000205712 001__ 205712
000205712 005__ 20181203023804.0
000205712 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1287/mnsc.2014.2009
000205712 022__ $$a0025-1909
000205712 02470 $$2ISI$$a000346204900004
000205712 037__ $$aARTICLE
000205712 245__ $$aBuy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions
000205712 260__ $$bInforms$$c2014$$aCatonsville
000205712 269__ $$a2014
000205712 300__ $$a22
000205712 336__ $$aJournal Articles
000205712 520__ $$aIncreasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can "buy-it-now" at a posted price, or "take-a-chance" in an auction where the top d > 1 bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized allocation incentivizes high-valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We analyze equilibrium behavior and apply our analysis to advertiser bidding data from Microsoft Advertising Exchange. In counterfactual simulations, our mechanism increases revenue by 4.4% and consumer surplus by 14.5% compared to an optimal second-price auction.
000205712 6531_ $$aonline advertising
000205712 6531_ $$areal-time bidding
000205712 6531_ $$aadvertisement exchange
000205712 6531_ $$aoptimal auctions
000205712 700__ $$uEcole Polytech Fed Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland$$aCelis, L. Elisa
000205712 700__ $$uMicrosoft Res New England, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA$$aLewis, Gregory
000205712 700__ $$uMicrosoft Res New England, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA$$aMobius, Markus
000205712 700__ $$aNazerzadeh, Hamid
000205712 773__ $$j60$$tManagement Science$$k12$$q2927-2948
000205712 909C0 $$xU10431$$0252454$$pLCA3
000205712 909CO $$pIC$$particle$$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:205712
000205712 917Z8 $$x103925
000205712 937__ $$aEPFL-ARTICLE-205712
000205712 973__ $$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000205712 980__ $$aARTICLE