000197491 001__ 197491
000197491 005__ 20190812205742.0
000197491 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1613/jair.4166
000197491 037__ $$aCONF
000197491 245__ $$aSymmetric subgame perfect equilibria in resource allocation
000197491 269__ $$a2012
000197491 260__ $$c2012
000197491 336__ $$aConference Papers
000197491 520__ $$aWe analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems. (Bhaskar 2000) proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, 1-resource allocation games: Agents start by symmetrically randomizing their actions, and as soon as they each choose different actions, they start to follow a potentially asymmetric "convention" that prescribes their actions from then on. We extend the concept of convention to the general case of infinitely repeated resource allocation games with N agents and C resources. We show that for any convention, there exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium which implements it. We present two conventions: bourgeois, where agents stick to the first allocation; and market, where agents pay for the use of resources, and observe a global coordination signal which allows them to alternate between different allocations. We define price of anonymity of a convention as the ratio between the maximum social payoff of any (asymmetric) strategy profile and the expected social payoff of the convention. We show that while the price of anonymity of the bourgeois convention is infinite, the market convention decreases this price by reducing the conflict between the agents. Copyright © 2012, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. All rights reserved.
000197491 700__ $$aCigler, L.
000197491 700__ $$g105074$$aFaltings, B.$$0240959
000197491 773__ $$j2$$tProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence$$q1326-1332
000197491 8564_ $$zn/a$$yn/a$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/197491/files/camera_ready.pdf$$s234894
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000197491 917Z8 $$x208605
000197491 937__ $$aEPFL-CONF-197491
000197491 973__ $$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000197491 980__ $$aCONF