Unaligned Rebound Attack: Application on Keccak

We analyze the internal permutations of Keccak, one of the NIST SHA-3 competition finalists, in regard to differential properties. By carefully studying the elements composing those permutations, we are able to derive most of the best known differential paths for up to 5 rounds. We use these differential paths in a rebound attack setting and adapt this powerful freedom degrees utilization in order to derive distinguishers for up to 8 rounds of the internal permutations of the submitted version of Keccak. The complexity of the 8 round distinguisher is $2^{491.47}$. Our results have been implemented and verified experimentally on a small version of Keccak. This is currently the best known differential attack against the internal permutations of Keccak.


Published in:
Proceedings of the 19th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Presented at:
19th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, Washington DC, USA, March 19-21, 2012
Year:
2012
Publisher:
Springer
Keywords:
Laboratories:




 Record created 2012-04-19, last modified 2018-09-13

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