000191265 001__ 191265
000191265 005__ 20181203023341.0
000191265 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1098/rsif.2013.0743
000191265 022__ $$a1742-5689
000191265 02470 $$2ISI$$a000332384400002
000191265 037__ $$aARTICLE
000191265 245__ $$aSelection methods regulate evolution of cooperation in digital evolution
000191265 260__ $$aLondon$$bRoyal Soc$$c2014
000191265 269__ $$a2014
000191265 300__ $$a8
000191265 336__ $$aJournal Articles
000191265 520__ $$aA key, yet often neglected, component of digital evolution and evolutionary models is the 'selection method' which assigns fitness (number of offspring) to individuals based on their performance scores (efficiency in performing tasks). Here, we study with formal analysis and numerical experiments the evolution of cooperation under the five most common selection methods (proportionate, rank, truncation-proportionate, truncation-uniform and tournament). We consider related individuals engaging in a Prisoner's Dilemma game where individuals can either cooperate or defect. A cooperator pays a cost, whereas its partner receives a benefit, which affect their performance scores. These performance scores are translated into fitness by one of the five selection methods. We show that cooperation is positively associated with the relatedness between individuals under all selection methods. By contrast, the change in the performance benefit of cooperation affects the populations' average level of cooperation only under the proportionate methods. We also demonstrate that the truncation and tournament methods may introduce negative frequency-dependence and lead to the evolution of polymorphic populations. Using the example of the evolution of cooperation, we show that the choice of selection method, though it is often marginalized, can considerably affect the evolutionary dynamics.
000191265 6531_ $$aSelection Methods
000191265 6531_ $$aDigital Evolution
000191265 6531_ $$aCooperation
000191265 6531_ $$aPrisoner's Dilemma
000191265 6531_ $$aEvolutionary Robotics
000191265 700__ $$0243230$$aLichocki, Pawel$$g191506
000191265 700__ $$0240742$$aFloreano, Dario$$g111729
000191265 700__ $$aKeller, Laurent
000191265 773__ $$j11$$k20130743$$tJournal of the Royal Society Interface
000191265 909C0 $$0252161$$pLIS$$xU10370
000191265 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:191265$$pSTI$$particle
000191265 917Z8 $$x111729
000191265 917Z8 $$x255330
000191265 937__ $$aEPFL-ARTICLE-191265
000191265 973__ $$aEPFL$$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED
000191265 980__ $$aARTICLE