15} &= 1 
\end{align*}
\]

Next, we run the attack in the interactive mode with the above \( \rho_i \)'s for a lot of WEP keys and find the minimal value of \( n_{\text{max}} \) which yields 50% success rate. Our experiments showed that \( n_{\text{max}} = 22 000 \). Consequently, We run the same attack in the interactive mode with \( n_{\text{max}} = 22 000 \) for recovering different WEP keys \( K_i \) leading to some \( n_i \) to succeed. Then, we compute the statistical average of the number of packets \( n_i \) when it succeeds and \( n_{\text{max}} \) for the attacks which fail. The average number of packets we obtained in practice was 19 800 packets, which is much less than the case when we were fixing the number of packets and maximizing the success probability.

An open problem is to analyze the theoretical complexity of the sequential distinguisher approach described above and compare it with the experimental results. We leave this to future work.

9 Conclusion

We deployed a framework to handle pools of biases for RC4 which can be used to break the WPA protocol. In the case of the 8 weak bits of the TK, we have shown a simple distinguisher and a partial key recovery attack working with \( 2^{42} \) packets and a practical complexity. This can be used to improve the attack by Moen-Raddum-Hole [43] to mount a full temporary key recovery attack of complexity \( 2^{96} \) using \( 2^{12} \) packets. So far, this is the best temporal key recovery attack against WPA. In a future work, we plan to study further key recovery attacks to recover more pieces of the TK with a complexity lower than \( 2^{96} \).

We have shown that conditional biases are not very helpful for breaking WPA, but they really are against WEP. For WEP, we recover the secret key with the success rate of 50% by using 19 800 packets in less than a minute using a sequential distinguishing approach. The attack is still feasible with less number of packets, but it runs for a longer period.

References

A Classification of Biases

In this section, we classify the biases in RC4. We only report those which are exploitable against WEP and WPA. Most of the biases reported against RC4 in [61] are not exploitable, because they do not bind the secret key with the keystream. They often require extra bytes, which are unknown to the attacker. We elaborate each bias individually and extract the probability that it holds in our model. The list includes the improved version of the Klein attack in [73] (elaborated in Section 4.1) and the improved version of the Maitra-Paul attack in [34]. Furthermore, it includes an improved version of 19 biases by Korek [33,32] (A_u15 was elaborated in Section 4.2) and the 5V_10, the improved bias of Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux in [61]. All the probabilities are new. The path for each bias is described. Due to the similarity of several paths and for simplicity, in several cases we do not repeat the same formulas again and again. The reader should refer to Appendix B for the formulas to compute the success probability of each attack.

Korek is the nickname of a hacker who discovered 20 key recovery attacks similar to the FMS attack [14]. Korek classified them into three categories. The first group of attacks uses only \( z_1 \) and the state of the array \( S_{i-1} \) (i.e., \( K[0], K[1], \ldots, K[i-1] \)) of the KSA to recover the secret key \( K[i] \) (typically the FMS attack). The second class of attacks uses the second byte of the keystream \( z_2 \). Ultimately, the last one highlights the improbable secret key bytes. They are called negative attacks or impossible attacks. We only mention 19 such correlations, since the conditions of the attack \( A_u5\_4 \) are rarely satisfied in practice except for \( i = 6 \) when \( t = 2 \), in which its corresponding success probability is very close to 1/256.

A.1 The Maitra-Paul-Improved Attack

Maitra and Paul illustrated in [34] that the \( \Pr[z_{i+1} = j_i] \) is not uniformly distributed. We can use this bias to perform a key recovery attack on RC4 using Lemma 5. There was initially no condition on this bias, except that it does not hold for \( i = 1 \). Maitra and Paul observed this abnormality for \( i = 1 \) experimentally. We introduce some extra conditions which improve the success probability of this attack. In the following, we specify the assumptions in this attack and extract its success probability and prove that the bias does not hold for \( i = 1 \). Their bias is directly exploitable for \( t = 2 \). We generalize it to any \( t \).

- **Conditions:** \( i \neq 1, z_{i+1} \geq i \) and \( (\forall 0 \leq i' \leq t : j_{i'} \neq z_{i+1}) \)
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 11)
  - \( (\exists m > i \mid j_m = i) \)
  - \( j_i = S_{-1}[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{m-1}[i] = S_m[m] = \cdots = S_{i+1}'[m] \)
  - \( m = S_{-1}[m] = \cdots = S_{m-1}[m] = S_m[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}'[i] = S_i'[j_i] = S_{i+1}'[i+1] \)
  - \( S_i'[i+1] = S_{i+1}'[j_{i+1}] = 0 \)
- **Key recovery relation:** \( \vec{K}[i] = z_{i+1} - \sigma_i \)
- **Probability of success:** \( P_{MPT}(i,t) \) (see Appendix B)

Later, for the attack to work, an \( m \) should exist such that \( j_m = i \). Due to the assumptions, we also assume \( S_{-1}[m] \) and \( S_{i-1}[j_i] \) are maintained until \( S_{i-1} \). Hence, we compute

\[
\Pr[S_{-1}[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i], S_{-1}[m] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[m]] = P_A^2(i,0)
\]

Furthermore, \( j_i \geq i \) and \( m \geq i \), otherwise they would both be swapped in the \( i \)-th initial KSA state updates. Right now, we fix \( m \) and then we sum over it. Thus, we compute

\[
\Pr[j_i \geq i] = \left( \frac{N-i}{N} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[j_m = i] = \left( \frac{1}{N} \right)
\]

At the \( i \)-th stage of the KSA update, \( S_{i-1}[j_i] \) is moved to \( S_i[j_i] \). Due to the assumptions, \( S_{i-1}[m] \) is maintained until the next state update. So, we obtain \( S_i[m] = m \). This holds with probability

\[
\Pr[S_{i-1}[m] = S_i[m]] = P_A^4(i+1,i-1)
\]
At the next stage, due to the assumptions, $S_i[i]$ and $S_i[m]$ are maintained until $S_{m-1}$, so at $S_{m-1}$ we have $S_{m-1}[m] = m$ and $S_{m-1}[i] = j_i$. Thus, we compute
\[
Pr[S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{m-1}[i], S_i[m] = \cdots = S_{m-1}[m]] = P^2_A(m, i)
\]

Since $j_m = i$, at the next update, we gain $S_m[m] = j_i$ and $S_m[i] = m$. Due to the assumptions, these two bytes are maintained until $S'_{i-1}$. So, we compute
\[
Pr[S_m[i] = \cdots = S'_{i-1}[i], S_m[m] = \cdots = S'_{i-1}[m]] = P^2_A(N + i - 1, m)
\]

At the $i$-th step of the PRGA update, $S'_{i-1}[i]$ is moved to $S'_{i-1}[j_i]$ and due to the assumptions, we assume that the value of $S'_{i-1}[m]$ is maintained until the next step. At this stage, we have $S'_{i}[m] = j_i$ and $S'_{i}[j_i] = m$. We also have $S'_{i}[i + 1] = 0$ due to the assumptions. Thus, we compute
\[
Pr[S'_{i-1}[m] = S'[i][m]] = P_A(N + i, N + i - 2) \quad \text{and} \quad Pr[S'[i + 1][i + 1] = 0] = \left( \frac{1}{N} \right)
\]

Finally, at the $(i+1)$-th PRGA update, $S'_{i+1}[i + 1]$ is moved to $S'_{i+1}[j_i]$ and $S'_{i+1}[j_i]$ is moved to $S'_{i+1}[i + 1]$. Due to the assumptions, the value of $S'_{i}[m]$ is maintained until $S'_{i+1}$. Ultimately, we compute
\[
Pr[S'_{i}[m] = S'_{i+1}[m]] = P^1_A(N + i + 1, N + i - 1)
\]

We also know that
1. $z_{i+1} = S'_{i+1}[S'_{i}[i + 1] + S'_{i}[j_i + 1]]$
2. $j'_{i+1} = j'_{j_i} + S'_{i}[i + 1] = j_i$
3. $S'_{i}[j_i + 1] = S'_{i}[j_i] = S_{i-1}[i] = S_m[i] = S_m[j_m] = S_{m-1}[m] = m$

Hence,
\[
z_{i+1} = S'_{i+1}[m] = S_m[m] = S_m[i] = S_{i-1}[j_i] = j_i
\]

So overall using Lemma 2 and Corollary 3, we obtain
\[
P_{\text{MPI}}(i, t) = Pr[K[i] = z_{i+1} - \sigma_i] = P_B \otimes P_D = P_D(i)P_B(i, t) + \frac{1}{N-1} (1 - P_D(i))(1 - P_B(i, t))
\]

where
\[
P_D(i) = Pr[z_{i+1} = j_i] = \sum_{m=1}^{N-1} \left( \frac{1}{N} \right)^2 \left( \frac{N-i}{N} \right) \cdot P^2_A(i, 0) \cdot P^2_A(i, i-1) \cdot P^2_A(m, i) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} (N-i-1)(N-i) \left( \frac{N-i}{N} \right)^{N-3+i} \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^3
\]

We introduced some extra conditions for this attack to work. Clearly, $S_{j_i-1}[j_i] = j_i$ implies that $j_i \geq i$ and $\forall i' < i : j_{i'} \neq j_i$. So, we can have a better probability with conditions $z_{i+1} \geq i$ and $\forall i' \leq t : j_{i'} \neq z_{i+1}$.

This bias does not hold when $i = 1$. This is because, at the first iteration of the PRGA, we have $i = 1$ and $j'_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = m$. Then, we swap $S_{N-1}[1]$ and $S_{N-1}[m]$. Thus, we have $S'_1[1] = j_i$ and $S'_1[m] = m$. At the next iteration, $i = 2$ and $j'_2 = m + S'_1[2] = m$, so we swap $S'_2[2]$ and $S'_1[m]$. Finally, $z_2$ is computed as $z_2 = S'_2[S'_2[2] + S'_2[m]] = S'_2[m] = 0$. As a result, $z_2 \neq j_i$. The value $S[m]$ should be maintained during all steps of the KSA and the PRGA, while if $i = 1$, it would be swapped in the first stage.
Fig. 11. RC4 state update in the Maitra-Paul-Improved attack
A.2 The A\textsubscript{s5}1 Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_t[1] < t + 1, S_t[1] + S_t[S_t[1]] = i, z_1 \neq \{ S_t[1], S_t[S_t[1]] \} \) and \( S_t^{-1}[z_1] < t + 1 \) or \( S_t^{-1}[z_1] > i - 1 \)

- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 12)
  - \( S_t[1] = \cdots = S_{t-1}[1] = z_1 = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = \alpha \)
  - \( S_t[\alpha] = \cdots = S_{t-1}[\alpha] = z_1 = \cdots = S_{N-1}[\alpha] = \beta \)
  - \( S_t[j_i] = \cdots = S_{t-1}[j_i] = S_t[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] \)

- **Key recovery relation:** \( K[i] = S_t^{-1}[z_1] - \sigma_i \)

- **Probability of success:** \( K\sigma_t^2(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

This attack is the generalization of the FMS attack. The attack works as follows: Assume \( S_t[1] = \alpha, S_t[\alpha] = \beta \) and also assume \( \alpha + \beta = i \) by the conditions. Then, assume these two values are maintained at the same position until the state \( S_{t-1} \) and then until the state \( S_{N-1} \). Another assumption we make is that \( S_t[i] \) is maintained until the state \( S_{N-1} \). At the first iteration of the PRGA, \( i = 1 \) and \( j' = S_{N-1}[1] = \alpha \). Then, a swap is made between \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[\alpha] \). Finally, we have \( z_1 = S'_t[S'_t[1] + S'_t[\alpha]] = S'_t[\alpha + \beta] = S'_t[i] = S_t[i] = S_{t-1}[j_i] = S_t[j_i] \). Hence, we obtain \( z_1 = S_t[j_i] \) and so \( j_i = S_t^{-1}[z_1] \). Since we also have \( K[i] = j_i - \sigma_i(t) \), we conclude from the previous equation that \( K[i] = S_t^{-1}[z_1] - \sigma_i \). The last condition on \( z_1 \) in the list of conditions are for filtering out some incorrect events leading to the same results. This makes the success probability and the key recovery more precise. The condition \( \{ S_t[1], S_t^{-1}[z_1] \} < t + 1 \) is to make \( \{ \alpha, j_i \} < t + 1 \), therefore it is not trivially swapped during the KSA iterations. We also should make sure that \( z_1 \neq \{ \alpha, \beta \} \), so we end up with 3 elements in the state that have not moved. Thus, we need the condition \( z_1 \neq \{ S_t[1], S_t[S_t[1]] \} \).

![Fig. 12. RC4 state update in the A\textsubscript{s5}1 attack](image)

A.3 The A\textsubscript{s13} Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_t[1] = i, (S_t^{-1}[0] < t + 1 \) or \( S_t^{-1}[0] > i - 1 \)) and \( z_1 = i \)
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 13)
  - \( S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = i \)
  - \( S_i[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] = 0 \)
- **Key recovery relation:** \( \bar{K}[i] = S_t^{-1}[0] - \sigma_i \)
- **Probability of success:** \( \text{Kor}^2_t(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

In this attack, a nice event happens in the PRGA which automatically makes \( S'_t[1] = 0 \). Assume that \( S_{N-1}[i] = \gamma \), then we explain that \( \gamma = 0 \). An the first step of the PRGA, \( i = 1 \) and \( j'_i = S_{N-1}[1] = i \), so we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[i] \). To compute \( z_1 \), we have \( z_1 = S'_t[S'_t[1] + S'_t[i]] = S'_t[\gamma + i] = i \), since from the conditions we have \( z_1 = i \). This makes us conclude that \( \gamma = 0 \). We already know from the relations in the KSA that \( S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] \) and we assume that \( S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[j_i] \) and also \( S_{i-1}[j_i] = 0 \). Thus, \( S_i[j_i] = 0 \). Then, we obtain \( j_i = S_t^{-1}[0] \). Using the similar formulas as the previous attacks, we get \( \bar{K}[i] = S_t^{-1}[0] - \sigma_i \).

![Fig. 13. RC4 state update in the A_u13 attack](image)

### A.4 The A_u13_1 Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_i[1] = i \), \( (S_t^{-1}[1] - i) < t + 1 \) or \( S_t^{-1}[1] - i > i - 1 \) and \( z_1 = 1 - i \)
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 14)
  - \( S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = i \)
  - \( S_i[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] = 1 - i \)
- **Key recovery relation:** \( \bar{K}[i] = S_t^{-1}[z_1] - \sigma_i \)
- **Probability of success:** \( \text{Kor}^2_t(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

At the first step of the PRGA, \( i = 1 \) and \( j'_i = S_{N-1}[1] = i \), so we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[i] \). To compute \( z_1 \), we have \( z_1 = S'_1[S'_1[1] + S'_1[i]] = S'_1[1] = 1 - i \). We already know from the relations in the KSA that \( S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] \) and we assume that \( S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[j_i] \) and also \( S_{i-1}[j_i] = 1 - i \). Thus, \( S_i[j_i] = 1 - i \). Then, we obtain \( j_i = S_t^{-1}[1 - i] \). Using the similar formulas as the previous attacks, we get \( \bar{K}[i] = S_t^{-1}[z_1] - \sigma_i \).
A.5 The A_u5_1 Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_i[1] = i, S_{i-1}[z_1] < t + 1, S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] \neq 1 \), \( (S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] < t + 1 \) or \( S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] > i - 1 \), \( z_1 \neq \{i, 1 - i, S_{i-1}[z_1] - i\} \) and \( S_t^{-1}[z_1] \neq 2i \)

- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 15)
  
  - \( S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = i \)
  
  - Assuming \( S_t^{-1}[z_1] = \alpha \), we should have \( S_i[\alpha] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[\alpha] = S_i[\alpha] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[\alpha] = z_1 \).
  
  - \( S_i[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] = S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i \)

- **Key recovery relation:** \( \tilde{K}[i] = S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] - \sigma_i \)

- **Probability of success:** \( K_2(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

At the first stage of the PRGA, we have \( i = 1 \) and \( j_i = S_{N-1}[1] = i \). So we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[i] \). We know that \( S_i[i] = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i \) and also \( j_i = S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] \). The output \( z_1 \) would be \( z_1 = S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] \). Therefore, we have \( \tilde{K}[i] = S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] - \sigma_i \). The condition \( z_1 \neq \{i, 1 - i\} \) is to filter out the attacks A_u13_1 and A_s13. \( S_t^{-1}[z_1] < t + 1 \), because otherwise \( z_1 \) would be swapped in the next iterations of the KSA. If \( S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] = 1 \), then \( j_i = 1 \) and so a swap will be made between \( S_{i-1}[1] \) and \( S_{i-1}[i] \) in the \( i \)-th step of the KSA.

A.6 The A_u5_2 Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_i[i] = 1 \) and \( z_1 = S_i[2] \)

- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 16)
  
  - \( S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[i] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = 1 \)
  
  - \( S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2] = z_1 \)
  
  - \( j_i = 1 \)
Fig. 15. RC4 state update in the $A_{u5\_1}$ attack

- **Key recovery relation:** $\bar{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i$
- **Probability of success:** $P_{\text{u5}}^2(i,t)$ (see Appendix B)

This is one of the attacks which we assume $j_i = 1$. In the PRGA, $i = 1$ initially and $j'_{i} = S_{N-1}[1] = 1$. In the swap step, no swap is made since we have to swap $S_{N-1}[1]$ and $S_{N-1}[1]$. Hence, $z_1 = S'_i[1] + S_1[1] = S'_i[2] = S_i[2]$. Finally, the key recovery formula becomes $\bar{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i$.

We classify the conditions as

$$C_1 : S_i[i] = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad C_2 : z_1 = S_i[2]$$

We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as

$$S_1 : S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[i]$$
$$S_2 : S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1]$$
$$S_3 : S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2]$$
$$S_4 : \bar{K}[i] = j_i - \sigma_i$$
$$E_1 : j_i = 1$$
$$B : \bar{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i$$

Now, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate $\Pr[B|C_1, C_2]$. Deploying a similar approach to the one of the attack $A_{u15}$, we end up with

$$\Pr[B|C_1, C_2] = \Pr[E_1|C] \cdot \left( \frac{N P_B(i,t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_B(i,t)}{N - 1} \right)$$

where

$$\Pr[E_1|C] \approx \Pr(C_1 S_1 S_2 S_3 E_1 C_2) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_A^2(i,t) \cdot \left( \frac{N - 2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \right)$$
We classify the conditions as $KSA$ and $A$. The $A$ of the keystream output is given by (Theorem Lemma 10. Deploying the above lemma, we obtain

\[
Pr[\sigma_1 = \bar{K}[2] + 3] = \frac{1}{N} \left[ \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) + \frac{1}{N^2} + 1 \right]
\]

Deploying the above lemma, we obtain

\[
Pr[C_1S_1S_2S_3|E_1C_2] = \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right)^{t-2} \cdot \frac{N}{\xi} \cdot \frac{1}{N} \cdot \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \cdot P^2_A(i,t)
\]

Therefore, overall we have

\[
Pr[B|C_1C_2] = \frac{1}{N} \left( \frac{NP_B(i,t) - 1}{N-1} \right)
\]

\[
\cdot \left[ \frac{1}{\xi} \cdot P^2_A(i,t) \left( \frac{N}{N-1} \right)^{t-2} \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} + \left( 1 - P^2_A(i,t) \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right) \right]
\]

\[
\cdot \left( 1 - \frac{P_B(i,t)}{N-1} \right)
\]

A.7 The $A_u13.2$ Attack

- **Conditions**: $S_i[i] = i$, $S_i[1] = 0$ and $\sigma_1 = i$
- **Assumptions**: (see Fig. 17)
  - $S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] = 0$
  - $S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[i] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = i$
  - $j_i = 1$
- **Key recovery relation**: $\bar{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i$
- **Probability of success**: $P^2_B(i,t)$ (see Appendix B)

This attack is very similar to the previous attack. Again, we assume $j_i = 1$. In the KSA, we know that $S_{i-1}[1] = 0$ and $S_{i-1}[i] = i$. At the $i$-th stage, due to the swap we have $S_i[1] = i$ and $S_i[i] = 0$. We assume these two values are maintained until the end of the KSA. In the PRGA, initially $i = 1$ and $j_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = i$. So, we swap $S_{N-1}[1]$ and $S_{N-1}[i]$. Then, $\sigma_1 = S_i'[S_i'[1] + S_i'[i]] = i$. Hence, the key recovery formula would be $\bar{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i$.

We classify the conditions as

- $C_1 : S_i[i] = i$ and $C_2 : S_i[1] = 0$ and $C_3 : \sigma_1 = i$
We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as

\[
\begin{align*}
S_1 &: S_t[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[i] \\
S_2 &: S_t[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] \\
S_3 &: S_t[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] \\
S_4 &: S_t[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] \\
S_5 &: \bar{K}[i] = j_i - \sigma_i \\
E_1 &: j_i = 1 \\
B &: \bar{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i,
\end{align*}
\]

Now, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate \(\Pr[B|C_1, C_2, C_3]\). Deploying a similar approach to the one of the attack \(A_{u15}\), we end up with

\[
Pr[B|C_1, C_2, C_3] = Pr(E_1|C) \cdot \left( \frac{NP_B(i,t) - 1}{N-1} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_B(i,t)}{N-1} \right)
\]

where

\[
Pr[E_1|C] = Pr(C_1C_2S_1S_2S_3S_4|E_1C_3) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P^2_A(i,t) \cdot \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \right)
\]

\[
Pr[C_1C_2S_1S_2S_3S_4|E_1C_3] = \frac{Pr[C_1C_2S_1S_2S_3S_4|E_1C_3]}{Pr[E_1|C_3]} \\
= Pr[C_3|C_1C_2S_1S_2S_3S_4E_1] \cdot \frac{Pr[C_1C_2S_1S_2S_3S_4E_1]}{Pr[C_3]} \cdot Pr[E_1|C_3] \\
= \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{i+1} \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \cdot P^2_A(i,t)
\]

Fig. 16. RC4 state update in the \(A_{u5,2}\) attack
\( \Pr[C_3] \) is uniformly distributed in this case and we also have
\[
\Pr[S_i[i] = i] = \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{i+1}
\]
Therefore, overall we have
\[
\Pr[B | C_1 C_2 C_3] = \left( \frac{NP_B(i, t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot \left[ \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{i+1} \left( \frac{N - 2}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right] \cdot P_A^2(i, t) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_A^2(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \right) + \left( 1 - P_B(i, t) \right)
\]

Fig. 17. RC4 state update in the Au13.2 attack

A.8 The Au13.3 Attack
- **Conditions:** \( S_i[i] = i, S_i[1] = 1 - i \) and \( z_1 = 1 - i \)
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 18)
  - \( S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] = 1 - i \)
  - \( S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[i] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = i \)
  - \( j_i = 1 \)
- **Key recovery relation:** \( \bar{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i \)
- **Probability of success:** \( P_u^3(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)
This attack is going through exactly the same approach as the previous attack, but with different values. Again, we assume \( j_i = 1 \). In the KSA, we know that \( S_{i-1}[1] = 1 - i \) and \( S_{i-1}[i] = i \). At the \( i \)-th stage, due to swap we have \( S_i[1] = i \) and \( S_i[i] = 1 - i \). We assume these two values are maintained until the end of the KSA. In the PRGA, \( i = 1 \) and \( j'_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = i \). So, we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[i] \). Then, \( z_1 = S'_1[S'_1[1] + S'_1[i]] = S'_1[1] = 1 - i \). Hence, the key recovery formula would be \( K[i] = 1 - \sigma_i \).

We classify the conditions as
\[
C_1 : S_i[i] = i \quad \text{and} \quad C_2 : S_i[1] = 1 - i \quad \text{and} \quad C_3 : z_1 = 1 - i
\]

We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as
\[
\begin{align*}
S_1 : S_i[i] &= \cdots = S_{i-1}[i] \\
S_2 : S_i[1] &= \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] \\
S_3 : S_i[1] &= \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] \\
S_4 : S_i[i] &= \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] \\
S_5 : K[i] &= j_i - \sigma_i \\
E_1 : j_i &= 1 \\
B : K[i] &= 1 - \sigma_i
\end{align*}
\]

Now, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate \( \Pr[B|C_1, C_2, C_3] \). Deploying a similar approach to the one of the attack A2u15, we end up with
\[
\Pr[B|C_1, C_2, C_3] = \Pr(E_1|C) \cdot \left( \frac{NP_B(i, t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) + \left( 1 - \frac{P_B(i, t)}{N} \right)
\]

where
\[
\Pr[E_1|C] = \Pr(C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4|E_1 C_3) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - \frac{P_A^2(i, t)}{N} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{N - 2}{N} \right)^{N-1-i}
\]
\[
\Pr_{C_3} C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4|E_1 C_3 = \frac{\Pr[C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 E_1 C_3]}{\Pr[E_1|C]} = \frac{\Pr[C_3 C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 E_1]}{\Pr[C_3] \cdot \Pr[E_1|C]} = \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{t+1} \left( \frac{N - 2}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \cdot \frac{P_A^2(i, t)}{N}
\]

\( \Pr[C_3] \) is uniformly distributed in this case and we also have
\[
\Pr[S_i[i] = i] = \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{t+1}
\]

Therefore, overall we have
\[
\Pr[B|C_1 C_2 C_3] = \left( \frac{NP_B(i, t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{t+1} \left( \frac{N - 2}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \cdot \frac{P_A^2(i, t)}{N} + \left( 1 - \frac{P_B(i, t)}{N} \right)
\]

45
A.9 The A_u5_3 Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_t[i] = i, S_r^{-1}[z_1] \neq 1, S_r^{-1}[z_1] < t + 1 \) and \( z_1 = S_t[S_t[1] + i] \)
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 19)
  - \( S_t[1] = \cdots = S_{t-1}[1] = S_t[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] = S_r^{-1}[z_1] - i \)
  - \( S_r[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[i] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = i \)
  - \( S_r^{-1}[z_1] = \cdots = S_{r-1}[z_1] = S_r^{-1}[z_1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}^{-1}[z_1] \)
  - \( j_i = 1 \)
- **Key recovery relation:** \( \tilde{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i \)
- **Probability of success:** \( P_u^5(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

This attack is the extension of the A_u13_2 and the A_u13_3 attacks. Again, we assume \( j_i = 1 \). In the KSA, we know that \( S_{i-1}[1] = S_r^{-1}[z_1] - i \) and \( S_{i-1}[i] = i \). At the \( i \)-th stage, due to the swap we have \( S_i[1] = i \) and \( S_i[i] = S_r^{-1}[z_1] - i \). We assume these two values and \( S_r^{-1}[z_1] \) are maintained until the end of the KSA. Now in the PRGA, initially \( i = 1 \) and \( j'_i = S_{N-1}[1] = i \). So, we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[i] \). Then, \( z_1 = S'_t[S'_t[1] + S'_t[i]] = S'_t[S_r^{-1}[z_1] - i + i] = z_1 \). Hence, the key recovery formula would be \( \tilde{K}[i] = 1 - \sigma_i \). The condition \( S_r^{-1}[z_1] \neq 1 \) is to filter the attack A_u13_3.

We classify the conditions as

\[
C_1 : S_t[i] = i \quad \text{and} \quad C_2 : S_r^{-1}[z_1] \neq 1, S_r^{-1}[z_1] < t + 1 \quad \text{and} \quad C_3 : z_1 = S_t[S_t[1] + i]
\]

We also classify the assumptions and the events and the key recovery bias as

Fig. 18. RC4 state update in the A_u13_3 attack
We then approximate 
\[ S_1 : S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[i] \]
\[ S_2 : S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] \]
\[ S_3 : S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] \]
\[ S_6 : S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] \]
\[ S_5 : S_i^{-1}[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] \]
\[ S_6 : R[i] = j_i - \sigma_i \]
\[ E_1 : j_i = 1 \]
\[ B : R[i] = 1 - \sigma_i \]

Now, we compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate \( \Pr[B|C_1, C_2, C_3] \). So, we compute

\[
\Pr[B|C_1, C_2, C_3] = \Pr[E_1 S_6|C] + \Pr[B\neg S_3|C] \\
= \Pr[E_1|S_6] \cdot \Pr[S_6|C] + \Pr[B|\neg S_6|C] \cdot (1 - \Pr[S_6|C]) \\
\approx \Pr[E_1|S_6] \cdot \Pr[S_6|C] + \left( \frac{1 - \Pr[E_1|S_6|C]}{N-1} \right) \cdot (1 - \Pr[S_6|C]) \\
= \Pr[E_1|S_6] \cdot \left( \frac{\Pr[S_6|C]}{N-1} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - \Pr[E_1|S_6|C]}{N-1} \right)
\]

We then approximate \( \Pr[S_6|C] \approx P_B(i,t) \) and we also have

\[
\Pr[E_1|S_6|C] \approx \Pr(E_1|C) \\
= \Pr(C_1 C_2|E_1 C_3) \left( \frac{\Pr(E_1|C_3)}{\Pr(C_1 C_2|C_3)} \right) \\
\approx \Pr(C_1 C_2|E_1 C_3) \\
= \Pr(C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5|E_1 C_3) + \Pr(C_1 C_2 \neg(S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5)|E_1 C_3) \\
\approx \Pr(C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5|E_1 C_3) + \frac{1}{N} (1 - \Pr(S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5|E_1 C_3)) \\
\approx \Pr(C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5|E_1 C_3) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_B(i,t) \cdot \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \right)
\]

\[
\Pr[C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5|E_1 C_3] = \left( \frac{\Pr[C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 E_1|C_3]}{\Pr[E_1|C_3]} \right) \\
= \Pr[C_3|C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 E_1] \cdot \left( \frac{\Pr[C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 E_1]}{\Pr[C_3] \cdot \Pr[E_1|C_3]} \right)
\]

\[
\Pr[B|C_1, C_2, C_3] = \Pr(E_1|S_6|C) \cdot \left( \frac{N P_B(i,t) - 1}{N-1} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_B(i,t)}{N-1} \right)
\]

where

\[
\Pr[E_1|S_6|C] \approx \Pr(C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5|E_1 C_3) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_B(i,t) \cdot \left( \frac{N-3}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \right)
\]

\[
\Pr[C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5|E_1 C_3] = \left( \frac{\Pr[C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 E_1|C_3]}{\Pr[E_1|C_3]} \right) \\
= \Pr[C_3|C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 E_1] \cdot \left( \frac{\Pr[C_1 C_2 S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 E_1]}{\Pr[C_3] \cdot \Pr[E_1|C_3]} \right)
\]

\( \Pr[C_3] \) is uniformly distributed in this case and we also have

\[
\Pr[S_i[i] = i] = \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{i+1}
\]
Finally,

\[
\Pr[E_1|C_3] = \Pr[C_3|E_1] \left( \frac{\Pr[E_1]}{\Pr[C_3]} \right) = \Pr[C_3|E_1]
\]

\[
= \Pr[C_3|E_1C_1C_2] \cdot \Pr[C_1C_2|E_1] + \Pr[C_3|E_1C_1C_2] \cdot \Pr[C_1C_2|E_1]
\]

\[
= \Pr[C_1C_2|E_1] + \frac{1}{N} (1 - \Pr[C_1C_2|E_1])
\]

\[
= \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \Pr[C_1C_2|E_1] + \frac{1}{N}
\]

This leads to

\[
\Pr[C_1C_2S_1S_2S_3S_4S_5|E_1C_3] = \frac{(\frac{N-1}{N})^{t+1} \left( \frac{1}{N} \right) \left( \frac{N-3}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} P_3^3(i,t)}{\left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{t+1} \left( \frac{1}{N} \right)} + \frac{1}{N}
\]

Therefore, overall we have

\[
\Pr[B|C_1C_2C_3] = \left( \frac{NP_B(i,t) - 1}{N - 1} \right)
\]

\[
\cdot \left[ \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{t+1} \left( \frac{1}{N} \right) \left( \frac{N-3}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right] \cdot P_3^3(i,t) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_3^3(i,t) \left( \frac{N-3}{N} \right)^{N-1} \right)
\]

\[
+ \left( 1 - P_B(i,t) \right) \frac{N - 1}{N - 1}
\]

Fig. 19. RC4 state update in the A_u5_3 attack
A.10 The A_s3 Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_i[1] \neq 2, S_i[2] \neq 0, S_i[2] + S_i[1] < t + 1, S_i[2] + S_i[S_i[2] + S_i[1]] = i, S_i^{-1}[z_2] \neq \{1, 2, S_i[1] + S_i[2]\}, S_i[1] + S_i[2] \neq \{1, 2\} \) and \((S_i^{-1}[z_2] < t + 1 \text{ or } S_i^{-1}[z_2] > i - 1)\)

- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 20)
  - \( S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] \)
  - \( S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[2] = S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2] \)
  - \( S_i[S_i[1] + S_i[2]] = \cdots = S_i[S_{i-1}[1] + S_{i-1}[2]] = S_i[S_i[1] + S_i[2]] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[S_{N-1}[1] + S_{N-1}[2]] \)
  - \( S_i[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] = z_2 \)

- **Key recovery relation:** \( K[i] = S_i^{-1}[z_2] - \sigma_i \)

- **Probability of success:** \( \text{Kor}_3^\gamma(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

In the PRGA, at the first iteration \( i = 1 \) and \( j'_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = \alpha \), then we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[\alpha] \). Assume that \( S'_1[2] = \beta \). At the next stage, \( i = 2 \) and \( j'_2 = S'_1[2] + \alpha = \alpha + \beta \). Then, swap \( S'_1[2] = \beta \) and \( S'_1[\alpha + \beta] \). By one of the conditions, we have \( S_i[2] + S_i[S_i[2] + S_i[1]] = i \). Therefore, we can write \( \beta + \alpha + \beta = i \). \( S_i[\alpha + \beta] = i - \beta \). By the KSA, we have \( S_i[i] = S_{i-1}[j_i] \) and \( j_i = S_i^{-1}[z_2] \), so \( S_i[i] = z_2 \). If we look at how \( z_2 \) is generated, we have \( z_2 = S'_2[S'_2[i] + S'_2[j'_2]] = S'_2[S'_2[i] + S'_2[\alpha + \beta]] = S'_2[i - \beta + \beta] = S'_2[i] = S_i[i] = z_2 \). Using the same formulas as the previous attacks we get \( K[i] = S_i^{-1}[z_2] - \sigma_i \). The condition \( S_i[1] \neq 2 \) prevents the value of \( S_i[2] \) to be swapped in the first iteration of the PRGA. The condition \( S_i[2] \neq 0 \) prevents \( z_2 \) to be something except \( S_i[i] \), otherwise \( z_2 = i - \beta \). The condition \( S_i[1] + S_i[2] < t + 1 \) makes its value not to be swapped in the next iterations of the KSA. We do not want the index of \( z_2 \) to be 1,2 nor \( S_i[1] + S_i[2] \), because then these values would modified. So, we need to have \( S_i^{-1}[z_2] \neq \{1, 2, S_i[1] + S_i[2]\} \).

**Fig. 20.** RC4 state update in the A_s3 attack
A.11 The A_s5.2 Attack

- **Conditions:** $S_t[2] + S_t[1] = i, S_t^{-1}[S_t[1] - S_t[2]] \neq \{1, 2\}, (S_t^{-1}[S_t[1] - S_t[2]] < t + 1$ or $S_t^{-1}[S_t[1] - S_t[2]] > i - 1$) and $z_2 = S_t[1]$
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 21)
  - $S_t[1] = \cdots = S_{t-1}[1] = S_{t}[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1]$
  - $S_t[2] = \cdots = S_{t-1}[2] = S_{t}[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2]$
  - $S_t[j] = \cdots = S_{t-1}[j] = S_{t}[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i]$
- **Key recovery relation:** $K[i] = S_t^{-1}[S_t[1] - S_t[2]] - \sigma_i$
- **Probability of success:** $K\sigma_2(i, t)$ (see Appendix B)

In the PRGA, at the first stage $i = 1$ and $j' = S_{N-1}[1] = \alpha$. Then, we swap $S_{N-1}[1]$ and $S_{N-1}[\alpha]$. At the next iteration, $i = 2$ and $j' = S_{N-1}[2] + \alpha = \alpha + \beta = i$, where $\beta$ is $S_t'[2]$ and from the conditions, we know that $\alpha + \beta = i$. Then, a swap is made between $S_t'[2]$ and $S_t'[i]$. Finally, $z_2 = S_t'[S_t'[2] + S_t'[i]]$. By the key recovery formula, we assume that $j_i = S_t'^{-1}[S_t'[1] - S_t'[2]]$. Also, we know that $S_t[i] = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_{i}[1] - S_{i-1}[2] = \alpha - \beta$. Therefore, $z_2 = S_t'[\alpha - \beta + \beta] = S_t'[\alpha] = \alpha = S_{t}[1]$. Hence, the key recovery formula is $K[i] = S_t'^{-1}[S_t'[1] - S_t'[2]] - \sigma_i$. The condition $S_t^{-1}[S_t[1] - S_t[2]] \neq \{1, 2\}$ prevents $j_i$ to be 1 or 2, so it prevents the swap of $S_{i-1}[1]$ and $S_{i-1}[2]$ in the $i$-th step of the KSA.

![Fig. 21. RC4 state update in the A_s5.2 attack](image)

A.12 The A_s5.3 Attack

- **Conditions:** $S_t[2] + S_t[1] = i, S_t^{-1}[z_2] \neq \{1, 2\}, (S_t^{-1}[2 - S_t[2]] < t + 1$ or $S_t^{-1}[2 - S_t[2]] > i - 1$) and $z_2 = 2 - S_t[2]$
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig.22)
  - $S_t[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_{i}[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1]$
  - $S_t[2] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[2] = S_{i}[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2]$
• \( S_i[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] \)

- **Key recovery relation:** \( K[i] = S_t^{-1}[2 - S_t[2]] - \sigma_i \)
- **Probability of success:** \( K_{\sigma_4}(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

In the PRGA, at the first stage \( i = 1 \) and \( j'_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = \alpha \). Then, we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[\alpha] \). At the next iteration, \( i = 2 \) and \( j'_2 = S_t[2] + \alpha = \alpha + \beta = i \), where \( \beta \) is \( S_t[2] \) and from the conditions, we know that \( \alpha + \beta = i \). Then, a swap is made between \( S_t[2] \) and \( S_t[i] \). Finally, \( z_2 = S_t^2[S_t[2] + S_t[i]] \). By the key recovery formula, we assume that \( j_t = S_t^{-1}[2 - S_t[2]] \). Also, we know that \( S_t[i] = S_{j-1}[j_t] = 2 - S_t[2] = 2 - \beta \). Therefore, \( z_2 = S_t[2 - \beta + \beta] = S_t[2] = 2 - S_t[2] \). Hence, the key recovery formula becomes \( K[i] = S_t^{-1}[2 - S_t[2]] - \sigma_i \). The condition \( S_t^{-1}[z_2] \neq \{1, 2\} \) prevents \( j_t \) to be 1 or 2, so it prevents the swap of \( S_{j-1}[1] \) and \( S_{j-1}[2] \) in the \( i \)-th step of the KSA.

![Fig. 22. RC4 state update in the A_4.13 attack](image)

**A.13 The A_4.13 Attack**
- **Conditions:** \( S_t[1] = 2, S_t[4] \neq 0, (S_t^{-1}[0] < t + 1 \) or \( S_t^{-1}[0] > i - 1 \) \) and \( z_2 = 0 \)
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 23)
  - \( S_t[1] = \cdots = S_{j-1}[1] = S_t[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = 2 \)
  - \( S_t[j_t] = \cdots = S_{j-1}[j_t] = S_t[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] \)
  - \( j_4 = S_t^{-1}[0] \)
  - \( i = 4 \)
- **Key recovery relation:** \( K[i] = S_t^{-1}[0] - \sigma_4 \)
- **Probability of success:** \( K_{\sigma_4}(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

This attack only works when \( i = 4 \). We also assume that \( j_4 = S_t^{-1}[0] \). This assumption sets zero into \( S_4[4] \). In the PRGA, at the first iteration \( i = 1 \) and \( j'_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = 2 \). Then, we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[2] \). At the next iteration, \( i = 2 \)
and \( j'_2 = S'_1[2] + 2 = 4 \). Then, we swap \( S'_1[2] \) and \( S'_1[4] \). Finally, \( z_2 = S'_2[2] + S'_2[4] = S'_2[2] = 0 \). Hence, the formula for the key recovery becomes \( S_t^{-1}[0] - \sigma_4 \). We set the condition \( S_t[4] \neq 0 \) to differentiate this attack from the \( A_{u15} \) attack.

We classify the conditions as

\[
\begin{align*}
C_1 : S_t[1] &= 2, \quad \text{and} \quad C_2 : S_t[4] \neq 0 \\
C_3 : (S'_t^{-1}[0] < t + 1 \text{ or } S'_t^{-1}[0] > i - 1) \quad \text{and} \quad C_4 : z_2 = 0
\end{align*}
\]

We also classify the assumptions, the events and the key recovery bias as

\[
\begin{align*}
S_1 : S_t[j_1] &= \cdots = S_t[j_{i-1}] \\
S_2 : S_t[4] &= \cdots = S_t[N-1] \\
S_3 : S_t[1] &= \cdots = S_t[N-1] \\
S_4 : \tilde{K}[i] &= j_i - \sigma_i \\
E_1 : j_i = S_t^{-1}[0] \\
B : \tilde{K}[i]' = S_t^{-1}[0] - \sigma_i
\end{align*}
\]

We compute the theoretical success probability of the attack. The goal is to estimate \( \Pr[B|C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4] \). Deploying a similar approach to the one of the attack \( A_{u15} \), we end up with

\[
\Pr[B|C_1C_2C_3C_4] = \Pr(E_1|C) \cdot \left( \frac{NP_B(i,t) - 1}{N-1} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_B(i,t)}{N-1} \right)
\]

where

\[
\Pr[E_1|C] \approx \Pr(C_1C_2C_3S_1S_2S_3|E_1C_4) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_B^2(i,t) \right) \cdot \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1}
\]

\[
\Pr[C_1C_2C_3S_1S_2S_3|E_1C_4] = \left( \frac{Pr[C_1C_2C_3S_1S_2S_3E_1|C_4]}{Pr[E_1|C_4]} \right)
\]

\[
= Pr[C_4|C_1C_2C_3S_1S_2S_3E_1] \cdot \left( \frac{Pr[C_1C_2C_3S_1S_2S_3E_1]}{Pr[C_4] \cdot Pr[E_1|C_4]} \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{i+1} \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \cdot P_B^2(i,t)
\]

We know from Lemma 8 that \( \Pr[C_4] = \frac{2}{N} \) and we also have

\[
\Pr[S_t[i] = i] = \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{i+1}
\]

Therefore, overall we have

\[
\Pr[B|C_1C_2C_3] = \left( \frac{NP_B(i,t) - 1}{N-1} \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{i+1} \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \cdot P_B^2(i,t) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_B^2(i,t) \right) \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \right] + \left( \frac{1 - P_B(i,t)}{N-1} \right)
\]

52
A.14 The A_4.u5.1 Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_i[1] = 2, z_2 \neq 0, z_2 \neq N - 2, (S_t^{-1}[N - 2] < t + 1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[N - 2] > 3) \) and \( z_2 = S_i[0] \)

- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 24)
  - \( S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = 2 \)
  - \( S_i[0] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[0] = S_i[0] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[0] = z_2 \)
  - \( S_i[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] \)
  - \( i = 4 \)

- **Key recovery relation:** \( \bar{K}[i] = S_t^{-1}[N - 2] - \sigma_4 \)

- **Probability of success:** \( \text{Kor}_2^p(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

This attack only works when \( i = 4 \). We also know that \( j_i = S_t^{-1}[N - 2] \). So, \( S_i[i] = S_{i-1}[j_i] = N - 2 \). In the PRGA, at the first iteration \( i = 1 \) and \( j_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = 2 \). Then, we swap \( S_{N-1}[1] \) and \( S_{N-1}[2] \). At the next iteration, \( i = 2 \) and \( j_2 = S_i[2] + 2 = 4 \). Then, we swap \( S_i[2] \) and \( S_i[4] \). Finally, \( z_2 = S_i[2] + S_i[4] = S_i[N - 2 + 2] = S_i[0] \). Hence, the formula for the key recovery becomes \( S_t^{-1}[N - 2] - \sigma_4 \). We set the condition \( z_2 \neq 0 \) to differentiate this attack from the A_4.s13 attack.

A.15 The A_4.u5.2 Attack

- **Conditions:** \( S_i[1] = 2, z_2 \neq 0, (S_t^{-1}[N - 1] < t + 1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[N - 1] > 3) \) and \( z_2 = S_i[2] \)

- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 25)
  - \( S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = 2 \)
  - \( S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[2] = S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2] = z_2 \)
  - \( S_i[j_i] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[j_i] = S_i[i] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[i] \)
  - \( i = 4 \)

Fig. 23. RC4 state update in the A_4.s13 attack
− **Key recovery relation:** $\overline{K}[i] = S_i^{-1}[N - 1] - \sigma_4$
− **Probability of success:** $Kor_2^3(i, t)$ (see Appendix B)

This attack only works when $i = 4$. We also know that $j_i = S_i^{-1}[N - 1]$. So, $S_i[i] = S_{i-1}[j_i] = N - 1$. In the PRGA, at the first iteration $i = 1$ and $j_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = 2$. Then, we swap $S_{N-1}[1]$ and $S_{N-1}[2]$. At the next iteration, $i = 2$ and $j_2 = S_1[2] + 2 = 4$. Then, we swap $S_1[1]$ and $S_1[4]$. Finally, $z_2 = S_2[2] + S_2[4] = S_2[N - 1 + 2] = S_2^*[1] = S_{N-1}[2] = S_i[2]$. Hence, the formula for the key recovery becomes $S_i^{-1}[N - 1] - \sigma_4$. We set the condition $z_2 \neq 0$ to differentiate this attack from the A.4.s13 attack.

### A.16 The A_neg.1 Attack

− **Conditions:** $S_i[2] = 0, S_i[1] = 2$ and $z_1 = 2$
− **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 26)
  - $S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = 2$
  - $S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[2] = S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2] = 0$
− **Key recovery relation:** $\overline{K}[i] = (1 - \sigma_i)$ or $\overline{K}[i] = (2 - \sigma_i)$
− **Probability of success:** $P_{neg}(i, t)$ (see Appendix B)

In the PRGA, at the first iteration $i = 1$ and $j_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = 2$. Then, we swap $S_{N-1}[1]$ and $S_{N-1}[2]$. Finally, $z_1$ is computed as $z_1 = S_1[S_1[1] + S_1[2]]$. This means that $j_i \notin \{1, 2\}$, otherwise it moves $S_{i-1}[1]$ or $S_{i-1}[2]$ from their positions and so $z_1 = 2$ would not hold. Thus, we get $K[i] \neq 1 - \sigma_i$ and $K[i] \neq 2 - \sigma_i$.

At this stage, we compute the probability of these two negative biases. We define the following events and conditions.
Fig. 25. RC4 state update in the A4,u5,2 attack

We need to compute $\Pr[B|C]$. It is computed as follows.

$$\Pr[B|C] = \Pr[E_1|S_5] + \Pr[B-S_5|C]$$
$$= \Pr[E_1|S_5] \Pr[S_5|C] + \Pr[B-S_5|C]$$
$$= \Pr[E_1|S_5] \Pr[S_5|C] + \Pr[B-S_5|C] (1 - \Pr[S_5|C])$$
$$\approx \Pr[E_1|S_5] \Pr[S_5|C] + \left(\frac{1-\Pr[E_1|S_5|C]}{N-1}\right) (1 - \Pr[S_5|C])$$

We know that $\Pr[S_5|C] \approx P_B(i,t)$, so we just need to compute $\Pr[E_1|S_5|C]$. Our approach is as follows.

$$\Pr[E_1|S_5|C] \approx \Pr[E_1|C] = \Pr[C_3|E_1C_1C_2] \cdot \left(\frac{\Pr[E_1|C_1C_2]}{\Pr[C_3|C_1C_2]}\right) \approx 0$$

So, overall, we have

$$\Pr[B|C] = \left(1 - \frac{P_B(i,t)}{N-1}\right)$$
A.17 The A_neg2 Attack

- **Conditions:** $S_t[2] = 0$, $S_t[1] \neq 2$ and $z_2 = 0$
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 27)
  - $S_t[2] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[2] = S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2] = 0$
- **Key recovery relation:** $\overline{K[i]} = (2 - \sigma_i)$
- **Probability of success:** $P_{neg}(i, t)$ (see Appendix B)

In the PRGA, at the first iteration $i = 1$ and $j'_1 = S_{N-1}[1] = \alpha$. Then, we swap $S_{N-1}[1]$ and $S_{N-1}[\alpha]$. In the next iteration, $i = 2$ and $j'_2 = S'_1[2] + \alpha = \alpha$. Then, we swap $S'_1[2]$ and $S'_1[\alpha]$. Consequently, $z_2 = S'_2[S'_2[2] + S'_2[\alpha]] = S'_2[\alpha] = 0$. Similar to the previous negative attacks, if $j_i = 2$, then $S_i[2]$ would be moved at the $i$-th step of the PRGA. To differentiate between this attack and the previous one, we set $S_t[1] \neq 2$. Finally, the filtering formula for the key would be $\overline{K[i]} = (2 - \sigma_i)$.

We define the following events and conditions.

- $E_1 : j_i = 2$
- $B : \overline{K[i]} = 2 - \sigma_i$
- $C : \begin{cases} C_1 : S_t[2] = 0 \\ C_2 : S_t[1] \neq 2 \\ C_3 : z_2 = 0 \end{cases}$
- $S : \begin{cases} S_1 : S_t[2] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[2] \\ S_2 : S_t[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2] \\ S_3 : \overline{K[i]} = j_i - \sigma_i \end{cases}$

What we need is to compute $Pr[B|C]$. It is computed as follows.

$$Pr[B|C] \approx Pr(E_1|S_3C) \left( \frac{NPr[S_3|C] - 1}{N - 1} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{N - 1} \right) (1 - Pr[S_3|C])$$

We know that $Pr[S_3|C] \approx P_b(i, t)$, so we just need to compute $Pr[E_1|S_3C]$. Our approach is as follows.
\[ \Pr[E_1 | S_3 C] \approx \Pr[E_1 | C] = \Pr[C_3 | E_1 C_1 C_2] \cdot \left( \frac{\Pr[E_1 | C_1 C_2]}{\Pr[C_3 | C_1 C_2]} \right) \approx 0 \]

So, overall, we have

\[ \Pr[B | C] = \left( 1 - \frac{P_{\text{neg}}(i, t)}{N - 1} \right) \]

**Fig. 27.** RC4 state update in the A\_neg\_2 attack

### A.18 The A\_neg\_3 Attack

- **Conditions**: \( S_i[1] = 1 \) and \( z_1 = S_i[2] \)
- **Assumptions**: (see Fig. 28)
  - \( S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[1] = S_i[1] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[1] = 1 \)
  - \( S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{i-1}[2] = S_i[2] = \cdots = S_{N-1}[2] = z_1 \)
- **Key recovery relation**: \( K[i] = (1 - \sigma_i) \) or \( K[i] = (2 - \sigma_i) \)
- **Probability of success**: \( P_{\text{neg}}(i, t) \) (see Appendix B)

In the PRGA, at the first iteration \( i = 1 \) and \( j_i = S_{N-1}[1] = 1 \). After the swap, no element would be modified. Consequently, \( z_1 = S_i'[1] = S_i'[1] + S_i'[1] = S_i'[2] \). Similar to the previous negative attacks, if \( j_i = 1 \) or \( j_i = 2 \), then \( S_{i-1}[1] \) or \( S_{i-1}[2] \) would be moved at the \( i \)-th step of the PRGA. Finally, the filtering formula for the key would be \( K[i] = (1 - \sigma_i) \) or \( K[i] = (2 - \sigma_i) \) with a very low probability.

At this stage, we compute the probability of these two negative biases. We define the following events and conditions.
What we need is to compute $Pr[B|C]$. It is computed as follows.

$$Pr[B|C] \approx Pr(E_1|S_5C) \left( \frac{NP\Pr[S_5|C] - 1}{N-1} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{N-1} \right) \left( 1 - Pr[S_5|C] \right)$$

We know that $Pr[S_5|C] \approx p_B(i,t)$, so we just need to compute $Pr[E_1|S_5C]$. Our approach is as follows.

$$Pr[E_1|S_5C] \approx Pr[E_1|C] = Pr[C_2|E_1C_1] \cdot \frac{Pr[E_1|C_1]}{Pr[C_2|C_1]} \approx 0$$

So, overall, we have

$$Pr[B|C] = \left( \frac{1 - p_B(i,t)}{N-1} \right)$$

---

**Fig. 28.** RC4 state update in the $A_{neg,3}$ attack

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**A.19 The $A_{neg,4}$ Attack**

- **Conditions:** $S_{i}[1] = 0, S_{i}[0] = 1$ and $z_{1} = 1$
- **Assumptions:** (see Fig. 29)
We know that would be moved at the \( P \) and it holds with probability \( A.20 \) The Sepehrdad-Vaudenay-Vuagnoux Bias

\[
\Pr \left( \text{bias path} \right) \text{. We first find the probability above.}
\]

What we need is to compute \( \Pr[B|C]. \) It is computed as follows.

\[
\Pr[B|C] \approx \Pr[E_1|S_5C] \left( \frac{N\Pr[S_5|C] - 1}{N - 1} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{N - 1} \right) (1 - \Pr[S_5|C])
\]

We know that \( \Pr[S_5|C] \approx P_B(i,t) \), so we just need to compute \( \Pr[E_1|S_5C]. \) Our approach is as follows.

\[
\Pr[E_1|S_3C] \approx \Pr[E_1|C] = \Pr[C_3] \cdot \frac{\Pr[E_1|C_1C_2]}{\Pr[C_3|C_1C_2]} \approx 0
\]

So, overall, we have

\[
\Pr[B|C] = \left( \frac{1 - P_B(i,t)}{N - 1} \right)
\]

A.20 The Sepehrdad-Vaudenay-Vuagnoux Bias

\textbf{Conditions}: \( S_{t+1}^{-1}[0] \leq t + 1 \) or \( S_{t+1}^{-1}[0] > 15, z_{16} = -16 \) and \( j_2 \notin \{t + 1, \ldots, 15\} \) (Cond)

\textbf{Assumptions}: (see Fig. 31)

- \( S_i[j_{16}] = \cdots = S_{15}[j_{16}] = S_{16}[16] = 0 \)
- \( i = 16 \)

\textbf{Key recovery relation}: \( K[16] = (S_{t}^{-1}[0] - \sigma_{16}) \)

\textbf{Probability of success}: \( P_{SV\&V10}(t) \) (see Appendix B)

Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux showed in [61] that \( \Pr[S_{16}^{-1}[j_{16}^\prime] = 0|z_{16} = -16] \) is not uniformly distributed and it holds with probability \( P_{db} = 0.038488 \). This probability was derived empirically. This bias was further analyzed in [58,59] and was proved in [59]. It was deployed to perform a key length discovery attack on RC4. We revisit this proof for completeness and we modify it slightly to derive a more precise proof with our notations (see Fig. 30 for the bias path). We first find the probability \( \Pr[z_{16} = -16, S_{16}^{-1}[j_{16}^\prime] = 0] \) and then using \( \Pr[z_{16} = -16] \), we compute the probability above.

In the first round of the KSA, when \( i = 0 \) and \( j_0 = K[0] \), the value 0 is swapped into \( S_0[K[0]]. \) The index \( j_0 = K[0] \notin \{16, -16, x\} \), so that the values 16, -16 and \( x \) at these indices respectively are not swapped out in the first round of the KSA, where \( 16 < x < N \) and \( x \neq 240 \). The role of \( x \) will be clear later. We also require that \( K[0] \notin \{16, -16, x\}. \)
\{1, \ldots, 15\}, so that the value 0 at index \(K[0]\) is not touched by the values of \(i\) during \(S_t\) to \(S_{15}\) state updates. Thus, \(K[0] \notin \{1, 2, \ldots, 15, 16, -16, x\}\). This happens with probability \((1 - \frac{16}{N})\).

From rounds \(S_0\) to \(S_{14}\) of the KSA, none of the indices \(j_1, \ldots, j_{14}\) touches the three indices 16, -16, \(K[0], x\). This happens with probability \((1 - \frac{4}{N})^{14}\). When \(i = 15\), the value of \(j_{15} = -16\) with probability \((\frac{4}{N})\). This moves -16 to index 15 in \(S_{15}\). When \(i = 16\), we have

\[j_{16} = j_{15} + S_{15}[16] + K[16] = -16 + 16 + K[0] = K[0]\]

where \(S_{15}[K[0]] = 0\). Hence, after the swap, we have \(S_{16}[16] = 0\). Since \(K[0] \neq 15\), we have \(S_{16}[15] = -16\).

From \(S_{16}\) to \(S_{x-1}\), the index \(j_x\) does not touch the indices 15, 16 and \(x\) with probability \((1 - \frac{3}{N})^{x-17}\). When \(i = x\), the value of \(j_x = 15\) with probability \((\frac{3}{N})\). Due to the swap, the value \(x\) moves to \(S_{x}[15]\) and the value -16 moves to \(S_{x}[x] = S_{x}[S_{x}[15]]\). For the remaining \(N - x - 1\) rounds of the KSA and for the first 14 rounds of the PRGA, none of the \(j_i\) or \(j'_i\) values should touch the indices 15, 16, 16. This happens with a probability of \((1 - \frac{3}{N})^{N-x+13}\). In the next state update, i.e., \(S'_{15}\), the value \(x\) is moved to \(S'_{15}[j'_{15}]\). We need to have \(j'_{15} \notin \{16, x\}\), otherwise 0 and -16 are moved. This happens with probability \((1 - \frac{2}{N})\). We need to end up in \(S'_{16}[j'_{16}] = 0\). This is exactly the case, because \(S'_{16}[j'_{16}] = S'_{15}[16]\) and \(S'_{15}[16]\) is set to zero. Since \(j'_{16} = j'_{15} + S'_{15}[16]\), we have \(j'_{16} = j'_{15}\). Hence, in the next state update, i.e., \(S'_{16}\), the value \(x\) is moved to index 16 and zero is moved to index \(j'_{16}\). The last probability we need to consider is the probability that -16 is not moved at \(S'_{16}\) state update, meaning \(j'_{16} \neq -16\). This is correct with probability \((1 - \frac{2}{N})\). Finally,

\[Z_{16} = S'_{16}[S'_{16}[16] + S'_{16}[j'_{16}]] = S'_{16}[S'_{16}[16]] = S'_{16}[x] = -16\]

This is the exactly the path we were searching for.

Considering another case where both events \(S'_{16}[j'_{16}] = 0\) and \(z_{16} = -16\) are happening with complete random association, the overall probability is computed as:

\[\Pr[S'_{16}[j'_{16}] = 0, z_{16} = -16] = \frac{1}{N^2} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N^2}\right)\gamma\]
Fig. 30. RC4 state update in the SVV_10 bias alone
where $\gamma$ is the probability that the bias path is correct and is computed as:

$$\gamma = (1 - \frac{18}{N^2}) (1 - \frac{1}{N})^{14} \left( \frac{1}{N^2} \right) (1 - \frac{2}{N}) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \sum_{x=1}^{N-1} \left( 1 - \frac{3}{N} \right)^x = \frac{N-18}{N^2}$$

To compute $\Pr[S_{16}[j_{16}] = 0 | z_{16} = -16]$, we need to find $\Pr[z_{16} = -16]$. Recalling the different steps of computing this probability is pretty involved in [59], therefore we refer the interested reader to [59] for the proof of $\Pr[z_{16} = -16] = 1.0355 / N$. Consequently, the overall probability is:

$$\Pr[S_{16}[j_{16}] = 0 | z_{16} = -16] = \frac{1}{1.0355} \left[ \frac{1}{N} + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \right]$$

Using the SVV.10 bias, the overall probability of the bias between the keystream bytes and the key bytes are not easily computable. Therefore, we refined this bias and derived a new one $\Pr[S_{16}[16] = 0 | \text{Cond1}] = P_{\text{db}2} = 0.03689$, where Cond1 denotes $z_{16} = -16$. In the following, we also recall the proof of this bias from [59]:

$$\Pr[S_{16}[15] = -16] = \Pr[S_{16}[15] = -16, S_{16}[16] = 0] + \Pr[S_{16}[15] = -16, S_{16}[16] \neq 0]$$

$$= \frac{1}{N} + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \alpha_{16} + \Pr[S_{16}[16] \neq 0] \cdot \Pr[S_{16}[15] = -16 | S_{16}[16] \neq 0]$$

$$= \frac{1}{N} + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \alpha_{16} + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right)^2$$

Now, we compute the main probability $\Pr[z_{16} = -16, S_{16}[16] = 0]$ as follows:

$$\Pr[z_{16} = -16, S_{16}[16] = 0] = \Pr[z_{16} = -16, S_{16}[16] = 0, S_{16}[15] = -16] + \Pr[z_{16} = -16, S_{16}[16] = 0, S_{16}[15] \neq -16]$$

$$= \Pr[S_{16}[16] = 0, S_{16}[15] = -16] \cdot \Pr[z_{16} = -16 | S_{16}[16] = 0, S_{16}[15] = -16]$$

$$+ \Pr[S_{16}[15] \neq -16] \cdot \Pr[z_{16} = -16, S_{16}[16] = 0 | S_{16}[15] \neq -16]$$

Hence, merging this bias with the weaknesses of the KSA, we obtain

$$0 \text{ } P_{\text{db}2_{\text{Cond}}} S_{16}[16] = S_{15}[j_{16}] P_{\text{A}}^1(16, j_{16}) S_{16}[j_{16}]$$

and

$$j_{16} \text{ } P_{\text{db}2}(16, j_{16}) = \bar{K}[16] + \sigma_{16}$$

where $j_{16} \notin \{ t + 1, \ldots, 15 \}$ (Cond') due to Lemma 4. We should set $S_{t-1}[0] < t + 1$ or $S_{t-1}[0] > 15$ (Cond2) to make sure that the index of zero is not trivially picked at the next iterations. Using Lemma 4, we obtain

$$\bar{K}[16] P_{\text{SVV10}}(t) = \text{Cond} S_{t-1}[0] - \sigma_{16}$$

which holds with overall probability of

$$P_{\text{SVV10}}(t) = P_{\text{db}2} \otimes P_{\text{A}}^1(16, t) \otimes P_{B}(16, t)$$

We found out that by adding $j_{2} \notin \{ t + 1, \ldots, 15 \}$ condition to the attack, we can derive a much better success rate in practice. Currently, we do not have any justification for this new condition.
**Table 3.** The biases for RC4, exploitable against WEP and WPA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>row</th>
<th>reference</th>
<th>( f )</th>
<th>( g )</th>
<th>( p )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Klein – Improved</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[-z_i] = \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( (i-z_i) \not\in {S_t[t+1], \ldots, S_t[i-1]} )</td>
<td>( p_{K\alpha}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i \neq 1 )</td>
<td>MP – Improved</td>
<td>( z_{i+1} - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( i \neq 1, z_{i+1} \geq t, \forall 0 \leq t \leq j' )</td>
<td>( p_{MP}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{u15} )</td>
<td>( 2 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[i] = 0, z_i = 0 )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{u15}}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{s13} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[0] - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = 1, (S_t^{-1}[0] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[0] &gt; i-1), z_i = 1 )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_1(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{u13_1} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[z_1] - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = 1, (S_t^{-1}[z_1] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[z_1] &gt; i-1), z_1 = 1 - i )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_1(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{u13_2} )</td>
<td>( 1 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = i, S_t[1] = 0, z_i = i )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{u13_2}}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{u13_3} )</td>
<td>( 1 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = i, S_t[1] = 1 - i, z_i = 1 - i )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{u13_3}}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{s5_1} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[z_1] - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] &lt; t+1, S_t[1] + S_t[S_t[1]] = i, z_1 \neq {S_t[1], S_t[S_t[1]]}, S_t^{-1}[z_1] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[z_1] &gt; i-1 )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_{2_1}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{s5_2} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[S_t[1] - S_t[2]] - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[2] + S_t[1] = i, S_t^{-1}[z_2] \neq {1, 2}, S_t^{-1}[z_2] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[z_2] &gt; i-1, z_2 = S_t[1] )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_{2_2}(t) )</td>
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<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{s5_3} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[z_2] - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[2] + S_t[1] = i, S_t^{-1}[z_2] \neq {1, 2}, S_t^{-1}[z_2] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[z_2] &gt; i-1, z_2 = 2 - S_t[2] )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_{2_3}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{u5_1} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = i, S_t^{-1}[z_1] &lt; t+1, S_t^{-1}[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] \neq {1, 2}, S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i \text{ or } S_t[S_t^{-1}[z_1] - i] \neq {1, 2}, S_t^{-1}[z_1] \neq {i, 1 - i, S_t^{-1}[z_1] - 1}, S_t^{-1}[z_1] \neq 2i )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_{3_1}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{u5_2} )</td>
<td>( 1 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = 1, z_1 = S_t[2] )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{u5_2}}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{u5_3} )</td>
<td>( 1 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = i, S_t^{-1}[z_1] \neq 1, S_t^{-1}[z_1] &lt; t+1, z_1 = S_t[1] + 1 )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{u5_3}}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{s3} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[z_2] - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] \neq 2, S_t[2] \neq 0, S_t[2] + S_t[1] &lt; t+1, S_t[2] + S_t[S_t[2] + S_t[1]] = i, S_t^{-1}[z_2] \neq {1, 1, S_t[1] + S_t[2]}, S_t[1] + S_t[2] \neq {1, 2}, S_t^{-1}[z_2] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[z_2] &gt; i-1 )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_{3_2}(t) )</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>( A_{s_{13}} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[0] - \sigma_4(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = 2, S_t[4] \neq 0, S_t^{-1}[0] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[0] &gt; i-1, z_2 = 0 )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{s_{13}}}(t) )</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>( A_{u_{5_1}} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[N - 2] - \sigma_4(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = 2, z_2 \neq 0, z_2 = S_t[0], z_2 \neq N - 2, S_t^{-1}[N - 2] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[N - 2] &gt; 3 )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_{3_3}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>( A_{u_{5_2}} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[N - 1] - \sigma_4(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = 2, z_2 \neq 0, S_t^{-1}[N - 1] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[N - 1] &gt; 3, z_2 = S_t[2] )</td>
<td>( \text{Kor}_{3_4}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{\text{neg}_1} )</td>
<td>( 1 - \sigma_i(t) \text{ or } 2 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[2] = 0, S_t[1] = 2, z_1 = 2 )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{\text{neg}_1}}(t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{\text{neg}_2} )</td>
<td>( 2 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[2] = 0, S_t[1] \neq 2, z_2 = 0 )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{\text{neg}_2}}(t) )</td>
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<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{\text{neg}_3} )</td>
<td>( 1 - \sigma_i(t) \text{ or } 2 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = 1, z_1 = S_t[2] )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{\text{neg}_3}}(t) )</td>
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<tr>
<td>( i )</td>
<td>( A_{\text{neg}_4} )</td>
<td>( - \sigma_i(t) \text{ or } 1 - \sigma_i(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t[1] = 0, S_t[0] = 1, z_1 = 1 )</td>
<td>( p_{A_{\text{neg}_4}}(t) )</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>( SVV_{10} )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[0] - \sigma_{16}(t) )</td>
<td>( S_t^{-1}[0] &lt; t+1 \text{ or } S_t^{-1}[0] &gt; 15, z_{16} = -16, z_2 \notin {t+1, \ldots, 15} )</td>
<td>( p_{SVV_{10}}(t) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B Computation of Biases

Biases were computed using the following formulas:

\[
P_{KI}(i, t) = P_{I} \otimes P_{0} \otimes P_{A}^{1}(i, t) \otimes P_{B}(i, t)
\]

\[
P_{MPI}(i, t) = P_{D}(i) \otimes P_{B}(i, t)
\]

\[
P_{SI}(i, t) = P_{B} \otimes P_{0} \otimes P_{A}^{1}(i, t) \otimes P_{B}(i, t)
\]

\[
P_{PI}(i, t) = P_{B} \otimes P_{0} \otimes P_{A}^{1}(i, t) \otimes P_{B}(i, t)
\]

\[
K_{o}^{P}(i, t) = R_{C}^{P}(i, t) \otimes P_{B}(i, t)
\]

\[
P_{\text{neg}}(i, t) = \left( \frac{1 - P_{B}(i, t)}{N - 1} \right)
\]

\[
P_{SVV10}(t) = P_{DI2} \otimes P_{A}^{1}(16, t) \otimes P_{B}(16, t)
\]

\[
P_{A}^{1}(i, t) = \left( \frac{N P_{B}(i, t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2} P_{A}^{1}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1} \right] + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_{A}^{1}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_{B}(i, t)}{N - 1} \right)
\]

\[
P_{A}^{2}(i, t) = \frac{1}{N} \left( \frac{NP_{B}(i, t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2} P_{A}^{2}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right] + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_{A}^{2}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_{B}(i, t)}{N - 1} \right)
\]

\[
P_{A}^{3}(i, t) = \frac{1}{N} \left( \frac{NP_{B}(i, t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2} P_{A}^{3}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right] + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_{A}^{3}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_{B}(i, t)}{N - 1} \right)
\]

\[
P_{A}^{4}(i, t) = \frac{1}{N} \left( \frac{NP_{B}(i, t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2} P_{A}^{4}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right] + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_{A}^{4}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_{B}(i, t)}{N - 1} \right)
\]

\[
P_{A}^{5}(i, t) = \frac{1}{N} \left( \frac{NP_{B}(i, t) - 1}{N - 1} \right) \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{2} P_{A}^{5}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right] + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - P_{A}^{5}(i, t) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N} \right)^{N-1-i} \right) + \left( \frac{1 - P_{B}(i, t)}{N - 1} \right)
\]

Fig. 31. RC4 state update in the SVV_10 full attack
where \( P_j = \frac{2}{N} \), \( P_0 = \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^{N-2} \), \( P_8 = \frac{1.05}{N} \), \( P_9 = \frac{1.038}{N} \), \( P_{db2} = 0.444 \) and \( \xi = \frac{1}{N} \left[ \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N^2} \right) + \frac{1}{N^2} + 1 \right] \).

\[
\begin{align*}
P_A^b(i, t) &= \left( \frac{N-b}{N} \right)^{i-t-1} \\
P_B(i, t) &= \prod_{k=0}^{i-t-1} \left( \frac{N-k}{N} \right) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - \prod_{k=0}^{i-t-1} \left( \frac{N-k}{N} \right) \right) \\
P_D(i) &= \frac{\left( N-1 \right) \left( N-i \right)}{N^3} \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-3+i} \left( \frac{N-1}{N} \right)^3 \\
R_c^b(i, t) &= r_c(i) P_A^b(i, t) + \frac{1}{N} \left( 1 - r_c(i) P_A^b(i, t) \right) \\
r_1(i) &= \left( \frac{N-2}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \\
r_2(i) &= \left( \frac{N-3}{N} \right)^{N-i-1} \\
r_3(i) &= \left( \frac{N-4}{N} \right)^{N-i-1}
\end{align*}
\]

These formulas are new. Biases were originally provided with probabilities for \( t = -1 \).