Breaking the IOC Authenticated Encryption Mode

In this paper we cryptanalyse a block cipher mode of operation, called Input Output Chaining (IOC), designed by Recacha and submitted to NIST in 2013 for consideration as a lightweight authenticated encryption mode. We present an existential forgery attack against IOC which makes only one chosen message query, runs in a small constant time, and succeeds with an overwhelming probability 1 - 3 x 2(-n), where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Therefore, this attack fully breaks the integrity of IOC.


Editor(s):
Pointcheval, David
Vergnaud, Damien
Published in:
Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2014, 8469, 126-135
Presented at:
7th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa (AFRICACRYPT), Marrakesh, MOROCCO, MAY 28-30, 2014
Year:
2014
Publisher:
Cham, Springer International Publishing
ISBN:
978-3-319-06733-9
978-3-319-06734-6
Keywords:
Laboratories:




 Record created 2014-06-04, last modified 2018-04-30


Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)